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Donovan Group NZ Limited v Reid [2020] NZHC 3367 (16 December 2020)

Last Updated: 20 January 2021


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE
CIV-2018-488-113
[2020] NZHC 3367
BETWEEN
DONOVAN GROUP NZ LIMITED
Plaintiff
AND
HAEMISH LEE REID
First Defendant
SMARTSTEEL BUILDINGS LIMITED
Second Defendant
BRETT STEVEN WALDRON
Third Defendant
WALDRON CONSTRUCTIO AND ROOFING LIMITED
Fourth Defendant
Hearing:
1 December 2020
Appearances:
S J Davies-Colley for the Defendants Anthony Jackson as independent counsel
Chris Baird and Peter Magee for the Plaintiff (appearing later)
Judgment:
16 December 2020


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE R M BELL



This judgment was delivered by me on 16 December 2020 at 4:00pm

pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules




Solicitors:

...............................

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Thomson Wilson (P J Magee), Whangarei, for the Plaintiff

WRMK Lawyers (S J Davies-Colley), Whangarei, for the Defendants

Copy for:

Anthony Jackson (appointed as independent counsel), Whangarei, for both parties Chris Baird, Southern Cross Chambers, Auckland.


DONOVAN GROUP NZ LIMITED v REID [2020] NZHC 3367




knowledge of current jobs and potential future jobs. Mr Reid had a written employment agreement. There was no restraint of trade clause, but he was required to keep information confidential. “Confidential information” is defined:

“confidential information” shall mean information, data and know-how, whether technical or not, which is disclosed to the employee, and which relates to the research, development or business activity of the employer which is either marked or stated to be confidential or is by its nature reasonably intended to be confidential and includes photographs, prototypes, diagrams and samples.

permitting the search of defined premises for information on computers and similar devices.

An interim injunction restraining all of the defendants from directly canvassing, soliciting or attempting to solicit, in respect of any work of a nature now undertaken or performed by the plaintiff or by any employee or agent of the plaintiff, work on, services for, any of the projects specified in lists attached in schedule 1 to this amended order.


The order listed 665 projects up and down the country.
for the defendants agreed that certain documents should be released to the plaintiff, and that has been done. The remaining document are for me to decide.
  1. the party relies on it;
  1. the documents are adverse to that party’s case;
  1. the documents are adverse to the other side’s case; or
  1. the documents support the other side’s case.

  1. See the principles in Assa Abloy New Zealand Ltd v Allegion (NZ) Ltd [2015] NZHC 2760 at [14], and Lighter Quay Residents’ Society Inc v Waterfront Properties (2009) Ltd [2017] NZHC 818 at [8]- [16].
favour discovery is made is assumed to be true. That is subject to the qualification that if the discovery sought is for an aspect of the case which cannot hope to succeed, discovery will not be ordered. There is no point in requiring one side to disclose documents on an issue for which there is no traction. That would be disproportionate.2

Pleading requirements for breach of confidence claims

The normal approach of the court is that if a plaintiff wishes to seek relief against a defendant for misuse of confidential information it is his duty to ensure that the defendant knows what information is in issue. This is not only for the reasons set out by Edmund Davies J in John Zink,4 but for at least two other reasons. First, the plaintiff usually seeks an injunction to restrain the defendant from using its confidential information. Unless the confidential information is properly identified, an injunction in such terms is of uncertain scope and may be difficult to enforce. ... Secondly, the defendant must know what he has to meet. He may wish to show that the items in the information relied on by the plaintiff are matters of public knowledge. His ability to defend himself will be compromised if the plaintiff can rely on matters of which no proper warning was given. It is for all these reasons that failure to give proper particulars may be a particularly damaging abuse of process.

