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Matapiro Olives (2008) Limited v The Olive Press Limited [2020] NZHC 1394 (19 June 2020)
Last Updated: 24 June 2020
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND MASTERTON REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHAKAORIORI ROHE
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CIV-2019-435-17 [2020] NZHC 1394
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UNDER
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the Companies Act 1993
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BETWEEN
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MATAPIRO OLIVES (2008) LIMITED
Applicant
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AND
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THE OLIVE PRESS LIMITED
Respondent
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Counsel:
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T Wano for applicant
R Gordon and A Leggat for respondent
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Judgment:
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19 June 2020
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JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE JOHNSTON
[On the papers]
- [1] As I began
my interim judgment dated 4 May 2020, in which the background to this proceeding
was fully canvassed, by saying, this
is an application by Matapiro Olives (2008)
Ltd pursuant to s 290 of the Companies Act 1993 for an order setting aside a
statutory
demand dated 22 October 2019 served on it by The Olive Press
Ltd.1
- [2] In that
judgment I concluded:
(a) the contract between the parties which was contained in an
exchange of emails in April 2018 between The Olive Press’ Mr
Rodney
Lingard and Matapiro’s Mr John Arthur involved Matapiro committing itself
to consigning at least 250 tonnes of olives
to The Olive Press for
1 Matapiro Olives (2008) Ltd v The Olive Press Ltd
[2020] NZHC 876.
MATAPIRO OLIVES (2008) LIMITED v THE OLIVE PRESS LIMITED [2020]
NZHC 1394 [19 June 2020]
processing on certain terms as to charges and other things during the 2018, 2019
and 2020 seasons;
(b) the dispositive question is the nature of The Olive
Press’ remedy, given that Matapiro did not consign any olives for
processing
during the 2019 season;
(c) the issue is whether this was a take or pay contract,
with the result that The Olive Press is entitled to recover as a debt the full
amount it would have been entitled to charge
had Matapiro consigned the minimum
quantity of olives (250 tonnes) at the minimum contractual rate (45c per kg), or
whether its remedy
is a claim for damages for breach of contract which would
involve an assessment of its net loss.
- [3] Because the
basis for The Olive Press’ claim was not put in issue by Matapiro in its
application or otherwise, and only
emerged as an issue during the course of the
hearing, in my interim judgment I invited both parties to file and serve further
affidavit
evidence and submissions on the point. The Olive Press filed and
served a further affidavit sworn by one of its directors, Mr Bruce
McCallum, and
supplementary submissions on 19 May 2020. Matapiro filed and served a further
affidavit sworn by Mr Arthur and supplementary
submissions on 2 June 2020. For
The Olive Press, Mr Gordon filed and served a brief submission in reply.
Counsel’s supplementary
submissions have helped to clarify the issue,
which is more complex and nuanced than it first appeared.
- [4] I propose to
summarise the supplementary evidence before turning to the parties’
submissions.
- [5] In his
affidavit, Mr McCallum exhibits the operating statements for The Olive
Press’ processing division for the 2018 and
2019 seasons (the four-month
period ending 31 August in each year). As he deposes, these indicate that the
company’s costs
associated with employees and contractors remained static
over those two years notwithstanding a 43 per cent (on my calculation)
reduction
in the tonnage of olives processed. Two categories of processing costs reduced
materially between the two years, namely
“Bladder and Plastic Jerry Can
Purchases” ($4,599 reduction) and
“Trade Waste Treatment & Disposal” ($60,183 reduction). The only
other noteworthy feature of The Olive Press’
operating statements for the
two seasons is a significant increase ($11,832) in the cost of “Repairs
& Maintenance –
Plant & Equipment”.
- [6] On the basis
of that information, Mr McCallum says:
Because TOPs’ processing, wages and contractor costs are
largely fixed, the only costs savings from not processing Matapiro’s
fruit
in 2019 would have been a minor reduction in electricity and gas usage, and
perhaps some other production costs such as lower
usage of enzymes and talc. The
amount of any such savings would have been in the order of a few hundred dollars
at most.
- [7] He goes on
to explain that the reduction in the item “Trade Waste Treatment &
Disposal” reflects the introduction
of a new treatment plant and process.
I expect this may be relevant to the increase in “Repairs &
Maintenance — Plant
& Equipment.”
- [8] Mr McCallum
continues:
The reality for Topp, as a direct result of Matapiro’s
breach of contract, was not that we saved costs in 2019; but rather,
we suffered
a massive loss of productivity and efficiency.
