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Teika v Te Whatu Ora Health New Zealand [2024] NZCA 390 (19 August 2024)

Last Updated: 26 August 2024

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. There is no order as to costs.

____________________________________________________________________

REASONS OF THE COURT

(Given by Cooke J)

• [1] Rueben Teika appeals from a decision of the High Court dismissing his application for habeas corpus under the Habeas Corpus Act 2001.^[1] Mr Teika is currently remanded at Te Whare Manaaki, a secure inpatient admission unit at Hillmorton Hospital in Christchurch. He contends that the legal authority for his detention no longer applies and that he should be released.

Background

• [2] The background is set out in the decision of the High Court.^[2] Mr Teika was charged with five charges of sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection and one charge of obtaining by deception. On 4 April 2024, the District Court found him unfit to stand trial under s 8A of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (the CPMIP). He was remanded in custody in prison pending an involvement hearing.
• [3] Mr Teika then made a first application for habeas corpus on the basis there was no power to remand him in custody in a prison following him being found unfit to plead. On 29 April 2024, this application was granted by Dunningham J.^[3] As a consequence, Mr Teika was remanded to Te Whare Manaaki.
• [4] An involvement hearing under s 10 of the CPMIP took place on 15 May 2024. On 5 July 2024, a finding of involvement was made by the District Court.^[4] The Court ordered that inquiries be made to determine the most suitable method of dealing with Mr Teika under ss 24 or 25 of the CPMIP. That order was made under s 23(1) of the CPMIP. Mr Teika continued to be remanded to Te Whare Manaaki for that purpose.
• [5] Section 23(4) of the CPMIP requires the inquiries to be completed as quickly as practicable and, in any event, within 30 days of the order under s 23(1) being made. That period of time expired on 3 August 2024.
• [6] On 2 August 2024, the matter was called again in the District Court. At that stage, counsel for Mr Teika contended that Mr Teika could no longer be detained under s 23 or any other provision following the expiry of the 30 day period. The District Court nevertheless ordered that he continue to be remanded in a secure facility until a scheduled disposition hearing on 26 September 2024.
• [7] Mr Teika’s second application for habeas corpus was then made to the High Court.
• [8] In the meantime, on 6 August 2024, the District Court made a fresh order for inquiries under s 23(1) of the CPMIP. The order for remand requires Mr Teika to be returned to the Christchurch District Court on 30 August 2024.
• [9] The application for habeas corpus was heard urgently by the High Court, and judgment dismissing the application was delivered on 8 August 2024. On the same day, a notice of appeal was lodged in this Court, and in accordance with the Habeas Corpus Act the appeal was given priority and was heard by us on 14 August 2024.^[5]

Appellant’s argument

• [10] Section 23 of the CPMIP provides:

23 Inquiries about persons found unfit to stand trial or insane

(1) When a person is found unfit to stand trial or is acquitted on account of his or her insanity, the court must order that inquiries be made to determine the most suitable method of dealing with the person under section 24 or section 25.

(2) For the purposes of the inquiries under subsection (1), the court must either—

(a) make it a condition of a grant of bail that the person go to a place approved by the court for the purpose of the inquiries; or

(b) remand the person to a hospital or a secure facility.

(3) Despite any provision in the Bail Act 2000, in deciding whether or not to grant bail for the purposes of subsection (2)(a), the need to protect the public is the paramount consideration.

(4) The inquiries under subsection (1) must be completed as quickly as practicable and, in any event, within 30 days after the date of the order under which the inquiries are made.

(5) A person who has an intellectual disability must, during the period in which the inquiries are made under subsection (1), be assessed under Part 3 of the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003.

• [11] Mr Williams, for Mr Teika, argued that the time limit referred to in s 23(4) means that Mr Teika can only be detained at Te Whare Manaaki for 30 days to allow the inquiries contemplated by this section to be undertaken and that there is no jurisdiction to extend that period of time or other lawful basis to detain Mr Teika at the facility, or otherwise, beyond 30 days. For this reason, he must now be released from detention.
• [12] The High Court did not accept this argument. In particular, Dunningham J did not agree that all stages through to disposition under s 24 of the CPMIP had to take place within the 30 days.^[6] The Judge considered that it was illogical to suggest there was no continuing power to remand someone in a facility when a disposition hearing under s 24 had not yet taken place, and that it could not have been intended that a person would be released into the community no matter how much risk they posed to the public.^[7] The Judge accordingly found that Mr Teika’s detention had been lawfully ordered pursuant to s 23(2)(b) and the writ of habeas corpus was declined.^[8]
• [13] On appeal, Mr Williams argued that the inquiries under s 23, and subsequent hearing to assess which orders under ss 24–28 should be made, must occur within 30 days. He argued that this is the plain meaning of the words of the CPMIP, and it is supported by the legislative history concerning the changes to what was originally s 115(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985, which had only allowed a remand to a facility for the purpose of such inquiries for a period not exceeding seven days. The period had been extended to 30 days to allow the assessment steps to take place, but Parliament had decided that a longer period than 30 days was not justified. Section 23 is also different from the provisions of ss 38(2) and 40 of the CPMIP which allow the period of detention for the purpose of assessment to be extended to a maximum of 30 days with the consent of the person detained.
• [14] Mr Williams submitted that there is no authority to detain Mr Teika under any other legislation. Mr Teika has been found unfit to stand trial, so there is no longer a basis upon which he can be remanded in custody in prison, as Dunningham J had found in her first habeas corpus decision.^[9]
• [15] It is also important to interpret these provisions in accordance with fundamental rights, including the right to be free from arbitrary detention under s 22 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.^[10] The CPMIP has serious shortcomings.^[11] These shortcomings are a matter for Parliament as it has chosen to impose a time limit on the inquiries, and the corresponding ability to detain a person in a hospital or a secure facility. There is no statutory provision that justifies the appellant’s detention so he should be released.

