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COMMENTARY

The decade of non-compliance; the New Zealand Government record of non-compliance with international labour standards 1990-98

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This paper will consider the relevance of International Labour Organisation (ILO) labour standards to New Zealand and examine the CTU's complaint to the ILO in 1993 on the Employment Contracts Act, and other issues relating to New Zealand's non-compliance with ILO Conventions during this decade.

Introduction

The thesis of the paper is that in the years since the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act 1991, more than ever before, international labour standards have become of direct relevance to New Zealander workers.

During this period, New Zealand has experienced the effects of economic globalisation which in itself raises important new issues for the international agencies. In addition, legal protections for workers have been seriously compromised by the profound effect which the ideology of the "new right", manifested by the views of the Employers Federation and Business Roundtable, has had on legislation, Government and employer policies, and court decisions.

For most of this century New Zealand had a regulated labour market dominated by the principles of collectivism and pluralist theories of law stemming from the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. The Employment Contracts Act 1991 introduced a fundamental conceptual and legal change to the nature of the employment relationship as part of the wider economic and social reform reflecting the prevailing market driven economic philosophy.

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From the International Labour Organisation's inception in 1919 until the late 1980's successive governments regularly ratified its Conventions. Although New Zealand has ratified 56 Conventions[1], there have been no ratifications since 1987.

This again reflects the influence of the "new right" philosophy and the prevailing view in New Zealand Government and employer circles that no credibility should be given to the views of organised labour, and that international labour conventions are an unjustifiable constraint on the "market".

From the perspective of labour the erosion of labour rights in legislation has meant that minimum international labour standards have become of greater significance for workers. The CTU is placing greater reliance on international conventions to promote and protect the rights of workers as domestic legislation fails to comply with the minimum standards laid down by this international law.

The role of the International Labour Organisation in the context of international law

The first point I wish to emphasise is that the minimum labour standards laid down by international law are human rights. If there was ever any doubt about this it is made perfectly clear in the Declaration of Philadelphia which confirmed (inter alia) that:

- labour is not a commodity;
- freedom of expression and of association are essential to sustained progress;
- all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.

It is very relevant at end of this decade that international agencies are warning against the infatuation with globalisation, the obsession of competitiveness and the casting aside of values. In his report to the 1997 International Labour Conference, the ILO Director General used child labour to illustrate his point that labour is not a commodity:

> Even if it is proved that child labour brings economic advantages to those resorting to it, it must still be abhorred by everyone with a healthy conscience[2].

The International Labour Organisation has been the leading source of international labour standards since its creation in 1919. The ILO is unique in being the only United Nations

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[1] A full list of New Zealand's ratifications appears in Appendix 2.

[2] Report of the ILO Director General to the ILO Conference 1997 p.6-7.

organisation where workers are directly represented alongside governments. On an annual basis worker, government and employer delegates participate in the committees at conference which both develop new conventions, and monitor compliance with ratified conventions.

The ILO has adopted 171 Conventions and 178 recommendations. Despite conventions only having "binding effect"if they are ratified by a particular state, unratified conventions remain an important influence over states as a global common standard.

Furthermore "by membership of the ILO itself, each member state is bound to respect a certain number of principles of freedom of association which have become rules above conventions"[3]. It is this principle which enabled the CTU to lay a complaint with the ILO's Freedom of Association Committee in 1993 that the Employment Contracts Act breached ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, and Convention 98 on the Right to Organise and Bargain Collective. This was possible despite the fact that New Zealand has never formally ratified these conventions.

This principle was formally recognised by the ILO Conference in 1998 in the *ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work* which obliges all member countries to promote and realise the fundamental convention rights, namely:

- freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining
- the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour
- the effective abolition of child labour
- the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation

Before turning to consider the CTU ECA complaint in more detail, I shall briefly mention the other ILO supervisory mechanisms.

The ILO also has other supervisory mechanisms which ensure an ongoing scrutiny of member states' labour laws and policies under the Article 19 and 22 reporting processes. Together they represent an important "external check" on the labour laws of the more than 160 countries which participate in the ILO.

