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Free to be Church Trust v Minister for Covid-19 Response [2024] NZCA 81 (27 March 2024)
Last Updated: 3 April 2024
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW
ZEALANDI
TE KŌTI PĪRA O AOTEAROA
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BETWEEN
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FREE TO BE CHURCH TRUST Appellant
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AND
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MINISTER FOR COVID-19 RESPONSE Respondent
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Hearing:
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1 August 2023
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Court:
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Gilbert, Goddard and Katz JJ
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Counsel:
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P T Rishworth KC and L I van Dam for Appellant B M McKenna and A J
Vincent for Respondent
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Judgment:
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27 March 2024 at 11.00 am
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
- The
appeal is dismissed.
- The
appellant must pay costs to the respondent for a standard appeal on a band A
basis, with usual
disbursements.
____________________________________________________________________
REASONS OF THE COURT
(Given by Goddard
J)
Table of contents
Para no
Introduction and summary
The issue on appeal: was there a delay in
removing COVID-19 gathering restrictions that breached the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act
1990?
- [1] The
appellant (FTBC) represents a group of churches whose right to manifest their
religious beliefs — a right protected
by s 15 of the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) — was limited by vaccination requirements imposed
on gatherings
under the COVID-19 Public Health Response (Protection Framework)
Order 2021 (Order).[1] At the Red
setting of what was colloquially known as the “traffic light”
framework put in place by that Order, the limit
that applied to gatherings that
included people without COVID-19 vaccination certificates (CVCs) was
25 persons. This restriction
prevented the represented churches from
gathering their congregations together for worship. FTBC’s unchallenged
evidence was
that the spiritual impact of the restrictions imposed by the Order
was profound.
- [2] FTBC now
accepts that those limits were justified, and thus that the Order was lawful, at
the time it was made by the Minister
for COVID-19 Response (Minister) in
November 2021. But they say that justification ceased to apply in early
2022 once the Omicron
variant of COVID-19 was prevalent in the community, and
that NZBORA required the relevant restrictions to be removed by mid-February
2022 at the latest. They say the actual end date for the relevant restrictions,
which was 4 April 2022, unjustifiably prolonged
the interference with their s 15
NZBORA right.
The High Court found
the Order was lawful
- [3] FTBC’s
application for judicial review was filed on 10 March 2022, shortly before
Cabinet made the decision to remove the
vaccination-related gathering
restrictions. It continued despite the changes made to the Order with effect
from 4 April 2022. It
was heard by Gwyn J in the High Court in June
2022. Before the High Court, FTBC and another applicant group sought judicial
review
of the Order on the basis that the CVC-related restrictions imposed on
faith-based gatherings were unlawful at the time the Order
was made because they
were inconsistent with NZBORA. FTBC also argued that even if the Order was
lawful at the time it was made,
it ceased to be justified and became unlawful in
early 2022.
- [4] The High
Court held
that:[2]
(a) The gathering limits in the Order limited the applicants’ right to
manifest their religious beliefs protected by s 15 of
NZBORA.
(b) Those measures were a justified limit on that right, both at the time of
introduction and after the Omicron variant was circulating
in
New Zealand.
(c) The Minister did not act unreasonably by making distinctions between
vaccinated and unvaccinated people in the Order.
- [5] FTBC’s
judicial review application was dismissed, as was the other application before
the
Court.[3]
Summary
of outcome on appeal
- [6] How
does NZBORA operate in circumstances where:
(a) delegated legislation is made containing a measure that limits rights
protected by NZBORA, in response to a public emergency
such as a pandemic;
(b) that instrument is lawfully made because the limits on rights are justified
at the time the instrument is made; but
(c) circumstances change in a way that affects the continuing justification for
the rights-limiting measure?
- [7] Such an
instrument does not automatically cease to be lawful and valid at a given date
because, with the benefit of hindsight,
it can be seen that the justification
for that measure was no longer sufficient on that date. Rather, NZBORA speaks
to the decision
maker, requiring them to act in a manner designed to ensure that
rights are not limited more than is demonstrably justified over
time.
- [8] The decision
maker must keep the measure under review (an obligation expressly recognised by
s 14(5) of the COVID-19 Public Health
Response Act). If that review
discloses that circumstances have changed in a way that materially affects the
continuing justification
for the (temporary) rights-limiting measure, the
decision maker must, within a reasonable timeframe, make changes to the
delegated
legislation to ensure that it does not limit rights more than can be
justified in light of the then-prevailing circumstances.
- [9] Often the
decision maker will not be making a binary choice between retaining or revoking
the measure in question: a range of
policy options will need to be considered
(for example, adopting different and less rights-limiting measures in place of
the current
measure). Consultation on those policy options will generally be
appropriate. A reasonable time needs to be allowed for provision
of advice to
the decision maker, and for decisions to be made about the preferred option.
The amending instrument then needs to
be drafted, the draft needs to be
considered by the decision maker and their advisers, and (after making any
changes to the draft
that may be needed) approved. Time may need to be allowed
to implement the new or amended delegated legislation. NZBORA does not
require
decision makers to depart from basic precepts of good (delegated) law-making.
The priority and urgency with which action
is taken must however be
proportionate to the nature and significance of the (no longer justified)
interference with rights.
- [10] In the
present case, the Minister and his advisers kept the Order under review: FTBC
did not contend otherwise. They gathered
and analysed new information as it
became available, assessing the reliability and relevance of that information,
including the various
studies that were emerging in relation to the
effectiveness of vaccination in the context of Omicron. Advice was sought from
internal
and external experts. Officials identified policy options, and
consulted on those options. They provided advice to Ministers, as
a result of
which Ministers made decisions which modified the Order in a manner which
responded to the then-prevailing circumstances.
It is not suggested that the
Order as amended from 4 April 2022 was inconsistent with NZBORA. So the
Minister made a decision that
brought the Order back into line with NZBORA.
- [11] Did the
Minister take so long to amend the Order to achieve
NZBORA-consistency that
the delay was itself a breach of NZBORA? The first difficulty we face in
answering that question is that
this was not the challenge to the Order
originally pleaded by FTBC. FTBC did not file any evidence addressing how long
such a process
ought to have taken, or the date by which the Order should have
been amended. Unsurprisingly in these circumstances, neither the
Minister’s affidavit nor the other affidavits filed by the respondents in
the High Court squarely addressed this timing issue:
when their evidence was
filed they did not know that this was the allegation that they needed to answer.
In those circumstances it
would not be fair or appropriate for the Court to make
the findings sought by FTBC, even if there was some support for them in the
material before us. But in any event the material before us does not support
the proposition that the Minister, or the Executive
collectively, took an
unreasonable amount of time to review and amend the Order to ensure consistency
with NZBORA.
- [12] For these
reasons, which we expand on below, the appeal must be
dismissed.
Background
- [13] The
background to these proceedings is set out in detail in the High Court
judgment.[4] For present purposes, a
brief summary is sufficient.
- [14] In the
first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, before any vaccine was available, the New
Zealand Government’s strategy was
to seek to eliminate
COVID-19 from
the community. On 23 March 2020 the Prime Minister issued an epidemic notice
and on 25 March 2020 New Zealand went
into its first nationwide lockdown. The
elimination strategy had a number of aspects, including border restrictions,
contact tracing,
regular testing of frontline workers, and the “Alert
Level Framework”. Between March 2020 and October 2021 New Zealand
moved
between alert levels with adjustments to restrictions as required.
- [15] Restrictions
on gatherings were, for most of that time, a central part of the Alert Level
Framework. Services provided at places
of worship were classified as
“gatherings” from the beginning of the Alert Level Framework.
- [16] The first
vaccine against COVID-19, the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine (Pfizer vaccine), was
approved for use in New Zealand in February
2021. Roll out of the vaccine
throughout New Zealand occurred in the course of 2021.
- [17] By early
August 2021, COVID-19 had been eliminated in the community in New Zealand.
- [18] In August
2021 New Zealand had its first community outbreak of the Delta variant of
COVID-19. The country was placed in an Alert
Level 4 lockdown on 17 August
2021. Most of New Zealand returned to Alert Level 2 by 7 September 2021, but
parts of Auckland, Northland
and Waikato remained in the higher alert levels for
several months.
- [19] In the
course of September and October 2021 Ministers received advice about development
of a new framework to replace the alert
levels which would incorporate use of
CVCs as part of a wider suite of interventions to reduce the risk of community
transmission
of COVID-19. Other elements would include requirements to stay
home for people with COVID-19 and for their close contacts, mandatory
recordkeeping, reinforcement of hygiene messaging, and mask wearing. The
strategy was founded on the effectiveness of vaccination
in reducing
transmission, reducing the risk of infection, and reducing the severity of
illness if infected. Advice dated 10 October
2021 from the Department of
the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) to Ministers recorded
that:
... even with 90%+ vaccination rates, enhanced restrictions
would need to remain in the toolkit for combatting COVID-19. For example,
if a
new variant arose, to which the vaccine did not offer protection, this would
reduce the effective immunity of the population,
rendering the overall
‘traffic lights’ risk strategy invalid (i.e. requiring Alert Level 3
or 4 public health controls
to regain control).
