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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 31 January 2018
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV 2014-485-11211 [2015] NZHC 2991
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UNDER
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the Judicature Amendment Act 1972
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IN THE MATTER
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of an application for judicial review of decisions under s 185 and s 188 of
the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 and s 68 of the Summary
Proceedings Act
1957
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BETWEEN
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ANNA ELIZABETH OSBORNE First Applicant
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AND
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SONYA LYNNE ROCKHOUSE Second Applicant
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AND
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WORKSAFE NEW ZEALAND First Respondent
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AND
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DISTRICT COURT AT WELLINGTON Second Respondent
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Hearing:
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25-26 May 2015
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Counsel:
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N Hampton QC and S Meikle for Applicants
J Holden and M Conway for First Respondent
No Appearance for Second Respondent
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Judgment:
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27 November 2015
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JUDGMENT OF BROWN
J
OSBORNE & OR v WORKSAFE NZ & OR [2015] NZHC 2991 [27 November 2015]
Table of Contents
Paragraph No.
Introduction [1] The issues [7] Relevant factual background [9]
The proposal
[12] The decision-making phase
[15] The Prosecution Decision
[22] Steps prior to the District Court Decision
[24] The District Court Decision
[29] Two matters in dispute
[30]
Is the Prosecution Decision amenable to judicial review? [31]
In deciding not to proceed with the prosecution against
Mr Whittall did the prosecutor fail to comply with the
Guidelines? [44]
Alleged illegal agreement
[52]
Was the proposal of a voluntary payment an
irrelevant consideration?
[60]
Worksafe’s consideration of other pleaded factors
[64]
In deciding not to proceed with the prosecution against
Mr Whittall did the prosecution fail to have regard to s 5(g)
of the Act? [78]
Did the applicants have a legitimate expectation that they would be consulted prior to the prosecutor making its decision and, if so, did the failure to so consult with them render the Prosecution Decision unlawful, invalid or
unreasonable? [83]
Was the District Court Decision unlawful by reason of the
process whereby the decision was made? [95]
Alleged failure to conduct hearing on the merits
[98]
Alleged failure to act judicially
[103]
Was the District Court Decision unlawful by reason of the
alleged unlawfulness of the Prosecution Decision? [118]
Was the District Court Decision unlawful because the
District Court Judge had recused herself? [123] Disposition [137]
Introduction
[1] The tragic events at the Pike River Mine on 19 November 2010 are
well known.1 Twenty-nine workers perished in the explosion.
The first applicant, Ms Osborne, lost her husband; the second applicant, Ms
Rockhouse, lost a son.
[2] On 10 November 2011 Keith Stewart, a health and safety inspector of
the first respondent (Worksafe, formerly the Department
of Labour),2
filed in the District Court at Greymouth informations against Pike River
Coal Ltd (in receivership) (PRCL), VLI Drilling Pty Ltd and
Peter William
Whittall, an employee and officer of PRCL (Mr Whittall) alleging breaches of
various sections of the Health and Safety
in Employment Act 1992 (the
Act).
[3] On 26 October 2012 in the District Court at
Greymouth before Judge J A Farish VLI Drilling Pty Ltd
pleaded guilty to the
three charges and was fined a total of $46,800.
[4] PRCL did not defend the charges against it and on 18 April 2013
convictions were entered by Judge Farish on nine offences
under the Act after a
formal proof hearing on 14–15 March 2013 in which the receivers of PRCL
did not participate. At a sentencing
hearing on 5 July 2013 Judge Farish imposed
fines of $760,000 and ordered PRCL to pay $3.41 million in reparations to the
families
of the 29 men killed and to the survivors of the explosion.
[5] Mr Whittall pleaded not guilty to the charges
against him. On
4 December 2013 Worksafe decided that it would not offer any evidence in support of the charges against Mr Whittall on the basis that it was not in the public interest to do so (the Prosecution Decision). On 12 December 2013 in the District Court at Christchurch Judge Farish dismissed all the charges against Mr Whittall (the District
Court Decision).
1 Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy (Wellington, 2012).
2 I refer throughout the judgment to Worksafe rather than to the Department of Labour or its contemporary the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (MBIE). The functions of the Department were transferred to MBIE in 2012.
[6] The applicants challenge the legality of the Prosecution Decision
and the District Court Decision contending that they were
extraordinary
decisions which struck at the heart and integrity of the criminal justice system
in New Zealand. The second respondent
having been granted leave to withdraw,
there was no appearance on its behalf.
The issues
[7] Two causes of action are pleaded against Worksafe and three against
the District Court. Both the Prosecution Decision and
the District Court
Decision are alleged to be statutory powers of decision. In an affirmative
defence Worksafe contends that the
Prosecution Decision is not amenable to
judicial review because it was a decision made in the exercise of its
prosecutorial discretion.
[8] The issues as reflected in the pleadings can be broadly stated as follows: (a) Is the Prosecution Decision amenable to judicial review?3
(b) In deciding not to proceed with the prosecution against Mr
Whittall,
did the prosecutor:
(i) fail to comply with the Solicitor-General’s
Prosecution
Guidelines (“the Guidelines”); or
(ii) fail to have regard to s 5(g) of the Act.
If so, did any such failure render the Prosecution Decision unlawful, invalid
or unreasonable?4
(c) Did the applicants have a legitimate expectation that they would be
consulted prior to the prosecutor making its decision and,
if so, did
the
3 Worksafe’s first affirmative defence.
4 First cause of action.
failure to so consult with them render the Prosecution Decision
unlawful, invalid or unreasonable?5
(d) Was the District Court Decision unlawful by reason of: (i) the process whereby the decision was made;
(ii) the alleged unlawfulness of the Prosecution Decision
(iii) because the District Court Judge had recused
herself?6
(e) If the Prosecution Decision was unlawful, should the relief sought by the
applicants be granted?7
Relevant factual background
[9] With the exception of two matters noted below,8
there was no material
dispute as to the sequence of events which gave rise to the applicants’
claim.
[10] Mr Whittall sought a transfer of the charges against him to the District Court at Wellington for a defended summary hearing. That application was granted on
13 June 2013. In response to Judge Farish’s inquiry whether there was any objection to her conducting that hearing, Mr Grieve QC for Mr Whittall indicated that his instructions were to object to Judge Farish sitting on the hearing because of the findings which she had made with regard to PRCL on the formal proof hearing.9
However there was no objection by either party to Judge Farish
continuing to maintain administrative supervision of the
file until another
Judge was allocated to hear the matter in Wellington.
[11] On 17 July 2013 the police announced that they had concluded their investigation into the explosion and had decided that no criminal charges would be
laid against any individual involved in the management of
PRCL.
5 Second cause of action.
6 Third, fourth and fifth causes of action.
7 Worksafe’s second affirmative defence.
8 At [30].
9 At [4] above.
The proposal
[12] On 2 August 2013 a meeting took place on a without prejudice,
counsel to counsel basis between counsel for Worksafe
and Mr Whittall.
Following that meeting Mr Grieve sent a letter to Mr Stanaway (the Crown
solicitor for Canterbury and Westland
at the time) dated 7 August 2013 which
included:
Thank you for agreeing to meet with me and Ms Shortall last Friday to
discuss, on a without prejudice counsel to counsel basis, possible
ways to
conclude the [Worksafe] prosecutions without the need for a very lengthy and
expensive trial at which the various allegations
would be the subject of
detailed challenge.
Given the recency and ambit of the discussions I see no need to rehearse the
detail now, save to say that the essence of the arrangement
that I proposed
involved a voluntary payment of a realistic reparation payment, conditional upon
the informant electing not to proceed
with any of the charges against Mr
Whittall.
Mr Grieve went on to explain that the defence team did not wish to waste
valuable time taking detailed instructions and preparing
a comprehensive
proposal if the essential feature from the defence’s perspective, namely
the dropping of all charges, would
in reality be destined for rejection from the
outset.
[13] In his without prejudice response of 20 August 2013 Mr Stanaway
stated:
2. Currently on the table (on a without prejudice basis) for
discussion, is the central arrangement that the insurers for
Mr Whittall/PRCL
would make a voluntary payment of a realistic reparation payment to the Pike
River disaster victims, conditional
on [Worksafe] electing not to proceed with
any of the charges against Mr Whittall.
3. I have had discussions with a number of [Worksafe] staff and it is
fair to say that the proposal is not dismissed out of
hand and that it is worthy
of further discussion. However as outlined to you the most principled and
appropriate outcome would be
a plea of guilty by Mr Whittall to at least one
charge with an agreed summary and stance on the issues of causation and
reparation.
...
5. Additionally, I doubt that a withdrawal of the charges alone in return for a substantial voluntary reparation payment would suffice. In my view and as discussed, there could appropriately be other steps involved including, for instance, exploring restorative justice processes and/or a statement of regret or apology.
[14] The proposal on behalf of Mr Whittall was elaborated upon in Mr
Grieve’s letter of 16 October 2013, three versions
of which were in
evidence. The following extracts are taken from the third and final version of
the letter:
2. It is understood that you have been reviewing the issues of
evidential sufficiency and public interest as they apply
to this case
in the context of the Solicitor-General’s 2013 Prosecution Guidelines.
The proposal which follows is made
on the basis that we consider that it should
be taken into account in the course of your review as a relevant and
appropriate
public interest consideration.
3. In short, the proposal is that a voluntary payment of $3.41 million be made available to the families of the 29 men who tragically lost their lives in Pike River’s coal mine and the two men who survived the
19 November 2010 explosion.
Proposed $3.41 million payment
4. While it is acknowledged that nothing can replace their loss, it
is envisaged that a voluntary payment to the families
could go some way towards
alleviating the financial pressures on the families and serve as a meaningful
recognition of such loss.
5. It is proposed that the voluntary payment:
(a) Will be made on behalf of the directors and officers of Pike River
Coal Limited (in receivership) (the Company) at the
time of the explosion for
the families of the 29 men who died and the two survivors, and
(b) Will comprise allocations of $110,000 for each of those
families and survivors in the amount calculated
by Judge Farish
when ordering that they be compensated for the significant loss and ongoing
trauma that she found had been caused
by the actions of the Company.
(c) Will be paid into Court for it to distribute to the families of
the 29 men who died and the two survivors.
6. In advance of the $3.41 million being made available, it is proposed
(with precise terms to be agreed) that:
(a) [Worksafe] will not proceed with the charges laid against Mr
Whittall by advising the Court that no evidence will be offered
in support of
any of the charges.
