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Teika v District Court of New Zealand [2024] NZHC 1017 (30 April 2024)

Last Updated: 16 May 2024

JUDGMENT OF DUNNINGHAM J

This judgment was delivered by me on 30 April 2024 at 2.45 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:

TEIKA v DISTRICT COURT OF NEW ZEALAND [2024] NZHC 1017 [30 April 2024]

Introduction

• [1] Rueben Teika faces five charges of unlawful sexual connection¹ and one charge of obtaining by deception.² The offending relates to sexual encounters Mr Teika is alleged to have had with three male complainants aged 16 to 18 years, whom he met through the Grindr application.

• [2] On 4 April 2024, Judge Crosbie found the defendant unfit to stand trial and that finding was recorded, as is required, by s 8 Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (the Act).

• [3] An involvement hearing pursuant to s 10 of the Act is scheduled to take place between 15 and 17 May 2024.

• [4] The applicant is currently being held in Christchurch Men’s Prison. Prior to being remanded in custody he was bailed to his parents’ address where he was subject to electronic monitoring. However, he breached bail in September 2023 by cutting off his EM bracelet and following that, was remanded in custody. His remand in custody was renewed on 15 December 2023 and it is under that warrant that Mr Teika is still detained.

• [5] On 23 April 2024, Mr Teika sought to be admitted to bail on the grounds he had been found unfit to stand trial and, under the Act, he could no longer be detained in custody. However, that application was declined by Judge Robinson in a decision issued on 24 April 2024,³ and again, by Judge Couch, on 26 April 2024.⁴

• [6] Mr Teika now applies for a writ of habeas corpus. He asserts he is being unlawfully detained at Christchurch Men’s Prison, contrary to s 23(1) and (2) of the Act which state that:

¹ Crimes Act 1961, ss 128(1)(b) and 128B, maximum penalty 20 years’ imprisonment.

² Crimes Act 1961, ss 240(1)(a) and 241(c), maximum penalty three months’ imprisonment.

³ R v Teika [2024] NZDC 9198.

⁴ I am advised by counsel that this was done orally.

23 Inquiries about persons found unfit to stand trial or insane

(1) When a person is found unfit to stand trial or is acquitted on account of his or her insanity, the court must order that inquiries be made to determine the most suitable method of dealing with the person under section 24 or section 25.

(2) For the purposes of the inquiries under subsection (1), the court must either—

(a) make it a condition of a grant of bail that the person go to a place approved by the court for the purpose of the inquiries; or

(b) remand the person to a hospital or a secure facility.

...

Legal principles

• [7] An application for an order under the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 allows a person to challenge the lawfulness of their detention.⁵ Under s 9, an application for a writ of habeas corpus must be given precedence over all other matters before the High Court, unless the Judge of that court considers the circumstances require otherwise. Section 9(3) requires the Registrar to allocate a date for hearing the application no later than three working days after it is filed. That has happened here.

• [8] The primary issue under s 14(1) of the Habeas Corpus Act 2001 is whether the detention of the applicant is lawful. Generally, the production of a warrant to detain the applicant is sufficient to establish the factual and legal basis for the applicant’s detention.⁶

Applicable Law

• [9] Section 14(2) of the Habeas Corpus Act provides, subject to exceptions:

(2) A Judge dealing with an application must enquire into the matters of fact and law claimed to justify the detention and is not confined in that enquiry to correction of jurisdictional errors. ...

⁵ Habeas Corpus Act 2001, s 6.

6. See, for example, Cooke v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2020] NZHC 244 at [10]- [11].

• [10] Section 14(2) requires the Judge hearing an application for habeas corpus to enquire into the “matters of fact and law claimed to justify the detention”.⁷ It is expressly provided that the Judge “is not confined in that enquiry to the correction of jurisdictional error”.⁸ The only limitation in s 14(2) is that the Judge cannot call into question a person’s conviction for an offence or a ruling as to bail (ss 14(2)(a) and (b)).

• [11] The Court of Appeal in Manuel held:⁹

• [46] Given s 14(2), Courts are not confined to jurisdictional enquiry and some consideration of the underlying questions of fact and law relevant to an applicant’s detention is clearly envisaged. ...

• [47] On the other hand, Parliament must have contemplated a consideration of underlying questions of fact and law only to the extent to which such enquiry is possible within the procedures provided for in the Act. The enquiry envisaged must have been one that although conducted in circumstances of urgency would allow an appropriately considered judicial examination that would warrant making an unappealable finding against the lawfulness of the detention.