- [20] On 18
October 2021 Cabinet decided to move from the elimination strategy to a
minimisation and protection strategy, with the
COVID-19 Protection Framework
(CPF) as the central element. The CPF laid out response measures which did not
rely on lockdowns for
what was, by then, a highly vaccinated population. The CPF
featured three settings:
(a) Green — which aimed to allow normal social and economic activity,
while continuing to build health system capacity.
(b) Orange — which aimed to avoid exponential growth in cases, with
moderate population-level controls.
(c) Red — which aimed to protect the sustainability of the health system
and the health of communities through population-level
controls.
- [21] Cabinet
agreed that decisions to move between settings would be guided by thresholds for
change developed by the Ministry of
Health:
(a) Green — case numbers kept low through testing, contact tracing, and
quarantine and hospitalisations at a manageable level.
(b) Orange — a move to Orange would occur with increasing community
transmission, increasing pressure on the health system,
or increasing risk to
at-risk populations.
(c) Red — a shift to Red would occur when Orange is no longer containing
the virus in the original outbreak areas, action is
needed to protect the
healthcare system, and the health of communities or at-risk populations.
- [22] The Order,
which provided for the CPF, was made on 30 November 2021 and came into force on
2 December 2021.
- [23] The Omicron
variant was circulating globally from late 2021. Omicron variant cases were
detected at the border in January 2022.
A DPMC briefing to Ministers dated 18
January 2022 recorded that:
While current measures under the
Framework appear to have been effective at minimising the spread of the Delta
outbreak, the risk
of an Omicron outbreak remains. Critically, evidence
suggests that two doses of Pfizer offer significantly less protection against
infection and hospitalisation due to Omicron than due to Delta.
- [24] Even at
this early stage, before Omicron was present in the community in
New Zealand, the effectiveness of vaccination in the
context of an Omicron
outbreak had been identified as an issue.
- [25] The first
case of the Omicron variant in the community in New Zealand was detected on 22
January 2022. On 23 January 2022 the
Minister ordered that all of New Zealand
be moved into the Red setting of the CPF. On the same day, Cabinet decided to
introduce
a three-phase system to address Omicron, which would run alongside the
CPF, with a focus on testing, contact tracing and self-isolation
requirements
for new cases.
- [26] On 25
January 2022 the Minister briefed Cabinet on updates to the Red setting of the
CPF, reflecting Ministry of Health advice
to him:
Current evidence
suggests Omicron has higher transmissibility, and vaccines show reduced
effectiveness against the Omicron variant
compared to Delta. This means that
more vaccinated people are likely to become infected and that the number of
COVID-19 cases occurring
each day will be far greater than at any other time
during the pandemic. At the initial stages of this outbreak, the overall
response
to Omicron will focus on ‘stamping it out’. Once community
case numbers increase, our focus will shift to ‘managing
the virus’
to slow the spread, mitigate impacts on the most vulnerable and maintain
essential activities and supply chains.
- [27] The
Minister also noted that decreasing the number and risk of exposure events was a
core public health measure to manage transmission:
Lower capacity
limits in high-risk settings will help to reduce the transmission of the virus.
However, there is no precise level
of capacity limits for particular kinds of
venues that is optimal. Rather, reducing capacity limits is a tool which may be
used
alongside other public health measures, and specific limits should be set
by reference to both those other measures and the practical
implications for
businesses, [whānau] and others who will be affected.
- [28] On 2
February 2022 the Director-General of Health (Director-General) gave advice to
the Minister, following a public health assessment
carried out by the Ministry
of Health, recommending that gathering limits at the Red setting remain
unchanged at that point but be
kept under regular review as the Omicron outbreak
evolved. The advice contemplated reducing gathering limits in the event of
rapid
and uncontrolled community transmission.
- [29] During
February Omicron cases in New Zealand continued to increase substantially. The
Government response was to shift to Phase
2 of the Omicron response on 15
February 2022 and to Phase 3 on 24 February 2022. At that point, there were
over 5,000 recorded
cases each day. By 27 February 2022, there were
14,491 cases recorded, with 305 patients in hospital (including five in
intensive
care) and one death.
- [30] From
mid-February 2022 the Government was focussed on planning for its future
COVID-19 response after the Omicron wave had reached
its peak. Central to that
was a review of the CPF.
- [31] On 4 March
2022 Ministry of Health officials advised the Director-General that physical
distancing and capacity limits would
remain necessary during the Omicron
outbreak, but once the peak was over there would be a strong case to
re-evaluate gathering limits.
- [32] FTBC put
some emphasis on this briefing paper, and in particular on an observation that
“there is technically not a sufficient
public health rationale currently
to justify CVCs being used to prevent entry to certain premises during this
phase of the response”.
However it is important to read that observation
in context. The briefing paper recorded that public health measures that
limit
rights are justified if they contribute materially toward the overarching
public health goals: reducing the spread and impact of
COVID-19. The briefing
paper also noted that limits on NZBORA rights associated with each measure need
to be proportionate to the
benefits such measures offer. The need for regular
review of such measures was expressly recorded:
- To
ensure public health measures remain proportionate, they should be reviewed
regularly. Furthermore, rights should be restored
as soon as safely and
reasonably possible, consistent with response objectives. Finally,
consideration is always given to whether
measures that limit rights less can be
applied to achieve a similar outcome.
Maintaining
overall integrity of the response
- Any
advice on how, when and why public health measures are removed needs to consider
the impact on the integrity of the response
overall and alignment with other
measures (for example worker vaccination orders, international and domestic
self-isolation etc).
- Some
measures would be difficult to reintroduce once removed and consideration should
be given to the future utility of public health
measures. When removing
measures, it is important that individuals, businesses, and other organisations
have the resources and clear
information about any changes to
measures.
- [33] Under the
heading “Physical distancing and capacity limits” the briefing paper
identified the need for re-evaluation
of gathering limits:
- While
we have significant cases in the community, the value of physical distancing and
capacity limits remain pertinent. Evidence
on physical distancing and gathering
limits continues to point to these measures as a basic public health tool to
reduce spread of
COVID-19. Further, there have been consistent examples of
COVID-19 spreading at gatherings where large numbers of people congregate
and
intermingle.
- The
CPF provides a system for managing physical distancing and capacity limits. If
the CPF is retained (even if modified), it can
continue to be used as the tool
to implement these measures, i.e., moving up and down the colours – but
the settings should
be kept under review based on available evidence.
- As
we move past the peak of Omicron, there will be a strong case for re-evaluating
gathering limits. Outdoor gatherings in particular
could likely be relaxed soon
as a preliminary measure given their lower risk profile compared to indoor
gatherings.
- [34] The
briefing paper then addressed the use of CVCs. We set out this passage in full,
as it includes the observation emphasised
by
FTBC:[5]
- The
use of COVID-19 Vaccine Certificates (CVCs) in the CPF was based on vaccination
providing significant population protection against
infection, separating
vaccinated and unvaccinated people as a tool to reduce transmission in the
community.
- New
Zealand now has some of the highest vaccination rates in the world, with
approximately 94% of those aged 12 and over having had
two doses of an approved
vaccine. Achieving this high rate of vaccination can, in part, be attributed to
the use of CVCs which are
the foundation of the CPF.
- Further,
we know that current vaccines are less effective at protecting people from
contracting Omicron. As most of the population
is vaccinated, almost all cases
are occurring in people who are ‘fully vaccinated’ (2 doses of the
Pfizer vaccine).
- Given
there is now significant community transmission, but with very high rates of
vaccination, the use of CVCs do not provide the
same population protection.
This brings the validity of retaining CVCs as a public health measure, at
this point in time, into question. The Director of Public
Health’s
advice is that, given the very high rate of vaccination nationally and the
current definition of ‘up-to-date
vaccination status’ (which only
includes 2 doses of vaccine, and is now under review), there is technically not
a sufficient
public health rationale currently to justify CVCs being used to
prevent entry to certain premises during this phase of the response.
- However,
it is important to note that you will be receiving further advice relating to
vaccine tools, including boosters, the definition
of “up-to-date
vaccination status”, and mandates for affected groups of workers which
should still remain at this point.
This further work, particularly if a
requirement to have been boosted is included in the definition of ‘up to
date vaccination
status[’], could mean that only 73%
of New Zealanders would be considered fully vaccinated. If so, the original
public health rationale for
CVCs would be restored immediately since a
significant number of New Zealanders would not be considered fully
vaccinated.
- [35] The
recommendations in the briefing paper, all of which were accepted by the
Director-General, included:
(a) Noting that public health measures that limit freedoms must be reviewed
regularly to ensure they are co-ordinated, orderly and
proportionate.
(b) Noting the Director of Public Health’s advice that, given the very
high rate of vaccination nationally, there is not a
sufficient public health
rationale currently to justify CVCs being used to prevent entry to certain
premises during this phase of
the response.
(c) Noting that further advice was being prepared regarding broader issues
relating to vaccinations, including boosters and the definition
of
“up-to-date vaccination status”, and mandates for affected groups
of workers.
(d) Noting that the further advice on the definition of “up-to-date
vaccination status” could include the requirement
to have received two
doses of vaccine and a booster to be considered fully vaccinated.
(e) Agreeing that, in light of the ongoing work to define an “up-to-date
vaccination status”, it was too early to conclude
that there was an
insufficient public health rationale for CVCs to be used to prevent entry to
certain premises.