(b) A private meeting will be arranged at which Mr Whittall will
express sympathy on behalf of the Company to the families
and survivors and
will convey his personal empathy and condolences.
(c) Each of the Company directors at the time of the explosion will be asked by Mr Whittall to attend this meeting.
(d) Any public statement by [Worksafe] and/or the Crown about the
charges against Mr Whittall being withdrawn will be
made in terms agreed
with me.
...
Proposal benefits
...
13. In terms of further expense, costly pre-trial applications pursuant
to the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 will likely be required
to determine issues
such as the admissibility of evidence and the application of the statutory time
bar in section 54B of the Health
and Safety in Employment Act 1992.
14. By withdrawing the charges, not only will all these costs
and burdens be avoided, but the extensive judicial and
prosecution resources
required for a defended hearing of up to 16–20 weeks in length could
instead be utilised elsewhere.
Conclusion
15. The voluntary payment of $3.41 million is economically viable only
if Mr Whittall’s continuing preparation costs
can be terminated
promptly. If this cannot be achieved, the proposed payment will not represent
any saving over the cost of proceeding
to trial and in that event, whatever the
outcome, I believe that the families will not receive anything like the amount
offered.
The decision-making phase
[15] Although Mr Stewart was aware discussions were taking
place, the investigation team continued to review the
evidence and prepare the
prosecution of the charges against Mr Whittall both prior to and after receipt
of the 16 October 2013 letter.
Criminal disclosure and the briefing
process were both substantially completed by 30 October 2013. In total 92
witness
briefs (signed and unsigned) were prepared and approximately 600,000
documents were reviewed for disclosure.
[16] Following completion of the briefing and disclosure process the Crown
Solicitor commenced his review of the charges against Mr Whittall as required
by para 9.2 of the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution
Guidelines.10
10 See [49] below.
[17] On 15 November 2013 the Crown Solicitor provided to Worksafe his
review of the charges. At Worksafe a panel was appointed
to advise on and
assist with the decision-making process, which process was considered at a
number of meetings. The Solicitor-General
and the chief executive of Worksafe
were informed of the proposed decision-making process. It was agreed that Crown
counsel would
attend the initial meeting to provide oversight of the
decision-making process on behalf of the Solicitor-General.
[18] At a meeting on 26 November 2013 Mr Stanaway’s advice as to
evidential matters and public interest considerations
was considered. In
his first affidavit Mr Stewart outlined the position at that meeting:
54. It was by then apparent that, while there was sufficient evidence
to justify the prosecution, the likelihood of a successful
prosecution was low
for several reasons including:
54.1 The unavailability of at least 14 notified prosecution
witnesses and other reluctant witnesses;
54.2 The likelihood that briefs or statements of unavailable
witnesses could not be admissible as evidence at trial;
54.3 The likely contests between expert witnesses for both parties
coupled with the burden of proof on [Worksafe];
54.4 The indications from the defence that lengthy and complex pre-trial
arguments would be raised.
55. In addition, several reasons that indicated a trial was not in
the public interest were by that time apparent:
55.1 The offences with which Mr Whittall was charged were
punishable by a fine only (and in the circumstances, a low sentence
was likely
to be imposed in the event of a conviction) and a reparation order was
unlikely;
55.2 Mr Whittall was charged as a secondary party to the
offending of PRCL;
55.3 PRCL had been convicted with record fines imposed and a substantial
reparation order made;
55.4 The Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy had taken place, with a comprehensive report produced;
55.5 A prosecution requiring a 16–20 week trial in Wellington would
be very costly both financially and in terms of use
of [Worksafe’s]
resources.
56. In addition to Mr Stanaway’s advice, we also discussed the
matters raised in the without prejudice and confidential
to counsel letter from
Mr Grieve dated 16 October 2013.
57. At the meeting concerns were expressed as to the legality
and propriety of considering an offer of voluntary payment
in the context of the
public interest component of the prosecution decision. No conclusion on this
issue was reached at that meeting
but we were all conscious of the importance of
ensuring the offer was dealt with in a proper manner and only taken
into
consideration if it was appropriate to do so. No decision
was made as to whether to proceed with the prosecution
or not.
[19] A further meeting was held on 28 November 2013 in which Mr Stanaway
participated by telephone. Mr Stewart explained:
59. At that meeting a number of matters concerning the decision-making
process were discussed, together with the outstanding
question of the legality
and propriety of considering an offer of voluntary payment. Although it was
potentially only one of several
matters that had to be considered before
determining to proceed with the prosecution, we considered it important to
know whether
it could be given any weight or had to be disregarded. This
was because, on the one hand, we were acutely aware of the
probable
perception that this was “chequebook justice” while, on the other
hand, we considered this was the only prospect
of securing the payment to the
families of the reparation order made against PRCL.
60. No decision was made at that meeting as to whether it was lawful or
appropriate to consider the offer of voluntary payment.
However, we agreed we
were uncomfortable with the without prejudice offer being in confidential
correspondence and discussed a
possible exchange of open correspondence if the
offer were to be considered. This was because we recognised there would be
public
interest in understanding the terms of the proposal made on
behalf of Mr Whittall.
61. Nor was any decision made at that meeting as to whether to proceed with the prosecution or not. However, in terms of the decision-making process, it was determined that ultimately any decision would be made by me, as Chief Inspector, Response and Investigations, on behalf of [Worksafe], and with the approval of Mr Podger as the Deputy Chief Executive, Health and Safety Group.
...
[20] Consideration by Worksafe officials of the issues and process
continued for a number of days. Ultimately it was decided
that the offer of
voluntary payment could be considered as one of the factors to be taken into
account.
[21] Consideration was also given to the question of consultation with
the families of the workers who had died in the explosion.
Mr Stewart
explained:
64. We considered whether it was necessary or feasible to consult with
the families of the deceased before making a final decision.
To do so would have
been unusual. Victims are routinely kept informed of significant
developments in relation to an
investigation or prosecution but it
is not usual to consult with them prior to making a decision not to proceed with
a prosecution.
In this instance, we concluded that any such consultation
would be fraught with difficulty given the large number of families
involved
and the difficulty in achieving consensus. In circumstances where one factor in
the decision-making was an offer made on
a without prejudice basis, there was
also a very high risk with such a large group that confidentiality would be
compromised and
the offer withdrawn.
The Prosecution Decision
[22] On the morning of 4 December 2013 Mr Stewart made the decision on
behalf of Worksafe not to proceed with the prosecution,
to offer no evidence and
to request that Judge Farish dismiss the charges. That decision was
subsequently approved by Mr Podger.
It was decided that offering no evidence
was the appropriate course in order to achieve finality rather than the
alternative of
offering no evidence and seeking leave to dismiss the charges
without prejudice to the charges being laid again.
[23] The decision was recorded in a five page document dated 5 December
2013. After sections headed Summary, Background, Legal
Advice from Crown
Solicitor and Process for Decision Making, the document stated:
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DECISION MAKING
25. The following factors were considered relevant and were taken into
account by the decision makers in the decision not to
proceed with the charges
against Mr Whittall –
i. Witness unavailability;
ii. Contests between expert witnesses;
iii. Indicated and anticipated procedural/pre-trial issues;
b. That Pike River Coal Limited (in receivership) was the
principal offender and has been held to account, with record
fines and
reparation ordered;
c. The seriousness of the offence – there is no causative link
alleged, and the maximum sentence is likely to be a fine
only, in the tens of
thousands of dollars;
d. That the Royal Commission has heard evidence and
provided a comprehensive report on the tragedy;
e. The matters in a ‘without prejudice and confidential
to counsel’ proposal from Mr Whittall’s
counsel, (which will be
superseded by an open letter for disclosure purposes if required);
f. The unlikelihood of court-ordered reparation being received from
PRCL by the victims; and
g. The high costs associated with continuing the prosecution,
particularly in light of procedural issues which the defence
had indicated it
intended to raise pre-trial.
Steps prior to the District Court Decision
[24] Following the Prosecution Decision Mr Stanaway was instructed to seek to discontinue the prosecution on the basis that no evidence would be offered. The proceeding had a scheduled telephone conference with Judge Farish for Thursday,
12 December 2013. On 6 December 2013 Mr Stanaway sent an email to the
District Court recording a request on his and Mr Grieve’s
behalf that
Judge Farish sit in open court in Christchurch at 10.00 am on 12 December in
respect of the proceeding.
[25] On Monday, 9 December Worksafe decided to provide the families with a confidential letter from Mr Podger setting out the decision and the reasons for it. It also decided that Mr Stanaway would seek a suppression order in relation to the hearing scheduled for 12 December 2013 until such time as the matter could be heard in open court. This was to enable Worksafe to properly inform the families of the decision before the matter became public.
[26] On 10 December 2013 Mr Grieve and Mr Stanaway appeared in the
District Court at Christchurch where an application was
made to Judge
Farish for a suppression order prohibiting publication of any information
concerning the forthcoming hearing on
12 December 2013. Mr Stanaway explained
in his affidavit that the reason why the order was sought was to
ensure that
there was no ill-informed or misinformed comment in the media
and otherwise about the decision until such time as the extensive
memoranda
prepared by both the prosecution and the defence had been filed and read in open
court on 12 December and any comments
had been made by Judge Farish.
[27] In advance of the hearing on 12 December 2013 Mr Stanaway filed a
detailed memorandum for the informant explaining the reasons
for the decision to
offer no evidence. In the context of the discussion of the public interest
test, with reference to the proposed
payment the memorandum stated:
38. The proposed payment of $3.41 million reparation made
by Judge Farish (as above) of the directors and officers
of PRCL is not simply a
payment made to avoid continued prosecution.
39. The informant has considered the proposed voluntary $3.41 million
payment on a principled and conventional basis in accordance
with the
Prosecution Guidelines.
40. The proposal outlined above has been treated as only one of the
relevant public interest factors for a continued prosecution
looked at in the
context overall of the Prosecution Guidelines.
[28] A substantial memorandum dated 11 December 2013 was also filed on
behalf of Mr Whittall which among other things addressed
alleged fundamental
deficiencies and flaws in the informant’s case. With reference to the
proposed voluntary payment it stated:
The $3.41 million voluntary payment
20. As a consequence of the Informant’s decision not to proceed,
funds which would otherwise have been used for the costs
of the hearing have
become available to enable a voluntary payment to be made to the families of the
29 men who died and the two
survivors.
21. As has been mentioned by the informant the voluntary payment will be made on behalf of the directors and officers of the Company at the time of the 19 November 2010 explosion.
