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Norbrook Laboratories Limited v Merial Limited [2014] NZIPOPAT 20 (22 September 2014)

Last Updated: 7 October 2014

IN THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF NEW ZEALAND

[2014] NZIPOPAT 20


IN THE MATTER of the Patents Act 1953

AND

IN THE MATTER of Letters Patent No 556537 in the name of Norbrook Laboratories Limited

Patentee

AND

IN THE MATTER of an application for revocation of said patent under section 42 by Merial Limited

Applicant for Revocation






Hearing: 5 June 2014

A Brown QC and M Caine for the Patentee
Dr J Landells and M Caulfield for the Applicant for Revocation
DECISION OF AN ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

  1. Notice of Acceptance of the Patent Application was published in Patent Office Journal No. 1570 on 30 April 2010, and the patent was granted on 17 February 2011.

  1. An Application for Revocation before the Commissioner was filed on 17 February 2012 under section 42, together with a request for an extension of time to file the applicant’s Statement of Case. The patentee consented to the extension and the applicant’s first amended Application for Revocation and Statement of Case were subsequently filed on 17 April 2012.

  1. A second amended Application for Revocation and first amended Statement of Case were filed on 11 June 2014, six days after the present hearing – these are further discussed in paragraphs 31 to 50 below.

  1. Grounds (b), (d), (e) (both limbs), (f), and (g), as set out in section 21(1), and ‘Lack of utility’ were pleaded by the Applicant for Revocation. However, at the hearing Dr Landells advised that only Ground (e) ‘obviousness’ and the question of ‘fair basis’ of the claims on the priority document were being pursued. However, for the sake of completeness, I have also considered Ground (b) ‘prior publication’ which, of course, does not require the production of evidence. I also note that ‘Lack of utility’ is not a valid ground under section 42 (Revocation of patent by Commissioner), although it is a valid ground under section 41 (Revocation of patent by Court).

  1. The patentee filed a Counterstatement on 13 July 2012. The patentee acknowledges that “the Applicant is a person interested for the purposes of bringing the application” and denies all grounds of revocation.

Locus standi

  1. As stated above, the Patentee acknowledges that the Applicant for Revocation is a “person interested”. I find that the Applicant for Revocation has locus standi in these proceedings.

The onus of proof

  1. Mr Brown reminded me that a revocation action under section 42 is often referred to as a “belated opposition” because the procedure and grounds for revocation before the Commissioner under section 42 are only those provided under section 21 in respect of oppositions. Section 42(1) reads:

At any time within 12 months after the sealing of a patent, any person interested who did not oppose the grant of the patent may apply to the Commissioner for an order revoking the patent on any one or more of the grounds upon which the grant of the patent could have been opposed

  1. Both parties agreed that the onus of proof is on the Applicant for Revocation, as is made clear in the proviso to section 42(3):

provided that the Commissioner shall not make an order for the unconditional revocation of a patent under this section unless the circumstances are such as would have justified him in refusing to grant the patent in proceedings under section 21.

  1. Rodney Hansen J, in Huhtamaki Australia Pty Limited v Seda SpA (HC Auckland, CIV 2010-485-509, 19 April 2011), stated:

[10] [Opposition proceedings] are designed to clear the Register of patents which are manifestly untenable. They are not intended to provide a method of disposing of truly contentious cases - General Electric Co (Coxs) Patents [1977] RPC 421 at 437. If there is a conflict of credible evidence, the Commissioner should not refuse the grant of a patent unless the conflict is clearly resolved in favour of the party opposing the grant [General Electric Co’s Applications [1964] RPC 413 (CA) at 453; Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Co (No 2) [1979] NZCA 64; 1979 NZLR 629 (SC)]. At the examination stage, the application should be allowed to proceed unless on no reasonable view can it be regarded as meeting the requirements of the Act.

[11] The onus on the opponent has been explained by reference to the interests of justice and the concern that, except in a clear case, the applicant should not be denied the opportunity of propounding the patent in revocation proceedings. The following passage from the judgment of Buckley LJ in Dunlop Holdings Ltd’s Application 1979] RPC 523 at 544-545 is often quoted:

It is a peculiar feature of opposition proceedings that, if opposition fails, the opponents are not at the end of the road; they still have an opportunity, at a later date, to defeat the objective of the applicants in a revocation action under section 32 [New Zealand section 41] of the Act in High Court proceedings, with all the features of pleadings, discovery, oral evidence including cross-examination, appertaining to a High Court action. It has been frequently said that opposition proceedings are a device for weeding out patent applications which obviously could not survive a revocation action. This peculiar feature of opposition proceedings may, it seems to me, have a bearing upon the degree of certitude which the Comptroller should feel in opposition proceedings, but it remains true that the standard of proof is the civil standard and not the criminal standard.

...

lf on the assessment of all the evidence adduced, regarded in the light of the civil standard of proof, the tribunal were to reach the conclusion that, if the application for a patent were dismissed, there would be a real risk that an injustice might be done by depriving the applicant of any opportunity to protect his right to the patent in a full scale revocation action in the High Court, it seems to me at least arguable that special weight should be given to that consideration by the tribunal hearing the opposition proceedings in considering what degree of certainty it should have in relation to the alleged grounds of opposition. It is for the tribunal hearing the opposition proceedings to determine, on the balance of probabilities, what degree of risk of that kind there is. I would think that that would be one of the circumstances that it would be proper for the tribunal to take into account in considering whether, on the balance of probabilities, the opponents had succeeded in making out their case.

[12] More succinctly, Buckley LJ said in General Electric Co’s Applications:

It seems to me that the test can be stated, perhaps more simply, in these terms: ls it clear on the evidence before the Comptroller that, if the issues of obviousness (assuming that to be the ground relied on) were fought out in a full scale revocation action, the claims would be held bad for obviousness? If the answer is affirmative, then it is right that the patent should be killed in its infancy. If the answer is negative, the patentee should not be deprived of his patent without the protection of a full scale action. In other words, section 33, like section 14, is designed to clear the register of patents which are manifestly untenable. It is not intended to provide a method of disposing of truly contentious cases.

[14] I propose to approach the appeal on the basis which appealed to Barker J in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Co (No 2):

I shall ask myself the questions in respect of each ground of opposition; is the claim to the patent in suit “manifestly untenable”? Is there a prima facie case for the grant of the patent? Does the justice of the case require the applicant to be permitted to resist the claim for invalidity in properly constituted revocation proceedings? All these tests, although differently stated really amount to the same thing.

  1. Dr Landells also reminded me that the standard of proof is the civil standard on the “balance of probabilities” and that the hearing officer must be “clearly satisfied” that the Applicant for Revocation has discharged its onus, but that this does not mean applying a standard that is “beyond reasonable doubt” (criminal standard) or “beyond doubt”: MacKenzie J, in Sealed Air New Zealand Ltd v Machinery Developments Ltd (High Court, Wellington Registry, CIV-2003-485-2274, 25 August 2004) quoted with approval the words of Buckley J reproduced above from paragraph 11 of Dunlop Holdings.

  1. Dr Landells also submitted that the burden of proof can shift and referred me to Barker J’s words in Beecham v Bristol-Myers (No2) [1980] 1 NZLR 192 at 212:

... whilst the overall onus to prove obviousness or anticipation in opposition proceedings rests on the opponent, that onus may shift, if on a consideration of the documents alone and without the necessity for cross-examination to resolve any conflict, the opponent makes out a prima facie case, on the balance of probabilities. In that event, the applicant may then bear the onus to rebut this conclusion. ....

  1. As submitted by Dr Landells, this is consistent with the approach endorsed by Duffy J in Carter Holt Harvey v Weyerhaeuser Company (High Court, Auckland Registry, CIV-2009-485-000244, 31 March 2010):

... look at the evidence filed on behalf of the applicants and the opponents in order to see (1) whether the opponents’ evidence read by itself clearly establishes the opponents’ case, and, if so, (2) whether the applicants’ evidence in reply raises any bone fide conflict of fact or expert opinion on a question the answer to which the opponents’ case depends.

  1. Mr Brown submitted that where there is a conflict of credible expert opinion, revocation should not be granted. Lord Diplock in General Electric Companies Application [1964] RPC 413 at 453 said:

The right principle is that if on the face of the written evidence filed there appears to be a bona fide conflict of fact or credible expert opinion upon a question on the answer to which the existence or non-existence of the ground for refusal specified depends, the [Commissioner] should not exercise his jurisdiction to refuse the grant, unless, after cross-examination of the witness if he thinks fit to order it, the conflict is clearly resolved in favour of the party opposing the grant.

  1. This principle was affirmed by Harrison J in Merck & Co Inc v Arrow Pharmaceuticals (NZ) Limited (2006) 70 IPR 667 at 12.15:

Here, the examiner expressly recognised that it was a close case - that is, it was, on his analysis, finely balanced. His observation is an implicit acknowledgement of the division within the extensive body of expert evidence lodged before the commissioner. That evidence was directed towards the nature of the skilled addressee, the body of knowledge which he would possess and the way in which such a skilled man would approach problems. Self-evidently, that conflict could not be resolved without a contested hearing, where the evidence was tested through the orthodox means of cross-examination, unless of course the collective weight of one view was so patently wrong that it should be dismissed at a preliminary stage. There was no basis upon which the examiner could reach such a definitive conclusion, and so he was wrong to call it a close case.

Evidence

  1. The evidence of the Applicant for Revocation, in the form of Statutory Declarations, is as follows:

Damian SLIZYS, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, a New Zealand Patent Attorney and a Partner of FB Rice & Co, declared on 16 January 2013.

Marilyn DOMNEY, Wellington, New Zealand, a Business Information Specialist employed by Wellington City Libraries, declared on 30 March 2011 (Domney 1).

Marilyn DOMNEY, declared on 12 September 2012 (Domney 2).

Stephen W PAGE, Newtown, New South Wales, Australia, a consultant specialising in the area of livestock pharmacology and, in particular, consulting on the use of veterinary medicines in livestock animals, such as sheep, beef and dairy cattle, goats, and horses and in companion species such as dogs and cats, declared on 8 February 2013 (Page 1).

Marilyn DOMNEY, declared and signed but undated (Domney 3).

  1. The evidence of the Patentee, in the form of Statutory Declarations, is as follows:

Ian Stanley PASCARL, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, a Partner of Davies Collison Cave Law and Davies Collison Cave, declared on 2 August 2013.

Craig BUNT, Christchurch, New Zealand, a Senior Lecturer in Animal Science at Lincoln University, New Zealand, declared on 27 September 2013 (Bunt 1).

Craig BUNT, a Statutory Declaration filed in Australian opposition proceedings in relation to Australian Patent Application No 2006207326 and included as Annexure CB-10 to Bunt 1 above (Bunt 2).

  1. The evidence in reply of the Applicant for Revocation, in the form of Statutory Declarations, is as follows:

Stephen W PAGE, declared on 3 March 2014 (Page 2).

John Simon LANDELLS, a registered New Zealand Patent Attorney and Senior Associate of FB Rice & Co, declared on 4 March 2014.

Nature of the invention

  1. The title of the complete specification reads:

Anthelmintic Compositions

  1. The first section of the complete specification, from page 1 to page 3b, reads:

Field of the Invention

This invention relates to a composition displaying efficacy against infections of Fasciola hepatica, Ostertagia ostertagi and Cooperia oncophora in susceptible ruminants, especially cattle.

