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Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Pori [2022] NZHC 3581 (21 December 2022)

Last Updated: 10 October 2023

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
CIV-2021-409-000435
[2022] NZHC 3581
BETWEEN
CHIEF EXECUTIVE,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Applicant
AND
TOMMY APERA PORI
Respondent
Hearing:
1 November 2022
Appearances:
C J Boshier for the Applicant M Starling for the Respondent K H Cook, Litigation Guardian
Judgment:
21 December 2022

JUDGMENT OF NATION J

1 How the respondent likes to be referred to.

2 Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Pori [2021] NZHC 2305 [PPO Decision].

3 Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act 2014, s 13(1).

CHIEF EXECUTIVE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v PORI [2022] NZHC 3581 [21 December 2022]

Background

Pori had the following convictions:4

(a) 1983 — conviction for rape from the Cook Islands;

(b) 1988 — convictions for being unlawfully found and assault on a child under 14 from the Cook Islands;

(c) 1993 — conviction for rape from the Cook Islands; and

(d) 2006 — convictions for sexual violation by unlawful sexual connection and indecent assault of a nine-year-old girl in New Zealand.

  1. Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v Pori [2020] NZHC 1446 [Interim Decision] at [13].

5 At [14].

6 Department of Corrections v Pori [2017] NZHC 3082.

May 2018, while there, Pori was very aggressive towards support staff and security. He made direct threats to kill and advanced on staff, forcing them to retreat from the lodge to outside the security fencing. Pori was arrested by Police and remanded in custody. He was convicted of threatening to kill/do grievous bodily harm.

7 Interim Decision, above n 4, at [3].

8 PPO Decision, above n 2, at [57].

9 Interim Decision, above n 4.

(a) direct the Chief Executive, pursuant to s 12 of the Act, to make an application under s 45 of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (Mental Health Act); or

(b) make a PPO which would then effectively retain the status quo.

(a) there was some potential benefit for Pori; and

(b) the safety objectives of the Act would not be unduly compromised.

10 PPO Decision, above n 2, at [57].

11 At [15].

  1. At [41] citing Chisnall v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 114, [2018] 1 NZLR 83 at [39].

13 At [50]−[53].

14 At [54].

15 At [61].

16 At [89].

17 At [90].

18 At [91].

19 At [93].

September 2021.20 The application for a substantive prison detention order remained before the Court.

Submissions

20 Chief Executive, Department of Corrections v Pori [2021] NZHC 2501.

21 Chisnall v Attorney-General [2021] NZCA 616, [2022] 2 NZLR 484.

to ESOs and, by extension, to prison detention orders. Ms Boshier’s written submissions included detailed reference to case law both in New Zealand and from other jurisdictions, and was provided to Mr Starling and Mr Cook only a short time before the hearing. Nevertheless, after they heard her submissions, neither took issue with them. Those submissions, for which the Court is grateful, are reflected in the analysis that follows.

Analysis

The law

85 Order for detention in prison

(1) The court may, on the application of the chief executive, order that a person subject to a public protection order be detained in a prison instead of a residence.

(2) The court may make an order under subsection (1) only if satisfied that—

(a) the person would, if detained or further detained in a residence, pose such an unacceptably high risk to himself or herself or to others, or to both, that the person cannot be safely managed in the residence; and

(b) all less restrictive options for controlling the behaviour of the person have been considered and any appropriate options have been tried.

(3) The court may make an order under subsection (1) against a person immediately after making a public protection order against that person.

(4) A prison detention order ceases to have effect if the person against whom it is made ceases to be subject to a public protection order.

ESOs and PPOs are imposed on persons nearing the end of the sentences imposed on them by the courts in response to their criminal offending, applying the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in the Sentencing Act [2002] including the important purpose of protecting the community from the offender. The restrictions which then flow from both ESOs and PPOs are potentially very severe, and in the case of PPOs can amount to indefinite detention. This is punishment, in the absence of trial and conviction for a further offence. It is a marked departure from the legal order reflected in s 26(2) of the Bill of Rights Act.