22. For the purpose of ensuring a clear record of the basis on which the payment is being received by the Court counsel suggests that Your Honour might consider it appropriate to stipulate that the
$3.41 million comprises allocations of $110,000 for each of the families of the 29 men who died and the two survivors in the amount
calculated by Your Honour when ordering that they be compensated
with a reparations order for the significant loss and ongoing trauma that Your Honour found had been caused by the actions of the
Company.
The District Court Decision
[29] At the hearing on 12 December 2013, after hearing from Mr Stanaway
and Mr Grieve, Judge Farish delivered an oral ruling which
I record in its
entirety, save for the final two paragraphs which explained the reason why the
suppression order had earlier been
made:
[1] I think it is very important to understand that the decisions that
have been reached today have been reached by two discrete
processes. They are
the decision in relation to whether or not the prosecution should proceed
against Mr Whittal and quite discrete
and separate from that, there has
clearly been another process which Mr Whittal and the other directors and their
advisors have
been having once I made the reparation orders in July of this
year.
[2] In March of this year I transferred Mr Whittal’s prosecution
to Wellington and I did that because of the complexity,
the length of the trial
and the difficulties that were going to be envisaged and at that stage the
parties were only partway through
the disclosure process, briefs of evidence had
not even been compiled at that stage and as it has turned out that process has
proved
quite difficult and fraught.
[3] I was not going to be the trial Judge for this trial and that was
because I had recused myself, at the request of Mr Whittal,
and I thoroughly
understood that and appreciated why but with the consent of all parties I have
continued to manage the file and
I have had two telephone conferences during the
year. The purpose of that management was to make sure that all parties were
heading
towards a hearing in a timely fashion and because of the complexity and
the nature of the disclosure process, it was important that
a Judge kept a
handle on what was actually occurring and occurring at the appropriate
times.
[4] Both counsel have kept me fully informed as to the process that
has been ongoing. But as Mr Grieve has advised, through
his memorandum, I have
been advised, as time has gone on, as to the difficulties that have occurred as
the disclosure process has
unfolded.
[5] Disclosure was completed at the end of August and the prosecution agreed that they would have the briefs of evidence compiled by the end of October, which they were able to meet but as you have heard today, of those
91 briefs of evidence, 31 of them are unsigned and as such they are not
admissible as evidence before the Court and for various reasons, as
Mr Zarifeh has outlined, some of those people do not
want to participate in this
prosecution and at least 14 of those are not compellable, that is that they
cannot be made to come
to Court because they live outside of the
jurisdiction.
[6] So by early November, and I can tell you I am completely unaware
of this, (I only found out about this decision and the
need to have the matter
called two days ago on Tuesday morning). As a result, by early November, there
was (sic) clearly quite in-depth
discussions going on between the prosecution
and the defence as to whether or not these charges were ever likely to be proved
against
Mr Whittal and as Mr Zarifeh has outlined in his memorandum, the case
against Mr Whittal is largely that he was a party to the principal
offender and
to put it in colloquial terms, to be a party you have to do an act or do
something to aid or assist the principal offender
but you also, at the time that
you do the act, have to have the intention to aid or assist the offender and you
also have to know
that what you are doing is aiding and assisting the principal
offender in terms of the commission of an offence and in relation to
this
prosecution, at the very outset that was always going to be very difficult.
That is principally why, when the prosecution have
looked at the prosecution
guidelines for the basis and on the basis that Mr Zarifeh has outlined, the
likelihood of a prosecution
here is extremely low. This case may not have even
got to that stage, given the amount of pre-trials that were going to be required
to determine admissibility issues before a hearing and whether or not any of
those witnesses that were unable to sign or unwilling
to sign their briefs of
evidence that could be admitted into evidence. So that is one discussion that
is going on.
[7] On 5 July I made a reparation order in a substantial amount and
there has (sic) been countless discussions as to who or
what or how that was
ever going to be honoured by the company, its directors, its shareholders,
political parties and I do not know
who else. But some of you may recall that
immediately after I gave that judgment, that one of the directors made a
statement that
he and some of the other directors may be willing to
participate in some way in honouring that reparation order and some
of you may
remember from the hearing that I said that I was satisfied that at that time,
that is in July, that by some means that
the company, its shareholders or
directors could be able to meet this payment because I was aware that there was
insurance money
available for some purposes. I did not envisage that this was
going to occur though.
[8] So after I made that decision as to the reparation, the directors
did start having discussions as to how they could honour
that payment. They
could not honour that payment whilst there were outstanding charges before the
Court, that could not occur, it
would be inappropriate, quite inappropriate but
as soon as a decision was made that the prosecution here was not going to
proceed,
then the directors, in discussions with the people that they need to
discuss matters with, have made this voluntary payment
and it is in
recognition of the reparation order that I made in July and it is paid into
Court on that basis.
[9] Now some of you I know will say and think and believe that this is Mr Whittal buying his way out of a prosecution and I can tell you it is not. The decision not to prosecute or to continue with the prosecution has been taken at a very high level and the voluntary payment is really a side issue in
terms of that determination, it is quite a side issue and I am quite
satisfied of that. Mr Whittal and the directors and senior officers
of the
company have no obligation to honour that payment. Once these proceedings are
at an end they had no obligation to honour
that payment because it is quite
separate and discrete from these proceedings.
[10] So I see this outcome as being a good outcome. One, because the
time and the length of the hearing and the resources for
a fineable only
offence, with very small chance of successful prosecution is not in the best
interests of your community or indeed
the wider community.
[11] The order that I made as to reparation was to recognise the ongoing
trauma caused by the company in relation to the 29 families
and the two men that
survived. Having this offer, this voluntary payment honouring that reparation
order is an acknowledgement
from the directors that the company failed the 29
men and the two men that survived and therefore I am prepared to accept it on
the
basis that it is given and I am prepared to formally discharge Mr Whittal in
relation to all 12 charges before the Court.
[12] Mr Grieve has asked me to do my best to ensure that that money is
provided to the families and the two survivors as expeditiously
as possible. I
understand through my registry staff that payments are centralised out of
Wellington. The prosecution have provided
to the Court all the names of the
family members and all of their bank details. So I will do what I can to
encourage the Ministry
staff to expedite those payments but I cannot promise
that those payments would be made before Christmas.
[13] So Mr Zarifeh and Mr Grieve, the informations are now formally
dismissed and I will direct the registry to receipt that
money in as payment of
the reparation made in relation to the Pike River Coal sentencing.
Two matters in dispute
[30] The applicants’ synopsis of submissions characterises
Worksafe’s decision not to call evidence as “the
result of an
agreement which it made with Mr Whittall to drop all of the charges in return
for a payment of $3.41 million to be made
by an insurer”. Worksafe
contends that the evidence before the Court does not establish such an
agreement. Worksafe
also disputes the applicants’ contention
that Judge Farish was recused from exercising the District Court’s
jurisdiction
to dismiss the charges against Mr Whittall. I address and
determine those two points of dispute in the context of the consideration
of the
first and fifth causes of action respectively.
Is the Prosecution Decision amenable to judicial review?
[31] In its first affirmative defence, after stating that there was no failure to exercise the prosecutorial discretion and noting that, while the test for evidential
sufficiency was met, the likelihood of a successful prosecution was low,
Worksafe pleaded:
58. The test for evidential sufficiency being met, the first
respondent’s decision not to proceed with the prosecution
was on the
grounds that it was not in the public interest to do so.
59. The first respondent’s decision is not amenable to judicial
review because it was a decision made after taking into
account specific factors
in the exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. Such factors included the
weighing of policy and
public interest factors with which it is
inappropriate for the Courts to interfere.
[32] Confronted with that apparently absolute stance, the
applicants’ written submissions contained a careful review the
English
authorities in particular, contending that, while judicial review of
prosecutorial discretion is exercised sparingly, the
Courts do not shy away from
its use in appropriate cases.11
[33] They drew attention in particular to two modern examples: (a) R v DPP ex parte C,12 a sexual offending case; and
(b) R v DPP ex parte Manning,13 a death in custody
case.
They further noted that the reasoning in Manning, that the threshold
for review will be lower in the context of decisions not to prosecute, had been
approved in subsequent cases.14
[34] It transpired however that Worksafe’s stance was not as unqualified as the affirmative defence suggested. Worksafe accepted that review was possible but submitted that the established New Zealand position is that courts should only interfere in prosecutorial decisions in “exceptional circumstances”.15 It drew
attention to the dictum in R (on the application of Corner House
Research and
11 R v Commissioner of Police Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 QB 118, [1968] 2 WLR 893 (CA).
12 R v DPP ex parte C [1995] 1 Cr App R 136 (QB).
13 R v DPP ex parte Manning [2000] EWHC 562; [2001] QB 330.
14 Mohit v DPP of Mauritius [2006] UKPC 20; Marshall v DPP [2007] UKPC 4.
15 Citing Gill v Attorney-General [2010] NZCA 468, [2011] 1 NZLR 433 at [19]; Fox v Attorney-General [2002] NZCA 158; [2002] 3 NZLR 62 (CA) at 62–72; Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne [2005] NZAR 408 (HC) at [61]–[69].
Others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office16 that only
in highly exceptional cases will the Court disturb the decision of an
independent prosecutor. It also noted the approach
of the highest courts
in Canada17 and Australia18 that prosecutorial
decisions are only subject to judicial review on the grounds of abuse of
process.
[35] Worksafe maintained that that high level of restraint is
required for constitutional and policy reasons:
(a) the discretion to prosecute is part of the function of the
executive, not the courts;
(b) it is inappropriate for the court to interfere in prosecutorial
decisions given its own function of responsibility for the
conduct of criminal
trials;
(c) prosecutorial decisions involve a high content of judgment
and discretion;
(d) there is political accountability for prosecutorial
decisions.
[36] In response to the applicants’ submissions Worksafe first suggested that decisions in relation to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in England and Wales should be viewed with caution in the New Zealand context because of the different statutory bases and operating context of the English Code for Crown Prosecutors and the New Zealand Prosecution Guidelines. It submitted that the distinction between decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute was not supported by the New Zealand
authorities19 and that the same constitutional and policy
concerns arise in both
scenarios.
16 R (on the application of Corner House Research and Others) v Director of the Serious Fraud
Office [2008] UKHL 60, [2009] 1 AC 756 at [31] (per Lord Bingham).
