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New Zealand Law Students Journal |
Last Updated: 17 November 2012
BRINGING THE CISG HOME: RESTITUTIONARY CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CISG IN THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
REBEKAH PLACHECKI*
Introduction
New Zealand became a party to the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) in 1994.1
However, the CISG only applies to international sale of
goods contracts.2 Where the CISG does not apply, ordinary conflict
of laws rules and domestic law continue to apply. Unlike the CISG, the New
Zealand
domestic law has been described as outdated. Consequently, New
Zealand has reformed its law for consumer transactions3 and
further legislative reform has been debated for commercial ones.4
In New Zealand, domestic commercial contracts for the sale of goods are
currently regulated by the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (SOGA).
The Law Commission
has hinted that for New Zealand, the application of the CISG as a domestic law
may be an advance on the retention
of SOGA. Compared to the CISG, the SOGA is an
‘older model, less direct, and has a less flexible range of
remedies’.5
The CISG has an inclusive set of remedies (including restitutionary
ones) which are particularly tailored to the sale
of goods context. In
contrast, the SOGA does not deal with relief following rescission or
rejection, or for relief following
a frustrating event. Therefore,
the
* LLB, Candidate for LLM, Victoria University of Wellington.
1 New Zealand acceded 22 September 1994: AppHR 1995 A1:81; 1994 UN Status,
384,386 (footnote). Entered into force for New Zealand 7 October 1995 by virtue of section 1 of the Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994.
2 These contracts are for the international sale of goods in the commercial context unless parties opt for domestic law to apply. Consumer transactions are governed by the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ).
3 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 (NZ).
4 New Zealand Law Commission The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: New Zealand’s Proposed Acceptance (NZLC Report 23, Wellington, 1992) p. 51.
5 Ibid.
132
The New Zealand Law Students’ Journal (2006) 1 NZLSJ
132
The New Zealand Law Students’ Journal (2006) 1 NZLSJ
SOGA which was intended to be a ‘code’ is not fulfilling that
original objective. Restitution under the current domestic
law is a matter for
the general common law and other statutes.
This paper is therefore based on the premise that the CISG should
extend to cover internal sales which remain covered by the
SOGA. Remedies are
‘critical to the effective operation of law and especially in an area such
as the sale of goods’.6 Hence, the thrust of this paper is to
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of obtaining restitutionary
remedies through
such reform.7
The structure of this paper is as follows: Part A will examine the restitutionary remedies available under the CISG.8 Part B will examine the restitutionary remedies available under the current New Zealand domestic law. The examination in these Parts will be divided into restitution for failed contracts followed by restitution as a form of damages for a breach of contract (restitutionary damages)9. These two situations are quite different from each other. In the first situation, parties may wish to exercise their right to recover goods or money where they have performed the contract up until its failure.10 The objective of a restitutionary remedy for a failed contract is therefore to restore the parties to their pre-contractual positions. In contrast, restitutionary damages may apply while the contract is in existence. They may become relevant where the obligee wants to bring a damages claim against the obligor but has difficulty in proving that loss is caused by the breach. Therefore, the loss suffered by the obligee might be measured by the benefit the obligor received.
SOGA which was intended to be a ‘code’ is not fulfilling that
original objective. Restitution under the current domestic
law is a matter for
the general common law and other statutes.
This paper is therefore
based on the premise that the CISG should extend to cover internal sales
which remain covered by the
SOGA. Remedies are ‘critical to the effective
operation of law and especially in an area such as the sale of
goods’.6 Hence, the thrust of this paper is to evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of obtaining restitutionary remedies through
such reform.7
The structure of this paper is as follows: Part
A will examine the restitutionary remedies available under the CISG.8
Part B will examine the restitutionary remedies available under the
current New Zealand domestic law. The examination in
these Parts will
be divided into restitution for failed contracts followed by restitution
as a form of damages for
a breach of contract (restitutionary
damages)9. These two situations are quite different from each
other. In the first situation, parties may wish to exercise their
right to recover goods or money where they have performed the contract
up until its failure.10 The objective of a restitutionary remedy
for a failed contract is therefore to restore the parties to their
pre-contractual positions.
In contrast, restitutionary damages may apply
while the contract is in existence. They may become relevant where the
obligee
wants to bring a damages claim against the obligor but has difficulty in
proving that loss is caused by the breach. Therefore,
the loss suffered by
the obligee might be measured by the benefit the obligor
received.
6 Ibid., p. 40.
7 The paper does not attempt to provide an exclusive set of considerations relevant to
such reform. There are many potential issues that could arise in regard to restitution – for example those surrounding the demand of substitute goods where the goods have been destroyed. However, this paper instead aims to focus on some of the more important considerations particularly in regard to articles 79, 81, 82 and 84 of the CISG.
8 See appendix.
9 Also known as a disgorgement of profits.
10 This paper considers two types of failed contracts. First, a contract may fail because a party is entitled to have the contract discharged for breach by the other party. Second, a contract may fail where it has become impossible for a party to perform the obligations under the contract.
6 Ibid., p. 40.
7 The paper does not attempt to provide
an exclusive set of considerations relevant to
such reform. There are
many potential issues that could arise in regard to restitution – for
example those surrounding the demand
of substitute goods where the goods have
been destroyed. However, this paper instead aims to focus on some of the more
important
considerations particularly in regard to articles 79, 81, 82 and 84 of
the CISG.
8 See appendix.
9 Also known as a disgorgement
of profits.
10 This paper considers two types of failed
contracts. First, a contract may fail because a party is entitled to have the
contract discharged
for breach by the other party. Second, a contract may fail
where it has become impossible for a party to perform the obligations
under the
contract.
Restitution under the CISG in the Domestic Context 133
Next, Part C will discuss what issues in relation to restitution should be
considered were the CISG to apply to domestic sale of goods
contracts. Various
questions arise. For example: Does the CISG have more advantageous
restitutionary provisions than those available
under New Zealand domestic law?
Would the CISG need to be supplemented by other provisions? If so, how would
the legislature proceed
to deal with those inadequacies?
Finally, Part D will summarise the findings of this paper, namely that the
restitutionary remedies under the CISG provide parties with
adequate protection.
A: Restitution Under the CISG
1. Breach
The CISG allows restitution for a failed contract under Section V –
‘Effects of Avoidance’. Avoidance of contract is expressly
allowed under the CISG in Articles 49 and 64. These
Articles provide that the
buyer or seller may avoid the contract where the other party is in fundamental
breach.11
However, the right to avoid the contract is conditional. Articles 49(2) and
64(2) prevent a buyer or seller from avoiding the contract
where the other
party has already performed, unless avoidance is declared within the time
specified in the CISG.12
Avoidance prima facie releases both parties from further obligations to carry
out the contract. The seller need not deliver the goods
and the buyer need not
take delivery or pay for them.
However, despite the parties being free from future obligations, avoidance is not nullifying the contract altogether. The CISG continues to regulate the rights and obligations of the parties to eliminate
Restitution under the CISG in the Domestic Context 133
Next,
Part C will discuss what issues in relation to restitution should be considered
were the CISG to apply to domestic sale of goods
contracts. Various questions
arise. For example: Does the CISG have more advantageous restitutionary
provisions than those available
under New Zealand domestic law? Would the CISG
need to be supplemented by other provisions? If so, how would the legislature
proceed
to deal with those inadequacies?
Finally, Part D will summarise
the findings of this paper, namely that the restitutionary remedies under
the CISG provide parties with adequate protection.
A: Restitution Under the CISG
1. Breach
The CISG allows restitution for a failed contract under Section V
–
‘Effects of Avoidance’. Avoidance of contract is
expressly allowed under the CISG in Articles 49 and 64. These
Articles provide
that the buyer or seller may avoid the contract where the other party is in
fundamental breach.11
However, the right to avoid the contract
is conditional. Articles 49(2) and 64(2) prevent a buyer or seller from
avoiding the contract
where the other party has already performed, unless
avoidance is declared within the time specified in the
CISG.12
Avoidance prima facie releases both parties from
further obligations to carry out the contract. The seller need not deliver the
goods
and the buyer need not take delivery or pay for them.
However,
despite the parties being free from future obligations, avoidance is
not nullifying the contract altogether.
The CISG continues to regulate the
rights and obligations of the parties to eliminate
11 A fundamental breach is defined. See, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (11 April 1980) 3 UNTS 1489, art. 25 (entered into force 30 September 1981).
12 Ibid., art. 49(2) and 64(2).
11 A fundamental breach is defined. See, United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (11 April
1980) 3 UNTS 1489, art. 25 (entered into force 30 September 1981).
12
Ibid., art. 49(2) and 64(2).
unnecessary detriment as a result of the contract being avoided. Article
81(2) says that:
[a] party who has performed the contract either wholly or in part may claim
restitution from the other party of whatever the first
party has supplied or
paid under the contract. If both parties are bound to make restitution, they
must do so concurrently.
This provision allows a party to seek a restitutionary remedy according to
the contractual arrangements.
Article 84 then recognises that gains made from the goods also should not be retained by the buyer. And, as for recovery of money by the buyer, the seller is bound to pay interest on it. It is notable that Article
84(2) is unique in regard to the seller’s rights. The seller may seek
not only the return of the goods but also an
account of profits.
This additional remedy for an account of profits is a personal remedy against
the buyer. In contrast the buyer
would not be entitled to excess money supposing
the seller has invested it and gained proceeds.13 Therefore, from
an unjust enrichment perspective, the seller may have the more favourable
claim. Nevertheless, in practical
terms, there may be calculation
difficulties in assessing the seller’s remedy.
