Marriage Equality Law and the Tale of Three Cities: How the Unimaginable Became Inevitable and Even Desirable

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Since 2000, more than 20 national laws on marriage have been changed to permit marriage between two competent qualified parties of the same sex. In this article, the author compares and contrasts the path to change taken in a number of jurisdictions starting in Europe, Latin America and elsewhere. He then explains the way in which change was brought about in New Zealand and the United States of America, involving in each case a combination of legislative and judicial developments. The attempts to introduce reform in Australia are then outlined, up to the present time. The High Court of Australia in 2013 invalidated a statute of the Australian Capital Territory, insisting that legal change was the sole constitutional responsibility of the Federal Parliament. However, that legislature has delayed action pending a possible plebiscite proposed by opponents of change in the governing parties. The author derives ten conclusions about the considerations that have influenced success and failure in achieving marriage equality for lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual and intersex (LGBTI) people. He predicts ultimate success in Australia but suggests that elsewhere is another story.

I THREE APPROACHES TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

Within the space of two years, marriage equality (or the provision of the legal status of marriage to couples of the same sex) moved in three countries (New Zealand, the United States of America and Australia)

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from what had been a highly-resisted notion to one that was achieved in law or where the decks were cleared to make this legally possible.

This review affords a study in contrasts between the approaches taken to reform of the marriage law in three jurisdictions that share many common features. Each jurisdiction inherited the common law of England, as received in a time when each was part of the colonial possessions of the British Crown. Long before local legislatures had begun to define the incidents and requirements of marriage, the common law had expressed the necessary features of that relationship, as the law would recognise it.

In England, even before the common law intruded, marriage was defined by the canon law of the universal church according to Christian notions. These required that the marriage should be validly celebrated as a public contract acknowledged in a church (known as a celebration *in facie ecclesiae*) or by a clandestine celebration conducted by a person in priest’s orders. Reflecting the Christian church’s concern to regulate things sexual, a theory was developed in the 12th century that passed fully into English law (known as Peter Lombard’s theory). This was that the man and woman who were parties to the marriage had to become “one flesh”, i.e. take part in penetrative sexual intercourse. These requirements of “marriage” were formalised by the Church at the Council of Trent in 1563.1 After the Reformation, the common law of England placed those in priest’s or deacon’s orders in the Church of England on the same footing as those in priest’s orders of the Roman and Eastern Churches of Christianity. A battle was joined by the Church of England to secure complete control over marriage. This was no small thing. Parties to an invalid marriage stood to lose property and claims to status.

It was this risk that resulted in the eventual intrusion in England of statute law. This followed the ascendancy of the Church of England after the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688.2 The statutes enacted were eventually consolidated in Lord Hardwicke’s Act of 1753.3 However, that statute complicated things. Prior to its enactment, a Roman Catholic priest was recognised by the common law as, being in priest’s orders, sufficiently authorised to officiate in a marriage. By that statute, marriages of Roman Catholics and dissenting Protestants, according to the rites of those churches, were invalidated. Lord Hardwicke’s Act conferred on the Church of England the sole right of celebrating marriages in the Kingdom. This

2 See, for example, Duties on Marriages etc Act 1694 (Eng) 6 & 7 Will & Mar c 6; Marriage Without Banns etc Act 1695 (Eng) 7 & 8 Will III c 35.
3 Clandestine Marriages Act 1753 (GB) 26 Geo II c 33 (popularly known as Lord Hardwicke’s Act).
was the situation that probably then also obtained in England’s settlements and colonies beyond the seas, including those which joined in the American Revolution of 1776. In England, and in the Australian and New Zealand colonies, the validity of marriages outside the Church of England was eventually secured by Toleration Acts. These removed the religious monopoly of the Church of England. They extended civic rights to other religious orders recognised in lands subject to British dominion.

It was through this legal journey that religious notions (normally specifically Christian and for a long time Anglican) found their way into the laws on marriage in British colonies and their successor jurisdictions. It was not inevitable that this should be so. In France, the Napoleonic Civil Code, in deference to the strong secular principle of laïcité that followed the French Revolution, divorced the civilian notion of marriage from the religious concept of marriage as a public Christian sacrament. To this day, in most countries of the world that trace their civil law to the Napoleonic Code, marriage is exclusively a secular legal event, provided by the state. Religious ceremonies might follow, but as a matter of law they are inessential.

In English-speaking countries, this history, briefly described, had two outcomes relevant to the subject matter of this article. First, although civil marriages became possible in a secular ceremony performed by a public official, usually conducted in a public registry building, most marriages until quite recently were conducted, in fact, in a place of religious observance. In that sense, a religious official was exceptionally authorised by law to perform a function to which were attached important legal consequences. Secondly, and perhaps inevitably, in consequence of the participation of religious officials in an occasion having important legal consequences, the elements of the “marriage” that could be celebrated under such law were themselves said by the judges to reflect those features that were regarded as necessary for the religious sacrament of marriage. Thus in the important English decision of Hyde v Hyde, marriage was declared to be the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.4

The public ceremony of marriage, conducted in accordance with these rules, was important for many purposes. It controlled social acceptance of the lawfulness of sexual relations and the legitimacy of children. It controlled the passing of property and the status of women’s property. It was reinforced by other laws, for instance by the criminal law of bigamy. It converted what might otherwise have been

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4 Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 (Prob & Div) at 133.
solely a contract between the parties into a matter of status, recognised by the community as important to its own legal order.\(^5\)

In many affected relationships, but not all,\(^6\) marriage was viewed as an essential precondition to the socially acceptable procreation of children and to their full protection by the law. Effectively, marriage upheld rules (usually derived from religious sources) governing permissible relationships between persons within defined degrees of consanguinity or affinity. Although love and affection might now represent the feelings of those entering into marriage, historically (at least in the three countries under consideration), such emotions were not essential ingredients for a legally valid marriage. This was a feature reinforced by the difficulty (or near-impossibility) of procuring divorce. Consent, publicly and properly declared by qualified parties of full age and capacity, was sufficient. Love and affection were happy — but inessential — ingredients.\(^7\)

As has been remarked recently in the context of the marriage equality debate, whether or not a couple married in England, from whence the common law notions of marriage were derived, was for centuries substantially a matter of social class.\(^8\) As the status and property rights of women became enlarged in society and by law; as sexual mores changed and the stigmatisation of children as “illegitimate” if born “out of wedlock” was made unlawful; and as attitudes towards lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender/transsexual and intersex (LGBTI) citizens were reformed and discrimination forbidden, a romantic, consensual and universal notion of marriage came to be proclaimed.

Still, as I shall show, resistance to reflecting these changes in the law was expressed mainly (but not exclusively) by those who saw marriage as a sacramental compact, basically designed to provide for the protection, safety and welfare of the children of such unions. For these opponents, often quite sincerely, the suggested “opening up” of marriage to same-sex partners was offensive. This was not simply because it represented a challenge to what had gone before. Rather, opponents perceived same-sex marriage as somehow undermining the heterosexual family unit of the mother, father and children, which they considered the bedrock of a normal, stable and peaceful society. This,

\(^5\) Niboyet v Niboyet (1878) 4 PD 1 (CA).
\(^6\) Baxter v Baxter [1948] AC 274 (HL) at 286.
they believed, meant same-sex marriage was dangerous to children. It afforded same-sex partners, who represented an “abomination”, an unmerited legal and societal equivalence to traditionally-married couples. Same-sex marriage, argued the opponents, was neither justified nor required. It diminished the status of “traditional” marriage. It had no place in the law that spoke for the majority of citizens who disapproved of such a change.