17 R v Anderson 2014 SCC 41, [2014] 2 SCR 167.
18 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501 (HCA) at 534.
19 Hallett v Attorney-General (No 2) [1989] NZHC 3; [1989] 2 NZLR 96 (HC); Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 15, at [69]. It was noted that R (on an application of Corner House Research and Others) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office, above n 16, which is the most recent House of Lords case on a decision not to prosecute does not refer to the distinction.
[37] Worksafe argued that particular caution is required where the
decision not to prosecute is made on the grounds of
public interest,
noting the observation of Lord Bingham in R (Corner House
Research):20
31 The reasons why the courts are very slow to interfere are well
understood. They are, first, that the powers in question
are entrusted to the
officers identified, and to no one else. No other authority may exercise these
powers or make the judgments
on which such exercise must depend. Secondly, the
courts have recognised (as it was described in the cited passage from
Matalulu v Director of Public Prosections)
“the polycentric character of official decision-making in such
matters including policy and public interest considerations
which are not
susceptible of judicial review because it is within neither the constitutional
function nor the practical competence
of the courts to assess their
merits.”
Thirdly, the powers are conferred in very broad and unprescriptive
terms.
Lord Bingham there noted that the House had not been referred to any case in
which a challenge had been made to a decision not to
prosecute or investigate on
public interest grounds.
[38] In the course of argument Mr Hampton QC advanced the proposition
that review of a prosecutorial discretion may be available
when the prosecutor
has failed to have regard to a relevant consideration or has had regard to an
irrelevant consideration.21 There is conflicting High Court
authority on that question.22 In my view the observations of the
Supreme Court of Fiji in Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecution (Fiji)
on this issue are in point:23
There may be other circumstances not precisely covered by the above in which
judicial review of a prosecutorial discretion would be
available. But
contentions that the power has been exercised for improper purposes not
amounting to bad faith, by reference to irrelevant
considerations or without
regard to relevant considerations or otherwise unreasonably, are unlikely to be
vindicated because of the
width of the considerations to which the DPP may
properly have regard in instituting or discontinuing
proceedings.
20 R (on the application of Corner House Research and Others) v Director of the Serious Fraud
Office, above n 16 at [31].
21 Webster v CPS [2014] EWHC 2516 (Admin) was cited in the written submissions as confirming that the doctrine of mandatory relevant considerations may be relied upon in appropriate cases of judicial review of prosecutional discretion.
22 Polynesian Spa Ltd v Osborne, above n 15 at [21]; Hallett v Attorney-General [1989] 2
NZLR 87 (HC) at 94.
23 Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecution (Fiji) [2004] NZAR 193 at 216 (SC Fiji).
[39] As Worksafe submits, such an approach is especially apt where the prosecutorial discretion is broad and does not expressly or impliedly identify extraneous matters. Attention was drawn to the following analysis of Duffy J in Cooke v Valuers Registration Board:24
[15] When dealing with a broad discretionary statutory power, it is necessary to distinguish considerations that the decision-maker has treated as relevant to the exercise of the power from those that are made mandatory by statute. The distinction is made clear in CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 (CA) at 183 per Cooke J:
What has to be emphasised is that it is only when the statute
expressly or impliedly identifies considerations required
to be taken into
account by the authority as a matter of legal obligation that the Court holds a
decision invalid on ... [that ground].
It is not enough that a consideration is
one that may properly be taken into account, nor even that it is one which many
people,
including the Court itself, would have taken into account if they had to
make the decision.
[16] There are no express relevant considerations stipulated in s 32;
nor do I consider that there is room to imply any requirement
other than that
the power be exercised reasonably. Accordingly, a challenge based on
not taking relevant considerations
into account cannot succeed. The
same applies to the challenge based on taking irrelevant considerations into
account.
Unless the statutory power in question either expressly or
impliedly identifies what is extraneous, this ground
of review cannot
succeed: see CREEDNZ at 197.
[40] Clearly there is no rule which is absolute or of general application
that a decision to bring or to refrain from bringing
a prosecution is not
amenable to judicial review. However in considering whether judicial review
should be entertained in my view
a high level of restraint will be observed by
the Court in recognition of the policy and constitutional dimension of such a
decision,
coupled with its discretionary nature.
[41] While it is for the highest appellate courts to formulate tests which circumscribe the circumstances in which review may be entertained, for example only in highly exceptional circumstances25 or where there is an abuse of power,26 in
my view the task for this Court is to determine the issue by a
consideration of the
24 Cooke v Valuers Registration Board [2014] NZHC 323.
25 R (on the application of Corner House Research and others) v Director of the Serious Fraud
Office, above n 16.
26 R v Anderson, above n 17 and Maxwell v The Queen above n 18.
specific circumstances rather than by pursuing an enquiry as to
whether any particular threshold is satisfied.
[42] This being a case where the decision not to proceed with the prosecution was not the consequence of the adoption of a general policy, but where the alleged error comprised the giving weight to irrelevant considerations and the failure to take into account relevant considerations, I do not consider that the impugned process is of such gravity that the high level of restraint should be relaxed and judicial review permitted. I conclude therefore that the Prosecution Decision is not amenable to judicial review. In reaching that conclusion I am particularly influenced by the
analysis of the Fiji Supreme Court in
Matalulu.27
[43] In the event that my conclusion was found to be erroneous I turn to
address
the contentions in the applicants’ first cause of
action.
In deciding not to proceed with the prosecution against Mr Whittall did
the prosecutor fail to comply with the Guidelines?
[44] The Guidelines in force at the date of the Prosecution Decision were
the Solicitor-General’s Prosecution Guidelines
of 1 July 2013.28
As pleaded in para 3 of the amended statement of claim those Guidelines
were promulgated pursuant to s 185 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 2011. Section
185(2) states:
(2) In discharging his or her responsibility under subsection (1), the
Solicitor-General may–
(a) maintain guidelines for the conduct of public prosecutions;
and
(b) provide general advice and guidance to agencies that
conduct public prosecutions on the conduct of those
prosecutions.
27 Matalulu v Director of Public Prosecutions (Fiji), above n 23.
28 Two versions of the Guidelines were in force during the time period relevant to this proceeding.
The 2010 Guidelines were in force at the time when the informations were laid and the prosecution was commenced against Mr Whittall on 10 November 2011. However the 2013
Guidelines are the applicable Guidelines being those in force at the time of the Prosecution
Decision.
[45] Furthermore s 188 states:
188 Duty of Crown prosecutor to comply with Solicitor-General’s
directions
A Crown prosecutor who conducts a Crown prosecution under section 187
must conduct that prosecution in accordance with any
directions given by the
Solicitor-General (either generally or in the particular case).
[46] The status of the earlier 1992 Guidelines was considered in R v
Barlow29 where Gallen and Neazor JJ held that the Guidelines
could not be relied on as forming a basis of an expectation as to how a case may
be conducted. The Court held that the 1992 Guidelines were only an indication
of the approach that a prosecutor will follow, not
a matter of law enforceable
by a mandamus. On appeal30 the Court of Appeal stated:
The Guidelines do not and could not purport to control the exercise of the
Courts’ discretionary powers. Their only relevance
for present purposes is
to indicate the general practice which is adopted by the
Solicitor-General.
[47] Paragraph [34] of the amended statement of claim
asserts:
34. In making the decision Worksafe, in determining whether or not the
public interest was served by continuing to prosecute
the charges against Mr
Whittall, was required to follow and to act in accordance with the guidelines
and, in particular, clauses
5, 9.2 and 29 thereof.
[48] Clause 5 of the 2013 Guidelines, headed “The Decision to
Prosecute”, is a lengthy provision which includes the
following:
The Test for Prosecution
5.1 Prosecutions ought to be initiated or continued only where
the prosecutor is satisfied that the Test for Prosecution
is met. The Test for
Prosecution is met if:
5.1.1 The evidence which can be adduced in Court is sufficient to provide
a reasonable prospect of conviction – the Evidential
Test; and
5.1.2 Prosecution is required in the public interest – the Public
Interest Test.
29 R v Barlow [1996] 2 NZLR 116 (HC) at 121.
30 R v Barlow (No 2) [1998] 2 NZLR 477 (CA) at 479.
5.2 Each aspect of the test must be separately considered and satisfied
before a decision to prosecute can be taken. The Evidential
Test must be
satisfied before the Public Interest Test is considered. The prosecutor must
analyse and evaluate all of the evidence
and information in a thorough and
critical manner.
The Evidential Test
5.3 A reasonable prospect of conviction exists if, in relation
to an identifiable person (whether natural or legal),
there is credible
evidence which the prosecution can adduce before a court and upon which evidence
an impartial jury (or Judge),
properly directed in accordance with the law,
could reasonably be expected to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
the individual who is prosecuted has committed a criminal offence.
[Clause 5.4 addresses the elements of the “definition” in clause
5.3.]
The Public Interest Test
5.5 Once a prosecutor is satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to
provide a reasonable prospect of conviction, the next
consideration is whether
the public interest requires a prosecution. It is not the rule that all
offences for which there is sufficient
evidence must be prosecuted. Prosecutors
must exercise their discretion as to whether a prosecution is required in the
public interest.
...
5.7 Broadly, the presumption is that the public interest
requires prosecution where there has been a contravention
of the criminal law.
This presumption provides the starting point for consideration of each
individual case. In some instances
the serious nature of the case will make the
presumption a very strong one. However, prosecution resources are not
limitless.
There will be circumstances in which, although the evidence is
sufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of conviction, the offence
is not
serious and prosecution is not required in the public interest. Prosecutors for
instance should positively consider the appropriateness
of any diversionary
option (particularly if the defendant is a youth).
[Several public interest considerations for and against prosecution are
listed in cls 5.8 and 5.9 respectively.]
5.10 These considerations are not comprehensive or exhaustive. The public interest considerations which may properly be taken into account when deciding whether the public interest requires prosecution will vary from case to case. In regulatory prosecutions, for instance, relevant consideration will include an agency’s statutory objectives and enforcement priorities.
5.11 Cost is also a relevant factor when making an overall assessment of
the public interest. In each case where the evidential
test has been met, the
prosecutor will weigh the relevant public interest factors that are applicable.
The prosecutor will then
determine whether or not the public interest requires
prosecution.
No prosecution
5.12 If the prosecutor decides that there is insufficient evidence or
that it is not in the public interest to prosecute, a decision
of “no
prosecution” will be taken.
[49] Clauses 9.2 and 29 of the Guidelines state:
9. REVIEW OF CHARGES
...