- [9] He then
provides a tabular analysis which he says illustrates “that
Matapiro’s breach of contract in the 2019 harvest
season did not result in
any costs savings for The Olive Press”.
- [10] In his
affidavit, Mr Arthur levels a series of criticisms at Mr McCallum’s
evidence. Many of these appear to me to be focussed
on peripheral issues, but at
paragraph 13 Mr Arthur refers to Mr McCallum’s evidence that The Olive
Press’ wages and
contractor costs are largely fixed, observes that Mr
McCallum does not say exactly what that means, and
continues:
- ...
Indeed it is difficult to assess too greatly what little information Mr McCallum
has provided. How does the 2018 and 2019 position
compare with previous years,
which would likely give a more accurate assessment of any supposed loss of
revenue?
- My
understanding also is that the wage cost referred to by Mr McCallum
in his affidavit is largely related to one full
time employee — what role
therefore do contractors and/or casual employees play in meeting demand, and so
how truly fixed are
these fixed costs?
- Mr
McCallum says at paragraph 7(e) of his affidavit that TOP contractually commits
to its staff in advance of the season, “which can be at a time when we
are still uncertain of the total volumes of fruit to be harvested.”
The nature of contractor and casual staff in our industry, likely as with
many other industries, is that you are not required to commit
to them, say for
example, if subsequently there is no work for them to do. Mr McCallum makes the
broad statement that TOP might commit
itself to such staff when there is still
some uncertainty as to the volume of fruit that might be harvested, but appears
to not make
the point that this is actually what occurred in the 2019 harvest
season. Again, I would have great difficulty in accepting that
that a business
such as TOP would not commit itself to additional resources and costs if it was
not required to. The normal agreement
to process is usually a few days prior to
harvest to take into consideration the effects of mother nature, such as a hard
frost damaging
crop. Mr McCallum acknowledges in his affidavit that harvest
volumes can vary each year as a result of mother nature. I note also
that in my
discussions with Rod Lingard in February 2019, TOP were aware at that point that
we would have an extremely small crop.
- We
also understand that TOP’s financial position in recent years has been
affected by the loss of other customers to other processors.
Again, it is
difficult to truly assess what TOP’s actual financial position relative to
Matapiro is on the basis of the little
information provide by Mr
McCallum.
- I
also note that TOP’s 2018 processing margin, on my estimate, and according
to the table provided by Mr McCallum, was 11 cents
per kg, even when we
Matapiro were able to supply approximately 360
tonnes.
- [11] This
evidence appears to me to be directed at establishing that whether or not, and
if so the extent to which, The Olive Press
suffered damages as a result of
Matapiro’s failure to consign any olives to it for processing during the
2019 season is a matter
which must go to trial. I accept that if that turns out
to be the issue then it is not one that can be decided on the basis of affidavit
evidence in the context of winding up proceedings.
- [12] I turn now
to the arguments advanced by Mr Gordon and Mr Wano.
- [13] On The
Olive Press’ behalf Mr Gordon’s primary contention is that the
contractual arrangement between The Olive Press
and Matapiro was of a take or
pay nature with the result that The Olive Press was entitled to claim the
amount it would have been able to charge had Matapiro consigned
the minimum
tonnage of olives it agreed to consign during the 2019 season at the minimum
contractual rate as a debt.
- [14] Mr Gordon
referred me to several comparatively recent English authorities concerning
take or pay contracts.
- [15] These
reinforce the point that emerged at the hearing, that is to say that the
essential issue here, as in all such cases, is
whether the contract is properly
categorised as of a take or pay nature so that Matapiro was obliged to
pay the agreed minimum amount, irrespective of whether or not it consigned 250
tonnes of olives
for processing. The answer to this question will determine
whether The Olive Press’ claim against Matapiro is a liquidated
claim for
a debt or a claim for unliquidated damages, and therefore whether its claim is
capable of founding a statutory demand under
s 289(2)(a) of the Companies Act
and whether it is even relevant to consider The Olive Press’ net
loss.
- [16] Mr Gordon
also referred me to one New Zealand authority on the point, the recent judgment
of Associate Judge Christiansen in
Miraka Ltd v Milk New Zealand (Shanghai)
Co Ltd.2 In that case the Judge was dealing with an arrangement
relating to the supply of UHT milk which was said to be of a take or pay
nature. As to such contracts, his Honour said:3
The
rationale for take and pay minimum obligations, is relatively routinely
commercial. It means issues regarding quality and service
do not override
obligations to make payment if as much is clear from the contract terms. If a
definite sum of money is required to
engage the services of another then that
obligation must be met within the timeframe required. Indeed even if the service
has not
been provided – if a contract anticipates that outcome, and even
if the provider suffered no loss if claims as to damage and
mitigation of loss
are clearly excluded by contract terms.