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[3] Freedom of Association: Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO 9 (1995).

ILO supervisory machinery: reporting under Article 22 of the Constitution

Article 22 of the ILO Constitution requires that:

> Each of the Members agrees to make an annual report to the International Labour Office on the measures which it has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party. These reports shall be made in such a form and shall contain such particulars as the Governing Body may request.

The reporting process in relation to ratified conventions varies depending on the status of the convention concerned. For instance, if a convention is one of the ten conventions that the ILO recognises as "priority conventions" a state must provide a detailed report on it every two years[4]. Member states are required to give "simplified reports" every five years on other ratified conventions. In addition, it is important to note that a state can be asked to give a detailed report on a ratified convention where the ILO's Committee of Experts makes a direct request. This often occurs where it is anticipated that changes to legislation are about to occur that might affect the application of the convention concerned.

Since the ILO is a tripartite organisation comprised of representatives from governments, workers and employers, all government reports to the ILO under Article 22 of the Constitution on ratified conventions must be submitted to representative worker and employer organisations for comment before being sent to the ILO.

The New Zealand Employers Federation and CTU therefore have an opportunity to comment on the New Zealand Government's reports before they are sent. Each government's Article 22 reports including comments from worker and employer organisations are then examined by the ILO's Committee of Experts, which produces a report. Often its reports will request further clarification in addition to making recommendations.

ILO supervisory machinery: reporting under Article 19 of the Constitution

In addition to the obligation to report on ratified conventions, members states also have an obligation to report on unratified conventions under Article 19 of the ILO Constitution. Paragraph 5(e) of Article 19 states that members must report:

> "....at appropriate intervals as requested by the Governing Body, the position of its law and practice in their country in regard to the matters dealt with in the [unratified] Convention, showing the extent to which effect has been given, or is proposed to be given, to any of the

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[4] The ten priority conventions are, freedom of association Nos. 87 and 98; abolition of forced labour Nos. 29 and 105; equal treatment and opportunities Nos. 100 and 111; employment policy No. 122; labour inspection Nos. 81 and 129; tripartite consultation No. 144.

provisions of the Convention by legislation, administrative action, collective agreement or otherwise and stating the difficulties which prevent or delay the ratification of such Convention".

Again, representative worker and employer organisations have an opportunity to comment before the government's report is sent to the ILO for examination by the Committee of Experts.

These regular reporting mechanisms under Articles 19 and 22 provide an effective forum for workers and employers to ensure that their views are heard and responded to.

However, like most international forums, the ILO cannot make binding recommendations to force a country to change its laws and practices. Instead pressure for compliance is applied by calling offending Governments to account before the Application of Standards Committee of the ILO Conference each year, by the threat of "unfavourable" mention in a "special paragraph" in the Conference report (reserved for the most serious of cases), the diplomatic and trade pressures which can be applied (for example on Myanmar in recent years), and by the use of public opinion and the media to focus attention, and pressure, on offending governments domestically.

Compliance issues raised by the CTU

Through the tripartite reporting process under Article 22, worker organisations like the CTU are able to raise issues of non compliance with ratified conventions with the Committee of Experts who scrutinise the reports and prepare a comprehensive report. The Committee of Experts is a panel of prominent international jurists who are appointed by the Governing Body of the ILO.

As I have already mentioned the report of the Committee of Experts is debated by the ILO Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations each year, and a number of Governments are called to account before the Committee.

It has been the embarrassing duty of the New Zealand Workers representatives to ILO Conferences during the past several years to call the New Zealand Government to account before this Committee for fundamental breaches of ratified conventions.

The Government has appeared before the Committee in the following instances:

- In 1993 regarding Convention 122 on Employment Policy, the Committee of Experts reminded the New Zealand Government of the Convention's requirement to "adopt as a major goal, full, productive and freely chosen employment" and seriously questioned whether compliance was compatible with the economic policies being pursued by the Government.