Avoiding the contract has another condition in addition to the ‘time’ constraint.14 Being able to make restitution to the other party (where that other party has performed in whole or part) is a pre-requisite. The CISG provides that (subject to the three exceptions listed in Article
82(2)), if a buyer cannot return the goods substantially in the condition in
which the buyer received them, the buyer must proceed
with the contract
and the remedy will be limited to damages.15
In conclusion, if a party is in breach of contract, the other party may seek avoidance of contract. However, the approach of the CISG requires restitution of whatever has been received as a condition to
unnecessary detriment as a result of the contract being avoided.
Article
81(2) says that:
[a] party who has performed the contract either wholly or in part may claim
restitution from the other party of whatever the first
party has supplied or
paid under the contract. If both parties are bound to make restitution, they
must do so concurrently.
This provision allows a party to seek a
restitutionary remedy according to the contractual arrangements.
Article
84 then recognises that gains made from the goods also should not be retained
by the buyer. And, as for recovery of money
by the buyer, the seller is bound
to pay interest on it. It is notable that Article
84(2) is unique in regard
to the seller’s rights. The seller may seek not only the return of the
goods but also an account
of profits. This additional remedy for an
account of profits is a personal remedy against the buyer. In contrast the buyer
would
not be entitled to excess money supposing the seller has invested it and
gained proceeds.13 Therefore, from an unjust enrichment
perspective, the seller may have the more favourable claim. Nevertheless,
in practical
terms, there may be calculation difficulties in assessing
the seller’s remedy.
Avoiding the contract has another condition
in addition to the ‘time’ constraint.14 Being able to
make restitution to the other party (where that other party has performed in
whole or part) is a pre-requisite. The
CISG provides that (subject to the
three exceptions listed in Article
82(2)), if a buyer cannot return the
goods substantially in the condition in which the buyer received them, the
buyer must proceed
with the contract and the remedy will be limited to
damages.15
In conclusion, if a party is in breach of
contract, the other party may seek avoidance of contract. However, the
approach
of the CISG requires restitution of whatever has been received
as a condition to
13 Although the buyer is entitled to interest, that is not an additional personal remedy. The domestic law (which applies because there is no provision in the CISG) merely sets an interest rate as part of the remedy.
14 Supra n. 12.
15 CISG (11 April 1980) 3 UNTS 1489, art. 82 (entered into force 30 September 1981).
13 Although the buyer is entitled to interest, that is not an
additional personal remedy. The domestic law (which applies because there
is no
provision in the CISG) merely sets an interest rate as part of the
remedy.
14 Supra n. 12.
15 CISG (11 April 1980) 3 UNTS
1489, art. 82 (entered into force 30 September 1981).
avoiding the contract. Furthermore, the restitutionary rights set out in
Articles 81 and 84 apply irrespective of which party caused
or declared
avoidance.16
2. Impossibility
Another situation in which restitution may become relevant is where the
contract has become frustrated. This is because a contract
may fail because it
has become impossible for a party to perform. A party in such situation may
wish to be put into his
or her pre-contractual position. The relevant
provision in the CISG to deal with a contract that has become impossible to
perform is Article 79. However, it is notable that this Article is not an
exception to Articles 49 and 64. Therefore, to avoid
a contract and obtain the
right to restitution, always requires a breach. So, Article 79 does not deal
with a ‘failed’
contract. The fact that Article 79 is not a gateway
to avoidance (and therefore restitution) can be problematic.
Article 79 exempts a party from performing his or her obligations under the contract if an unexpected impediment occurs. The Article does not however bring the contract to an end. Article 79(3) says that
‘the exemption provided ...has the effect for the period during which the impediment exists.’ Further, although Article 79 allows either party to seek other remedies,17 namely avoidance; it does not provide an exception to the prerequisite of showing a breach to avoid. Hence, the only way for the contract to come to an end permanently, is for there to be a breach.18
avoiding the contract. Furthermore, the restitutionary rights set out in
Articles 81 and 84 apply irrespective of which party caused
or declared
avoidance.16
2. Impossibility
Another situation in which restitution may
become relevant is where the contract has become frustrated. This is because a
contract
may fail because it has become impossible for a party to perform. A
party in such situation may wish to be put into his
or her
pre-contractual position. The relevant provision in the CISG to deal with a
contract that has become impossible to
perform is Article 79. However, it
is notable that this Article is not an exception to Articles 49 and 64.
Therefore, to avoid
a contract and obtain the right to restitution, always
requires a breach. So, Article 79 does not deal with a ‘failed’
contract. The fact that Article 79 is not a gateway to avoidance (and therefore
restitution) can be problematic.
Article 79 exempts a party from
performing his or her obligations under the contract if an unexpected
impediment occurs.
The Article does not however bring the contract to an end.
Article 79(3) says that
‘the exemption provided ...has the effect for
the period during which the impediment exists.’ Further, although Article
79 allows either party to seek other remedies,17 namely
avoidance; it does not provide an exception to the prerequisite of showing a
breach to avoid. Hence, the only way for
the contract to come to an end
permanently, is for there to be a breach.18
16 Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer (eds) Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (2nd ed, 2005) p. 888.
17 Except for damages.
18 Or for the parties to terminate the contract (both parties must agree to this). See,
Article 29(1) of the CISG. This paper is based on the premise that the parties do not have mutual wishes to end the contract. Rather one (either the buyer or seller) wishes to proceed but the other party does not. This is the difficulty of the CISG because if an unexpected impediment occurs one party may suffer detriment and wish to be free from his or her obligations under the contract. However, he or she cannot invoke Article 29 (because the other party is not in agreement to end the contract) nor can the contract be avoided for mere frustration.
16 Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer (eds) Commentary
on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) (2nd
ed, 2005) p. 888.
17 Except for damages.
18 Or
for the parties to terminate the contract (both parties must agree to this).
See,
Article 29(1) of the CISG. This paper is based on the premise that
the parties do not have mutual wishes to end the contract. Rather one
(either the buyer or seller) wishes to proceed but the other party does not.
This
is the difficulty of the CISG because if an unexpected impediment occurs
one party may suffer detriment and wish to be free from
his or her obligations
under the contract. However, he or she cannot invoke Article 29 (because the
other party is not in agreement
to end the contract) nor can the contract be
avoided for mere frustration.
The operation of Article 79 is therefore problematic.
‘Avoidance’ cannot be sought for mere frustration because
the
Article does not permanently exempt a party from performing. Therefore, the
way the Article operates may result in economic
disadvantages to either
the seller or the buyer. The seller may face undue hardship in making
alternative arrangements
to carry out his or her obligations.
Alternatively, the buyer may face inconvenience from the seller’s
delay.
Suppose for example, a seller is obliged to manufacture and supply goods to the buyer. The seller’s factory is destroyed by an ‘act of God’ making it impossible to deliver the goods to the buyer. To be able to perform the contract, the seller now has to re-locate to a new factory and manufacture new goods (meaning that now the seller will incur enormous cost increase). In this situation, because performance could still be carried out at a later date, the seller is only temporarily exempted from performing19 and the seller cannot seek avoidance for mere frustration. The seller cannot avoid the contract although he or she can return whatever has been received from the other party.20 Likewise, if the seller had partly performed prior to the frustrating event, there would be no right to avoid the contract and seek restitution unless the seller can show that the buyer is in breach of contract. Alternatively, the time delay by the seller may be burdensome for the buyer. But, the buyer cannot avoid the contract either unless the seller is in breach.21
Since Article 79 temporarily exempts the seller from performing, the
seller would only be in breach if he or she failed to perform
at all.
3. Restitutionary Damages for Unjust Enrichment
Article 74 of the CISG is the damages provision. It provides that
‘[d]amages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach.’
The operation of Article 79 is therefore problematic.
‘Avoidance’ cannot be sought for mere frustration because
the
Article does not permanently exempt a party from performing. Therefore, the
way the Article operates may result in economic
disadvantages to either
the seller or the buyer. The seller may face undue hardship in making
alternative arrangements
to carry out his or her obligations.
Alternatively, the buyer may face inconvenience from the seller’s
delay.
Suppose for example, a seller is obliged to manufacture
and supply goods to the buyer. The seller’s factory is destroyed
by an
‘act of God’ making it impossible to deliver the goods to the
buyer. To be able to perform the contract, the seller
now has to re-locate to a
new factory and manufacture new goods (meaning that now the seller will
incur enormous cost increase).
In this situation, because performance could
still be carried out at a later date, the seller is only temporarily exempted
from
performing19 and the seller cannot seek avoidance for mere
frustration. The seller cannot avoid the contract although he or she can return
whatever
has been received from the other party.20 Likewise, if the
seller had partly performed prior to the frustrating event, there would
be no right to avoid the contract
and seek restitution unless the seller can
show that the buyer is in breach of contract. Alternatively, the time delay by
the seller
may be burdensome for the buyer. But, the buyer cannot avoid the
contract either unless the seller is in breach.21
Since Article
79 temporarily exempts the seller from performing, the seller would only be
in breach if he or she failed to perform
at all.
3. Restitutionary Damages for Unjust Enrichment
Article 74 of the CISG is the damages provision. It provides
that
‘[d]amages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum
equal to the loss, including loss of profit, suffered by the
other party as a
consequence of the breach.’
19 Also, there is nothing to prevent the other party from bringing a claim for specific performance. See, Nina M Galston and Hans Smit (eds) International Sales – The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1984) at 5.03.
20 This is assuming the buyer wishes the contract to be continued of course: supra n. 18.
21 This is also assuming that the seller would not suffer undue detriment and therefore
does wish to proceed with the contract once his or her affairs have been sorted out: supra n. 18.
19 Also, there is nothing to prevent the other party from
bringing a claim for specific performance. See, Nina M Galston and Hans Smit
(eds) International Sales – The United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (1984) at 5.03.
