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New Zealand Legal Aid Review Panel |
Last Updated: 28 July 2015
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Legal Aid Review Panel (LARP) 243/07
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Decision Date:
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24 July 2007
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Panel:
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G. Melvin ; G. Woodcock
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LARP NOs. 241/07 - 249/07
Summary:
Refusal of aid under s9(4)(e)
The applicants are practitioners of the
Falun Gong movement who began High Court proceedings against the former
president of the People’s
Republic of China, the former Vice Premier of
China’s State Council and the Secretary of the Political and Judiciary
Committee
of the Central Committee in China. They sought damages and declaratory
relief for unlawful arrest and detention, assault and battery,
malicious abuse
of office and conspiracy to injure. As the defendants were out of NZ, the
applicants needed leave from the HC under
Rule 220 to serve the proceedings on
the defendants. The application was declined by an Associate Judge and then by a
HC Judge. The
reason was that the defendants were protected by state immunity.
An exception to that principle would be needed, and the House of
Lords decision
in Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26; 2 WLR 1424 stated that there was no
basis for an exception. The applicants applied for aid to appeal to the Court of
Appeal. After
consulting a specialist adviser the Agency declined aid under
s9(4)(e), and confirmed that refusal after reconsideration. To the
Panel the
applicant submitted that there was a recent decision of the Supreme Court of New
South Wales (Zhang v Zemin & anor
[2007] NSWSC 229) which had come to her
attention in which leave to serve similar proceedings outside the jurisdiction
had been granted. In addition
there was a decision in 2006 of the Ontario
Superior Court where an order had been made dispensing with service for a
similar proceeding
by Falun Gong practitioners.
The Panel noted that the
specialist adviser had given his advice before these decisions had come to light
so they had not been taken
into account. Although the Agency had stated that the
additional information had not persuaded it to grant aid, it appeared that
the
Agency had not sought another report from a specialist adviser. As the issue was
a difficult one involving a mix of domestic
and international law, the Panel
considered that the Agency should again consult a specialist adviser on the new
information. For
those reasons, the Panel directed the Agency to reconsider its
decision within 15 working days taking into account the Panel’s
finding
that it should ensure it obtained another specialist adviser’s report
considering the new information. To ensure natural
justice, the Panel advised
that it was desirable that the new information be considered by a new specialist
adviser.
DECISION
Introduction
[1] This
decision relates to nine separate applications for review brought by nine
applicants for legal aid (the “Applicants”).
The subject matter of
each application is the same and it is convenient to deal with them all in one
decision.
[2] Each of the Applicants applied for legal aid for an appeal
to the Court of Appeal and, by letters dated 39 April 2007, but presumably
meant
to be 30 April 2007, the Legal Services Agency (the “Agency”) upheld
earlier decisions of 30 March 2007 to decline
aid.
Grounds of the
Application
[3] Eight of the Applicants submit that the Agency’s
decision was both manifestly unreasonable and wrong in law. While the applicant
for review in LARP 244/07 has not identified the grounds upon which she has made
her application, the Panel has proceeded on the
assumption that she, too,
submits the Agency’s decision is both manifestly unreasonable and wrong in
law.
The Facts
[4] The Applicants are practitioners of the Falun
Gong movement who initiated proceedings in the High Court against the former
president
of the People’s Republic of China, the former vice-premier of
China’s State Council and the Secretary of the Political
and Judiciary
Committee of the Central Committee in China. They sought damages and declaratory
relief for unlawful arrest and detention,
assault and battery, malicious abuse
of office and conspiracy to injure.
[5] Pursuant to rule 220 of the High
Court Rules, the Applicants had to obtain the leave of the High Court to serve
the proceeding
on the defendants out of New Zealand. Initially, the application
for leave came before Associate Judge Faire, who declined it. The
Applicants
then sought a review of that decision. Randerson J considered the application
for review and, for a number of reasons,
dealt with it as if it were a fresh
application under rule 220 of the High Court Rules. In a reserved judgment of 21
December 2006,
he dismissed the application. His Honour was satisfied that there
was no arguable prospect that the Applicants could establish an
exception to the
principle of state immunity, which he found would protect the defendants if the
Applicants were granted leave to
serve out of the jurisdiction. In reaching that
conclusion, His Honour found that there was no valid basis upon which to
distinguish
the House of Lords’ decision in Jones v Saudi Arabia [2006]
UKHL 26; 2 WLR 1424, which he followed.
[6] The Applicants applied for
legal aid to appeal Randerson J’s decision in the Court of Appeal. The
Agency received the applications
on 27 February 2007 and referred them to a
specialist advisor.
[7] The Agency followed the specialist
advisor’s recommendation to decline the applications for aid pursuant to
section 9(4)(e)
of the Legal Services Act 2000 (the “Act”). That
provision permits the Agency, in the case of an appeal, to refuse aid
where it
“considers that for any reason the grant of aid or further aid is not
justified”. By letters dated 30 March
2007, the Agency advised that, like
Randerson J, it found the analysis in Jones v Saudi Arabia (supra) compelling
and it did not
consider the Court of Appeal would differ from the House of Lords
on such an issue of international law.