- In 1994 regarding the Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration when the Application of Standards Committee heard evidence that after decades of slow but steady progress, the introduction of the Employment Contracts Act had resulted in a steady widening of the gap between men's and women's wages as well as effectively rendering inoperative the Equal Pay legislation.

- In 1996 regarding Convention 81 on Labour Inspection when the Committee noted non-compliance, particularly in the low number of inspectors, the confidentiality of complainants and the provision of annual inspection reports.

- In 1997 in relation to Convention 17 on Workers Compensation, the Government was asked to report on progress to rectify acknowledged non compliance with the requirement to ensure that work injuries are treated at no cost to the injured worker. The CTU had first raised this issue in a direct report in 1992 when the Government first reduced the level reimbursed for medical treatment by 20% across the board. Following legal advice the Government had, in late 1993, acknowledged the breach of convention and undertaken to remedy it by amending legislation as soon as practicable. Despite amendments to the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act in other respects, no attempt had been made to remedy the breach when the matter came before the Application of Standards Committee at the 1997 Conference. The Committee of Experts in their report showed some impatience:

  > It once again urges the Government to take the necessary steps in the very near future to ensure full compliance with Article 9 of the Convention.

  The pressure did yield results. It has been estimated by the ACC that the non-compliance was resulting in injured workers having to meet, directly each year, about $22 million of their own treatment costs. In 1997 the direct purchasing arrangement between ACC and hospitals ensured that, at least in respect of secondary treatment, compliance with ILO 17 was achieved. The issue of part charging for primary treatment remains an issue which the Accident Insurance Bill recently introduced to Parliament does nothing to rectify. The CTU will be raising this again with the ILO Committee of Experts this year.

- In 1998 regarding Convention 26 on Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery and the Committee of Experts observations on the lack of genuine consultation with worker organisations, the Youth Minimum Wage which breaches the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value, and the inadequacy of the enforcement provisions in the Minimum Wage Act.

On the positive side I am pleased to be able to report that as a result of pressure from the CTU, New Zealand is now in compliance with ILO Convention 42 on Workers Compensation (Occupational Diseases) after at least 23 years of non-compliance.

These cases all concerned non-compliance with conventions which have been specifically ratified by New Zealand and I turn now to look at the CTU complaint regarding the non-compliance of the Employment Contracts Act with the non-ratified, but core conventions, Conventions 87 and 98.

The CTU complaint to the ILO on the Employment Contracts Act

As mentioned earlier, the CTU laid a complaint with the ILO using a special complaints procedure reserved for complaints about infringements to the principles of freedom of association. The complaint was laid with a special committee of the ILO called the Committee on Freedom of Association in 1993.

Background

The basis of the CTU's complaint was that the Employment Contracts Act 1991 was in breach of two core ILO conventions: Convention 87, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Rights to Organise Convention 1948; and Convention 98, the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention. Both Conventions are recognised as founding ILO conventions that all states are obliged to observe by membership of the ILO itself regardless of ratification. In this sense they have a higher status than other conventions. New Zealand has not ratified either of these conventions, but given their special status, the CTU was still able to lay a complaint.

It is important to note that New Zealand has never been able to ratify either convention, even prior to the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act 1991.

In the past the exclusive right of representation and compulsory union membership was in breach of the principle of freedom of association because it was contrary to the principle that individuals have a right to join associations of their own choosing.

Despite the Minister of Labour stating that the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 would enable the ratification of Conventions 87 and 98, it was clear to the CTU that although the Act may purport to allow individuals to associate freely, that its real objectives and effect would breach these core ILO Conventions.

The focus of Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948) is protection of the right of workers to "organise freely" in trade unions of their own choosing.

The Convention places an obligation on governments to take "all necessary and appropriate measures" to achieve this. It therefore contemplates proactive measures to achieve this goal. It does not simply confer the right to organise, but requires positive intervention for the promotion and protection of this right.

The focus of Convention 98 is on ensuring that worker organisations have independence from employers so that they can freely represent the interests of workers. Article 2 requires that workers' organisations are to be protected against control by employers. This means that, for example, officials employed by workers' organisations should not be subject to employer retribution.