22 Chisnall v Attorney-General [2022] NZCA 24.

23 At [218].

[53] We accept the submission of R that consequent upon Chisnall, the continuation of the ESO needs to be clearly justified. Whilst that has always been the case, the declarations of inconsistency made by the Court emphasise the need for careful scrutiny. In this regard we note Chisnall holds that s 26(2) of the NZBORA (the second penalty provision) is capable of being subject to a reasonable limit. “Strong justification” will, however, be required, and that accordingly is the lens through which we assess whether the Judge erred in confirming the order.

(footnotes omitted)

the person would, if detained or further detained in a residence, pose such an unacceptably high risk to himself or herself or to others, or to both, that the person cannot be safely managed in the residence ...

24 Department of Corrections v Gray [2021] NZHC 3558; Miller v Department of Corrections [2022] NZHC 1342; Department of Corrections v Bell [2022] NZHC 2453; Department of Corrections v Brady [2022] NZHC 2179; and Department of Corrections v Mist [2022] NZHC 2178.

25 R (CA586/2021) v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, [2022] NZCA 225; Wilson v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 289; Chisnall v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 402; and Mosen v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2022] NZCA 507.

26 R (CA586/2021) v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections, above n 25.

27 Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act, s 85(2)(a).

28 Section 13(1).

mind − and, on the evidence, come to a judicial conclusion.29 In relation to the phrase “satisfied”, which is the test for imposing an ESO, the Court of Appeal has stated “[t]here is no onus or standard of proof; rather, the court must make up its mind on the evidence”.30 Nevertheless, the court must do this bearing in mind a prison detention order must be strongly justified after careful scrutiny of the evidence.

29 McDonnell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2009] NZCA 352, (2009) 8 HRNZ 770 at [72] and [75], citing R v Leitch [1998] 1 NZLR 420 (CA) at 428.

30 Kiddell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2019] NZCA 171 at [25], citing Holland v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2017] NZSC 161, [2018] 1 NZLR 771 at [12].

31 Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Bill 2012 [68-3).

32 Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13(1); Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DBJ [2017] QSC 302; High Risk Serious Offenders Act 2020 (WA), ss 48(1) and 7(1); Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASCA 206, (2007) 85 WAR 297; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASCA 187, (2008) 38 WAR 207; Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic), ss 62(2) and 63(4); Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice [2013] VSCA 213, (2013) 41 VR 359; Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), s 105A.7; Attorney General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605 at [27]; Cornwall v Attorney-General (NSW) [2007] NSWCA 374 at [21]; and State of New South Wales v Thomas [2011] NSWSC 118.

33 State of New South Wales v Thomas, above n 32 at [20].

“Whether a risk is unacceptable depends upon the degree of likelihood of offending and the seriousness of the consequences if the risk eventuates.

34 Emphasis added.

35 Attorney-General for the State of Queensland v DBJ, above n 32.

There must be a sufficient likelihood of the occurrence of the risk which, when considered in combination with the magnitude of the harm that may result and any other relevant circumstance, makes the risk unacceptable.”

(footnotes omitted)

The word ‘unacceptable’ necessarily connotes a balancing exercise, requiring the court to have regard, amongst other things, for the nature of the risk (the commission of a serious sexual offence, with serious consequences for the victim) and the likelihood of the risk coming to fruition, on the one hand, and the serious consequences for the offender, on the other, if an order is made (either detention, without having committed an unpunished offence, or being required to undergo what might be an onerous supervision order). As John Fogarty points out, albeit in a rather different context (Unacceptable risk ‑ A return to basics (2006) 20 AJFL 249, 252), the advantage of the phrase ‘unacceptable risk’ is that ‘it is calibrated to the nature and degree of the risk, so that it can be adapted to the particular case ...’.

36 Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR, above n 32, at [27].

37 Nigro v Secretary to the Department of Justice, above n 32, at [130].

The evidence

Mr Pori demonstrates a history of offending that can occur in an impulsive, opportunistic manner; or by actively seeking out and creating opportunities to offend. His offending is motivated by an intense desire for sexual gratification and ungoverned by impulse control, anticipation of the consequence for himself or others, or an ability to take another’s perspective. ... His sexual offending has occurred over more than 35 years, with continued sexual offending and sexualised behaviour occurring during the period of his Extended Supervision Order. He has offended against females of different ages and within different environments.

These factors, in the writer’s opinion, all reflect an intense and persistent drive or urge to actively seek sexualised contact.

