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Coleman v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2020] NZCA 210 (2 June 2020)

Last Updated: 12 June 2020

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

The appeal is dismissed.
____________________________________________________________________

REASONS

Para No.
Brown and Mallon JJ [1]
Simon France J [50]

BROWN AND MALLON JJ
(Given by Brown J)

Introduction

[1] Mr Coleman is serving a sentence of two years’ intensive supervision (ISUP) which includes special conditions under ss 54G and 54I of the Sentencing Act 2002 (the Act) imposing a curfew between the hours of 8.00 pm and 8.00 am daily and requiring him to undertake a reintegration programme for up to 12 hours per day seven days a week.^[1] For that purpose he is required to reside in housing at Tōruatanga which is administered by the Department of Corrections (the Department) adjacent to the Christchurch Men’s Prison.
[2] By application dated 5 May 2020 Mr Coleman sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming to be detained because his approved address is a prison, and because he is required to reside there and to not leave at all during the curfew period and to not leave without prior permission and accompaniment otherwise. Such detention was said to be unlawful because he is not subject to a sentence of imprisonment and the orders for supervision do not specify special conditions requiring him to remain at the approved address at all times. The respondent did not contest that Mr Coleman was detained but contended that his detention was lawful.
[3] In an oral judgment following a hearing on 8 May 2020 Nation J declined the application.^[2] In a reasons judgment of 18 May 2020 the Judge ruled that habeas corpus was not an appropriate procedure for what he considered to be a challenge by Mr Coleman to either the administration of his sentence or the conditions of the sentence. He further held that to the extent Mr Coleman was detained, the detention was lawful.^[3]
[4] Mr Coleman appeals against that judgment.
[5] When this matter first came before us, as in the High Court, Mr Coleman challenged his detention as unlawful because he claimed it went further than what was authorised on the face of the interim supervision order (ISO) and ISUP conditions. We explored with counsel whether it would be possible to craft an order identifying those periods when Mr Coleman was lawfully required to remain at Tōruatanga and which consequently should be excluded from the order sought. The hearing was adjourned to enable the respondent to respond to our request to provide specific details of Mr Coleman’s reintegration programme.
[6] However at the resumed hearing Mr Coleman contended that the respondent has no power to detain him at all and that he cannot be “detained pre-emptively” to ensure compliance with the ISO and ISUP conditions, including the night curfew. Hence he requested that a writ be issued in the standard form in the schedule to the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 without amendment or conditions.
[7] As this Court observed in Nottingham v Ardern, the assessment as to whether or not restrictions upon an individual’s movement constitute a restriction of their liberty, and therefore detention for the purposes of the Habeas Corpus Act, requires an examination of all relevant facts and an evaluative judgment as to whether or not Parliament intended that the established circumstances satisfy the requirements for detention in that Act.^[4]

Factual context

[8] Mr Coleman pleaded guilty to a charge of exploitative sexual connection and on 3 July 2015 was sentenced in the District Court at Auckland to imprisonment for four years and two months.^[5] An appeal was dismissed in the High Court on 18 December 2015.^[6]
[9] In December 2018 the Department applied in the District Court at Waitakere for an extended supervision order (ESO) and an ISO. The ESO application, which was to be heard on 25 March 2020, could not proceed because of the COVID-19 lockdown and is still to be heard. However on 5 April 2019 an ISO under s 107FA of the Parole Act 2002 was made in the District Court at Waitakere.^[7] The judgment records that Mr Coleman and his counsel both accepted that the ISO could be made by consent. The ISO contained standard and special residential conditions including GPS monitoring at all times.
[10] Mr Coleman failed to answer calls by the monitoring team as required by the GPS monitoring condition. He pleaded guilty to a charge of a breach of the supervision order. He also pleaded guilty to two other charges of assault and intimidation arising out of his behaviour in making unwanted advances to and pursuing young women.
[11] A Department pre-sentence report described Mr Coleman as having a disordered lifestyle and being unable to maintain his own accommodation to an acceptable sanitary standard without external support. The report further referred to the Department’s concerns about the charges involving Mr Coleman approaching women which paralleled his previous offending pathways, stating:

This is of high concern for the Department and, as such, Mr Coleman would benefit from a high level supported living accommodation with a reintegration programme where his lifestyle could be structured in a way that encourages him to engage in productive activities as opposed to ruminating about women and placing himself in high risk situations. The Department of Corrections is working towards sourcing an appropriate provider, however accommodation is not confirmed at this time. Therefore, it is recommended that there is a condition whereby he engages in a programme for up to 12 hours per day. This would allow for Mr Coleman to obtain the best assistance to allow him to develop reintegrative skills and to mitigate his risk in the community. If accommodation with a suitable programme provider is located, a curfew condition for the remaining 12 hours will be required to ensure consistency with other residents. It will also mitigate the risk of Mr Coleman leaving the property unaccompanied and placing himself in high risk situations.