The Foundation of the CTU case

The key arguments of the CTU's case are summarised below:

1. At a fundamental level the Employment Contracts Act does not promote collective bargaining, as envisaged by Article 4 of Convention 98. For example collective agreements are not "collective" in the true sense but rather an aggregate of individual agreements.

2. The consultation process when the Employment Contracts Bill was passed was inadequate. First, it was not amended despite a majority of submissions critical of the bill. Secondly, the process was contrary to the principle of tripartism which is fundamental to ILO tradition.

3. There is no requirement to bargain in good faith and further, the possibility of "good faith" bargaining has been eroded by employer interference in worker organisations and discrimination against legitimately established workers' organisations. The Act enables employers to dominate the appointment of bargaining representatives. Furthermore the ratification and authorisation procedures are barriers to collective bargaining and the right to organise.

4. The legislation does not provide scope for multi-employer bargaining at any level.

5. The right to strike has been limited to during the course of negotiations for a collective agreement or where the health and safety of workers is in jeopardy.

Conclusions of the Freedom of Association Committee

The ILO's Freedom of Association Committee made fifteen recommendations in its interim report[5]. Principally:

1. Negotiation between employers and worker organisations should be encouraged and promoted.

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5 *Case No.1698* in 292nd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association (1994)

2. The Act does not promote collective bargaining and the Government should take steps to ensure that the legislation encourages and promotes collectivity.

3. The Act provides inadequate protection for workers against acts of interference and discrimination by employers in the case of authorisation of a union. Therefore, the Government should take necessary steps to ensure that the legislation lays down explicit remedies and penalties against acts of interference and discrimination on the basis of authorisation of a union.

4. The Committee said that the requirement established by the Act that a union establish its authority for all workers it claims to represent in negotiations for a collective employment contract is excessive and in contradiction with the freedom of association principles as it may be applied so as to constitute an impediment to the right of a workers organisation to represent its members. The Committee requested that the Government take all necessary steps to remove the offending provisions from the Act.

5. The definition of a legal strike under the Employment Contracts Act is too narrow. Unions should be allowed to strike lawfully on issues relating to economic and social policy and in respect of multi-employer negotiations.

As a whole the Freedom of Association Committee upheld almost all of the CTU's complaint except in relation to two issues. The First related to unions' rights of access to workplaces, which the ILO concluded were adequate. Second, on the basis of evidence presented, the ILO concluded that the Government did not intervene improperly in negotiations.

The recommendations of the Freedom of Association Committee were a strong attack on the credibility of the Employment Contracts Act. The process did not ,however, end there. The Committee later sent a mission to New Zealand to investigate the matter further and produce a final report after hearing more submissions from the Government and CTU over a period of two days.

The missions's final report endorsed what had previously been said in the interim report - however, it chose to do this by summarising its principle conclusions with four recommendations. Noting that the interim report had fifteen recommendations, the Government and Employers Federation appealed to the popular media suggesting that the CTU complaint had failed on the basis that 15 recommendations had been reduced to four in the final report. The president of the Employers' Federation said:

> "... the new findings of the ILO are a substantial endorsement of the fairness and value of the Act"[6].

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[6] New Zealand Employers Federation. (Media release) "ILO's report on the ECA" 17 Nov. 1994.

And further:

> "It is pleasing that the ILO came to recognise that the underlying philosophy of the Employment Contracts Act gives equal rights to employees and employers ..."[7]

Alarmingly, the media accepted the Government's and Employer's Federation propaganda. It reported the final conclusions as an exoneration of the Employment Contracts Act. Indeed as Haworth and Hughes contend the lack of understanding by leading commentators was cause for concern[8].

It is a sad reflection on the investigative role of the media that it simply accepted and reported the "analysis" which the Government and employers presented publicly without scrutinising it to see whether it was in fact correct.

In reality, the ILO's final report in no way endorsed the Employment Contracts Act. The ILO consistently maintained that the philosophy of the Act does not promote collective bargaining and remains contrary to Conventions 87 and 98. It recommended that the Employment Contracts Act be amended so that it is in line with the conventions.