20 This
is assuming the buyer wishes the contract to be continued of course: supra n.
18.
21 This is also assuming that the seller would not suffer undue
detriment and therefore
does wish to proceed with the contract
once his or her affairs have been sorted out: supra n. 18.
The specific reference to loss of profit is necessary because in some
legal systems the ‘concept of loss standing alone
does not include loss of
profit.’22 Therefore loss includes wasted expenditure
and compensation for lost profits.
It is clear that the drafters of the CISG had compensatory and not
restitutionary damages in mind in relation to this article.
The thrust of a
restitutionary remedy is for an account of profits and is different from lost
profits.
So the question becomes whether a party could ever claim an account of
profits under the CISG apart from under Article 74. The answer
lies in whether a
buyer or seller may assert, in addition to or instead of his rights under
Article 45(1) [and 61(1)], further claims
he derives under domestic law that is
secondarily or complementarily applicable by virtue of the rules of private
international law.
23
The Schlechtriem and Schwenzer’s Commentary on the CISG24
provides some guidance on this issue.
“[Article] 74 therein provide[s] for “an evaluation of
the parties’ interests with the intent of protecting
the seller from
excessive liability.” Domestic law should not be permitted to interfere
with this carefully considered assessment...A
buyer’s concurrent remedy
based on domestic law is admissible only under three conditions: the grounds
upon which the remedy
is based cannot fall within the scope proper of
Uniform Sales Law; the remedy cannot be in conflict with the
regulatory
goals of Uniform Sales Law; and the domestic law itself must permit
concurrent assertion of the remedy.”25
Accordingly, it is uncertain whether restitutionary damages would be allowed as a matter of principle. There is no international consensus on allowing restitutionary damages for a breach of contract. As will be
The specific reference to loss of profit is necessary because in some
legal systems the ‘concept of loss standing alone
does not include loss of
profit.’22 Therefore loss includes wasted expenditure
and compensation for lost profits.
It is clear that the drafters of
the CISG had compensatory and not restitutionary damages in mind in
relation to this article.
The thrust of a restitutionary remedy is for an
account of profits and is different from lost profits.
So the question
becomes whether a party could ever claim an account of profits under the CISG
apart from under Article 74. The answer
lies in whether a buyer or seller may
assert, in addition to or instead of his rights under Article 45(1) [and 61(1)],
further claims
he derives under domestic law that is secondarily or
complementarily applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.
23
The Schlechtriem and Schwenzer’s Commentary
on the CISG24
provides some guidance on this issue.
“[Article] 74 therein provide[s] for “an evaluation of
the parties’ interests with the intent of protecting
the seller from
excessive liability.” Domestic law should not be permitted to interfere
with this carefully considered assessment...A
buyer’s concurrent remedy
based on domestic law is admissible only under three conditions: the grounds
upon which the remedy
is based cannot fall within the scope proper of
Uniform Sales Law; the remedy cannot be in conflict with the
regulatory
goals of Uniform Sales Law; and the domestic law itself must permit
concurrent assertion of the remedy.”25
Accordingly, it
is uncertain whether restitutionary damages would be allowed as a matter of
principle. There is no international
consensus on allowing restitutionary
damages for a breach of contract. As will be
22 Albert Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1989) p. 475.
23 Schlechtriem; Schwenzer, supra n 16, p. 530.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 531.
22 Albert Kritzer, Guide to Practical Applications of the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(1989) p. 475.
23 Schlechtriem; Schwenzer, supra n 16, p.
530.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 531.
noted later in this paper, even common law commentators are divided on the
acceptability of allowing such claim.
However, there remains another possibility – that of excluding the
application of Article 45 altogether. Article 6 of the
CISG allows the
parties to derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.
Hence, derogating from Article 45 means
that damages will be a matter for the
domestic law and not subject to the CISG.26 Consequently, if the
law of the jurisdiction (which is to be applied according to the rules of
private international law) allows
for restitutionary damages, then a party
may be entitled to seek them.
B: Restitution Under New Zealand Domestic Sale of Goods Law
1. Breach
Unlike the CISG, there is no provision regulating the avoidance of a
contract under the SOGA. The set-up of the New Zealand Act
is quite different.
Under the SOGA it is the buyer’s obligation to accept and pay for the
goods. 27 However, where the seller is in breach the buyer may reject
them.28 Accordingly, it is the duty of the seller to deliver the
goods.29
However, if the buyer is in breach, the seller may rescind the contract and
may also exercise a right to an equitable lien over the
goods in the
seller’s possession. Under the current law it seems that so long as the
seller retains possession he or she is
adequately protected by rights of
retention if there is a breach of contract by the buyer.30 On the
other hand, the rescinding seller who has given up possession is ‘confined
to rights in personam against the buyer.’31
If the seller is in breach and does not deliver any goods at all (therefore the buyer cannot accept or reject them) but the buyer has pre-paid,
noted later in this paper, even common law commentators are divided on the
acceptability of allowing such claim.
However, there remains another
possibility – that of excluding the application of Article 45
altogether. Article 6 of the
CISG allows the parties to derogate from or
vary the effect of any of its provisions. Hence, derogating from Article 45
means
that damages will be a matter for the domestic law and not subject to the
CISG.26 Consequently, if the law of the jurisdiction (which is to
be applied according to the rules of private international law) allows
for
restitutionary damages, then a party may be entitled to seek them.
B: Restitution Under New Zealand Domestic Sale of Goods Law
1. Breach
Unlike the CISG, there is no provision regulating the avoidance of a
contract under the SOGA. The set-up of the New Zealand Act
is quite different.
Under the SOGA it is the buyer’s obligation to accept and pay for the
goods. 27 However, where the seller is in breach the buyer may reject
them.28 Accordingly, it is the duty of the seller to deliver the
goods.29
However, if the buyer is in breach, the seller may
rescind the contract and may also exercise a right to an equitable lien over the
goods in the seller’s possession. Under the current law it seems that so
long as the seller retains possession he or she is
adequately protected by
rights of retention if there is a breach of contract by the buyer.30
On the other hand, the rescinding seller who has given up possession is
‘confined to rights in personam against the
buyer.’31
If the seller is in breach and does not
deliver any goods at all (therefore the buyer cannot accept or reject them)
but the buyer
has pre-paid,
26 Ibid., p. 533.
27 Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ), section 29.
28 New Zealand Law Commission, Contract Statutes Review, (NZLC Report 25, Wellington,
1993) p. 116.
29 Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) section 29.
30 New Zealand Law Commission, supra n. 28, p. 121.
31 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 533.
27 Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ),
section 29.
28 New Zealand Law Commission, Contract Statutes
Review, (NZLC Report 25, Wellington,
1993) p. 116.
29 Sale
of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) section 29.
30 New Zealand Law
Commission, supra n. 28, p. 121.
31 Ibid.
then under section 55 of the SOGA the buyer can bring an action to recover
the money, based on a failure of performance. In contrast,
if the seller is in
breach of contract but the goods have been delivered, the buyer may reject
them. By rejecting them, the buyer
is free from the duty to pay. However, if the
buyer has pre-paid for them, because the SOGA does not deal with relief
following
rejection, the buyer must seek restoration of benefits on the
ground of a failure of basis. Likewise, as the SOGA does
not deal with
relief following rescission, restitution for the seller is dealt with on the
ground of a failure of basis.
Failure of basis within a contractual context is dealt with at common law. Common law allows a plaintiff to either seek compensation for the loss of performance or recover the value of money or other benefits transferred pursuant to the contract.32 Common law dealing with
‘failure of basis’ supplements the SOGA.33
Nevertheless, although restitutionary remedies where a contract is
discharged for breach are available, the common law’s
practical
implications have been criticised. Obtaining restitution through this avenue is
therefore often going to be an inefficient
or ineffective process. The
problems arising under common law will be discussed in greater detail later
in this paper.34
2. Impossibility
Because the SOGA does not deal with impossibility to perform, other law
applies – namely, the Frustrated Contracts Act 1944
(NZ)
(FCA).35
The FCA allows a party to seek restitution where a contract ‘has become impossible of performance or otherwise been frustrated’.36
Section 3(2) of the FCA provides that:
[a]ll sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the contract before the time when the parties were so
then under section 55 of the SOGA the buyer can bring an action to recover
the money, based on a failure of performance. In contrast,
if the seller is in
breach of contract but the goods have been delivered, the buyer may reject
them. By rejecting them, the buyer
is free from the duty to pay. However, if the
buyer has pre-paid for them, because the SOGA does not deal with relief
following
rejection, the buyer must seek restoration of benefits on the
ground of a failure of basis. Likewise, as the SOGA does
not deal with
relief following rescission, restitution for the seller is dealt with on the
ground of a failure of basis.
Failure of basis within a contractual
context is dealt with at common law. Common law allows a plaintiff to either
seek compensation
for the loss of performance or recover the value of money or
other benefits transferred pursuant to the contract.32 Common
law dealing with
‘failure of basis’ supplements the
SOGA.33 Nevertheless, although restitutionary remedies where a
contract is discharged for breach are available, the common law’s
practical implications have been criticised. Obtaining restitution through this
avenue is therefore often going to be an inefficient
or ineffective
process. The problems arising under common law will be discussed in
greater detail later in this paper.34
2. Impossibility
Because the SOGA does not deal with impossibility to perform, other law
applies – namely, the Frustrated Contracts Act 1944
(NZ)
(FCA).35
The FCA allows a party to seek restitution
where a contract ‘has become impossible of performance or
otherwise
been frustrated’.36
Section 3(2) of the FCA
provides that:
[a]ll sums paid or payable to any party in pursuance of the contract
before the time when the parties were
so
32 Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett, Unjust Enrichment and Restitution in New
Zealand (2000), p. 165.