Analysis

• [16] We agree with the High Court Judge that the argument advanced by Mr Teika was one that was appropriately addressed by an application for habeas corpus under the Habeas Corpus Act.^[12] Whilst a warrant for detention has been produced, the argument advanced by the appellant is properly susceptible to fair and sensible summary determination under the Habeas Corpus Act.^[13]
• [17] We do not accept, however, that the question of Mr Teika’s lawful detention is ascertained solely by looking at the provisions of the CPMIP, and in particular s 23. It is necessary to consider the broader legislative framework, particularly the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (the CPA), and the Bail Act 2000. We consider that the lawful authority for Mr Teika’s detention is to be found in the CPA as well as the CPMIP.
• [18] Once criminal proceedings are commenced by the filing of charging documents in accordance with s 14 of the CPA, the regime under that Act is engaged. Under s 167, such proceedings may then be adjourned. Section 168 of the CPA provides:

168 Dealing with defendant on adjournment

(1) If a proceeding is adjourned, a judicial officer or Registrar may, subject to sections 171 and 172, and in accordance with any applicable provisions of the Bail Act 2000,—

(a) allow the defendant to go at large; or

(b) grant the defendant bail under the Bail Act 2000; or

(c) if the defendant is liable on conviction to a sentence of imprisonment or if the defendant has been arrested, remand the defendant in custody.

...