II FROM CIVIL UNIONS TO SAME-SEX MARRIAGE

A common feature of the law in virtually all English-speaking countries deriving their legal system from England was the inclusion of criminal offences for sexual activity between persons of the same sex. This was a feature of the laws of England that passed, without exception, into the laws of many English settlements and colonies around the world. To this day, many of the countries of the Commonwealth of Nations, formerly colonies of the British Empire, continue to provide criminal prohibitions against same-sex activity.10

A recommendation by a high-level group that such laws should be repealed has so far fallen on mainly deaf ears.11 In 42 of the 54 member countries of the Commonwealth of Nations, such laws remain in place. Until quite recently, they were also a feature of many former British colonies that did not remain members of the Commonwealth.12 In some countries of the Commonwealth, things have recently become worse. In Brunei, the newly proclaimed Sharia criminal laws have reintroduced the death penalty for same-sex sexual activity.13 In India, an enlightened decision of the Delhi High Court (which had held criminal offences for homosexual behaviour to be incompatible with the Indian Constitution)14 was reversed by a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India.15 In consequence, homosexual acts were again recriminalized in India.16 Recent adverse

9 Lev 20:13 (“If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death…”).
11 At 102 (R60).
12 Myanmar (Burma), Republic of Ireland, United States of America and Zimbabwe.
13 The amendment to the law in Brunei is timed to commence in 2016.
14 Naz Foundation v Delhi [2009] 4 LRC 838 (Delhi HC).
15 Koushal v Naz Foundation (2014) 1 SCC 1. A curative petition has been listed for hearing but is undecided as this article goes to press.
decisions of final courts in Singapore\(^\text{17}\) and Malaysia\(^\text{18}\) have apparently closed off judicial avenues of reform. In the face of statutes criminalising same-sex activity, one can scarcely begin to contemplate legal recognition of same-sex personal relations which include, or might include, consensual sexual activity.

The legal position in many non-English-speaking countries differed by reason of the repeal of the equivalent criminal laws in France in 1793. That was a development that affected the influential Napoleonic Penal Code that followed. In truth, social attitudes towards same-sex minorities were often hardly better than in English-speaking countries. But at least the underpinning of prejudice by enforceable criminal laws was missing, making changes in social education and relationship recognition easier to achieve.

Two developments proved particularly important in paving the way for reform. First, the highly publicised research of scientists (including Alfred Kinsey) revealed the comparatively common occurrence of LGBTI minorities in the countries studied.\(^\text{19}\) As a result, increasing numbers of scientists, social and political leaders and LGBTI people themselves began to demand the removal of criminal and other discriminatory laws. Such demands were assisted (at least in Western and developed countries) by the coincidence of similar calls to end legal discrimination against women, indigenous peoples and others stigmatised by reference to their race or skin colour.

Secondly, increasing numbers of heterosexual couples began living together without the benefit of marriage. This increase reflected changes in sexual mores, which had developed at least in part in response to the widespread availability of various forms of contraception. In many Western countries, legislation was enacted to regulate such relationships (heterosexual and otherwise), both to provide property and financial protections to the parties and to provide enforceable rights to any children of such relationships.

In Australia, the drafters of the Constitution (unlike those of the United States) gave the Federal Parliament the power to make laws with respect to “marriage”\(^\text{20}\). Such drafting left the enactment of Australian legislation concerning de facto marriage relationships within the authority of the state and territory legislatures. The result


\(^{20}\) Australian Constitution, ss 51(xxi) and 51(xxii). In the United States, the legislative power is not assigned to Congress. It thus remains, subject to the Constitution, a matter of state legislative power.
has been the enactment of such laws in most Australian jurisdictions. Such legislation — sometimes expressly applicable to LGBTI relationships — facilitated a new way of thinking about the relationships of, and protection for, the parties (and any children) to such arrangements. However, it did not, at least at first, provide formal recognition for the relationship as such. Nor did it provide for a ceremony, registration or certification of the relationship or for a public occasion to mark its existence in the community.

Steps to change the foregoing situation first began in Scandinavia, with the introduction of laws to permit same-sex couples to enter into domestic partnerships or unions. Substantially, these laws occasionally built on earlier laws protecting de facto heterosexual relationships. But they added the ingredient of a formal relationship status. Such laws quickly spread to many Western European countries and to a number of jurisdictions beyond Europe: specifically a number in North America, Latin America and New Zealand.

The first country to take the step of permitting “marriage” to be entered into by same-sex couples was the Netherlands. It did so by a law enacted by the legislature, stated to be for the “opening up” of marriage to people of the same sex. This law was enacted in 2000 and came into operation in 2001. Since that move, the adoption of marriage by legislative (L) and judicial (J) decisions, in a comparatively short space of time, has been extraordinary. At the time of writing, the jurisdictions that have provided for marriage by LGBTI couples are: Argentina (L); Belgium (L); Brazil (L); Canada (J); Denmark and Greenland (L); Finland (L); France (L); Iceland (L); Ireland (L, following a referendum); Luxemburg (L); Mexico (sub-national) (L); Netherlands (L); New Zealand (L); Norway (L); Portugal (L); Slovenia, (L, subject to reversal in a later referendum); Spain (L and J); South Africa (J); Sweden (L); United Kingdom (except Northern Ireland) (L); various states of the United States of America (J after L); and Uruguay (L).

The specific instances of reform and attempted reform in New Zealand, the United States and Australia are worth noticing. They illustrate the different paths to reform for marriage laws and the pitfalls that have sometimes arisen. They also give rise to certain general conclusions.

21 See, for example, De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) and similar legislation in other states.
22 The Netherlands law for the opening up of marriage was introduced into the House of Representatives in September 2000 and passed by 109 votes to 33. On 19 December 2000 it was approved by the Senate by 49 votes to 26. It came into effect on 1 April 2001 by changing Article 1:30 of the previous marriage law to broaden the availability of marriage to include one entered into by two persons.
III NEW ZEALAND LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The first step on the path to the recognition of the right of LGBTI people in New Zealand to marry was, necessarily, the repeal of certain provisions of the Crimes Act 1961. These imposed penal sanctions on sexual activity between gay men, even if conducted by adults with full and knowing consent and performed in private. The repeal of those laws was a tortuous story. It was ultimately achieved by the Parliament of New Zealand in Wellington in 1986, after a number of false starts. Reform was predictably opposed by a number of religious organisations and conservative politicians. However, over time, the idea gathered support from both sides of Parliament and the wider New Zealand public.

After the passage of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993, three couples in stable, long-term lesbian relationships applied to the Registrar-General of Births, Deaths and Marriages for marriage licences under the Marriage Act 1955. The Registrar refused to grant the licences. He did so on the ground that marriage could not take place between a same-sex couple. This was so although the word “marriage” was not defined in the 1955 Act. The view was taken, nonetheless, that in 1955, the New Zealand Parliament had adopted a “traditional” concept of marriage, as stated in *Hyde v Hyde*.24

The decision of the Registrar-General was challenged in the High Court. However, the challenge was rejected by the trial judge (Kerr J). An appeal was then taken to the New Zealand Court of Appeal.26 In that Court, the appellants relied on the fact that the Human Rights Act had expressly prohibited discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. Further, they noted that the Bill of Rights Act had created a right to freedom from discrimination, relevantly on the grounds of sexual orientation, and that the Act provided that interpretations of legislation that were consistent with the rights and freedoms it protected were to be preferred to those that were inconsistent “where possible”.