(f) Agreeing to receive further advice on the definition of “up-to-date
vaccination status”, including any implications
this may have for the
appropriate usage of CVCs, “shortly”.
- [36] On 21 March
2022 the Minister reported back to Cabinet on the CPF review and sought
decisions from Cabinet on the post-Omicron-peak
COVID-19 response.
The Cabinet paper noted that the elimination strategy and minimisation and
protection approach had prevented
the worst impacts of COVID-19. Modelling
indicated that hospitalisations were likely to peak some time in mid-to-late
March and
would then decline.
- [37] Cabinet was
advised that CVCs would have served their purpose once the Omicron peak
subsided, and that the significant limit
on rights that they reflected would no
longer be proportionate to the public health risks in the next phase. However
the paper advised
Cabinet that CVCs remained an important part of the
“toolkit” for those businesses and organisations who wished to
continue
using them and as part of a future response if, for example, a more
severe, immunity-evading variant emerged for which there was
a new, effective
vaccine. The paper also advised that, to be effective, CVCs would need to be
updated to reflect the roles of boosters
and acquired immunity. The paper dealt
with a number of related issues, such as modifying a support payment scheme
affected by gathering
limits, and noted that officials were engaging with
business and union stakeholders to update guidance to reflect the removal of
certain vaccination mandates and the shift of more responsibility to employers
and others to determine whether they would want to
retain any restrictions on
entry to premises for health and safety, or other grounds.
- [38] On 23 March
2022 Cabinet agreed to make, and publicly announced, a number of changes to the
CPF. The changes that are relevant
for present purposes became operative in two
stages. With effect from 25 March 2022 capacity limits for
CVC-compliant
gatherings were removed at the Green and Orange settings, and increased to 200
for indoor gatherings at Red. And with
effect from 4 April 2022 CVCs were
removed from the CPF, so there were no longer separate (lower) limits on
gatherings that were
not CVC compliant.
- [39] The
decision to remove CVCs from the CPF on 4 April 2022 was informed by:
(a) Ministry of Health advice that, while two doses of the vaccine provided some
reduction in Omicron transmission, it was less than
for Delta.
(b) New Zealand now had one of the highest vaccination rates in the world, with
approximately 95 per cent of those aged 12 and over
having had two doses of an
approved vaccine (88 per cent for Māori). Unvaccinated people therefore
represented a smaller transmission
risk than when CVCs were introduced.
(c) The increasing level of acquired immunity from the Omicron outbreak.
(d) The fact that it would take five to six weeks to incorporate a booster into
the CVC system and for the public to download their
new CVC for use, by which
time New Zealand would likely be well past its Omicron peak.
- [40] Thus, with
effect from 4 April 2022, the vaccination-based gathering restrictions to which
FTBC objected were no longer in
place.
Relevant legislation
COVID-19 Public Health Response Act
2020
- [41] The
COVID-19 Public Health Response Act came into force on 13 May 2020. Its purpose
is set out in
s 4:[6]
4
Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to support a public health response to
COVID-19
that—
(a) prevents, and limits the risk of, the outbreak or spread of COVID-19
(taking into account the infectious nature and potential
for asymptomatic
transmission of COVID-19); and
(b) avoids, mitigates, or remedies the actual or potential adverse effects of
the COVID-19 outbreak (whether direct or indirect);
and
(c) is co-ordinated, orderly, and proportionate; and
(ca) allows social, economic, and other factors to be taken into account where
it is relevant to do so; and
(cb) is economically sustainable and allows for the recovery of MIQF costs;
and
(d) has enforceable measures, in addition to the relevant voluntary measures
and public health and other guidance that also support
that response.
- [42] Part 2 of
the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act provided for COVID-19 orders to be made
by the Minister.[7] The requirements
for making a COVID-19 order at the relevant time were set out in
s 9(1):[8]
9
Requirements for making COVID-19 orders under section 11
(1) The Minister may make a COVID-19 order under section 11 in accordance
with the following provisions:
(a) the Minister must have had regard to advice from the Director-General
about—
(i) the risks of the outbreak or spread of COVID-19; and
(ii) the nature and extent of measures (whether voluntary or enforceable) that
are appropriate to address those risks; and
(b) the Minister may have had regard to any decision by the Government on the
level of public health measures appropriate to respond
to those risks and avoid,
mitigate, or remedy the effects of the outbreak or spread of COVID-19 (which
decision may have taken into
account any social, economic, or other factors);
and
(ba) the Minister must be satisfied that the order does not limit or is a
justified limit on the rights and freedoms in the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act
1990; and
(c) the Minister—
(i) must have consulted the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, and the
Minister of Health; and
(ii) may have consulted any other Minister that the Minister (as defined in
this Act) thinks fit; and
(d) before making the order, the Minister must be satisfied that the order is
appropriate to achieve the purpose of this Act.
- [43] Section 11
set out the wide range of matters that may be provided for in a COVID-19 order,
including requirements in relation
to: entry to premises; physical distancing;
isolation and quarantine; refraining from participating in gatherings of a
specified
kind, in a specified place, or in specified circumstances; requiring
that a CVC be produced to enter certain premises; and providing
for CVC
eligibility, issue, and period of validity.
- [44] Section
13(1)(a) provided for COVID-19 orders to be valid despite inconsistency with the
Health Act 1956 or other enactments. However s 13(2) expressly provided
that s 13(1)(a) did not limit or affect the application of NZBORA. And
s 13(3) provided, to avoid doubt, that nothing in the Act prevented the
filing, hearing or determination of any legal proceedings
in respect of the
making or terms of any COVID-19 order.
- [45] Section 14
provided for the form, publication and duration of COVID-19 orders. Section
14(5) provided that the Minister and
the Director-General must keep their
COVID-19 orders under
review.
COVID-19 Public Health
Response (Protection Framework) Order 2021
- [46] As
already mentioned, the Order was made on 30 November 2021.
- [47] Clause 3 of
the Order provided that its purpose was to prevent, and limit the risk of, the
outbreak or spread of COVID-19 and
to otherwise support the purposes of the
COVID-19 Public Health Response Act.
- [48] The Order
set out various public health measures which would apply if and only if they are
specified as applicable in a COVID-19
response schedule (Green, Orange or Red)
that applied to a particular region at any given time.
- [49] On 2
December 2021, when the Order took effect, there were two active
schedules:
(a) The Red schedule (sch 7) was active for Northland, Auckland, Rotorua
district, Kawerau district, Whakatāne district, Ōpōtiki
district,
Gisborne district, Wairoa district, Taupō district, Ruapehu district,
Whanganui district and Rangitīkei district;
and
(b) The Orange schedule (sch 6) was active for the rest of New Zealand.
- [50] From 23
January 2022 the Red schedule was active for all of New Zealand, with the whole
country moving to the Orange setting
on 13 April 2022.
- [51] The Order
defined the term “gathering” as follows:
13 Meaning
of gathering
In this order, gathering—
(a) means people who are intermingling in a group but excludes people who remain
at least 2 metres away from each other, so far as
is reasonably practicable;
and
(b) includes—
(i) a gathering to undertake voluntary or not-for-profit sporting, recreational,
social, or cultural activities:
(ii) a gathering to undertake community club activities (except activities that
occur at the same time and place as services provided
under a club licence under
section 21 of the Sale and Supply of Alcohol Act 2012):
(iii) a faith-based gathering:
(iv) a funeral or tangihanga:
(v) a gathering held in a defined space or premises of a workplace (other than a
vehicle in use as part of a public transport service)
that have been hired for
the exclusive use of the gathering by a person (other than the person who
manages or controls the defined
space or premises); but
(c) excludes a gathering for the purpose of a business or service at—
(i) office workplaces; and
(ii) ordinary operations at retail; and
(iii) gyms; and
(iv) hearings at courts and tribunals; and
(v) education entities at normal operations.
- [52] The
definition specifically included faith-based gatherings.
- [53] In the Red
setting[9] there were to be no
gatherings unless permitted.[10]
A permitted gathering was one where:
(a) if it was a gathering of “CVC compliant” people, it was subject
to a fixed number of 100 and a one-metre physical
distancing
rule;[11] and
(b) if it was not a gathering of exclusively “CVC compliant” people,
it was subject to a fixed number of 25 and a one-metre
physical distancing
rule.[12]
- [54] In the
Orange setting,[13] there were to be
no gatherings unless permitted,[14]
and a permitted gathering was one where:
(a) if it was a gathering of “CVC compliant” people, there was no
fixed number limit;[15] and
(b) if it was not a gathering of all “CVC compliant” people, it was
subject to a fixed number of 50 and a one-metre physical
distancing
rule.[16]
- [55] In the
Green setting,[17] there were to be
no gatherings unless permitted,[18]
and a permitted gathering was one where:
(a) if it was a gathering of “CVC compliant” people, there was no
fixed number limit;[19] and
(b) if it was not a gathering of all “CVC compliant” people, it was
subject to a fixed number of 100 and a one-metre
physical distancing
rule.[20]
- [56] CVC was
defined to mean a COVID-19 vaccination certificate issued under cls 8 or 9
of the COVID-19 Public Health Response (COVID-19
Vaccination Certificate) Order
2021.[21] “CVC
compliant” was defined as follows:
6 When person is CVC
compliant
(1) In this order, a person is CVC compliant if the person—
(a) holds a valid CVC issued to that person; or
(b) is under the age of 12 years and 3 months.