The ILO left the case open and asked that the Government keep it informed about developments. Given that the CTU complaint originated very early in the life of the Employment Contracts Act, there were a number of issues still to be clarified by legal decisions under the Act to determine their precise meaning. In 1996 the CTU reiterated its concerns referring to developments in case law. The ILO responded by repeating its earlier recommendation that the government change the Employment Contracts Act so that it accords with Conventions 87 and 98. It is clear that the Government has no intention of doing so.

Conclusion

The experiences of the CTU have confirmed some of the limitations of the ILO structures and supervisory machinery.

Nevertheless, despite the ILO having no power to make binding recommendations, CTU action in relation to Conventions 87 and 98 in respect of the Employment Contracts Act, and in relation to Convention 17 in respect of ACC, have been of great value.

In particular, the CTU's complaint in relation to Conventions 87 and 98 drew international attention to New Zealand's situation and put the Government under intense diplomatic

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7 Ibid.

8 Haworth, N. and Hughes, S. (1995), "Under Scrutiny: The ECA, the ILO and the NZCTU Complaint 1993 - 1995". *New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations* **20(1)**: 143.

scrutiny as it was forced to defend its labour market reforms in an international forum. Secondly, the complaint sparked intense media interest and debate in New Zealand. Again, the Government was forced to defend itself, this time to the New Zealand public. Thirdly, the complaint remains open. This is important because it means the Government is required to keep the Committee informed of developments and to report on the application of Conventions 87 and 98 every two years under Article 22 of the ILO Constitution. This means the Government's policies and practices in relation to the principles of freedom of association are constantly subject to scrutiny.

The complaints and reporting procedures under the ILO Constitution have become very important to the CTU. During the last seven years, genuine tripartite consultation has disappeared, and basic minimum labour standards are being eroded. The ILO has become one of the few remaining institutions that recognises labour rights as human rights.

The CTU supports the Director-General's re-affirmation to the 1997 ILO Conference of the importance, in the context of trade liberalisation, of guaranteeing fundamental rights which allow social partners to claim freely a fair share of economic progress.

With the recognition of the fundamental importance of the core ILO Conventions by the April 1995 Heads of State Social Summit in Copenhagen, the 1996 OECD study on Trade and Labour Standards and, most recently the Singapore ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organisation in December 1996 there can be no questioning that the ILO has not only a constitutional, but a political mandate, for a continued standard setting and social monitoring role in the pursuit of social justice and peace in the global economy.

In particular the CTU support' the proposals:

- That not only should the ILO ensure that all partners in the multilateral trade system respect the fundamental rights (preferably by ratification of and compliance with the core conventions), but further steps should be taken to strengthen the supervisory machinery. This recommendation has been implemented to some extent with the 1998 Conference *Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work* which was passed with 273 votes for, no votes against, and 43 abstentions.

- That certain other rights, such as health and safety be identified as fundamental and vital. In this regard I note that none of the major ILO Conventions on Health and Safety (155, 161, 162, 174, 176) have been ratified by New Zealand.

Concluding comments

In the last seven years the Government has been touting the success of its economic and social reforms in New Zealand and overseas. Exposing the inconsistencies and flaws in its agenda has become a difficult task for organisations like the CTU. The international stage is becoming increasingly important with globalisation of the economic community

and the emergence of new international forums (i.e. APEC and WTO) and as reliance can no longer be placed on fundamental democratic structures in New Zealand.

The erosion of consultative decision making processes in New Zealand has been developing for some time. Unsurprisingly after almost a decade of unbridled economic reform, MMP was favoured by many New Zealanders in the belief that it would deliver a balance of justice and consultation in parliamentary decision making. The rise of MMP was a manifestation of New Zealanders' frustration with the erosion of democracy.

Unions have experienced frustration as the principles of tripartism, a cornerstone of the industrial relations system for most of this century, were swept aside by the Employment Contracts Act. The parliamentary select committee process, with all its flaws, has become the only formal process that remains for those seeking to challenge legislation. Recent experience suggests that it is not as open to participation and consultation as might have been hoped for under MMP.