[12] On 23 October 2019 Mr Coleman was sentenced to two years’ intensive supervision on the standard conditions set out in s 54F of the Act. In addition the Court imposed the following special conditions under ss 54G and 54I:

1. To undertake, engage in and complete a reintegration programme approved by your Probation Officer for up to twelve hours per day, seven days a week. Whilst participating in the programme, to submit to being supervised and monitored as necessary to ensure your attendance at classes or participating in other activities associated with the programme. To abide by the rules of the programme to the satisfaction of your Probation Officer.
2. Not to loiter near public transportation hubs and/including bus-stops, train stations, and ferry terminals, unless you have the prior written permissions of your managing probation officer. ...
3. Not to use any form of public transport unless you have the prior written permission of your managing probation officer.
4. To be at your approved address between the hours of 8.00PM and 8.00AM daily unless you have a prior written approval of a probation officer.

[13] An amended order recording those conditions, receipt of which Mr Coleman acknowledged, advised that failure to comply with the terms of the sentence without reasonable excuse might result in an offence punishable by up to six months’ imprisonment or a fine up to $1,500 under s 70A of the Act.
[14] Mr Coleman’s approved accommodation is at Tōruatanga, a facility located on Christchurch Men’s Prison land but not part of the prison, being located outside the wire of the main prison and having a separate entrance. The manager of Tōruatanga explained in an affidavit filed in the High Court that the purpose of Tōruatanga is to provide a transitional housing and support option for people with high and complex needs who are subject to community-based sentences and orders and who require a high level of reintegrative support and supervision as a bridge between prison and community living.
[15] It comprises a community hub and three standalone houses. Mr Coleman occupies one of those houses which is a fenced property with a gate which is not locked and often is not closed. There is a fence around the entirety of the Tōruatanga property with a front gate which is normally open during the day but which, we understand, is locked at night. However during the Level 4 COVID-19 restrictions the front gate to Tōruatanga was also locked during the day.

The High Court judgment

[16] By reference to an affidavit of Mr Coleman in support of the application, the Judge summarised his complaint in this way:^[8]

Mr Coleman said he lives in a house on the property of Christchurch Men’s Prison in Templeton, that he had been brought down to Christchurch by Probation when he would rather be back in Auckland. His house was within a secured section with two other houses, like a gated community. People there could not “just come and go”. Since he had been living at this address, he had not been allowed to leave the property by himself. There were four scheduled outings per week. On each occasion, he was accompanied by at least one or two, usually two, staff members. He was only allowed to go to the supermarket once a week. When he was not doing a programme at the property, he had no organised tuition or classes to attend.

[17] The Judge then recorded counsel for Mr Coleman Ms Wham’s oral argument as follows:^[9]

• (a) Mr Coleman, under his sentence of intensive supervision and ISO, was subject to a curfew only between the hours of 10 pm and 8 am;
• (b) Mr Coleman was detained within a small site managed and staffed by the Department and only able to leave it with advance permission and when accompanied;
• (c) although Mr Coleman was subject to a basic programme at the site, there was substantial downtime when he was not involved with that programme but was not permitted to leave the property;
• (d) Mr Coleman was not subject to any order or sentence that required him to be at the property at all times; and
• (e) the constraints he was under were such to mean that he was detained for habeas corpus purposes.

[18] For the Department it was submitted that pursuant to s 14(1A) of the Habeas Corpus Act the Court should refuse the application because a writ of habeas corpus was not the appropriate procedure for considering the complaints made by Mr Coleman.^[10] Although said to be potentially moot, it was not contested that Mr Coleman was detained. However it was submitted that the detention was lawful in terms of both the ISUP and the ISO.
[19] After discussing relevant authorities^[11] the Judge concluded:

[33] In this instance, Mr Coleman was not subject to a prison sentence. There was however no dispute that he is subject to intensive supervision. It was not suggested that he was not required to reside at Tōruatanga as a condition of that sentence. It was accepted that he was subject to a curfew which restrained him from leaving that place and that, while there, he was required to participate in any such programme as might be directed in accordance with the conditions of intensive supervision. Mr Coleman was attempting to use the habeas corpus writ procedure to challenge an element of the restraints or detention he was under pursuant to his sentence of intensive supervision in the same way as the two prisoners did in Bennett as to their prison sentence. As the Court of Appeal held was the case in Bennett, an appropriate procedure to do this is by judicial review.