These principles do not apply only to the question of the content of the pleadings. Just as it may be an abuse of process to fail properly to identify the information on which the plaintiff relies, it can be an abuse to give proper particulars but of information which is not, in fact, confidential. A claim based even in part on wide and unsupportable claims of confidentiality can be used as an instrument of oppression or harassment against the defendant. It can be used to destroy an ex-employee’s ability to obtain employment or a

  1. Robert Jones Holdings Ltd v McCullagh [2016] NZHC 2529; Oxygen Air Ltd v LG Electronics Australia Pty Ltd [2018] NZHC 945 and Dold v Murphy [2018] NZHC 994.
  2. Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd (No.2) [1996] EWHC Patents 1; [1997] RPC 289 at 360. See also his judgment in CMI Centers for Medical Innovation GmbH v Phytopharm Plc [1999] FSR 235.

4 John Zink & Co Ltd v Wilkinson [1973] RPC 717.

competitor’s ability to compete. The wider the claims, the longer and more expensive the litigation. The defendant is likely to feel that he has no alternative but to challenge the confidentiality of everything, even though he believes that much or most of that technology pleaded cannot reasonably be thought of as secret. Furthermore, a defendant faced with a narrow claim may decide that the commercial realities point towards a tactical withdrawal. He may be able to relinquish use of the contested information yet stay in business. The possibility of doing this reduces as the width of the plaintiff’s claims increases. The defendant is left no alternative but to fight on in heavy litigation, spending money on lawyers which he would much prefer to spend on building up what may be a new business. The attractions of this to a plaintiff bent on harming a competitor’s business are obvious. Furthermore, the more technology put before the court, the easier it may be to obscure the issues. A competitor or ex-employee is entitled to copy non-confidential material, but if the plaintiff mixes a large amount of technology together, some of which has been copied by the defendant, there is a risk that the court will jump to the conclusion that some of what was copied must have been confidential.

An employee is entitled to deploy his skill and expertise for any employer. It may be a skill and expertise which is held by many others so that, as a practical matter, it is readily available to all competitors in the trade, or he may be one of a select band. When an employee works for his employer he is bound by an implied obligation of good faith. Generally, he is expected to work for his employer not for his employer’s competitors. He is expected not to put his

  1. See Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd (No.2) [1996] EWHC Patents 1; [1997] RPC 289 at 370-371; Faccenda Chicken Ltd v Fowler [1987] Ch 117 (CA),

6 See Ocular Sciences Ltd v Aspect Vision Care Ltd (No.2) [1996] EWHC Patents 1; [1997] RPC 289 at 370-371.

skills at the service of one person or at the salary being paid by another. This has nothing to do with the confidentiality of his skills and expertise. Similarly, when he learns new things during his employment which become part of his skills and expertise, the employer can insist that, while he is employed, he uses those things only for the purpose of his employment. Whether or not those things are confidential, in the Coco v Clark sense7, is largely irrelevant to the restraint on his ability to use it to his employer’s detriment while he is still employed by him. The significance of this is that there is risk at slipping into thinking that what an employee can be restrained from using while in employment is likely to be secret when, in truth, that restraint has little to do with secrecy but a lot to do with the employee’s obligation to act in the interests of his employer. Once one slips into thinking that because a piece of information cannot be disclosed to a competitor during employment, therefore it is secret, it is but a little step to say that it is a secret for the purposes of the law of confidence.

  1. Of the material that constitutes information and not know-how coming to the knowledge of an employee during employment, only a small proportion is recognised by the law as confidential and (as will appear) not all of that is protected.
  1. For the information to be confidential, it must be information of a kind capable of being confidential. Information that is in the public domain or is readily available from the plaintiff or some other person (including a customer of the plaintiff) does not qualify. To be confidential, the information must be confidential to the employer and not merely confidential to the customer. It must be confidential as against the customer. There may be all sorts of material that a customer or client can prevent an employee, as well as the employer, from disclosing to unauthorised persons but which the employer cannot, at the end of the employment, prevent the employee from disclosing to the customer, or the customer from disclosing to the employee.
  1. To be confidential the information must be not only confidential to the employer and of such a character as to be capable as to be confidential, but it must also have been imparted in confidence by the employer to the employee.
  1. It is not possible to define in advance the information that is confidential. It depends on the circumstances.

