You are here:
NZLII >>
Databases >>
High Court of New Zealand Decisions >>
2021 >>
[2021] NZHC 1113
Database Search
| Name Search
| Recent Decisions
| Noteup
| LawCite
| Download
| Help
Halifax New Zealand Limited (in liquidation) v Loo [2021] NZHC 1113 (19 May 2021)
Last Updated: 19 May 2021
|
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
COMMERCIAL PANEL
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
|
|
|
|
UNDER
|
Section 284 of the Companies Act 1993, section 66 of the Trustee Act 1956
and Part 19 of the High Court Rules 2016
|
|
IN THE MATTER
|
of HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
|
|
AND
|
an application by MORGAN JOHN KELLY and PHILIP ALEXANDER QUINLAN
First Applicants
.../2
|
|
Hearing:
|
30 November, 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 December 2020
|
|
Appearances:
|
A Leopold SC,* E Holmes,* C Trahanas,* M Kersey and S J Jones for
Applicants
E Hyde* for First Respondent
J V Gooley* for Second Respondent
V Whittaker SC* and C Mitchel* for Third Respondent R Scruby SC* and K
Petch* for Fourth Respondent
S D Munro and C M O’Brien for Fifth Respondent E L Smith for Sixth
and Seventh Respondents
No appearance for Eighth and Ninth Respondents
*(appearing remotely from Federal Court)
|
|
Judgment:
|
19 May 2021
|
JUDGMENT OF VENNING J
This judgment was delivered by me on
19 May 2021 at 11.00 am, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date...............
HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND LIMITED (IN LIQ) v LOO & ORS [2021] NZHC
1113 [19 May 2021]
an application by HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Second Applicant
MORGAN JOHN KELLY and PHILIP ALEXANDER QUINLAN
Third Applicants
an application by HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Second Applicant
MORGAN JOHN KELLY and PHILIP ALEXANDER QUINLAN
Third Applicants
AND CHOO BOON LOO
First Respondent
ELYSIUM BUSINESS SYSTEMS PTY LTD
Second Respondent
JASON PAUL HINGSTON
Third Respondent
ATLAS ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY
LTD (as trustee for the Atlas Asset Management Trust)
Fourth Respondent
FIONA McMULLIN
Fifth Respondent
ANDREW PHILLIP WHITEHEAD and
MARLENE WHITEHEAD (as trustees for the Beeline Trust)
Sixth Respondent
ANDREW PHILLIP WHITEHEAD
Seventh Respondent
JEFFREY JOHN WORBOYS
Eighth Respondent
HONG KONG CAPITAL HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED (HKCH)
Ninth Respondent
Introduction
[1]
Procedural matters [7]
Background [10]
Halifax entities/shareholding and control
[10]
Representative parties and
other respondents [13]
Choo Boon Loo
[14]
Elysium Business Systems Pty
Ltd [15]
Jason Paul Hingston
[16]
Atlas Asset Management Pty Ltd
[17]
Fiona McMullin [18]
Whitehead Interests [20]
Jeffrey John Worboys and
Hong Kong Capital Holdings Pty Limited, [21] The operations of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ
[25]
The trading platforms
[31]
Closing out – operation of investments
[38]
The relationships: Halifax NZ
and its Clients [39]
The
relationships: Halifax NZ and IB [44]
The relationships: Halifax AU and Halifax NZ
[51]
The Trust relationship
[54]
A single deficient mixed fund
[64]
The Whitehead Interests’
case [92]
Category 3 investors
[122]
Category 5 investors
[150]
Category 1/Category 2
investors [176]
Barry Taylor and DM3
[183]
Discussion [214]
Remaining issues
[236]
Post appointment deposits [236]
Set-off [237[
Low/minimal balances [240]
Currency [243]
Final orders
[244]
Category 3 investors [244]
Category 5 investors [244]
Post-appointment deposits [244]
Date of calculation of value of
clients’ entitlements [244]
Pooling and distribution [244]
Distribution process [244]
Set-off [244]
Low account balances [244]
Electronic communications [244]
Reservation of leave
[245]
Costs [246]
Introduction
- [1] On 27
November 2018, Morgan John Kelly, Philip Alexander Quinlan and Stewart McCallum
were appointed administrators of Halifax
New Zealand Limited (Halifax NZ). Just
under four months later, on 22 March 2019, Halifax NZ was placed into
liquidation.1 Mr Kelly, Mr
Quinlan and Mr McCallum were appointed liquidators.2
- [2] On 18
September 2019, Mr Kelly and Mr Quinlan were appointed trustees of a Regulation
246 Trust by the Financial Markets Authority
(FMA).3
- [3] Seventy per
cent of the shares in Halifax NZ are held by Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd
(Halifax AU).
- [4] On 23
November 2018, Halifax AU entered voluntary administration. That triggered the
administration of Halifax NZ four days later.
Then, on 20 March 2019, Halifax AU
was placed in liquidation on a creditors’ voluntary winding up. Messrs
Kelly and Quinlan
are the liquidators.
- [5] At the time
administrators were appointed to Halifax AU, the aggregate value of the assets
recorded in client accounts of Halifax
AU and Halifax NZ was approximately AUD
211.6 million. However, the total assets held between the two entities was AUD
192.6 million.
There was a deficiency of approximately AUD 19
million.
- [6] In their
capacity as liquidators of Halifax NZ, and as trustees of the Regulation 246
Trust, Mr Kelly and Mr Quinlan apply to
the Court for directions in relation to
the distribution of funds held by Halifax NZ (together with ancillary and
related orders).4 The applicants had
previously made a similar application for directions and advice to the Federal
Court of Australia (Federal Court).
1 Companies Act 1999, s
241(2)(a).
2 On 9 May 2019 Mr McCallum resigned from
his position of liquidator.
3 Reg 246(2) of the Financial Markets
Conduct Regulations 2014 (FMCR).
- The
applicants were variously referred to during the proceedings as applicants,
liquidators and trustees. The same terminology applies
throughout this
judgment.
Procedural matters
- [7] The
relief sought in the application for directions and advice before the Federal
Court and the originating application before
the High Court of New Zealand
(HCNZ) is identical in all relevant respects, as are the parties. The Federal
Court and the HCNZ agreed
to jointly conduct the hearings to determine the
applications in both sets of proceedings.5
- [8] Although the
Courts initially contemplated sitting together, with one week in Sydney and one
week in New Zealand, ultimately,
with the COVID-19 pandemic, the hearings were
conducted jointly by VMR link. Counsel were physically present in either Sydney,
Australia
or Auckland, New Zealand but appeared before both Courts. Witnesses
who were required for cross-examination on their affidavits were
sworn or
affirmed in both proceedings. Both the Federal Court and the HCNZ received the
same submissions and heard the same evidence.
- [9] All parties
agreed that the Federal Court and the HCNZ could discuss issues during
deliberations. Markovic J and I have settled
and are agreed on the principal
issues raised in the two sets of proceedings. But the ultimate decision in each
proceeding and the
reasons for decision in relation to those issues are each
Court’s own.
Background
Halifax
entities/shareholding and control
- [10] Halifax AU
was incorporated on 30 May 2001. Halifax NZ was incorporated on 21 May 2008.6 On 1 November 2013 Halifax AU
acquired a controlling 70 per cent interest in Halifax NZ. Andrew Gibbs (a
director of Halifax NZ) and
the Andrew Gibbs’ Family Trust own the
remaining 30 per cent of the shares.7
- Kelly,
in the matter of Halifax Investment Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 5) [2019]
FCA 1341, [2019] 139 ACSR 56 [Kelly No 5]; and High Court Minute No (4)
dated 12 December 2019 [Minute No
4].
6 Until 9 October 2013,
Halifax NZ was called Strategic Capital Management Limited.
- Previously,
on 1 July 2013, Halifax AU and Halifax NZ had entered an introducer agreement
pursuant to which Halifax NZ (Strategic
Capital Management Ltd as it was then
known) would introduce clients to Halifax AU.
- [11] The eighth
respondent, Jeffrey Worboys, holds 40.97 per cent of Halifax AU’s
shareholding. Mr Worboys is a director of
Halifax AU and was also a director of
Halifax NZ from 18 November 2014 to 25 November 2018.
- [12] Matthew
Barnett, the sole director and shareholder of Hong Kong Capital Holdings Pty Ltd
(the ninth respondent), which also owns
40.97 per cent of the shares of Halifax
AU, was a director of Halifax AU from 22 January 2007 to 28 February 2018 and a
director
of Halifax NZ from 18 November 2014 to 15 May
2018.
Representative
parties and other respondents
- [13] The Court
appointed the first to fifth respondents to represent various classes of
investor. It also approved the joinder of
further respondents to enable the
Court to deal with all issues raised in the applications.
Choo
Boon Loo
- [14] Choo Boon
Loo was appointed as first respondent to represent all clients of Halifax AU and
Halifax NZ whose proportionate entitlement
to, or share of funds from, the
deficient mixed fund will be higher after the realisation of all extant
investments than their entitlement
or share was on the date administrators were
appointed to Halifax AU and Halifax NZ (Category 1 clients). Subsequently, Mr
Loo’s
brief as representative was extended to represent all clients who
seek an in specie distribution.
Elysium
Business Systems Pty Ltd
- [15] Elysium
Business Systems Pty Ltd was appointed as second respondent to represent all
clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ whose
proportionate entitlement to or share
of funds from the deficient mixed fund will be lower after the realisation of
all extant investments
than their share or entitlement was on the date
administrators were appointed to Halifax AU and Halifax NZ (Category 2
clients).
Jason
Paul Hingston
- [16] Mr Hingston
was appointed as third respondent to represent all clients of Halifax AU and
Halifax NZ who transferred shares into
the Halifax AU IB Platform or Halifax NZ
IB Platform from another stockbroker and have not traded in those shares
(Category 3 clients).
Atlas
Asset Management Pty Ltd
- [17] Atlas Asset
Management Pty Ltd (as trustee for the Atlas Asset Management Trust) was
appointed as fourth respondent to represent
those clients of Halifax AU and
Halifax NZ whose investments are not traceable and who wish to contend that all
clients should share
in any deficiency regardless of whether the investments are
traceable or not (Category 4 clients).
Fiona
McMullin
- [18] Ms McMullin
was appointed as fifth respondent to represent all clients of Halifax AU and
Halifax NZ who invested prior to 1 January
2016 in order to propound the
argument that investments made before there was a deficient mixed fund are
traceable (Category 5 clients).
- [19] The
reasonable legal expenses of the first to fifth respondents are to be paid out
of the funds held by the applicants.
Whitehead
Interests
- [20] Andrew
Phillip Whitehead and Marlene Whitehead (as trustees of the Beeline Trust) and
Andrew Phillip Whitehead were joined as
the sixth and seventh respondents
respectively on their applications to enable them to pursue individual arguments
on behalf of the
Whitehead interests generally. The issue of costs was
reserved.
Jeffrey
John Worboys and Hong Kong Capital Holdings Pty Limited,
- [21] On 9
October 2020, Jeffrey John Worboys and Hong Kong Capital Holdings Pty Limited,
the eighth and ninth respondents, were joined
to these proceedings on
the
application of the liquidators.8
The eighth and ninth respondents had previously been joined to the Federal
Court proceedings on their application to argue, inter
alia, that the assets of
Halifax AU which were acquired in connection with the trading of financial
products by clients of Halifax
AU, were beneficially owned by Halifax AU and
were neither acquired by clients of Halifax AU nor held on trust for clients of
Halifax
AU.
- [22] If that
argument had succeeded, it would have reduced the assets available for
distribution to clients of Halifax NZ as well
as Halifax AU. For that reason,
the eighth and ninth defendants were also joined to the Halifax NZ
proceeding.
- [23] The eighth
and ninth defendants were required to post AUD 50,000 as initial security for
costs in the Federal Court proceeding.
Prior to the hearing the applicant
liquidators sought further security. Counsel for the eighth and ninth
respondents then sought
and were granted leave to withdraw in both the Federal
Court and the HCNZ proceedings. The eighth and ninth respondents did not appear
and have taken no steps to advance their arguments in either
proceeding.
- [24] Although
the eighth and ninth respondents did not pursue their claim, on the evidence
before the Court the arguments could not
have succeeded in any event. The
ultimate orders of the Court reflect that. I do not need to refer to nor to
consider the eighth
and ninth respondents’ claims any further. I am aware
that an application for indemnity costs against the eighth and ninth
respondents
has been made in the Federal Court. As the eighth and ninth respondents were
joined to these proceedings at the instigation
of the Court and on the
application of the liquidators, I do not propose to make any order for costs
against the eighth and ninth
respondents in this proceeding. The Federal Court
is the appropriate Court for the costs caused by the actions of the eighth and
ninth respondents in the litigation to be determined given the initial active
steps taken by them in that Court.
8 Interlocutory Order dated
21 October 2020.
The operations of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ9
- [25] From
19 February 2003, Halifax AU held an Australian Financial Services Licence. From
at least 2009, until it was placed in administration
on 23 November 2018,
Halifax AU provided financial services. Clients’ money was deposited with
Halifax AU in connection with
financial services and/or financial products
(including both stocks and derivative products) being issued, granted or
otherwise made
available to the client.
- [26] Clients of
Halifax AU (and clients of Halifax NZ) could access the following online
platforms provided by Halifax AU:
(a) the Interactive Brokers LLC (IB) trading platform also known
as Trader Workstation (referred to as IB AU);
(b) its MetaTrader 4 (MT4) trading platform licence from
MetaQuotes Software Corp (MetaQuotes) and also known as Halifax Pro;
(c) from at least around 2009 to around July/August 2016, the
Saxo trading platform (Saxo); and
(d) from around 8 August 2016, its MetaTrader (MT5) trading
platform also licensed from MetaQuotes and known as Halifax Plus.
- [27] Clients
having accounts with Halifax AU could access the above trading platforms and
place trades at their own discretion or
could instruct Halifax to place trades
on their behalf. Halifax AU was also an authorised body under Halifax NZ’s
derivatives
licence but was not a market participant on any
exchange.
- [28] Halifax NZ
acted as a broker in respect of exchange traded products. It was a licensed
derivatives issuer and held a market service
licence (MSL) granted by the FMA.
Halifax NZ’s MSL allowed the company, and Halifax AU, as an authorised
body, to issue derivatives
in New Zealand. Halifax NZ was also an introducing
broker
- The
summary at [25] to [37] is taken from the Agreed Statement of Facts dated 3
November 2020 and admitted pursuant to s 9, Evidence
Act
2006.
to Halifax AU. On 1 July 2013, four months before Halifax AU acquired the
controlling share in Halifax NZ, the parties entered an
introducing
broker/referral agreement pursuant to which Halifax NZ agreed to introduce
clients to Halifax AU and refer them to Halifax
AU’s financial services
business. As such, Halifax NZ introduced prospective clients to Halifax AU for
the purpose of financial
products trading.
- [29] Halifax NZ
conducted business by:
(a) providing access for its clients and for clients of Halifax
AU to the IB trading platform (which was referred to as IB NZ);
(b) facilitating access for its clients to Halifax AU’s IB
AU platform;
(c) facilitating access for its clients to Halifax AU’s
MT4 platform; and
(d) facilitating access for its clients to Halifax AU’s
MT5 platform.
- [30] The
financial products in which clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ could trade
were either:
(a) exchange traded financial products, namely investments
traded on a regulated exchange, such as the Australian Stock Exchange,
New York
Stock Exchange, or London Stock Exchange (including shares, warrants, futures
and options); or
(b) over the counter (OTC) financial products comprising
derivatives which were not listed on a regulated stock exchange but which
were
traded via private contracts between the client and either Halifax AU or Halifax
NZ, the value of which contracts were based
on the price of assets such as
shares, precious metals and commodities.
The trading platforms
- [31] The
exchange traded financial products, including shares, could be traded through
the IB AU, IB NZ, and MT5 platforms.
- [32] OTC
products could be traded through the MT4, MT5 and IB NZ
platforms.
- [33] The MT4,
MT5, IB AU and IB NZ platforms were operated in Australia by Halifax
AU.
- [34] The Halifax
AU IB platform enabled clients to trade in shares, warrants, equity and index
options, futures and options on futures.