...

[49] A person who detains another can fairly be expected to establish, effectively on demand, the legal justification for the detention. In cases involving imprisonment or other statutory confinements, this will involve the production of a relevant warrant or warrants or other documents which provide the basis for the detention. We accept that apparently regular warrants (or other similar documents) will not always be a decisive answer to a habeas corpus application. But it will be a rare case, we think, where the habeas corpus procedures will permit the Court to enquire, into challenges on administrative law grounds to decisions which lie upstream of apparently regular warrants. This is particularly likely to be the case where the decision maker is not the detaining party. There may not be a bright line which distinguishes between those arguments which are available on habeas corpus applications and those which can only be deployed (if deployed at all) in judicial review proceedings. Nonetheless we see the test as coming down to whether the arguments in issue are properly susceptible to fair and sensible summary determination. If they are, they can be addressed in habeas corpus proceedings. If not, they must be held over for evaluation in judicial review proceedings. In such proceedings, an application for interim relief (including release from custody) would be dealt with urgently and the Judge dealing with such an application would be in a position to give directions as to the future conduct of the litigation to ensure prompt substantive determination.

7. E v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development [2007] NZCA 453 at [33]; [2007] NZCA 453; [2008] NZAR 226.

⁸ At [33].

⁹ Manuel v Superintendent, Hawkes Bay Regional Prison [2004] NZCA 440; [2005] 1 NZLR 161 (CA).

• [12] In this case, an option suggested was to defer the matter to be dealt with on appeal. However, given there is scope to make inquiries into the underlying facts and law if the interests of justice require it and noting counsel have addressed the legal arguments arising and there is no dispute over the factual matters, this is, in my view, an appropriate case to determine whether Mr Teika’s continued detention is lawful in the context of this application.

The District Court’s decision

• [13] Mr Teika came before Judge Robinson on 23 April 2024 where counsel argued that he should be released under one of the provisions in s 23(2). The Judge acknowledged that Mr Teika had been found unfit to stand trial on 4 April 2024. He also noted that in light of the risk factors posed by Mr Teika, he was not a suitable candidate for bail, saying there was “a strong case of serious offending on bail, and a high likelihood of further offending if he is granted bail at this juncture”.¹⁰ At that stage the Judge also understood there to be no available bed in a secure facility which suggested a stark choice between releasing Mr Teika on bail or retaining him in custody.¹¹

• [14] The Judge then turned to whether s 23 of the Act applied. In a clear and carefully reasoned judgment he determined that it did not apply prior to the involvement hearing saying the following:

[11] The CPMIP process is linear.¹² After the health assessors’ reports are received, the Court must find whether the defendant is unfit to stand trial.¹³ As the defendant was found to be unfit, the court must then inquire into the defendant’s involvement in the offences under s 10.¹⁴ On a finding of involvement, the court moves to obtain information relevant to disposition,¹⁵ and then makes orders as to disposition.¹⁶

...

¹⁰ R v Teika, above n 3, at [8].

¹¹ At the hearing I was advised from the bar that a bed was available in a secure facility but there was no funding for it until Mr Teika was ordered to be placed there for the purpose of an inquiry into disposition.

¹² Balemi v R [2014] NZCA 176 at [23].

¹³ Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 8A(2)(b).

¹⁴ Section 8A(5).

¹⁵ Sections 13(4) and 23(1).

¹⁶ Sections 24 and 25.

• [17] In my judgment, given the scheme of the CPMIP Act, s 23 (which forms part of subpart 3) does not come into play immediately on a finding of unfitness. There is an intermediate step: determining involvement under s 10.

• [18] Section 13 of the CPMIP then applies:

13. Outcome of consideration of defendant’s involvement in offence

(1) When the court has ascertained, in accordance with any of sections 10 to 12, whether the court is satisfied of the matter specified in section 10(2), 11(2), or 12(2), as the case requires, the court must record its finding on the matter.

(2) If the court is not satisfied of the matter specified in

section 10(2), 11(2), or 12(2),—

(a) the court must dismiss the charge against the defendant under section 147 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011; and

(b) the finding that the defendant is unfit to stand trial is deemed, for all legal purposes, to have been quashed; and

(c) the court must not deal with the defendant

under subpart 3.