Background of the Invention

Infections of Fasciola hepatica, Ostertagia ostertagi and Cooperia oncophora in livestock are problematic, and in particular first season grazing cattle can be susceptible in contaminated pastures. Injection solutions containing ivermectin and clorsulon are known in the industry for use in treating beef and non-lactating cattle.

Clorsulon is a compound belonging to the benzenesulphonamide (benzenesulfonamide -USA) family which is recommended for control of adult liver flukes (Fasciola hepatica and Fasqiola gigantica) in cattle as suspensions for oral use or in injectable formulations for subcutaneous administrations. The oral recommended level is 7 mg/kg body weight (bw) and the subcutaneous level 2mg/kg bw. Currently, there is no known topical formulation, and this is likely to be due to foreseeable difficulties in achieving adequate penetration of the skin by clorsulon.

An objective of the invention is to provide a topical formulation which is effective against the aforesaid infections, preferably presented as a pour-on formulation. A further object of the invention is provide a composition comprising at least one effective agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, i.e. a macrocylic lactone or chemically modified or synthetic derivative thereof together with another anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type. Another objective of the invention is to provide a composition suitable for the treatment of immature Fasciola hepatica.

With this objective in mind, a study was conducted to determine the feasibility of producing a topical formulation containing known agents already recognised in the field in other delivery forms, e.g. injections, as offering efficacy against infections of Fasciola hepatica (Adult), Ostertagia ostertagi (Adult) and Cooperia oncophora (Adult) in cattle.

The new formulation under consideration for the purposes of this study would include at least one anthelmintic compound of the disulphonamide type, e.g. clorsulon, a member of the benzenesulphonamide family (CAS.No. 60200-06-84; Amino-6-(trichloroethenyl)-1,3-benzene-disulfonamide), and an avermectin suitable for the treatment of immature Fasciola hepatica e.g. ivermectin, a mixture of semi-synthetic macrocyclic lactones (CAS.No. 70288-86-7; “22, 23-dihydro-C076B” a mixture of 80% ivermectin component B1a (5-O-demethyl-22,23-dihydroavermectin A1a) and 20% ivermectin component B1b (5-O-demethyl-35-de(l-methylpropyl)-22,23-dihydro-35-(1-methylethyl)avermectin A1a)).

This study followed an authorised protocol in accordance with recognised industry practice, at an accredited animal facility of Norbrook Laboratories Limited, Research Division, upon healthy male calves of European bovine stock.

During the study each animal was infected with 500 metacercariae of Fasciola hepatica, 10000 Ostertagia ostertagi larvae and 10000 Cooperia oncophora larvae. At 79 days following the administration of Fasciola hepatica and 32 days following administration of Ostertagia ostertagi and Cooperia oncophora the animals were treated with a pour-on formulation newly developed by Norbrook Laboratories Limited, comprising ivermectin and clorsulon. Approximately 3 weeks following treatment all animals were slaughtered and livers, abomasums and small intestines removed. These organs were processed to allow enumeration of helminths contained in each.

The calves used in the study were all healthy at selection and throughout the study period. The tested pour-on product was well tolerated in cattle and no adverse reactions to treatment were observed during the course of the study.

Enumeration of Fasciola hepatica, Ostertagia ostertagi and Cooperia oncophora burdens after slaughter and comparison to those of the untreated control group confirmed an efficacy of > 90% for each parasite and therefore it can be concluded that the tested pour~on product is effective in the treatment of adult FascioIa hepatica, adult Ostertagia ostertagi and adult Cooperia oncophora infections in cattle.

The efficacy of the tested pour-on product, in this instance comprising ivermectin and clorsulon, against induced infections of adult Fasciola hepatica, adult Ostertagia oslertagi and adult Cooperia oncophora cattle following topical administration at a nominal dose rate of 500 µg ivermectin and 5mg clorsulon per kg bodyweight was recognised.

Summary of the invention

Accordingly, the present invention provides a hitherto unavailable topical formulation comprising as active ingredients, at least one effective agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, i.e. a macrocylic lactone e.g. an avermectin or chemically modified or synthetic derivative thereof, e.g. ivermectin, together with another anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, e.g. clorsulon, in a carrier that facilitates topical administration and delivery of the active ingredients transdermally. The carrier comprises alcoholic solvents, with optional excipients and formulation aids, which may comprise a polymeric species such as PVP or a poloxamer. In preferred form, a pour-on formulation is provided containing clorsulon and ivermectin. The alcoholic solvents comprise at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol, together with isopropanol to make the formulation up to 100%.

An embodiment of such a formulation of this invention is:

ivermectin 0.5% (w/v) Clorsulon 5.0% (w/v)

Ethanol 30% v/v PEG200 10% v/v

Crodamol Cap 20% v/v IPA (isopropanol) to 100% v/v

Brilliant Blue Dye 0.01 %(w/v) Denatonium Benzoate 0.001 %(w/v)

The nominal dose rate thereof is 500 µg ivermectin and 5mg clorsulon per kg bodyweight.

The invention also provides a topical anthelmintic formulation including, as active ingredients, a therapeutically effective amount of at least one anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, with a therapeutically effective amount of at least one other anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, in an alcoholic solvent-based carrier suitable for topical administration and delivery of the active ingredients transdermally, said carrier including at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol together with isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%.

Preferably the formulation is presented as a pour-on.

Preferably the formulation includes an avermectin. In a further preferred form the formulation includes ivermectin. In a highly preferred form both.

Preferably the anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type is clorsulon. A highly preferred form of the formulation includes clorsulon and ivermectin.

Preferably the formulation has an efficacy such that, when applied to the skin of an animal infected by F. hepatica, at least 90% of the mature F. hepatica are killed.

Preferably the therapeutically effective amount for cattle of clorsulon is at least 5% (w/v). Preferably the dosage rate is controlled to provide about 500µg ivermectin and 5mg/kg of clorsulon.

Preferably the carrier includes a polymeric species.

Preferably in use the formulation provides at least 2µg of a benzenesulphonamide per ml of blood plasma.

A highly preferred formulation for use on cattle, presented as a pour-on includes:

Ivermectin 0.5% (w/v) Clorsulon 5.0% (w/v)

Ethanol 30% v/v PEG200 10% v/v

Crodamol Cap 20% v/v IPA (isopropanol) to 100% v/v

Brilliant Blue Dye 0.0l%(w/v) Denatonium Benzoate 0.001 %(w/v)

Preferably the formulation includes at least one excipient and/or formulation aid.

  1. The claims read as follows:

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation including, as active ingredients, a therapeutically effective amount of at least one anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, with a therapeutically effective amount of at least one other anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, in an alcoholic solvent-based carrier suitable for topical administration and delivery of the active ingredients transdermally, said carrier including at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol together with isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to claim 1, wherein the formulation is presented as a pour-on.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to claim 1, wherein the formulation includes an avermectin.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to claim 1, wherein the formulation includes ivermectin.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according any one of the preceding claims, wherein the anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type is clorsulon.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to claim 1 or claim 2, including clorsulon and ivermectin.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to any one of the preceding claims, having an efficacy such that, when applied to the skin of an animal infected by F. hepatica, at least 90% of the mature F. hepatica are killed.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to claim 5, wherein the therapeutically effective amount for cattle of clorsulon is at least 5% (w/v).

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to any one of the preceding claims, wherein the carrier includes a polymeric species.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to claim 1, which in use provides at least 2µg of a benzenesulphonamide per ml of blood plasma.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to claim 6 for use on cattle, wherein the dosage rate is controlled to provide about 500µg ivermectin and 5mg/kg of clorsulon.

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation for use on cattle, presented as a pour-on and consisting of:

Ivermectin 0.5% (w/v) Clorsulon 5.0% (w/v)

Ethanol 30% v/v PEG200 10% v/v

Crodamol Cap 20% v/v IPA (isopropanol) to 100% v/v

Brilliant Blue Dye 0.0l%(w/v) Denatonium Benzoate 0.001 %(w/v

  1. A topical anthelmintic formulation according to any one of the preceding claims wherein it includes at least one excipient and/or formulation aid.


Priority date

  1. The complete specification was filed on 19 January 2006 as a national phase entry of PCT Application No PCT/GB2006/00211 and claimed a priority date from GB 0501220.8 filed on 21 January 2005.

  1. The Applicant for Revocation, in its Statement of Case, states:

2.2 The Opponent alleges that none of the claims are entitled to a priority date of 21 January 2005 and puts the Applicant to proof that they are so entitled.

2.3 The Opponent submits that the specification at page 2, lines 20 to 26 and 28 to 32 of the priority document does not provide priority basis for the features of claim 1 of the patent as granted. In particular, the only disclosure of the percentage ethanol and isopropanol is in the context of the specific embodiment at the bottom of page 2 of the priority document, which discloses that:

"An embodiment of such a formulation of this invention is:

Ivermectin 0.5% (w/v) Clorsulon 5.0% (w/v)

Ethanol 30% (v/v) PEG200 10% (v/v)

Crodamol Cap 20 % (v/v) IPA(isopropanol) to 100 % v/v

Brilliant Blue Dye 0.01% (w/v) Denatonium Benzoate 0.001% (w/v)"

2.4 Thus, aside from this particular embodiment, there is no disclosure that the formulations of the patent in general contain 30 % ethanol (v/v). In other words, the "30 % ethanol" feature is not disclosed anywhere other than in combination with the above-specified components, in the defined amounts.

2.5 Moreover, claim 1 refers to an alcoholic solvent based carrier comprising "at least 30% ethanol", whereas the priority document only discloses a specific embodiment containing 30% (v/v) ethanol, i.e. there is no disclosure anywhere in the priority document of formulations containing greater than 30 % ethanol.

[Emphasis added by Applicant for Revocation]

  1. As pointed out by Mr Brown, the test for fair basis in his situation is that set out by Lloyd Jacob J in Mond Nickel Ltd’s Application [1956] RPC 189 at 194:

It seems to me that there is a three-fold investigation which is called for. Firstly one has to enquire whether the alleged invention as claimed can be said to have been broadly described in the provisional specification, and only if an affirmative answer is given to that question does one proceed to the second question, which is: Is there anything in the provisional specification which is inconsistent with the alleged invention as claimed? If it is found, upon examination, that the invention as characterised in the claim includes something which is inconsistent with that which is described in the provisional specification, as at present advised I should think that it would be right to conclude that that claim could not have been fairly based upon the disclosure; but, assuming that those two burdens are satisfactorily surmounted, there is, I think, a third matter for enquiry: Does the claim include as a characteristic of the invention a feature as to which the provisional specification is wholly silent? It is with those approaches which I have indicated that I have to consider the submissions which have been made to me in the present case.
[Emphasis added]

  1. In the present case, of course, in considering these three questions the basic United Kingdom specification from which priority is claimed, rather that a “provisional” specification, must be considered.

  1. Also as pointed out by Mr Brown, the term “broadly described” was clarified by the Court in Imperial Chemical Industries Limited’s application [1960] RPC 223 at 228 as meaning “in a general sense”.

  1. In the present case the priority document, GB 0501220.8, under the heading “Summary of the invention”, states:

Accordingly, the present invention provides a hitherto unavailable topical formulation comprising as active ingredients, at least one effective agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, i.e. a macrocylic lactone e.g. an avermectin or chemically modified or synthetic derivative thereof, e.g. ivermectin, together with another anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, e.g. clorsulon, in a carrier that facilitates topical administration and delivery of the active ingredients transdermally. A carrier that is useful for this purpose comprises alcoholic solvents with optional excipients and formulation aids. In preferred form, pour-on formulation is provided containing clorsulon and ivermectin.