(2) A person who is required under an applicable COVID-19 provision to ensure
or verify that a person (person A) is CVC compliant satisfies that
requirement, in relation to subclause (1)(b), if the person reasonably considers
that person A is
under the age of 12 years and 3 months.
- [57] The
Government issued Guidelines for Places of Worship on 29 November 2021 which
explained the application of the Order in the
context of places of
worship.[22] Under the CPF
restrictions, a religious group could choose to:
(a) require CVCs for all services and offer larger services;
(b) require CVCs for no services and offer smaller services;
(c) offer both services operating with CVCs and services operating without CVCs
(as long as spaces were cleaned between groups, there
was no intermingling of
the two groups, spaces used were ventilated, and those involved were clear on
the distinction); or
(d) if an organisation had multiple defined spaces in a venue, operate multiple
activities at once, with an activity requiring a
CVC in one space and an
activity not requiring a CVC in another space (provided there was no
intermingling between groups).
- [58] As under
the Alert Level Framework, online services remained an available option for
religious groups to reach the members of
their congregations.
- [59] As already
mentioned, requirements in relation to CVCs were removed from the CPF with
effect from 4 April
2022.
NZBORA
- [60] NZBORA
affirms a number of rights and
freedoms.[23] It applies to acts
done by the legislative, executive and judicial branches of the Government of
New Zealand.[24] It thus
applies to acts done by the Minister in connection with making, and reviewing,
COVID-19 orders.
- [61] Section 5
of NZBORA provides that the rights and freedoms contained in NZBORA may be
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed
by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.
- [62] Section 13
of NZBORA provides that everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, religion, and belief, including
the right to adopt and to hold
opinions without interference. It was not suggested that the Order limited
freedom of religious belief.
The right that FTBC emphasises, which relates to
manifestation of religion and belief, is affirmed in s 15:
15 Manifestation of religion and belief
Every person has the right to manifest that person’s religion or belief
in worship, observance, practice, or teaching, either
individually or in
community with others, and either in public or in private.
The FTBC proceedings
- [63] FTBC
is a charitable trust incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957.
It represents ministers and church leaders of
various Christian churches of
Protestant denominations which have been affected by the New Zealand
Government’s
COVID-19 response.
- [64] FTBC filed
its application for judicial review on 10 March 2022, at a time when the Order
had been in force for some three months.
The Minister was named as the
respondent. The focus of the application was the gathering restrictions that
applied under the CPF.
In particular, FTBC pleaded that the effect of the Order
at the Red setting was to restrict all of its faith-based gatherings to
25
people and, accordingly, to preclude the ability of a physical gathering of the
whole congregation. It thus limited the right
of those represented by FTBC to
manifest religion in worship, observance and practice in community with others
and in public.
- [65] FTBC
pleaded that in making the Order, and keeping it under review, the Minister
failed to take into account, or failed to properly
and meaningfully take into
account, whether the Order limited their s 15 right, and if so, whether the
Order was a justified limitation
on that right. FTBC pleaded that when the
Order was made, and at the time of filing their application, the Order was an
unjustified
limit on the s 15 right because:
(a) The limiting measures did not serve a sufficiently important purpose to
justify curtailment of the s 15 right “given that
vaccination does
not prevent persons contracting and spreading COVID-19, particularly once the
... Omicron variant became the prevailing
threat in New Zealand”.
(b) The limiting measures were not rationally connected with the purpose, given
that vaccination does not prevent persons contracting
and spreading COVID-19
“particularly once the ... Omicron variant became the prevailing threat in
New Zealand”.
(c) The limiting measures impaired the s 15 right more than was reasonably
necessary for sufficient achievement of the purpose.
The purpose could be
achieved through less rights-impairing public health mechanisms such as the
wearing of face coverings, testing,
and/or by reference to the space needed to
adhere to physical distancing rules.
(d) The limiting measures were not in due proportion to the importance of the
objective.
- [66] FTBC sought
a declaration that the limiting measures in the Order were in breach of
s 15 of NZBORA and invalid, an order quashing
one or all of the limiting
measures, and declarations that the Minister had failed to take into account the
matters referred to above.[25]
- [67] FTBC’s
statement of claim did not contain any pleading that expressly referred to the
scenario of the limiting measures
in the Order being consistent with NZBORA at
the time the Order was made, but ceasing to be justified at some point in early
2022.
There was no pleading that the Minister had acted inconsistently
with NZBORA by failing to keep the limiting measures under review,
or by failing
to modify or revoke those limiting measures by a specified date.
- [68] FTBC filed
evidence from ministers and members of affected churches about their beliefs,
and the impact of the Order on those
beliefs. FTBC did not file any expert
evidence about the effectiveness of COVID-19 vaccinations.
- [69] The other
applicant group, referred to in the High Court judgment as the “Orewa
applicants”,[26] relied on
expert theological evidence from Dr Matthew Flannagan, a New Zealand
theologian, and expert medical evidence from Professor
Timothy Flanigan, a
Professor of Medicine at Brown University in the United States who specialises
in serious infectious diseases
and public health. FTBC also relied to some
extent on the evidence of Professor Flanigan.
- [70] The
respondents filed evidence from Dr Ashley Bloomfield, the
Director-General
at the relevant time, and Dr Ian Town, the Chief Science Advisor at the Ministry
of Health. They also filed evidence
from the Minister, Mr Christopher Hipkins,
about the making of the Order and the rationale for it. The Minister’s
evidence
also addressed the ongoing review of the restrictions provided for by
the CPF, and the decisions to modify the CPF that were made
on 23 March 2022.
The respondents also filed an affidavit sworn by a theologian, Professor
Paul Trebilco.
- [71] FTBC did
not file any evidence that addressed the question of timing of revocation of the
limits on gatherings, on the hypothesis
that they were originally justified and
NZBORA consistent. Rather, that argument was advanced at the High Court
hearing, and before
this Court, in reliance on the evidence provided by the
respondents and the documents included in that evidence.
- [72] The issue
that was the focus of argument before us — did the Minister move too
slowly in removing the gathering restrictions,
and in particular the 25 person
restriction for non-CVC-compliant gatherings at the Red setting — was not
addressed by any
of the deponents for the respondents. That is unsurprising, in
circumstances where a challenge on that basis was not articulated
in the
statement of claim or in any evidence filed by FTBC. The absence of such
evidence has implications for our ability to address
the claim as now advanced
by FTBC, as we explain in more detail
below.
High Court judgment
The issues before the High Court
- [73] Before
the High Court, as before us, the Minister accepted that the gathering
restrictions limited the applicants’ right
to manifest their
religion.[27] So the key question
for the Judge to determine was whether that limitation was demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic
society.[28]
- [74] It was
common ground before the High Court that the appropriate approach to that
question was as outlined by the Supreme Court
in Hansen v R. The
respondents were required to show that any limiting
measure:[29]
(a) is prescribed by law;
(b) serves a sufficiently important objective or purpose to warrant limiting the
protected right or freedom; and
(c) the means chosen to achieve the objective are proportionate to the
importance of the objective. This has several elements:
(i) rational connection — whether the limiting measure is rationally
connected with its purpose.
(ii) minimal impairment — whether the limiting measure impairs the right
or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary to
achieve that purpose; and
(iii) proportional effect — whether the benefits achieved by the measure
are outweighed by the significance of the limitation
of the right.
Applying the Hansen test to the Order
- [75] The
restrictions challenged by the applicants were contained in the Order, so were
clearly prescribed by law.[30]
- [76] The Orewa
applicants accepted that the second limb of the test was also satisfied: the
gathering restrictions served a sufficiently
important objective to warrant
limiting the s 15 right. FTBC originally pleaded that the limiting
measures did not serve a sufficiently
important purpose, but by the time of the
hearing no longer pursued that
argument.[31] The Judge considered
the issue for herself, and concluded that the purpose of the CPF was to minimise
the spread of COVID-19 in
the context of a Delta outbreak, to protect the
vulnerable and to avoid the health system being overwhelmed. The principal
rationale
for the introduction of CVCs and the gathering limits was the advice
from the Director-General that, because of the effectiveness
of the COVID-19
vaccine in limiting the risk of infection, transmission and hospitalisation, the
use of CVCs would mitigate the risk
of COVID-19 outbreaks and protect vulnerable
populations by reducing the risk of COVID-19 spread. An incidental benefit was
the
possibility that the use of CVCs could help to boost vaccination rates.
Gathering limits self-evidently limit the ability of the
virus to spread in the
community.[32] These purposes
were sufficiently important to justify some curtailment of the right to manifest
religion.[33]
- [77] The Judge
noted that the two applicant groups adopted somewhat different approaches at the
High Court hearing. The Orewa applicants
challenged all the gathering
restrictions in the Order as introduced. FTBC also challenged the gathering
restrictions in the Order
as introduced, but primarily focussed on the CVC-based
gathering restrictions once Omicron entered the New Zealand
community.[34]
Were
the CVC-related gathering restrictions proportionate when introduced?