9.2 Once charges have been filed, and before trial, the prosecutor
should review the charges to determine whether those are
the charges that should
be prosecuted or whether:
9.2.1 Any of the charges should be amended to bring them into conformity
with the evidence available;
9.2.2 Other charges should be added; and
9.2.3 Any charges should be withdrawn (because, for example, they are no
longer considered necessary in the public interest,
or are not adequately
supported by the evidence).
...
29. VICTIMS
29.1 Victims of crime in the criminal justice system are to be:
29.1.1 Treated with courtesy and compassion; and with
29.1.2 Respect for their dignity and privacy.
29.2 The key means of observing these principles is through the provision
of information to ensure that victims understand the
process and know what is
happening at each stage. So far as is possible, the victim should have
explained to them the court processes
and procedures, and should be kept
informed of what is happening during the course of the proceedings.
29.3 Prosecutors should seek to protect the victim’s interests as best they can whilst fulfilling their duty to the Court and in the conduct of the prosecution on behalf of the Crown.
29.4 Crown prosecutors are referred to the protocol “Victims of
Crime – Guidance for Prosecutors” (issued with
these Guidelines) for
greater detail as to the role and duties of prosecutors in respect of victims.
Prosecutors in government agencies
should be aware of and take into account the
guidance provided in that protocol.
[50] The manner of Worksafe’s alleged failures in this respect
is detailed in paras 35 and 36 of the amended statement
of claim:
35. Worksafe failed to act in accordance with the guidelines in that it
had regard to and gave weight to the following irrelevant
considerations:
35.1 The offer to pay $3.41m in return for Worksafe offering no evidence
in support of the charges against Mr Whittall.
35.2 Alleged witness unavailability.
35.3 Anticipated contests between expert witnesses.
35.4 Indicated and anticipated procedural/pre-trial issues.
35.5 An asserted view that PRC was the principal offender and had been
held to account, with record fines and reparation ordered.
35.6 The seriousness of the alleged offences, it being asserted there was
no causative link alleged, and the maximum sentence
was likely to be a fine
only, in the tens of thousands of dollars.
35.7 The fact that the Royal Commission into the disaster had heard all
the evidence and provided a comprehensive report on the
tragedy.
35.8 The unlikelihood of the amount of reparation ordered being received
from PRC by the families of the dead and the survivors.
35.9 The matters referred to in [the letter referred to
in paragraph 12 above] (to be superseded by an open
letter for disclosure
purposes if required).
35.10 The high costs of continuing with the prosecution,
particularly in light of the procedural issues which
the defence had
indicated it intended to raise pre-trial.
36. In making the decision Worksafe failed to act in accordance with
the guidelines in that it failed to have regard to the
following relevant
considerations:
36.1 The Court was likely to impose high fines by way of
penalties.
36.2 The catastrophic and continuing harm caused by the disaster.
36.3 The emotional and financial loss and or damage caused to the
applicants and, as well, to the families of the other dead and
the
survivors.
36.4 The public and the applicants’ interest in completing the
prosecution so as to decide the culpability or otherwise
of Mr Whittall.
36.5 The proper administration of justice.
36.6 The principle that money should not be paid to influence whether a
prosecution should proceed.
36.7 The interests of justice.
[51] The applicant’s submissions addressed the assertions comprised
in the first
cause of action in two parts:
(a) first, the asserted illegality of what was alleged to be an agreement
between Worksafe and Mr Whittall for a monetary payment;
and
(b) secondly, the inappropriateness of Worksafe’s
consideration of the
other pleaded factors.
Alleged illegal agreement
[52] The applicants submitted that at common law an agreement to stifle a
prosecution, by for example withdrawing charges in return
for a payment, is an
unlawful contract and is void on public policy grounds, citing The Bhowanipur
Banking Corporation Ltd v Sreemate Durgesh Nadini Dasi31 and
Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society.32
In the New Zealand context reference was also made to Polymer
Developments Group Ltd v Tilialo where Glazebrook J
said:33
[63] Few would have any doubt that certain contracts to
stifle prosecutions are clearly contrary to public policy.
For example, most
would agree, for a variety of reasons, that the situation in Callaghan v
O’Sullivan [1925] ArgusLawRp 86; [1925] VLR 664, whereby money was paid by an alleged
criminal to police officers so that they would not institute a prosecution,
is
against public policy. ...
32 Jones v Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society [1892] 1 Ch 173 (CA).
33 Polymer Develpments Group Ltd v Tilialo [2002] 3 NZLR 258 (HC) at [63].
[53] The applicants contended that an unprincipled and unlawful agreement
was made between Worksafe and Mr Whittall “to
drop all the charges in
return for a payment to be made by an insurer”. The implications of that
agreement for the first cause
of action were described in this way in the
applicant’s submissions:
[Worksafe] took into account the agreement between itself and Mr Whittall
pursuant to which it would offer no evidence if the $3.41m
was paid. It was
wrong for this to be taken into account. The payment of the money was an
irrelevant consideration because it was
paid pursuant to an illegal agreement
and contrary to public policy, and therefore could not be part of any public
interest aspect
of the decision making process.
[54] Unsurprisingly Worksafe accepted that an agreement to stifle a
prosecution would not be consistent with the Guidelines, observing
that no
reasonable prosecutor would enter into such an agreement. It then made the
point that the pleading did not specifically
allege any agreement in
the terms asserted in the applicant’s submissions, only that the
prosecutor had
regard to and gave weight to the “offer” referred to
in para 35.1.34
[55] I consider that Worksafe’s demur is entirely proper. An
allegation of what is in effect contended to be a contract
interfering with the
course of justice should be explicitly pleaded, not just to be inferred from an
allegation of having regard
to an irrelevant consideration.
[56] However the contention having surfaced, it should not be left
hanging. It was Worksafe’s contention that the “offer”
was of
a voluntary payment to be received by the victims of the tragedy in the nature
of reparation. It rejected the applicants’
submission that there had
been a “requiring or receiving” of the payment on the part of
Worksafe. It emphasised that
it did not enter into any binding agreement to
secure the payment on behalf of the victims or at all.
[57] The distinction between a voluntary payment as compared with one which is made as a consequence of a binding bargain appears to be a critical feature. The
point is usefully captured in the judgment in Polymer
Developments:
34 At [50] above.
[46] A number of reasons have been put forward for the rule prohibiting
most agreements to stifle prosecutions. One rationale
for the prohibition was
set out by Bowen LJ in Jones at pp 183–184 as being to ensure that
decisions whether to prosecute were not influenced by an indirect motive.
Reparation (whether by the offender or a relative) could well be a
matter that could be taken into account in a decision not to prosecute but
there must be no bargain made about it. He said:
“The duty to prosecute, or not to prosecute, is a social and not a
legal duty, which depends on the circumstances of each case.
It cannot be said
that it is a moral duty to prosecute in all cases. The matter depends on
considerations, which vary according
to each case. But the person who has to
act is bound morally to be influenced by no indirect motive. He is morally
bound to bring
a fair and honest mind to the consideration and to exercise his
decision from a sense of duty to himself and others.
What is it that the law requires about the exercise of this moral duty?
It is that it shall not be made a matter of private bargain.
(emphasis added).
[58] Despite the applicants’ resolute depiction of the events as an
agreement, the record reveals that the proposed payment
was consistently
referred to as a voluntary payment and one in the nature of reparation
to the disaster victims. It
was considered in that light by those whose
task it was to make the Prosecution Decision. It was also apparent that the
perception
of Judge Farish was to the same effect.35
[59] In my view the unpleaded allegation that Worksafe and Mr Whittall
entered into an unprincipled and unlawful binding agreement
to stifle the
prosecution in return for Mr Whittall arranging for the payment of a
sum of money is not established
on the evidence before the
Court.
Was the proposal of a voluntary payment an irrelevant
consideration?
[60] Ms Holden submitted that, the offer having been made, it was lawful and appropriate for the prosecutor to take it into account. Indeed it was suggested that the prosecutor could very well have been criticised if the prosecution had proceeded and failed or if the prosecutor had made the decision not to continue with the
prosecution at a significantly later date, thereby denying the victims
the prospect of a
35 Para [9] in [29] above.
substantial payment. Attention was also drawn to cl 5.9.10 of the Guidelines
which states the following is a public interest consideration
against
prosecution:
5.9.10 Where the victim accepts that the defendant has rectified the loss or
harm that was caused (although defendants should not
be able to avoid
prosecution simply because they pay compensation);
[61] The point was made that that clause recognises that compensation
payments are not precluded from consideration in the
public interest
factors against prosecution. In the present case the fact of the proposed
voluntary payment was only one of
several factors and hence the “simply
because” precondition was not applicable. That state of affairs was
reflected
in the following paragraphs in the document which was prepared for
distribution to the victims’ families:
5. A further factor was the without prejudice proposal from counsel
for Mr Whittall to make a voluntary payment of $3.41 million
to meet the
reparation ordered against PRCL and also the proposal that a private meeting be
arranged between Mr Whittall and the
families and survivors to which the company
directors at the time of the explosion would also be invited.
6. [Worksafe] sought advice from the Solicitor General on whether the
financial offer should be taken into account, and if
so, how. After
consultation with the Solicitor-General and careful consideration, it was
determined that the offer should
be taken into account. However,
ultimately it was the low likelihood of conviction together with the other
public interest factors
weighing against prosecution that led the Ministry to
the conclusion not to proceed with the charges.
[62] Possibly also relevant on this question is the point made on behalf
of the applicants that while the Act prohibits insurance
against fines,36
there is no such constraint so far as reparation orders are
concerned.37
[63] As discussed above, the applicants’ argument was premised on the existence of an illegal agreement as amounting to an irrelevant consideration. I did not understand the applicants to contend that, in the absence of a binding agreement, the
existence of a voluntary offer (which was not of course the
applicant’s depiction of
36 Section 56I.
37 Department of Labour v Street Smart Ltd (2008) 5 NZELR 603 (HC) at [54].
events) was an irrelevant consideration. I accept Worksafe’s
submission on the
allegation in para 35.1.38
Worksafe’s consideration of other pleaded factors
[64] The various factors the subject of the applicants’ criticism
were those referred to in the five page decision document
of 5 December
2013.39
[65] The applicants first submitted that the issues of witness
unavailability, contest between experts and contested pre-trial
evidential
issues were three issues which should not have been taken into account in
considering the issue of public interest. Rather
they were factors which related
to evidential sufficiency which Worksafe had always accepted was
met.