An embodiment of such a formulation of this invention is:

Ivermectin 0.5% (w/v) Clorsulon 5.0% (w/v)

Ethanol 30% v/v PEG200 10% v/v

Crodamol Cap 20% v/v IPA (isopropanol) to 100% v/v

Brilliant Blue Dye 0.01% (w/v) Denatonium Benzoate 0.001% (w/v)

  1. In answer to the first question it seems to me that the priority document does broadly describe the alleged invention. As submitted by Mr Brown, the document discloses at least one anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, at least one other anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, and a “carrier” comprising at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol together with isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%, and highlights the importance of the carrier and, in particular, “the alcoholic solvents with optional excipients and formulation aids”.

  1. The answer to the second question must be in the negative – there is nothing in the priority document which is inconsistent with the invention as claimed in the claims of the present complete specification.

  1. Finally, in answer to the third question, there is no feature in the claims of the present complete specification as to which the priority document is wholly silent.

  1. Thus I conclude that the priority date of the present complete specification is 21 January 2005, the date of filing of the United Kingdom patent specification No GB 0501220.8.


The second amended Application for Revocation and first amended Statement of Case

  1. At the hearing Dr Landells stated, in his submissions in reply, that there had been a “clear oversight” by the Opponent in not including two documents, IVOMEC Plus Injection for Cattle (IVOMEC-F) and IVOMEC Pour-on for cattle and deer (IVOMEC Pour-on), as Prior Publications in the Statement of Case. He also submitted that it was indicated in the oral submissions that there was a clear intention to include these two documents and requested that approval be given to file an amended Statement of Case.

  1. This request was formalised by the filing on 11 June 2014 of a second amended Application for Revocation and amended Statement of Case. In support of the request the covering letter stated:

In support of this request it is submitted that the prior art documents of lvomec-F and lvomec Pour-On were extensively relied upon as ”published documents" in the evidence filed by the Opponent, for example at paragraphs 28, 29, 34 and 35, of the First Page New Zealand Declaration dated 8 February 2013, extensively addressed in the Patentee's evidence in support, for example at paragraphs 34 to 45 in the Second Bunt New Zealand Declaration dated 27 September 2013, and again extensively relied upon as published prior art in the Opponent's evidence in reply, for example the Second Page New Zealand Declaration dated 3 March 2014 and the Landells Declaration dated 4 March 2014 (including Exhibits JSL-1 to JSL-4). Further, the written submissions filed by the Opponent, which were made available to the attorneys and counsel for the Patentee earlier in the week before the hearing, clearly relied upon these prior published documents as "published" documents under the first limb of the Section 21(e) ground. It is also pointed out that the attorneys for the Patentee have been fully aware of these two prior art documents as published documents in the counterpart Australian opposition. It is therefore submitted that the Patentee has been able to fully address these two documents, and it would be in the public interest not to restrict the Assistant Commissioner in the consideration of the evidence under both limbs of Section 21(e).

  1. In a letter dated 3 July 2014 the Attorney for the Patentee confirmed that the Patentee wished to oppose the application to amend the “revocation application/belated opposition and Statement of Case” and accordingly written submissions were filed by the Patentee on 15 July 2014.

  1. After pointing out that the Patentee had not been able to find any example where, in proceedings before IPONZ, a party has been allowed to amend its pleadings post hearing”, a number of legal principles were discussed.

  1. Regulation 167 reads as follows:

(1) In any proceedings before the Commissioner, if he thinks fit,—

(a) any document filed in the proceedings for the amendment of which no express provision is made in the Act or these regulations may be amended during the course of the proceedings:

(b) any irregularity in procedure may be rectified.

(2) Any approval given by the Commissioner under this section may be on such terms as he may direct, including, if he thinks fit, the payment of a fee not exceeding $50.

  1. It is clearly stated in paragraph 453 of Terrell on the Law of Patents, Twelfth Edition (1971), that a party cannot rely on the case being made clear in the evidence filed:

... The issues must be adequately defined by the Statement and Counter-statement, and not left to be made clear by the declarations filed at a later stage. ...

  1. Paragraph 5-206 of Patents for Inventions, T A Blanco White, Fourth Edition (1974) states:

Additions and alterations to the opponent’s case, not needing amendment to the notice of opposition, should be made the subject of a supplementary statement of case. There is an old-established practice of taking such altered or additional grounds into consideration without amendment of the statement, where they are adequately raised by the evidence, but this is wrong—the parties ought not to raise matters not pleaded. Leave to raise new matter at the hearing is apt to be refused, if the hearing will be adjourned in consequence.

[Emphasis added]

  1. Lloyd-Jacob J, in Bradford Dyers Association Limited [1966] FSR 79, emphasised the importance of clear and explicit pleadings. He said:

It is of the utmost importance that documents required by the Rules to be filed in cases such as the present [i.e. opposition proceedings] should be as clear and as explicit as is reasonably possible and that no submission or argument should be presented or considered which is inconsistent with their plain meaning. The strong aversion shared by the Patent Office and parties to adjournments of fixed hearings, with its accompaniment of delay, expense and wasted effort, should not be permitted to excuse non-observance of the essential requirements that the issues to be debated should be adequately and formally defined.

  1. The Patentee submitted that the Applicant for Revocation, in its original Application for Revocation and its Statement of Case (on which the case was argued at the hearing) pleaded the two separate limbs of Obviousness, Obviousness having regard to prior publication and Obviousness having regard to prior use. However, the references to the two documents in question, IVOMEC Plus Injection for Cattle (IVOMEC-F) and IVOMEC Pour-on for cattle and deer (IVOMEC Pour-on), were only cited under the second limb. As again pointed out by the Applicant for Revocation, it is well-established practice, at least in New Zealand, that the two limbs are separate and may not be combined; this is confirmed by a Practice Note published in New Zealand Patent Office Journal No 1367, issued on 28 April 1993:

Obviousness: Ground (e) This ground has two separate and distinct limbs. (a) obviousness and clear lack of inventive step, having regard to what has been published in New Zealand, before the priority date of a claim under attack, and (b) obviousness and clear lack of inventive step, having regard to what has been used in New Zealand, before the priority date of a claim under attack. It is not permissible to combine the two separate limbs. Note the use of the disjunctive "or" in the paragraph. It should be noted that the term “common general knowledge" is not mentioned in the section, and is consequently not a ground of opposition. What is, or is not, common general knowledge is a matter for the evidence stages of the pleadings. See Benz Ltd’s Application [1958] R.P.C. 78 at 79.

  1. I agree with the Patentee’s contention that what the Applicant for Revocation is now attempting to do, after the case has been heard, is to legitimise the incorporation of Prior use into the first limb of section 21(1)(e).

  1. In their letter of 11 June 2014, referred to in paragraph 3 above, the Applicant for Revocation quoted paragraphs 28, 29, 34, and 35 of Page 1, paragraphs 34 and 35 of Bunt 1, and Page 2 and the Landells evidence in reply.

  1. The quoted paragraphs of Page 1, together with paragraph 27, which assists in determining the relevance of the quoted paragraphs, read as follows:

  1. l was initially asked by FB Rice to set out what l believe was the "common general knowledge" of a skilled but non-inventive worker in the field of the treatment of animals using topically administered antiparasitic agents ("the relevant field") in Australia immediately before 21 January 2005 ("the priority date of the opposed application”), which l was advised was the earliest priority date of the patent application that is opposed by Merial.

  1. I was then provided with Material Safety Data Sheets for the commercial product IVOMEC Plus Injection for Cattle (also known as IVOMEC F) injection for cattle comprising ivermectin and clorsulon (Exhibit SWP-10) and the commercial product IVOMEC Pour-on comprising ivermectin (Exhibit SWP-11). Based on this information l was asked to consider how l would formulate a pour-on combination product comprising ivermectin and clorsulon. Specifically, I was asked to consider what carriers and excipients could be utilised to formulate such a combination for pour-on application to cattle. I was advised that the priority date for the opposed patent is 21 January 2005 and instructed to consider only prior art before this date.

  1. Following this, I was informed that the Australian proceeding related to an opposition by Merial to Australian Application No. 2006207326 in the name of Norbrook Laboratories Limited entitled “Anthelmintic Composition" (herein referred to as "the opposed Australian application" or "the opposed Australian specification”). Exhibit SWP-NZ4 is a copy of the opposed Australian application. At the same time as receiving the Australian application, l was provided with the corresponding New Zealand application. Exhibit SWP-N25 is a copy of the opposed New Zealand application. I was also advised that the opposed Australian and New Zealand applications derive priority from a Great Britain provisional patent application filed on 21 January 2005 (PCT/GB2006/000211). Exhibit SWP-NZ6 is a copy of the priority document. l was asked to consider the opposed Australian application and the priority document and provide comments in light of what I believe was common general knowledge to those persons involved in the relevant field.

...

  1. With regard to the Australian MSDS for the IVOMEC Pour-on for cattle referred to in the first declaration as Exhibit SWP-11, l consider that this would have been available in New Zealand before the priority date. However, products sold in New Zealand require a New Zealand specific MSDS. As such, a skilled person may have considered the New Zealand MSDS in addition to or in replacement of the Australian MSDS. Submitted as Exhibit SWP-NZ7 is the New Zealand MSDS for IVOMEC Pour-on for cattle and deer (dated 28 September 1998). I note that the New Zealand MSDS is equivalent to the Australian MSDS in that it discloses that the product comprises ivermectin (ivermectin comp. B1la and B1b), isopropyl alcohol and inert ingredients.

  1. With regard to Exhibit SWP-20, Exhibit SWP-21, Exhibit SWP-26, Exhibit SWP-27 and Exhibit SWP-34 which relate to Freedom of Information summaries from the US Food and Drug Administration (Exhibit SWP-20), Summary of Product Characteristics (SPC) from the UK Veterinary Medicines Directorate (VMD) (Exhibit SWP-21, Exhibit SWP-26 and Exhibit SWP-27) and Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing, Office of Chemical Safety and Environmental Health ADI List: Acceptable Daily intakes for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (Exhibit SWP-34), l consider that these documents would have been accessible to a person in New Zealand in the same way that they were available to a person in Australia as discussed in the first declaration.

[Emphasis in original]

  1. These paragraphs all appeared under the heading “Common General Knowledge” and, as I understand it, there was no indication that they were considered by the Applicant for Revocation as potential citations under the ground of Obviousness with regard to Prior Publication.

  1. The quoted paragraphs of Bunt 1 read as follows:

  1. Page has not identified any prior art which discloses the alcoholic solvent combination of at least 30% ethanol in isopropanol. As I have commented for the Australian opposition (paragraph 28 of my Australian declaration annexure CB10), only two of the Exhibits provided by Page in his summation of the common general knowledge disclose formulations comprising ivermectln or combinations thereof and an alcoholic solvent. These are the MSDS for Ivomec Pour-on for cattle (SWP-11) and an extract from Pfizer's Compendium of Veterinary Products, which includes Ivercide Liquid for horses (SWP-19). Both of these disclosures include ivermectin as the only active ingredient, together with 80% isopropanol and 3% benzyl alcohol, respectively.