7 Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] RPC 41.

8 Nedax Systems NZ Ltd v Waterford Security Ltd [1994] NZEmpC 65; [1994] 1 ERNZ 491 at 505.

  1. Certain kinds of information are readily recognisable as confidential. For example, trade secrets, secret processes, and information of a kindred kind.
  1. Many other kinds of information are almost never confidential. Among them, business methods, administrative procedures and information as to price structures.
  1. In between trade secrets, on the one hand, and information of routine operations on the other, there is some material that can be confidential.
  1. Even if it is, in a given situation, it will not be protected if it cannot be separated from other information that is not confidential, and it may not be protected if the effect of protecting it is to prevent competition and there is no covenant or restraint of trade between the former employer and employee.
  1. One category of information that requires careful consideration as to its confidentiality is information that discloses the employer’s vulnerability to attack from the outside. For example, knowledge that a supply relationship is brittle, or under strain in a particular way, as was the case in Medic ...
  1. Another category of cases can be described as the springboard cases where it is suggested that a former employee has obtained some commercial advantage, not as a result of any personal attributes, but as the result of being a former employee of the plaintiff. I do not find this line of argument impressive in the absence of solicitation during the employment and in the absence of any fiduciary relationship. This is just an aspect of knowing the industry and understanding the market. There is a risk of preventing a former employee from using information that he, or she, or a third person altogether, could have obtained from the supplier on enquiry. It is perfectly natural for former employees to derive some advantage in marketing themselves from their former employment.9



And:11

I can see no objection, in principle, to a former employee exploiting a rapport developed with the former employer’s customers during the course of employment.

I think it is extremely important to recognise that people in the position of the defendants are not, without good cause, to be restrained from earning a living in any way they choose. This is all the more important when there is no restraint of trade. The general rule is that former employees are entitled to contact former customers or suppliers of the employer ... Information about key people within those organisations is not confidential once employment

  1. Cited with approval in Longbeach Holdings Ltd v Chia HC Christchurch, CP182/98, 25 November 1998.

10 Longbeach Holdings Ltd v Chia HC Christchurch, CP182/98, 25 November 1998, at p 16.

11 At p 19.

has ceased. ... Where an employer has derived special knowledge about a client from that client, there is nothing to prevent that client from making the same information available to the former employee as Nedax shows. Industry or trade knowledge and experience cannot be regarded as confidential in this context.

Donovan Group’s pleadings

(a) Against Mr Reid alone, breach of the confidentiality clause in his employment agreement;

(b) Against all defendants, breach of confidence in equity;

(c) Against all defendants, conversion of confidential information;

(d) Against all defendants, conspiracy by unlawful use of confidential information.



12 Donovan Group NZ Ltd v Reid [2018] NZHC 2854 at [35]- [47].

action for the jurisdiction reasons given by Toogood J. However, he insisted that Donovan Group would continue with all the other causes of action.

... it is now well established that that (aside from any obligations undertaken by contract) the law relating to confidential information is an equitable invention and is not founded on the concept of information as property.


The conspiracy cause of action will be harder to prove than establishing that third parties are liable for misusing information disclosed to a confidant. In running so many causes of action, Donovan Group is taking a heavy-handed approach.

(a) Its client base.

(b) Its prospective client and leads database.

(c) Its supplier database.

(d) Its building and building element designs, plans and specifications, standard details, including but not limited to its “bracketless portal system” and its “tapered box beam system”.

(e) Its project management software “Coremanage”.

(f) Its building design software “Constructor”.

(g) Its automated design and manufacture software operated by its design engineering and drafting business “Design Station Limited”.


13 See the discussion in Singh v Patel [2020] NZHC 2242 at [31]- [41].

14 Thomas v Farr plc [2007] EWCA Civ 118 at [39].

(h) All design specific pricing which could not be accurately quoted by Design Station software.

(i) Its pricing methodology.