The majority of the Court of Appeal concluded that there was no prohibited discrimination in the refusal of marriage licences to the applicants. In his reasons, Gault J stated that to “differentiate” was not

23 Attempts were made to amend the New Zealand laws against buggery (unnatural offences by males) in 1974, 1979 and 1980 but were not successful. In 1985 a Bill to remove provisions of the Crimes Act 1961 to decriminalise homosexual conduct between males was approved on 9 July 1986 and became the Homosexual Reform Act 1986. The legislation was introduced by Fran Wilde MP (Labour).
25 *Quilter v Attorney-General* (1996) 14 FRNZ 430 (HC) [*Quilter (HC)*].
26 *Quilter v Attorney-General* [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) [*Quilter (CA)*].
necessarily to “discriminate”. Because the Marriage Act only envisaged a married relationship between opposite sexes, there was no discrimination in applying that statute to refuse the application of the Act to the appellants who were in same-sex relationships.

In his reasons, Keith J referred to the state of international law. He concluded that, viewed in the international context, with non-acceptance by the world community of a right to same-sex marriage, the New Zealand statute did not breach the rule against discrimination by its failure to provide for same-sex marriage.

On the other hand, Tipping J concluded that the impact of the prohibition against same-sex marriages inherent in the Marriage Act did prima facie amount to discrimination against persons on the grounds of their sexual orientation. However, he concluded that the purpose of anti-discrimination laws was to be kept in mind. Although there was no express definition of “marriage” in the 1955 statute, it was lawful to exclude same-sex relationships because they did not thereby breach the combined operations of the subsequent laws. This was because the New Zealand Parliament had reserved to itself all legislative functions. The necessary process of interpretation of legislation was “not [to] be used as a concealed legislative tool”.27 Tipping J also pointed to the suggested inconsistency between certain provisions in forms under the Act referring to “husband” and “wife” under the Marriage Act. He concluded that these words provided a textual impediment to the gender-neutral reasoning urged by the appellants.

The reasoning of Thomas J in the Court of Appeal could not have been more different from that of the other New Zealand judges. He agreed with the view of the others that it was preferable that Parliament should address the issue of same-sex marriage than that it should be determined by a court. However, he concluded that this preference only begged the question in issue in the appeal. This was the operation of the 1955 Act in light of the subsequent passage of the human rights statutes. It was for the court to address and answer the submission of the appellants that they were subject to discrimination and entitled to relief as a consequence. These were proper judicial, not legislative, questions.28

In this country, as in many societies throughout the world, marriage is the single most significant communal ceremony of belonging. The legal recognition it has been accorded has conferred on it a status which, apart from the symbolism of legal

27 At 572.
28 At 554–555.
recognition, attracts many consequential legal benefits. To exclude from that status gays and lesbians who live in enduring and committed relationships, which can reflect all the qualities of heterosexual marriage other than procreation, is necessarily discriminatory. The exclusion is inescapably based on their sex or sexual orientation. Such a basis equally inescapably judges them less worthy of the respect, concern and consideration deriving from the fundamental concept of human dignity applying to all human rights legislation.

The only reason why Thomas J ultimately refused the relief sought by the appellants was that he concluded that the word “marriage” (and some other words such as “husband” and “wife”) were so well established that they could not be transferred to aid a contrary interpretation of the Marriage Act — at least not “without usurping Parliament’s legislative supremacy”.29

Because of the difference between the reasons of the judges (Thomas and Tipping JJ both found there was discrimination against LGBTI persons), Richardson P made it clear that he agreed with the views of the other judges, inferentially concluding that the legislation “differentiated” but did not “discriminate” in a prohibited way.

At the time I first read of the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 1998, I was approaching the 30th anniversary of my own relationship with my partner, Johan van Vloten.30 It is a mark of the narrow tendency common to the legal mind that I first thought the majority in the Court of Appeal had the better of the arguments. Could not Thomas J see that “marriage” in 1955, and indeed always, had meant opposite-sex marriage? If something bigger and newer were “intended”, surely that was for Parliament to provide, not a court.

Looking back now, I can see that Thomas J, and to some extent Tipping J, were the only judges in the case who approached the matter as it should have been approached: as a human rights question. Certainly, there was discrimination. Of course, Parliament could have corrected this. However, clearly, Parliament had failed to do so. The courts then had their own separate function, conferred on them by Parliament itself, which they had to discharge judicially. In retrospect, it is only perhaps surprising that Thomas J, having correctly found discrimination, did not allow the wind behind his judicial sails to carry him forward to the provision of relief by techniques of interpretation authorised by the Bill of Rights Act.

29 At 542.
In July 2002, undeterred by the Court of Appeal’s reasoning and order, a New Zealand citizen made a communication to the United Nations Human Rights Committee. By that communication it was argued that New Zealand was in breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by refusing or failing to provide the facility of marriage to same-sex partners. It was contended that this was inconsistent with the decision of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, reached earlier in Toonen v Australia. That decision had concluded that, by failing to reform the criminal laws against gays in Tasmania, Australia was in breach of the ICCPR. The New Zealand communication relied on an argument by analogy. However, that argument did not make any more headway in Geneva than it had done in Wellington. The Committee concluded that the state of New Zealand law did not violate the ICCPR.

It was after reaching that impasse, followed by the immediate failure of the New Zealand Parliament to amend the Marriage Act, that moves were finally initiated to pursue legislative reform. On 14 May 2012, Louisa Wall MP, a member of the Labour Party, introduced in the New Zealand Parliament the Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Bill 2012. It was a Private Member’s Bill. It proposed amendment to the definition of “marriage” in the Marriage Act to “the union of two people regardless of their sex, sexual orientation or gender identity”. Its purpose was to permit same-sex couples to marry and to access all of the legal rights available to married couples, including the adoption of children. On 24 July 2012, that Bill was selected, by a ballot procedure, to permit a vote in Parliament. Both the Prime Minister of New Zealand (the Rt Hon John Key, National) and the Opposition Leader (David Shearer, Labour) announced that they would vote in favour of the Bill at all stages. They indicated, however, that members of their respective political parties would be permitted a conscience vote.

On 29 August 2012, the Bill was approved on its first reading (80–40). On 13 March 2013, the Bill passed its second reading (77–44). On 17 April 2013, the Bill passed the third and final reading (77–44). Significantly, 27 of 59 National Party Members of Parliament (46%) voted in favour of the Bill, as did 30 of the 34 Labour Party members (89%). All of the members of minor parties, except the New

32 Established by the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). New Zealand had ratified the ICCPR and accepted the authority of the Human Rights Committee.
34 See, for example, Quilter (CA), above n 26, at 553–554 per Thomas J and at 560–563 per Keith J.
Zealand First Party and independent Brendan Horan, voted for the Bill. An emotional scene in the New Zealand House of Representatives was seen worldwide. The legislative process having been completed, the Bill received the Royal Assent of the Governor-General on 19 April 2013. It came into force on 19 August 2013. Since that time, marriage equality has been a feature of the New Zealand community.

IV UNITED STATES LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORMS

The achievement of marriage equality in the United States took a course different from New Zealand. That course also began with the same obstacle, presented by the inherited laws that included “sodomy” — the so-called “unnatural offence” which was “not to be spoken of”. In most states the offence was, until the 1970s, severely punished upon conviction, whatever the ages of the actors, the private place of the offence or the consent of the parties. The fact that the offence was recorded in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England helped to ensure that it passed seamlessly from England into American law. It did so in every American colony and then in every state and territory of the Union.

Nevertheless, publicity surrounding the research of Alfred Kinsey and his successors eventually led to a movement in the United States, slow at first, towards the repeal of these offences. This movement had to confront religious opposition and even security “scares” during the Cold War decades. Homosexuals were blamed for leaking intelligence to foreign enemies when blackmailed for their “deviance”.