- [35] The Halifax
NZ IB Platform enabled clients to trade in shares, warrants, foreign exchange,
equity and index options, futures,
options on futures, mutual funds and CFDs on
shares. Clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ could also transfer stocks onto the
IB
AU and IB NZ Platforms from other sharebrokers.
- [36] The MT4
platform enabled clients to trade in foreign exchange and CFDs on shares,
indices, metals and commodities. The MT5 platform
enabled clients to trade in
shares, foreign exchange and CFDs on shares, indices, metals and
commodities.
- [37] The Saxo
platform enabled clients to trade in stocks, futures, foreign exchange
derivatives and CFDs. On 30 June 2016, Saxo terminated
its agreement with
Halifax AU to provide access to the Saxo platform. Following that termination,
the majority of clients on the
Saxo platform were migrated to the MT5
platform.
Closing out – operation of investments
- [38] Since
23 November 2018 the administrators (and subsequently the liquidators) have
permitted clients to close out open positions
or to sell or realise investments
in financial products but clients have not been able to enter any new
transactions or trades.
The relationships: Halifax NZ and its clients
- [39] Halifax
NZ and its clients generally entered Client Service Agreements (CSAs).10 The standard CSA contained
the following relevant clauses:
- Appointment
- The
Client appoints Halifax NZ as its agent to:
- enter
into the Transactions on behalf of the Client;
- do all things reasonably necessary to perform the
Transactions; and
- do
all things reasonably incidental to the performance of the
Transactions.
- [40] Transaction
is defined as:
... means trading in the Financial Products described in the
Client Details Form and such other Financial Products as may be agreed
... from
time to time.
...
6 Trusts and Segregated Accounts
...
- All
money and property deposited by the Client with Halifax NZ, or received by
Halifax NZ on behalf of the Client, will, if required
by law, be deposited in a
trust account or client segregated account by Halifax NZ and held in accordance
with applicable legal requirements.
- any
deposit into a client segregated account does not fully protect the
Client’s money and property from the risk of Loss due
to a default not
caused by the Client.
- If
the Client’s money and property is placed in a client segregated account,
it may be co-mingled with the money and property
of other Halifax NZ clients or
also with the money and property of other clients of Halifax NZ’s
counterparties and agents.
...
10 There are at least two
editions of the CSA, one dated 1 May 2015 and the other 8 July 2018. The above
clauses are taken from the CSA
entered by the Whitehead Interests on 11 April
2016. The later version (8 July 2018) is similarly worded in relevant
respects.
- [41] Clients of
both Halifax AU and Halifax NZ were able to trade on all of the platforms
regardless of whether they had executed
a Client Service Agreement (CSA)
although it was necessary for the client to first have an account set up and
funded in connection
with the relevant platform to be able to
trade.
- [42] Halifax NZ
also issued Product Disclosure Statements (PDS) and accompanying schedules from
time to time through the Halifax NZ
website in relation to derivative products.
PDS were issued by Halifax NZ on 26 May 2015 for CFDs, Exchange Traded Option
Contracts,
Future Contracts and Futures Option Contracts, and for Margin Foreign
Exchange, and Foreign Exchange Options.11
- [43] The PDS
included the following terms:
1.1 What is this?
This is a product disclosure statement (PDS) for
Contracts for Difference (CFD) provided by Halifax New Zealand Limited
(Halifax, we, our, us). CFDs are derivatives, which are contracts between
you and Halifax that may require you (client) or Halifax to make payment
or deliver on the CFDs underlying index, equity, commodity, financial product,
or other asset (as the
case may be). The value of the contract will depend on
the price or value of the underlying index, equity, commodity, financial
product,
or other asset. The contract specifies the terms on which those
payments and deliveries are to be made.
...
2.1 What is a CFD?
A CFD is an agreement between you and Halifax to pay the other
the difference arising from movements in the value of an Underlying
Product,
without either party having to actually own the Underlying Product.
A CFD is an OTC derivative product. This means that CFDs are
created and traded off-market between you and Halifax rather than being
traded
on an exchange, such as a stock exchange or futures exchange.
...
- How
Halifax treats funds and property received from you
- 5.1 How we
treat your money
Amounts you pay to us are deposited into the Client Trust
Accounts that we maintain. The Client Trust Accounts are held with ANZ Bank
New
Zealand.
- Other
versions of the PDS for CFDs and Margin Foreign Exchange and Foreign Exchange
Options were issued on 30 June 2016.
This means that client funds
(and property) transferred to us through the Trading Platforms are held on
trust. Funds we receive are
not available to pay any liability of ours,
including general creditors in the event of our receivership or liquidation.
Any funds of yours required to meet Margin Requirements,
including any fees and charges you incur, will be deducted from the Client
Trust
Account and paid directly to us.
For money deposited in the Client Trust Account, you should be
aware that:
- individual
client accounts are not separated from each other;
- all
clients’ funds are co-mingled into the one account;
and
- the
client money provisions may not protect any funds of yours if the
Trust
Halifax is entitled to retain all interest earned on the money
held in the Client Trust Accounts.
The relationships: Halifax NZ and IB
- [44] The
relevant agreements between Halifax NZ and IB included:
(a) IB Institutional Services Customer Agreement dated 18
November 2014;
(b) IB Consolidated Account Clearing Agreement dated 25 November
2014;
(c) IB Fully Disclosed Clearing Agreement dated 15 February
2015.
- [45] Similar
agreements were concluded between Halifax AU and IB on 18 June 2007 and 29 July
2010.12
- [46] There was
also an agreement dated 19 January 2017 between Halifax NZ and Interactive
Brokers (UK) Limited which governed certain
products offered on the IB NZ
platform.
- In
relation to both the Consolidated Account Clearing Agreement and Fully Disclosed
Clearing Agreement.
- [47] The IB
Institutional Services Customer Agreement licensed the customer (Halifax NZ) to
use IB software.
- [48] The IB
Consolidated Account Clearing Agreement dated on 25 November 2014 included the
following clauses:
(a) “WHEREAS, [Halifax NZ] “desires to maintain ...
consolidated accounts ... with [IB] through which it will effect transactions
in
specified investment products on behalf of [Halifax NZ] Customers
...”;
(b) the Consolidated Account would be “carried in the name
of [Halifax NZ] and [Halifax NZ] shall effect all transactions to
be executed
and cleared by [IB] for [Halifax NZ] through the Consolidated Account. [Halifax
NZ] shall be solely responsible for all
aspects of the acceptance and handling
of the individual accounts of the Customers of [Halifax NZ] whose transactions
are effected
through the Consolidated Account ..., the acceptance and handling
of all orders submitted by [Halifax NZ’s] Customers ...”;
13
(c) Halifax NZ “may accept orders of its Customers and
submit such orders to [IB], or [Halifax NZ] may provide its Customers
with a
mechanism to submit such orders themselves electronically directly to [IB];
(d) IB “shall receive and execute orders” and clear
executed transactions for [Halifax NZ] through the Consolidated Account;
(e) [Halifax NZ] “shall be solely responsible for
maintaining required books and records in connection with all [Halifax NZ]
Customer Accounts and transactions contemplated by this Agreement or involving
[Halifax NZ] Customers ...”;
13 This was known as the
“White Label” agreement.
(f) Halifax NZ acknowledged that a “separate account[s] that may be
used to hold any proprietary funds and positions of [Halifax
NZ] will not be
treated as customer accounts” for certain regulatory purposes; (referred
to by witnesses as the IB NZ Prop
Account);
(g) IB would “establish Sub-Accounts of the [Halifax NZ]
Consolidated Account” (with each Sub-Account to be used for trading
of the
[Halifax NZ] Customer Account and the single Master Sub-Account to be used to
hold any proprietary funds and positions of
[Halifax NZ];
(h) IB granted to Halifax NZ a non-exclusive and
non-transferrable licence to use IB’s proprietary software to communicate
with
the Interactive system;
(i) when a customer order was entered into the Interactive
system and transmitted for execution (e.g. to an exchanges electronic system)
the identity of IB’s customer was anonymous.
- [49] The IB
Consolidated Account Clearing Agreement also provided for the payment of
commissions and fees payable to IB.
- [50] IB
separately contracted with BNP Parabas Securities Services (BNP) for the
provision to IB of, amongst other things, custodial
services.14
The relationships: Halifax AU and Halifax NZ
- [51] On
1 July 2013, Halifax AU and Halifax NZ entered a Clearing and Settlement Program
Agreement. Pursuant to that Agreement Halifax
NZ agreed to act as a referral
source for the purpose of introducing and referring prospective clients to
Halifax AU for the purpose
of financial products trading. Halifax NZ agreed to
ensure that all introduced clients received Halifax AU’s Financial
Services
Guide and Halifax AU’s PDS prior to executing the account
application.15 In return
Halifax AU agreed to pay
- Local
Document Australia and New Zealand dated 8 August 2016 between BNP and IB
Australia Pty Ltd and IB Australia Nominees Pty
Ltd.
15 Clause 3A(g).
Halifax NZ a fee in respect of the introduced clients in accordance with an
agreed schedule.
- [52] Following
Halifax AU’s purchase of a controlling interest in Halifax NZ, the
treasury and finance operations of Halifax
NZ were carried out by Halifax AU. In
particular, the treasury functions carried out included:
(a) conducting a daily review of the bank accounts of Halifax AU
and Halifax NZ for the purpose of identifying and allocating deposits
made by
clients;
(b) causing deposited funds to be transferred to the appropriate
bank account relating to the specific trading platform used by the
client;
(c) causing a client’s account on a relevant trading
platform to be credited with an amount reflecting the funds deposited by
the
client so that the client could commence trading;
(d) actioning redemption requests from clients of Halifax AU or
Halifax NZ, meaning requests to transfer funds from accounts held
with Halifax
NZ or Halifax AU to external accounts nominated by clients;
(e) attending to transfers of funds as requested by Jeff Worboys
and Matthew Barnett, the former directors of Halifax AU; and
(f) attending to periodic internal and external reporting
requirements.
- [53] Halifax
AU’s support of Halifax NZ was reflected in their respective staff
numbers. Immediately prior to administration,
Halifax AU had 16 employees while
Halifax NZ had only four, all of whom were predominantly sales
focussed.
The Trust relationship
- [54] All
parties accept that the investments and cash in bank accounts are held on trust
by the applicants.16
However, they differ as to the precise nature and extent of the
obligations under the trusts. The trusts arise variously by imposition
by
statute or regulation, under the terms of the contractual arrangements or by the
practical dealing between the parties.
- [55] Separate
statutory and regulatory provisions apply in both jurisdictions. As noted,
Halifax NZ was a broker. Section 77P of the
Financial Advisers Act 2008 (FAA)
provides that:
(1) A broker who receives client money or client property, in
his, her or its capacity as a broker for a client, –
(a) must hold the client money or client property, or ensure the
client money or property is held, on trust for the client; .....
- [56] Client
money and client property are defined in s 77B(2) of the FAA. Client money means
money received from, or on account of,
a client in connection with acquiring,
holding or disposing of a financial product, or otherwise in connection with a
financial product.
Client property means a financial product, a beneficial
interest in a financial product or received in connection with a financial
product received from, or on account of, a client. Financial product is defined
in s 5 of the FAA and, via the definition of financial
product in the Financial
Markets Conduct Act 2013 (FMCA), includes equity securities. In short, all
moneys paid into Halifax NZ in
respect of share trading and all shares acquired
by Halifax NZ on behalf of clients fell within the s 77P FAA
Trust.
- [57] However, as
noted, in addition to facilitating the purchase of shares Halifax NZ also
enabled its clients to purchase derivatives
by facilitating investment in
derivative products through Halifax AU. While the definition of financial
product in s 7 of the FMCA
Act includes derivatives, s 77C(1)(d) of the FAA
excludes from the definition of a broking service under that Act a person
providing
a relevant service in
16 Some of the funds held
include commission and fees payable to Halifax AU and Halifax NZ and interest
earned on funds in client deposit
accounts. The client investors’ claims
to such money falls outside the directions sought by the applicants in these
proceedings.
the course of acting as a derivatives issuer under a licence pursuant to Part
6 of the FMCA. So, money paid to Halifax NZ in its capacity as a derivatives
issuer fell outside the scope of the s 77P FAA Trust. Nevertheless,
regs 240 to
243 of the FMCR, read with the definition of derivatives investor money in reg
239, have the effect that all money paid
to Halifax NZ in the nature of margin
payments, all proceeds of the closing out of any such positions and all money
deposited but
not yet invested were required to be held by Halifax NZ on trust
pursuant to reg 240 and were to be paid into a trust account: reg
241. The only
exclusions were charges, fees, and other amounts payable as the price for making
the investments, together with interest
payments.
- [58] The
appointment of administrators to Halifax NZ on 27 November 2018 constituted an
insolvency event for the purposes of reg 246
of the FMCR. As a result, the
following was subject to a single trust in favour of all clients on behalf of
whom the money was held:
(a) derivatives investor money, and derivatives investor
property (as defined in the FMCR);
(b) money or property held by a hedging counterparty on behalf
of the derivatives issuer as a result of the use of derivatives, investor
money,
or derivatives, investor property in authorising hedging activities; and
(c) any obligations owed by a hedging counterparty to the
derivatives issuer that have arisen from the use of derivatives investor
money
or derivatives investor property.
- [59] As noted,
on 18 September 2019 the FMA appointed Mr Kelly and Mr Quinlan as trustees of
the single trust created by reg 246.
- [60] As Halifax
NZ facilitated investment by its clients on the MT4 and MT5 platforms through
Halifax AU, it also met the definition
of a derivatives issuer within s 6 of the
FMCA. As such, Halifax AU was required to hold the money (and property) in
relation to
such derivative investments on trust and, following the liquidation,
reg
246 would apply to it also. Accordingly, some of the assets held by Halifax AU
would also be held pursuant to the trusts under the
provisions of the FMCR.
- [61] In any
event, if the money were not held on such a trust by Halifax AU, it would be
held pursuant to the statutory trusts under
s 981H of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth).
- [62] As noted,
apart from those statutory and regulatory trusts, the contractual relationship
recorded in the CSAs and the PDSs and
the dealings between Halifax NZ and its
clients established Halifax NZ as trustee of moneys and other property on behalf
of clients.
- [63] In
conclusion, on one or more of the above bases, all money or property paid to or
held by Halifax NZ (apart from charges, fees
and interest due to Halifax by
contract) was held by Halifax NZ on trust for its clients.
A single deficient mixed fund
- [64] As
noted, the total value of assets held for the clients of Halifax AU and Halifax
NZ when the applicants were appointed administrators
was approximately AUD 192.6
million. There was a deficiency of approximately AUD 19 million between the
aggregate value of the assets
recorded as being held in the client accounts of
Halifax AU and Halifax NZ and the value of assets actually held. However, that
sum
was partly offset by an amount of money held in the corporate bank accounts
and term deposits in the name of Halifax AU. The client
moneys’ shortage
was approximately AUD 15.471 million.17
- [65] Although
the assets held (shares, options and warranties) have increased since the date
of administration so that the aggregate
balance of investor accounts was, as
at
31 July 2020, just under AUD 265 million, the costs of the administration, the
liquidation, and the litigation have also increased
so that there was a
shortfall in client funds as at 31 July 2020 of just over AUD 53 million.
17 Outline of
liquidators’/trustees’ submissions at 44.
- [66] With the
exception of the Whitehead Interests (and while in some cases arguing for an in
specie distribution, or in the case
of the Category 3 and Category 5 clients,
that their investments were not purchased from the deficient mixed fund), the
remaining
respondents accept that the funds of Halifax NZ were mixed with the
funds of Halifax AU. Their position is that there is effectively
a single
deficient mixed fund comprising shares and other investments as well as money in
bank accounts held between the two entities.
- [67] The
Whitehead Interests do not accept the characterisation of the investments and
funds held by Halifax NZ and Halifax AU as
being a single deficient mixed
fund.
- [68] The
Whitehead Interests accept that Halifax AU and Halifax NZ were trustees and/or
custodians of money and investments held for
the various clients. However, they
argue that where the shareholdings are identified in the segregated client
accounts on the IB
platforms, they should not be considered as part of a single
deficient mixed fund.