(j) Its branding, marketing material and methodologies.

  1. Sachs v Speilman [1887] UKLawRpCh 227; (1887) 37 Ch D 295, Hickson v Scales [1900] NZGazLawRp 83; (1900) 19 NZLR 202 (SC), Truck Master Ltd v Mastagard Waste Ltd [2014] NZHC 1676 at [15].
company, the 665 jobs in the amended interim injunction of November 2018. Its case is that information about those jobs was confidential, so that Mr Reid could not use information about them after he left. Inside knowledge of negotiations, terms of contract and prices can for pleading purposes be accepted as a closely-guarded secret which Mr Reid could not use after he left.

16 O Mustad & Son v S Allcock & Dosen [1964] 1 WLR 109 (HL).

Donovan Group’s case to show that its project management software is confidential as opposed to industry skills that Mr Reid acquired during his employment.

The documents

(a) Pricing schedules;

(b) Projects which Mr Reid was aware of before he left;

(c) Head contractors who had done work with Donovan Group before Mr Reid left;

(d) Customers where confidentiality is not in issue; and

(e) Customers who had no connection with Donovan Group Ltd.

Pricing schedules

Projects in contemplation before Mr Reid left

its franchisees. Documents relating to seven of those projects were found under the search and seizure orders:

(a) Northland Milk (Wayne Brown);

(b) J A Russell Ltd’s Marsden Development;

(c) Placemakers Levin;

(d) Greenmount Espies;

(e) Supply to Waldron Construction and Roofing Ltd subcontracting to Dixon Projects for the “Stroeven” project;

(f) Supply to Waldron Construction and Roofing Ltd subcontracting to Dixon Projects for the Griffiths Extension project; and

(g) Placemakers Warkworth.


As none of the documents seized related to any of the other projects in the order, it is not necessary to deal with those projects in this decision.

(a) Those showing how or why customers chose the defendants over the plaintiff;

(b) Those originating from Donovan Group, such as concept plans;

(c) Those relevant to quantum – to be withheld until liability is first established.

Head contractors who had done work with Donovan Group before Mr Reid left

defendants will say in their defence that they already had relationships with businesses Donovan Group dealt with. There is no bar to Mr Reid building on relationships that he had developed with Donovan Group customers during his employment. New jobs that were not pending when he left cannot be the subject of Donovan’s confidentiality claims identified in this judgment. Accordingly, documents relating to new jobs with existing Donovan Group customers are not discoverable.

Customers who had had no contact with Donovan Group

The privilege question

do not want the fact that those documents have been given to their lawyers for advice to be disclosed to Donovan Group, because that would give away what they were seeking advice for.

The ratio of the decision is, I think, that where the selection of documents which a solicitor has copied or assembled betrays the trend of advice which he is giving the client the documents are privileged.

A gloss on the principle that a lawyer’s advice is privileged from discovery should not result in the right of a party to refuse discovery of documentary evidence that was in the possession of that party before the selection was made, or copies or translations of such evidence.


17 Lyell v Kennedy (No 3) [1884] UKLawRpCh 102; (1884) 27 Ch D 1 (CA).

18 Ventouris v Mountain [1991] 1 WLR 607 (CA), 615.

  1. Sumitomo Corpn v Credit Lyonnais Rouse Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1152, [2002] 1 WLR 479 at [76]- [77].
gives the defendants a choice. They may cross-check to see if the documents are relevant and have already been disclosed. They need not disclose those Donovan Group has already received. Alternatively, they can dispense with the cross-check and allow all the attachments and enclosures to be disclosed.

Safeguarding confidentiality

(4) A party who obtains a document by way of inspection or who makes a copy of a document under this rule—

(a) may use that document or copy only for the purposes of the proceeding; and

(b) except for the purposes of the proceeding, must not make it available to any other person (unless it has been read out in open court).

one side to have adequate access to documents relevant to the proceeding and the need to protect the other side from improper use of those documents following discovery.