  1. Furthermore, prior to having viewed the opposed Australian patent application (paragraph 69 of the 10 August 2012 declaration), Page stated in paragraph 66 of his 10 August 2012 declaration that before 21 January 2005, there would have been great interest in a pour-on formulation of Ivermectin and clorsulon that was as similar as possible to the known Ivomec Pour-On, which indudes triethanolamine and isopropyl alcohol in combination with Ivermectln. He was silent with respect to the alleged "arbitrary and non-inventive combination" of ethanol and isopropanol.

  1. As pointed out by the Applicant for Revocation, the quoted paragraphs in Dr Bunt’s declaration do not address an inventive step based on prior publication but, rather, he is primarily addressing the development of a pour-on combination comprising ivermectin and clorsulon; in other words, he is discussing the obviousness based on prior use starting from the MSDS (Material Safety Datasheet) for Ivomec plus and Ivomec Pour-On for cattle.

  1. In the case of Page 2 and Landells Statutory Declaration, both in reply, I agree with the Patentee’s submission that neither of these declarations discuss the IVOMEC products with respect to Obviousness. Page 2 discusses them in relation to the commercial delay in the development of a pour-on product and in relation to the development of a pour-on product. Dr Landells' declaration simply confirms that registration details for IVOMEC PLUS injection for Cattle and IVOMEC Pour-On for Cattle and Deer were published in New Zealand before the priority date of the present complete specification. The Patentee also points out that neither of these documents discloses the carriers and excipients included in the formulations.

  1. Finally, in relation to the Applicant for Revocation’s statement concerning the content of the written submissions filed, and provided to the Patentee only two days before the hearing, it is useful to produce the relevant paragraphs of these submissions and the Patentee’s comment on them.

  1. Paragraphs 178 and 179 of the submissions of the Applicant for Revocation read:

  1. The Opponent refers to the above previous submissions regarding the prior art documents of Razzak, Blakely, lvomec F and lvomec Pour-on, and submits that a person skilled in the field would have been reasonably expected to have combined the disclosure and teaching in Razzak with one or more of Blakely, lvomec F and lvomec Pour-on documents, in considering the development of a pour-on anthelmintic comprising ivermectin and clorsulon (see paragraphs 264 to 283 of the First Page New Zealand Declaration and paragraph 75 of Second Page New Zealand Declaration.)

  1. As submitted above, Razzak discloses an anthelmintic formulation comprising a combination of at least one anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermitins (avermectins including ivermectin), with at least one other anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type (clorsulon). The compositions containing ivermectin and clorsulon can be “easily adapted” for topical administration and contain medium chain mono- and diglycerides and preferably at least one of a surfactant, solvent or carrier. The solvent can be an alcohol, with isopropanol, amyl and benzyl alcohol specifically listed.

  1. Paragraphs 197 to 199 of the submissions of the Patentee read:

  1. A final comment needs to be made concerning Merial’s submissions on combination documents/prior art at paras 178-187 of its submissions. Here it is contended that the skilled addressee can combine Razzak with one or more of Blakely, “lvomec F (Plus) and lvomec Pour-On documents”.

  1. The patentee objects to this combining of prior are [sic] for two reasons.

  1. First, the Statement of Case filed by Merial does not rely on lvomec Plus or lvomec Pour-on “documents” as prior art documents for the first limb of s21(1)(e), i.e. having regard to what has been published before the priority date. They were relied on only for obviousness through prior use.

  1. Second, and in any event, it is well established law that it is impermissible to combine the two separate limbs of s 21(1)(e). This was the subject of a Practice Note from IPONZ in Journal 1287 as follows: [the practice note reproduced in paragraph 39 above].

[Emphasis added]

  1. After consideration of all the above matters, I conclude that the particular circumstances of the present case do not justify a departure from the general policy as outlined, for example, by Lloyd-Jacob J, in Bradford Dyers Association Limited [1966] FSR 79 (quoted above in paragraph 38). I therefore refuse the request, made at the hearing and in the Applicant for Revocation’s letter of 11 June 2014 (quoted above), to file the second amended Application for Revocation and amended Statement of Case. Thus, the case will be decided with reference to the first amended Application for Revocation and Statement of Case filed on 17 April 2012.

Prior publication – section 21(1)(b)

  1. Section 21(1)(b) reads:

That the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, has been published in New Zealand before the priority date of the claim—

(i) in any specification filed in pursuance of an application for a patent made in New Zealand and dated within 50 years next before the date of filing of the applicant's complete specification:

(ii) in any other document (not being a document of any class described in subsection (1) of section 59 of this Act):

  1. The usual test for prior publication is that set forth in the judgment of the English Court of Appeal, delivered by Sachs LJ, in The General Tire & Rubber Company v The Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company Limited and Others [1972] RPC 457 at 485-486:

If the prior inventor's publication contains a clear description of, or clear instructions to do or make, something that would infringe the patentee's claims if carried out after the grant of the patentee's patent, the patentee's claim will have been shown to lack the necessary novelty, that is to say, it will have been anticipated. The prior inventor, however, and the patentee may have approached the same device from different starting points and may for this reason, or it may be for other reasons, have so described their devices that it cannot be immediately discerned from a reading of the language which they have respectively used that they have discovered in truth the same device; but if carrying out the directions contained in the prior inventor's publication will inevitably result in something being made or done which, if the patentee's patent were valid, would constitute an infringement of the patentee's claim, this circumstance demonstrates that the patentee's claim has in fact been anticipated.

If, on the other hand, the prior publication contains a direction which is capable of being carried out in a manner which would infringe the patentee's claim, but would be at least as likely to be carried out in a way which would not do so, the patentee's claim will not have been anticipated, although it may fail on the ground of obviousness. To anticipate the patentee's claim the prior publication must contain clear and unmistakeable directions to do what the patentee claims to have invented... A signpost, however clear, upon the road to the patentee's invention will not suffice. The prior inventor must be clearly shown to have planted his flag at the precise destination before the patentee.

  1. As pointed out by Mr Brown, this test was affirmed by the New Zealand Supreme Court in Lucas v Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd [2006] NZSC 20; [2006] 3 NZLR 721, at [3].

  1. Mr Brown also pointed out that MacKenzie J, in Sealed Air New Zealand Limited v Machinery Developments Limited, HC Wellington CIV-2003-485-2274. Paragraph 16 reads:

The test for prior publication is the “reverse infringement” test. That is to say, the test is to consider the document relied upon as constituting prior publication, and to determine whether that clearly (a) describes something that would infringe the claim, or (b) instructs something to be done or made which would infringe the claim, or (c) gives directions, the carrying out of which would inevitably result in infringement of the patent applied for. The test is described by Sachs LJ (delivering the judgment of the Court) in General Tire & Rubber Company v The Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company Limited and Others [1972] RPC 457 at 485-486, in these terms ...

  1. In its Statement of Case the Applicant for Revocation cites one document (European Patent Specification No WO 0209764) under this ground. According to the evidence of Mr Slizys, it was available to the public at IPONZ from 20 February 2002.

  1. The abstract of this document reads:

The invention relates to a veterinary composition and in particular one that enables the incorporation of both hydrophilic and lipophilic drugs. In a first aspect the invention relates to a stable composition including at least one hydrophilic active and medium chain mono- and di-glycerides. Preferably the composition additionally includes at least one lipophilic active. Preferably the composition additionally includes at least one of a surfactant, solvent and a carrier. Preferably the hydrophilic is selected from the group including clorsulon, closantel, vaccine solution, sodium selenate, vitamin B12, and other hydrophilic anthelmintics and mineral salts. More preferably the lipophilic active is selected from the group including macrocyclic lactones, including avermectins and milbemycins.

  1. A list of suitable organic solvents is given on page 3 of the cited document:

More preferably the organic solvent is selected from the group including benzyl alcohol, polyethylene glycol (PEG), propylene glycol, alcohol including isopropyl, amyl and benzyl, 2-pyrollidone, N-methyl pyrollidone, tetraglycol, dimethyl sulphoxide, xylene, petroleum distillate, aromatic hydrocarbons, dipropylene glycol methyl ether, diethylene glycol monobutyl ether, dioxolans, glycerol formal, glycofurol, dimethylacetamide, N-(B-hydroxyethyl)-lactamide, ethyl lactate, glycerin, 1,3-Butylene glycol and other pharmaceutically acceptable excipients. Most preferably said organic solvent may be benzyl alcohol.

  1. I note that although isopropyl alcohol (propanol) is listed, ethanol is not.

  1. Dr Bunt, in Exhibit CB-10 to Bunt 2, a Statutory Declaration prepared by him for the equivalent Australian proceedings, states:

I have undertaken the comparison requested In Annexure CB-9 and it is clear that the Razzak patent does not disclose all the features of the claims of the Australian patent. The Razzak patent does not disclose:

(a) a topical formulation comprising a combination of at least one anthelmintic derived from Streptomyces avermitillis, with at least one anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type.

(b) neither does It disclose a topical formulation comprising ethanol and isopropyl [sec] as the alcoholic solvents either alone or in combination; or

(c) in the proportions of at least 30% (v/v) ethanol together with an isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%.

  1. I agree with Dr Bunt with regard to (b) and (c), but note that the cited document does, as pointed out by Mr Page in paragraph 103 of Page 1, disclose, on page 9, a “preferred composition” containing 1% Ivermectin and 10% Clorsulon. Therefore I am satisfied that the prior inventor has not, in this case, “planted his flag at the precise destination before the patentee”.

  1. Thus I find that the ground of Prior publication is not made out.

Obviousness – section 21(1)(e)

  1. Section 21(1)(e) reads:

that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is obvious and clearly does not involve any inventive step having regard to matter published as mentioned in paragraph (b), or having regard to what was used in New Zealand before the priority date of the applicant's claim:

  1. Both Dr Landells and Mr Brown reminded me of the importance of the word “clearly” in section 21(1)(e) – the word does not appear in section 41(1)(f) which relates to Revocation of a patent by the Court rather than the Commissioner of Patents. The significance of the word was discussed by Barker J in Beecham Group Limited v Bristol-Myers Company (No 2) [1980] 1NZLR 192 at 230:

The word “clearly” in s 21(1)(e) is not found in s 41(1)(f) which provides, as a ground for revocation by the court of a patent in proceedings to that end ... The insertion of the word “clearly” in the opposition section indicates a higher onus on an opponent in opposition proceedings who alleges that there is no inventive step; the omission of the word in the revocation section indicates that the onus there is not quite so high.

  1. Dr Landells referred me to a summary of the rationale for testing whether an invention is obvious, by Slade LJ in Hallen Co and Anr v Brabantia (UK) Ltd [1991] RPC 195 at 209:

The word ‘obvious’ in [united Kingdom] section 3 is I believe directed to whether or not an advance is technically or practically obvious and not to whether it is commercially obvious. Although the law is encapsulated in section 3 of the [United Kingdom] Patents Act 1977, the law on obviousness goes back many hundreds of years. The basis of the law is that the public are entitled to manufacture that which has been published, in the sense of made available to the public, with obvious modifications. By ‘obvious modifications’ are meant that which technically or practically would be obvious to the unimaginative skilled addressee in the art. Such a skilled man should be assured that his actions will not be covered by any monopoly granted to another if he does that which is part of the state of the art with modifications which are workshop alterations or otherwise technically or practically obvious alterations. He does not and should not have to look further and consider whether the step he is taking is obvious or not for commercial reasons. The prize for a good commercial decision or idea is a head start on the competition and not a monopoly for twenty years.