- [69] The
Whitehead Interests make the point they did not trade on the MT4 or MT5
platforms. They argue that their holdings, as recorded
in the segregated IB
client accounts, were acquired as a result of purchases arranged or directed by
Mr Whitehead and in respect
of which the Whitehead Interests had provided
valuable consideration by depositing money to the Halifax NZ client trust
account prior
to or at the time of acquisition. They argue their holdings are
separately identifiable and traceable.
- [70] Given the
arguments raised by the Whitehead Interests, it is necessary to determine
whether the funds (shares and other property,
including money) held by Halifax
AU and Halifax NZ constitute a single deficient mixed
fund.
- [71] At the
outset, it is important to acknowledge the factual complexities in this case
caused by the numerous bank accounts and
the various trading platforms used by
Halifax AU and Halifax NZ. This is not the case of a trustee operating a single
bank account.
As at 23 November 2018 Halifax AU had funds in 27 bank accounts
(including IB and MT4 and MT5 accounts), funds with two hedging providers
and
with five merchant providers and at least six accounts with IB. Halifax NZ had
funds in eight bank accounts and held a further six
IB accounts.
- [72] Clients in
Halifax NZ deposited money into a variety of bank accounts, including the ANZ
Halifax NZ dollar account, the IB suspense
account with Bankwest in AUD and NAB
foreign currency accounts or the Halifax Pro-Suspense account also with Bankwest
and in AUD.
- [73] The
applicant’s evidence establishes that, where a Halifax NZ client deposited
funds into one of the Halifax NZ dollar
accounts, the Halifax IB suspense
account in Australia or one of the foreign currency sub-accounts then, once the
funds had been
identified and cleared, on the instructions of Halifax treasury,
the client’s account or sub-account on the IB Platform would
be credited
and a corresponding debit would be made in the Halifax master account on the
platform.
- [74] The
principal evidence regarding the flow of funds between the various accounts is
contained in Mr Kelly’s affidavits of
26 June 2019 and 22 June 2020 as
corrected and clarified in his subsequent affidavit of 20 October 2020.18
- [75] Mr
Kelly’s evidence confirms the following processes
applied:
(a) Clients who invested on the IB NZ Platform deposited money
into the ANZ Halifax NZ account (which was expressly designated as
a trust
account) or into a range of ANZ foreign currency accounts (in the name of
Halifax NZ – again expressly designated as
trust accounts). The deposits
into the ANZ Halifax NZ account were in NZD and the deposits with the latter
accounts were made in
a range of foreign currencies. The ANZ foreign currency
accounts were not commonly used. Where IB NZ clients wished to make deposits
in
foreign currencies, they were encouraged to make their deposits into one of the
NAB foreign currency accounts operated by Halifax
AU.
18 A flow chart showing the
flows of money in general terms is attached marked ‘A’.
(b) IB NZ clients were also able to deposit funds into the IB Suspense
Account, the Merchant Account, the Halifax Pro-Suspense Account
and were
encouraged to use the NAB foreign currency accounts.
(c) MT4 and MT5 clients who signed a CSA with Halifax NZ
deposited funds into either the Halifax Pro-Suspense Account, the Merchant
Account, or into a NAB foreign currency account. In some instances, clients on
the MT4 or MT5 Platforms also deposited money into
the IB Suspense Account or
directly into the ANZ Halifax NZ account.
(d) In order for the client account to be credited there needed
to be sufficient funds deposited by Halifax NZ in one of the IB named
bank
accounts and recorded in the IB NZ master account. To achieve this Halifax NZ,
like Halifax AU, maintained a surplus “buffer”
of funds with IB.
This enabled Halifax NZ to credit client accounts on the IB Platform immediately
on receipt of the deposit rather
than waiting 24 to 48 hours for a transfer from
Halifax NZ to IB to appear in the relevant account as cleared funds. To achieve
this,
funds were regularly transferred from the ANZ Halifax NZ account to IB as
required to maintain the buffer.
(e) An examination of the Halifax NZ business records (which Mr
Kelly has reviewed and approved) also discloses that some payments
were made for
the benefit of Halifax NZ rather than for the benefit of its clients. In the
case of Halifax NZ, for instance, legal
fees were paid from the ANZ Halifax NZ
account. However, most such unauthorised payments made in that way were for the
benefit of
Halifax AU.
(f) Some payments were made to clients at their request.
(g) There were also some transfers to Invast and Gain for the
purpose of hedging foreign currency and other derivative transactions
entered
into between the clients and Halifax NZ on the MT4 and MT5 platforms. This
occurred automatically by way of a bridge.
(h) There were also transfers to HSBC foreign currency accounts in the name
of IB to ensure foreign currency held by IB in the name
of Halifax NZ was
maintained at a level required by IB. From time to time, Halifax treasury would
notify IB they wanted to make a
deposit and IB would provide an account number
for the deposit.
(i) There was a regular flow of funds from the ANZ Halifax NZ
account to the NAB New Zealand dollar account.
- [76] Importantly,
clients of Halifax AU or Halifax NZ did not deposit funds directly with IB. The
provision of funds by a client to
a Halifax bank account did not give rise to a
corresponding deposit to an IB account. Deposits from Halifax AU or Halifax NZ
bank
accounts were only made to IB on an as needed basis when the balance of
funds with IB had fallen below a level (the buffer) that
Halifax treasury
considered necessary to fund potential future
transactions.
- [77] From time
to time and as required, Halifax AU and Halifax NZ made the buffer payments by
transferring funds from bank accounts
held by those companies to the IB bank
account to ensure Halifax AU and Halifax NZ had sufficient funds deposited with
IB so their
clients could trade through the credit recorded in their accounts
with IB.
- [78] Further,
when clients realised open positions on the IB AU or IB NZ platforms, their
account with IB recorded a credit. The moneys
from such realisations generally
remained in the relevant IB AU or IB NZ bank account and were effectively
available as retained
proceeds to enable further trading, not only by the
clients who had realised their investments but also by other clients. The
retention
of the moneys effectively meant either a lesser buffer payment would
be required, or more time could pass before a further buffer
payment would be
necessary.
- [79] Mr Kelly
confirmed that a review, as at the date of the administration, of 30,000 plus
transactions and accounts operated by
the Halifax Group had determined there was
no pattern behind the transfer of funds. There was no direct link between
investments
and individual client deposits. Clients were able to trade using
the
commingled pool of funds deposited by other clients before their own funds were
cleared.
- [80] Mr Kelly
confirmed that the MT4 and MT5 Platforms operated in the same way. Funds were
deposited to ensure there was sufficient
credit to allow the transactions to
occur. Again, if a client deposited funds for the purposes of investing through
the MT4 or MT5
platform the funds could have gone into any account. If in New
Zealand dollars it would have been deposited to the Halifax ANZ New
Zealand
dollar account or possibly to one of the foreign currency accounts operated by
Halifax in Australia.
- [81] The other
assets held by Halifax NZ for clients were contractual rights and derivative
products such as options, warrants and
the rights resulting from trades placed
by Halifax NZ with Invast or Gain to hedge the exposure of the Halifax NZ to
clients under
a range of foreign exchange contracts or index CFDs entered into
by clients (known as A book clients).
- [82] The IB AU
Prop account was a sub-account of the master account. It recorded share
transactions on the MT5 Platform and it was
also where commissions and other
moneys payable to Halifax AU were aggregated.
- [83] Shares held
in the IB NZ Prop account were held for the purpose of hedging against trades on
the MT5 Trading Platform. The assets
were held on behalf of Halifax NZ rather
than the individual client. The shares were purchased to hedge exposure to CFDs.
Halifax
NZ acquired the shares out of trust funds. The shares were accordingly
subject to an equitable charge in favour of the relevant clients.
The legal
interest was held on behalf of Halifax NZ (which was purporting to transact on
its own behalf) but the beneficial interest
was subject to the equitable
charge.
- [84] Mr
Kelly’s evidence focused primarily on the period from January 2016 to 23
November 2018 as the records predating January
2016 were incomplete. In that
period
(January 2016 to 23 November 2018) the following amounts were paid into the IB
AU master account:19
(a) net payments of AUD 28.3 million flowed from the IB
allocated account;
(b) payments totalling approximately AUD 900,000 were
transferred from the Halifax Pro Allocated account (funds deposited by MT4
clients
and MT5 clients);
(c) net payments of approximately AUD 3.2 million flowed from
the ANZ HNZ dollar account (funds deposited by Halifax NZ clients);
and
(d) funds of approximately AUD 5.4 million were transferred from
various foreign currency accounts.
- [85] During the
same period, the following amount were paid into the IB NZ master
account:
(a) net payments of AUD 17.5 million flowed from the IB
allocated account;
(b) payments totalling approximately AUD 1.5 million were
transferred from the Halifax Pro Allocated account (funds deposited by MT4
clients and MT5 clients);
(c) net payments of approximately AUD 19.8 million flowed from
the ANZ HNZ account; and
(d) funds of approximately AUD 22.1 million were transferred
from the foreign currency accounts.
- A
flowchart showing the typical application of credits to clients’
sub-accounts on the IB Platform and client accounts on the
MT4 and MT5 is
attached marked ‘B’.
- [86] While the
primary focus was on the period after January 2016, Mr Kelly confirmed the bank
accounts of Halifax AU were commingled
with each other from the latest by
December 2011. From 29 June 2015 the accounts were also commingled with the ANZ
Halifax NZ account.20
- [87] Further, on
Mr Kelly’s evidence there had also been significant transfers of funds
between Halifax AU accounts and Halifax
NZ accounts between 29 June 2015 and 23
November 2015. The following transactions took place during that
time:
(a) NZD 8,139,247 was transferred from the ANZ HNZ account to
the NAB company account;
(b) NZD 350,000 was transferred from the ANZ HNZ account to
various foreign currency accounts; and
(c) NZD 2,114,724 was transferred from Halifax’s AU NAB
NZD account to the ANZ HNZ account.
- [88] Mr
Kelly’s evidence confirms the extent of the admixture of clients’
funds with other clients’ money and also
between Halifax NZ and Halifax
AU. Further, the funds flow memorandum prepared for and overseen by Ian
Sutherland, a director of
KPMG, also confirms the extent of the admixture. As a
specific example, $300,000 was transferred in May 2018 from the ANZ Halifax
NZ
account to the IB account.
- [89] Apart from
the funds flow memorandum, Mr Sutherland also carried out a
“tracing” exercise in relation to a sample
of twenty clients of
Halifax AU and Halifax NZ and analysed the transactions undertaken by those
clients. With the exception of three
cases (where stock was transferred through
another broker and does not appear to have gone through the IB master account or
to have
involved any other Halifax group controlled commingled bank account),
the funds of the other 17 clients had all been commingled and
tracing was not
otherwise feasible.
20 A flowchart showing an
example of how the funds were co-mingled is attached marked ‘C’.
- [90] The
evidence satisfies the Court that there was a commingling of client funds
through various bank accounts operated by Halifax
NZ itself and also a
commingling of funds (both of its clients and its own) between various bank
accounts of Halifax NZ and Halifax
AU.
- [91] Those
commingled funds were then used to purchase the shares and other investments
held for Halifax NZ’s clients. As the
shares, other investments and bank
accounts are insufficient to meet all clients’ entitlements, there is a
single deficient
mixed fund.
The Whitehead Interests’ case
- [92] The
Whitehead Interests seek directions that their holdings are held by Halifax NZ
for their sole benefit. In the alternative,
they support an in specie
distribution as argued for by the first respondent.
- [93] The
Whitehead Interests argue that Halifax NZ only had authority to invest its
clients’ funds subject to the instructions
of those clients. The
investments on the IB Platforms were held by IB (or its nominee) as custodian of
the holdings recorded in the
segregated client accounts. The deposits by the
Whitehead Interests were not allocated to any other client’s segregated
client
account on the IB or other platforms. They say their holdings are
identifiable, distinct, and traceable. The relevant transactions
are
transactionally and causally linked to the deposits authorised by Mr Whitehead.
They are ultimately held by Halifax NZ for the
benefit of the Whitehead
Interests as distinct from the claims of other clients on the IB platform and
the clients who invested through
the MT4 and MT5
platforms.
- [94] The
Whitehead Interests make the following points to support their
argument:
(a) first, they argue that Mr Whitehead deposited money solely
to the Halifax NZ trust account. They say that money was applied to
purchase the
Whitehead Interests’ holdings;
(b) next, they note the separate legal entities of Halifax NZ
and Halifax AU; and
(c) they argue that, at the date of administration, Halifax NZ was not
insolvent so was in a position to satisfy its trust obligations
to the Whitehead
Interests. The Whitehead Interests held a personal bundle of rights in a solvent
company.
- [95] Ms Smith
submitted that the Whitehead Interest’s holdings were traceable from the
records held by Halifax NZ and the IB
segregated account. She referred to the
following passage from Sonray in support:21
[86] Of course, rateable
distribution is subject to an important qualification
— it does not apply if the claimants do not have equal claims:
French Caledonia at [176] and [185]. Put another way, it is necessary to
determine whether there should be differential treatment of claimants. That
question is determined on available evidence. Thus, if a claimant can establish
a remedy founded on tracing, the court will grant
relief founded on that
evidence because it permits it to reach a different conclusion in respect of
that claimant: French Caledonia at [178], [187] and [189].
- [96] Ms Smith
submitted there was no reason why the breach by Halifax AU of its obligations as
trustee should itself favour pooling,
if pooling was not otherwise
required.22 She argued there was a
principled basis to treat the Whitehead Interests
differently.
- [97] The
fundamental difficulty with the Whitehead Interests’ submission is that it
is based on the premise that if the individual
investments can be tracked
through the account records, and there is a balance or holding recorded to their
credit, they are entitled
to trace that holding or money. That proposition
however fails to acknowledge the evidence that the bank account into which the
Whitehead
Interests initially paid their moneys and which funds were transferred
to the IB accounts from time to time was tainted as part of
the deficient mixed
fund. The submissions for the Whitehead Interests fail to adequately take
account of the difference between the
various accounting records (such as the IB
Prop account for example) and the various bank accounts.
21 Georges (in his
capacity as joint and several liquidator of Sonray Capital Markets Pty Ltd (in
liq) v Seaborn International (as trustee
for the Seaborn Family Trust)
[2012] FCA 75, 288 ALR 240 [Sonray].
22 Re BBY Ltd (recs and mgrs apptd)
(in liq) (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 346, (2018) 363 ALR 492 [BBY (No 2)] at
[51].
- [98] The
Whitehead Interests’ case is that their money was used to purchase their
share investments through the IBNZ or IBAU
platforms as confirmed by the entry
in their segregated client accounts under those platforms. But Mr Kelly’s
evidence confirms
that the Whitehead Interests shares (just like other
clients’ shares) were purchased from admixed funds.
- [99] On this
point the case cannot be distinguished from Sonray. In Sonray, the
funds and assets were spread over a number of segregated accounts denominated in
various currencies with numerous shareholdings
and open trading positions held
by or with third party institutions. The trust funds and assets had been mixed.
The liquidators sought
a direction they were entitled to pool the balance of the
accounts into a single account for distribution. Gordon J noted:23
- [91] As
discussed at [48] above, there were at least 1049 defalcations which directly or
indirectly affected the funds held in the
ANZ AUD segregated account. Due to the
nature, number and frequency of the defalcations and the number and frequency of
legitimate
deposits, withdrawals, transfers, dealings and trading by Sonray
clients, officers and providers, that account cannot practically
or economically
be the subject of a cash tracing exercise.
- [92] When Sonray
client money from the ANZ AUD segregated account was transferred into other
segregated accounts, or was used for
trading by Sonray clients who had deposited
money into another segregated account for that purpose (the tainted
transactions), those
segregated accounts became “tainted” with both
the deficiency in the ANZ AUD segregated account and the equitable joint
charge
over, or the equitable tenancy in common in, the money transferred or the money
deposited but not used in the trading: see
[83] above. Those accounts share with
the ANZ AUD segregated account the character of being irreversibly deficient and
mixed and
too can no longer practically or economically be the subject of a cash
tracing exercise.
and then, importantly for present purposes:24
[214] The liquidators accepted that a Sonray client is
beneficially entitled to shares on a their sub-account on a trading platform
provided that the shares were not purchased with money that passed through a
tainted segregated account or the proceeds of shares
purchased with such money
and were not otherwise “connected with” a tainted transaction.