Mr Pori has demonstrated a very limited self-regulatory capacity throughout his life and particularly over recent years. He displays frequent dysregulated emotional and aggressive outbursts in response to minimal triggers including perceived injustices and criticisms, change, when his goals are thwarted, and other forms of stress.

38 Interim Decision, above n 4.

39 At [15].

40 At [19].

41 At [24].

... little doubt that the impact of the traumatic brain injury [suffered when he was 18-20 years old] has been to exacerbate or cause poor impulse control, impaired judgment and to contribute to his subsequent significant offending history[.]

42 At [25].

43 At [33].

44 At [25].

45 PPO Decision, above n 2, at [29].

46 At [34].

due to there being no acute risk identified, or mental health concerns in his presentation upon arrival and while residing in prison. It was understood his presentation was in the context of his historical traumatic brain injury. It was considered an at-risk assessment and health update assessment were not required.

to manage Pori’s behaviour using calming and de-escalating techniques. During that period, he often stated that he enjoyed living at Matawhāiti, liked all the staff and considered them to be his whānau.

Corrections’ officers and appeared to happily accompany them when they took him to the prison.

for life is being better than being out in Matawhāiti with “kid fuckers” and kept repeating the words “I will murder ... I will murder”.

They have to try to provide for their residents’ needs in this regard, their mental and emotional wellbeing as much as their physical wellbeing, so there would be great difficulty in being able to separate and therefore safely manage the other resident with Pori on site. For the staff, the seclusion room is not a long-term option.

Pori expressed his appreciation that staff made time to call him, and informed that the unit was treating him well; he had his “banana cake”, there was “roast pork” on the menu and Pori would be “happy to share it” with MW (Matawhāiti) staff. Pori indicated that his “brothers” were keeping well and behaving themselves as he was their “elder” in the prison unit. Our conversation reminded me of similar situations from my own Pacific islander experiences; one of many similar scenarios where uncles/grand uncles who had lived their lives and travelled their journeys involved in somewhat similar incidences etc, whereby the community know the truth about trails of physical/sexual abuse committed by these characters, they had covered up

their past by suppressing those thoughts and covering those up with layers of pseudo-memories that were told and re-told until these were embedded in the community’s minds as their truth, and to keep the peace the stories were kept and retold. Pori in our phone conversation today appeared to be amongst “his people”, assuming the role of an elder and the acceptance of the routines, the unlocks, the dinner time, the lockups, the prison language etc., the institutionalisation. Pori did not once mention Matawhāiti and signed off the conversation wishing staff a good afternoon.

47 Para [7].

Determination as to the evidence

48 PPO Decision, above n 2, at [90].

The exercise of the discretion

49 Public Safety (Public Protection Orders) Act, s 20.

27 Rights of residents

(1) A resident has the rights of a person of full capacity who is not subject to a public protection order except to the extent that those rights are limited by—

(a) this Act; or

(b) any rules, guidelines or instructions, or regulations made under this Act; or

(c) a decision of the manager taken in accordance with this section.

(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the rights of a resident include the rights set out in sections 28 to 40.

(3) The manager may limit the rights of a resident to the extent reasonably necessary to prevent the resident from harming himself or herself or any other person or from disrupting the orderly functioning of the residence.

(4) In making a decision that affects a resident, the manager must be guided by the following principles:

(a) a resident must be given as much autonomy and quality of life as is compatible with the health and safety and well-being of the resident and other persons and the orderly functioning of the residence:

(b) a decision that adversely affects a resident must be reasonable and proportionate to the objective sought to be achieved.

(5) Residents must be given the opportunity to provide input into the making of rules for the residence and into the running of the residence for the purpose of the orderly functioning of the residence and the creation and maintenance of a residence community.

5 Principles

Every person or court exercising a power under this Act must have regard to the following principles:

...

(d) persons who are detained in a residence under a public protection order should have as much autonomy and quality of life as possible, while ensuring the orderly functioning and safety within the residence.

50 Section 31.

Conclusion

Solicitors:

Raymond Donnelly & Co., Christchurch M Starling, Barrister, Christchurch

K H Cook, Barrister, Christchurch.

51 Section 87(1).

52 Section 88.


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