- [78] The
Judge began by considering the CVC-related gathering restrictions as
introduced.[35] She reviewed the
evidence about transmission of COVID-19 and the effectiveness of the Pfizer
vaccine, in some detail.[36] She
also considered the evidence about risk of transmission of the virus at
faith-based gatherings.[37]
- [79] The Judge
was satisfied that the gathering restrictions in the Order, as they applied to
faith-based gatherings, were not arbitrary
and were rationally connected to
their purpose. So the first limb of the proportionality test in Hansen
was satisfied.[38]
- [80] After
considering the evidence of Professor Flanigan on alternative mechanisms for
reducing the spread of COVID-19 at faith-based
gatherings — social
distancing, masks and hand hygiene — and the applicants’ argument
that regular testing of congregants
by way of PCR tests or Rapid Antigen Tests
and proof of prior infection could have been used as a practical alternative to
the CVC-related
restrictions, the Judge concluded that the approach adopted by
the Minister was within the range of reasonable alternatives open
to him. The
applicants’ claims of arbitrariness and over-breadth by way of comparison
with other activities were not borne
out.[39]
- [81] The Judge
then considered the proportionality of the benefits achieved by the gathering
restrictions to the significance of the
limitation on the applicants’
right to manifest their religion. The Judge concluded that the benefits of the
CVC-related restrictions
as introduced outweighed the limitation on the
applicants’ right. The limitation was proportional and demonstrably
justified.[40]
- [82] Although
the Judge’s finding on this point was not in issue before us, one aspect
of the Judge’s reasoning was challenged
by FTBC. FTBC say that the Judge
wrongly gave less weight to their rights because they were a minority group. It
is helpful to
set out in full the passage that prompted this
argument:[41]
[236] As
the respondents acknowledge, it would be inappropriate for them or the Court to
challenge the correctness of the applicants’
beliefs. Having said that,
the consultation with faith communities showed that many churches decided to
operate with CVCs, to protect
vulnerable congregants, and Professor
Trebilco’s evidence was that there is a range of views within the
Christian community.
That is relevant to the proportionality analysis.
The gathering restrictions affected religious
and non-religious alike. They may be a proportionate limit on the s 15
rights of a group whose views are not widely shared.
[237] The primary objective of the Order is to prevent, and limit the risk
of, the outbreak or spread of Covid-19 in the community,
in order to minimise
death and serious illness and consequent impacts on the public health system. I
have concluded that there was
a rational connection between the restrictions and
their object of decreasing the spread of Covid-19. That connection is
convincingly
set out in the evidence for the respondents. The applicants have
not identified any alternative method that would be equally effective
in
achieving the objective. I conclude that the benefits of the CVC-related
restrictions as introduced outweigh the limitation on
the applicants’
right and the limitation is proportional and demonstrably justified.
Were the CVC-related gathering restrictions
proportionate after Omicron emerged?
- [83] The
Judge then turned to the FTBC argument that once the Omicron variant had emerged
in New Zealand, the public health rationale
for having a materially lower cap on
numbers at a gathering, if one or more attendees were unvaccinated, was
undermined. At that
point, FTBC argued, the limitations in the Order became
arbitrary and not rationally connected to the objective. Non-CVC gatherings
should have been subject to the same capacity limits as those applying to CVC
gatherings (100 rather than 25, at the Red setting),
but using protective
measures other than CVCs, in particular
masks.[42]
- [84] FTBC argued
that the Government knew, at least in January 2022, that the effectiveness of
the primary course of the Pfizer vaccine
against the Omicron variant was
substantially reduced. A public health review in February 2022 had concluded
that there was no longer
“a sufficient public health rationale to
justify” a differentiated approach based on vaccination. However the
gathering
limit was not removed until April
2022.[43]
- [85] The Judge
reviewed the evidence from Dr Town and Dr Bloomfield, which acknowledged that
early evidence suggested that two doses
of the vaccine offered significantly
less protection against infection from Omicron than Delta, and that Omicron was
significantly
more transmissible than Delta. Dr Town gave evidence that rapid
waning of vaccine effectiveness occurs with Omicron, but a booster
dose restores
protection. The Judge summarised his evidence as follows:
[248] Dr
Town says that rapid waning of [vaccine effectiveness] occurs with Omicron, but
a booster dose restores protection. The
data demonstrates that:
(a) The vaccine effectiveness is around 55 per cent or more soon after two doses
of Pfizer. This represents an epidemiologically
important reduction in
transmission. Vaccine efficacy wanes to levels unlikely to reduce infection
risk and transmission within
five to six months of the second dose.
(b) The vaccine efficacy is around 55 per cent to 69 per cent after the booster
dose of Pfizer. The data also suggests that while
there is some waning of
efficiency after the booster dose, this occurs more slowly than after the
primary course, with efficiency
remaining above 50 per cent in those
who had received a booster more than 10 weeks before.
[249] [Vaccine effectiveness] against hospitalisation appears to be 60-70 per
cent after a primary vaccine course, but declines to
around 45 per cent from 25
weeks after the second dose. Vaccine effectiveness against hospitalisation
increases to around 90 per
cent after a booster dose (including in those over 65
years of age).
[250] Dr Town concludes that two doses of the Pfizer vaccine continued to
provide some protection and to assist in limiting the spread
of Omicron within
the community and reducing the incidents of hospitalisation. Two doses are less
effective against Omicron than
against Delta. A booster dose provides enhanced
protection.
- [86] The Judge
was not persuaded that the evidence of reduced vaccine effectiveness for
Omicron, compared with Delta, when taken together
with the evidence about the
ongoing benefits of vaccination in the Omicron context, supported the submission
that there was no longer
a sufficient public health benefit to justify continued
use of CVCs.[44]
- [87] The Judge
then considered FTBC’s argument that the briefing paper of 4 March 2022,
and in particular the observation that
“there is technically not a
sufficient public health rationale currently to justify CVCs being used to
prevent entry to certain
premises during this phase of the
response”.[45] FTBC argued
that this briefing paper should have led the Minister to immediately remove CVCs
from the CPF.[46]
- [88] The Judge
considered that FTBC’s reliance on the 4 March 2022 briefing paper was
selective and misleading. She emphasised
the paragraph immediately following,
which identified the possibility of a change to the definition of
“up-to-date vaccination
status”, and advised that this would restore
the original public health rationale for CVCs. The Judge concluded that the 4
March 2022 briefing paper did not support FTBC’s submission. It did
however demonstrate that the Order was being kept under
review, as required by
s 14(5) of the COVID-19 Public Health Response
Act.[47]
- [89] The Judge
then considered the third issue raised by FTBC: the apparent delay between
Cabinet’s agreement on 23 March 2022
to remove CVCs from the CPF, and the
actual removal on 4 April 2022. The Judge considered that the 21 March 2022
paper from the
Minister to Cabinet made plain why the gap between the decision
and that decision taking effect was
required:[48]
15 I
propose that MVPs are removed from the Framework at 11:50pm Monday 4 April 2022.
By this date, we are very likely to have confidence
that we have moved past the
Omicron peak and allows time for sectors and agencies to put in place the
guidance and workplace requirements
they need to manage residual COVID-19
risk.
- [90] That aspect
of FTBC’s challenge also
failed.[49]
- [91] The Judge
was satisfied on the evidence that, after the Omicron variant was circulating in
the community, there remained a rational
connection between the
CVC-related
restrictions and the purpose of those
restrictions.[50]
High
Court conclusions
- [92] While
there were a range of other, less restrictive measures relevant to the purpose
sought to be achieved by the CVC-related
restrictions, the Judge considered that
they would not have had a similar level of
effectiveness.[51] The restrictions
after Omicron was in the community were in due proportion to the importance of
their objective. The potential
of faith-based gatherings to affect others
— the rights of the broader public to life and health and their interests
in an
effectively functioning health system — rendered the possibility of
qualification of the applicants’ rights
necessary.[52] The restrictions had
been subject to ongoing review. They were temporary (four months) in the
context of what was almost certainly
the worst public health crisis in at least
100 years. Overall, the Judge was satisfied on the evidence that the
CVC-related restrictions as introduced, and as continued after Omicron
arrived in the community, continued to be a proportionate response
to the public
health risk.[53]
- [93] The Judge
concluded that the Order was not an unjustifiable limitation on the
applicants’ rights under s 15 of NZBORA at
the time it was made, or
after Omicron had arrived in the
community.[54]
- [94] The
respondents did not seek costs before the High Court, given the fundamental
rights at issue and the public interest in the
matters
raised.[55] No costs order was
made.
Issues on appeal
- [95] FTBC
appeals to this Court against the Judge’s conclusion that the limit on the
right to manifest religion arising out
of the Order was demonstrably justified
when the Omicron variant was circulating in the community. The argument before
us proceeded
on the basis that the Order was justified at the time it was made.
- [96] The issues
agreed by the parties focussed on the application of the Hansen test as
at mid-February 2022. The core issues that the parties invited this Court to
consider were whether:
(a) applying the correct legal test, the limiting measure was rationally
connected to its objective from mid-February 2022;
(b) the Court was correct to conclude that from mid-February 2022, a mask
requirement would not have had a similar level of effectiveness
to the
CVC-related restrictions; and
(c) the harm to the appellant’s right to manifest religion was outweighed
by the benefit of the 25-person limit on non-CVC
gatherings at this time.