33 See, the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ), sections 55 and 60.
34 See, below Part C(1)(a).
35 There is a saving provision in the FCA in regard to the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) section 9. However, this paper will focus on the reasons for impossibility apart from that saving, and which therefore fall within scope of the FCA.
36 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ) section 3(1).
32 Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett, Unjust Enrichment and
Restitution in New
Zealand (2000), p. 165.
33 See,
the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ), sections 55 and 60.
34 See, below Part
C(1)(a).
35 There is a saving provision in the FCA in
regard to the Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) section 9. However, this paper will
focus on the
reasons for impossibility apart from that saving, and which
therefore fall within scope of the FCA.
36 Frustrated Contracts Act
1944 (NZ) section 3(1).
discharged...shall, in the case of sums paid, be recoverable from him as
money received by him for the use of the party by whom
the sums were paid,
and, in the case of sums so payable, cease to be so
payable.37
This remedy is subject to the proviso which is a statutory recognition of the
defence of change of position.
Provided that, if the party to whom the sums were so paid or payable incurred
expenses before the time of discharge in, or for the
purpose of, the
performance of the contract, the Court may...allow him to retain
or...recover the whole or any part
of the sums so paid or payable,
not being an amount in excess of the expenses so incurred.38
Therefore if the defendant has changed position in reliance on the
contract then restitution to the plaintiff may
be subject to those
expenses incurred by the defendant. A restitutionary remedy could be
calculated as the amount paid or payable
to the plaintiff minus the
defendant’s wasted expenses.
The FCA then goes on to allow the plaintiff recovery where a benefit is
obtained by a defendant other than money. Under section
3(3) the court
has the discretion to grant the party conferring the benefit such sum as it
thinks just.
3. Restitutionary Damages for Unjust Enrichment
The common law principle of damages for a breach of contract has been that the plaintiff should be put in the position, had the contract been performed.39 Hence, a general restitutionary claim for profit gained by a defendant for breach of contract has not been recognised in New Zealand.40 In assessing damages for the breach of contract, the court is concerned with the plaintiff’s loss and not with the defendant’s gain.41 However, there has recently been a significant shift in thinking.
discharged...shall, in the case of sums paid, be recoverable from him as
money received by him for the use of the party by whom
the sums were paid,
and, in the case of sums so payable, cease to be so
payable.37
This remedy is subject to the proviso which is a
statutory recognition of the defence of change of position.
Provided
that, if the party to whom the sums were so paid or payable incurred expenses
before the time of discharge in, or for the
purpose of, the performance of
the contract, the Court may...allow him to retain or...recover the
whole or any part
of the sums so paid or payable, not being an amount
in excess of the expenses so incurred.38
Therefore if the
defendant has changed position in reliance on the contract then
restitution to the plaintiff may
be subject to those expenses incurred
by the defendant. A restitutionary remedy could be calculated as the amount
paid or payable
to the plaintiff minus the defendant’s wasted
expenses.
The FCA then goes on to allow the plaintiff recovery where a
benefit is obtained by a defendant other than money. Under section
3(3)
the court has the discretion to grant the party conferring the benefit such sum
as it thinks just.
3. Restitutionary Damages for Unjust Enrichment
The common law
principle of damages for a breach of contract has been that the plaintiff
should be put in the position, had the
contract been performed.39
Hence, a general restitutionary claim for profit gained by a
defendant for breach of contract has not been recognised in New
Zealand.40
In assessing damages for the breach of contract, the court is
concerned with the plaintiff’s loss and not with the defendant’s
gain.41 However, there has recently been a significant shift in
thinking.
37 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ) section 3(2).
38 Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p. 176.
39 Robinson v Harman [1848] EngR 135; (1848) 1 Ex 850, p. 855.
40 Blanchard (ed), Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2003) p. 32.
41 Sotiros Shipping Inc v Sameiet Solholt [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 605 (CA).
37 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ) section 3(2).
38
Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p. 176.
39 Robinson v Harman
[1848] EngR 135; (1848) 1 Ex 850, p. 855.
40 Blanchard (ed), Civil
Remedies in New Zealand (2003) p. 32.
41 Sotiros Shipping Inc v
Sameiet Solholt [1983] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 605 (CA).
Attorney-General v Blake42 became a leading case in 2003
for recognizing the possibility of restitutionary damages for breach of
contract. This English
case mentions two situations where restitutionary
damages could be sought - for skimped performance and/or for doing the very
thing you contracted not to do. The latter situation could easily arise in a
contract for the sale of goods. Whether the obiter dictum
of this case would be
accepted in New Zealand has been a matter of academic debate.43
It is notable that there is no statutory impediment to allowing this
remedy for a breach of a sale of goods contract. While the SOGA
does not provide
any express regulation of applying for restitutionary remedies, section 60
provides that ‘rules of common
law...save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act...shall continue
to apply
to contracts for the sale of goods.’ Therefore,
development in the common law for allowing restitutionary damages is
possible.
C: Restitutionary Considerations for the CISG Applying to Domestic
Contracts
The preceding Parts have set out how and when restitution is available under
the CISG and the domestic law. As can be seen, the domestic
law is
substantively different to the CISG in various ways. This paper will now
explore those differences and determine
whether the restitutionary
remedies available under the CISG would be an acceptable
alternative to those available
under the current domestic law.
This Part will first focus on the weaknesses of the domestic law concerning restitution for failed contracts and determine whether the CISG would eliminate those weaknesses if it were to supersede SOGA. Alternatively, if the CISG has any weakness then those will also be addressed. Then, since restitutionary damages are not available under the CISG or current domestic law, the paper will address whether that is an inadequacy and how it could be dealt with if the CISG were a basis for a new domestic code. Finally, domestic law that would be
Attorney-General v Blake42 became a leading case in 2003
for recognizing the possibility of restitutionary damages for breach of
contract. This English
case mentions two situations where restitutionary
damages could be sought - for skimped performance and/or for doing the very
thing you contracted not to do. The latter situation could easily arise in a
contract for the sale of goods. Whether the obiter dictum
of this case would be
accepted in New Zealand has been a matter of academic debate.43
It is notable that there is no statutory impediment to allowing this
remedy for a breach of a sale of goods contract. While the SOGA
does not provide
any express regulation of applying for restitutionary remedies, section 60
provides that ‘rules of common
law...save in so far as they are
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act...shall continue
to apply
to contracts for the sale of goods.’ Therefore,
development in the common law for allowing restitutionary damages is
possible.
C: Restitutionary Considerations for the CISG Applying to Domestic
Contracts
The preceding Parts have set out how and when restitution
is available under the CISG and the domestic law. As can be seen, the domestic
law is substantively different to the CISG in various ways. This paper will
now explore those differences and determine
whether the
restitutionary remedies available under the CISG would be an
acceptable alternative to those available
under the current domestic
law.
This Part will first focus on the weaknesses of the
domestic law concerning restitution for failed contracts and determine
whether the CISG would eliminate those weaknesses if it were to supersede SOGA.
Alternatively, if the CISG has any weakness
then those will also be
addressed. Then, since restitutionary damages are not available under the
CISG or current domestic
law, the paper will address whether that is an
inadequacy and how it could be dealt with if the CISG were a basis for a new
domestic
code. Finally, domestic law that would be
42 Attorney-General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party) [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). See also, Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises INC Edward Chalpin [2003] EWCA Civ 323 for application of restitutionary remedies for breach of contract in the commercial context.
43 Views are currently divided. See Maree C Chetwin and David K Round ‘Breach of
Contract and the New Remedy of Account of Profits’ (2002) 38 ABACUS.
42 Attorney-General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party)
[2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). See also, Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises
INC Edward Chalpin [2003] EWCA Civ 323 for application of restitutionary
remedies for breach of contract in the commercial context.
43
Views are currently divided. See Maree C Chetwin and David K Round
‘Breach of
Contract and the New Remedy of Account of
Profits’ (2002) 38 ABACUS.
needed in addition to the CISG to regulate contracts for the sale of
goods will be noted.
1. Failed Contracts
(a) Breach
There are two main problems with the domestic law in regard to
restitution for a breach of contract. First, the
SOGA makes no
provision for when a buyer who rejects the goods actually cancels the
contract.44 And second, restitution under the common law for
‘failure of basis’ is inadequate and dated. The Law Commission has
noted
these issues and suggested amendments to SOGA. This paper will now
determine whether those recommendations by the Law Commission
could also
be achieved by replacing SOGA with the CISG.
In regard to the cancellation issue, the Law Commission suggested that the
buyer should have the choice to either reject the goods
or cancel the
contract. This would eliminate the current ambiguity of when rejection
also amounts to cancellation.
The Law Commission noted that to complete
the dovetailing, it is necessary to affirm the rule that the effect of
rejecting
goods after the property has passed or cancellation of
the contract is that title re-vests in the seller unless the
goods have been
accepted.45 They said that it would be inconvenient, if in the
majority of fact situations, the property were to remain in the buyer after
cancellation.46 Accordingly, a proprietary right is transferred back
to the seller and this right can be enforced by way of
restitution.47
If the CISG were to take the place of SOGA, then the inadequacy of the word rejection would not be an issue. Under the CISG rejection and cancellation would be combined into ‘avoidance’. Where a party wishes to avoid the contract under the CISG, notice to the other side is
needed in addition to the CISG to regulate contracts for the sale of
goods will be noted.
1. Failed Contracts
(a) Breach
There are two main problems with the domestic law in regard to
restitution for a breach of contract. First, the
SOGA makes no
provision for when a buyer who rejects the goods actually cancels the
contract.44 And second, restitution under the common law for
‘failure of basis’ is inadequate and dated. The Law Commission has
noted
these issues and suggested amendments to SOGA. This paper will now
determine whether those recommendations by the Law Commission
could also
be achieved by replacing SOGA with the CISG.