• [19] The Bail Act sets out the legal framework that the court must apply in relation to the release of defendants on bail when a proceeding is adjourned.^[14] That will likely include an assessment of whether there is just cause for continuing detention.^[15] Under s 169 of the CPA, a defendant may also be detained in a hospital or secure facility if they are mentally impaired, and their mental condition requires them to be detained in a hospital or secure facility instead of a prison because it is in their own interests.
• [20] We consider that it is these provisions, and particularly s 168(1) of the CPA that provides the source of the lawful authority to detain Mr Teika rather than s 23 of the CPMIP. Mr Teika remains charged with an imprisonable offence even though he has been found unfit to plead under s 8A of the CPMIP, and a person in his position remains subject to the provisions in the CPA unless the charges are dismissed or permanently stayed.^[16] In the meantime, Mr Teika remains a defendant charged with an imprisonable offence subject to the CPA regime.
• [21] The provisions of s 23(2) of the CPMIP assume the continuation of the regime under the CPA and the Bail Act in this respect. Section 23(2)(a) contemplates the variation of conditions of bail for a defendant to go to the place for the purpose of the inquiries contemplated by s 23(1). A grant of bail is made under the Bail Act as contemplated by s 168(1)(b) of the CPA. Similarly, s 23(2)(b) is concerned with where the remand contemplated by s 168(1)(c) of the CPA is to take place. A person remanded in custody in a prison can have the place of the remand changed to a hospital or a secure facility to enable the inquiries contemplated by s 23(1) to take place.
• [22] So, s 23 is not the provision under which the detention is authorised. Rather, it provides additional powers to the court in relation to where a person is remanded, or where the defendant is to go as a condition of bail, so that the inquiries contemplated by s 23(1) can be made.
• [23] We do not accept Mr Williams’ submission that detention under s 168(1)(c) of the CPA is excluded by the CPMIP because s 7(1) of the CPA provides that it is to be “read subject to any special provisions of any other enactment relating to the procedure in any particular case”. We do not consider that s 23 of the CPMIP establishes a separate and inconsistent detention regime. The statutory provisions are complementary and operate together. To the extent that the first habeas corpus decision in relation to Mr Teika involved a finding that an unfit person cannot be remanded in custody in a prison we take a different view, although we agree with the Judge that a hospital or secure facility is likely to be the more appropriate place for remand in such circumstances.^[17]
• [24] We also do not accept Mr Williams’ submission that, as a matter of fact, Mr Teika will never be fit to stand trial so there is no prospect of him being liable on conviction to a sentence of imprisonment such that s 168(1)(c) of the CPA could no longer apply to him. Section 168 of the CPA was engaged as soon as Mr Teika was charged and brought before the court. On each occasion when the proceedings were adjourned, a remand in custody was authorised under that section. That authority continues until the charges are disposed of.
• [25] These provisions also apply to someone found not guilty by reason of insanity following trial, as contemplated by s 20 of the CPMIP. The relevant proceedings are not yet finally determined and need to be adjourned pending a final disposition. Sections 23–28 of the CPMIP then apply to a defendant found not guilty but criminally responsible on account of insanity under s 20, and the relevant detention can be to a hospital or secure facility for the purpose of the necessary inquiries.
• [26] It follows that the primary reason for rejecting Mr Teika’s arguments that was given in the High Court — that their consequence was that if the inquiries contemplated by s 23(4) are not conducted within 30 days mentally unwell defendants must be released into the community no matter how unsafe they are — does not arise. The CPA regime, including detention under s 168(1)(c), continues to be applicable and a remand in custody accordingly remains available.
• [27] But we agree with the Judge that a remand to a hospital or secure facility under s 23(2) is contemplated for such persons. We also agree that a remand under this provision may continue for longer than 30 days.^[18] Unlike ss 38 and 40 of the CPMIP, which expressly provide that a detention may only last for 14 days (or, if extended under s 40, 30 days), s 23 does not prescribe a time limit for detention. It only prescribes a time limit for the undertaking of the contemplated inquiries. That different formulation is understandable given that the assessment under s 38 will be when a defendant’s mental fitness is first being addressed. As a consequence, the provisions tightly prescribe the period of time that such a detention can last for the purpose of undertaking such an assessment. But once the court has found that a person is unfit to stand trial following an assessment by at least two health assessors under s 8A of the CPMIP, the continuation of detention in such a hospital or secure facility is more readily justified, and preferable to detention in a prison.
• [28] There is no time limit on detention in the hospital or secure facility prescribed in s 23. The only prescribed condition is that the detention be for the purpose of the inquiries referred to in s 23(1). We consider that it follows that an order under s 23(2), which varies the location and purpose of the defendant’s remand, need not be time bound. It may nevertheless be good practice for the proceedings to be called again in 30 days’ time, perhaps with the defendant’s attendance excused, to review compliance with s 23(4). But the actual order varies the location of the remand under s 168 of the CPA to a hospital or a secure facility rather than to a prison, in cases where bail is not appropriate. The court continues to have jurisdiction to further amend the terms of remand, or to grant bail, to ensure that the defendant’s rights are properly protected.
• [29] We also agree with the Judge that s 23(4) only makes reference to completing the “inquiries”.^[19] It is not necessary for the “sufficient information” referred to in s 24(1), including the evidence of the health assessors contemplated by s 24(1)(b), to be available within 30 days, or for the disposition hearing itself to take place within that time frame. That view is consistent with the approach taken in Maaka-Wanahi v Attorney-General in relation to the related provisions in s 38(2) of the CPMIP.^[20]
• [30] Mr Williams submitted that the analysis outlined above was unlikely to be the correct interpretation of the provisions given that there would be no consequences of a failure to meet the obligation in s 23(4) to have the inquiries conducted as quickly as practical, and in any event within 30 days of the order being made. It is true that there are no consequences in terms of the defendant’s detention, but this does not mean that there are no consequences arising from a failure to comply with the duty in s 23(4). This remains an important obligation, and it reflects a general legislative policy in favour of determining these matters promptly. As we have indicated, it may be desirable for the proceedings to be called before the court within the 30 day period to ensure that s 23(4) is being complied with.
• [31] We accordingly agree that the Judge was right to dismiss the application for habeas corpus, albeit for different reasons.
• [32] Both parties advised the Court that they did not seek costs on the appeal.

Result

• [33] The appeal is dismissed.
• [34] There is no order as to costs.

Solicitors:
Raymond Donnelly & Co, Christchurch for Respondent

^[1] Teika v District Court of New Zealand [2024] NZHC 2218 [Judgment under appeal].

^[2] At [3]–[10].

^[3] Teika v District Court of New Zealand [2024] NZHC 1017.

^[4] R v Teika [2024] NZDC 15391.

^[5] Habeas Corpus Act 2001, s 17(1).

^[6] Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [34]–[35].

^[7] At [36]–[37].

^[8] At [39].

^[9] Teika v District Court of New Zealand, above n 3, at [28].

^[10] The right to refuse medical treatment under s 11 was also said to be engaged given s 43 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003.

^[11] See R v K [2017] NZHC 518.

^[12] Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [28]–[29].

^[13] See Manuel v Superintendent of Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2004] NZCA 440; [2005] 1 NZLR 161 (CA) at [46] and [49].

^[14] Bail Act 2000, s 27.

^[15] Section 7(5).

^[16] Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act, ss 13, 27(1) and 32.

^[17] Teika v District Court of New Zealand, above n 3, at [30].

^[18] Judgment under appeal, above n 1, at [36]–[38].

^[19] At [38].

^[20] Maaka-Wanahi v Attorney-General [2023] NZCA 217.