In 1986, in Bowers v Hardwick, a first attempt was made to secure a ruling from the Supreme Court of the United States that the constitutional right to privacy, which had earlier been held to protect “family, marriage or procreation”, gave protection to adult, consensual, sexual conduct, including by homosexuals.35 In June 1986, by a decision of 5–4, Justice Byron White led a narrow majority of the Supreme Court to rejecting the analogy. The majority held that the prohibition was “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”.36 The contrary argument was said to be “at best,
facetious”. White J found support in the fact that, until 1961, all 50 states of the United States had outlawed sodomy and that, in 1986, 24 states and the District of Colombia continued to do so.

The deciding vote in the case was that of Justice Lewis Powell. He had initially favoured striking down the Georgia statute. However, he then changed his mind. Notoriously, he claimed that he had never known a homosexual person. It is now known that one of his clerks at the time was gay. In 1990, Powell J sought to defend his decision in Bowers on the basis that no one in the case was actually being prosecuted. Nevertheless, he acknowledged that he had “probably made a mistake” in failing to join the dissenting opinion of Blackmun J. Whilst Bowers stood, it was legally impossible to contemplate a Supreme Court decision upholding the right of LGBTI people in the United States to marry. Because marriage would usually involve sexual activity, a relationship that contemplated illegal conduct could not be constitutionally protected.

The first step on the path to constitutional protection occurred in 2003 in another sharply divided decision in Lawrence v Texas. The Supreme Court’s majority opinion in that case was written by Kennedy J. He concluded that Bowers had been wrong when it was decided. He held that anti-sodomy laws offended the due process clause in the Fifth Amendment to the United States constitution and the constitutional right to privacy. To the complaint that sodomy laws had existed at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution and that they were found throughout the world, Kennedy J cautioned that the founders did not seek, and did not have the power to impose on later generations, a final statement of the manifold dimensions of liberty provided by the Constitution. The result was that legislation throughout the United States imposing criminal sanctions on LGBTI people was struck down as unconstitutional. The impediment to non-heterosexual relationship recognition was removed.

Fearing that legislation would be enacted in certain states to provide legal recognition for long-term personal relationships of non-heterosexuals, the United States Congress in 1996 had enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). That law defined “marriage” for

37 At 194.
38 At 197–198.
41 Defense of Marriage Act Pub L No 104–199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996) [DOMA]. The Act was adopted by the 104th United States Congress and became effective on 21 September 1996. Contrast the decision of the Supreme Court in Loving v Virginia 388 US 1 (1967) where the Court unanimously struck down an anti-
federal purposes as the union of one man and one woman. It allowed states to refuse to recognise same-sex marriages granted under the laws of other states. It barred same-sex couples who had effected a marriage under a state law from being recognised as “spouses” for the purposes of federal laws. It imposed burdens on the relationships permitted by some state laws.

The DOMA was passed by both Houses of the Congress by large veto-proof majorities and signed into law by President WJ Clinton, creating a new obstacle to the recognition of same-sex marriage in the United States. DOMA statutes were then enacted by a large number of state legislatures. The legislation was enacted on a wave of popular support. At the time, it was hoped that DOMA would stop legislators and impede courts from any temptation to change the definition of “marriage”. However, concurrently with these moves, support for a change began to appear in sections of the judiciary and in the legal profession.42

For a time, divided debates over DOMA became a critical, even possibly decisive, argument in the United States political scene. Once again, it was the United States Supreme Court that cleared the way to permit relationship recognition. On this occasion, it did so by finding, in United States v Windsor,43 that part of the federal DOMA was unconstitutional, so far as it related to the federal recognition of same-sex marriages. On the same day as Windsor was decided, the Supreme Court, in another 5–4 decision, allowed same-sex marriages in the State of California to recommence. It did so by ruling that the proponents of the constitutional initiative to bar such marriages in that state, had lacked standing, under Article III of the Federal Constitution, to challenge the decision of the federal trial judge invalidating the operation of the state Constitution by which the marriages had been terminated.44

The Windsor decision of the Supreme Court held that the Federal Government in the United States was obliged to recognise same-sex marriages validly conducted under state law. At that point, only 10 states and the District of Colombia had so provided in their

miscarriage law in force in Virginia which polls (before the decision) showed was popular, enjoying strong community support.

42 Philip S Gutis “Small Steps Toward Acceptance Renew Debate on Gay Marriage” The New York Times (New York, 5 November 1989). The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v Department of Public Health 798 NE 2d 941 (Mass 2003) was a highly influential case, the first by the highest court of a state in the United States upholding the right of same-sex partners to be married without discrimination under state law.

43 United States v Windsor 133 S Ct 2675 (2013). By this decision, s 3 of the DOMA (codified at 1 USC §7) was struck down as unconstitutional on 26 June 2013. The decision of the Supreme Court was given by Kennedy J with whom Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan JJ agreed; Roberts CJ, Scalia, Thomas and Alito JJ dissenting.

44 Hollingsworth v Perry 133 S Ct 2652 (2013).
laws. Following the decision in *Windsor*, all such state and territory same-sex marriages immediately became entitled to the rights conferred on married couples by federal law.

On 6 November 2014 a new blockage arose. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (covering Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee) applied an earlier decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Baker v Nelson*. It held that *Baker* required the Court of Appeals to uphold a state prohibition on same-sex marriage and precluded it from endorsing the contrary view. Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in *Windsor* did not govern its decision because *Windsor* had merely invalidated a federal law that refused to permit state laws allowing gay marriage, whilst *Baker* had upheld the right of the people of a state in their legislatures to define “marriage” as they saw fit. One judge of the Circuit Court dissented. There were also conflicting opinions in other federal courts. This state of affairs virtually obliged the Supreme Court to resolve the differences of judicial opinion. That resolution was provided in the next case in the American series: *Obergefell v Hodges*. Again the Supreme Court was divided 5–4. Again, Kennedy J wrote the majority opinion for the Court. In that opinion, he said:

The lifelong union of a man and a woman always has promised nobility and dignity to all persons, without regard to their station in life. Marriage is sacred to those who live by their religions and offers unique fulfillment to those who find meaning in the secular realm. Its dynamic allows two people to find a life that could not be found alone, for a marriage becomes greater than just the two persons. Rising from the most basic human needs, marriage is essential to our most profound hopes and aspirations.

Technically, the majority in *Obergefell* concluded that a fundamental right to marry was guaranteed to same-sex couples in the United States both by the due process clause (Fifth Amendment) and the equal protection clause (Fourteenth Amendment) of the United States Constitution. The majority held that, because of the fundamental nature of marriage, prohibitions on same-sex marriage in state as well as federal law sought to impose inequality on same-sex couples by denying them rights afforded to opposite-sex couples. They thus prevented them from exercising a fundamental right enjoyed under the

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45 *DeBoer v Snyder* 772 F 3d 388 (6th Cir 2014).
47 *DeBoer v Snyder*, above n 45, at 400.
48 *Obergefell v Hodges* 135 S Ct 2584 (2015).
49 At 2594.
Constitution. The majority did not find that sexual orientation, as such, was a “suspect class” under the equal protection clause of the Constitution (as race or religion has earlier been held to be). Such a finding would have had considerable significance for laws other than marriage under which LGBTI people in the United States still suffer disadvantages. However, the outcome of Obergefell was that DOMA legislation in 14 states of the United States was invalidated.

This decision, and the reasoning of the majority, was strongly criticised by the dissenting Justices in the Supreme Court. Roberts CJ (joined in this respect by Thomas and Scalia JJ) concluded that the case was really about who should have the power to change the law on “marriage”. Pointing to the many states that had already enacted legislation in favour of same-sex marriage, he argued that the change should be left to the people, exercising their votes by democratic process in state elections. Specifically, Roberts CJ predicted that the majority ruling would lead to uncertainties in the law, as future clashes would occur between the rights of people with religious beliefs assented against LGBTI persons, to oppose their claims on the basis of their religious convictions. Still, a significant change in tone was noticeable in the minority’s reasoning in Obergefell. Unlike earlier opinions, particularly those of Scalia J, all of the dissentients wrote respectfully of the same-sex couples litigating the case. Roberts CJ even offered an olive branch to them, absent from the earlier rhetoric. They would, he acknowledged “[c]elebrate the opportunity for a new expression of commitment to a partner”.