[20] The Judge nevertheless proceeded to discuss the issue of the lawfulness of the conceded detention. The Judge identified the essence of Mr Coleman’s complaint as being he is unlawfully detained because, when he is not subject to curfew and not participating in a programme as required by his probation officer, he is unlawfully restrained from leaving Tōruatanga and going where he wishes.
[21] With reference to the programme which Mr Coleman is required to undertake the Judge said:

[42] The evidence from [the Tōruatanga manager] satisfies me that Mr Coleman is engaging in a rehabilitation programme through having to live at Tōruatanga. Mr Coleman’s needs are so basic and the risks to himself and others in the community so intense that the reintegration programme requires him to stay at Tōruatanga unless he can be accompanied on approved outings. The programme also allows the staff to interact with him in a way that might assist him to complete the most basic tasks that might, at some stage, enable him to live within the community.

...

[44] Pursuant to s 54H, for the purposes of s 54G, programme means, amongst other matters, “placement in the care of any appropriate person, persons, or agency approved by the chief executive of the Department of Corrections ...”. Mr Coleman has been placed in the care of the Department at Tōruatanga. Mr Coleman is thus subject to a programme in accordance with the conditions of his sentence of intensive supervision through having to reside at Tōruatanga. It is through that condition Mr Coleman is required to remain at Tōruatanga for 12 hours per day in addition to being subject to the curfews imposed as part of the ISO and intensive supervision sentence.

[22] Hence the Judge concluded that Mr Coleman must comply with the requirements to remain at Tōruatanga and not leave there without the Department’s approval and oversight. To the extent that Mr Coleman is detained at Tōruatanga, the Judge was satisfied such detainment is lawful.

Grounds of appeal

[23] The notice of appeal asserts that the Judge erred by finding that Mr Coleman was lawfully detained and that habeas corpus is not the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations against the respondent. Mr Coleman seeks the following judgment from this Court:

• (a) that habeas corpus is the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations against the respondent;
• (b) that he is detained; and
• (c) his detention is unlawful.

Is Mr Coleman detained?

[24] Detention is defined in the Habeas Corpus Act to include every form of restraint of liberty of the person.^[12] In Drever v Auckland South Corrections Facility^[13] this Court observed that the concept of detention under the Habeas Corpus Act refers to circumstances where a person is held in “close custody”, for example detention in prison or in an immigration or deportation context.^[14] In that case the special conditions of parole were held not to amount to detention.
[25] It appears that the respondent’s concession that Mr Coleman is detained was influenced by the decision in Wilson v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections where Collins J held that ESO conditions requiring Mr Wilson to reside at a specified address and not leave the Whanganui area without prior written consent were a restraint of his liberty fitting within the definition of detention in the Habeas Corpus Act.^[15]
[26] However Mr Coleman’s sentence of intensive supervision is a community‑based sentence.^[16] His initial placement was in a house in Christchurch but it is apparent from the evidence that his challenging behaviour could not be managed in that environment. His present residence, while on prison land, is separate from the prison itself. We accept counsel for the Department Ms Boshier’s submission that the location of his residence on prison land is not determinative and is not detention in and of itself.
[27] We also agree with Ms Boshier’s submission that Mr Coleman’s liberty is not restrained in the sense that he is not physically prevented from leaving his residence. No doubt if he did so, breach action would follow, similar to situations of breaches by persons granted bail or parole. However there is no physical impediment rendering it impossible for him to leave Tōruatanga. Ms Boshier submitted that it is arguable therefore that the special conditions of the ISUP and the ISO do not amount to detention for the purposes of the Act.
[28] However orders which have the effect of confining a person to a particular location may be viewed as in the nature of custody. Clark and McCoy write:^[17]

The custody requirement includes other forms of restriction short of imprisonment where the applicant is subject to restrictions not shared by the public generally. It includes house arrest, being ordered to reside in a certain village, being under arrest but not yet in a police station or prison, and being detained at a military unit or base. The same argument could be extended to a person on parole or on probation, and possibly to a person released on bail though the local authorities are slight. In principle, though there is no habeas corpus case on the matter, the various forms of home detention and weekend leave, now favoured in modern prisons or corrections legislation, would be sufficient custody for habeas corpus purposes. In one jurisdiction explicit provision is made to the effect that a prisoner who is on weekend leave is deemed to be in custody.