The ability of each party to a proceeding to inspect the documents of the other, except for documents which are privileged, is important in enabling the proceeding to be brought to a just conclusion. It avoids parties being taken by surprise. It enables legal advisers to better assess the likely outcome of trial, and to concentrate on what will ultimately prove to be the real issues. In this way it can save cost. Sometimes, however, relevant documents which are not privileged may be commercially sensitive. Examples would be documents showing the detailed costings of products or services which are provided in a competitive market, the marketing plans for a proposed new product, or a patent specification during the period before the application has been accepted and made available for inspection.


The court went on to note that there are different ways by which the confidentiality may be preserved, while allowing them to be inspected by the other side. It added:21

It is a matter of balancing on the one hand the interests of justice in ensuring that the commission is able to prepare and present its case, and on the other the interests of Port Nelson in safeguarding its confidential information in a competitive market.

Each case has to be decided on its own facts and the broad principle must be that the Court has the task of deciding how justice can be achieved taking into account the rights and needs of the parties. The object to be achieved is that the applicant should have as full a degree of disclosure as will be consistent with adequate protection of the secret. In so doing, the Court will be careful not to expose a party to any unnecessary risk of its trade secrets leaking to or being used by competitors. What is necessary or unnecessary will depend upon the nature of the secret, the position of the parties and the extent of the disclosure ordered. However, it would be exceptional to prevent a party from access to information which would play a substantial in the case, as such would mean that the party would be unable to hear a substantial part of the case, and would be unable to understand the reasons for the advice given to him and, in some cases, the reasons for the judgment. Thus what disclosure is necessary entails not only practical matters arising in the conduct of a case but also the general position that a party should know the case he has to meet, should hear matters given in evidence and understand the reasons for the judgment.



20 Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission (1994) 7 PRNZ 344 (CA) at 347.

21 At 348.

22 Roussel Uclaf v Imperial Chemical Industries Plc [1990] FSR 25 (Ch) at 29-30.

In modern times, however, it is rare that the claimant himself, (or, where the claimant is a corporate body, a named officer) is excluded from knowledge, because decisions whether to continue or abandon the action, for example, should be made by the claimant, and not by his advisers. Sometimes he may only inspect under strict conditions. But exceptional cases do occur from time to time. It is increasingly common to create a “confidentiality club” of specified persons who alone may have access to the documents...As to who should be in the confidentiality club with access to the confidential material, there may be an issue whether it should extend beyond external lawyers.



  1. Paul Matthews and Hodge M Malek Disclosure (5th ed, Sweet and Maxwell London, 2017) at 479-480.

24 At 480.

I, [name] of [place], [occupation], undertake, subject to any orders of the court or further agreement by the plaintiff/defendants, in relation to the documents required to be disclosed in proceeding CIV-2018-488-113:

  1. I will inspect documents disclosed under discovery solely for the purpose of the proceeding CIV-2018-488-113.
  1. Any copies I receive of the documents, and any notes which I make and knowledge I gain of the contents of the documents, will be used solely for the purpose of the proceeding.
  1. Subject to 4 below, I will safeguard the confidential documents and any copies thereof and will not at any time disclose the documents or copies or the contents thereof, in whole or in part, to any person without first obtaining the consent of the plaintiff/defendants in this proceeding, or an order of the court allowing disclosure, or required by any law, rule, or regulation to do so.
  1. I may disclose the content of the confidential documents or of any copies and discuss the contents of the documents with the court or any person who has been permitted to inspect the documents and who has first provided a signed undertaking in this form to the solicitors for the plaintiff/defendants in this proceeding.
  1. If any of the documents are scanned or imaged and converted to electronic form for the purpose of the proceeding, these will be held by me in a secure form, and will not be further copied or transmitted and will remain in my possession and subject to my control at all times.
its undertaking. That may include orders available under r 7.48 of the High Court Rules 2016 – that is, breach of the undertaking may result in the claim being struck out or the defendants being barred from defending.

Directions




...........................................

Associate Judge R M Bell


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