This indicated that even those who, for constitutional, philosophical or religious reasons opposed same-sex marriage, could understand the deep feelings that the claim evoked amongst those who advocated its availability to LGBTI people and amongst LGBTI people themselves.

On the whole, the reaction to the decision in Obergefell was positive, even amongst some religious observers. By the time Obergefell was decided, 36 states, the District of Columbia and the federal territory of Guam had come round to providing for marriage between same-sex couples. The Supreme Court simply administered the coup de grâce to the opposition by invoking a constitutional norm. The battleground on LGBTI rights immediately shifted to other areas of suggested discrimination. However, whilst most academic commentary was favourable to the decision and to the outcome in the Supreme Court, some politicians have maintained their rage in the ensuing presidential election campaign. Some lawyers cavilled at the
legal reasoning of the majority. Some opponents shifted their energies to the competing right of those with religious convictions to have such convictions respected and upheld.52 However, the battle over marriage was to all intents over in the United States. The legal caravan in that country had moved on.

V AUSTRALIAN RELUCTANCE AND DELAY

Whereas New Zealand and the United States had, by 2015, resolved the same-sex marriage debate, Australia proved slow to follow. At the time of writing, the position is unresolved. Neither marriage nor civil unions or partnerships are available to same-sex couples in Australia. In some sub-national jurisdictions, forms of recognition of the relationships of LGBTI persons have been enacted. However, they fall far short of marriage.

Despite the existence of federal power to enact a uniform marriage law in Australia after federation in 1901, marriage and divorce, until the late 1950s, remained governed by colonial and later state legislation, read with the common law. Thus, divorce in New South Wales was regulated by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1899 (NSW). Marriage was regulated by the Marriage Act 1899 (NSW). And the Married Women’s Property Act 1901 (NSW) governed the “rights and liabilities of married women”. Despite the fact that these laws substantially reflected the values of the colonial era, they endured for more than half of the first century of Australian federation.

In 1961, the Federal Parliament at last exercised its constitutional power and enacted the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). As in the case of the contemporaneous New Zealand statute, it omitted a definition of “marriage”. “Marriage” was expressed in gender-neutral terms.53 However, it was generally assumed that the facility was only applicable to opposite-sex couples. There was some, weak, textual support for this view in the use of words generally treated as referring

52 Thus the Marriage Registrar in Rowan County Kentucky (Kim Davis) refused to issue licences or to allow deputies to do so to any same-sex couple. In doing this she failed to conform to the law as stated by the United States Supreme Court and with a direction she had received from the State Governor. She was convicted of contempt of court on 3 September 2015 and committed to prison. When she was released, she received a hero’s welcome. Allegedly, she discussed her resistance in a meeting with Pope Francis during his visit to the United States. The Supreme Court unanimously refused to intervene in her case: see Alan Blinder and Richard Pérez-Peña “Kim Davis, Released From Kentucky Jail, Won’t Say if She Will Keep Defying Court” *The New York Times* (online ed, New York, 8 September 2015); and Jim Yardley and Laurie Goodstein “Pope Francis Met With Kim Davis, Kentucky County Clerk, in Washington” *The New York Times* (online ed, New York, 30 September 2015).

53 See, for example, “party”, “parties” and “a person” in s 13.
to opposite-sex couples.\textsuperscript{54} And because the law continued to criminalise so-called “unnatural offences”,\textsuperscript{55} and because asserting LGBTI rights was heavily stigmatised, virtually no one at that time demanded gay marriage in Australia. Most people concerned felt obliged to hide, or deny, their minority sexual orientation or gender identity or feelings.

The reform of the criminal law in England in 1967,\textsuperscript{56} following the Wolfenden Report on homosexual offences,\textsuperscript{57} led to demands for similar changes in Australia. Starting with South Australia in 1974, reforming statutes were enacted in all Australian states and territories except Tasmania. The criminal law in that state\textsuperscript{58} was eventually the subject of a communication to the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. It was the decision of that Committee\textsuperscript{59} that led to the enactment of a federal law that was designed to give effect, in Tasmania, to Australia’s international obligations under the ICCPR.\textsuperscript{60}

A challenge to the Tasmanian Criminal Code in the High Court of Australia having been decided, in part, in favour of the complainant,\textsuperscript{61} the Tasmanian legislation was finally reformed by Act of the Tasmanian Parliament. In consequence, the last criminal prohibition on same-sex (ordinarily male) sexual conduct in Australia was abolished. This step coincided with growing demands for the removal of other discriminatory laws in matters such as compassionate rights, property relationships and the adoption of children.\textsuperscript{62} Additionally, de facto relationships legislation was enacted to protect both heterosexual and other persons (many gay) in long-term personal relationships.\textsuperscript{63} LGBTI people in several parts of Australia began to demonstrate publicly in favour of the removal of discriminatory laws affecting them. Eventually, these demands gave rise to claims (following European and North American precedents) for legal recognition of civil unions, civil partnerships and ultimately marriage.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[54] See, for example “wife (or husband)” in ss 45 and 72; and “widow or widower” in s 42.
\item[55] Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), ss 79–81. Section 79 provided: “Whosoever commits the abominable crime of buggery, or bestiality, with mankind … shall be liable to penal servitude for life or any term not less than five years.” In s 81, the offence was provided of “indecent assault upon a male person”. Consent was no defence to either crime.
\item[56] Sexual Offences Act 1967 (UK).
\item[57] Report of the Departmental Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (HMSO, Cmnd 247, 4 September 1957) [Wolfenden Report].
\item[58] Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas), ss 122(a) 122(c) and 123.
\item[59] Toonen v Australia, above n 33.
\item[60] Human Rights (Sexual Conduct) Act 1994 (Cth).
\item[61] Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119. The decision concerned the standing of the applicant to bring his challenge against the Tasmanian Criminal Code provision. Standing was upheld.
\item[62] Michael Kirby “Same-Sex Relationships: Some Australian Legal Developments” in Through the World’s Eye (Federation Press, Sydney, 2000) 64 at 69–72, where the relevant NSW legislation is described.
\item[63] De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW).
\end{footnotes}
In 2004, during the Howard Government, the Australian Parliament enacted two laws evidencing a measure of ambivalence about LGBTI relationships. One was an alteration to the federal laws on superannuation (contributory pension) rights and employment entitlements. However, whilst such federal laws edged forward with entitlements for those in so-called “eligible” or “interdependent” relationships (mostly gay), a specific blow was struck at those who dreamed of marriage for LGBTI people or its equivalent. The blow came in two measures.

The first was the exceptional disallowance by the Federal Parliament, on the initiative of the Howard Government, of a law providing for civil unions in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). That law had been enacted pursuant to the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth). It was complained that this law, both by its use of the word “union” and by its detailed provisions, “mimicked” marriage and thus caused an unacceptable confusion, incompatible with the federal Marriage Act 1961, confined to heterosexual or opposite sex couples. Secondly, to put the matter beyond doubt, the Government introduced a Bill into the Federal Parliament, enacted with bipartisan support in 2004, inserting in s 5(1) of the Marriage Act a definition of marriage in terms providing that it was “the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life”. To rub salt into the wound caused by this prescription, the amending Act also inserted into the Marriage Act a provision stipulating that foreign marriages of same-sex couples “must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia”. Furthermore, the restricted definition of marriage was henceforth to be read publicly at every “marriage” conducted in Australia, so that no one present would be in any doubt.