- [17] The final
sentence of that passage neatly summarises many of the other authorities in the
area, all of which confirm that before
a court can conclude that a contract is
of a take or pay nature it must be satisfied that the parties’
objectively determined mutual intention was that the primary obligation of the
relevant party was to pay a pre-determined amount for the goods or services
whether or not that party availed itself of its entitlement
to the
same.4
2 Miraka Ltd v Milk New Zealand (Shanghai) Co Ltd
[2017] NZHC 2163.
3 At [75].
- See
also Air Tahiti Nui SAEML v Pounamu International Ltd [2001] NZCCLR 16
(HC) and Northern Crest Investments Ltd v Robert Jones Holdings Ltd
[2009] NZHC 1542.
- [18] Mr Gordon
submitted that key indicia of take or pay agreements are term
arrangements for the supply of goods or services which have advantages for both
parties, and that that describes
the contract between The Olive Press and
Matapiro. I accept that those are certainly common characteristics of take or
pay contracts. However, it is necessary to take the analysis further than
this before reaching any conclusion as to the nature of the
contract.
- [19] In his
submissions in reply, Mr Wano for Matapiro focussed his attention on the terms
of the contracts in the reported cases.
As I understood his submission it was
effectively that in the reported cases the parties had expressly, and often in
considerable
detail, set out the nature of the take or pay obligations.
He submitted that it could not be inferred in this case that the objectively
assessed mutual intention of the parties
was to enter into a take or pay
arrangement, and that if the court were so to conclude it would be going
well beyond any of the earlier cases.
- [20] It is true,
certainly, that in some of the cases to which counsel referred the take or
pay obligations might be said to have been explicit and detailed. Examples
are to be found in:
(a) Amico (UK) Exploration Co & Ors v Teesside Gas
Transportation Ltd:5
7.4 An amount (hereinafter referred to as the Send-Or-Pay
Payment”) shall be payable by [TGTL] to the CATS Parties for each
quarter
effective from 6 am on the Commencement Date until 6 am on 1 October, 2013
...”.
(b) Associated British Ports v Ferryways NV &
Anor:6
If after the end of a Year the total number of Units discharged
from and loaded to Services at the Port pursuant to this Agreement
is less than
the Minimum Throughput for the relevant Year then ABP will be entitled to be
paid by Ferryways a sum equal to the amount
ABP would have received had the
Minimum Throughput been met provided that if the shortfall is less than 10% of
the Minimum Throughput
for the relevant Year no invoice will be issued therefor
and the Minimum Throughput for the following Year will be increased by the
amount of such shortfall and provided further that any shortfall which has been
carried forward from a previous Year shall be
- Amico
(UK) Exploration Co & Ors v Teesside Gas Transportation Ltd [2001] UKHL 18; [2001] 1 ALL
ER (Comm) 865.
6 Associated British Ports v Ferryways
NV & Anor [2008] EWHC 1265 (Comm).
disregarded when calculating whether a short-fall in any Year is less than
10% of the Minimum Throughput.
(c) Port of Tilbury (London) Ltd v Stora Enso Transport and
Distribution Ltd & Anor:7
Payment for Minimum Tonnage Not Taken
Subject to the terms of Clause 10 (Maintenance, Insurance and
Destruction of, or Major Damage to, the Facilities) if in any Contract Year
the aggregate tonnage of Cargo in respect of which the Freight Price is paid to
POTLL is less than the Minimum
Tonnage then with the payment in respect of the
last month of that Contract Year SE shall pay to POTLL a sum calculated by
reference
to the formula.
((MT – T) x FP)
where:
MT is the Minimum Tonnage
T is the tonnage of Cargo (other than Cargo within Direct
Transit Trailers) discharged at the Facilities in the relevant Contract
Year
FP is the Freight Price per tonne for the Minimum Tonnage
- [21] On the
other hand, in E-Nik Ltd v Department for Communities and
Local Government,8 the clause
which Burton J concluded amounted to a take or pay arrangement was not
dissimilar from the relevant aspects of the contract here:
2.1 The authority hereby undertakes to purchase minimum of 500
days of Consultancy from the Supplier per year based on project requirement,
additional days will be required once the purchased days have been
exhausted.