  1. Both Dr Landells and Mr Brown agreed that the appropriate test for Obviousness is based on the restatement of the “Windsurfing test” (set out by Lloyd Jacob J in Pozzoli SPA v BDMO SA [1994] RPC 49 at 112-115) and modified by recent decisions where obviousness based on prior publication – the first limb – is in issue:

  1. (a) Identify the notional "person skilled in the appropriate art";

(b) Identify the relevant common general knowledge of that person;

  1. Identify the inventive concept of the claim in question;

  1. Consider the cited published matter;

  1. Identify the differences between the cited published matter and the invention as claimed;

  1. Ask myself whether these differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to a "normally skilled but unimaginative addressee" in the appropriate art, armed with the “common general knowledge" in the appropriate art possessed by such a person, or whether they require any degree of invention.

  1. Dr Landells listed a number of general principles which he submitted emerge from a review of recent leading cases:


The notional “normally skilled but unimaginative addressee”

  1. Several cases were cited by Dr Landells and Mr Brown in defining the characteristics of “skilled addressee”.

  1. Barker J, in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Company 1 NZLR 193 at 232 gave a helpful summary these characteristics:

The issue of obviousness is to be judged from the viewpoint of a notional addressee. This, wraith-like legal creature who stalks the Reports of Patent Cases just as the “reasonable man” does the treatises at tort, is required to have numerous attributes:

(i) He is presumed to be a skilled technician, knowledgeable in the relevant literature, including patent specifications, but incapable of a “scintilla of invention" (see Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Mills & Rockley (Electronics) Ltd [I972] RPC 346, 355, per Lord Reid:

“To whom must the invention be obvious? It is not disputed that the hypothetical addressee is a skilled technician who is well acquainted with workshop technique and who has carefully read the relevant literature. He is supposed to have an unlimited capacity to assimilate the contents of, it may be scores of specifications but to be incapable of a scintilla of invention. When dealing with obviousness, unlike novelty, it is permissible to make a ‘mosaic’ out of the relevant documents, but it must be a mosaic which can be put together by an unimaginative man with no inventive capacity."

(ii) The notional addressee need not be an individual but may be a research team such as the teams employed by both the parties in this case. See Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation v Biorex Laboratories Ltd [l970] RPC l57, l84, where Graham J said:

“At this stage it is most important to appreciate that the papers above referred to are only a very small part of the relevant prior art. It seems probable, as stated above, that they, together with a very large mass of other material, would certainly be produced and would be brought to the notice of a properly qualified and instructed research organisation engaged on the problem in question . . .”

(iii) lt is to be presumed that the notional addressee would seek advice on aspects with which he is not personally familiar. See Tetra Molectric Ltd v Japan Imports Ltd [1976] RPC 547, 583, per Buckley LJ in the Court of Appeal:

“He [referring to the notional skilled person] would not probably be himself expert in the techniques of piezo-electricity; but, having been put on the track, he should, l think, reasonably be expected to seek advice and assistance from an expert or experts in that field. lf he had done so, the evidence of the defendants’ experts, in my opinion, establishes that he would have been advised that the suggestion was definitely worth trying.“

(iv) It is presumed that the notional addressee believes what he finds in the documentation to be true. See May & Baker Ltd v Boots Pure Drug Co Ltd (1950) 67 RPC 23, 36, per Lord Normand:

‘lf it is sometimes convenient to say that the specification should be read as it would be read by a qualified addressee, it is as well to remember that that is not a completely accurate statement, and that the addressee postulated must be assumed to read it with the will to believe what he finds set down in it.”

  1. Tompkins J, in Smale v North Sails Ltd [1991] 3 NZLR 19 at 50 said:

I return to what I understand to be the crucial question. The problem, as defined in the specification by the description of the object of the patent, is to minimise stretch or distortion in the luff area. The question, therefore, is whether a skilled addressee, knowledgeable in the art of sail design and construction, aware of all the developments that had previously taken place, considering the problem at the priority date, 16 May 1983, would have found the solution contained in the patent to be obvious. ...

  1. Morris J, in Novartis New Zealand Ltd & Another v Ancare New Zealand Ltd, High Court, Auckland Registry, 19 June 1998, at 37, said:

The judge of obviousness is a notional addressee. This person is a skilled technician in the art in question, knowledgeable in the relevant literature (including patent specifications and such material as would be discovered on making a diligent search), but unimaginative and with no inventive capacity; Technograph Printed Circuits Ltd v Mills & Rockley (Electronics) Ltd [1972] RPC 346, 355 per Lord Reid; Beecham Group Ltd v. Bristol Myers Co (No.2) [1980] 192. Where the subject matter covers more than one discipline, the notional addressee need not be an individual but may be a research team. In this case such a team would include a toxicologist, chemist and formulator. The Court must consider the whole field of research and the whole field of documents reasonably discoverable or generally known; Dow Chemical Co. (Mildners’) Patent [1975] RPC 165.

  1. Gault J, in Ancare New Zealand Limited v Cyanamid of NZ Limited [2000] NZCA 127; [2000] 3 NZLR 299 at 43, said:

... the test [for obviousness] is well established. It postulates a person (or, where appropriate, a team) skilled in the field but not inventive, invested with the common general knowledge available in the field at the priority date, presented with the prior knowledge or prior use relied upon. Prior documents may be looked at together if that is what the skilled person or team would do. It asks whether to that person or team the alleged inventive step would be obvious and would be recognised, without bringing to bear any inventiveness, as something that could be done or is at least worth trying. That is a question of fact. If any embodiment within the scope of the claim is obvious the claim is invalid. These propositions are helpfully expanded upon in the recent English cases which are still applicable though under the 1977 Act; see the Windsurfing International case, Hallen Co v Brabantia (UK) Ltd [1991] RPC 195 at p 211, and Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd [1994] RPC 49 112

  1. Mr Brown pointed out that it is important to note that Ancare was a revocation case under section 41, not section 42 and therefore the lower test of Obviousness was at play. In the present case the higher standard of “obvious and clearly does not involve any inventive step” applies.

  1. Mr Brown also submitted that ‘it is perhaps unfortunate that in the passage from Ancare [cited in paragraph 71 above] the Court of Appeal did not elucidate the extent of what is meant by the statement “at least worth trying”’. Mr Brown pointed out that in this regard it is worth noting the extra judicial comments of Gault J in a paper given to the International Bar Association annual conference in Auckland in 2004:

A point of contention is whether, if the skilled person were led to undertake a series of ‘trial and error’ tests which would give the result, the required inventive step would be absent. In Hickman v Andrews [1983] RPC 147 at p189, Goff LJ said:

There is another preliminary question and that is what the expert is supposed to be doing. It cannot be that he is to look at the whole store of his imaginary knowledge and see if it is obvious to turn something therein to better account. He must I think have some definite object in view.

In Beecham Group Ltd's (Amoxycillin) Application [1980] RPC 261 at pp290-291 Buckley LJ said that it must be shown that the notional addressee would consider it worthwhile to try the step or process ‘in order to solve some recognised problem or meet some recognised need’. It should not be assumed that the uninventive expert will be engaged in attempting to discover something inventive. Similarly, the Court in Hallen Co (supra) said that the skilled man must be supposed to have tried everything that appeared to him to have a prospect of valuable results.

[Emphasis added by Mr Brown]

  1. Mr Brown also referred me to Peterson Portable Sawing Systems Ltd v Lucas in which the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in Mr Brown’s words, ‘dealt obliquely with the “worth a try” test’. The context was an argument that Fisher J had erred by failing to mention this test. The Court of Appeal rejected this; in paragraph 85 he said:

Fisher J identified all the relevant principles, albeit that he did not specifically invoke the "worth a try" test, the utility of which may well be moot. It seems to add little to the technique of ascertaining obviousness. Anything may be worth a try, depending on acceptable cost for potential benefit, but inventiveness may lie in deciding what to try. The crucial test is the statutory expression examined in terms of the orthodoxy of Windsurfing.

  1. Lord Hoffmann, in Conor Medsystems Inc v Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc [2008] RPC 716, said:

The question of obviousness must be considered on the facts of each case. The court must consider the weight to be attached to any particular factor in the light of all the relevant circumstances. These may include such matters as the motive to find a solution to the problem the patent addressees, the number and extent of the possible avenues of research, the effort involved in pursuing them and the expectation of success.

[Emphasis added by Mr Brown]

  1. Mr Brown pointed out that the High Court of Australia in AB Hassle v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2002] HCA 59; (2002) 212 CLR 411 (a decision given after Ancare) considered carefully, in paragraphs 66-76, the decisions in the UK as to whether something was “obvious” or “worthwhile to try”. It noted, in paragraph 73, the rejection by the Courts in the United States of any notion of “obvious to try” reciting a passage of a decision by Judge Rich in which he said:

Slight reflection suggests, we think, that there is usually an element of 'obviousness to try' in any research endeavor, that it is not undertaken with complete blindness but rather with some semblance of a chance of success, and that patentability determinations based on that as the test would not only be contrary to statute but result in a marked deterioration of the entire patent system as an incentive to invest in those efforts and attempts which go by the name of ‘research’.

  1. The Australian test is, again in Mr Brown’s words, “neatly summarised” by Lindgren J in paragraph 180 of Alphapharm Pty Ltd v H Lundbeck AS as involving two elements:

The High Court also held in Astra (at [50]–[53]) that obviousness was to be determined by asking whether a hypothetical non-inventive skilled addressee, equipped with the common general knowledge as at the priority date, would have taken steps towards the invention “as a matter of routine” in the expectation that they might well produce the invention or some other useful result (endorsing statements in Wellcome Foundation Ltd v V.R. Laboratories (Aust) Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 262 (Wellcome) at 286 and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation v Biorex Laboratories Limited [1970] RPC 157 (Olin) at 187-188). The High Court has therefore insisted on the two elements: (1) being led as a matter of routine to the desired result; and (2) having a reasonable expectation of achieving that result.

[Emphasis added]

  1. The High Court of Australia, considering the question of where, as in the present case, the invention involves a combination of integers, is the combination, rather than each integer of the combination, obvious. The Court said, in paragraph 41 of AB Hassle [supra]:

... The claim is for a combination, the interaction between the integers of which is the essential requirement for the presence of an inventive step. It is the selection of the integers out of "perhaps many possibilities" which must be shown by Alphapharm to be obvious, bearing in mind that the selection of the integers in which the invention lies can be expected to be a process necessarily involving rejection of other possible integers. ...

  1. As pointed out by Mr Brown, the High Court of Australia, in paragraph 76 of AB Hassle [supra] also adopted criticisms of Judge Rich in relation to ‘two kinds of error often associated with the standard of “obvious to try” or even “worth a try”’:

In In re O'Farrell [98], Judge Rich also said:

“The admonition that 'obvious to try' is not the standard under §103 has been directed mainly at two kinds of error. In some cases, what would have been 'obvious to try' would have been to vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful. ... In others, what was 'obvious to try' was to explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it."

The reasoning in these and other United States authorities [99] should be accepted in preference to the path apparently taken in the English decisions, particularly after the 1977 UK Act, upon which Alphapharm relied. The United States decisions reflect an approach to the subject closer to that adopted in Minnesota Mining and Wellcome Foundation.