[66] Worksafe’s stance on this issue was inconsistent. Its
written submissions treated these matters as having been considered
as part of
the Evidential Test while at para 19 of Worksafe’s statement of
defence these factors were referred to
as additional factors taken into
account in considering whether continuing with the prosecution was in the public
interest. In
Mr Stewart’s first affidavit these issues appear to be
viewed at para 54 as relating to evidential matters while at para 68
in
expanding on the reasons in the decision summary document they are treated as
public interest considerations.
[67] In my view it is possible and permissible for factors such as these to be taken into account at both stages. I say that because the Evidential Test is concerned with a certain threshold, namely whether a reasonable prospect of conviction exists, whereas the Public Interest Test involves a broad range of considerations in which it is legitimate, in my view, to include such particular difficulties in the mix. In that
connection I note again the content of cls 5.10 and
5.11.40
38 At [50] above.
39 At [23] above.
40 At [48] above.
[68] Worksafe’s submissions made essentially the same point but in
a slightly different way in its conclusion on the application
of the Evidential
Test:
Following the review of evidential sufficiency by the Crown Solicitor, a
senior prosecutor, the prosecution concluded that the Evidential
Test was met,
however, the prospects of success at trial were low. It is submitted that the
assessment that the prospects of success
were low forms an important backdrop to
the application of the Public Interest Test that followed, in particular in
relation to factors
concerning cost and best use of resources.
[69] So far as the remaining matters are concerned, there is room for
differences of opinion as to the significance of such matters
as the
implications of the Royal Commission’s Report, the seriousness of an
offence under s 50 of the Act and the absence of
causation as an ingredient, and
the depiction of a charge against a director of a company under s 56(1) of the
Act as a secondary
offence.
[70] In my view none of the remaining matters listed in para 35 of the
amended statement of claim can be rejected as truly irrelevant
considerations.
That is recognised in the applicants’ submissions with reference to the
issue of the high costs of continuing
with the prosecution for a trial
contemplated to be 16–20 weeks duration. It was said that, while cost
may be a legitimate
factor,41 it must have significantly less
importance in a multiple death case.
[71] Assuming that proposition to be sound, the response made by Worksafe
is that that submission goes to the weight which the
prosecutor attributed to
the cost factor. However it is well established that the weight to be given to
relevant considerations
is quintessentially a matter for the decision maker, not
a matter for challenge in judicial review.42
[72] The fact that in a number of instances the applicants’ real basis for complaint was the weight perceived to have been accorded to a particular consideration also appears in the submissions relating to para 36 of the amended statement of claim concerning the alleged failure to have regard to relevant considerations. It was submitted that Worksafe failed to pay “proper regard” to the very heavy fines and
reparation orders which it was contended could have been
imposed.
41 Clearly that is correct. It is addressed in cl 5.11 of the Guidelines.
42 Secretary for Justice v Simes [2012] NZCA 459, [2012] NZAR 1044 at [50].
[73] Worksafe responded that there was in fact no precedent for the
imposition of high fines for a s 56 offence but the key point
is that the
prosecutor gave genuine consideration to the issues and hence due regard was had
to the matter in the course of the decision-making
process.
[74] With reference to paras 36.2 to 36.4 of the amended statement of
claim the
applicants’ submission stated:
It is submitted that [Worksafe] overlooked in its decision making the
catastrophic harm caused by the accident and ongoing
emotional and
financial loss and damage caused to the victims. In the context of a mass death
accident, it is incomprehensible
that [Worksafe] downplayed or ignored
the importance of the families’ and the public’s interest in a trial
to ascertain
culpability.
[75] While the depth of the applicants’ concerns is palpable, it is
simply not tenable in the face of the record to suggest
that Worksafe
“overlooked” the harm which resulted from the tragedy. The
decision itself noted the fact of the Royal
Commission’s report which Mr
Stewart referred to in his first affidavit in the following way:
[T]he Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy had heard evidence
and provided a comprehensive report on the tragedy.
The inquiry served the
purpose, often fulfilled by criminal proceedings, of enabling evidence of the
circumstances surrounding the
tragedy to be established in a public forum. For
this to have occurred before criminal charges have been determined was unusual
and we considered it a meaningful contribution to addressing the harm caused by
the disaster.
[76] Nor do I consider that a submission that Worksafe
“ignored” the matters referred to is justified or indeed entirely
fair. The allegation that certain factors may have been
“downplayed”, whether consciously or otherwise, may be closer
to the
mark. However at that point the Court is again being asked to embark on a
process of assessing the weight which was given
to various matters but that is a
step beyond the Court’s jurisdiction in judicial review.
[77] On the basis of my consideration of the record, the first affidavit of Mr Stewart and the submissions for both sides I conclude that the contention that Worksafe failed to act in accordance with the Guidelines in the manner alleged in para 36 of the amended statement of claim is not established.
In deciding not to proceed with the prosecution against Mr Whittall did
the prosecution fail to have regard to s 5(g) of the Act?
[78] Section 5(g) of the Act states:
5 Object of the Act
The object of this Act is to promote the prevention of harm to all persons at
work and other persons in, or in the vicinity of, a
place of work
by–
...
(g) providing a range of enforcement methods, including
various notices and prosecution, so as to enable an appropriate
response to a
failure to comply with the Act depending on its nature and gravity;
and
[79] In para 37 of the amended statement of claim the applicants
assert:
37. In making the decision Worksafe did not have regard to s 5(g) of
the Act in that it failed to provide an enforcement
method against Mr
Whittall, namely prosecution, appropriate to his grave and serious
failures to comply with the Act.
[80] Worksafe’s response to this allegation is threefold. First
it contends that s 5(g) cannot require prosecution of
all breaches of the Act
that reach a certain level of gravity even where prosecution is not in the
public interest. Secondly it
argues that the allegation does not add anything
to the assertion discussed above that the prosecutor failed to have regard to
the
catastrophic and continuing harm caused by the disaster and the emotional
and financial loss or damage caused to the families of
the dead and to the
survivors. Worksafe submits that it is implicit in the prosecutor’s
consideration of those issues that
it took into account the s 5(g) statutory
object.
[81] Thirdly attention is drawn to the informant’s
memorandum dated
11 December 2013 which states:43
34. It is clear that the considerations listed in the Guidelines are
not exhaustive and here there is at least one specific
consideration which
requires attention. In the employment health and safety domain there is a need
to recognise the significance
of specific and general deterrence principles to
keep workers safe (particularly in inherently dangerous industries).
43 At [27] above.
[82] While it is the case that s 5(g) is not explicitly identified in the
documents which evidence Worksafe’s consideration
of the issues relating
to the Prosecution Decision, I agree with the Worksafe contention that in all
the circumstances it cannot
be said that Worksafe did not have regard to the s
5(g) objective.
Did the applicants have a legitimate expectation that they would be
consulted prior to the prosecutor making its decision and, if
so, did the
failure to so consult with them render the Prosecution Decision unlawful,
invalid or unreasonable?
[83] The applicants plead that they had a legitimate expectation
that:
(a) they would be consulted by Worksafe as to the proposal to offer no evidence in support of the charges in return for the payment of
$3.41 million in satisfaction of the reparation order made
against
PRCL; and
(b) they would be consulted about whether they accepted that Mr
Whittall had rectified the loss or harm that had been caused
to them through
means of the payment of money by a third party in satisfaction of the reparation
order made against PRCL.
[84] That legitimate expectation was said to arise from: (a) Victims’ Rights Act 2012, s 12;
(b) Victims of Crime – Guidance for Prosecutor Guidelines, cl 16;
and
(c) Solicitor-General’s 2013 Prosecution Guidelines, cl 5.9.10.
[85] Those materials relevantly provide:
(a) 12 Information about proceedings
(1) A victim
must, as soon as practicable, be given information by investigating
authorities or, as the case requires, by members of court staff, or the
prosecutor, about the following matters:
(a) the progress of the investigation of the offence:
(b) the charges laid or reasons for not laying charges, and all changes to
the charges laid:
...
(d) the date and place of each event listed in subsection
(2):
(e) the outcome of the prosecution of the offence
(and of any proceedings on appeal), for example—
(i) any plea of guilty or conviction entered, and sentence imposed or
substituted; or
(ii) any finding that an accused
is unfit to stand trial; or
(iii) any finding that the charge was not proved;
or
(iv) any acquittal or deemed acquittal; or
(v) any grant of free pardon.44
(b) CASES INVOLVING A DEATH
16. Prosecutors will on request meet the family of someone
killed as a result of a crime and explain a decision on prosecution.
In any
case involving a death the prosecutor has a role to play in minimising the
additional distress criminal proceedings are
likely to cause to a victim’s
family and friends. The bereaved family are likely to be acutely concerned
about any major
decision taken in the case, e.g. to change the charge or accept
a plea to an alternative or lesser charge, or to terminate the
proceedings.
(c) 5.9 The following section lists
some public interest considerations against prosecution which may
be
relevant and require consideration by a prosecutor when determining where the
public interest lies in any particular case. The
following list is
illustrative only.
Public interest considerations against prosecution
...
5.9.10 Where the victim accepts that the defendant has rectified the loss or
harm that was caused (although defendants should not
be able to avoid
prosecution simply because they pay compensation);
[86] The applicants’ written submissions on this issue were again
premised on the contention that an agreement was
made between Worksafe
and Mr Whittall concerning the $3.41 payment. The tenor of the
argument is reflected in the
following paragraphs:
... There was a secret arrangement in which the prosecutor assumed a role
almost as a kind of unauthorised agent for the victims,
which even extended to
“trading” the dismissals of charges (and dismissals “on the
merits”) for the payment
of the reparations owed to the victims by
PRC.
In truth, [Worksafe] placed itself in a highly compromised position.
It purported to act for the victims and to negotiate
with Mr Whittall about the
reparation owed to the victims, but excluded them from any input into the terms
of the “unfortunate
bargain” that it made.
[87] In reliance on Manning45 it was contended
that there is a heightened obligation on the prosecutor to provide reasons
to victims in circumstances where
life has been lost. Further in the course of
oral argument when Mr Hampton was speaking to his written Opening, which
referred
to a legitimate expectation to be “consulted meaningfully”,
it emerged that the nature of the consultation which was
envisaged was not
merely prior notice of but also prior agreement to the course
proposed.