- [97] The issues
identified by the parties also included questions about the operation of the
Hansen test, and in particular whether:
(a) Rational connection is only a “threshold issue” such that it is
necessary only to show that there is a causal connection
between the
infringement and the benefits sought on the basis of reason or logic, or,
alternatively, whether the Court should have
required the respondents to
establish the limiting measure was “fair and not arbitrary, carefully
designed to achieve the objective
in question and rationally connected to the
objective”.[56]
(b) It is relevant to the proportionality assessment that a religious view is
not widely shared.
- [98] As we
explain below, it seems to us that the invitation to this Court to re-apply the
Hansen test as at mid-February 2022 is misconceived. Rather, the focus
should be on what NZBORA requires of a decision maker in changing
circumstances
which call into question the continuing justification for a rights-limiting
measure. We return to this below.
FTBC submissions on appeal
- [99] The
argument before us on behalf of FTBC focussed on the relativity of the gathering
limits set by the Minister under the Red
setting of the CPR. Gatherings were
limited to 100, if all participants were vaccinated, and 25, if one or more
participants were
unvaccinated.[57]
FTBC accepted that the Government was entitled to set an overall gathering limit
of 100 to reflect its risk tolerance: that limit
was not challenged. FTBC also
accepted that the 100:25 ratio was based on the public health advice received by
the Minister in September/October
2021, which FTBC characterised as being that
with the Delta variant, an unvaccinated person in a 25-person gathering posed a
similar
level of transmission risk as a vaccinated person in a 100-person
gathering. Thus, FTBC submitted, the 100:25 ratio reflected the
two
groups’ relative risk of spreading COVID-19.
- [100] However
the emergence of the Omicron variant changed that relative risk. Although that
relative risk had changed materially,
the 100:25 ratio was retained.
So, FTBC argued, from mid-February 2022, when Omicron had out-competed
Delta, the different treatment
of vaccinated and unvaccinated people was no
longer rational or proportionate to its purpose, and hence not demonstrably
justified.
It was not demonstrably justified to wait until 4 April 2022 to
recognise the material change in relative risk.
- [101] It
followed, FTBC submitted, that the High Court had erred by failing to consider
whether a gathering limit of 25 people (where
one or more is unvaccinated)
remained in due proportion to a gathering limit of 100 vaccinated people, or was
demonstrably justified
relative to the gathering limit of 100 vaccinated people.
In addition, FTBC submitted that the Court applied the wrong test for
rational
connection and failed to engage with the expert evidence that the
effectiveness of the vaccine against Omicron infection was “clinically
insignificant”.
- [102] FTBC also
submitted that the High Court erred in concluding that masks were not a less
rights-impairing alternative in the Omicron
context, and in its weighing of the
significant harm caused to the FTBC church communities against the limited
social advantage of
the gathering restrictions.
- [103] FTBC
clarified that it does not criticise the Government for retaining the capacity
limit of 100 for gatherings of vaccinated
people, despite the significantly
increased risk of infection/transmission with Omicron. The Government was
entitled to increase
its risk tolerance and was entitled to have regard to the
economic impact of its response to COVID-19. Rather, the criticism was
that the
public health risk assessment overlooked that, in retaining the status quo in
the face of a materially altered relative
risk, the 100:25 ratio was no longer
proportionate. Despite acknowledging on 18 January 2022 that the Order needed
to be “adjusted
to account for the ... reduced vaccine effectiveness of
Omicron”, the Government made no adjustment to gatherings until 4 April
2022.
- [104] FTBC
responded to the Judge’s analysis of the 4 March 2022 advice to the
Director-General by saying that the pending advice
on boosters did not detract
from the conclusion that the justification for the measure had ceased. It
indicated only that the public
health justification which had lapsed might be
capable of being revived. But that should not have been used as a reason to
delay
removing a public health measure that was no longer proportionate.
Equally, FTBC said, there was no sensible basis to retain until
4 April 2022 a
measure that had become ineffective, so as to allow the Omicron peak to subside.
- [105] FTBC
submitted — and this submission goes to the heart of their argument
— that the Ministry’s view as to
timing was not determinative of the
issue of whether the 100:25 ratio continued to be demonstrably justified in
response to Omicron.
That, FTBC submitted, is a question of law for this
Court to decide.
- [106] Mr
Rishworth KC, who appeared for FTBC, confirmed that the challenge before this
Court was to the Executive’s decision
not to revoke the Order, or remove
the relevant gathering restrictions, at an earlier date. He said it was not a
challenge to the
reasonableness of the Minister’s decision making.
Rather, he said, the question was whether the Order complied with the
requirements
of NZBORA from
mid-February 2022 onwards.
- [107] In the
course of oral argument we explored with Mr Rishworth the relief sought on
appeal. He confirmed that FTBC was not arguing
that the Order ceased to be
effective at some date. Nor was FTBC seeking an order setting aside the Order.
Rather, FTBC was seeking
an appropriate declaration. The form of declaration
suggested by Mr Rishworth in the course of the hearing was that the Minister
failed to amend or revoke the limiting measure of the 25-person limit on
gatherings so as to maintain its rationality and proportionality
from
mid-February 2022.
- [108] We asked
Mr Rishworth who was under a duty to act, and unlawfully failed to act, at a
particular time. He acknowledged that
identifying the person who failed to act
in this case is difficult. He fell back on the notion of collective
responsibility of the
Crown. He explained that FTBC’s case was that
things were not done in a timely way by various officials that would have made
it possible for the Minister to act differently. There had been a failure to
ask the right questions at the time they should have
been asked.
- [109] Ms van
Dam, who appeared as junior counsel for FTBC, took us in considerable detail
through the internal Crown documents in
late 2021 and early 2022.
She confirmed that FTBC was not arguing that the Minister had failed to
comply with the obligation in
s 14(5) to keep the Order under review. But,
she said, there were many points revealed by the documentary record where it
became
unlawful to fail to make the decision to dispense with CVC-based
gathering limits. It should have been made when Omicron was circulating
widely
in the community in February 2022. By 15 February 2022 Delta was no longer
circulating. And by 4 March 2022 it had been
recognised that there was
“technically” no longer a justification for requiring CVCs. This,
she said, was the latest
point at which a decision should have been made but was
not made.
The Minister’s
submissions
- [110] The
Minister emphasised that as the argument had developed on appeal, its focus was
a seven-week period from mid-February 2022
to 4 April 2022 when the challenged
gathering restriction was removed. During this period, the Minister said, the
Government faced
an unprecedented challenge. For the first time in the
pandemic, COVID-19 was circulating widely in the community. Officials were
dealing with imperfect information, and preliminary and limited understandings
as to how the Omicron variant would impact a COVID-naïve
population.
- [111] In these
circumstances, the Minister said, immediate removal of CVCs in
mid-February
2022 would have been contrary to the precautionary principle in circumstances
where the vaccine continued to have an
impact against Omicron, albeit a lesser
one than against Delta. In particular, vaccination continued to have a
significant impact
on hospitalisation, so was relevant to the Government’s
central concern about the health system being overwhelmed as the first
Omicron
wave reached its peak. The Government also needed to responsibly assess its
options for a fundamentally changed COVID-19
landscape. A knee-jerk reaction to
Omicron would have risked jeopardising the public and the health system.
- [112] Thus, the
Minister submitted, the Government acted appropriately and expeditiously in line
with the precautionary principle
to remove restrictions once it became apparent
they were no longer
justified.
Discussion
- [113] This
is, so far as we are aware, the first time that an appellate court in
New Zealand has been called on to consider how NZBORA
applies to delegated
legislation in circumstances where that legislation limits rights affirmed by
NZBORA, those limits are demonstrably
justified for the purposes of s 5 of
NZBORA at the time the relevant legislation is made, but circumstances change in
a manner that
calls into question the continuing justification for the
rights-limiting
measure.[58]
NZBORA
limits the power to make delegated legislation
- [114] It
is well-established that delegated legislation that is inconsistent with NZBORA
cannot be lawfully made in the absence of
an express provision in the empowering
legislation that authorises that inconsistency. If Parliament intends to
authorise the making
of regulations or other orders that are in conflict with
fundamental rights, then it needs to do so expressly and unambiguously.
Otherwise, this is treated as an inherent limit on the power conferred by the
primary legislation to make subordinate
legislation.[59]
- [115] The
COVID-19 Public Health Response Act did not authorise the Minister to make
orders inconsistent with NZBORA. To the contrary,
s 9(1)(ba) expressly
required the Minister to be satisfied that an order does not limit or is a
justified limit on the rights and
freedoms in NZBORA. As Cooke J explained in
NZDSOS Inc v Minister for COVID-19 Response, the requirement that the
Minister be satisfied that an order is NZBORA-consistent provides an additional
level of protection. But
it does not replace the requirement that any order
must be consistent with NZBORA. That is a further, objective, requirement which
must be assessed by the Court.[60]
- [116] It follows
that if a court finds that delegated legislation made under the COVID-19 Public
Health Response Act was not consistent
with NZBORA at the time it was made, that
delegated legislation was not lawfully made within the scope of the powers
conferred by
Parliament on the relevant decision maker. The appropriate relief
will generally be to set aside the delegated legislation (or the
problematic
measures contained in that legislation, if severable).