As a result, the CTU is beginning to place more reliance than in the past on international forums and global common standards embodied in the principles of the ILO and United Nations covenants for guidance and redress. International diplomatic pressure and criticism has become one of the last remaining "checks" on the power of government.

Appendix 1

Case No. 1698: Interim conclusions of the Freedom of Association Committee presented to the March 1994 session

a) The Committee underlines that the principle of consultation and co-operation between public authorities and employers' and workers' organisations at the industrial and national levels is one to which importance should be attached.

b) Noting that the Act contains no express provisions on the recognition of representative workers' organisations for the purposes of collective bargaining, the Committee recalls the importance which it attaches to the right of representatives to negotiate, whether these organisations are registered or not, and reminds the Government that employers, including governmental authorities in the capacity of employers, should recognise for collective bargaining purposes the organisations representative of the workers employed by them.

c) The Committee notes that in cases where the employer successfully bypassed the authorised union representative, the Employment Court has not found the employers' actions to be at variance with the Act. The Committee requests the Government to provide further information on decisions of the courts and their consequences.

d) The Committee draws the Government's attention to the role of workers organisations in collective bargaining and to the principle that negotiation between employers or their organisations and organisations of workers should be encouraged and promoted.

e) Considering that, taken as a whole, the Employment Contracts Act does not encourage and promote collective bargaining, the Committee requests the Government to take appropriate steps to ensure the legislation encourages and promotes the development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers and employers' organisations and workers' organisations with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.

f) The Committee notes that case law has established that attempts by the employer to persuade workers to withdraw their authorisation to the union as their bargaining agent are perfectly valid since the Act does not require the employer to remain strictly neutral when its vital interests are affected, and it asks the Government to provide further information on whether this remains the situation. The Committee considers that employer attempts to negotiate collective contracts by seeking to persuade employees to withdraw authorisations given to a union could unduly influence the choice of workers and undermine the position of the union, thus making it more difficult to bargain collectively, which is contrary to the principle that collective bargaining should be promoted.

g) Noting that the Act does not grant sufficient protection to workers against acts of interference and discrimination by employers in case of authorisation of a union and that the absence of such protection means that protection against interference and discrimination on the basis of trade union membership or activities is ineffective in practice, the Committee asks the Government to take the necessary steps so that legislation lays down explicitly remedies and penalties against acts of interference and discrimination on the basis of authorisation of a union.

h) Recalling the importance of the independence of the parties in collective bargaining, the Committee asks the Government to take the necessary measures to ensure that legislation specifically prohibits negotiation being conducted on behalf of employees or their organisation by bargaining representatives appointed by or under the domination of employers or their organisations.

i) The Committee is of the view that the requirement established by the Act that a union establish its authority for all the workers it claims to represent in negotiations for a collective employment contract is excessive and in contradiction with freedom of association principles as it may be applied so as to constitute an impediment to the right of a workers' organisation to represent its members. The Committee requests the Government to take necessary steps to ensure that this possibility is removed.

j) The Committee believes that the right of access to workplaces is sufficiently guaranteed by the Act and reinforced by case law. It considers that problems related to union security clauses should be resolved at the national level, in conformity with national practice and the industrial relations system in each country. It further considers that the right to have names of members supplied to unions and the right to time off for union meetings are matters negotiable by the parties.

k) The Committee considers that the prohibition in the Act on strikes if they are concerned with the issue of whether a collective contract will bind more than one employer is contrary to the principles of freedom of association on the right to strike and that workers and their organisations should be able to call for industrial action in support of multi-employer contracts.

l) The Committee does not consider the restriction in the Act on the right to strike in an essential industry to be incompatible with freedom of association.

m) The Committee draws the Governments's attention to the principle that trade union organisations ought to have the possibility of recourse to protest strikes in particular where aimed at criticising a government's economic and social policy. However, strikes that are purely political in character do not fall within the scope of the principles of freedom of association. Accordingly, the right to strike should not be limited solely to industrial disputes that are likely to be resolved through the signing of a collective agreement; workers and their organisations should be able to express in a broader context, if necessary, their dissatisfaction as regards economic and social matters affecting their members' interests.

n) The Committee moreover requests the complainant and the Government to provide any other information which they consider to be relevant to the practical implementation of the Act.