[88] Worksafe first drew attention to the requirements for establishing a legitimate expectation of consultation as stated by the Court of Appeal in Green v Racing
Integrity Unit Ltd:46
45 R v DPP ex parte Manning, above n 13 at [28]–[33].
46 Green v Racing Integrity Unit Ltd [2014] NZCA 133, [2014] NZAR 623.
[13] It was not in dispute in the High Court or before us
that the [appellants] must establish three elements if
they are to succeed on a
claim for breach of a legitimate expectation, in the administrative law context:
(1) a promise or commitment,
in this case by the adoption of a
settled practice or policy, to act in a certain way; (2) their legitimate or
reasonable
reliance on the promise or commitment; and (3) the appropriate remedy
if any that should be granted.
[14] We accept that success at the first step – establishing the
existence and content of the expectation pleaded –
might not come in the
form of an explicit promise. A promise can be implied from past practice or
policy. But where the expectation
is in the form of a practice or policy, as
alleged here, its existence and content must equally be established to the level
of a
commitment or undertaking. The existence and content of such a practice or
policy must be both unambiguous, and settled in the sense
that it is regular and
well established.
[89] Although the prospect of consultation with the families of the
deceased was considered,47 Worksafe accepts that it did not
“consult” with the families of the deceased before deciding to
not continue with
the prosecution of Mr Whittall. However it was
Worksafe’s submission that the obligation under the cited
provisions48 was to provide information, not to engage in
consultation prior to making its decision.
[90] Such provision of information included the following steps in
advance of the
12 December hearing before Judge Farish:
(a) a suppression order was sought on 10 December 2013 in order that
the families of the deceased could be informed about the
Prosecution
Decision;
(b) on 10 December 2013 a telephone conference was convened with
representatives of the families to advise that the prosecutor
was not proceeding
with the charges against Mr Whittall;
(c) on 11 December 2013 a meeting was convened in Greymouth with the families of the survivors and the deceased to explain the Prosecution
Decision;
47 At [21] above.
48 At [77]–[78] above.
(d) on 11 December 2013 the families were given through their lawyer
and representative a copy of a statement setting out the
reasons and basis for
the Prosecution Decision.
[91] Responding to the applicants’ submissions, Worksafe
contended that Manning can be distinguished in the present case because
the Court there considered that the Director of Public Prosecutions was only
required
to give reasons in limited cases, such as where there was a death in
custody. The submission was made that Manning is not authority for the
proposition that reasons must be given or consulted on prior to a prosecutorial
decision being made or finalised.
[92] Reference was also made to Re Adams’ Application for
Judicial Review
where the Northern Island Court of Appeal stated:49
The DPP did not act in breach of any duty of fairness in failing to consult
the appellant before reaching his decision not to prosecute
the police officers.
One of the matters with which the DPP should concern himself is the
interests of victims, but there
is no general duty to consult a victim: see R
v Director of Public Prosecutions ex parte C (2000, unreported).
[93] I accept Worksafe’s submission that the obligation imposed by the provisions cited in the claim is an obligation to provide information. Although it appears that information was provided, it is also apparent that it was provided within a condensed and even pressured timeframe which, given the significance of the information, did not provide the recipients sufficient time within which to fully digest it prior to the hearing on 12 December 2013. Furthermore the information was provided within the constraint of the suppression order which would likely have compounded the pressured environment for the recipients of the information. Notwithstanding the constructive motivations of the relevant Worksafe personnel, the events of
10-12 December were less than ideal.
[94] However the issue which I am required to determine is a different one, namely whether the circumstances were such as to impose on Worksafe an obligation to consult with the families first and before reaching a decision. In my view none of
the provisions cited or the cases referred to in argument support a
conclusion that the
49 Re Adams’ Application for Judicial Review [2001] NI1 (CA, Northern Island).
applicants had a legitimate expectation of prior consultation on the part of
Worksafe, either in terms of the traditional meaning
of the word
“consult” or in the extended meaning of prior agreement as suggested
on behalf of the applicants in the course
of argument.
Was the District Court Decision unlawful by reason of the process whereby
the decision was made?
[95] Under the heading “improper purpose”, having first noted
that the District Court Decision was made pursuant to
s 68(1) and (2) of the
Summary Proceedings Act 1957 (the SPA), the third cause of action then
stated:
46. The SP Act, and s 68 in particular, provided for the lawful conduct
of a summary hearing by way of submissions and evidence
before the final
disposition of the charges.
47. The District Court decision was made with the knowledge that
$3.41m would only be paid if no evidence was offered in support of the
charges and the charges were dismissed.
48. The District Court decision was made with the knowledge that
$3.41m was to be paid by insurers to satisfy the reparation order.
49. The District Court decision allowed for, endorsed, and gave effect
to the payment of $3.41m in return for the dismissal
of the charges and was thus
contrary to the purposes of the SP Act and s 68 thereof.
50. The District Court decision was contrary to the public interest and
contrary to the proper administration of justice.
51. The District Court decision was unlawful, invalid and unreasonable.
[96] The allegations in paras 47 and 48 were admitted in the statement of
defence.
[97] As it developed the applicants’ argument involved two limbs. First, it was said that there had been no proper discharge of s 68(1) in that it could not be said that the prosecution had been heard by the Court “on the merits”. Secondly, it was asserted that the Judge had not brought any objectivity to the process but had enthusiastically endorsed what was described as “the agreement reached”. Although much greater emphasis was placed on the second line of argument, I will address them in sequence.
Alleged failure to conduct hearing on the merits
[98] Although s 68 has been repealed,50 because
the proceedings against Mr Whittall commenced on 10 November 2011 and were
not finally determined before the Criminal
Procedure Act 2011 came into
force on 1 July 2013, s 68 continued to apply.51
[99] Section 68(1) states:
68 Decision of Court
(1) The Court, having heard what each party has to say and the
evidence adduced by each, shall consider the matter and may
convict the
defendant or dismiss the information, either on the merits or without prejudice
to its again being laid, or deal with
the defendant in any other manner
authorised by law.
[100] The applicants’ contention as reflected in para 46 appeared to
be that s 68(1) requires that there be a full hearing
with evidence adduced
before it is open to a Judge to dismiss an information.
[101] In response Ms Holden drew attention to Haskett v Thames District
Court where Hammond J considered the three-stage process which had evolved
in the practice of District Courts in exercising summary jurisdiction.52
She submitted that it would be contrary to the interests of justice and
the public interest of a District Court did not have the power
and jurisdiction
to enable it to act effectively by allowing charges to be withdrawn without
conducting a full defended hearing and
hearing all the evidence.
[102] I accept her submission that the inherent jurisdiction permits a dismissal of informations pursuant to s 68(1), consistent with the practice referred to in Haskett,
without the Judge hearing all the
evidence.
50 Summary Proceedings Amendment Act (No 2) 2011.
51 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 397.
52 Haskett v Thames District Court (1999) 16 CRNZ 376 (HC).
Alleged failure to act judicially
[103] The thrust of the applicants’ complaint was that the Judge did not bring an independent mind to bear on the issue of discharge but instead “rubber-stamped” the Prosecution Decision by simply endorsing the payment as pleaded in para 49. The applicants referred to the underlying principle as being the need for the Court “to protect its own process from being degraded and misused”, citing the House of
Lords decision in R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court ex parte
Bennett53 which
approved the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in Moevao v Department
of
Labour.54
[104] The nub of their argument was captured in the issue framed
in their submissions in this way:
[105] The answer to that postulated issue is clearly in the negative. As
Ms Holden submitted, confronted with the prosecutor’s
decision to not
oppose dismissal of the charges, the options then open to the District Court
were to consider the prosecutor’s
position in offering no evidence and to
determine whether it was in the interests of justice to dismiss the informations
on that
basis or instead to not adopt the position taken by the Crown and remand
the matter through to a further date.
[106] Observing that authorities relating to s 347 of the Crimes Act 1961 are relevant to the determination of matters under s 68 of the SPA, Ms Holden drew attention to Timbun v The District Court at Auckland which concerned a charge of stupefying and sexual violation.55 As the complainant could not be located when the trial was to commence, the Crown offered no evidence against Mr Timbun. His counsel then made an application for discharge under s 347 of the Crimes Act 1961
which the Crown did not oppose. However the District Court Judge
remanded
Mr Timbun to another date to face trial again on these
charges.
53 R v Horseferry Road Magistrates Court ex parte Bennett [1993] UKHL 10; [1994] 1 AC 42 (HL) at 76.
54 Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464 (CA).
55 Timbun v The District Court at Auckland HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-1239, 10 June 2009.
[107] Mr Timbun applied for judicial review of the Judge’s decision
declining to grant the application for a discharge and
sought an order that the
decision be quashed and that he be discharged.
[108] The High Court ruled that the Judge had applied the correct test,
namely what was in the overall interests of justice, when
he declined to
discharge Mr Timbun pursuant to s 347 and that there was no basis upon which it
could interfere with the exercise
of the District Court Judge’s
discretion. Lang J stated:
[40] I take the view that this issue is ultimately answered by reverting
to fundamental principles. One of these is that it
is for the Court and not
counsel to determine the outcome of an application for discharge under s 347.
The Crown position must
obviously be taken into account and in some cases may be
decisive, but that does not alter the fact that the Judge is required to
bring
an independent mind to bear on the issue that he or she is required to decide.
It would be completely wrong in principle for
a Judge to grant an application
for discharge solely because the Crown did not oppose it.
[41] ... For the reasons that I have given, however, I am satisfied that
the Judge was entitled, and indeed required, to look
beyond the stance taken by
the Crown in order to decide whether the interests of justice required him to
grant or dismiss the application
for discharge.
[109] Turning to the present case, the applicants contend that Judge Farish
failed to look beyond the Prosecution Decision. In
support of that contention
they note that the District Court Decision failed to refer to:
(a) section 68 of the SPA or discuss the alternatives (ss 68(1) and 78)
to the dismissal of the informations;
(b) the legality of accepting money from an insurer to be paid to
satisfy another defendant’s reparation order in return
for the offering of
no evidence;
(c) the absence of any consent of or consultation with the victims and
the consensual position taken by it and Mr Whittall;
(d) the Court being asked to seal an agreement which was placed before it as a fait accompli; and
(e) the public perception of the dismissal of the informations in
the context of a tragedy.
[110] While acknowledging that the Judge did not explicitly refer to the interests of justice test, Ms Holden argues that in essence the Judge so concluded in finding that it was not in the best interests of the community for the prosecution to continue. She submitted that the Judge took into account the reasons outlined in the informant’s
11 December memorandum and reached her own view on the issues and that it was
apparent from reading the ruling that the Judge had
not simply endorsed the
Prosecution Decision.