- [117] However
that is not the position here. The Minister lawfully made the Order challenged
by FTBC. The Order is lawfully made
delegated legislation.
Implications of NZBORA for lawfully
made rights-limiting delegated legislation
- [118] How
does NZBORA operate in relation to rights-limiting delegated legislation after
the date on which that legislation is made?
In the absence of relevant
authority squarely on point, we address this question from first
principles.
- [119] Mr
Rishworth was right to concede in the course of argument that even if it could
be shown that the Order ceased to be demonstrably
justified by a given date,
applying the Hansen test, that would not mean it had automatically become
invalid on that date. It was lawfully made, and continued in force unless
and
until amended or revoked by the Minister, or set aside by a court. NZBORA does
not impose a test for the continuing validity
of delegated legislation. The
delegated legislation does not vanish in a puff of smoke as soon as the
Hansen test ceases to be satisfied.
- [120] Nor does
the delegated legislation become unlawful, so liable to be set aside, as soon as
that test ceases to be satisfied.
If delegated legislation was lawfully made,
it remains lawful and valid unless and until revoked. A court cannot set aside
delegated
legislation that was lawful and valid at the time it was originally
made on the basis that such legislation could not have been lawfully
made at
some later date. That is not the right test as a matter of principle.
- [121] Rather,
NZBORA operates by speaking to relevant decision makers, and requiring them to
act consistently with the rights that
are affirmed both at the time they make
delegated legislation and on a continuing basis. As s 3 states, NZBORA
applies to acts done (and, we would add, omissions to act) by each of the
three branches of government — here, to acts of the Minister as a member
of the executive branch. In making delegated legislation a decision maker
must act consistently with NZBORA. Failure to do so means
the act of making the
delegated legislation was not lawfully authorised, so the product of that act is
liable to be set aside by
the court in judicial review proceedings. But what
NZBORA requires of a decision maker changes once the legislation has been made.
It speaks to the acts and omissions of decision makers that are relevant at that
point in time. Those acts and omissions fall into
two linked categories:
keeping the delegated legislation under review, and exercising powers to amend
or revoke it. We address each
in turn.
- [122] Where
delegated legislation contains measures that limit rights affirmed in NZBORA in
order to support a response to a public
emergency such as a pandemic, it is
inherent in the rationale for those measures that they will not be justified
indefinitely. The
public emergency will at some point come to an end, or
require a different form of response. The measures will be lawful if the
limits
on rights that they impose are demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society at the time the delegated legislation
is
made.[61] But the expectation is
that the emergency will pass, and the initial justifications for the
rights-limiting measures will cease
to apply. In those circumstances NZBORA
requires the maker of the delegated legislation to keep it under review to
ascertain whether
there continues to be a sufficient justification for the
rights-limiting measures that it
contains.[62] The greater the
limits on rights effected by those measures, and the faster circumstances are
changing, the greater the need for
vigilance to ensure that rights are not
limited for longer than can be justified.
- [123] Such a
review may identify that a rights-limiting measure is no longer justified, in
the sense required by s 5 of NZBORA. Or
the absence of justification may
come to the decision maker’s attention in other ways, for example where
public concerns are
raised about the measure. If the maker of the delegated
legislation appreciates that the measure is no longer NZBORA compliant,
that
decision maker is required by NZBORA to take action to amend or revoke the
delegated legislation to bring it back into compliance
with NZBORA. That
duty also arises, in our view, where a decision maker who took reasonable steps
to review the measure would appreciate
the NZBORA non-compliance, even if the
particular decision maker has failed to do so.
- [124] The
decision maker’s duty under NZBORA to act consistently with the rights
affirmed by NZBORA manifests itself in this
context as a duty to take steps to
amend or revoke the delegated legislation. That duty must operate in a
realistic manner that
takes into account the importance of considered, properly
informed, democratically legitimate, delegated law making. The issue for
the
decision maker will rarely be as simple as whether an isolated provision in
delegated legislation should be retained or revoked.
More commonly, there will
be a range of interrelated policy choices to be made. If for example the
rights-limiting measure is no
longer justified because its objective can be
achieved by different less rights-limiting measures, those alternative measures
need
to be identified, and amending legislation prepared to give effect to those
alternative measures in place of the original measure.
Or the original measure
may be justified provided additional safeguards are introduced: but then those
safeguards need to be identified
and appropriate provisions framed to give
effect to them. There may be a choice to be made between one or more paths to
NZBORA compliance,
and that choice may turn on a range of social and
economic considerations that the decision maker needs to weigh.
- [125] In short,
the decision maker will have an obligation to act. But precisely how the
decision maker acts will depend on the relevant
circumstances at that time, the
objectives of the empowering legislation, and an analysis of the available
options for pursuing those
objectives in the current circumstances.
- [126] NZBORA
does not require decision makers to act precipitously on the basis of
insufficient information, or without appropriate
advice from officials and
relevant experts. It does not require them to act without properly consulting
those affected by any proposed
changes to the legislation. Nor does it require
draft legislation to be developed in artificially constrained timeframes that
risk
errors and oversights. It does not require the decision maker to
adopt that legislation without giving it careful consideration.
None of these
are features of the free and democratic society that NZBORA is designed to
uphold.
- [127] Nor will
it invariably be appropriate for any decision that is made to have immediate
effect, even where it is designed to restore
NZBORA compliance. Often, a
reasonable time needs to be allowed for implementation of new arrangements
introduced by changes to
a legislative instrument. NZBORA does not require
decision makers to ignore the practical implications of law changes.
- [128] These
duties — the duty to keep delegated legislation that limits rights under
review, and the duty to take steps to amend
or revoke the delegated legislation
to achieve compliance with NZBORA — can be supervised by the courts in the
same way as
any other statutory obligations. But as the discussion above makes
plain, the inquiry is not just whether the delegated legislation
is NZBORA
compliant at a particular point in time. Rather, the inquiry will focus on
whether the ongoing duties outlined above have
been breached. And if a breach
is made out, the remedial response will generally be a declaration. It is
difficult to conceive
of circumstances in which a court would determine for
itself what the outcome of the review should have been, and set aside delegated
legislation (or part of it) without the decision maker having an opportunity to
consider the full range of options for amending or
replacing that legislation.
That would involve the court making a decision entrusted to the relevant
decision maker, which is rare
in any circumstances, let alone where the exercise
of a delegated legislative power is in issue.
- [129] Importantly,
it does not follow from a finding (made with the benefit of hindsight) that a
particular measure in delegated legislation
ceased to satisfy the Hansen
test at a given date, that the legislation should have been amended by that
date to remove the (no longer justified) measure. Rather, the question is
whether the relevant decision maker failed to act consistently
with the duties
outlined above by not initiating action by that date directed towards promptly
amending or revoking the delegated
legislation.
- [130] As this
brief discussion illustrates, an inquiry into failure to comply with NZBORA in
relation to a complaint that a rights-limiting
measure should have been, but was
not, revoked or amended is very different from an inquiry into whether such a
measure could lawfully
have been made in the first place. If the measure is
still in force, the question will be whether it has been kept properly under
review. If not, the likely response is to direct that such a review take place.
The more significant the limit on rights, and the
clearer the absence of
continuing justification, the more urgent that review will be.
- [131] Where a
measure has been kept under review, and the complaint is that the review should
have taken place faster and reached
a conclusion earlier, the nature of the
inquiry will depend on whether it is common ground that the measure ceased to be
justified
at a later time. If, as here, it is common ground that the measure
ceased to be justified and, by the time the challenge is heard,
that measure has
been modified in a manner that addresses the concerns raised, the question for
the courts will be whether failure
to move faster was itself a failure to act
consistently with NZBORA. That will require a highly contextual examination of
the process
followed during the review, and identification of a time by which
NZBORA required action to be taken that was not taken. That is
a very different
inquiry from the inquiry into initial lawfulness. It is an inquiry that the
court will be in a position to undertake
only if such a challenge has been
adequately pleaded, and the decision maker has had a fair opportunity consistent
with the requirements
of natural justice to respond to that challenge.
- [132] At the
risk of stating the obvious, the duties of a maker of delegated legislation to
keep rights-limiting measures under review,
and to take steps to amend or revoke
the delegated legislation to achieve compliance with NZBORA, do not depend on
whether the limits
on rights affect all or most people or a small minority.
Where the limits on rights affect different groups in different ways or
to a
different extent, the justification for all of those impacts must be kept under
review and appropriate action taken where the
justification ceases to exist in
respect of any group, however
small.
Applying this framework to the
present case
- [133] We
turn to apply this framework to the present case. Here, the argument before us
proceeded on the basis that the Order was
lawfully made on 30 November 2021.
It was common ground that the measure was kept under review. It was also
common ground that
by 23 March 2022, it was apparent to the Minister (and other
Ministers) that the circumstances had changed to an extent that meant
that the
CVC-related gathering restrictions were no longer justified, and should be
promptly removed.
- [134] We do not
consider that any useful purpose would be served by making a declaration that
merely confirmed that the CVC-related
gathering restrictions ceased to be
justified at some point in time in early 2022, in circumstances where that is
not in dispute.