- [100] In BBY
(No 2), Brereton J approved the above reasoning and noted:25
23 Sonray, above n
21.
24 Sonray, above n 21.
25 BBY (No 2), above n 22, citing Sonray, above n 21.
[45] Sonray proceeds on the principle that “all contributors to
a deficient mixed fund hold an equitable charge over the entire fund and
its
traceable proceeds to the value of their contributions, subject to any dealings
and costs
... or are equitable tenants in common of the mixed fund as a whole,
including its traceable proceeds, and subject to such deductions”.
Thus a
person who deposits money in a trust account, whose money by reason of
subsequent transactions becomes mixed in a deficient
second trust account,
thereby acquires an equitable charge over all of the moneys in the second
account, and so can be said to be
“entitled” to money in the second
account. In Sonray, the transfers of client money from one segregated
account to others “tainted” the others with both the deficiency in
the first account and the equitable joint charge over, or the equitable tenancy
in common in, the money transferred; and because
they could no longer
practically or economically be the subject of a cash tracing exercise, they
could be regarded as irreversibly
deficient and mixed, and treated as one fund
and pooled.
- [101] While
mixing can provide a proper basis for pooling, where mixing is established it
does not necessarily mean pooling must follow.26 In the present case the ANZ
Halifax NZ account which the Whitehead Interests paid their monies into was
co-mingled with the NAB NZD
account which was itself a source of the deficiency.
Further, on 9 June 2015, money was transferred from the Saxo account (which
was
itself intermingled with the IB Allocated and Halifax Pro Allocated accounts) to
the ANZ Halifax NZ account. The evidence confirms
that all the Whitehead
deposits passed through the commingled ANZ Halifax NZ account after that date.
As Mr Whitehead confirmed,
the Whitehead Interests entered a client/broker
relationship with Halifax NZ in April 2016. The evidence confirms that the
Whitehead
Interests’ shares were purchased from admixed
funds.
- [102] While Ms
Smith is correct that the terms of the contracts Halifax AU and Halifax NZ had
with their respective clients are the
legal foundation of the relationship
between Halifax AU and Halifax NZ, they are not of themselves determinative of
this issue. Both
Halifax AU and Halifax NZ breached the terms of those
contracts. Halifax NZ was entitled to mix clients’ funds. What it was
not
entitled to do, and what it did, was to mix clients’ funds with its own
and also with the funds of clients of Halifax AU.
- [103] The
Whitehead Interests’ argument does rather beg the question whether their
purchases through the IB platforms were made
from a deficient mixed fund. The
IB
- BBY
(No 2), above n 22, at [46]; and
Re MF Global Australia Ltd (in liq) [2012] NSWSC 994, (2012) 267 FLR 27
[MF Global] at [47]–[49].
AU master account and IB NZ master account, which they rely on for the record of
their holdings, are ledgers rather than bank accounts.
As Mr Kelly explained,
the cash in the IB bank accounts transferred from the general Halifax NZ
accounts enabled the debits and credits
in the IB NZ master account (and from
time to time the IB AU master account) to the clients’ sub-accounts in
those ledgers
to take place. The buffer or credit that the relevant Halifax
entity had in its master account enabled IB to carry out the transaction
requested. There was, however, no cash flow directly associated with particular
entries in the ledger.
- [104] The
Whitehead Interests rely on the records which show their holdings and confirm
their separate interests. Ms Smith referred
to the prima facie validity of such
records as recognised in Re Registered Securities Ltd and Finnigan v
Yuan Fu Capital Markets Ltd (in liq).27
- [105] While in
the present case each client’s individual account records their holdings
there are not enough such holdings and
funds within the bank accounts into which
those funds were paid for every client to be paid out the holding or amounts
recorded to
their credit. If the Whitehead Interests’ argument was correct
then all parties who invested through the IB platform with Halifax
NZ would be
entitled to repayment in full but there are insufficient holdings and funds to
achieve that. The Whitehead Interests,
like other clients, have an equitable
charge over the entirety of the admixed fund represented by the holdings and
funds in the various
bank accounts, but do not have a separately identifiable
charge over any particular shares.
- [106] Ms Smith
submitted that the applicants’ appeared to argue for a collective right to
trace in answer to the Whitehead Interests
claim. While such a right may have
been recognised in Foskett v McKeown,28 it was said to be
“dubious” by Williams J in Re International Investment Unit
Trust29 and was rejected
on its facts by Clifford J in Priest v Ross Asset Management Ltd (in
liq).30
- Re
Registered Securities Ltd [1991] 1 NZLR 545 (HC); and Finnigan v Yuan Fu
Capital Markets Limited (in liq) [2013] NZHC
2899.
28 Foskett v McKeown
[2000] UKHL 29; [2001] 1 AC 102 (HL).
29 Re International Investment Unit
Trust [2005] 1 NZLR 270 (HC).
- Priest
v Ross Asset Management Ltd (in liq) [2016] NZHC 1803, (2016) NZCLC 98-046
at [159], [161]–[163], [166].
- [107] Ms Smith
mischaracterises the applicants’ argument as being for a collective right
to trace. The applicants do not argue
for a collective right to trace, rather
they rely on fact that the Whitehead Interests’ holdings (just as the
majority of other
clients’ holdings) were purchased, not from Whitehead
funds, but from moneys sourced from the deficient mixed fund (which involved
an
admixture of not only other clients’ money but also Halifax NZ’s
money). It is not a question of a collective right
to trace but rather it is a
recognition of the source of the funding for the Whitehead Interests’
investments.
- [108] The
Priests’ claim was quite different factually. Mr Priest had a close
relationship with Mr Ross and was himself a sharebroker
and financial adviser.
Much of Mr Priest’s trading was through his own firm. He used Ross Asset
Management (RAM) and Mr Ross
to trade in overseas markets he did not have access
to and also to hold the securities for him. Although Mr Ross and RAM were
involved
in a Ponzi scheme, the Priest holdings actually existed. Importantly,
as Clifford J made clear in Priest, the suggestion that all clients
acquired a proprietary right or claim in the Priest investments could not
succeed on the facts as
RAM (and its related entities) did not use other
clients’ money to acquire property for their own benefit, rather, they
acquired
bare title for the Priests as beneficial owners. As Clifford J
recognised, the Priest Holdings were not “part of a mixed fund
of the type
the courts have recognised, generally consisting of monies in a bank
account”.31 In the
present case the Whitehead Interests were purchased from such a mixed
fund.
- [109] While the
documentation is quite different, the present case is factually more similar to
that of Re Registered Securities Ltd.32 In that case some of the
mortgage investments had purportedly been allocated to specific clients but it
was not possible to trace
the clients’ funds into the mortgages allocated
to them for a variety of reasons, including that there was a deficiency in
the
trust accounts and clients’ funds were mixed and were used to pay
shortfalls in interest payments due to other clients.
No client could have a
right to property which did not belong to them. The liquidator’s evidence
was sufficient to displace
the “prima facie” validity of the
allocations to individual clients. The Court concluded that a division of assets
on
a contribution
31 Priest v Ross Asset
Management Ltd (in liq), above n 30,
at [15].
32 Re Registered Securities Ltd,
above n 27.
basis was the only rational mode of distribution. Similarly, in the present
case, the applicants’ evidence is sufficient to
displace the
“recorded” allocation of holdings in the Whitehead Interests’
names. The Whitehead Interests cannot
have a separate and individual right to
holdings acquired from the admixed fund, rather they have a shared right to an
interest in
all such holdings.
- [110] In further
reliance on Re BBY (No 2), Ms Smith referred to the following passage to
argue that, to the extent Halifax AU was in breach of trust, the trust fund was
restored
when the Whitehead Interest funds were cleared:33
[81] But
“mixture” can be a matter of degree, and is not necessarily
irreversible; it can sometimes be seen that the fund
B money sits for a short
time in fund A, as oil on water, and is then removed elsewhere. In such a case,
where fund A is in effect
merely a conduit or temporary repository before the
money reaches its ultimate destination (and particularly if fund A has disgorged
the money it received, back to fund C) it is difficult to see why fund B should
be regarded any longer as having contributed to fund
A, and the beneficial
interest of the fund A beneficiaries diminished on that account — although
that may be subject to qualification
depending on how long the money was
retained and the use made and benefit derived by fund A from the money while it
retained it.
- [111] But with
respect to that submission, Mr Leopold SC is correct in his response to it that
there was no challenge to Mr Kelly’s
evidence that it was the buffer
payments (and the retained realisations of closed out positions) rather than
deposits which enabled
trading. From before April 2016 (when the Whitehead
Interests made their first deposit) the Halifax NZ account was part of the
deficient
mixed fund. There was no evidence that from any particular point after
April 2016 the Halifax NZ account “disgorged’
the moneys it received
from the admixed funds so that it was entirely cleansed and made
whole.
- [112] Ms Smith
emphasised that these proceedings do not involve the liquidation of a single
entity. Halifax AU and Halifax NZ are
separate legal entities. She noted the
contractual relationship created by the CSA between Halifax NZ and its clients
and also that
the terms of the Clearing and Settlement Agreement confirmed
Halifax NZ was not the agent of Halifax AU. She submitted that there
was no
conjunctive or joint venture trading.
33 BBY (No 2), above
n 22.
- [113] Ms Smith
is correct in her submission that Halifax NZ is a separate entity from Halifax
AU. However, again, that does not address
the fundamental difficulty for the
Whitehead Interests of the established admixture of funds between the clients of
Halifax AU and
Halifax NZ (and an admixture of the Halifax entities’ funds
with clients’ funds) and that the holdings claimed by the
Whitehead
Interests as their property were purchased from such admixed
funds.
- [114] Ms Smith
next submitted that Halifax NZ was solvent as at the date of administration. Any
deficiency lay solely in Halifax AU
and apparently arose from its failure to
hedge all its derivative trades. She relied on aspects of the
administrator’s report
to creditors of 14 March 2019 to support her
submission that Halifax NZ was solvent. In particular, she relied on the
following note
from the report:
Our investigations to date indicate that Halifax NZ became
insolvent on or around 23 November 2018, being the date from which Halifax
AU
was unable to continue to provide financial support.
Our preliminary investigations have revealed that the company
may not have traded while insolvent for a material time (if at all).
It is
likely the company became insolvent on or after 23 November 2018 being the date
administrators were appointed to Halifax AU
and the director immediately took
steps to appoint administrators to Halifax NZ.
- [116] Ms Smith
submitted that, but for the actions of Halifax AU, the Halifax NZ Trust held for
the benefit only of the Halifax NZ
IB platform clients would have been solvent
so that the assets held by Halifax NZ would have been refundable to Halifax NZ
IB clients
in their entirety.
- [117] There are
two principal difficulties with that submission. First, the statements as to the
solvency of Halifax NZ are somewhat
equivocal. In cross-examination, Mr
Kelly’s evidence about Halifax NZ’s solvency
was:
Q. So it – by definition of what a solvent or insolvent
company is, it was considered solvent, was it not?
A. It’s – it’s difficult to answer that
question. Because Halifax New Zealand was entirely dependent on Halifax
Australia for its income flows and for its revenue, the question remains as to
whether Halifax New Zealand was actually solvent because
of the insolvency
of
Halifax Australia. But the fact remains, as far as the director knew of
– as far as – sorry – as far as Mr Gibbs and the other two
directors whose names escape me at the moment would have
[known] the income
flows from Halifax Australia were sufficient to allow the Halifax New Zealand
operation to pay its debts as and
when they fell due. When those weren’t
sufficient, the Halifax expenses would have been paid out of client moneys. So
it’s
an open [question] as to Halifax New Zealand was in fact solvent or
[insolvent], but the directors certainly considered that it was
based on what
they knew.
...
Jeff Worboys, the Australian director – he was director of
both – would’ve had a different point of view.
- [118] As Mr
Gooley pointed out in closing submissions, read as a whole, the report to
creditors actually supports the suggestion that
Halifax NZ was insolvent as at
23 November principally because the company was obviously dependent on Halifax
AU for support and
funding to continue to operate. Halifax NZ could not meet the
test of solvency as at that date. It was not able to pay its debts
as they fell
due from money available to it. It was dependent on funding and support from
Halifax AU. At all material times Mr Worboys
was a director of Halifax NZ. The
company is fixed with his knowledge that Halifax NZ was dependent on support
from Halifax AU to
continue operating.
- [119] The other
problem with Ms Smith’s submission is that it again overlooks the
fundamental difficulty that the Whitehead
Interests’ holdings were
purchased using funds from the deficient mixed fund. On their transfer into
Halifax NZ the funds from
Halifax AU were already subject to other obligations,
including to other clients. They were not funds Halifax NZ could lawfully apply
for its own purposes or for the sole benefit of any particular Halifax NZ
client. The fact there were different platforms is of no
moment. The issue
remained how the funds flowed through the various bank
accounts.
- [120] For the
above reasons the claim by the Whitehead Interests to be in a special and
different position to that of other clients,
both in Halifax NZ and Halifax AU
must fail.
- [121] In the
alternative, Ms Smith supported Mr Hyde’s submission for a form of in
specie distribution. She submitted pooling
could not be regarded as a
principled
response when some clients had chosen to close out, while others had retained
open positions. To pool in those circumstances would
amount to an unprincipled
windfall to some. I deal with the reasons for rejecting that submission in the
context of considering Mr
Hyde’s case for the first respondent.
Category 3 investors
- [122] Mr
Hingston is the representative of the Category 3 clients, namely all clients of
Halifax AU and Halifax NZ who transferred
shares into Halifax’s trader
workstation platform (the IB platform) from another stockbroker and have not
traded in those shares.
- [123] On 19
March 2018 Mr Hingston transferred [redacted] shares in Altium Limited, which he
owned, into an IB client sub-account
on the Halifax AU trader workstation. The
shares were not derived from any deficient mixed fund nor were any funds from
bank accounts
held by Halifax AU or Halifax NZ used to acquire the shares. The
shares were transferred directly from Computershare to interactive
brokers
CHESSHIN and from there to a securities account at BNP in the name of IB
Nominees Pty Ltd (the BNP account). Through a series
of contractual arrangements
BNP holds the Altium shares on trust for IB Australia which in turn holds its
interest on trust for IBLLC,
which acts as agent for Halifax AU in relation to
the Altium shares. Halifax AU holds the shares as agent for Mr Hingston under
the
CSA.
- [124] Between 19
March and the administration date, Mr Hingston sold [redacted] Altium shares.
During the same period a limited number
of other clients also sold Altium shares
from the BNP account.
- [125] As at the
date of administration the BNP account had a total of [redacted] shares
including [redacted] recorded as held for
Mr Hingston, being the balance of
Altium shares that he transferred from Computershare on 19 March 2018 and which
had not been traded.
- [126] On behalf
of Mr Hingston (and other Category 3 shareholders in the same position in
relation to other shareholdings transferred
in and not traded),34 Ms Whittaker SC submitted
the balance of the shares transferred to the BNP account from Computershare, and
which had not been traded,
were traceable into an equivalent number of Altium
shares now held in the BNP account. Mr Hingston had an equitable charge over the
contents of the account to that extent. Shares were available to satisfy that
charge, and they should be carved out rather than applied
as part of a general
pool to meet the indirect claims of other Halifax clients. She resisted the
suggestion that Mr Hingston’s
charge over the contents of the BNP account
should be rateably reduced.
- [127] The
applicants accept that the Category 3 clients’ shares never became part of
the mixed fund. They also accept that Halifax
client records and the former
activity statements make it possible to identify those clients who fall into
Category 3 and whose rights
in the shareholding introduced by them are
untainted.
- [128] For those
reasons, the applicants accept that the holdings of the Category 3 clients
should not be pooled, noting Brereton J’s
comments in Re BBY (No
2):35
[57] ... On the other hand, pooling may be inappropriate where
the trust ledger records provide a reliable factual foundation on which
to mould
relief, and mere difficulty in ascertaining entitlements to permit distribution
by single account may not suffice to justify
“pooling”, though that
would be influenced by the size of the estate, the number of claimants, and the
degree of difficulty.