Undeterred by this setback, which took its inspiration from the earlier enactment of DOMA legislation in the United States, the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in 2007 published a report on an audit of federal legislation by reference to equality in matters of sexuality, entitled Same-Sex: Same Entitlements. This report coincided closely with the electoral defeat of the Howard Government and the return of the Australian Labor Party to government under Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. However, when the ACT Legislative Assembly tested the waters by reintroducing a civil partnership law, so named and dropping the

65 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s 88EA. See also Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), sch 1, item 1.
66 Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), s 46(1).
description of “union”, the Rudd Government moved once again to disallow the Bill in the Federal Parliament. Allegedly, this was done because of promises made to religious groups during the preceding federal election.

Notwithstanding this negative stance, as if in amelioration, the Rudd Government quickly introduced legislation to amend nearly a hundred federal laws to eliminate discrimination against LGBTI people in Australia.68 Welcome as such reforms were, they did not provide for relationship recognition. A first measure to introduce a Bill for marriage equality was taken in August 2009 by the Australian Greens Party.69 However, this Bill died in a Senate Committee. In February 2010 another Marriage Equality Bill 2009 reached a vote in the Senate. It was defeated 45–5. Only the Greens voted in favour. Many senators absented themselves from the vote.

Despite a change of Prime Minister in Australia, and the election of the Hon Julia Gillard, she maintained a commitment to the Australian Christian Lobby to oppose the enactment of a federal law for marriage equality. Both the Labor and the Coalition parties continued to tread more warily on the subject of same-sex marriage than opinion polls suggested was acceptable to the Australian population. By the time the next federal election came around in March 2013, Mr Rudd had been restored as leader and Prime Minister. He promptly announced his personal conversion to the cause of marriage equality. His party had earlier adopted the principle as part of its political platform. Nevertheless, at the election in 2013, the Government was defeated.

The Coalition were returned to power in Australia. Their leader and the new Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, opposed amendment of the Marriage Act to permit same-sex marriage. Moreover, he made it clear that he would not allow members of his party (many of whom were rallying to the cause of marriage equality) a conscience vote. The issue continued to be divisive on both sides of the aisle in the Australian Federal Parliament.

It was at this time that the ACT Legislative Assembly acted once again in a third attempt at relationship recognition. It enacted the Marriage Equality (Same Sex) Act 2013 (ACT). The new Federal Government immediately challenged the constitutional validity of the statute in the High Court of Australia. It contended that, within the meaning of s 28(1) of the Australian Capital Territory (Self

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69 The Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2009 was introduced by Greens Senator Sarah Hanson-Young. It lapsed.
Government) Act 1988 (Cth), the ACT Act was inconsistent with the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), a valid law of the Federal Parliament. It therefore had no legal effect or, alternatively, was repugnant to the Marriage Act and, on that ground, void.

An element of urgency was introduced into the issue by the passage of the ACT law. Accordingly, the constitutional challenge to the High Court of Australia was heard with expedition on 3 December 2013. It was decided on 12 December 2013. In the interim, a number of LGBTI people had rushed to secure marriage certificates. In the result, they were disappointed. The High Court upheld the Commonwealth’s challenge to the third ACT law. It declared the ACT Act to be inconsistent with the federal Marriage Act and hence of no effect. It concluded that the latter Act provided a “comprehensive and exhaustive” statement of the law of marriage in Australia. The territory law was an incompetent attempt to venture into the creation and recognition of a legal status of marriage in Australia. Because that subject was already comprehensively provided for in the federal law, the territory law was of no legal effect.

Territory arguments before the High Court had pressed the contention that by the 2004 amendment to the Marriage Act, the Commonwealth and the Federal Parliament had in effect withdrawn from the legislative topic of same-sex marriage. They had therefore left a legislative space into which the ACT Assembly was entitled to move. The arguments were subtle. They had some intellectual support outside the only place where it mattered most: the Bench of the High Court of Australia. The Justices were swift and unanimous in reaching the contrary conclusion.

Nevertheless, to many clouds there is a silver lining. In this case, it was provided by observations expressed in the unanimous opinion of the High Court of Australia. The Justices had neither a constitutional bill of rights to appeal to (as the Supreme Court of the United States could do) nor a statutory Bill of Rights Act or other operative federal human rights law to direct their attention to broad questions of equality of citizenship, due process, privacy or vulnerable minority status (as had been invoked in New Zealand). But they did have the responsibility to interpret the Australian Constitution, with its provisions separating federal, state and territory powers.

An obvious question presented at the threshold of the case was whether the Australian Federal Parliament could validly enact a statute on same-sex marriage. Opinions had been ventured (although

71 At [57] and [58].
72 Per French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ.
not in the arguments in the instant case) that, because the only “marriage” known to the law at the time of the foundation of the Australian Commonwealth was “traditional” or “opposite-sex” marriage, no power existed to enact a federal law on same-sex marriage. While this point was not advanced by any party in the case, the parties could not by their mere assumption settle important constitutional questions inherent in the legal issues to be resolved before the Court.

The Justices of the High Court of Australia expressed cautionary words about argumentation expressed in general terms of “originalism” or “original intent”. Still, they left no doubt about the breadth of the federal power granted by the Australian Constitution:74

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\text{[T]he federal Parliament has power under s 51(xxi) to make a national law with respect to same sex marriage. ... The federal Parliament has not made a law permitting same sex marriage. But the absence of a provision permitting same sex marriage does not mean that the Territory legislature may make such a provision. It does not mean that a Territory law permitting same sex marriage can operate concurrently with the federal law. The question of concurrent operation depends upon the proper construction of the relevant laws. In particular, there cannot be concurrent operation of the federal and Territory laws if, on its true construction, the Marriage Act is to be read as providing that the only form of marriage permitted shall be a marriage formed or recognised in accordance with that Act. ... Why otherwise was the Marriage Act amended as it was in 2004 by introducing a definition of marriage in the form which now appears, except for the purpose of demonstrating that the federal law on marriage was to be complete and exhaustive?}
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The result was that the proponents of marriage equality in Australia secured a clear and unanimous opinion from the nation’s highest court that, if the Federal Parliament decided to enact marriage for same-sex couples, such a law would be upheld under the Constitution. In effect, the Court placed the responsibility where, in its opinion, it lay and should lie under the Australian Constitution, namely with the Federal Parliament. The Court upheld the possibility, uncomplicated by federal restrictions, of a democratic solution to the issue similar to what had been achieved in New Zealand. It took the course of facilitating that democratic solution, as had been urged by the dissentients in the United States Supreme Court in Obergefell. This was done because the Court held that it had no alternative legal

73 At [14].
74 At [56]–[57] (footnotes omitted).
principles to which it could appeal to uphold the legislation in question.

Since the decision of the High Court of Australia, debates in Australia on same-sex marriage have waxed and waned. On 15 September 2015, the Liberal Party withdrew support from Tony Abbott as leader of the Party and as Prime Minister. His successor, the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, is a committed supporter of marriage equality legislation. However, as part of his negotiations with party colleagues to win election to the leadership, he agreed to proceed with a national plebiscite on the subject, earlier promised by Mr Abbott. Many supporters of marriage for LGBTI persons in Australia have opposed the conduct of a plebiscite. Certainly, it is exceptional in the Australian context, having only previously been utilised in 1916 and 1917 on compulsory overseas military service (both plebiscites were rejected) and on symbolic matters such as the change of the national anthem. Conducting a plebiscite that is not constitutionally required involves a departure from the representative form of government through the Federal Parliament, as established by the Australian Constitution. Some concern was expressed that the initiative might become a precedent for impeding the exercise of clear constitutional power and political responsibility.