- [22] Like Mr
Gordon, Mr Wano referred to Associate Judge Christiansen’s judgment in
Miraka, emphasising that his Honour’s observations quoted above
reinforced the need for a careful examination of the contract. He
also referred
me to the line of cases exemplified by Air Tahiti and North Crest
Investments that, although not concerned with take or pay
arrangements, focussed on the types of claim capable of founding a statutory
demand.
- Port
of Tilbury (London) Ltd v Stora Enso Transport and Distribution Ltd & Anor
[2009] 1 CLC 35 (CA).
8 E-Nik Ltd v Department for
Communities and Local Government [2012] EWHC 3027 (Comm).
- [23] In the end,
the issue comes down to the construction of the agreement in order to discern
whether the parties’ mutual intention
was to contract on take or pay
terms.
- [24] It may be
helpful at this point to refer to the long standing and well understood (though
recently reconsidered and revised)
principle that in a breach of contract claim
the innocent party is entitled to recover damages reflecting his, her or its
loss flowing
from the breach, but that the law will not sanction the recovery of
a penalty. The prevailing view has always been that the rule
against penalties
does not apply to take or pay provisions in contracts. This is because,
in such contracts, the failure of the relevant party to take the goods or
services in question is not a breach of contract. It is a course open to that
party, in the knowledge that he, she or
it will have to pay for the goods or
services not taken in any event. To superimpose the rule against penalties on
such arrangements
would be to interfere with that party’s contractual
right to elect not to take but to pay, and in doing so constrain
the financial freedom of commercial parties to protect themselves against the
risks associated with contracts
involving up-front establishment
costs.
- [25] That this
remains the law was recently confirmed by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in
Cavendish Square Holdings BV and Another v Talallel
Makdessi9 (though that case is
better known for its reformulation of the law relating to when liquidated
damages provisions in contracts will
be treated as penalties, and the departure
from Lord Dunedin’s formulation of this principle in Dunlop Pneumatic
Tyres v Selfridge & Co Ltd).10 Earlier this month, in 127
Hobson Street Ltd v Honey Bees Preschool Ltd11 the Supreme Court
also reconsidered the law relating to contractual penalties, concluding that an
unenforceable penalty exits where
the consequence of enforcement would involve
the imposition of obligations that are out of all proportion to the legitimate
interests
of the innocent party.
- [26] In
Cavendish the United Kingdom Supreme Court explained that there was a
difference in principle between the law stepping in to review the fairness
of
contractual obligations on the one hand and regulating the remedy for breach of
the same on the other. It said that the common
law did not review the fairness
of bargains, and
9 Cavendish Square Holdings BV and Another v
Talallel Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67.
10 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyres v Selfridge & Co Ltd UKHL 1,
AC 847.
11 127 Hobson Street Ltd v Honey Bees Preschool Ltd [2020]
NZSC 53 at [56]
therefore that the rule against penalties ought only to regulate “the
remedies available for breach of a party’s primary
obligations, not the
primary obligations themselves”.12
- [27] In their
judgment, Lords Neuberger and Sumption said:13
Where a contract contains an obligation on one party to perform
an act, and also provides that, if he does not perform it, he will
pay the other
party a specified sum of money, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a
secondary obligation which is capable
of being a penalty; but if the contract
does not impose (expressly or impliedly) an obligation to perform the act, but
simply provides
that, if one party does not perform, he will pay the other party
a specified sum, the obligation to pay the specified sum is a conditional
primary obligation and cannot be a penalty.
- [28] Focussing
on that passage from their Lordships’ judgment, the essential issue is
whether, as is submitted on The Olive
Press’ behalf, Matapiro’s
primary obligation was to pay for the processing of at least 250 tonnes of
olives at the agreed
rate.
- [29] If so then
The Olive Press has a liquidated claim for a debt. If not then it has an
unliquidated claim for damages, and it is
elementary that the latter cannot
support a statutory demand.
- [30] In the end,
I am satisfied that the arrangement reached between The Olive Press and Matapiro
in April 2018 in respect of the
2018 and 2019 seasons was intended by the
parties to be of a take or pay nature (the position in relation to the
2020 season may well be different because, at the very last moment, the parties
left the rate
for that season unresolved). The considerations which have
influenced me in reaching that view are:
(a) The circumstances in which The Olive Press and Matapiro
entered into this contract are such that it was attractive to both to
achieve
certainty for a period of time. Furthermore, it is clear from their exchanges
that both appreciated the other’s objectives.
For The Olive Press, the
attraction was securing certainty of revenue. For Matapiro, the attraction was
securing the certainty of
a competitive rate for the processing of its olives.
Those admittedly slightly different, but mutually compatible, objectives, by
their nature, lent themselves to a
12 Cavendish Square Holdings BV and Another v
Talallel Makdessi, above n 9, at
[13].