[111] The applicants’ challenge can only be determined by
reference to and analysis of the terms of the District
Court Decision. It is
comparatively brief, having been delivered orally at the conclusion of the
hearing on 12 December 2013.
[112] Naturally enough the applicants place emphasis on those parts
of the Decision which refer to the fact of the
payment and its
implications for the previously made reparation order.
[113] However, while the applicants may understandably view it with a
cynical eye, the Judge was at pains from the very commencement
of her comments
to endeavour to explain her perception that two discrete processes had been
involved. As she said in the first paragraph:
[1] I think it is very important to understand that the decisions that have been reached today have been reached by two discrete processes. They are the decision in relation to whether or not the prosecution should proceed against Mr Whittal and quite discrete and separate from that, there has clearly been another process which Mr Whittal and the other directors and their advisors have been having once I made the reparation orders in July of this year.
[114] The Judge reiterated that point in front-footing the
“buy out” notion at
para [9]:
[9] Now some of you I know will say and think and believe that this is
Mr Whittal buying his way out of a prosecution and I
can tell you it is not. The
decision not to prosecute or to continue with the prosecution has been taken at
a very high level and
the voluntary payment is really a side issue in terms of
that determination, it is quite a side issue and I am quite satisfied of
that.
...
[115] Furthermore the Judge referred to a number of factors which were
consistent with the application of an overall justice analysis
and inconsistent
with the notion that only the voluntary payment had figured in her
consideration:
(a) the difficulties associated with preparation of the prosecution
case:
paras [2], [4] and [5];
(b) the difficulties associated with proof of the particular
offence:
para [6];
(c) the prosecution’s assessment by reference to the Guidelines: para
[6]. [116] A very significant indication that the Judge
did adopt the correct
approach
can be seen in the observation at para [10]:
[10] So I see this outcome as being a good outcome. One, because the
time and the length of the hearing and the resources for
a fineable only
offence, with very small chance of successful prosecution is not in the best
interests of your community or indeed
the wider community.
[117] While structured and couched in a fashion consistent with an immediate oral judgment, it is impossible in my view to conclude from a consideration of the entirety of the Decision that the Judge had abdicated her role under s 68 of the SPA and failed to undertake her own analysis of the appropriateness of the course proposed.
Was the District Court Decision unlawful by reason of the alleged
unlawfulness of the Prosecution Decision?
[118] On this issue the pleading stated:
The District Court failed to have regard to a relevant consideration, namely
that Worksafe’s decision was unlawful, invalid
and unreasonable for the
reasons set out in paragraphs 34 to 38 and 39 to 44 above and that it was
therefore not in the public interest
to dismiss the charges.
[119] The references to paras 34 to 38 and paras 39 to 44 are to the
totality of both the first and second causes of action
respectively
against Worksafe. The consequence of pleading the case by employing that
cross-reference technique is an expansive
and arguably oppressive
pleading.
[120] In my view a finding of a failure on the part of a court or tribunal
to have regard to an alleged invalidity or illegality
of an action on the part
of a party before it could only fairly be sustained if it was demonstrated that
the court or tribunal had
explicit knowledge of the claimed invalidity or
illegality of the action.
[121] Such a scenario did not arise in the present case. The Judge was the recipient of memoranda from both the informant and the defendant. The thrust of the informant’s memorandum was that the decision which had been taken was one made in accordance with the obligations under the Prosecution Guidelines and by the application of a principled and conventional approach. That the Judge had plainly considered that memorandum is apparent from the references to it at para 5 of the
Decision.56 Nothing in the memorandum warranted the
Judge coming to the
conclusion that the Prosecution Decision was invalid or illegal in the manner
alleged in the first and second causes of action.
[122] The Judge’s task was to exercise the jurisdiction under s 68(1). The attack on that Decision is the subject of the third cause of action. Absent express knowledge of any invalidity or illegality on the part of Worksafe, I do not accept that the Judge’s Decision can be made the subject of discrete attack via the route of the allegation in
the fourth cause of action.
56 There was also reference to the defendant’s memorandum at para 4.
Was the District Court Decision unlawful because the District Court Judge
had recused herself?
[123] The fact of recusal is first addressed in paras 9 and 10 of the
amended statement of claim:
9. In or about July 2013 Mr Whittall sought and obtained a transfer
of the charges to the District Court at Wellington for
a defended summary
hearing and an order from Judge Farish recusing herself from presiding at the
hearing (the recusal order).
10. With the consent of both Worksafe and Mr Whittall, Judge Farish
continued to manage the files relating to Mr Whittall’s
prosecution.
[124] Then, under the heading “Ultra vires – District Court
Judge recused”, the
fifth cause of action stated:
The District Court Judge had been lawfully recused from acting and
remained so recused when she purported to make the District
Court
decision.
Consequently there was no jurisdiction for the Judge to make the District
Court decision.
[125] Worksafe’s response to para 9, which is repeated at para 53 of
the statement of defence, stated:
9. In relation to paragraph 9 it admits that Mr Whittall
sought and obtained a transfer of the charges to the District
Court at
Wellington for a defended summary hearing and says that the decision granting
transfer was made on 13 June 2013.
It denies that Mr Whittall sought
and obtained an order from Judge Farish recusing herself from presiding at the
hearing, whether
in July 2013, or at all. It says further that both parties
anticipated that Judge Farish would recuse herself in relation to
the
hearing of the trial but were agreed Judge Farish would remain the
judge with supervision and management
of the file until a hearing date was
assigned and a judge allocated.
Paragraph 10 of the amended statement of claim was admitted by
Worksafe.
[126] The position appears to be that no formal recusal order was recorded but, as is evident from para [3] of the District Court Decision, Judge Farish considered that she had recused herself from presiding at the trial in response to Mr Whittall’s request.
[127] Citing United States commentary the applicants contended that a
recused judge cannot adjudicate on any substantive matter
in the material
case57 although acknowledging that the judge may perform
ministerial, non-discretionary acts to ensure that the case is properly disposed
of by an unbiased decision maker.58
[128] The applicants maintain that the only issue is whether a judge in
dismissing charges is simply “managing the file”
and providing
“supervision and overview” or whether such a dismissal crosses
the line and is part of a non-ministerial,
discretionary act. In their
submission a s 68(1) dismissal is a substantive decision involving a core
adjudicative function which
brings a charge to a conclusion.
[129] Worksafe did not appear to resist that submission which was not
surprising given the law as reviewed in the context of the
third cause of
action.59 However Worksafe contended that, whether or not Judge
Farish had formally recused herself, she was not prevented from making an order
under s 68(1) dismissing the charges either because of the parties’
ongoing consent to her participation or because she reassumed
jurisdiction for
the purposes of determining the application.
[130] With reference to the first proposition, namely ongoing consent, it was Worksafe’s submission that consent of the parties is relevant not only on the fact of recusal but also to the scope of recusal. It was said that while Mr Whittall had requested Judge Farish to recuse herself due to her role in the hearing involving PRCL, he had not raised any issue concerning her determining whether to dismiss the charges. Reference was made to the fact that the defendant’s memorandum of
11 December 201360 in relation to dismissal recorded Judge Farish
as the relevant
judicial officer.
57 Richard E Flamm Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges (2nd ed, Banks & Jordan Publishing Company, California, 2007) at 646–648, 652.
58 S Matthew Cook “Extending the due process clause to prevent a previously recused judge from later attempting to affect the case from which he was recused” (1997) 2 BYU Law Review 423 at 444.
59 At [103] above.
60 At [28] above.
[131] I do not accept that argument. If objection is taken to the
participation of a judicial officer on the grounds of apparent
bias, then the
expectation would plainly be that the objection would extend to any dimension of
the adjudicative role in any particular
case. Nor do I accept the submission
for Worksafe that because the decision to dismiss the charges was in Mr
Whittall’s
favour, then there can have been no appearance that Judge
Farish was biased against Mr Whittall with the consequence
that the
grounds for recusal were not relevant. Rather, the issue must be whether at the
relevant time the Judge was or was not
recused.
[132] However, depending on the grounds advanced for an application to
recuse, I accept that it is possible for an objection made
by a party to be
withdrawn, thereby enabling a Judge (if the Judge considers it appropriate) to
reassume the judicial role in effect
with the consent of the party who initially
raised an objection.
[133] I recognise that that is an invitation which the recused judicial
officer may decline to accept. I also recognise that a
reassumption of the
judicial role may be, or may be perceived to be, unsatisfactory in that it
could appear to be effectively placing
in the hands of one party the power to
select a particular judicial officer. However such reservations aside, I do not
consider that,
at least in a scenario of apparent bias, a judicial officer once
recused may not resume the judicial role if the original objection
is
subsequently withdrawn.
[134] In my view that is what transpired in the present case. On 6
December 2013 the Crown Solicitor sent an email to the District
Court which
stated:
Currently the matter has a scheduled teleconference with Judge Farish on
Thursday the 12th December (adjourned from 22 November). Judge
Farish, I understand, is maintaining oversight of the case in the
meantime.
Mr Grieve QC and I have requested that Judge Farish, (rather than convene a teleconference), sit in open Court in Christchurch at 10 am on the
12th December in Court 6 to deal with the matter. I understand the Judge is
provisionally amenable, with time and a Court available.
[135] While less than explicit as to the intended course of action, that request was followed by the filing of the memoranda of the informant and Mr Whittall and by the appearance of counsel before Judge Farish on 10 December 2013 when the application was made for the suppression order.61 Certainly by that point, which was prior to the 12 December 2013 hearing, both the nature of the application to be made and the fact that Mr Whittall no longer objected to her determining the matter were
apparent to Judge Farish. As Worksafe points out, the Judge’s express
reference in the Decision to her earlier recusal indicates
that she had not
forgotten about the objection and the fact that she proceeded with the hearing
indicates that she considered that
she was entitled to assume jurisdiction in
the circumstances.
[136] For those reasons I conclude that in dismissing the
charges on
12 December 2013 the Judge was not acting ultra vires and the
challenge to her exercise of jurisdiction cannot succeed.
Disposition
[137] For the reasons above none of the grounds of review are established
and the application for judicial review is dismissed.
[138] In the event that costs are sought and are not agreed, then any memorandum seeking costs should be filed by 18 December 2015 and any memoranda in response
by 5 February 2016.
Brown J
Solicitors:
Crown Law, Wellington
61 At [26] above.
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