The record of Australian constitutional referendums since 1901 has been unpromising. Only 8 of 44 have succeeded. Although a referendum on same-sex marriage mandated by constitutional requirements in Ireland in May 2014 approved the extension of marriage to same-sex persons, the conservatism of Australian electors in popular votes meant that a repetition of the Irish experience could not be guaranteed. Many LGBTI citizens in Australia ask why, exceptionally, they should be singled out for this added procedural requirement, in the face of the clear affirmation of the High Court of Australia that the power resides in the Federal Parliament. Why should that legislative power not be discharged, whatever its outcome?

A negative plebiscite on the issue occurred in Slovenia, reversing the vote of the nation’s Parliament in favour of availability of marriage to same-sex couples. LGBTI citizens and their supporters ask: what right does a majority have, by plebiscite vote, to deny a minority of entitlements grounded in basic civil rights whose effect is substantially, or wholly, confined to the parties intimately concerned? And why should such an issue be canvassed outside the responsible legislature, where the strong passions and prejudices are likely to occasion deep communal hurt, insult and individual distress?

75 Required under s 128 of the Australian Constitution to approve formal changes to the constitutional text.
The Australian saga continues to be played out. For a country that prides itself on its egalitarian spirit and affording a “fair go” to all citizens, the delay in resolving the issue of same-sex marriage is curious. Certainly, it represents a contrast to the achievement of the change in many countries that most Australians would probably regard as less progressive and enlightened than their own.

VI TEN CONCLUSIONS

What conclusions may be drawn from the tale recounted in this survey?

(1) Scientific Research

The first, I would suggest, is the importance of scientific and empirical research. Long before the issue of same-sex marriage came to the fore, attitudes of hostility existed towards sexual minorities in Australia and elsewhere. This was so for centuries, and even longer. The attitudes shamed and intimidated millions of people with same-sex attractions into hiding that aspect of their reality. They encouraged some writers of theological texts, philosophical analyses and social studies to embrace hostile stereotypes of LGBTI people. They produced persecution that lasted for a very long time, essentially up to recent years. The criminal offences were regarded as so horrible that decent people could not even name them. There were similar examples of hostility against women, illegitimate children, racial minorities, indigenes and people suffering disabilities and from a number of diseases. Still, the animosity targeted at sexual minorities, whose sexual orientation, gender identity or experience were different from the majority, was especially harsh and persistent.

So what triggered change to such deep seated, visceral feelings? Something happened that caused a change in the impediment to rational discussion. At a certain point in Berlin, in the late 19th century, homosexuality was given its name and LGBTI people began to demand an end to the hostility.76 The source of this change was ultimately the appeal to human rationality applied to shared, or discovered, experience. The work of Alfred Kinsey and his predecessors and successors gained widespread publicity in the United States after the 1940s. That publicity challenged the demand for silence. Publicity was encouraged in the United States by the First

Amendment to the Constitution providing protection for publication of unorthodox opinions. Such opinions prompted moves towards attitudinal and legal reforms. Soon it was impossible to put the genie back in the bottle. Scientific truth proved to be an antiseptic that helped to reverse the demand for silent acquiescence in shame and silence in respect of self-regarding and consensual adult activity. Suddenly, the ignorance was challenged. Facts undermined myths. Science and knowledge became strong allies of reform.

(2) Parallel Movements

It is no coincidence that legal reform affecting LGBTI people followed closely upon reforms affecting women, people of different races, indigenes and other minorities. Many such reforms grew out of the same or similar stimuli. In each case, rationality suggested that it was unjust to treat another human being as inferior because of some indelible feature of their nature, which they did not choose and could not change. Once analogies came to be perceived between gender, racial and other forms of discrimination and phobias, the need for change and an end to discrimination against gays became clear. The LGBTI community learned from the earlier movements for reform, particularly the women’s movement with its appeal to equality, rationality and respect for the dignity of fellow human beings.

(3) Criminal Law Repeal

The achievement of a wider ambit of criminal law reform affecting LGBTI people was essential to any serious move to secure legal recognition, and eventually equality of LGBTI personal relationships. Once repeal of criminal laws had started, they were bound to spread as more communities were confronted with the equity of repeal. Most European countries had criminal laws against LGBTI conduct in the 18th century because of the influence of Judeo-Christian scriptures and teaching. When such laws were abolished in France in 1793, the initiative attracted intellectual support in England. However, it took 150 years for England to follow the French lead, and longer for its settler dominions. Advancing the same reforms in non-settler societies of the Commonwealth of Nations has proved extremely difficult. Advocates of reform must insist on the same principles as earlier overcame racial apartheid in southern Africa. The opponents of change to LGBTI criminalisation in Africa, the Caribbean and parts of

Asia must be assisted to see that sexuality apartheid is as offensive for human dignity and universal rights as racial apartheid was. Lawyers — who know, implement and help to apply such laws — have taken a leadership role in the persuasion. In most of the countries concerned, the pre-existing criminal law did not include laws against same-sex activity. Demands to respect national cultures and traditions cannot impede the promotion of reform. Even if the criminal laws are not normally enforced, until they are repealed, there is no real possibility of relationship recognition or broader initiatives for anti-discrimination and cultural change.

(4) The Place of Religion

Although freedom of (and from) religious belief is included among universal human rights, and although religious organisations have often opposed reform of the laws against LGBTI people, in some developed countries the power of religious organisations has been wound back. This is the result not only of the recent awareness of abuse of vulnerable believers, but also of more widespread knowledge of facts that challenge notions said to derive from “inerrant” scriptural texts. Despite declining church attendances, reduced resources of many traditional religions and sensible concessions by some church leaders on LGBTI issues, the same institutions appear to influence disproportionately political decisions made in many countries. Time does not appear to favour the continuation of such influence, at least in Western countries. The extremely rapid spread of legal (mostly legislative) versions of same-sex marriage in Europe, North and South America, South Africa and New Zealand in the face of significant religious opposition and campaigning speaks volumes about the direction in which such opposition is travelling.

(5) Mature Secularism

One of the most important consequences of English constitutionalism has been the spread of the idea of the secular state. The idea was never a pure or absolute one, as the establishment of the Church of England in England demonstrates. However, in many former British colonies

78 One recent breakthrough has been the decision of the Supreme Court of Belize in Orozco v Attorney-General of Belize Claim No 668 of 2010, 10 August 2016. In that case, Benjamin CJ upheld a challenge to the constitutional validity of the relevant provision of the Criminal Code of Belize, s 53. The decision was not appealed. The litigation was partly funded and supported by international civil society organisations.


80 See, for example, the well-known statement of Pope Francis “Who am I to judge?” in response to a question concerning his attitudes to homosexual persons.
the principle has been enshrined, both in constitutional provisions and in ethical practice. At a time of particular global danger from religious intolerance and fanaticism, the secular principle is especially important and valuable. It helps to secure common allegiance to living peacefully together, despite religious differences. It is a product of the need felt in England to accommodate Roman Catholics, Protestants, dissenters and others, whilst also respecting the observance of their diverse religious beliefs. Such observance had to be accommodated to beliefs (or lack of beliefs) of others, if violence and hostility were to be avoided or their risks minimised. An appreciation of this history is essential for the adjustment of the demands of some citizens that their religious “faith” forbids respect, or even acknowledgement, of the civic rights of LGBTI people. As Zechariah Chafee Jr put it: “Your right to swing your arms ends just where the other man’s nose begins.” To deny another citizen a right to the legal status of marriage, because the very thought of that possibility is disturbing to a stranger to the relationship, appears to invoke Chafee’s dictum. This is especially so when the benefits of the relationship in issue, if desired by the participants, are so many and substantial — extending to health, financial, spiritual and social advantages.