  1. Mr Brown also pointed out that the High Court of Australia, in AB Hassle, concluded that instead of adopting the English approach of asking whether a non-inventive skilled worker would think it worthwhile to try the solution found in the patent, the test was whether the steps might have been taken by such a person as a matter of course. Paragraph 53 of Hassle reads:

That way of approaching the matter has an affinity with the reformulation of the "Cripps question" by Graham J in Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation v Biorex Laboratories Ltd [57]. This Court had been referred to Olin in the argument in Wellcome Foundation [58]. Graham J had posed the question [59]:

"Would the notional research group at the relevant date, in all the circumstances, which include a knowledge of all the relevant prior art and of the facts of the nature and success of chlorpromazine, directly be led as a matter of course to try the -CF3 substitution in the '2' position in place of the -C1 atom in chlorpromazine or in any other body which, apart from the -CF3 substitution, has the other characteristics of the formula of claim 1, in the expectation that it might well produce a useful alternative to or better drug than chlorpromazine or a body useful for any other purpose?" (emphasis added)

That approach should be accepted.

  1. Finally, as submitted by Mr Brown, the authorities establish that it is erroneous to characterise the variation of all parameters or the trying of all choices until one proves successful as being obvious (Alphapharm [supra] at [183] referring to AB Hassle [supra] at [76]). What must be shown, consistent with the above principles, is that the person skilled in the art would have been directly led as a matter of course to try the claimed invention, as distinct from other avenues of inquiry, with a reasonable expectation of success. The conduct of a program of trial and error with dead ends and the retracing of steps is not indicative of obviousness (AB Hassel [supra] at [58]).


The notional skilled addressee(s) in the present case

  1. Two expert witnesses are involved in the present case, Mr Page for the Applicant for Revocation and Dr Bunt for the Patentee.

  1. Mr Page is a consultant specialising in the area of livestock pharmacology and, in particular, the use of veterinary medicines in livestock animals, such as sheep, beef, and dairy cattle, goats, and horses, and in companion species such as dogs and cats. He has also had experience as a university teacher and in private industry, including the development of a number of pour-on anthelmintic compositions.

  1. Dr Bunt is currently employed as a senior lecturer in animal science at Lincoln University in New Zealand. He has had considerable university teaching and research experience and, as stated in paragraph 11 of Bunt 1, has “extensive knowledge of pharmaceutical formulation science, especially; formulation, veterinary drug delivery and parenteral drug delivery (including transdermal and vaginal)”.

  1. I am satisfied that both Mr Page and Dr Bunt fulfil the requirements of the notional “skilled addressee”.


The common general knowledge

  1. Dr Landells referred me to a useful definition of “common general knowledge” given by Laddie J in Raychem Corp’s Patent [1997] EWHC 372; [1998] RPC 31 (Ch) at 40:

... It seems to me that another passage in the [General Tire and Rubber Company v Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company Limited 1972 RPC 457 at 43 sets] out the rationale for treating data as common general knowledge:

“As regards patent specifications it is the somewhat artificial concept of patent law that each and every specification, of the last 50 years, however unlikely to be looked at and in whatever language written, is part of the relevant public knowledge if it is resting anywhere in the shelves of the Patent Office. On the other hand, common general knowledge is a different concept derived from a common-sense approach to the practical question of what would in fact be known to an appropriately skilled addressee - the sort of man, good at his job that could be found in real life.”

This emphasises the difference between pleaded prior art and common general knowledge. The court is trying to determine in a common sense way how the average skilled but non-inventive technician would have reacted to the pleaded prior art if it had been put before him in his work place or laboratory. The common general knowledge is the technical background of the notional man in the art against which the prior art must be considered. This is not limited to material he has memorised and has at the front of his mind. In includes all that material in the field he is working in which he knows exists, which he would refer to as a matter of course if he cannot remember it and which he understands is generally regarded as sufficiently reliable to use as a foundation for further work or to help understand the pleaded prior art. This does not mean that everything on the shelf which is capable of being referred to without difficulty is common general knowledge nor does it mean that every word in a common text book is either. In the case of standard textbooks, it is likely that all or most of the main text will be common general knowledge. In many cases common general knowledge will include or be reflected in readily available trade literature which a man in the art would be expected to have at his elbow and regard as basic reliable information. ...

  1. I have carefully and thoroughly considered the evidence of Mr Page and Dr Bunt on the question of the “common general knowledge” and it seems to me that the following summary represents the items on which there is agreement between them.

Page also says in paragraph 78 of his 10 August 2012 declaration and in a number of paragraphs in his 8 February 2013 declaration including at paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 that the combination of 30% ethanol together with lsopropanol to 100% is a trivial selection of a solvent mixture that a skilled person would derive through routine experimentation. I disagree with this comment. Although selection of an aliphatic alcohol in a solvent system is not unusual, the selection of two aliphatic alcohols as the solvent system for a pour-on formulation is atypical.

[Emphasis added]

The inventive concept

  1. Dr Landells referred me to the words of Lloyd Jacob J in Pozzoli SPA v BDMO SA [2007] EWCA Civ 588; [2007] FSR 37 [15]-[17]:

I think the [Windsurfing] test requires some restatement and elaboration. First one must actually conduct the first two operations in the opposite order—mantle first, then concept. For it is only through the eyes of the skilled man that one properly understand what such a man would understand the patentee to have meant and thereby set about identifying the concept.

Next, that first step actually involves two steps, identification of the attributes of the notional “person skilled in the art” (the statutory term) and second identification of the common general knowledge (cgk) of such a person.

What now becomes stage (2), identifying the inventive concept, also needs some elaboration. As I pointed out in Unilever Plc v Chefaro Proprietaries Ltd [1994] R.P.C. 567 at 580:

“It is the inventive concept of the claim in question which must be considered, not some generalised concept to be derived from the specification as a whole. Different claims can, and generally will, have different inventive concepts. The first stage of identification of the concept is likely to be a question of construction: what does the claim mean? It might be thought there is no second stage—the concept is what the claim covers and that is that. But that is too wooden and not what courts, applying Windsurfing stage one, have done. It is too wooden" because if one merely construes the claim one does not distinguish between portions which matter and portions which, although limitations on the ambit of the claim, do not. One is trying to identify the essence of the claim in this exercise.”

  1. Dr Landells for the Applicant for Revocation submitted that:

... the inventive concept (or solution to the problem as identified in the complete specification) provided by claim 1 is the use of an alcoholic solvent-based carrier comprising ethanol and isopropanol. Claim 1 also recites an additional parameter of "at least 30% v/v ethanol". It is submitted by the Opponent that this additional parameter is an arbitrary selection that does not provide any additional technical property, particularly in view of the evidence of the Opponent and as detailed further below. Consequently, the Opponent submits that the inventive concept does not encompass this additional arbitrary parameter and the inventive concept should be considered (at most) to essentially be a ‘topical anthelmintic formulation comprising a macrocyclic lactone (e.g. ivermectin) and a sulphonamide (clorsulon) in an alcoholic solvent carrier comprising ethanol and isopropanol'.

  1. Mr Brown, for the Patentee, has proposed a separate inventive concept for each claim, including the dependent claims. His proposals for the two independent claims are:

The inventive concept [of Claim 1] is the provision of a topical anthelmintic formulation effective for the treatment of infections of Fasciola hepatica, Ostertagia ostertagi and Cooperia oncophora in susceptible ruminants, the topical anthelmintic formulation comprising the combination of at least one anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, at least one anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type and an alcoholic solvent based carrier comprising at least 30% ethanol and isopropanol sufficient to 100%, the combination allowing the transdermal administration and delivery of the anthelmintic agents to the site of infection.

The inventive concept [of Claim 12] is the provision of a topical pour-on anthelmintic formulation effective for the treatment of infections of Fasciola hepatica, Ostertagia ostertagi and Cooperia oncophora in cattle, the topical pour-on anthelmintic formulation consisting of 0.5% (w/v) ivermectin, 5.0% (w/v) clorsulon, 305 vlv ethanol, 10% v/v PEG200, 20% v/v Crodamol Cap, 0.01% (w/v) Brilliant Blue Dye, 0.001% (w/v) denatonium benzoate and isopropanol to 100 % v/v, the pour-on formulation allowing the transdermal administration and delivery of the anthelmintic agents to the site of infection.


Obviousness with regard to Prior Publication – (first limb)

  1. The following 22 documents were cited, in the Statement of Case filed on 17 April 2012, under this ground.


D1 European Patent Specification No WO 0209764

  1. As stated above, in paragraph 60, I am satisfied that this document, although it discloses a topical anthelmintic composition containing a combination of a Streptomyces avermitilis derivative and a sulphonamide derivative, does not disclose such a formulation comprising ethanol as an alcoholic solvent either alone or in combination with isopropanol. It follows that the document does not disclose the presence of these solvents in the proportions of at least 30% (v/v) ethanol together with an isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%.


D2 Baynes R E, “In vitro dermal disposition of abamectin (abamectin B1) in livestock”, Research in Vet Science, 2004, Vol 76, p 235-242.

  1. According the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was June 2004; however, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D3 Clymer B et al, “Persistance of the activity of topical ivermectin against biting lice (Bovicola bovis)”, The Veterinary Record, 1998, Vol 143, p 193-195.

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was 1 May 2001. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D4 Page N et al, “Observations on topical ivermectin in the treatment of otoacariosis, cheyletillosis, and toxocariosis in cats”, Can Vet J, 2000, Vol 41, p 773-776.

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was October 2000. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D5 Rolfe PF and Boray JC, “Comparative efficiencuy of moxidectin, an ivermectin clorsulon combination and closantel against immature paramphistomes in cattle” Australian Veterinary Journal, 1993, Vol 70 (7)

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was July 1993. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D6 Sibille P et al, “Fasciola hepatica: influence of gender and liver biotransformations on flukicide efficiency of rats infested and cured with either clorsulon/ivermectinor triclabedazole”, Experimental Parasitology, 2000, Vol 24, p 227-236.

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was April 2000. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D7 Loyacano et al, “Effects of parenteral administration of doramectin and clorsulon on control of gastrointestinal nematode and liver fluke infections and growth performance in cattle”, JAVMA, 2001, Vol 218, No 9, p 1465-1468.

  1. The summary printed on the first page of this document, which, according to Domney 2, was received by the Massey University Library on 2 July 2001, reads:

Objective—To compare effects of an injectable doramectin preparation with those of an injectable ivermectin-clorsulon preparation on control of gastrointestinal nematodes and liver flukes and on growth performance in cattle.

Design—Randomized complete block design.

Animals—60 crossbred calves.

Procedures—Calves (20/treatment group) were treated with doramectin or ivermectin-clorsulon or were not treated. Fecal samples were collected for nematode and Fasciola hepatica egg counts on day 0 and for up to 140 days after treatment. Cattle were weighed before treatment and at 28-day intervals until day 140.

Results—From day 7 through day 49, nematode egg counts for calves treated with doramectin or with ivermectin-clorsulon were significantly lower than those for untreated control calves. As the study progressed beyond day 56, the percentages of cattle with fluke eggs in their feces increased, but differences in regard to these percentages were not detected among the 3 groups. Average daily gain for the doramectin-treated cattle (0.79 kg/d [1.74 lb/d]) was significantly greater than that for the cattle treated with ivermectin-clorsuIon (0.71 kg/d [1.56 lb/d]); values for both groups were significantly greater than that for the control cattle (0.62 kg/d [1.37 lb/d]).