- [129] The
applicants accept that in the case of the Category 3 respondents it is
practicable to give effect to their rights by appropriating
to them a specific
identifiable and severable part of the trust property, albeit they propose the
Category 3 clients pay the additional
cost associated with giving effect to
their rights.
- [130] A similar
approach was taken by Gordon J in Sonray.36 Gordon J accepted, without
criticism, the liquidator’s concession that a Sonray client was
beneficially entitled to shares on
the sub account on a trading platform
provided the shares had not
34 Eleven Category 3
investors (including Mr Hingston) have been identified to date.
35 BBY (No 2), above n 22, (footnote omitted).
36 Sonray, above n 21.
been purchased with money that had passed through a tainted segregated account,
and were not otherwise connected with a tainted transaction.
- [131] Mr Scruby
SC, representing the interests of the Category 4 clients, argued against the
case made for the third respondents.
He submitted that there was insufficient
evidence to determine, for any particular member of Category 3, whether or to
what extent
the shares could be identified so as to be able to exclude them from
part of the deficient mixed fund. The particular shares held
by Mr Hingston
could not be differentiated. Further, if the other Altium shares had been
purchased with deficient mixed funds then
those shares would effectively have
“infected” the overall shareholding of the Altium
shares.
- [132] Mr Scruby
submitted that in the absence of a sufficient explanation as to what happened to
the overall pool of shares between
the time the Category 3 clients transferred
shares to Halifax and the appointment date, it was not possible for the Category
3 clients
to sufficiently identify their interest in the shares to trace
them.
- [133] Mr Scruby
also relied on the case of Caron v Jahani (No 2) (Courtenay
House).37 He carefully and thoroughly
took the Court through the reasoning of Bell P in that case and submitted that
the lowest intermediate
balance rule should be applied. Any sales of shares of
the same type held by Category 3 clients would have to be treated as having
depleted the interest of the Category 3 clients in the same proportion either to
their interest in the mixed fungible fund of shares
or the interest of the
others entitled to the same shares.
- [134] While Mr
Scruby spent some time analysing the decision of Courtenay House, with
respect, that decision is not directly applicable to the Category 3 clients in
this case. While, as a matter of principle, the
Court can accept that the lowest
immediate balance rule is not confined in its application to money in a bank
account and can
37 Caron v Jahani in
their capacity as liquidators of Courtenay House Pty Ltd (in liq) and Courtenay
House Capital Trading Group Pty
Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 117, (2020)
382 ALR 158 [Courtenay House].
apply to other kinds of fungible funds,38 that does not address
whether the lowest intermediate balance rule is applicable on the facts of a
particular case.
- [135] Courtenay
House can be distinguished on its facts from the present case. First, the
issue in that case, as identified by Bell P, was:39
[9] ... how limited funds in a bank account are to be
distributed between investors whose funds were deposited into and co-mingled
in
that account over a number of years, ...
- [136] In
Courtenay House the Court was concerned with a single bank account and
cash. Here the Court is concerned with a single mixed fund, which is made up
of
a number of bank accounts, shares and other types of investments. Further, the
Courtenay House decision dealt with a Ponzi scheme and, relevantly, the
contest was between depositors who had made deposits prior to the date of
the
freezing orders and those who had made deposits after the orders. The later
depositors were also divided into those who had made
deposits before the
withdrawal of a sum of $60,000 and those who deposited after (whose latter
deposits could be identified). Bell
P concluded that the lowest intermediate
balance rule provided the fairest, most equitable and principled outcome in that
case. In
the context of a Ponzi scheme the application of the lowest
intermediate balance rule may be more appropriate (although it was not
applied
by Clifford J in Priest). But each case must turn on its on facts. As
Bathurst CJ noted in Courtenay House:40
[3] ....it is by no means
clear... that it would be appropriate to apply the lowest intermediate balance
method if the losses were
incurred in the course of legitimate trading pursuant
to the mandate given to Courtenay House ....
And:41
[5] Finally, the determination of distribution in accordance
with the lowest intermediate balance method may be of such complexity
that a
liquidator would be justified and entitled to distribute on a pari passu
basis.
38 Re Goldcorp Exchange
Ltd (in receivership) [1995] 1 AC 74 (PC); Re Global Finance Group Pty
Ltd (in liq) (supervisor apptd); Ex Parte Read (as liquidator of Global Mortgage
Investments Pty Ltd and
Global Finance Group Pty Ltd) [2002] WASC 63, (2002)
26 WAR 385 [Global Finance]; and Brady v Stapleton, [1952] HCA 62; (1952)
88 CLR 322.
39 Courtenay House, above n 37, at [9].
40 At [3].
41 At [5].
- [137] Ms
Whittaker accepted that, when transferred into the fungible mass in the BNP
account, the Altium shares became indistinguishable
from other shares held in
that account but she submitted that, at that time, Mr Hingston became entitled
to an interest in the equivalent
number of Altium shares from the BNP account.
She argued his interest could be traced into an “equitable
proprietary”
interest in an equivalent number of Altium shares held in the
BNP account. His interest was held by way of an equitable charge over
the whole
of the account valued as the extent of his interest (the remaining shares
recorded as held by him) in it.
- [138] In
Priest v Ross Asset Management Ltd Clifford J considered that a trust
could be declared over part of a pool of unnumbered, uncertified shares.42 Clifford J
noted:
- [178] Shares in
one company are, amongst themselves, fungible. This means that there is no way
to distinguish one share in a particular
company from other shares in that
company. A conceptual difficulty arises.
- [179] Assume
that, at the date of the acquisition by RAM/Dagger of shares comprising the
Priest Holdings-say shares in Company X-RAM
or Dagger already owned (for Other
Investors) shares in Company X. In that circumstance, a question of the
certainty of the subject
matter of the trust would arise. That is, for a trust
to come into existence the property which is the subject matter of the trust
must be able to be identified with certainty. If RAM or Dagger already held
shares in Company X for Other Investors, given that shares
in a particular
company are amongst themselves fungible, it could be argued it would not be
possible to identify which of the pool
of fungible shares was subject to the
trust in favour of the Priests, and which were subject to the trust in favour of
the Other
Investors. I am not attracted to that argument. Given the ubiquity of
decertificated shares, in my view it should be enough for a
given number of
those shares to be identified as having been earmarked for an investor for the
trusts, bare or otherwise, recognised
in managed funds to come into
existence.
- [139] In
Ellison v Sandini Pty Ltd Jagot J considered Clifford J’s reasoning
and similarly concluded that a trust can exist over a fungible pool of assets.43
- [140] In the
case of the Category 3 clients there are reliable records which enable the Court
to mould appropriate relief.44
The relief is not necessarily available to all holders of the Altium
shares. As Mr Scruby argued, some of those shares held by other
Altium investors
could have been purchased from tainted monies. But it is not the
fact
42 Priest v Ross Asset
Management Ltd, above n 30.
43 Ellison v Sandini Pty Ltd
[2018] FCAFC 44, (2018) 263 FCR 460 at [148].
44 See Re BBY (No 2), above n 22, at [57].
they are Altium shares which sets Mr Hingston’s holding apart. It is that
his holding itself (it could have been any other
shareholding) was not purchased
from a tainted fund but rather was transferred into Halifax AU from an untainted
source and, importantly,
remains untainted.
- [141] Mr
Scruby’s submissions overlook the evidence of Mr Kelly that it is possible
to identify the Category 3 clients’
interest in the shares. In his
affidavit of 22 June 2020, Mr Kelly accepted that shares transferred from an
external broker which
had not been traded could be traceable because the funds
used to acquire them had not passed through a commingled account. Clients
whose
holdings fell within Category 3 were identifiable from the transfers, open
positions, and trade sections of statements produced
in respect of the IB client
sub accounts. The transfers section of the client account statements showed
whether shares had been transferred
into the account, the date of any transfer,
the quantity and relevantly the method by which shares were transferred into an
IB AU
or IB NZ account.
- [142] Importantly,
the Category 3 shares were transferred to the IB AU Platform but were not
recorded in the IB AU Prop account and
so were unaffected by any discrepancy in
that account. They were recorded in the relevant IB AU client subaccount with
BNP.45 Mr Hingston can trace
his interest in the Altium shares transferred to Halifax AU by him and has a
direct proprietary right in those
shares or the balance remaining after his
sales.
- [143] The
feature of the Category 3 clients which distinguishes them is that their shares
were not acquired using funds from the deficient
mixed fund. Their shares were
transferred into Halifax AU or Halifax NZ from other brokers. In Mr
Hingston’s case, importantly,
while he has sold some and thus reduced his
holding, the original shares transferred in remain untainted. The issue is not,
as it
was in Courtenay House, the timing of the transactions, which was
central to the Court’s reasoning. Rather, the issue is the source of the
payment
for Mr Hingston’s Altium shares. The fund in issue in Courtenay
House was the bank account into which the deposits were made. It was
deficient. The Altium shares were not purchased from and never passed
through
the
45 Mr Kelly’s
affidavit, dated 24 November 2020, at 22.
deficient mixed bank accounts in the present case. They were untainted and were
held from the outset by IB AU as custodian.
- [144] Finally, a
further answer to Mr Scruby’s submission that, if the remaining Altium
shares had been purchased using funds
from the deficient mixed fund the fungible
mass would be “infected”, is that there is no trustee default
involving Mr
Hingston’s shares. While he may have sold some of his
“untainted” shares, there are still sufficient Altium shares
available to meet his proportionate remaining interest. The Altium shareholding
was never a deficient fund.
- [145] There is
no principled reason to alter Mr Hingston’s “relatively clear
property interests ... [by] some notion of
common misfortune”.46 Mr Hingston (and other
Category 3 clients) are not in the same position as other clients whose holdings
were purchased using funds
from the deficient mixed fund.
- [146] For the
above reasons I accept the Category 3 shareholders are in a separate category
and their shareholdings do not form part
of the deficient mixed
fund.
- [147] In the
circumstances, I have not found it necessary to consider Ms Whittaker’s
alternative argument that if the third
respondent’s Altium shares in the
BNP account were to be pooled, a rateable, in specie, distribution of the Altium
shares equivalent
to his interest would still be appropriate particularly given
the tax considerations. Ms Whittaker’s submissions in relation
to the tax
consequences were supported by an expert report from Craig Stephens of BDO.47
- [148] I consider
it to be beyond the ambit of the applications before the Court to seek to
address the issue of the possible consequences
of the imposition of a capital
gains tax (CGT).
- [149] In any
event, for the reasons advanced by Mr Leopold for the applicants, there is a
good argument that an in specie distribution
would not avoid liability for
CGT.
46 BBY (No 2), above
n 22, at [83].
- On
this issue, Mr O’Hara, the nominated respondent also addressed the Court
on the possible consequences of the imposition of
a CGT.
The transfer of shares (in specie) would coincide with the extinguishment of an
equitable right, which would be the disposal of a
CGT asset.
Category 5 investors
- [150] During
the course of his closing submissions, Mr Munro sought to expand the class of
the Category 5 clients. Mr Munro suggested
the other relevant categories of
clients whose interests could be similar to those of the Category 5 clients
were:
(a) clients of Halifax AU or Halifax NZ who transferred shares
from another broker to the Saxo Platform and never traded in those
shares, which
shares were transferred from the Saxo Platform to the IB AU Platform or the IB
NZ Platform and were recorded in a client
account on the MT5, the IB AU Platform
or the IB NZ Platform;
(b) clients of Halifax NZ who purchased shares through the IB NZ
Platform prior to the date on which Halifax AU purchased a controlling
interest
in Halifax NZ and never traded in those shares;
(c) clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ who purchased shares
through the IB AU Platform, the IB NZ Platform or the MT5 Platform prior
to the
date of deficiency (as determined by the Courts) which shares were never
traded.
- [151] None of
the other parties opposed the expansion of the Category 5 class of clients in
the way Mr Munro proposed. While Ms Holmes
confirmed the applicants did not
oppose the amendment, she noted that, without evidence but on instruction, the
applicants considered
it was unlikely there would be very many clients who would
fall within the proposed additional categories. I grant leave to extend
the
classes of Category 5 clients as sought.
- [152] Mr Munro
argued that the Category 5 clients were in special position. They could not be
said to be subject to a common misfortune
and so their holdings
should
be excluded from any pari passu distribution. He noted that
in Re BBY Ltd (No 2)
Brereton J had cited with approval the comments of Black J in MF Global
that:48
[47] ... “the case law has recognised that, where there
are relatively clear property interests in particular property, this
cannot
‘be altered by reference to some notion of common misfortune’”
and that “accounts should only be pooled
... if mixing or another proper
basis for pooling is established”.
- [153] Ms Holmes
confirmed the applicants accepted that in principle the reasoning applicable to
the Category 3 clients would also
be applicable to the expanded Category 5
clients noted in paras (a) and (b) above. The relevant point is that the shares
of such
clients were, like the Category 3 clients, not purchased using moneys
from the admixed funds in the bank accounts of Halifax AU and/or
Halifax NZ but
were either transferred into Halifax AU and Halifax NZ whole or were purchased
before the funds of clients of Halifax
NZ became mixed with the deficient funds
of Halifax AU.
- [154] As Mr
Scruby pointed out, there may well be practical problems in identifying such
clients. Mr Lunn, a technical support officer
employed by Halifax AU who worked
in the online trading support team, gave evidence that on termination of the
SAXO platform there
were some issues in uploading the accounts onto the MT5
platform by Think Liquidity. For example, if an MT5 client account did not
record a cash balance Think Liquidity could not record shares in that account.
Sometimes not all financial products recorded in the
clients SAXO account were
taken across and recorded in the client’s MT5 account. Mr Kelly had also
noted a further practical
issue. He confirmed that the liquidators had
ascertained there were discrepancies in the share record recorded in the IB AU
prop
account when reconciled against the record in the individual client
accounts of the shares held by clients and the share CFDs held
by
them.
- [155] Those are
practical problems which, if necessary, the applicants can seek further
directions on. For present purposes, the important
point is that, in principle,
if there are clients whose transactions can be ascertained to fall into the
above expanded categories
then it seems reasonable that they should be treated
the same as the Category 3 clients. If it is impractical or not economically
feasible for the applicants
48 BBY (No 2), above
n 22, citing MF Global, above n
26, at [78].
to be able to confirm that individual clients come within that category then, as
noted, the applicants can seek further directions.
- [156] There are
two issues surrounding dates in relation to the expanded categories of the
Category 5 clients. The first is whether
the relevant date for those in the
extended Category 5(b) should be when Halifax AU purchased a controlling
interest in Halifax NZ
on 1 November 2013 or the earlier date when Halifax NZ
and Halifax AU entered the introducing broker agreement on 1 July
2013.
- [157] There is a
lack of evidence about Halifax NZ’s financial position prior to 1 July
2013. Mr Kelly confirmed in cross-examination
that the liquidators had not
investigated anything prior to the merger date with respect to the New Zealand
entity. He also accepted
that there was no evidence of either a client money
shortage or a trust deficiency in Halifax NZ prior to 1 July
2013.
- [158] The second
and principal issue in relation to the Category 5(c) clients is the date of
deficiency.
- [159] There are
two possible measures of the date of deficiency, either the date of the first
client money shortfall or the date of
the first trust deficiency. The difference
is that, in calculating the client money shortfall, funds held by Halifax AU and
Halifax
NZ in their own right are taken into account in calculating the
shortfall in accordance with the principle from Re Hallett’s case,
whereas the trust deficiency arises as soon as any money required to be held on
trust was used contrary to the trust.49 A trust deficiency will
generally arise at an earlier date before the client money
shortfall.
- [160] Mr Munro
argued that the first date of a client money shortfall was the appropriate
measure to apply. Not surprisingly, Mr Scruby
argued that the date of the first
trust deficiency was the appropriate date.
- [161] In support
of his argument that the client money shortfall date was the appropriate date,
Mr Munro referred to the cases of
Finnigan v Yuan Fu
Capital
49 Re Hallett’s
Estate [1880] UKLawRpCh 38; (1879) 13 ChD 696 (CA).