(6) International Momentum

There is little doubt that the momentum for change on marriage for LGBTI people has assisted the process of adjusting to the idea in particular jurisdictions. When judges in New Zealand in 1998 were asked to construe the Marriage Act 1955 so as to apply it to LGBTI applicants without discrimination, the notion was novel, at least in modern times. All that had recently gone before were a few instances of relationship recognition in Scandinavia, and these were confined to civil partnerships. A judge or legislator asked today to embark upon this issue is no fresh explorer. There are now many decisions of courts in Europe, North and South America, South Africa and Australasia favourable to various aspects of the notion. Many statutes have now been passed. These also provide visible recognition of this civil legal status for millions of people. Even in Asia, lawmakers in Vietnam and Nepal have reportedly begun to consider the concept. Although the idea is still viewed as radical in many parts of the world, and more countries exist where it is unavailable than where it is lawful, the notion is no longer astonishing or unheard of. Lawyers, and especially

81 See, for example, United States Constitution, Amendment 1 and Australian Constitution, s 116.
judges, are understandably cautious about embracing bold ideas. Most prefer to leave these to legislators. Yet often they know that for progress on such matters, lawmakers are even more cautious about the perils of the democratic imperative and insensitive to the demands of minorities.

(7) Institutional Interaction

In most jurisdictions where marriage has become available to LGBTI people, it has come about as a result of interaction between legislators and the judiciary. In the Netherlands, the first law “opening up” marriage was made by Parliament, unaided by the judiciary. However, even that step followed a series of highly influential decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. By those decisions, that Court reversed its earlier rejections of the claims of sexual minorities. It then began to strike down criminal laws against same-sex activity.84

In New Zealand, the road to reform led to Parliament in Wellington passing the law that followed important judicial decisions of the Court of Appeal including the prescient opinion of Thomas J (and Tipping J) upholding the complaint of discrimination made by the same-sex appellants. The decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 2004 on same-sex marriage in that State appeared heterodox, even foolhardy, in the political circumstances in which it was delivered.85 Yet it undoubtedly helped to advance a legal and community movement that culminated in the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell. Even in Australia, where most of the activity has been in legislatures, the moves for change sharpened the judicial insistence that a final decision on marriage equality had to be made in the Federal Parliament. In the event, that has hastened the exceptional proposal for a plebiscite that most proponents of marriage equality reject and resist.

(8) National Differences

Where change is proposed in matters long assumed or considered settled, it is inevitable that the legal culture will affect the way the question of gay marriage will be approached and decided. Thus, in New Zealand, a country with a tradition of legal innovation,86 a small

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84 See, for example, Dudgeon v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHR 149 (ECHR); Norris v Republic of Ireland (1988) 13 EHR 186 (ECHR); and Modinos v Cyprus (1994) 16 EHRR 485 (ECHR). These cases are discussed in Kirby, above n 16, at 104, 138, 149, 214–219 and 226.
85 Goodridge v Department of Health, above n 42.
86 New Zealand was, for example, the first country to enact women’s suffrage; provisions for industrial arbitration; and judicial power to vary testator dispositions by testator’s family maintenance legislation.
population readily engaged in debates over values, and a unicameral legislature, the road to reform was simpler. Even in the United States, the fast-moving acceptance of same-sex marriage laws in so many states (and some territories) undoubtedly supported the resolve of the Supreme Court to intervene, as ultimately and repeatedly it did. It cut the Gordian knot presented by unequal treatment of persons from different states, recognising that the differences arose in a matter intimate, personal and important to the lives of persons concerned.

In Australia, the delay in reaching resolution can be explained in part by the federal system that often makes swift action difficult; the need to secure progress through federal legislation in a highly politicised time; and the absence of a human rights powers to stimulate the courts or the legislative process. About the time that many Western countries were changing their laws on same-sex marriage recognition, some of Australia’s political leaders were hostile towards the idea of gay marriage. When, at last, both the Government and the Opposition in Federal Parliament elected leaders committed to same-sex marriage reform, the politics of the conservative parties restrained swift action of the kind achieved by political leadership in Spain (Zapatero), the United Kingdom (Cameron) and France (Hollande). The recent developments teach once again that the movement for reform will find expression at different times, in different countries, in different places with differing energy.

(9) A Generational Shift

Support for LGBTI rights is typically led by young people. In part, this is because older LGBTI citizens were accustomed to being silent on such matters. To deny their sexuality. To pretend that it was different. To pretend even to their families and loved ones. This is what was expected. Some of the older generation still observe this rule, including those in the law or on the bench. But things are changing. Amongst young people in Western societies, many have friends who identify as LGBTI. They may not be numerous in absolute numbers. However, they are sufficient, remembering the oppression of the Jews and other minorities in Nazi Germany and the lands it conquered. For many young people, sexuality is not an issue. They see churches and religions as deeply hostile to LGBTI people. Within those institutions, those who raise their voices to question the old oppression are themselves sometimes bullied and threatened. This results in a kind of abuse. Indeed, it is another abuse for which religious institutions will eventually be accountable.
Anti-miscegenation laws were originally justified by religious texts. So was apartheid in South Africa. So was slavery worldwide. It will be the privilege of young people to offer leadership and secure reform.

(10) Timing

So when does the unimaginable in the law become inevitable and then desirable? The lesson of the developments that I have described in Wellington, Washington and Canberra teach us this. Timing is critically important. Julius Stone, onetime Dean of Law at the University of Auckland and later Dean at the University of Sydney, adapting Radbruch, taught that, in finding and declaring the law, judges have choices. Those choices may give them leeways for action. Sometimes the exercise of those choices will result in conclusions that the prohibitions on same-sex marriage, contained in state laws, are not constitutionally valid. Politicians also have choices in exercising their powers. Sometimes, however, in sensitive matters involving sexual matters, religious traditions and strong feelings, the politicians may be paralysed into delay or inaction in an ultimately futile effort to postpone the moment of decision.

VII FINAL REMARKS

The issue of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is not one of the most important legal issues of our time. Amongst these, I would rank (1) new efforts to secure, and radically extend, global control and elimination of nuclear weapons, the very existence of which is a threat to the survival of the human species and the biosphere; (2) the provision of timely and effective responses to global climate change, including on the part of the courts and lawyers of the world; (3) the improvement in international efforts to uphold universal human rights, when nation states fail to do so; (4) attention to the global problem of poverty by which more than a billion human beings go to sleep at night hungry and are reduced to a kind of slavery from whose shackles there is no easy release; and (5) the new and urgent attention to international cruelty to animals that are sentient yet regarded as mere things although they clearly feel pain, grief and fear, as we humans do.

87 Julius Stone Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings (Maitland Publications, Sydney, 1964) at 319–321. See also Stone’s discussion of the writings of Gustav Radbruch at 188–189.
There is no doubt, as my own life teaches, that LGBTI people can get by in stable and loving relationships without the benefit of legal recognition. Yet the legal right, of its nature and purpose, should be there for those of full age, otherwise qualified, who desire it. Still, those who advocate its provision must keep their sense of proportionality and clear-sightedness about the priorities. The achievement of same-sex marriage in so many countries so quickly is a testament to the global power of ideas and the international technology by which those ideas are now rapidly spread. Lawyers are sometimes hostile or doubtful about new ideas. At first I was myself, in respect of marriage equality. Even now, my partner and I, who have shared our lives over 47 years, are not certain that we would marry if the status were available to us in Australia in law. But we claim the option to decide. That privilege has arrived in New Zealand and the United States. Australia lags behind but will eventually catch up. The rest of the world is a different story.