(Footnotes omitted).

[29] By that process of reasoning certainly the 12 hour curfew to which Mr Coleman is subject would constitute detention. That conclusion derives support from Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ where the requirement to remain in residence for 18 hours a day between 4.00 pm and 10.00 am was described as a “classic detention or confinement”.^[18] Very recently in finding a curfew to a particular address between the hours of 11.00 pm and 7.00 am to be imprisonment at common law, the United Kingdom Supreme Court in R (Jollah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department emphasised the crucial difference between voluntary compliance with an instruction and enforced compliance with that instruction.^[19] As in Jollah, the present case is one of enforced, not voluntary, compliance.
[30] The status of the reintegration programme is less certain. A programme under s 54H of the Act may be residential or non-residential in nature. It may involve the placement of a person in the care of others (if approved by the respondent) including a marae, an ethnic or cultural group or a religious group. While it may well be the case that a person in such care would be subject to restrictions not shared by the public generally, that is not the sole criterion. There must be a restriction on liberty analogous to close custody.
[31] As this Court recently observed in Ardern:^[20]

[20] ... In order to constitute detention under the Act, restraint of a person’s liberty must entail more than intermittent or limited constraint upon his or her general right of movement. Not every curtailment of the right to movement affirmed by s 18 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 constitutes detention under the Act. Detention under the Act requires holding a person in close custody or in a similarly restrictive environment not shared by the public generally.

(Footnote omitted).

[32] Like the curfew, Mr Coleman’s presence at Tōruatanga during the period of the programme (potentially 12 hours per day, seven days a week) is not voluntary but enforced. As Baroness Hale said in Jollah, he is “obliged to stay where he is ordered to stay whether he wants to do so or not”.^[21] Although we would require more detailed argument than the circumstances of the present appeal permitted in order to rule definitively that it was Parliament’s intention that the programmes envisaged by s 54H would constitute detention for the purpose of the Habeas Corpus Act, we consider that Ms Boshier’s concession below was responsibly made and we proceed on the basis that Mr Coleman is detained while under the curfew and for the duration of his particular programme.

Is the detention unlawful?

[33] At the hearing on 21 May 2020 Mr Coleman accepted that he is lawfully obliged to abide by the curfew and participate in programme activities at Tōruatanga. However he submitted that the respondent is detaining him beyond what is permitted by the ISO and ISUP conditions.
[34] The point was made that special condition 1 of the ISUP requires Mr Coleman to engage in and complete a reintegration programme approved by his probation officer “for up to” 12 hours per day, seven days a week. But it was contended that the respondent had not demonstrated that it is providing programme activities for the full 12 hours per day. On the contrary, it was said that Mr Coleman’s evidence was to the effect that he is rarely doing anything structured or meaningful.
[35] Ms Wham submitted that the Judge who imposed the ISO and later the ISUP sentence did not intend that Mr Coleman would be confined to Tōruatanga at all times. If that was the intention, there would have been no reason to impose ISUP special conditions restricting him from using public transport or approaching public transport hubs. Similarly a condition not to enter parks or recreational areas would be unnecessary if it was intended that he be detained all of the time.
[36] In short Mr Coleman contended that when he is neither subject to the curfew nor engaged in programme activities, then the residual conditions only go so far as to prevent him from going to particular places but do not prevent him from entering the community at large.
[37] Ms Boshier construed the argument to be that the programme conditions were being misused to monitor Mr Coleman unlawfully, observing that such an argument did not find favour with this Court’s majority judgment in Woods v Police.^[22]
[38] The respondent did not accept the inadequacies in the programme alleged by Mr Coleman. However it was difficult for the Court to engage with the argument in the abstract and without reference to the programme itself which was not before us. Consequently the hearing on 21 May was adjourned and the respondent was requested to provide Mr Coleman’s reintegration programme to the Court by midday on 25 May 2020.
[39] The document which was filed, dated 20 May 2020, is entitled “Dylan Coleman Reintegration Plan”. It addressed five assessed reintegrative needs:

• (a) accommodation;
• (b) education/training;
• (c) skills for life;
• (d) whānau, friends and community support; and
• (e) physical and mental health.