Conclusions and Clinical Relevance—Results suggest that doramectin had a greater impact on subclinical gastrointestinal tract parasitism in calves, as demonstrated by growth performance, than did ivermectin-clorsulon. In the Gulf Coast region of the United States, spring-born nursing beef calves may have minimal grazing exposure to F hepatica during the peak fluke transmission period; therefore, mature fluke burdens may be negligible at the beginning of the fall season. (J Am Vet Med Assoc 2001; 218: 1465-1468).

  1. This document describes the treatment of cattle with commercial products containing clorsulon and ivermectin. However, it contains no discussion of the solvents used and definitely no description of an ethanol/isopropanol solvent combination with the composition specified in the present claim 1.


D8 Rehbein S and Visser M, “Efficiency of an injectable ivermectin/clorsulon combination against Fasciola hepatica in sheep”, The Veterinary Record, (1999) 145, 468-469

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was 16 October 1999. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D9 United States Patent No 5 773 422

  1. The abstract of this document, which, according to Mr Slizys’ evidence, was available at IPONZ from 17 July 1998, reads:

Novel formulations are disclosed for the administration of an avermectin, based upon the use of N-methylpyrrolidone or 2-pyrrolidone or mixtures thereof to dissolve avermectin. Formulations can contain from 0.1 to 40% by weight dissolved in at least 5% by volume of N-methylpyrrolidone, 2-pyrrolidone or mixture thereof. Various formulations are suitable for administration by intramuscular or subcutaneous injection, by topical application, stomach intubation, oral and drench administration.

  1. This document discloses compositions containing ivermectin and clorsulon, for topical application to sheep. However, as acknowledged in paragraph 7.12.3 of the Statement of Case, “This document employs pyrrolidone solvents as carriers and therefore differs from the alleged invention in regard to the use of the specific solvent mixture of ethanol and isopropanol”.


D10 European Patent Specification No WO 0160380

  1. The abstract of this document, which, according to Mr Slizys’ evidence, was available at IPONZ from 19 September 2001, reads:

A parasiticidal formulation is provided. This formulation includes a pyrrolidone solvent, a bridging solvent, and a parasiticidal agent. One or more parasiticidal agents may be included in the formulation. Preferably, the formulation contains both closantel and ivermectin. Another aspect of the present invention is a method of making this parasiticidal formulation. This method includes mixing a pyrrolidone solvent and a bridging solvent to form a solvent solution and adding one or more parasiticidal agents to the solvent solution. A further aspect of the present invention is a method for administering the parasiticidal formulation of the present invention to an animal. This method of administration includes providing the parasiticidal formulation described above and applying this formulation to the skin of an animal, wherein the formulation is absorbed through the animal's skin.

  1. Again, as is the case with Document D9, this document discloses the use of topical compositions containing ivermectin and clorsulon but does not describe the use of an ethanol/isopropanol solvent, particularly one of the specific range of compositions of Claim 1 of the present complete specification.


D11 European Patent Specification No EP 0125004

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was 14 November 1984. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D12 United States Patent specification No 2003040494

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was 27 February 2003. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D13 WO 94/26113

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was 24 November 1994. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D14 WO 0030449

  1. The abstract of this document, which, according to Mr Slizys’ evidence, was available at IPONZ from 20 June 2000, reads:

A long-acting antiparasitic formulation suitable for topical application including: (a) 0.1-50 % w/v an avermectin or milbemycin having activity against endo- and/or ectoparasites; (b) 1-50 % v/v a di(C2-4 glycol) mono(C1-4 alkyl) ether; (c) an optional antioxidant; and (d) an optional skin acceptable volatile solvent q.s. v/v.

  1. This document describes topical compositions containing ivermectin. However, as acknowledged in paragraph 7.17.3 of the Statement of Case: “The alleged invention differs to that described in this document in the use of the specific solvent mixture of ethanol and isopropanol and the inclusion of an anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type (clorsulon)”.


D15 WO 2004089239

  1. The abstract of this document, which, according to Mr Slizys’ evidence, was available at IPONZ from 21 October 2004 reads:

This invention provides for inter alia, topical anthelmintic formulations which comprise a pharmaceutically active combination consisting of at least one macrocyclic compound and at least one compound selected from the group consisting of praziquantel, morantel and pyrantel, which are dissolved in a non-aqueous solvent or solvent mixture and optionally a thickening agent.

  1. The Statement of Case, in paragraph 7.18.3, summarises the relevant disclosure of this document as follows:

... this document describes anthelmintic formulations comprising an avermectin (an anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermitiis) and a second anthelmintic which can be applied topically using a solvent/co-solvent mixture as a carrier. The solvent and co-solvent can be selected from solvents including the alcohols isopropanol and ethanol. The alleged invention differs to that described in this document in that the second anthelmintic of the combination is not one of the sulphonamide type (clorsulon). ...

  1. Thus, it is clear that this document differs from the invention claimed in the present complete specification in that the compositions disclosed do not include an “anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type” or a carrier “including at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol together with isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%”.


D16 United States patent specification No 20040151744

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was 5 August 2004. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D17 Australian patent specification No AU 199742110

  1. According to the Statement of Case the publication date of this document was 14 April 1997. However, no date has been provided for its date of publication in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D18 Coldman MF et al, “Enhancement of Percutaneous Absorption by the use of Volatile Non-volatile Systems as Vehicles”, J Pharm Sci, 1969, Vol 58, p 1098-1102

  1. No date has been provided for the date of publication of this document in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D19 Chiu et al, “Determination of ivermectin residue in animal tissues by high-performance liquid chromatography-reverse isotope dilution assay”, J Agric Food Chem, 1985, Vol 33, p 99-102

  1. No date has been provided for the date of publication of this document in New Zealand (“Published” as defined in section 2(1)). Thus it is not a valid citation in the present proceedings.


D20 WO 2005007241

  1. The abstract of this document, which, according to Mr Slizys’ evidence, was available at IPONZ from 8 February 2005, reads:

An anti-parasiticidal composition presented as a topical 'pour-on' product for treating animals infected by parasites which are known to be susceptible to salicylanilides, especially closantel, alone or together with at least one other anti parasitic compound of the avermectin or milbemycin type and offers enhanced bioavailability of the salicylanilide by provision of a delivery system comprising at least 20%(v/v) of one or more alcohols, and optionally including a polymeric moiety selected from the group consisting of polyvinylpyrrolidone (PVP), polyoxypropylene/polyoxyethylene block copolymers (poloxamer), and polyethylene glycols (PEG), thereby improving the bioavailability of e.g. closantel (as assessed with respect to blood plasma levels of closantel).

  1. The Statement of Case, in paragraph 7.24.5, summarises the relevant disclosure of this document as follows:

... this document describes anthelmintic formulations comprising an avermectin, and specifically ivermectin, (an anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermititis) and a second anthelmintic which are applied topically using an alcoholic solvent-based carrier of 30% ethanol and isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%. The alleged invention differs to that described in this document in that the second anthelmintic of the combination is not one of the sulphonamide type (clorsulon). ...

  1. I note that the only references in the cited document to the combination of ethanol and isopropanol are two “illustrative formulations” which contain “Ethanol 30% v/v Isopropyl alcohol to 100% v/v” and “Ethanol 20% v/v Denatonium Benzoate 0.05%w/v Isopropyl alcohol q.s. to 100%”. Thus the compositions in the cited document do not contain an anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type and there is no disclosure of the specific requirement, of the claims of the present complete specification, that the carrier must contain “at least 30% v/v of ethanol together with isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%”.


The differences between the cited published matter and the invention as claimed and whether these differences constitute steps which would have been obvious to a "normally skilled but unimaginative addressee" in the appropriate art, armed with the “common general knowledge" in the appropriate art

  1. As I understand it from the above analysis of the cited documents, considered in conjunction with the common general knowledge discussed above, the difference between the cited published matter and the invention as claimed in the two independent claims (Claims 1 and 12) is that none of the prior art documents, taken individually or in combination, discloses a topical anthelmintic composition containing an athelmintic derived from Streptomyces avermitilis together with another anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, in a solvent-based carrier including at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol together with an amount of isopropanol sufficient to 100%.

  1. Dr Landells submitted that the feature of “at least 30% (V/v) ethanol” is an example of “parameteritis” as discussed by Laddie J in Raychem Corp’s Patents [1997] EWHC 372; [1998] RPC 31 at 37:

One of the arguments advanced by Mr Silverleaf was that Raychem’s patents were an exercise in what has become known amongst patent lawyers as parametritis. This is the practice of seeking to repentant the prior art by limiting claims by reference to a series of parameters which were not mentioned in the prior art. Sometimes it includes reference to parameters measured on test equipment which did not exist at the time of the prior art. The attraction of this to a patentee is that it may be impossible to prove now that the prior art inevitably exhibited the parameters and therefore it is impossible for an opponent to prove anticipation. Even if that is what has happened here, it does not alter the task of the court. It must decide whether the opponent has proved anticipation or some other statutory ground of invalidity. Parametritis may make the court’s task more difficult, but at the end of the day the test of invalidity must be the same, whatever the form of the claims.

  1. On page 46 Laddie J, referring to the use in the claims of the parameter in question, states:

... is essentially arbitrary and has little technical significance. The selection of a group of compositions by reference to such a parameter does not involve any inventive step. Although it may not be obvious, in the common use of that word, to limit a claim by reference to this particular meaningless and arbitrary parameter, that has nothing to do with patentability. Patents are not given for skill in inventing technically meaningless parameters. Many PTC compositions having obviously desirable characteristics will happen to fall within the limits of these claims. As such they cover what is obvious and would be invalid for this reason.

  1. Dr Landells referred me to two Australian cases where the issue of Parameteritis has arisen.

  1. In Williams Advanced Materials Inc v Target Technology Co LLC (2004) 66 IPR 645; [2004] FCA 1405 at [48] (Williams), Bennett J considered claims to an optical storage medium having a reflective layer including a silver-palladium alloy. At [48] Bennett J said:

... there is nothing in the specification that suggests that the proportions or the ranges of the metals in the alloys are in any way part of the invention, other than the mere reference to them. It is a case of “parameteritis”.

  1. In Austral Ships Pty Ltd v Stena Rederi Aktiebolag (2005) 66 IPR 420; [2005] FCA 805 at [108], Bennett J referred to the Williams case and distinguished it because:

... there is reference in the patent specification and evidence which supports the fact that the parameters have been carefully chosen, are part of the invention and are related to a claimed advantage as part of the combination of the design.

  1. I agree with Mr Brown’s submission that the present case falls squarely within the Austral Ships case because the present complete specification ‘clearly identifies the alcoholic system as technically significant in “facilitat[ing] topical administration and delivery of the active ingredients transdermally”’.

  1. This is illustrated by the paragraph, under the heading “Background of the Invention”, on page 1 lines 11 to 17 of the complete specification, which states:

Clorsulon is a compound belonging to the benzenesulphonamide (benzenesulfonamide -USA) family which is recommended for control of adult liver flukes (Fasciola hepatica and Fasqiola gigantica) in cattle as suspensions for oral use or in injectable formulations for subcutaneous administrations. The oral recommended level is 7 mg/kg body weight (bw) and the subcutaneous level 2mg/kg bw. Currently, there is no known topical formulation, and this is likely to be due to foreseeable difficulties in achieving adequate penetration of the skin by clorsulon.