Markets Ltd (in liq), and Eaton v LDC Finance Ltd (in rec).50 Those cases confirmed the
application of the Re Hallett’s Estate principle, namely that where
trust money was mixed with the trustee’s personal money, the beneficiaries
of the Trust are entitled
to a charge on the property purchased. Applying the
principle to the present case, it would be assumed that Halifax AU and Halifax
NZ depleted their own monies first before accessing clients’ funds.
- [162] Mr Munro
submitted the “rough justice” referred to in the cases could be
tempered by relying on the best evidence.
On that basis, the best evidence was
that a client money shortage could not be said to have occurred prior to January
2016.
- [163] Mr Munro
submitted that prior to 1 January 2016, after taking into account all the funds
available to Halifax AU and Halifax
NZ, all clients could have been made
whole.
- [164] Mr Munro
noted that while Mr Sutherland considered a client moneys’ shortage of AUD
2,030,880 would have existed as at
June 2015 if a series of Term Deposits and
Trident Funds were excluded from assets available to Halifax AU and Halifax
NZ,51 it was only by January
2016 that a client moneys’ shortage of AUD 273,092 existed even if the
various term deposits were available
to Halifax AU and Halifax NZ. That client
moneys’ shortage increased to AUD 857,592 by June 2016, and AUD 5 million
by March
2017.
- [165] In arguing
for a general pooling of the assets held by the liquidators, including shares,
Mr Scruby submitted the appropriate
date to take as the date of deficiency was
the date of the first trust deficiency.
- [166] Mr Scruby
supported his argument by reference to the decision of Sonray.52
In
Sonray, Gordon J had confirmed that:53
- Finnigan
v Yuan Fu Capital Markets Limited (in liq), above n 27; and Eaton v LDC Finance Ltd (in
rec) [2012] NZHC 1105.
- For
example, on 9 June 2015 Halifax AU lent Halifax NZ NZD 1.2 million to satisfy
the requirements of its FSP’s
licence.
52 Sonray,
above n 21.
53 At [83]. References omitted.
... all contributors to a deficient mixed fund hold an equitable charge over
the entire fund and its traceable proceeds to the value
of the contributions,
subject to any dealings and costs or are equitable tenants in common of the
mixed fund as a whole, including
its traceable proceeds, and subject to such
deductions.
And then later, at [218], Gordon J held that as the transferred cash went
through a tainted segregated account, it was also tainted,
before concluding
that shares purchased with transferred cash or assets purchased with deficient
mixed client funds:54
... should be treated as
subject to the equitable charge or equitable tenancy in common in favour of all
contributors to the tainted
segregated accounts ...
- [167] The issue
is whether the shares of the Category 5(c) clients were tainted like other
shares acquired through the Halifax entities.
Whether they were tainted depends
on whether they were purchased from the deficient mixed fund. I agree with Mr
Scruby that logically
it follows that the relevant date and focus of the inquiry
must be when the first trust deficiency arose rather than when the first
client
money shortfall occurred.
- [168] While
acknowledging the evidence about when the deficiency first arose was imperfect,
Mr Scruby submitted it was sufficient
in the context of an application for
directions. Again, he made reference to Brereton J’s judgment in Re BBY
Ltd:55
(5) The
pragmatic nature of the jurisdiction means that neither strict proof of mixing
such as would entitle a beneficiary to an
equitable proprietary remedy, nor
absolute impossibility of tracing, is required; pooling may be directed where
the identification
and tracing of the interests of individual clients is not in
the circumstances of the particular case reasonably and economically
practical,
on the basis that it is reasonable in the circumstances that the funds be
regarded as irreversibly deficient and mixed.
And:56
(7) ... That requires the Court to form a view, if it can
— albeit an imprecise and impressionistic one — as to what
is
likely to be the extent of the interest of the beneficiaries ...
54 At [218].
55 BBY (No 2), above n 22, at [83].
56 At [83].
- [169] Mr Scruby
submitted that it was clear from Mr Sutherland’s “deficiency
affidavit” that there were a series
of trust defalcations over an extended
period of time involving large amounts of money. It could not be said at any
particular time
there was no trust deficiency in Halifax AU. Put another way, it
could not be said at any particular time the shares were purchased
through
Halifax AU from funds that were not tainted.
- [170] Mr Scruby
submitted that, on the evidence, there was a breach of trust as early as 17
November 2009. On that day AUD 442,260
was transferred out of the trust account
to open a term deposit to enable Halifax AU to provide security for a bank
guarantee. However,
as Mr Scruby recognised, Mr Sutherland was unable to
establish whether that led to a trust deficiency at the time as there was
insufficient
information to confirm it.
- [171] Mr
Sutherland was, however, able to confirm a trust deficiency as at 1 May 2012
when AUD 5.5 million was transferred from the
SAXO Allocated Account to a HSBC
Term Deposit. That was a clear example of client moneys being applied in breach
of trust and at
a time when Halifax AU had insufficient moneys to meet client
entitlements.
- [172] The
applicants agree with Mr Scruby’s submissions on this point and submit
there is no basis for concluding there was
a particular time when there was not
a single mixed fund which was not deficient.
- [173] Ms Holmes
submitted there was a clear inference that funds belonging to clients on the
Saxo and IB Platforms and later the MT4
and MT5 Platforms had always been
commingled. The pattern of funds’ movement, in particular transfers
between the bank accounts
of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ, confirmed the practice
was ongoing. The various redemptions from bank accounts of Interactive Brokers
to bank accounts of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ were not isolated into independent
transfers. There was a continuous pattern in the
evidence from the beginning of
2016 to that effect. But there was no reason to suggest the pattern would only
have started in 2016.
While there were practical reasons to explain why the
liquidators’ detailed investigations only
started in January 2016, there was no reason to think there was any moment after
Halifax AU acquired a majority interest in Halifax
NZ that there was not a
comingling.
- [174] As the
authorities confirm, the Court must take a pragmatic approach to determining the
appropriate date. Taken overall, the
evidence satisfies the Court, on balance,
that the date should be 1 May 2012 in relation to Halifax AU. By that date there
was the
first apparent shortfall in available assets held by Halifax AU as
trustee as well as in its own right (a client moneys’ shortage).
There was
also an established trust deficiency in the Saxo allocated account. In relation
to Halifax NZ clients, specifically Halifax
NZ clients who invested through
Halifax AU under the introducing broker agreement, the first relevant date must
be 1 July 2013. By
investing through Halifax AU they were purchasing investments
through a mixed fund which, on Mr Sutherland’s evidence, was
deficient by
that time.
- [175] Mr Scruby
also argued that the cost and time involved in identifying the clients who might
fit the expanded categories could
not be justified. He noted Mr Kelly’s
evidence that the exercise would be extremely time consuming and expensive. The
point
is well made, but the answer to it is that any such additional expense
would have to be borne by the Category 5 clients. If the applicants
encounter
any substantial difficulties in implementing the relevant orders, they can seek
further directions.
Category 1/Category 2 investors
- [176] As
at the date of the administration of Halifax AU, 23 November 2018, the total
value of the 1,028 client account balances notionally
in Category 1 was AUD
81,908,935.41. By 31 July 2020, the total value of the client account balances
in Category 1 had increased
to AUD 138,036,324.77. The Category 1 clients seek
the option of an in specie distribution based upon a methodology developed by
Barry Taylor, a registered liquidator, and referred to as Distribution
Methodology 3 (DM3). Alternatively, they argue there should
be a closing out of
all extant investments with the date of calculation of respective entitlements
being determined as close as practicable
to the date of distribution, rather
than the administration date.
- [177] By
contrast, as at 23 November 2018, the total value of the 10,910 client account
balances notionally in Category 2 was AUD
129,692,896.28. As at 31
July
2020, the balance had increased only marginally to AUD 126,761,344.07. The
Category 2 clients say that client entitlements should
be calculated at the date
of administration and, while they do not necessarily oppose an in specie
distribution, they seek a pooling
of investments so that all clients share
equally in the gains or losses in investments left open following the date of
administration.
- [178] Mr Loo,
the representative of the Category 1 clients, gave evidence and was
cross-examined. Another Category 1 client, Paul
McNeil, provided affidavit
evidence too. Mr Hyde also led evidence from Mr Taylor about the distribution
methodologies that he considered
could be available to the applicants. Mr
Taylor’s opinion was that his distribution method DM3 supported an in
specie distribution.
- [179] Mr Hyde
submitted DM3 was the fairest and most equitable approach to distribution of the
deficient mixed fund and would provide
the most principled outcome in the
present case. It recognised the Category 1 clients’ interest in the
holdings and the fact
their open investment positions had manifestly increased
in value since the administration date.
- [180] As noted,
in the alternative, Mr Hyde submitted that if an in specie distribution was not
possible, the date for calculating
the clients’ proportionate entitlement
should be as close as possible to the distribution date itself rather than the
administration
date. That would permit Category 1 clients to retain the benefit
of the increase in value of investments they had chosen to make
and had
retained. Mr Hyde observed that while clients were unable to enter new
transactions, they were able to close out if they
wished. While some clients had
done that, Category 1 clients such as Mr Loo had not.
- [181] During the
presentation of the first respondent’s case it was suggested at one stage
that Mr Loo may have been able to
acquire shares post administration by
exercising an option. While Mr Loo’s affidavit evidence on the point was
somewhat ambiguous,
it appears clear that Mr Loo was only able to acquire the
additional shares because the right to the options was in existence prior
to the
administration date. In effect, by exercising the option Mr Loo was closing out
his position in relation to it. It was not
the exercise of a fresh right.
- [182] At the
outset it is necessary to clarify that the in specie distribution pursued on
behalf of the Category 1 clients is effectively
a hybrid in specie distribution
rather than an in specie distribution of identifiable, traceable assets held on
trust for particular
clients. The in specie distribution Mr Hyde argued for was
of particular proportions of the investments made from the deficient mixed
fund.
Barry
Taylor and DM3
- [183] As Mr
Taylor’s DM3 underpinned Mr Hyde’s submissions on behalf of Category
1 clients for a form of in specie distribution,
it is necessary to consider it
in more detail. The essence of DM3 is that it would enable clients to retain the
increase in the value
of their investment portfolio. Mr Taylor provided two
affidavits and two reports dated 19 and 27 October 2020. In summary, under
Mr
Taylor’s preferred methodology, DM3 client claims would be determined as a
proportion of the total claims of all clients
at the administration date. All
clients would receive their proportionate share of net assets as at the
administration date subject
to each of them contributing a proportionate share
of the deficiency. Clients would be required to maintain a minimum cash
contribution
(MICR) to fund their share of the deficiency as at the
administration date (and all subsequent recovery and liquidation costs). Once
the MICR was deducted from the client’s portfolio, the client would be
entitled to the remainder of their portfolio and all
fluctuations in value to
the distribution date would accrue to that client.
- [184] Mr Taylor
demonstrated the DM3 in the following example:
|
Distribution Methodology 3
|
|
Adjudication Date
|
Administration Date
|
|
|
Claims Assessed at Adjudication Date
|
$211,601,822
|
(a)
|
|
Fund Deficiency
|
$40,150,845
|
(b)
|
|
Investor Claim at Administration Date
|
$10,000,000
|
(c)
|
|
Investor proportionate share (Investor Claim %)
|
4.73%
|
(c) ÷ (a) = (d)
|
|
Minimum Investor Cash Requirement (“MICR”)
|
$1,897,472
|
(b) x (d) = (e)
|
|
Investor Distribution Entitlement (Notional)
|
$8,102,528
|
(c) – (e)
|
|
Value of Investor Portfolio at Distribution Date
|
$20,000,000
|
(f)
|
|
Investor Distribution Entitlement (Actual)
|
$18,102,528
|
(f) – (e)
|
- [185] Mr Taylor
supported DM3 for the following reasons:
(a) fixing the
administration date as the date for determining claims removed the uncertainty
of fixing a future date given the nature
of assets in the deficient mixed
fund;
(b) notionally distributing to clients their investment
portfolios on the investment administration date subject to withholding the
MICR
gave certainty as to entitlements;
(c) the deficiency of the fund was able to be forecast with
reasonable accuracy so that each client would be informed as to the MICR
required to fund their proportionate contribution to the deficiency if
necessary;
(d) the methodology most effectively attributed the outcomes of
each client’s individual investment choices since the administration
date
to that client;
(e) the methodology provided the simplest and most effective
method for clients to elect to receive a distribution in specie in cash
or in a
combination; and
(f) the methodology reduced the risk of error in distributing
the fund to clients by removing the risk of market volatility after
the
administration date.
- [186] Mr Taylor
accepted the liquidators’ evidence that a number of open clients’
positions were not able to be distributed
in specie. The MT4 is a virtual
trading platform which does not have underlying assets or shares available for
an in specie distribution.
He agreed that an in specie distribution would not be
available for such clients. He also agreed with the applicants’ conclusion
that assets in that IB AU Prop Account would not be available for an in specie
distribution.
- [187] Mr Taylor
considered that the liquidators’ concern as to the potential cost and time
burden of undertaking an in specie
distribution could be met, in part at least,
if the liquidators perform an exercise to determine a profile of clients and
investments
for exclusion from an in specie distribution. He noted that the liquidators had
assumed in excess of 1,549 clients may wish to have
an in specie distribution,
but he considered there would likely be further reductions in that number. In
response to the liquidators’
point that the assets held for an in specie
distribution will continually change value, which added to the complication of
calculating
client entitlements, Mr Taylor considered a date as close to the
distribution date as possible would still be workable.
- [188] Under
cross-examination Mr Taylor accepted that applying DM3 would lead to clients
having different proportionate entitlements.
He also accepted that the
alternative approach of a proportionate entitlement calculated after all
unrealised investments had been
realised, which would lead to each client
retaining the same original proportionate entitlement of the whole, would
not.
- [189] Mr Taylor
accepted that there would be practical issues with the application of DM3
because of the inherent volatility in the
nature of the investment assets. He
also accepted he had not made any analysis of the additional processes required
by the liquidators
or the likely costing associated with the implementation of
DM3.
- [190] Mr Kelly
did not support the proposed DM3. Apart from issues of equity between investor
clients, he considered it raised a number
of practical issues. In his affidavit
of 22 June 2020 in particular, he noted the following steps would be required
for an in specie
distribution under DM3:
(a) First, each client would be advised of the value of their
claims. In theory those clients on the IB AU and IB NZ platforms with
open
positions would be entitled to transfer some of the open positions without
liquidating those positions.
(b) Next clients would advise the liquidators about their
decision by completing a form setting out the assets which they would like
to be
transferred to an alternative broker as part of an in specie distribution. An
investor would need to have an account with the
alternative broker.
(c) Next Halifax would process each individual transfer form completed by
clients. Mr Kelly has assumed that 1,549 clients would
like an in specie
distribution so there would be an equivalent number of transfer forms to be
processed. That would take around
three weeks for the Halifax staff members to
complete. But it would take longer than that to complete the transfer forms
because
the staff have additional tasks to perform. Further, it may take longer
in individual cases.
(d) Once transfers had been effected, the liquidators would
undertake the closeout of remaining investor positions. Assets remaining
in the
AU IB client subaccounts for which the liquidators had not received a request
for an in specie distribution would be addressed.
- [191] In Mr
Kelly’s initial estimate, the whole process might take as long as 13 to 14
months when a pooling and subsequent
distribution would be closer to six months.
Further, an in specie distribution might hold up the process of a cash
distribution as
the open positions on the IB AU and IB NZ platforms could not be
realised until the applicants knew which positions were to be transferred
rather
than realised.
- [192] In
addition, Mr Kelly considered there would be significant additional costs
involved in an in specie distribution. There would
be brokerage and commission
costs, continued platform operating costs and additional liquidator’s
remuneration. If the in specie
distribution took 13 to 14 months, the additional
operating costs could be at least AUD 1.5 million. He also believed that an in
specie distribution would be complex because of the complications arising from
movements in the market.