In regard to the
cancellation issue, the Law Commission suggested that the buyer should have the
choice to either reject the goods
or cancel the contract. This would
eliminate the current ambiguity of when rejection also amounts to
cancellation.
The Law Commission noted that to complete the dovetailing, it
is necessary to affirm the rule that the effect of rejecting
goods
after the property has passed or cancellation of the contract is that
title re-vests in the seller unless the
goods have been accepted.45
They said that it would be inconvenient, if in the majority of fact
situations, the property were to remain in the buyer after
cancellation.46 Accordingly, a proprietary right is transferred back
to the seller and this right can be enforced by way of
restitution.47
If the CISG were to take the place of SOGA,
then the inadequacy of the word rejection would not be an issue. Under the
CISG rejection
and cancellation would be combined into
‘avoidance’. Where a party wishes to avoid the contract under the
CISG,
notice to the other side is
44 It is unclear what further act is required for the contract to be cancelled. Rejecting is not always going to involve complete cancellation of the contract. The Law Commission also suggested that the word ‘rescission’ by the seller should be replaced with
‘cancellation’. However, unlike the situation for the buyer, that does not substantially
change the provision so it will not be discussed.
45 New Zealand Law Commission, supra n. 28, p. 118.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
44 It is unclear what further act is required for the contract to
be cancelled. Rejecting is not always going to involve complete cancellation
of
the contract. The Law Commission also suggested that the word
‘rescission’ by the seller should be replaced
with
‘cancellation’. However, unlike the situation for the
buyer, that does not substantially
change the provision so it will not
be discussed.
45 New Zealand Law Commission, supra n. 28, p.
118.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
required.48 The CISG then has the desirable objective of
putting the parties into their pre-contractual positions by allowing
restitution
of performance to be claimed by either party. Upon avoidance the
seller has the right to the re-vesting of his or her property interest.
And, the
buyer may recover any money pre-paid.
The second issue - failure of basis - is that, as mentioned earlier in this
paper, the common law has been criticised. The
problems with the
current law are as follows. First, the common law requires a total failure of
basis.49 Therefore a plaintiff who has received part of the
contractual performance is prevented from seeking restitution. Second,
restoration
can only be to the party not in breach – thereby barring the
party in breach from restitution.50 Third, restitution as a failure
of basis claim allows the party to have returned only what was agreed
under the contract.
Therefore gains made would not be recoverable.51
Finally, benefits conferred under the contract are not
recoverable if the contract was one constructed as requiring
complete
performance.52
Although the enactment of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ) (CRA) was implemented to remove the common law inadequacies, it specifically excluded its application to the sale of goods.53 Nevertheless, it is notable that the drafters of the CRA intended the saving to be temporary.54 It seems that the saving was merely to allow time to conduct a thorough overhaul of the SOGA, which was to be the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform Committee’s (CCLRC) next project.55 The CCLRC was, however abolished before it could undertake that review.56
required.48 The CISG then has the desirable objective of
putting the parties into their pre-contractual positions by allowing
restitution
of performance to be claimed by either party. Upon avoidance the
seller has the right to the re-vesting of his or her property interest.
And, the
buyer may recover any money pre-paid.
The second issue - failure of basis
- is that, as mentioned earlier in this paper, the common law has been
criticised. The
problems with the current law are as follows. First, the
common law requires a total failure of basis.49 Therefore a plaintiff
who has received part of the contractual performance is prevented from seeking
restitution. Second, restoration
can only be to the party not in breach –
thereby barring the party in breach from restitution.50 Third,
restitution as a failure of basis claim allows the party to have returned
only what was agreed under the contract.
Therefore gains made would not be
recoverable.51 Finally, benefits conferred under the contract
are not recoverable if the contract was one constructed as requiring
complete
performance.52
Although the enactment of the
Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ) (CRA) was implemented to remove the
common law inadequacies,
it specifically excluded its application to the sale
of goods.53 Nevertheless, it is notable that the drafters of the
CRA intended the saving to be temporary.54 It seems that the
saving was merely to allow time to conduct a thorough overhaul of the
SOGA, which was to be
the Contracts and Commercial Law Reform
Committee’s (CCLRC) next project.55 The CCLRC was,
however abolished before it could undertake that
review.56
48 CISG (11 April 1980) 5 UNTS 1489, art 26 (entered into force 30 September 1981).
49 Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p. 168.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Cutter v Powell (1795) 6 Term Rep 320.
53 Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ) section 15(d). But also see sections 4(3) and 6(2) of the CRA for exceptions where the CRA applies despite the SOGA. Those exceptions are however are not discussed in this paper.
54 Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p. 169.
55 New Zealand Law Commission, supra n. 28, p. 112.
56 Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p. 170.
48 CISG (11 April 1980) 5 UNTS 1489, art 26 (entered into force
30 September 1981).
49 Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p.
168.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Cutter v
Powell (1795) 6 Term Rep 320.
53 Contractual Remedies
Act 1979 (NZ) section 15(d). But also see sections 4(3) and 6(2) of the CRA for
exceptions where the CRA applies
despite the SOGA. Those exceptions are however
are not discussed in this paper.
54 Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p.
169.
55 New Zealand Law Commission, supra n. 28, p.
112.
56 Grantham; Rickett, supra n. 32, p. 170.
Therefore the Law Commission has since argued that the CRA and the SOGA
should be harmonised. Particularly that section 9 of the
CRA should be made
available for sale of goods contracts.
Section 9 overcomes the problems of the common law noted above. However,
at the time of the Law Commission’s proposal, the
CISG had not been
adopted by New Zealand. Therefore, proceeding with the CCLRC’s original
plan, the CISG could overtake
SOGA. The substantive objectives of
the Law Commission would also be achieved but through a different avenue
– the CISG
instead of the CRA.
The CISG is an advance on the common law by allowing restitution (whether
or not there has been part performance) to be
sought by either party,
not limiting recovery to the contract (Article 84), and by being available
whether or not complete performance
was stipulated in the contract. The CISG is
a mechanism to provide a fairer remedy for restitution than what is available to
parties
under the current domestic law.
Further, the CISG is arguably even more desirable than the CRA in that it
makes restitution a guaranteed right on avoidance. Under
the CRA
restitutionary relief is entirely at the court’s discretion and
not the subject of firm rules.57 Importantly, this point
was criticised by Professor D McLauchlan shortly after the CRA was
implemented.
The [CCLRC] has effectually swept away 200 years of case-law dealing with
restitution upon rescission...with no reported discussion
of the important
and complex issues involved. [However] it is not suggested that the common
law ought to have been retained...It
is for the legislature to make
the policy decisions, not simply to uproot the existing rules and dump
the problems into
the lap of the courts to be solved by the exercise of an
almost boundless discretion.58
However, restitution under the CISG is not free from criticism. Some academics have argued that Article 82, which bars the buyer from
Therefore the Law Commission has since argued that the CRA and the SOGA
should be harmonised. Particularly that section 9 of the
CRA should be made
available for sale of goods contracts.
Section 9 overcomes the problems
of the common law noted above. However, at the time of the Law
Commission’s proposal, the
CISG had not been adopted by New Zealand.
Therefore, proceeding with the CCLRC’s original plan, the CISG
could
overtake SOGA. The substantive objectives of the Law Commission
would also be achieved but through a different avenue –
the CISG instead
of the CRA.
The CISG is an advance on the common law by allowing
restitution (whether or not there has been part performance) to be
sought by either party, not limiting recovery to the contract (Article 84), and
by being available whether or not complete performance
was stipulated in the
contract. The CISG is a mechanism to provide a fairer remedy for restitution
than what is available to parties
under the current domestic
law.
Further, the CISG is arguably even more desirable than the CRA in
that it makes restitution a guaranteed right on avoidance. Under
the CRA
restitutionary relief is entirely at the court’s discretion and
not the subject of firm rules.57 Importantly, this point
was criticised by Professor D McLauchlan shortly after the CRA was
implemented.
The [CCLRC] has effectually swept away 200 years of case-law
dealing with restitution upon rescission...with no reported discussion
of
the important and complex issues involved. [However] it is not suggested that
the common law ought to have been retained...It
is for the legislature
to make the policy decisions, not simply to uproot the existing rules
and dump the problems into
the lap of the courts to be solved by the exercise of
an almost boundless discretion.58
However, restitution under
the CISG is not free from criticism. Some academics have argued that Article
82, which bars the
buyer from
57 Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ) sections 9(1)-(4); Cynthia Hawes (ed) Butterworths
Introduction to Commercial Law (2005), p. 127.
58 David McLauchlan ‘Contract Law Reform in New Zealand: The CRA 1979’ (1981) 1
OJLS 284, pp. 288 and 292.
57 Contractual Remedies Act 1979 (NZ) sections 9(1)-(4); Cynthia
Hawes (ed) Butterworths
Introduction to Commercial Law
(2005), p. 127.
58 David McLauchlan ‘Contract Law
Reform in New Zealand: The CRA 1979’ (1981) 1
OJLS 284, pp. 288
and 292.
avoiding the contract if the buyer cannot make restitution of the goods, is
too restrictive.59 Perhaps a more liberal provision in place
of the current Article 82 would be to grant a party an allowance in money.
This
is the approach of The International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT). On the other hand, the criticism
that the CISG is
too restrictive has also been countered:
Due to the wide range of exceptions to the bar of avoidance under Art.
82(2)(a) to (c) CISG and the objective equalization of
benefits according to Art. 84(2) CISG, restitution
under [UNIDROIT and
CISG] will quite often produce the same or, at least, a similar result.
Furthermore, one should give broad
application to the exceptions of para.