[Emphasis added]

  1. Further, on page 3 of the complete specification, under the heading “Summary of the Invention”, it is stated:

Accordingly, the present invention provides a hitherto unavailable topical formulation comprising as active ingredients, at least one effective agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, i.e. a macrocylic lactone e.g. an avermectin or chemically modified or synthetic derivative thereof, e.g. ivermectin, together with another anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, e.g. clorsulon, in a carrier that facilitates topical administration and delivery of the active ingredients transdermally. The carrier comprises alcoholic solvents, with optional excipients and formulation aids, which may comprise a polymeric species such as PVP or a poloxamer. In preferred form, a pour-on formulation is provided containing clorsulon and ivermectin. The alcoholic solvents comprise at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol, together with isopropanol to make the formulation up to 100%.

[Emphasis added]

  1. Also on page 3 it is stated:

The invention also provides a topical anthelmintic formulation including, as active ingredients, a therapeutically effective amount of at least one anthelmintic agent derived from Streptomyces avermitilis, with a therapeutically effective amount of at least one other anthelmintic of the sulphonamide type, in an alcoholic solvent-based carrier suitable for topical administration and delivery of the active ingredients transdermally, said carrier including at least 30% (v/v) of ethanol together with isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100%.

[Emphasis added]

  1. The statement, pointed out in the complete specification (in the third paragraph under the heading “Background of the invention” and reproduced in paragraph 19 above) that there is no topical formulation comprising clorsulon “due to foreseeable difficulties in achieving adequate penetration of the skin” is disputed by Mr Page who argues, in his declaration, dated 10 August 2012, in the equivalent Australian proceeding, that clorsulon is a small molecule and has chemical characteristics that would potentially allow for skin penetration. However, Dr Bunt, in paragraphs 49 and 50 of Bunt 1, disputes this argument by reference to a paper (annexed to Bunt 1 as Exhibit CB-13) by Magnusson, Pugh, and Roberts, published in Pharmaceutical Research, Vol 21, No 6, June 2004, entitled “Simple Rules Defining the Potential of Compounds for Transdermal Delivery or Toxicity”. Commenting on this paper, Dr Page concludes, in paragraph 50 of Bunt 1:

On the basis of the physicochemical parameters, particularly MW and log K, clorsulon can be defined as a poor candidate for transdermal delivery. Of the parameters mentioned in the table above, the MW and log K parameters are the two of most Importance for the assessment of suitability for transdermal delivery. Therefore, at 21 January 2005, based on this publication a formulator would foresee substantial difficulties achieving penetration of the skin by clorsulon and would be disinclined to select it as a candidate for transdermal delivery.

[Emphasis added]

  1. Thus it seems to me that the words of Bennett J, “[there] is reference in the patent specification and evidence which supports the fact that the parameters have been carefully chosen, are part of the invention and are related to a claimed advantage as part of the combination of the design”, are appropriate in the present case.

  1. Mr Page, the expert witness for the Applicant for Revocation, in paragraph 283 of Page 1, after comprehensively discussing a number of the cited documents, concludes by saying:

Therefore, when developing an alternative topical formulation that is capable of incorporating both a lipophilic drug (e.g. ivermectin) and a hydrophilic drug (e.g. clorsulon) in a single formulation, it would be clearly obvious to a skilled person to modify the formulations of the Komer paper [Document D9] to include ethanol and isopropanol, based on their common general knowledge, and more specifically in light of the teachings of the Blakely [Document D20], Soll [Document D15] and/or Lukas [Document D14] papers. Moreover, as mentioned above at [265], the “at least 30%" feature in relation to the ethanol component is already known from the Blakely [Document D20] paper. In the absence of any particular technical effect associated with this value being described in the opposed application, l consider that the "at least 30%" is an arbitrary choice of little technical significance to the invention as claimed that does not involve any degree of inventiveness as an alternative choice would provide the same result. Further, l consider that such a solvent system could be chosen or predicted by any competent formulation chemist without difficulty.

  1. On the other hand, Dr Bunt, the Patentee’s expert witness, says in Bunt 1:

  1. In conclusion, I believe that the only document cited by Page that teaches or suggests the use of alcoholic solvents including a combination of ethanol and isopropanol is W0 2005/007241 [Document D20]. However, this document does not disclose or suggest using agents of the sulphonamide class.

  1. In paragraphs 275-283 of his 8 February 2013 declaration, Page appears to express the opinion that various combinations of Komer with the Razzak [Document D1], Blakely [Document D20], Soll [Document D15], Mihalik [Document D3] and Lukas [Document D14] patents together with common general knowledge deprives the New Zealand patent claims of inventive step.

  1. As stated in paragraph 94, there is nothing in patent documents 02/09764 [Document D1], W0 2005/007241 [Document 20], US 577, 3422 [Document D2], W0 01/60380 [Document D3], W0 2004 089239 Document D15] and W0 2000 30449 [Document D14] that would have caused me to combine any one of them. For this reason, and the reasons set out in the preceding paragraphs of this declaration, I do not consider that the New Zealand patent claims clearly lack an inventive step in light of common general knowledge and any of the combinations suggested by Page in paragraphs 122-283 of his 8 February 2012 declaration.

  1. After considering the matters discussed above, including the conflicting evidence of Mr Page and Dr Bunt, I have concluded that the Applicant for Revocation has not shown that these differences constitute steps which would have been clearly obvious to a "normally skilled but unimaginative addressee" in the appropriate art, armed with the “common general knowledge" in the appropriate art. Thus, I find that the ground of Obviousness with regard to Prior publication is not made out.


Obviousness with regard to Prior Use – section 21(1)(e) second limb

  1. The Applicant for Revocation’s Statement of Case pleads as follows:

6.1 MERIAL contends that the invention, so far as claimed in any claim of the complete specification, is obvious and clearly does not involve any inventive step having regard to what was used in New Zealand before the priority date of the applicant's claim. The following instances of prior use and/or publication of the registration of the products in New Zealand will be relied upon:

6.2 IVOMEC Plus Injection for Cattle has been a New Zealand-registered veterinary medicine since 16 March 1993 (Reg. No. A006481) and has been used in New Zealand since before the priority date of NZ 556537.

6.2.1`This product is an injectable solution which is sold by MERIAL Limited and is recommended for use in the treatment and control of internal and external parasites of cattle, including adult liver flukes.

6.2.2 According to Section 2 of the MSDS [Material Safety Data Sheet] IVOMEC Plus comprises the following components

Name
CAS
Proportion
Ivermectin
70288-86-7
10g/L
Clorsulon
60200-06-8
100g/L
Glycerol Formal
5464-28-8
400g/L
Propylene Glycol
57-55-6
400g/L

6.2.3 Thus, the MSDS teaches that the combination of ivermectin and clorsulon can provide a safe, stable and effective broad spectrum anthelmintic product. Additionally, the disclosure of the MSDS teaches that both ivermectin and clorsulon are soluble in alcohols. Accordingly, when formulating an ivermectin and clorsulon combination for pour-on administration it would be obvious for a skilled artisan to employ alcohols which facilitate dermal absorption.

6.3 IVOMEC Pour-on for Cattle and Deer has been a New Zealand-registered veterinary medicine since 5 June 1998 (Reg. No. A005303) and has been used in New Zealand since before the priority date of NZ 556537.

6.3.1 This product is a pour-on which is sold by MERIAL Limited and is recommended for use in the treatment and control of major internal and external parasites of cattle and deer.

6.3.2 According to Section 2 of the MSDS IVOMEC Plus comprises the following components

Component
Molecular
Formula
Molecular
Weight
CAS Number
Ivermectin Comp B1a
C48H74O14
875
70288-86-7
Comp. B1b
C47H72O14
861
(Mixture)
Isopropyl alcohol
C3H8O
60.09
67-63-0
Inert ingredients
Not available
Not available
Not available

6.3.3 Thus, the disclosure of the MSDS teaches that ivermectin can be delivered by pour-on application using an alcoholic solvent-based carrier. Specifically, the MSDS teaches that the alcoholic solvent-based carrier can comprise isopropanol. As discussed above in Section 4, there is a significant advantage in preparing a formulation for a new product that is as familiar as possible to regulatory reviewers. For this reason, there would have been great interest in a formulation of the combination of ivermectin and clorsulon that was as similar as possible to the existing ivermectin pour-on formulation, just as the combination of clorsulon and ivermectin in an injectable formulation is similar to the injectable formulation of ivermectin alone.

6.3.4 Accordingly, the Opponent submits that in developing an ivermectin and clorsulon combination for pour-on administration it would be obvious for a skilled artisan to start with a formulation wherein the carrier system is isopropanol. As discussed in Section 4 and 5.2.5, in the development of a new formulation with high efficacy an optimisation process would be routinely employed. In carrying out such an optimisation process, it would be obvious for a skilled artisan to prepare a number of formulations comprising varying amounts and types of solvents, excipients and additives. It is known that alcohols such as methanol, ethanol and isopropanol, and mixtures thereof, are commonly used for topical applications due to the ability of these solvents to improve dermal absorption. Accordingly, it would be obvious for a skilled artisan to look to combinations of solvents such as ethanol and isopropanol as a carrier system for a topical formulation comprising ivermectin and clorsulon.

6.3.5 As discussed in Section 5.2.5, the Applicant has not shown evidence demonstrating the optimisation process and appears to have arbitrarily selected at least 30% (v/v) ethanol together with isopropanol quantity sufficient to 100% as the solvent system for the pour-on formulations. As such, the Opponent considers that there is no inventive step involved in such an arbitrary selection and further considers that the selection of at least 30% (v/v) ethanol would be obvious to a skilled artisan.

  1. It seems to me that my comments in paragraphs 126 to 134 above, in relation to the first limb, Obviousness with regard to Prior publication, apply equally to the second limb, Obviousness with regard to Prior use. Thus I conclude that this ground is not made out.


Decision

  1. In summary, my findings are as follows:

  1. The Applicant for Revocation’s request to file a second amended Application for Revocation and amended Statement of Case is refused. Thus, the case has been decided with reference to the first amended Application for Revocation and Statement of Case filed on 17 April 2012.

  1. The priority date of the present complete specification is 21 January 2005, the date of filing of the United Kingdom patent specification No GB 0501220.8.

  1. None of the grounds having been made out, I dismiss the Application for Revocation.


Costs

  1. I award costs to the Patentee in accordance with scale in the sum of $3660.00 calculated as follows:


Item in IPONZ scale of costs

Cost

Preparing and filing Counterstatement:

Receiving and perusing Applicant for Revocation’s evidence:

Preparing and filing Patentee’s evidence:

Receiving and perusing the Applicant for Revocation’s evidence strictly in reply:

Preparation of case for hearing:

Attendance at hearing by counsel (1 day):

Hearing fee:

TOTAL:

300.00

400.00


800.00


100.00



500.00

810.00


750.00

$3660.00 to the Patentee




Dated this 22 day of September 2014

Description: http://mako/otcs/llisapi.dll/2588209/IPONZ_-_Hearings_-_Signature_-_Pop.png?func=doc.Fetch%26amp;nodeid=2588209%26amp;viewType=1
_____________________________
K B Popplewell
Assistant Commissioner of Patents


Davies Collison Cave for the Patentee
FB Rice for the Applicant for Revocation


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