13 At [14].
take or pay arrangement which would provide the necessary certainty for
both parties. That, it seems to me, is an important contextual feature
of the
case.
(b) It seems to me to follow that the commercial efficacy of the
contract from the perspective of both parties would be maximised
by take or
pay arrangements, so that if what the parties said they were agreeing to was
in any sense ambiguous I would be inclined to favour an interpretation
by which
the parties achieved the certainty they were both looking for
— which, again, would tend to favour an interpretation that this was a
take or pay contract.
(c) Standing back and looking at the parties’ contractual
arrangements as a whole, and bearing in mind that, as I said in my
interim
judgment, the primary terms are those in the exchange of emails between Mr
Lingard and Mr Arthur because The Olive Press’
standard operating
conditions were only to apply to the extent that they were not inconsistent with
the unique terms of the arrangement,
I can see nothing in the contract as a
whole that is inconsistent with a take or pay arrangement. All this means is
that the focus
falls — as in the end it must — on the words which
the parties chose to use in their email exchange.
(d) It is a fair point for Mr Wano to have made on
Matapiro’s behalf that the contract does not use the phrase take or pay
or any comparable terminology. However, the search here is for the
objectively determined common intention of the parties, and no
particular
terminology is necessary. So much is clear from Burton J’s analysis of the
contract under consideration in E-Nik Ltd14 where, not only
was the key clause in the contract — as quoted above — less
obviously a take or pay arrangement than the
words used by the parties here,
there were aspects of the contract which apparently contradicted the
plaintiff’s contention
that it was a take or pay arrangement (such as a
right of termination on notice during the term).
14 E-Nik Ltd v Department for Communities and
Local Government, above n 8.
(e) Focussing on the words which the parties used to capture their mutual
intention, they strike me as clearly directed at achieving
to the maximum extent
the certainty to which I have referred. Matapiro was to commit to consign
its production to The Olive Press for processing during the seasons in question.
It was obliged to consign a minimum of 250 tonnes in each year for those
seasons. In recognition of those commitments, The Olive Press agreed to a flat
rate that the
evidence indicates was particularly competitive.
- [31] In summary
then, on the basis of the joint commercial objectives of these parties, the
terms of the contract as a whole; and
having regard to the language they used to
express their arrangements, I am satisfied that The Olive Press and Matapiro
intended
to contract on a take or pay basis. The reasonable person, if
asked what would happen if Matapiro decided not to consign any olives to The
Olive Press for processing
in 2019, might be expected to have replied:
“Well, that is up to Matapiro, but of course it will have to pay for the
processing
of 250 tonnes of olives anyway”. In other words, it was a
matter for Matapiro what tonnage of olives (if any) it consigned
to The Olive
Press for processing (which, incidentally, need not have been from its own olive
groves, as it could have elected to
take advantage of the low rate it had
negotiated and acquired olives from elsewhere for consignment). However, in my
view, Matapiro’s
failure to consign any olives in the 2019 season means
that it was obliged to pay for the processing of 250 tonnes of olives at the
agreed rate.
- [32] For those
reasons, in my judgement, The Olive Press has a claim for a debt for a
liquidated amount and a proper basis for its
statutory
demand.
- [33] On The
Olive Press’ behalf Mr Gordon invites the Court to move directly to an
order winding up Matapiro.
- [34] I am not
prepared to adopt that course. It appears to me that the more appropriate course
is to dismiss Matapiro’s application
for an order setting aside the
statutory demand, leaving it to The Olive Press to proceed with winding up
proceedings. Pre-emptively
to wind up Matapiro at this point would deprive that
company of the opportunity to resolve the outstanding issues between the parties
in
one way or another, and advance whatever arguments it may have available to it
in the context of winding up proceedings.
- [35] I dismiss
Matapiro’s application for an order setting aside The Olive Press’
statutory demand dated 22 October 2019.
Pursuant to s 291 of the Companies Act I
order Matapiro to pay the debt within 15 working days of the date of this
judgment. In default
of payment The Olive Press may make an application to put
the company into liquidation.
- [36] Not having
heard from counsel in relation to costs I reserve these. My preliminary view is
that The Olive Press is entitled to
its costs on a 2B basis. If counsel are
unable to resolve costs, as I would expect them to be able to do, they may come
back to me
by memorandum in the usual way and I will deal with them on the
papers.
Associate Judge Johnston
Solicitors:
Govett Quilliam, New Plymouth for applicant
Minter Ellison Rudd Watts, Wellington for respondent
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