(2) and thereby limit the bar of Art. 82(1) CISG.60
Therefore, the exceptions in Article 82(2) mean that the buyer would not
often face a dissimilar result to that under the
UNIDROIT approach. If
the reason the buyer cannot return the goods is not his or her fault, or if the
goods have simply been on-sold
the goods in the normal course of business,
then the buyer can avoid the contract. These exceptions are very wide.
The
working operation of article 82 arguably strikes a good balance and is
fair for both parties.
(b) Impossibility
If the CISG became a code for domestic contracts, then it would trump the FCA
where the sales of goods are involved.61
The domestic law differs from the CISG in that it deals with restitution for frustrated contracts and restitution where the contract is discharged for breach separately. As pointed out earlier in this paper, there are problems with the operation of Article 79 of the CISG. Under the CISG, discharging the contract is not a guaranteed option for the party faced with the impossibility.62 The CISG’s problem of having a breach
avoiding the contract if the buyer cannot make restitution of the goods, is
too restrictive.59 Perhaps a more liberal provision in place
of the current Article 82 would be to grant a party an allowance in money.
This
is the approach of The International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (UNIDROIT). On the other hand, the criticism
that the CISG is
too restrictive has also been countered:
Due to the wide range of
exceptions to the bar of avoidance under Art.
82(2)(a) to (c) CISG
and the objective equalization of benefits according to Art. 84(2)
CISG, restitution
under [UNIDROIT and CISG] will quite often produce the
same or, at least, a similar result. Furthermore, one should give broad
application to the exceptions of para. (2) and thereby limit the bar of Art.
82(1) CISG.60
Therefore, the exceptions in Article 82(2)
mean that the buyer would not often face a dissimilar result to that
under the
UNIDROIT approach. If the reason the buyer cannot return the goods
is not his or her fault, or if the goods have simply been on-sold
the goods in
the normal course of business, then the buyer can avoid the contract.
These exceptions are very wide. The
working operation of article 82 arguably
strikes a good balance and is fair for both parties.
(b) Impossibility
If the CISG became a code for domestic contracts, then it would trump the
FCA where the sales of goods are involved.61
The domestic law
differs from the CISG in that it deals with restitution for frustrated contracts
and restitution where the contract
is discharged for breach separately. As
pointed out earlier in this paper, there are problems with the operation
of Article
79 of the CISG. Under the CISG, discharging the contract is not
a guaranteed option for the party faced with the impossibility.62
The CISG’s problem of having a breach
59 See, Florian Mohs ‘Remarks on the manner in which Articles 7.3.5 and 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles compare with Articles 81 and 82 of the CISG’ http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/mohs.html at 21 January 2006.
60 Ibid.
61 This is because the CISG has its own regime for dealing with frustrated contracts in
Article 79.
62 Supra Part A(2).
59 See, Florian Mohs ‘Remarks on the manner in which
Articles 7.3.5 and 7.3.6 of the UNIDROIT Principles compare with Articles
81 and 82 of the CISG’
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/mohs.html at 21 January
2006.
60 Ibid.
61 This is because the CISG has
its own regime for dealing with frustrated contracts in
Article
79.
62 Supra Part A(2).
as a pre-requisite to avoid as opposed to allowing avoidance for a
frustrating event, has been criticised:
The system of remedies is ill-adapted to the situation dealt with
in Article 79. The remedies, of course, are simply the
general remedies for the
kind of non-performance which a common lawyer calls breach of contract, whereas
in article 79 we are not
dealing with breach. We are concerned with adjusting
the rights of two innocent parties. The problems are those of balancing
benefits received against expenses incurred, problems which are normally thought
of in the context of the law of restitution, but
call for the exercise of a
greater degree of judicial discretion than found in normal restitutionary
remedies.63
Unlike the CISG, discharging a contract for impossibility under the current domestic law is not dependent on a breach by the other party. So in that respect the domestic law is better. Consequently, the question becomes whether or not the problems of Article 79 could be overcome if the CISG were to apply to domestic contracts. The easiest way to overcome the problem would be to delete Article 79(3). Article
79(3) makes the exemption under Article 79 temporary – during the
period that the impediment exists. If a party is permanently
exempted from
performing, the contract has failed. In that case, either party could declare
the contract avoided and seek restitution.64
Despite the FCA perhaps being advantageous as to when it applies, its provisions on how it applies are not so attractive for sales of goods.65
Particularly, perhaps the CISG is more geared to dealing with commercial contracts for the sale of goods in that it provides the option to have the actual goods returned where applicable. The FCA section 3(2) does not allow the restitution of property, other than in a monetary form.66 This limitation may be problematic at times.
as a pre-requisite to avoid as opposed to allowing avoidance for a
frustrating event, has been criticised:
The system of remedies is
ill-adapted to the situation dealt with in Article 79. The remedies, of
course, are simply the
general remedies for the kind of non-performance which a
common lawyer calls breach of contract, whereas in article 79 we are not
dealing
with breach. We are concerned with adjusting the rights of two innocent
parties. The problems are those of balancing
benefits received against expenses
incurred, problems which are normally thought of in the context of the law of
restitution, but
call for the exercise of a greater degree of judicial
discretion than found in normal restitutionary
remedies.63
Unlike the CISG, discharging a contract for
impossibility under the current domestic law is not dependent on a breach by
the other party. So in that respect the domestic law is better.
Consequently, the question becomes whether or not the
problems of Article 79
could be overcome if the CISG were to apply to domestic contracts. The easiest
way to overcome the problem
would be to delete Article 79(3). Article
79(3)
makes the exemption under Article 79 temporary – during the period
that the impediment exists. If a party is permanently
exempted from
performing, the contract has failed. In that case, either party could declare
the contract avoided and seek restitution.64
Despite the FCA
perhaps being advantageous as to when it applies, its provisions on how it
applies are not so attractive for sales
of goods.65
Particularly,
perhaps the CISG is more geared to dealing with commercial
contracts for the sale of goods in
that it provides the option to have
the actual goods returned where applicable. The FCA section 3(2) does not
allow the restitution
of property, other than in a monetary form.66
This limitation may be problematic at times.
63 Galston and Smit, supra n. 19, at 5.20.
64 This however brings inconsistency to the domestic and international approach. However, the author is of the view that Article 79 needs to be amended for international contracts as well. However, reform of the CISG in the international context is a complicated matter requiring consensus by parties. That inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper.
65 New Zealand Law Commission, supra n. 28, p. 296. Note that there were several
criticisms in regard to the subsection.
66 Ibid., p. 297.
63 Galston and Smit, supra n. 19, at 5.20.
64 This
however brings inconsistency to the domestic and international approach.
However, the author is of the view that Article 79 needs
to be amended for
international contracts as well. However, reform of the CISG in the
international context is a complicated matter
requiring consensus by parties.
That inquiry is beyond the scope of this paper.
65 New Zealand Law
Commission, supra n. 28, p. 296. Note that there were
several
criticisms in regard to the subsection.
66 Ibid., p.
297.
Arguably, if the actual goods could be returned, (as allowed in
the CISG) the parties could be restored to their pre-contractual
positions with
minimum hardship.67 Additionally, in some circumstances it may be
very difficult for the court to assess a just sum in relation to a
benefit
incurred. It may be easier for the courts to order the return of the
goods if for instance the goods have increased in value.
Moreover, there is no provision in the FCA equivalent to Article 84 of the
CISG allowing the recovery of gains made from
the goods or interest to
be paid on the refunded money. However, interest would be available by recourse
to section 87 of the Judicature
Act 1908 (NZ). In regard to gains made from the
goods by the buyer, the FCA says that the seller may recover a just sum but such
sum cannot exceed the value of the said benefit to the party obtaining
it.68 Therefore, unlike the CISG, the seller has no personal
remedy for ‘profits’ under the FCA.
2. Restitutionary Damages for a Breach of Contract
As a general rule the measure of damages for breach of contract
‘is compensatory rather than restitutionary, so that
the claimant will
have his [or her] damages assessed by reference to the loss sustained, not to
the profit made by the defendant
as a result of his [or her] wrongful
act.’69
However, both academic articles and case law have criticized the
limitation of damages to compensatory relief. Some
writers have
favoured the view that ‘in some circumstances the innocent party to a
breach of contract should be able
to disgorge the profits he [the
breaching party] obtained from his breach of contract.’70 An
award of damages assessed by loss is not always going to be
adequate.71
It is quite possible for a defendant to gain from a breach of contract but without causing any loss to the plaintiff. This can be illustrated by the following examples:
Arguably, if the actual goods could be returned, (as allowed in
the CISG) the parties could be restored to their pre-contractual
positions with
minimum hardship.67 Additionally, in some circumstances it may be
very difficult for the court to assess a just sum in relation to a
benefit
incurred. It may be easier for the courts to order the return of the
goods if for instance the goods have increased in value.
Moreover, there
is no provision in the FCA equivalent to Article 84 of the CISG allowing the
recovery of gains made from
the goods or interest to be paid on the
refunded money. However, interest would be available by recourse to section 87
of the Judicature
Act 1908 (NZ). In regard to gains made from the goods by the
buyer, the FCA says that the seller may recover a just sum but such
sum cannot
exceed the value of the said benefit to the party obtaining it.68
Therefore, unlike the CISG, the seller has no personal remedy for
‘profits’ under the FCA.
2. Restitutionary Damages for a Breach of Contract
As a general
rule the measure of damages for breach of contract ‘is compensatory
rather than restitutionary, so that the
claimant will have his [or her] damages
assessed by reference to the loss sustained, not to the profit made by the
defendant as
a result of his [or her] wrongful
act.’69
However, both academic articles and case
law have criticized the limitation of damages to compensatory relief.