- [193] While
accepting practicality is one reason an in specie distribution may not be
appropriate, Mr Hyde made the point that in
cross-examination Mr Kelly had
accepted his estimate of time involved in an in specie distribution had been
overstated. Mr Hyde submitted
that, in light of Mr Kelly’s concessions,
there could be as much as a six month saving on Mr Kelly’s original
estimate
of time for an in specie distribution. Effectively the time required
would not be materially different to what was required for a
cash distribution
following the closing out of positions. He submitted Mr Kelly had overstated the
practical issues associated with
an in specie distribution.
- [194] Further,
in relation to costs, he noted the figure of AUD 1,500 for each Category 3
client had been suggested. He submitted
a similar cost could be applied to an in
specie distribution to each Category 1 client but, even if the actual cost was
more, those
clients opting for an in specie distribution could be required to do
so on a cost recovery basis.
- [195] Mr Hyde
acknowledged the following comments regarding the application of a pari passu
approach from the Courtenay House decision:57
- [88] The pari
passu approach to the distribution of a fund as between investors or
contributors makes perfect sense in circumstances where all deposits
were
received at one time or, if not at one time, then before any material
withdrawals from the fund were made, and where no subsequent
deposits were made
after those material withdrawals. As Debelle J observed in Magarey (at
[120]):
“[t]here is a marked difference between this case which
involves dealings in a trust account over a long period of time and
those cases
where a number of investors contribute to a trust fund in a relatively short
period of time, where a pro rata distribution may be a suitable means of
distribution, especially in the absence of records”.
- [89] The pari
passu approach may also be, and certainly has been, treated as appropriate
where the nature of the investment involves investors knowing
that their funds
will be pooled with those of other investors for investment purposes.
...
- [196] However,
he noted that at [175] of the Courtenay House decision, Bell P identified
the critical questions were how limited funds were to be distributed between
clients and whether there
was a principled basis to differentiate between them.
Mr Hyde submitted there was such a principled basis in the present
case.
- [197] Mr Hyde
made the point that in cases where pooling was favoured or adopted there was
generally an acceptance that funds would
be pooled. But where, as here, parties
had made and retained investments, there was not the same imperative for
pooling. The Category
1 clients had chosen to retain their holdings rather than
close out and the holdings had increased in value. Why should other clients
who
had chosen to close out share in those gains? Mr Hyde submitted the following
question posed by Professor Smith had some resonance
in the present case:58
57 Courtenay House (No
2), above n 37.
58 At [98].
“Is it really a principle of private law that parties’ rights may
be forfeited to convenience? And if so, whose convenience?”
- [198] Mr Hyde
adopted the comments of McGechan J cited with approval at [133] of the
Courtenay House decision:59
... “where there can be tracing, there shall be tracing.
Where there cannot, the ‘nearest approach practicable to substantial
justice’ shall be taken.” ...
- [199] Mr Hyde
submitted the reasoning of Bell P in Courtenay House also supported his
argument. The position had changed after the administration date. It was not
appropriate to adopt a general pooling
of investments approach as Mr Scruby
argued for or the simple pari passu approach as advocated for by Mr Gooley for
the Category
2 clients. While accepting that no method would result in justice
for all he submitted that the Court should adopt the “least
unfair
method” which was DM3. It was the nearest possible approach to substantial
justice.
- [200] Mr Hyde
referred in particular to the comments of Bell P at [165] of
the
Courtenay House decision:60
[165] ... application of the simple pari passu approach
is to force one victim to subsidise another in the face of evidence before the
Court (namely that some or all of an earlier
investor’s deposit had been
dissipated) and openly to redistribute property.
He submitted such an outcome would occur in this case. Mr Hyde of course
accepted that the Courtenay House case was different factually but
submitted the statements of principle were still applicable.
- [201] Mr Hyde
noted that the in specie distribution could apply to those clients who had kept
an open position after the administration
date and those clients who had
acquired shares after the administration date (by the exercise of options). It
could apply equally
to certain Category 2 clients.
59 At [133].
60 At [165].
- [202] Mr Hyde
also noted that the likely imposition of a capital gains tax, if the fund was
distributed on a pooled and cashed out
approach, was an additional reason to
support an in specie distribution.
- [203] Mr Gooley
submitted that the Category 2 clients he represented were the majority of
clients. They held 91.4 per cent of the
investments as at 31 October 2020. While
the Category 2 clients had no objection in principle to an in specie
distribution, that
was on the basis the date for fixing their proportionate
entitlement was the date of administration, with all clients sharing equally
in
the gains or losses in open investments following that
date.
- [204] Mr Gooley
noted that the in specie distribution referred to in this context cannot be an
in specie distribution in the traditional
form because, save for Category 3
clients (and some limited Category 5 clients), the investments held by clients
had been purchased
from a tainted fund, so no single investor could claim a
particular holding as theirs. Effectively, the in specie distribution was
a
distribution of a monetary equivalent.
- [205] Mr Gooley
referred to the decision of Australian Securities and Investments Commission
v Idylic Solutions Ltd and the following statement of Barrett J:61
“[o]nce a
contribution is made to the fund, the contribution ceases to have any identity
linked to its contributor. The contributor’s
rights become proportionate
rights in relation to the fund as it exists from time to time, as
distinct from rights in respect of specifically traceable assets within
it...”. (emphasis added).
- [206] Mr Gooley
submitted the same situation applied in this case. There was a deficient mixed
fund. That fund represented shares
and money recorded in bank accounts. The
second respondents submitted that those funds were held on trust(s) constituted
under the
general law or pursuant to statutory trusts. Mr Gooley submitted the
two questions for the Court were: first, should a single date
be adopted for the
quantification of entitlements; and second, what was the appropriate
date.
- At
[93] citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Idylic
Solutions Ltd (2009) 76 ACSR 129, [2009] NSWSC 1306 at [74].
- [207] Mr Scruby
argued that all trust assets held by Halifax AU and Halifax NZ should be pooled
or grouped together for the purpose
of a pari passu distribution. For the
purposes of argument, Mr Scruby accepted the applicants’ contention that
it is not feasible
or practical to trace all the transactions within the Halifax
group to ascertain what happened to every dollar invested by each
client.
- [208] In large
part, Mr Scruby’s submissions for the Category 4 investor clients that
pooling was appropriate supported Mr Gooley’s
argument for a pari passu
distribution. However, as noted, Mr Gooley was open to the possibility of an in
specie distribution whereas
Mr Scruby accepted that, on the applicants’
evidence, such a distribution was not possible.
- [209] Mr Scruby
submitted that, with the possible exception of the Category 3 clients (and such
Category 5 clients as may be relevant),
the assets held by the Halifax entities
were acquired from the deficient mixed fund and it was not in any practical
sense possible
to identify the clients on whose behalf they were held. He noted
that Mr Sutherland’s evidence was that to trace the 26,489
deposits made
by clients since 1 January 2016 would cost between AUD 26.4 and AUD 37.5
million.
- [210] Mr Scruby
submitted that the evidence established that:
(a) there was extensive commingling between Halifax AU and
Halifax NZ accounts;
(b) there was extensive commingling of monies in accounts which
were to be used for investments though the IB platform and the MT4
and MT 5
platforms;
(c) there was no principled basis or pattern to the commingling;
and
(d) the commingling included the use of client funds to
discharge other clients’ obligations to Halifax and obligations owed
by
Halifax to other clients. As a result the funds were mixed and commingled.
- [211] Mr Scruby
referred to the principles summarised by Brereton J in Re BBY (No 2)62 and submitted that while the
statutory provisions Brereton J was considering had been repealed there was no
reason to consider the
general principles did not still apply. Further, similar
principles had been expressed in New Zealand authorities.63
- [212] Finally,
Mr Scruby made the point that there was, on the evidence, no practically
feasible way for the applicants to ascertain
whether the shortfall was
attributable to particular clients’ investments or introduced funds.
Further, the applicants’
have not been able to discern or establish the
cause of the balance of the deficiency.
- [213] In the
circumstances, he submitted it was appropriate to treat the entitlements of all
clients as rateably equal. Given the
extensive commingling of monies between
accounts in the IB and MT4 and MT5 platforms there was no basis to pool or group
clients
by reference to the platforms.
Discussion
- [214] As counsel
have submitted, the facts of this case are different to a number of the
authorities discussed before us. Nevertheless,
there are a number of relevant
principles that emerge from them. The starting point is that the Court, on an
application for directions
in this context, is being asked to determine the
rights of parties to a fund which is insufficient for all clients to be made
whole.
- [215] The
Category 1 clients’ argument is essentially that they made the decision to
invest in certain shares and to hold those
shares rather than to close out
following the administration of the Halifax entities. They should be entitled to
retain the benefit
of their decisions rather than having to share the benefit
with other clients who either invested in poorly performing shares or
made the
decision to close out.
62 BBY (No 2), above
n 22, at [83].
- Re
Waipawa Finance Company Ltd (in Liq) [2011] NZCCLR 14 (HC); and Re Ross
Asset Management Ltd (in Liq) [2018] NZHC 2007.
- [216] The
principal difficulty with the argument for the Category 1 clients is that it
fails to take account of the fact that the
shares held by them were purchased
through a deficient mixed fund from funds provided by other
clients.
- [217] In
Priest v Ross Asset Management Ltd (in liq), Clifford J observed that:64
In Re International Investment Unit Trust (another
Ponzi), pari passu distribution was seen as being fairest because all investors
had paid into a mixed fund knowing their
money would be blended with that of
other investors. Therefore, their presumed intention was also for pari passu
sharing.
- [218] As
Clifford J went on to note, where pari passu sharing has been adopted it is
considered:65
a pragmatic and fair way to share a common misfortune. It is the
misfortune being common that gives rise to the pari passu distribution,
rather
than some pre-existing proprietary right held in common.
- [219] Where
most, if not all, investments were funded from a deficient mixed fund then I
accept Mr Gooley’s submission that
all clients should share in the
increase in value of retained investments. Otherwise, as he submitted, the more
the post administration
accretions get pushed over to Category 1, the more the
fund available for Category 2 clients becomes more proportionately
deficient.
- [220] Further,
despite Mr Hyde’s criticism of Mr Kelly’s estimate of the time an in
specie distribution might take, I
consider the proposed in specie distribution
under DM3 would be more complex and time consuming than a distribution following
pooling
and cashing up of investments. It would inevitably place further
administrative burdens on the applicants which would increase the
cost to all
clients. While part of that cost could be recoverable from the Category 1
clients, it adds a further unnecessary complication
to the
process.
- [221] Where it
is not possible, either as a matter of law or where it is not practically
pragmatic or possible because of the time
and expense involved, to distinguish
between clients, then the Court must do the best it can. The courts have put
this principle
a number of different ways. In McKenzie v Alexander Associates
Ltd (No 2)
64 Priest v Ross Asset
Management Ltd (in liq), above n 30,
at [105].
65 At [107].
McGechan J noted the Court searches for “the nearest approach
practicable to substantial justice”.66 In Re International
Investment Unit Trust (in statutory management) Williams J said “what
is required is a search for the least unfair result for the investors”.67
- [222] A further
objection to the DM3 methodology proposed by the first respondent is that it
will lead to widely differing results
for individual client investors. The MICR
has the potential to impose disproportionate obligations on investor clients
with open
positions whose investments have not increased in
value.
- [223] As Mr
Leopold put to Mr Taylor in cross-examination, there is a degree of
artificiality in DM3 because, while it purports to
calculate proportionate
entitlements as at apportionment date, the ultimate in specie distribution to
clients would be what ends
up in their hands, which would not be
proportionate.
- [224] It is also
relevant that the proposed in specie distribution would only be available to
those clients on the IB AU and IB NZ
platforms with open positions. As at 29 May
2020 there were 1,549 such clients, but they represent only 13 per cent of all
client
accounts.
- [225] For those
reasons, I do not accept the arguments for an in specie distribution. Apart from
those clients coming within Category
3 or 5, the investments of other clients of
Halifax NZ should be pooled for distribution on a pari passu
basis.
- [226] There is
no real issue between the parties that there should be a single date for
ascertaining client entitlements. The issue
is whether it should be the
administration date or, as Mr Hyde argued for, a date close to the ultimate
distribution.
- [227] Mr Hyde
argued that if an in specie distribution was not available, the clients’
entitlement should be valued as close
to the date of distribution as possible.
While he accepted that, in a number of cases, the date had been fixed as at the
administration
date and pooling had been applied, he made the point that in
those cases, the date had
66 McKenzie v Alexander
Associates Ltd (No 2) (1991) 5 NZCLC 67,046 (HC) at 67,065.
- Re
International Investment Unit Trust (in statutory management) [2005] 1 NZLR
270 (HC) at [73].
not been in issue. For example, in Sonray68 the administration date was
accepted by the Judge as the logical date, but no party had expressed a
different view.
- [228] Further,
in both BBY (No 2) at [372], BBY (No 3) and MF Global Australia
Ltd (in liq) the dates were taken on the basis that no-one spoke against
them.69 Mr Hyde noted there
was a difference between shares and open investments and bank
accounts.
- [229] Mr Hyde
then submitted that there was no principled reason why the valuation date ought
not to be when each of the positions
has closed out, accepting it would have to
be a single date close to the closing out and the distribution of all
investments.
- [230] Mr Hyde
acknowledged that the Category 1 clients knew there was a risk that the
appropriate date for the calculation of entitlements
would be the administration
date. But he suggested that the liquidators’ advice to clients about the
appropriate date for closing
out and valuing positions was somewhat equivocal.
He noted that in their report of 12 March 2019 regarding Halifax AU, the
applicants
had said:
The recent decision in BBY Ltd suggests that ... the date
of appointment of administrators is the appropriate date at which to calculate
entitlements. ...
Such a position is somewhat complicated where Client positions
remained open on the appointment date. In such circumstances, it may
be
appropriate to determine the value of the positions by reference to the value of
those positions when closed out.
...
It appears that it is reasonably practicable to carry out a
calculation of the value, as at the appointment date, of positions which
were
open on the appointment date but which were closed out subsequently.
Accordingly, it appears that the appointment date of 23
November 2018 is likely
to be accepted by the Court as the appropriate date for crystallising the value
of all investments.
- [231] Further,
during the course of these proceedings, the applicants had sought confirmation
from the Court that they were not required
to close out clients’ open
positions on the basis the Court might order an in specie distribution.70
68 Sonray, above n
21.
69 BBY (No 2), above n 22, at [372]; In the matter of BBY Ltd
(recs and mgrs. apptd) (in liq) (No 3)
[2018] NSWSC 1718 at [2]–[4]; and MF Global, above n 26.
70 Minute No 8 of Venning J, dated 21
February 2020.
- [232] In
Courtenay House, Bell P acknowledged the date advocated by some of the
parties was not a principled date.71 The date was the date that
an ex parte freezing order had been made. By contrast, the date of
administration is a principled date.
Black J noted in Re MF Global:72
In my view, the adoption of the Appointment Date as the date for
the quantification of entitlements finds strong support in the approach
adopted
in trust law generally and in insolvency.
- [233] There are
also the worked examples from the liquidators’ updated report to clients
of 31 August 2020 which support Mr
Gooley’s submission that the
administration date provides a more equitable basis for sharing. In that report
the applicants’
analysis showed that the estimated dollar return to
investors with entitlements calculated on asset values as at 31 July 2020
(taking
account of estimated costs) for a Category 2 investor was between a low
of 87 and a high of 89. By contrast for a Category 1 investor
it was between a
low of 119 and a high of 122. That compares with the entitlements calculated as
at 23 November 2018 of between 99
and 102 for a Category 2 investor and between
98 and 102 for a Category 1 investor.73
- [234] I accept
the appropriate date for quantification of entitlement is the administration
date. A complicating factor is that there
are two dates of administration in
this case.
- [235] While Mr
Gooley argued for the Australian date of 23 November, the applicants accept
that, on balance, 27 November, the date
of administration in New Zealand, would
be the appropriate date. There is a logic in that later date. There will have
been no relevant
activity in Halifax AU from 23 November, but there may have
been some activity in the accounts in Halifax NZ between 23 and 27 November.
I
take the appropriate date as 27 November 2018.
71 Courtenay House (No
2), above n 37.
72 MF Global, above n 26, at [114].
73 Liquidators’ Report to
Investors and Creditors, dated 31 August 2020 at 9.6.2.