(3) [Repealed]

(4) If the court is satisfied of the matter specified in

section 10(2), 11(2), or 12(2), as the case requires, the

court must deal with the defendant under subpart 3.

(emphasis added)

• [19] The effect of s 13(4) is that jurisdiction under s 23 only arises after a finding of involvement. On a finding of involvement, the court must deal with the defendant under subpart 3, i.e. ss 23 – 33F.¹⁷

• [20] No other provision empowers the court to make orders under s 23 before involvement is established.

• [21] Section 13(4) is therefore the gateway to section 23.

• [22] On that basis, I do not consider there is any impediment to me remanding the defendant in custody. Issues of bail or remand to a hospital or secure facility only arise after a finding of involvement, when the court “must deal with the defendant under subpart 3”.¹⁸

• [23] That interpretation is confirmed by the purpose of s 23 ...

¹⁷ Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, s 13(4).

¹⁸ Section 13(4).

• [24] Section 23(1) requires the court to order that enquiries be made as to disposition. The court must not make such orders unless satisfied the defendant was involved in the hearing.¹⁹

• [25] The power under s 23(2) to release on bail or remand to a hospital or secure facility is only for the purpose of inquiries as to disposition, which cannot arise if the defendant is not involved in the offences.

• [26] Given the legislative scheme, s 23(1) must be construed as reading: “When a person is found [to be involved in the offence(s) and] unfit to stand trial or is acquitted on account of his or her insanity, the court must order that inquiries be made to determine the most suitable method of dealing with the person under section 24 or section 25.”

• [27] That reflects that jurisdiction under s 23(1) does not arise until a finding of involvement under s 10 given the terms of s 13(2) and (4).

• [15] Accordingly, the Judge found he had jurisdiction to remand the defendant in custody and, given the issues of risk the Judge had identified, this was the most appropriate course of action to take in the circumstances.

Applicant’s submissions

• [16] While Mr Williams counsel for Mr Teika acknowledges that s 23 of the Act deals with disposition for those who are found to be both unfit and involved, he maintains that the provisions of that section are engaged once a person is found “unfit to stand trial”. He says, on a plain reading of s 23, and consistent with the fact that Mr Teika can now only be discharged or dealt with as a health care recipient, he should either be granted bail or remanded to a secure facility. It is not appropriate or lawful for him to be held in prison.

• [17] Mr Williams accepts that the law as currently drafted is confusing because the involvement inquiry (under ss 10, 11 or 12 of the Act, depending on the circumstances) now occurs after an individual has been found unfit to stand trial, even though s 23 is predicated on both steps having been completed. Prior to the 2018 amendments to the Act,²⁰ the involvement hearing occurred before fitness was determined, therefore, every person found unfit to stand trial had already been found to have been involved and so, under s 23, inquiries as to disposition could proceed. Section 23 was not amended at the same time these charges were made.

¹⁹ Section 13(2)(a) – (c).

²⁰ Introduced in November 2018 under the provisions of the Court Matters Act 2018.

• [18] Mr Williams submits that the applicant’s approach to s 23, which is that it applies on a finding of unfitness, is the only sensible interpretation because once such a finding is made, that individual can never be imprisoned. Imprisonment is a punishment imposed on those who are criminally responsible for their actions. It does not apply to those who are found unfit to stand trial or who were legally insane at the time of the alleged act.

• [19] Furthermore, he submits that such an interpretation of s 23 is consistent with Parliament’s intention, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and key policy considerations. In particular, an interpretation that s 23 applies from the moment of finding of unfitness has been made, is consistent with the following provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act:

(a) s 9 which provides that everyone has the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or punishment; and

(b) s 23(5) which provides that everyone deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person.

• [20] In support of that argument, Mr Williams points out that those who are found unfit to stand trial are, from that point forward, health care recipients. They are entitled to be kept in a therapeutic environment and not a prison. To find that the law allows Mr Teika to be held in prison, when he cannot be criminally liable, would be to adopt an interpretation that results in disproportionately severe treatment. It is also inconsistent with the right to be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the person.

• [21] In terms of whether there is jurisdiction to deal with this issue on an application for habeas corpus, rather than deferring the issue to an appeal, Mr Williams relies on the decision in E v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development which, citing Manuel v Superintendent, Hawkes Bay Regional Prison, points out that in appropriate cases the Court can enquire into matters of fact and law.²¹

²¹ E v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development, above n 7.