Some
writers have favoured the view that ‘in some circumstances the
innocent party to a breach of contract should be able
to disgorge the
profits he [the breaching party] obtained from his breach of
contract.’70 An award of damages assessed by loss is not
always going to be adequate.71
It is quite possible for a
defendant to gain from a breach of contract but without causing any loss to the
plaintiff. This can be
illustrated by the following examples:
67 Ibid., p. 301.
68 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ), section 3(3) (emphasis added).
69 Attorney-General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party) [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268, 274 (HL).
70 Ibid., (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); see, Catherine Mitchell ‘Remedial Inadequacy in
Contract and the Role of Restitutionary Damages’ (1999) 15 JCL 133.
71 See, Attorney-General v Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party) [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268, 274 (HL).
67 Ibid., p. 301.
68 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ),
section 3(3) (emphasis added).
69 Attorney-General v
Blake (Jonathan Cape Ltd Third Party) [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268, 274 (HL).
70
Ibid., (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); see, Catherine Mitchell ‘Remedial
Inadequacy in
Contract and the Role of Restitutionary Damages’
(1999) 15 JCL 133.
71 See, Attorney-General v Blake (Jonathan Cape
Ltd Third Party) [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268, 274 (HL).
Suppose Company A contracts with Company B not to manufacture and sell a
particular type of good for one year except to Company
B (the buyer) with
Company B’s name attached. Company A sells the exact same model to
Company C inside that same
year. Company A gains 10 per cent profit from sales
to Company B and Company C. Can Company B sue Company A for the profit obtained
from Company C? Has there been a loss to Company B or merely a gain to Company
A? There is no doubt that Company A is in
breach but what would
Company B’s remedy be?
Suppose Company A is in breach of contract because it delays
transferring goods under the contract entered into
with Company B. Company
A chooses to delay in transferring the goods to Company B because it is making
money by selling them elsewhere.
Can the party in breach of contract be sued
for the money made by Company A as a result of the delay?
Under the CISG and the current New Zealand domestic law, the
plaintiff in both scenarios would be without remedy. Academics
have argued
that it is not clear why it should be any more permissible to expropriate
personal rights than property rights.72
Therefore, the legislature may wish to consider whether to allow for restitutionary damages in addition to the CISG. This could be achieved perhaps by drafting a separate remedies provision to apply alongside the CISG. However if a provision allowing for restitutionary damages was accepted, then drafters should take into account that restitutionary damages differ from true restitution. Consequently, a plaintiff should not be able to claim restitutionary damages as well as compensatory damages.73 Furthermore, such provision would only be able to apply for domestic contracts. This is because parliament cannot unilaterally add to the international convention.74
Suppose Company A contracts with Company B not to manufacture and sell a
particular type of good for one year except to Company
B (the buyer) with
Company B’s name attached. Company A sells the exact same model to
Company C inside that same
year. Company A gains 10 per cent profit from sales
to Company B and Company C. Can Company B sue Company A for the profit obtained
from Company C? Has there been a loss to Company B or merely a gain to Company
A? There is no doubt that Company A is in
breach but what would
Company B’s remedy be?
Suppose Company A is in breach of
contract because it delays transferring goods under the contract entered
into
with Company B. Company A chooses to delay in transferring the goods to
Company B because it is making money by selling them elsewhere.
Can the party in
breach of contract be sued for the money made by Company A as a result of the
delay?
Under the CISG and the current New Zealand domestic law,
the plaintiff in both scenarios would be without remedy. Academics
have argued
that it is not clear why it should be any more permissible to expropriate
personal rights than property rights.72
Therefore, the
legislature may wish to consider whether to allow for restitutionary damages
in addition to the CISG. This could
be achieved perhaps by drafting a separate
remedies provision to apply alongside the CISG. However if a provision
allowing for
restitutionary damages was accepted, then drafters should take
into account that restitutionary damages differ from true restitution.
Consequently, a plaintiff should not be able to claim restitutionary damages
as well as compensatory damages.73 Furthermore, such provision
would only be able to apply for domestic contracts. This is because
parliament cannot unilaterally
add to the international
convention.74
72 See, Lionel D Smith ‘Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and Efficient Breach’ (1995) 24 Can BLJ 121.
73 Blanchard, supra n. 40, p. 32.
74 This paper is based on the presumption that the new sales code simply uses the CISG as a ‘basis’ for domestic sale of goods contracts. International contracts would be governed strictly by the Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994 (NZ) where the parties had not chosen ordinary conflict of laws rules to apply.
72 See, Lionel D Smith ‘Disgorgement of the Profits of
Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and Efficient Breach’ (1995)
24 Can
BLJ 121.
73 Blanchard, supra n. 40, p. 32.
74 This
paper is based on the presumption that the new sales code simply uses the CISG
as a ‘basis’ for domestic sale
of goods contracts.
International contracts would be governed strictly by the Sale of Goods
(United Nations Convention) Act
1994 (NZ) where the parties had not chosen
ordinary conflict of laws rules to apply.
3. Gaps
Although the CISG is set up as a code for international sale of goods
contracts,75 sometimes by virtue of the ordinary rules of private
international law, a domestic law may apply (relevant for this paper are those
New Zealand domestic laws that apply alongside the CISG).
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity
with the
general principles on which it is based or, in absence of such principles, in
conformity with the law applicable by virtue
of the rules of private
international law.76
There are some gaps in the CISG in regard to restitution. Two of the major
ones are discussed in this chapter. First, the CISG does
not deal with the
passing of property. Consequently, the SOGA section 19 currently applies
even where a contract is governed
by the CISG. Accordingly, if the CISG
became SOGA’s successor, the legislature would need to address this
gap. A provision
such as the following (equivalent to that of section 19
SOGA) should apply alongside the CISG:
(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of goods to which this Act77
applies, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time
as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties,
regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct
of the parties,
and the circumstances of the case.
Second, the CISG is silent on the details of transfer in restitution. It is therefore a matter for domestic law to determine which of the parties (or their insurance companies)78 bears the cost. Restitutionary costs could be very substantial for the buyer. For example, the buyer may
3. Gaps
Although the CISG is set up as a code for international sale of goods
contracts,75 sometimes by virtue of the ordinary rules of private
international law, a domestic law may apply (relevant for this paper are those
New Zealand domestic laws that apply alongside the CISG).
Questions
concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly
settled in it are to be settled in conformity
with the general
principles on which it is based or, in absence of such principles, in conformity
with the law applicable by virtue
of the rules of private international
law.76
There are some gaps in the CISG in regard to
restitution. Two of the major ones are discussed in this chapter. First, the
CISG does
not deal with the passing of property. Consequently, the SOGA
section 19 currently applies even where a contract is governed
by the CISG.
Accordingly, if the CISG became SOGA’s successor, the legislature
would need to address this gap. A provision
such as the following (equivalent
to that of section 19 SOGA) should apply alongside the CISG:
(1) Where there is a contract for the sale of goods to which this Act77
applies, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time
as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.
(2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties,
regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct
of the parties,
and the circumstances of the case.
Second, the CISG is silent on the
details of transfer in restitution. It is therefore a matter for domestic law to
determine which
of the parties (or their insurance companies)78
bears the cost. Restitutionary costs could be very substantial for
the buyer. For example, the buyer may
75 Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994.
76 CISG (11 April 1981) 3 UNTS 1489, art 7(2) (entered into force 30 September 1981).
77 ‘This Act’ will be the new domestic code based on the CISG.
78 Insurance law is beyond the scope of this paper and therefore it will not be discussed.
75 Sale of Goods (United Nations Convention) Act 1994.
76
CISG (11 April 1981) 3 UNTS 1489, art 7(2) (entered into force 30
September 1981).
77 ‘This Act’ will be the new
domestic code based on the CISG.
78 Insurance law is beyond the
scope of this paper and therefore it will not be discussed.
incur significant shipment expenses by returning a large quantity of goods back to the seller. Also, if a party is obliged to make restitution in money terms then he or she could incur expenses in accessing the funds. This would occur for example if the party’s bank requires a fee to withdraw from the account. Domestic statute law in New Zealand does not expressly deal with this issue where the contract is discharged for breach.79 Therefore, the availability of restitutionary costs is a matter for the common law. In contrast, if the contract is discharged for impossibility, the FCA seems to exclude the recovery of restitutionary costs incurred by a seller making restitution. The FCA says that where the seller is obliged to make restitution only the
‘expenses for which allowance may be made, are those paid incurred
before the time of discharge’80 In other words, the wasted
expenditure incurred by the party bound to make restitution, would fall
within scope of the
provision, but restitutionary costs would not (as
those would be incurred by the seller after the contract had been discharged).
As for the buyer, the set-up of the FCA pre-empts potential claims for
restitutionary expenses in returning goods. This is because,
as noted
earlier, section 3(3) of the FCA does not allow a party to obtain
restitution for the particular goods
but only their money equivalent.
However, restitutionary costs could still be incurred (like with the
seller) in accessing
money. Yet, unlike the situation for the seller, the Act
does not expressly exclude the recovery of restitutionary costs. The FCA
leaves
the amount of money the buyer must pay (as restitution) at the discretion of
the court.81 While the Act expresses factors that a judge
should particularly take into account, those factors are not exclusive.82
Accordingly, it is quite possible that restitutionary costs incurred by
the buyer could be deducted from seller’s restitutionary
remedy.