Remaining issues
Post
appointment deposits
- [236] These are
deposits made to the bank accounts of Halifax NZ after the date of
administration of Halifax NZ. They are held on
trust and are able to be
identified by the liquidators. There were no investments made from the fund they
were paid into after the
date of appointment. They should be
refunded.
Set-off
- [237] A number
of clients have multiple accounts on the various investment platforms, some of
which have positive balances and some
of which have negative balances. The
applicants seek directions enabling them to combine the balances of those
accounts to calculate
the net position of a client.
- [238] As at
close of trading on the 26 November 2018, the IB NZ consolidated account
recorded out of money positions on CFDs of AUD
356,096. By 30 May 2020 the IB NZ
consolidated account disclosed out of money positions of AUD 3,157 for equity
and index options
and AUD 17,078 in relation to CFDs. Across all platforms, as
at 30 May 2020, there were 271 accounts with a negative balance totalling
AUD
541,735. One hundred and seventy two of those accounts had balances of less than
AUD 100.
- [239] While the
Halifax NZ CSAs do not expressly permit positive balances to be set-off of
against negative balances, such set off
has been permitted in other cases and is
also consistent with the intent of s 310 of the Companies Act 1993.74 It is in the interests of
the general body of clients to set off such balances.
Low/minimal
balances
- [240] The
applicants also seek directions enabling them to exclude clients who have a
credit balance of AUD 100 or less from participation
in the final
distribution.
74 BBY (No 2),
above n 22, at [375]–[392]
- [241] As at 23
November 2018, 179 Halifax NZ clients had a balance of less than AUD 100. The
total value on the IB NZ platform of
the 179 clients was AUD
5,945.
- [242] I accept
Mr Kelly’s evidence that the cost of distributing those minor balances to
clients would considerably exceed the
funds held.
Currency
- [243] As noted,
there are a number of bank accounts and funds held in several different
currencies. It would assist the applicants
to be able to convert foreign
accounts into one currency, the AUD, for the purpose of determining the total
value of the pool of
assets for distribution. If the liquidators determine that
it is more cost efficient to convert AUD to NZD for the purpose of distributing
to Halifax NZ clients, then they should be able to do so.
Final orders
- [244] To
give effect to the above and notwithstanding the contentions by each of the
first to ninth respondents, the Court makes the
following
orders/directions:
Category
3 investors
(a) The applicants are justified in organising for the shares of
clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ that were transferred from another
broker
to the IB AU Platform or the IB NZ Platform, and were never traded (Category 3
shares), to be transferred to a person nominated
in writing (including by email)
by the client in respect of whom the entitlement to those shares is recorded by
Halifax AU or Halifax
NZ (as the case may be).
(b) The applicants are justified in conclusively identifying
clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ as those with an entitlement to
Category 3
shares by:
(i) sending a written communication (which may include an email)
to all clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ with accounts on
the IB AU Platform or the IB NZ Platform, which have open share positions
recorded, asking them to confirm in writing within 21 days
whether they contend
they have an entitlement to Category 3 shares (Category 3 communication);
and
(ii) proceeding on the basis that only affirmative responses of
clients to the Category 3 communication are to be further considered
as to
whether the clients responding hold an entitlement to Category 3 shares.
(c) If the applicants do not receive, within 35, days a written
response to the Category 3 communication, the applicants are justified
in
treating those who have not responded as having no entitlement to Category 3
shares.75
(d) The applicants are justified in requiring that all clients
of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ from whom they receive an affirmative
response to
the Category 3 communication, pay to the liquidators a fee of AUD 1,500 within
21 days of the applicant’s request
for such a fee, together with a
proportionate share of all the additional fees and expenses of the liquidators
concerning their work
in relation to the Category 3 shares as approved by the
Court.
(e) If the liquidators do not receive the fee of AUD 1,500
requested in Order (d) within 35 days of their request, the applicants
are
justified in treating the shares the subject of the Category 3 communication as
not being Category 3 shares and in distributing
them in accordance with the
directions at (m) and following.
- I
consider this to be a practical approach and analogous to the reasoning adopted
in MF Global UK Ltd [2013] EWHC 1655
(Ch).
Category
5 investors76
(f) The applicants are justified in organising for the shares of
clients of Halifax AU and/or Halifax NZ who:
(i) transferred from another broker to the Saxo platform and
never traded in those shares, which shares were transferred from the
Saxo
platform to the IB AU platform or the IB NZ platform and were recorded in a
client account on MT5 platform, or the IB AU platform
or the IB NZ platform;
or
(ii) purchased shares through Halifax NZ prior to 1 July 2013
and never traded those shares; or
(iii) purchased shares through the IB AU platform, the IB NZ
platform or the MT5 platform prior to 1 May 2012 and who never traded
those
shares;
(known collectively as Category 5 shares) to be transferred to a person
nominated in writing (including by email) by the client in
respect of whom the
entitlement to those shares is recorded by Halifax AU or Halifax NZ (as the case
may be).
(g) The applicants are justified in conclusively identifying
clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ as those with an entitlement to
Category 5
shares by:
(i) sending a written communication (which may include an email)
to all clients of Halifax AU and Halifax NZ with accounts on the
IB AU platform
or the IB NZ platform, which have open share positions recorded, asking them to
confirm in writing within 21 days
whether they contend that they have an
76 The Court has already
made an order extending the ambit of Category 5 clients: [150]–[151].
entitlement to Category 5 shares (Category 5 Communication); and
(ii) proceeding on the basis that only affirmative responses of
clients to the Category 5 Communication are to be further considered
as to
whether the clients responding hold an entitlement to Category 5 shares.
(h) If the applicants do not receive, within 35 days, a written
response to the Category 5 Communication, the applicants are justified
in
treating those who have not responded as having no entitlement to Category 5
shares.
(i) The applicants are justified in requiring all clients of
Halifax AU and Halifax NZ from whom they receive an affirmative response
to the
Category 5 Communication pay to the liquidators a fee of AUD 1,500 within 21
days of the applicants’ request for such
a fee together with a
proportionate share of all the additional fees and expenses of the liquidators
concerning their work in relation
to the Category 5 shares as approved by the
Court.
(j) If the liquidators do not receive the fee of AUD 1,500
requested in order
(i) within 35 days of their request, the applicants are justified in treating
the shares the subject of the Category 5 Communication
as not being Category 5
shares and in distributing them in accordance with the directions at (m) and
following.
Post-appointment
deposits
(k) The applicants are justified in arranging for
post-appointment deposits deposited on or after 27 November 2018 into the ANZ
Halifax
NZ account and the ANZ USD account to be returned to the investor(s) who
made those deposits.
Date
of calculation of value of clients’ entitlements
(l) Subject to the above orders the applicants are justified in
adopting the appointment date of 27 November 2018 as the date on which
the
proportionate entitlements of clients are to be calculated.
Pooling
and distribution
(m) Subject to the above orders the applicants are justified in
calculating client entitlements using the pari passu approach.
(n) Subject to the above orders as soon as reasonably
practicable the applicants are justified in closing out or directing the closing
out of:
(i) open position of clients of Halifax NZ recorded in accounts
on the IB AU Platform and the IB NZ Platform; and
(ii) open positions of clients of Halifax NZ recorded in client
accounts on the MT4 and MT5 Platform.
(o) Subject to the above orders the applicants are justified in
pooling the funds in the Bank Accounts listed in the schedule hereto.77
(p) For the purpose of calculating each client’s
entitlement in accordance with the above orders or for the purpose of making
a
distribution to clients in accordance with the above orders the applicants are,
prior to making the calculation and/or distribution,
justified in converting
into Australian dollars or New Zealand dollars any foreign currency in their
Halifax NZ’s control.
Distribution
process
(q) The applicants are justified in adopting the following
process to distribute investor entitlements.
77 Schedule attached as
annexure ‘D’.
(r) The applicants are to email each investor (or, if email is not, in the
liquidators' opinion, the most appropriate means of communication
with an
individual investor, post to the investor's last known address) a notification
providing them with unique login details to
a secure, web- based investor portal
(Investor Portal) and instructing them that, upon logging into the Investor
Portal, they will
be notified of the value of their entitlement for the purpose
of any distribution (Distribution Notice).
(s) In the Investor Portal, the applicants are:
(i) to ask clients to verify their identity and to confirm the
value of their investment;
(ii) if a client disputes the value of their entitlement, to ask
the investor to notify the applicants of this and provide reasons
and supporting
documentation (if any) in support of their position; and
(iii) to ask clients to provide their bank account details
(nominated bank account) for the distribution of an entitlement.
(t) Clients are to be given 21 days to respond to the
Distribution Notice by logging into the Investor Portal and completing the steps
identified in order (s)(ii) above.
(u) If, in response to the Distribution Notice, a client
affirmatively disputes the value of their entitlement, then, on the condition
that their response is accompanied by both reasons and any necessary supporting
documents:
(i) the applicants are to assess whether the dispute is
well-founded;
(ii) if the dispute is well-founded, the applicants are to
notify the client that the liquidators agree with the issues raised in
the
dispute and have agreed to amend the value of the entitlement; and
(iii) if the dispute is not well-founded, the applicants are to
notify the client that they may apply to the Court (in these proceedings)
if the
client considers that their dispute is well-founded and that otherwise the
liquidators may proceed to distribution on the
basis of the value of the
entitlement as set out in the Distribution Notice.
(v) The applicants are to proceed to distribution on the basis
of the value of the entitlement of each client as recorded in the Investor
Portal if:
(i) within 35 days of the Distribution Notice, the client
confirms the value of their entitlement on the Investor Portal; or
(ii) the client does not log into the
Investor Portal to confirm or dispute their entitlement within 35 days of the
Distribution Notice;
or
(iii) the client logs into the Investor Portal and disputes
their claim but provides no particularity as to the basis of their dispute
within 21 days of notification that the client must provide further
particularity or else the distribution will proceed on the basis
of the
client’s entitlement as set out in the Distribution Notice; or
(iv) the applicants notify the client that their dispute is not
well- founded in accordance with the process in order (u)(iii) above
and the
client does not apply to the Court (in these proceedings) within 21 days of that
notification.
Set-off
(w) The applicants are justified in proceeding on the following
basis in respect of the calculation of entitlements of clients:
(i) where a client has multiple accounts on the IB AU Platform
and/or the IB NZ Platform and/or the MT4 Platform and/or the MT5 Platform,
the
applicants are entitled to combine the balances of those accounts to calculate
the net position of a client; and
(ii) setting-off positive account balances credited to a
particular client against negative account balances incurred by the same
client.
Low
account balances
(x) The applicants are justified in treating clients who have a
credit balance of AUD 100 or less as having no right to participate
in the
distribution of funds by the applicants.
Electronic
communications
(y) Subject to (r) above, the applicants are justified in
publishing or sending any notices, correspondence or other relevant material
to
clients as part of the distribution process by:
(i) sending copies of any notices, correspondence or other
relevant materials to the email address of each client for whom the liquidators
or Halifax AU or Halifax NZ holds an email address;
(ii) by notice or link on: https://home.kpmg/au/en/home/creditors/halifax-investment-
services.html
https://home.kpmg/au/en/home/creditors/halifax-nz-limited.html.
Reservation of leave
- [245] Issues
may arise regarding implementation of the above. Leave is reserved to the
applicants to seek such further directions
as may be required on 72 hours’
notice to affected respondents.
Costs
- [246] There
is a protocol in place for fixing the liquidators’ and trustees’
costs. The costs of the first to fifth respondents
as representative parties
have been covered. As noted previously I do not propose to make any order for
costs in relation to the
eighth and ninth respondents’ very limited
involvement in these New Zealand proceedings.
- [247] The
remaining issue in relation to costs is the position of the sixth and seventh
respondents, the Whitehead Interests. When
they were joined to pursue their own
interests, the issue of costs was reserved. Mr Leopold for the applicant
liquidators sought
costs on an indemnity basis against them. While the Whitehead
Interests have failed on their major arguments, they raised some issues
which
were relevant to Halifax NZ clients generally. My preliminary view is that while
they should pay costs, an award of scale costs
on a Category 2B basis is
appropriate. However, as requested by counsel, I formally reserve the issue of
costs involving the sixth
and seventh respondents. If the parties wish to pursue
the matter further, the applicants are to file submissions within 15 working
days. The sixth and seventh respondents are to respond within a further 15
working days and the applicants may reply within five
working days. Costs
memoranda are not to exceed three pages in length. The Court will then determine
costs on the papers.
Venning J
Solicitors: Russell McVeagh, Auckland
Tailored Legal Solutions Ltd, Dargaville Anderson Lloyd, Christchurch
Simpson Grierson, Auckland K&L Gates, Australia Gilbert + Tobin,
Australia Turks Legal, Australia Maddocks, Australia Murdoch
Clarke,
Australia
Counsel: A Leopold SC, Australia V Whittaker SC, Australia R Scruby SC,
Australia



‘B’

'C'
ș°
December
2Dll



Example of commingling between bank accounts
‘D’
HALIFAX DRAFT ORDERS – NZ
PROCEEDINGS
|
Bank
|
Account Name
|
Account Number
|
Currency
|
Note
|
|
|
|
|
the Orders dated 2
July 2020
|
|
NAB
|
HALIFAX INVESTMENT
|
HALIIUSD01
|
USD
|
This account
|
|
SERVICES PTY LTD (IN
|
|
|
contains US
|
|
LIQUIDATION) - IB AU
|
|
|
dollars withdrawn
|
|
CASH ACCOUNTS (AU)
|
|
|
from IB AU
|
|
|
|
|
Investor accounts
|
|
|
|
|
as per the Orders
|
|
|
|
|
dated 2 July 2020
|
Bank accounts of Halifax NZ
|
Bank
|
Account Name
|
Account Number
|
Currency
|
Note
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (EUR)
|
205964EUR0000
1
|
EUR
|
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (USD)
|
205964USD0000
1
|
USD
|
|
|
ANZ
|
Business Current Account (ANZ HNZ Account)
|
01-0121-
0135307-02
|
NZD
|
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (GBP)
|
205964GBP0000
1
|
GBP
|
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (AUD)
|
205964AUD0002
0
|
AUD
|
|
|
ANZ
|
HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND
|
06-0323-
|
NZD
|
|
|
LTD (IN VOLUNTARY
|
0537865-00
|
|
|
ADMINISTRATION)
|
|
|
|
ANZ
|
HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND
|
06-0323-
|
NZD
|
|
|
LTD (IN VOLUNTARY
|
0537865-01
|
|
|
ADMINISTRATION)
|
|
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (AUD) (Post-
Appointment)
|
257085AUD0000
1
|
AUD
|
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (EUR) (Post-
Appointment)
|
257085EUR0000
1
|
EUR
|
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (GBP) (Post-
Appointment)
|
257085GBP0000
1
|
GBP
|
|
|
Bank
|
Account Name
|
Account Number
|
Currency
|
Note
|
|
ANZ
|
FCA (USD) (Post-
Appointment)
|
257085USD0000
1
|
USD
|
|
|
NAB
|
HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) - IB
NZ
Cash Accounts (AU)
|
08200542961975
4
|
AUD
|
This account
contains Australian dollars withdrawn from IB NZ Investor
accounts as per the Orders dated 2 July 2020
|
|
NAB
|
HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND
|
HFNZLNZD01
|
NZD
|
This account
|
|
LIMITED (IN
|
|
|
contains New
|
|
LIQUIDATION) - IB NZ
|
|
|
Zealand dollars
|
|
Cash Accounts (AU)
|
|
|
withdrawn from
|
|
|
|
|
IB NZ Investor
|
|
|
|
|
accounts as per
|
|
|
|
|
the Orders dated
|
|
|
|
|
2 July 2020
|
|
NAB
|
HALIFAX NEW ZEALAND
|
HFNZLUSD01
|
USD
|
This account
|
|
LIMITED (IN
|
|
|
contains US
|
|
LIQUIDATION) - IB NZ
|
|
|
dollars withdrawn
|
|
Cash Accounts (AU)
|
|
|
from IB NZ
|
|
|
|
|
Investoraccounts
|
|
|
|
|
as per the Orders
|
|
|
|
|
dated 2 July 2020
|
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2021/1113.html