Appendix 2

ILO Conventions ratified by New Zealand

Number	Name of Convention	Ratified
	Core Standards	
29	Forced Labour Convention, 1930	1938
100	Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951	1983
105	Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957	1968
111	Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958	1983

	Conditions of Work	
47	Forty Hour Week Convention, 1935	1938
1	Hours of Work (Industry) Convention, 1919	1938[9]
30	Hours of Work (Commerce and Offices) Convention 1930	1938[10]
49	Reduction of Hours of Work (Glass-Bottle Works) Convention, 1935	1938[11]
14	Weekly Rest (Industry) Convention, 1921	1938
52	Holidays with Pay Convention, 1936	1950
101	Holidays With Pay (Agriculture) Convention, 1952	1953
11	Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921	1938
50	Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention, 1936	1947
64	Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention ,1939	1947
65	Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1939	1947
104	Abolition of Penal Sanction (Indigenous Workers) Convention, 1955	1956
21	Inspection of Emigrants Convention, 1926	1938[12]
	Minimum Age for Work	
10	Minimum Age (Agriculture) Convention 1921	1947
15	Minimum Age (Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, 1921	1959
58	Minimum Age (Sea Convention (Revised), 1936	1938
59	Minimum Age (Industry) Convention (Revised), 1937	1947
	Labour Administration, Wages and Social Policy	
81	Labour Inspection Convention, 1947	1959[13]
26	Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery Convention, 1928	1938
99	Minimum Wage Fixing Machinery (Agriculture) Convention, 1951	1952
144	Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention, 1976	1987
63	Convention Concerning Statistics of Wages and Hours of Work, 1938	1940[14]
122	Employment Policy Convention, 1964	1965
44	Unemployment Provision Convention, 1934	1938
2	Unemployment Convention,1919	1938

[9] Has denounced this Convention.

[10] Has denounced this Convention.

[11] Has denounced this Convention.

[12] Has denounced this Convention.

[13] Excluding Part II.

[14] Excluding Part II.

88	Employment Service Convention,1948	1949
80	Final Articles Revision Convention, 1946	1947
116	Final Articles Revision Convention, 1961	1963
97	Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949	1950[15]
	Occupational Health and Safety	
12	Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, 1921	1938
17	Workmen's Compensation (Accidents) Convention, 1921	1938
42	Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention (Revised), 1934	1938
32	Prevention Against Accidents (Dockers) Convention (Revised), 1932	1938
134	Prevention of Accidents (Seafarers) Convention, 1970	1977
41	Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1934	1935[16]
89	Night Work (Women) Convention (Revised), 1948	1950[17]
45	Underground Work (Women) Convention, 1935	1938[18]
	Seafarers	
8	Unemployment Indemnity (Shipwreck) Convention, 1920	1980
9	Placing of Seamen Convention, 1920	1938
16	Medical Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention, 1921	1961
22	Seamen's Articles of Agreement Convention, 1926	1938
23	Repatriation of Seamen Convention, 1926	1980
53	Officers Competency Certificates Convention, 1936	1938
68	Food and Catering (Ships' Crews) Convention, 1946	1977
69	Certification of Ships Cooks Convention, 1946	1980
74	Certification of Able Seamen Convention, 1946	1961
92	Accommodation of Crews Convention, 1949	1977
133	Accommodation of Crews (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1970	1977
145	Continuity of Employment (Seafarers) Convention, 1976	1980
	Non-Metropolitan Territories	
84	Right of Association (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947	1952
82	Social Policy (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention, 1947	1954

[15] Excluding provisions in Annex 1.

[16] Convention denounced as a result of ratification of Convention No.89.

[17] Has denounced this Convention.

[18] Has denounced this Convention.