[8] On 3 April 2007, counsel for
the Applicants asked the Agency to reconsider its refusal to grant aid. By its
letters of 30 April
2007, the Agency confirmed its decisions. It stated that,
while it is possible that the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court might depart
from
the House of Lords, that seemed very unlikely on matters of international law
where there is a strong tendency for courts of
different states to share a
common position. There was nothing in either Jones v Saudi Arabia (supra) or in
Randerson J’s decision
that supported a departure by New Zealand from the
international consensus.
[9] The Agency sent a further letter dated 11
May 2007 to replace its letter of 30 April, which, it stated, had been sent in
the name
of the wrong grants officer. The second letter was sent so as to
conform with section 29(2) of the Act, which, as a matter of natural
justice,
requires that a decision must be reconsidered by a different person than the
person who made the original decision.
[10] On 22 May 2007, the
Applicants filed with the Panel applications for review of the Agency’s
decision. They nominated the
Agency’s decision of 30 April 2007 as the
decision to be reviewed.
The Applicant’s Submissions
[11] On
behalf of the Applicants, counsel submits that the Agency’s decision to
decline aid is manifestly unreasonable and wrong
in law because it is unwilling
to accept that the Court of Appeal is able to distinguish Jones v Saudi Arabia
(supra). She refers
to the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in
Zhang v Zemin & Anor [2007] NSWSC 229, which came to her notice after the
Agency’s refusal to grant aid. In that decision, the Supreme Court granted
leave to serve
similar proceedings outside its jurisdiction.
[12] In a
covering letter that accompanied the applications for review, counsel also
refers to a decision dated 17 July 2006 of the
Ontario Superior Court of
Justice. In that decision, the Court dealt with similar proceedings brought by
Falun Gong practitioners
and made an order dispensing with service under rule
16.04 of the Ontario service rules. Counsel contends that the Agency’s
decision did not analyse the evolution of the law within the Commonwealth and
that the Applicants’ appeal relies on the evolving
differences in law from
Australia and Canada.
The Agency’s Submissions
[13] The
Agency submits that nothing further has been added that justifies a review of
its decision to decline aid.
The Issue
[14] The issue before the
Panel is whether the Agency’s decision to refuse aid to each of the
Applicants is manifestly unreasonable
or wrong in law, or both.
The
Law
[15] A decision is manifestly unreasonable if it is shown
“clearly and unmistakably” that the Agency’s decision
“went beyond what was reasonable or was irrational or logically
flawed” (Legal Services Agency v Fainu [2002] 17 PRNZ 433).
[16] A
decision may be wrong in law for a variety of reasons. It may be wrong in law,
for example, if it derives from an inaccurate
application or interpretation of a
statute, or is wrong in principle. It may be wrong in law if a decision-maker
has failed to take
into account some relevant matter or takes into account some
irrelevant matter, or if the decision depends on findings which are
unsupported
by the evidence (Legal Services Agency v Fainu
(supra)).
Discussion
[17] On the copy of the file that is before
the Panel, the decisions of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Zhang v Zemin
(supra)
and of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice are stapled to
counsel’s letter of 3 April 2007. However, on 27 June 2007, responding
to
a request by the Panel’s Convenor to clarify this point, the Agency
advised that counsel did not enclose with her letter
a copy of the New South
Wales judgment and did not refer to the judgment. Presumably, the Ontario
judgment was also not enclosed
with the letter.
[18] In any case, the
specialist advisor’s report, upon which the Agency based its decision, is
dated 29 March 2007. The specialist
advisor did not have either judgment when he
wrote his report.
[19] The Panel has before it a short letter dated 12
June 2007 from the Agency in which it confirms that it has received and
considered
all the attachments counsel for the Applicants has forwarded to it,
which, presumably, is a reference to the documents filed in support
of the
application for review, including the New South Wales and Ontario decisions. It
states that the additional information has
not persuaded it to grant aid.
However, there is nothing to suggest that the Agency has obtained a report from
a specialist advisor
in respect of the additional information, including the two
overseas decisions that counsel for the Applicants maintains support
their
case.
[20] Given that the matters raised in these applications are
difficult ones that involve a mix of domestic and international law,
and that
the Agency’s decision relies on a specialist advisor’s report, the
Panel considers the Agency should ensure
it obtains a further specialist
advisor’s report that gives full consideration to the new information the
Applicants have provided.
Decision
[21] For the reasons set out
above, and instead of determining the review, the Panel directs the Agency
within 15 working days from
receipt of this decision to reconsider its decision.
The Agency is directed to take into account:
(a) the Panel’s
finding in paragraph [20] that it should ensure it obtains a further specialist
advisor’s report that
gives full consideration to the new information the
Applicants have provided, including in particular the decisions of the Supreme
Court of New South Wales and of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.
(b)
the desirability from a natural justice point of view that the new information
the Applicants have provided be considered by a
different specialist advisor
than the person who first advised the Agency.
Dated this 24th day of
July 2007
(original signed by)
__________________________
D.J.
Maze, Convenor
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