• [22] While he acknowledges that this decision predates s 14(1A) being introduced into the Habeas Corpus Act (which allows this Court to refuse an application for the issue of a writ if that is not “the appropriate procedure for considering the allegations made by the applicant”), he says that section does not apply in the present case. The current warrant to detain was issued in December 2023. The circumstances have changed since then, consequent on the finding of unfitness. This is a relatively focused argument dealing with a legal issue only and it is important for the matter to be determined quickly. That means it is appropriate to determine the correct interpretation of s 23 in the context of an application for habeas corpus.

Respondent’s submissions

• [23] Mr McClenaghan, appearing for the second respondent, submit first, that this is not a suitable case to issue a writ of habeas corpus. Given the warrant to detain is valid and there is no error raised as to its issue, the Court is precluded from issuing a writ under s 14(2)(b) of the Habeas Corpus Act. That section provides:

(2) A Judge dealing with an application must enquire into the matters of fact and law claimed to justify the detention and is not confined in that enquiry to the correction of jurisdictional errors; but this subsection does not entitle a Judge to call into question—

...

(b) a ruling as to bail by a court of competent jurisdiction.

• [24] Instead, he invites the Court to hear the matter as a general appeal against the District Court decision of Judge Robinson.

• [25] However, he notes the Crown’s position is that the Court should order Mr Teika be remanded in a hospital or secure facility under s 23(2)(b) of the Act, regardless of whether a bed is available or not, as to hold Mr Teika in custody appears unlawful. The Crown accepts the Judge has misinterpreted s 23 of the Act and the most appropriate way to interpret that section is that once a determination of unfitness is made, then s 23 is triggered. Once a s 23(2)(b) order has been made, then Te Whata Ora and/or the Director-General of Health must action and facilitate a bed for Mr Teika.
• [26] The Crown also submits that neither bail simplicitor or electronically monitored bail is appropriate given that Mr Teika is at high risk of reoffending and public safety must be the paramount consideration, as set out in s 23(3) of the Act.

Discussion

• [27] I deal first with the question as to whether I am precluded from determining the application under s 14(2)(b) of the Habeas Corpus Act. In my view, this is not an application for bail under the Bail Act 2000 nor is it a challenge to the warrant to detain issued in December 2023. Rather, it is an application to correctly apply the requirements in s 23(2) of the Act, and I am not precluded from considering this argument in an application for habeas corpus.

• [28] While the decision is amenable to appeal in the usual way, I do not consider that it is appropriate to decline to determine this issue under s 14(1A)(b) in this case. Both the applicant and the Crown agree that s 23 is intended to apply as soon as a finding of unfitness is made and Mr Teika should not be remanded in custody now that he is no longer at risk of being found criminally liable for the acts alleged. This is a confined legal issue. It was not live when the warrant to detain was issued. It only arose after the finding of unfitness was made on 4 April 2024. Furthermore, there is urgency in ensuring Mr Teika is held in the most appropriate institution given the finding as to fitness.

• [29] The issue turns on the interpretation of s 23. I accept that s 23 is in its current form, because it was drafted to reflect the fact that, prior to 2018, a finding of unfitness was made after an involvement hearing. When the Act was amended in 2018, no clear thought appears to have been given to amending this section as well to deal with the situation once a finding of unfitness is made, but before inquiries as to disposition are able to be made. As currently worded there is a tension between the section saying its provisions apply once a person is found unfit to stand trial and the fact that the section anticipates that this is for the purpose of making inquiries as to disposition.

• [30] However, for the reasons advanced by the applicant, I am satisfied that an individual who has been found unfit to stand trial should not remain in prison. They are no longer at risk of being found criminally liable and it is not appropriate they be

held in custody. Consistent with the original intent of the legislation and consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the options set out in s 23(2)(b) should apply at the point a person has been found unfit to stand trial, notwithstanding they appear to apply only once the Court is in a position to make inquiries into disposition.

Outcome

• [31] Accordingly, for these reasons, I made the following order at the hearing of the application for habeas corpus:²²

(1) I grant the application for a writ of habeas corpus. The applicant, Mr Teika is, pursuant to s 23(2) of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally Impaired Persons) Act 2003, to be remanded to a hospital or a secure facility.

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Christchurch

Copy to:

A M S Williams, Barrister, Christchurch

²² Teika v District Court of New Zealand [2024] NZHC 970.