[40] Annexed to the plan was an example of Mr Coleman’s “Weekly Planner” for June 2020 showing the various activities planned for the different periods of each day of a single week commencing at 7.45 am and concluding with a time slot “5 pm onwards”. Relevant to Mr Coleman’s complaints about his not being permitted to leave the property alone, the skills for life section of the plan includes the following:

Dylan will be accompanied by staff on all outings so that he is assisted with managing his interactions with the public safely and appropriately, to receive guidance in the moment, and feedback from staff.

The annexed weekly planner made provision for shopping expeditions on Tuesday, Friday and Saturday afternoons.

[41] There were also several slots designated simply as “exercise” or “rest”. The final time slot for each evening from 5.00 pm onwards was described as “dinner/hobbies/interests”. In a supplementary submission of 26 May 2020 Ms Wham submitted that the programme plan did not demonstrate that Mr Coleman was obliged to be on site at Tōruatanga and/or accompanied by staff at all times. She said:

4. The weekly plan exemplar shows a number of time slots where the appellant would not need supervision or to be onsite at Tōruatanga to complete the tasks at hand, for example during rest, exercise or hobbies/interests periods. It is submitted that “rest” is not an activity associated with the programme.

[42] Our very brief review in the context of a habeas corpus application is not to be read as either criticism of or endorsement of the material provided as amounting to an appropriate reintegrative programme. However two significant acknowledgements were made concerning the programme in the course of the resumed hearing on 27 May. First, Ms Wham accepted that the Court has jurisdiction to impose a condition that requires an offender to engage in a reintegration programme for 12 hours per day seven days a week. Secondly, Ms Boshier accepted that if the programme which was put in place was for (say) ten hours per day, then there would be no restriction on Mr Coleman which prevented him leaving the property on his own during that remaining two hour period.
[43] We consider that Ms Boshier’s acknowledgement is properly made. As Ms Wham had submitted, the approved programme was to be for “up to” 12 hours per day, seven days a week. To the extent that the programme did not occupy that entire period, we consider it is plain that Mr Coleman would not be breaching the standard or special conditions by being absent from Tōruatanga during that period, subject of course to his complying with other conditions which placed constraints on his conduct. However if an approved reintegrative programme occupied the entire non-curfew period, then the opportunity for Mr Coleman to leave the property unaccompanied would not arise.
[44] In summary, Mr Coleman’s detention in the form of his being required to be present at Tōruatanga for the duration of a reintegration programme imposed as a special condition of the ISUP will not be unlawful, nor will his evening curfew. However if he were prevented from leaving the property during any period in respect of which there was no reintegration programme in operation and no curfew, such detention would be unlawful. Nevertheless, given Ms Boshier’s acknowledgement,^[23] it follows that the basis upon which the application for the writ was advanced at the hearing on 21 May 2020 evaporated. The issue that remains for Mr Coleman — whether the programme, as it is presently structured, properly requires him to be at Tōruatanga for 12 hours, and whether, if it is to apply for the entire period of the ISUP, that is inconsistent with the conditions of the ISUP providing for a programme of “up to” 12 hours and the conditions concerning his use of public transport — is one for judicial review, not habeas corpus.
[45] However in her supplementary submissions of 26 May 2020 Ms Wham focussed her attention on the powers of the respondent vis-à-vis Mr Coleman. Drawing a comparison with the powers of arrest in the Parole Act, the Sentencing Act and the Corrections Act 2004, Ms Wham submitted that the respondent has no general power to detain Mr Coleman. The submission stated:

11. It is submitted that the appellant’s curfew, programme, and residence conditions impose positive obligations on the appellant to comply with them; they do not afford the respondent a power of detention either alone or in combination. Were the accommodation and programme provider someone other than the Department of Corrections this proposition might be clearer.

...

15. The respondent has no power to detain the appellant. The appellant cannot be detained pre-emptively to ensure compliance with his conditions, including the curfew. A general writ demanding the release of the appellant will not abrogate his obligation to comply with conditions nor constrain the respondent from invoking breach action if necessary.