Nor do we consider that it is legally relevant or practically
useful to attempt to determine a specific date by which that was,
or should have
been, apparent to the Minister. That is only part of the equation when it comes
to determining whether the duty to
act in a timely manner to achieve
NZBORA-compliance was engaged and was breached.
- [135] In any
event, Mr Rishworth confirmed that he was not arguing that the Minister had
acted unlawfully by failing to modify the
Order to remove the CVC-related
gathering restrictions at an earlier date. The Minister had not received
unequivocal advice that
the restrictions were no longer justified before the
advice stream that led to the 23 March 2022 decisions. Nor was it
suggested
in argument that the Minister should have taken specific steps at some
earlier date to accelerate the process of receiving advice
and making decisions
about the amendment of the Order.
- [136] That
brings us back to the observation we made earlier about the way in which the
argument before us had evolved from the original
challenge before the High
Court. We were not well placed to consider whether the review ought to have
been conducted more rapidly,
or what specific steps ought to have been taken by
the Minister or his advisers by particular dates, in the absence of evidence
squarely
addressing that issue. FTBC did not plead its case on the
(alternative) basis that the Order was valid when made, but should have
been
amended or revoked earlier. It did not file any evidence addressing that
question. In the absence of any pleading squarely
raising this issue, and any
evidence from FTBC on the point, it was (unsurprisingly) not addressed in the
affidavit of the Minister
or the other affidavits filed in the High Court. In
those circumstances a court could not fairly or responsibly make a finding that
the Minister (or the Executive collectively) had failed to act in accordance
with NZBORA because he had failed to amend or revoke
the Order by an earlier
date.
- [137] However we
observe that on the basis of the documentary record before us, the process that
was undertaken to identify and analyse
the change in circumstances, consider
options for responding to those changed circumstances, and provide advice to the
Minister,
in the context of a fast-developing and complex public health crisis,
appears to have been prompt and efficient.
- [138] We do not
accept the submission that there was a clear path forward as at 4 March
2022 that required the CVC-related gathering
restrictions to be removed
forthwith. The advice paper to the Director-General of 4 March 2022
expressly identified two possible
paths forward. One would recognise the
absence of a sufficient public health rationale for use of CVCs based on the
current definition
of “up-to-date vaccination status” (which only
included two doses of the vaccine). The other option, which was the subject
of
continuing work, was to modify the definition of “up-to-date vaccination
status” to include a requirement to have
had a booster. The advice to the
Director-General was that this would restore the original public health
rationale for use of CVCs.
In circumstances where the second option was still
squarely on the table, it would have made no sense — and would have been
inconsistent with good legislative practice — to remove, then shortly
afterwards reintroduce, CVC-related gathering restrictions.
That is an
unrealistic and impractical suggestion. We do not accept that failure to take
that path was inconsistent with NZBORA.
- [139] Nor do we
consider that it was inconsistent with NZBORA for the Minister to decide on 23
March 2022 to remove the CVC-related
gathering restrictions with effect from 4
April 2022, rather than immediately. As the Judge noted, the 21 March 2022
Cabinet paper
identified the rationale for the gap between the decision and its
operative date.[63] It was expected
that by 4 April 2022 New Zealand would have moved past the Omicron peak,
reducing pressure on the health system.
And, critically, that would allow
time for sectors and agencies to put in place the guidance and workplace
requirements they needed
to manage residual COVID-19 risk. In circumstances
where the Government requirement for CVCs was being removed, it was necessary
for employers and those responsible for gatherings to consider whether, in the
particular context of the workplaces and gatherings
for which they were
responsible, such requirements should be retained or different requirements
(such as wearing a specified type
of mask) should be put in place. There was no
evidence before us about the time reasonably required to enable that adjustment
to
occur throughout New Zealand. We are not prepared to find that an
11-day lead time was inconsistent with the requirements of NZBORA
in the absence
of any pleading or evidence addressing that issue.
- [140] That is
sufficient to dispose of the appeal. It has not been necessary for us to
address the issues identified in the parties’
agreed issues list
concerning application of the Hansen test to the Order as at mid-February
2022. The issues of principle identified at [97] above are better decided in a
case where they
squarely arise. Here, for the reasons explained above,
they do not.
Costs
- [141] The
Minister seeks costs before this Court. He submits that the public interest in
a review of the lawfulness of the Order
was satisfied by the High Court
proceedings, and is further diminished by the fact that the CPF has now been
revoked.
- [142] We agree:
we do not consider that there was sufficient public interest in an appeal
raising the question of whether a change
to the Order that already had been made
should have been made some weeks earlier, especially in circumstances where the
material
before the High Court did not squarely address that timing issue with
the result that this Court was, in turn, not well placed to
consider it. The
ordinary principle that costs follow the event is not displaced in the context
of this appeal.
Result
- [143] The
appeal is dismissed.
- [144] The
appellant must pay costs to the respondent for a standard appeal on a band A
basis, with usual disbursements.
Solicitors:
Parry Field Lawyers, Christchurch for
Appellant
Crown Law Office | Te Tari Ture o te
Karauna, Wellington for Respondent
[1] The Order was made by the
Minister for COVID-19 Response under the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act
2020
[2] Orewa Community Church v
Minister for COVID-19 Response [2022] NZHC 2026, [2022] 3 NZLR 475
[High Court judgment] at [11].
[3] At [296]–[298].
[4] At [13]–[46].
[5] Emphasis added.
[6] All references to the
provisions of the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act are references to the Act
as it stood at the time the
Order was made in November 2021.
[7] The pre-requisites for making
such an order are set out in s 8 of the Act.
[8] Emphasis added.
[9] COVID-19 Public Health Response
(Protection Framework) Order 2021, sch 7.
[10] Clause 42. See sch 7, pt 2.
[11] Clause 46.
[12] Clause 47.
[13] Schedule
6.
[14] Clause 42.
[15] Clause 46.
[16] Clause 47.
[17] Schedule
5.
[18] Clause 42.
[19] Clause 46.
[20] Clause 47.
[21] Clause 5.
[22] These guidelines were
subsequently amended on 4 April 2022.
[23] New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990, s 2.
[24] Section 3(a).
[25] The statement of claim also
alleged that the Minister had acted unreasonably in making the Order, and sought
a declaration to that
effect. However that claim was not successful in the High
Court, and has not been pursued on appeal.
[26] See High Court judgment,
above n 2, at [5].
[27] At [120].
[28] At [116].
[29] At [118], citing R v
Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1; and R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR
103.
[30] At [120].
[31] At [124].
[32] At [125].
[33] At [126].
[34] At [127]–[129].
[35] At [130].
[36] At [148]–[168].
[37] At [169]–[186].
[38] At [206].
[39] At [211]–[226] and
[234].
[40] At [237].
[41] Emphasis added.
[42] High Court judgment, above
n 2, at [238]–[239].
[43] At [238]–[239].
[44] At [252].
[45] See [33] of the briefing
paper, set out at [34] above.
[46] High Court judgment, above
n 2, at [253]–[254].
[47] At [259].
[48] At [261].
[49] At [262].
[50] At [275].
[51] At [276].
[52] At [282].
[53] At [283].
[54] At [296]–[297].
[55] At [299].
[56] Hansen v R, above n
29, at [204].
[57] Strictly speaking, if the
person responsible for the gathering did not ensure that all participants were
CVC-compliant. So if CVC
status was not checked, the limit was 25. And a
person could be CVC-compliant although not vaccinated, if they had an exemption
or were aged under 12 years and three months.
[58] The issue was touched on by
Cooke J in NZDSOS Inc v Minister for COVID-19 Response [2022] NZHC
716, (2022) 18 NZELR 833 at [63]. An appeal from that decision was heard by
this Court, and judgment has been delivered. This issue was not however
squarely addressed
in the judgment: see NZTSOS Inc v Minister for COVID-19
Response [2024] NZCA 74.
[59] New Health New Zealand
Inc v South Taranaki District Council [2018] NZSC 59, [2018] 1 NZLR 948 at
[294]–[297], citing Drew v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 207; [2002] 1 NZLR 58 (CA)
at [68]; Cropp v Judicial Committee [2008] NZSC 46, [2008] 3 NZLR 774 at
[25]; Zaoui v Attorney-General (No 2) [2005] NZSC 38, [2006] 1 NZLR
289 at [90]–[91]; and Dotcom v Attorney-General [2014] NZSC
199, [2015] 1 NZLR 745 at [100].
[60] NZDSOS Inc v Minister
for COVID-19 Response, above n 58,
at [59]–[60].
[61] The inherently temporary
nature of the justification for such limits on rights affirmed by NZBORA will
generally require the rights-limiting
measures to be time bounded. Thus for
example the COVID-19 Public Health Response Act was itself time-bounded, and
provided for
limits on the duration of COVID-19 orders: see ss 3 and
14–16.
[62] For an analogous obligation
to keep under review emergency measures that derogate from obligations under the
International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, see the American
Association for the International Commission of Jurists Siracusa Principles
on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant
on Civil and Policial Rights (April 1985) at [51] and [55]. The
Siracusa Principles can be a useful interpretive aid when applying NZBORA: see
Quilter v Attorney-General [1997] NZCA 207; [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) at 540–541; and
Nottingham v Attorney-General [2022] NZHC 405 at [11]–[12].
[63] High Court judgment, above
n 2, at [261].
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