However, if the CISG succeeded the SOGA, the FCA would not apply.83 Therefore, recovery of restitutionary costs would be a matter
incur significant shipment expenses by returning a large quantity of
goods back to the seller. Also, if a party is obliged
to make restitution in
money terms then he or she could incur expenses in accessing the
funds. This would occur for example
if the party’s bank requires a fee to
withdraw from the account. Domestic statute law in New Zealand does not
expressly deal
with this issue where the contract is discharged for
breach.79 Therefore, the availability of restitutionary costs
is a matter for the common law. In contrast, if the contract is discharged
for impossibility, the FCA seems to exclude the recovery of
restitutionary costs incurred by a seller making
restitution. The FCA says
that where the seller is obliged to make restitution only
the
‘expenses for which allowance may be made, are those paid
incurred before the time of discharge’80 In other words, the
wasted expenditure incurred by the party bound to make restitution,
would fall within scope of the
provision, but restitutionary costs would
not (as those would be incurred by the seller after the contract had been
discharged).
As for the buyer, the set-up of the FCA pre-empts potential claims
for restitutionary expenses in returning goods. This is because,
as noted
earlier, section 3(3) of the FCA does not allow a party to obtain
restitution for the particular goods
but only their money equivalent.
However, restitutionary costs could still be incurred (like with the
seller) in accessing
money. Yet, unlike the situation for the seller, the Act
does not expressly exclude the recovery of restitutionary costs. The FCA
leaves
the amount of money the buyer must pay (as restitution) at the discretion of
the court.81 While the Act expresses factors that a judge
should particularly take into account, those factors are not exclusive.82
Accordingly, it is quite possible that restitutionary costs incurred by
the buyer could be deducted from seller’s restitutionary
remedy.
However, if the CISG succeeded the SOGA, the FCA would
not apply.83 Therefore, recovery of restitutionary costs would be
a matter
79 The Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) is silent on the matter.
80 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ) section 3(2), emphasis added.
81 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ) section 3(3).
82 The Court has ‘regard to all the circumstances’: Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ),
section 3(3).
83 This is because this paper assumes that the CISG would be implemented as a domestic
code and proposes that a consequential amendment would be to exclude the application of the FCA.
79 The Sale of Goods Act 1908 (NZ) is silent on the
matter.
80 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ) section 3(2), emphasis
added.
81 Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ) section
3(3).
82 The Court has ‘regard to all the circumstances’:
Frustrated Contracts Act 1944 (NZ),
section 3(3).
83 This is
because this paper assumes that the CISG would be implemented as a
domestic
code and proposes that a consequential amendment would be to
exclude the application of the FCA.
for common law in all cases for contracts discharged for breach or
impossibility. Whether restitutionary costs should
be allocated by
statute or left to judicial discretion is something the legislature may wish to
consider on reform of its sales
of goods law. Further, Schlechtriem and
Schwenzer’s Commentary on the CISG84 has provided
some guidance on restitutionary costs, which should be considered by either a
judge (if restitutionary costs are left
to the common law), or parliament (if it
chose to regulate such costs by statute):
It would seem appropriate for the innocent party to include
[restitutionary] costs in his damages calculation,
while the other party
should bear his own costs. If the other party is exempt from damages by virtue
of Article 79, the innocent
party must bear his own costs of making
restitution.85
If the legislature chose to regulate the availability of restitutionary costs
by statute then it may consider drafting a provision
with a similar effect to
the following:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) a party who is bound to make restitution in
accordance with this Act, may include restitutionary
costs in a damages
claim.
(2) A party cannot include restitutionary costs under
subsection (1) if he or she is in breach of contract or if
the contract has
been avoided because of an impediment under Article 79.
D: Conclusion
The SOGA which was set up as a ‘code’ is not fulfilling that original objective. This is because over time, inadequacies with the SOGA have arisen. As a consequence, other law supplements the SOGA – for example the general common law and the FCA. This paper concludes that the CISG as a basis for a domestic code in New Zealand is desirable. That way, the SOGA could be replaced with a more inclusive code. Restitutionary remedies would be available under the one code.
for common law in all cases for contracts discharged for breach or
impossibility. Whether restitutionary costs should
be allocated by
statute or left to judicial discretion is something the legislature may wish to
consider on reform of its sales
of goods law. Further, Schlechtriem and
Schwenzer’s Commentary on the CISG84 has provided
some guidance on restitutionary costs, which should be considered by either a
judge (if restitutionary costs are left
to the common law), or parliament (if it
chose to regulate such costs by statute):
It would seem appropriate
for the innocent party to include [restitutionary] costs in his
damages calculation,
while the other party should bear his own costs. If the
other party is exempt from damages by virtue of Article 79, the innocent
party
must bear his own costs of making restitution.85
If the
legislature chose to regulate the availability of restitutionary costs by
statute then it may consider drafting a provision
with a similar effect to the
following:
(1) Subject to subsection (2) a party who is bound to make restitution in
accordance with this Act, may include restitutionary
costs in a damages
claim.
(2) A party cannot include restitutionary costs under
subsection (1) if he or she is in breach of contract or if
the contract has
been avoided because of an impediment under Article 79.
D: Conclusion
The SOGA which was set up as a ‘code’
is not fulfilling that original objective. This is because over time,
inadequacies
with the SOGA have arisen. As a consequence, other law
supplements the SOGA – for example the general common law
and the FCA.
This paper concludes that the CISG as a basis for a domestic code in
New Zealand is desirable. That way,
the SOGA could be replaced with a more
inclusive code. Restitutionary remedies would be available under the one
code.
84 Schlechtriem and Schwenzer, supra n. 16.
85 Ibid., p. 861.
84 Schlechtriem and Schwenzer, supra n. 16.
85 Ibid., p.
861.
This paper has discussed the key provisions relating to restitution in the
CISG and the current domestic law. It has pointed out various
issues in regard
to restitution that should be considered if the CISG were to succeed the
SOGA in New Zealand. As noted throughout
this paper, there are substantial
differences between the CISG and SOGA in regard to restitutionary rights
and obligations.
The paper finds a number of problems with the current domestic law that could
be overcome if the CISG were used as a basis for a domestic
sale of goods
code. Furthermore, while the CISG has some disadvantages, this
paper argues that those too
could be overcome through an adjustment to
the principles in the CISG or drafting separate provisions to apply
alongside
the CISG.86 Finally the paper has addressed the gaps in
the CISG and pointed out how they should be dealt with.
This paper concludes that the CISG has a better regime to deal with restitutionary rights and obligations than the current domestic law. It would provide New Zealand with a more inclusive code. Moreover, if the international and domestic law for sale of goods contracts are eventually harmonised, then certainty and consistency in the law is increased.
This paper has discussed the key provisions relating to restitution in the
CISG and the current domestic law. It has pointed out various
issues in regard
to restitution that should be considered if the CISG were to succeed the
SOGA in New Zealand. As noted throughout
this paper, there are substantial
differences between the CISG and SOGA in regard to restitutionary rights
and obligations.
The paper finds a number of problems with the current
domestic law that could be overcome if the CISG were used as a basis for a
domestic
sale of goods code. Furthermore, while the CISG has
some disadvantages, this paper argues that those too
could be overcome
through an adjustment to the principles in the CISG or drafting
separate provisions to apply alongside
the CISG.86 Finally the paper
has addressed the gaps in the CISG and pointed out how they should be dealt
with.
This paper concludes that the CISG has a better regime to deal
with restitutionary rights and obligations than the current domestic
law. It
would provide New Zealand with a more inclusive code. Moreover, if the
international and domestic law for sale of goods
contracts are eventually
harmonised, then certainty and consistency in the law is
increased.
86 Note that these would only apply in the domestic context. While there are still some inadequacies at the international level, that issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
86 Note that these would only apply in the domestic context.
While there are still some inadequacies at the international level, that
issue
is beyond the scope of this paper.
Appendix: Restitution under the CISG
Appendix: Restitution under the CISG
Fundamental Breach of Contract
Fundamental Breach of Contract
Avoiding the Contract – what are the restitutionary rights and obligations?
Avoiding the Contract – what are the restitutionary rights and
obligations?
Avoidance sought by buyer Avoidance sought by seller
Avoidance sought by buyer Avoidance sought by seller
Has the buyer pre-paid any/all of the amount due AND/OR
Have any/all of the goods been delivered by the seller to the buyer?
Have any/all of the goods been delivered by the seller AND/OR Has the buyer pre-paid any/all of the amount due?
Has the buyer pre-paid any/all of the amount due
AND/OR
Have any/all of the goods been delivered by the seller to the
buyer?
Have any/all of the goods been delivered by the seller AND/OR Has the buyer pre-paid any/all of the amount due?
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
If goods have been delivered, can the buyer return them in substantially the same condition?
Can avoid contract and no restitutionary claim is relevant. Neither party need perform
If goods have been delivered, can the buyer return them in substantially the same condition?
Can avoid contract and no restitutionary claim is relevant. Neither party need perform
Yes No
Other remedies may be relevant.
Yes No
Other remedies may be relevant.
Does an exception in
Article 82 apply?
Yes No
Article 81. Seller can avoid the contract and bring a restitutionary claim for any goods delivered and/or buyer can claim in restitution for money paid to be refunded
Does an exception in
Article 82 apply?
Yes No
Article 81. Seller can avoid the contract and bring a restitutionary claim for any goods delivered and/or buyer can claim in restitution for money paid to be refunded
Article 81. Buyer can avoid the contract and seller can claim restitution for goods and/or buyer can bring a restitutionary claim for pre-paid money
Cannot avoid the Contract – can try for other remedies (Article
83)
Article 81. Buyer can avoid the contract and seller can claim restitution for goods and/or buyer can bring a restitutionary claim for pre-paid money
Cannot avoid the Contract – can try for other remedies (Article
83)
Article 84: Buyer can claim interest and/or seller can claim for gains made from the goods by buyer
Article 84: Buyer can claim interest and/or seller can claim for gains made from the goods by buyer
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The New Zealand Law Students’ Journal (2006) 1 NZLSJ
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