[46] It is nowhere alleged, and we do not understand it to be contended, that the respondent’s officers have physically sought to restrain Mr Coleman from leaving the property. However Ms Wham submitted that if a representation is made by the respondent that enforcement action would be taken in the event Mr Coleman was to leave the property, then that would amount to detention. We do not accept that it is an act of detention for the designated provider or carer (whether it be the respondent or, for example, the Salvation Army) merely to explain to Mr Coleman the statutory consequences of s 70A of the Act if he were to leave the property in breach of the special conditions.
[47] It is not correct to characterise such advice as pre-emptive detention to ensure compliance with Mr Coleman’s conditions including the curfew. The giving of such advice, which is in Mr Coleman’s own best interests, would be a responsible act on the part of a person who had the care of another in terms of s 54H(c). We do not view it as amounting to what Baroness Hale referred to as “threats, whether of force or of legal process”.^[24] It does not provide a basis for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus in the standard form to the caregiver in whose charge Mr Coleman is placed by the ISUP conditions.

Is habeas corpus the appropriate procedure for considering Mr Coleman’s allegations?

[48] As we are not satisfied that there is unlawful detention on either of the bases advanced by Mr Coleman, it is not necessary to have recourse to s 14(1A) of the Habeas Corpus Act. However we agree with the Judge that Mr Coleman is essentially seeking to use the habeas corpus procedure to take issue with the administration of his sentence by criticising the content,^[25] or possibly even attacking the bona fides, of the programme reflected in the reintegrative plan document. We agree with the Judge that an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle to advance such a complaint.

Result

[49] The appeal is dismissed.

SIMON FRANCE J

[50] I agree with the majority. As regards the submissions of the appellant at [45], I consider the error in the appellant’s approach is seeking to classify aspects of the detention as separate or fresh detentions. The programme (probably) detains Mr Coleman for the hours in which it operates. Part of the characteristics that make it detention are that the programme requires him to be on site for the whole time, not to leave without accompaniment, and only when the supervisors agree. Another characteristic that contributes to it being detention is that Mr Coleman is threatened with formal breach responses should he seek to leave the property during the programme’s hours. Advising Mr Coleman that there are sanctions for breaching does not alter the nature of an already existing state of detention.
[51] The legality issue for habeas corpus purposes is whether such a programme is permitted as a condition of an ISUP. It is conceded, correctly, that such a programme is permitted. It is therefore a lawful detention.
[52] The appellant’s complaint is that certain features of the programme (for example rest) are not valid features and should not be part of it. If those times were not included he would be free, during those times, to leave the property. It is common ground that would be the consequence of shortening the daily duration of the programme. I agree whether it should be altered in that way is not an appropriate habeas corpus issue.

Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor, Christchurch for Respondent

^[1] He is also subject to an interim supervision order under s 107FA of the Parole Act 2002: see [9] below.

^[2] Coleman v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2020] NZHC 947.

^[3] Coleman v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2020] NZHC 1033 [Reasons judgment].

^[4] Nottingham v Ardern [2020] NZCA 144 at [21].

^[5] R v Coleman [2015] NZDC 12457.

^[6] Coleman v R [2015] NZHC 3298.

^[7] Police v Coleman [2019] NZDC 6499.

^[8] Reasons judgment, above n 3, at [3].

^[9] At [4].

^[10] At [6].

^[11] Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2005] 1 NZLR 161; Wilson v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections [2018] NZHC 2322, [2018] NZAR 1357; and Bennett v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison [2001] NZCA 286; [2002] 1 NZLR 616 (CA).

^[12] Habeas Corpus Act 2001, s 3.

^[13] Drever v Auckland South Corrections Facility [2019] NZCA 346, [2019] NZAR 1519.

^[14] At [27] and [29].

^[15] Wilson v Chief Executive, Department of Corrections, above n 11, at [10].

^[16] Sentencing Act 2002, s 44(1)(c).

^[17] David Clark and Gerard McCoy Habeas Corpus: Australia, New Zealand and The South Pacific (2nd ed, Federation Press, Sydney, 2018) at 68–69.

^[18] Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2007] UKHL 45, [2008] AC 385 at [59].

^[19] R (Jollah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 4, [2020] 2 WLR 418 at [27].

^[20] Nottingham v Ardern, above n 4.

^[21] R (Jollah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 19, at [24].

^[22] Woods v Police [2019] NZCA 446. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was granted: Woods v Police [2020] NZSC 3.

^[23] At [42] above.

^[24] R (Jollah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, above n 19, at [24].

^[25] A draft writ submitted by Mr Coleman following the hearing sought his release at all times apart from:

1. during the hours of curfew under the orders of interim supervision and/or intensive supervision; and

2. during the hours of programme activities where attendance or supervision is required, excluding hours designated for rest, exercise, or hobbies and interests.