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New Zealand Law Students Journal |
Last Updated: 30 August 2012
HOME DETENTION
AS A STAND-ALONE SENTENCE
DAVID BULLOCK[*]
Introduction
In 2007, the Government introduced a raft of new non-custodial sentences
with the express aim of reducing New Zealand’s increasing
prison
population.[1] At the heart of these
changes was the establishment of home detention as a stand-alone
sentence.[2] Before then, judges acted
only as a “gate-keeper”, determining whether leave to apply for home
detention should be granted
– the final decision rested with the parole
board.[3]
Home detention could be ‘front ended’ for offences receiving less
than two years imprisonment; applications were able
to be made immediately after
sentencing.[4]
For longer offences, application could be made for home detention within the
final three months before release to parole. The new
stand-alone sentence of
home detention, which repealed and replaced the old ‘front end’
model, was designed to be an
alternative to short sentences of
imprisonment,[5] giving greater
flexibility to sentencing judges.
The advantages of home detention are
much lauded. Politicians from both sides of the political divide have been
attracted by the fiscal
advantages of home detention compared to imprisonment
and the possibilities of encouraging rehabilitation and reducing
recidivism.[6] In this paper I address
the nature and operation of the stand-alone sentence of home detention. I
further consider how the courts
have interpreted and applied the sentence before
concluding on the overall efficacy of the new sentence and outstanding policy
issues.
A. Features of Home Detention as a Stand-alone Sentence
Home detention is a “hybrid”
sentence.[7] It is not defined as a
community sentence,[8] nor is an
offender subject to home detention regarded as “in
custody”.[9] A sentence of
home detention, of between 14 days and 12
months,[10] may be imposed for any
offence punishable by imprisonment, or where home detention is expressly
provided for.[11] The 12 month
maximum means that home detention is generally not available in cases where a
term of imprisonment of greater than two
years is
justified.[12]
This disparity is explained by the requirement that a sentence of home detention
be served in full. Thus, a sentence of home detention
is regarded as roughly
equivalent to half the length of a sentence of
imprisonment,[13]
though this is not an automatic
computation.[14]
A sentence of home detention is available only if a less restrictive
sentence cannot achieve the relevant purposes of sentencing,
and a “short
term” sentence of imprisonment is otherwise
appropriate.[15] A relevant
pre-sentence report considering the suitability of the proposed residence, the
safety and welfare of the occupants and
the offender’s consent to the
conditions of detention is
required.[16] The occupants of the
residence must be informed of the offender’s past and current offending
and their consent obtained.[17] Home
detention is versatile and may be combined with a sentence of a fine,
reparation, or community work.[18]
This is valuable as it not only enables a wide application of home detention but
it also aids the court in ensuring the least restrictive
sentence is
imposed.
It is a popular misconception that home detention entails
incarceration-like constant restraint. A detainee must not leave their residence
unless authorised; this typically involves approval from a probation
officer,[19] or on special
conditions imposed by the court.[20]
Approved absences may include working, attending rehabilitative or restorative
activities, or any other specifically approved
activity.[21] Special conditions may
be imposed where there is a significant risk of further offending, standard
conditions are insufficient, or
to make use of rehabilitative or reintegrative
programmes.[22] Compliance is
enforced through monitoring by the Probation Service or contractors and use of
an electronic anklet is frequently made,
although not a
requirement.[23] It is an offence to
breach home detention conditions, post-detention conditions or to refuse entry
to a parole officer.[24]
Once
the sentence is completed the offender may remain subject to post-detention
conditions, typically for a further 12
months.[25] Standard conditions are
automatically imposed on sentences of more than six months and may be imposed on
shorter sentences by the
Court.[26]
Standard conditions involve reporting to a probation officer, not changing
residence without permission, and refraining from specific
activities or
associations.[27] Special conditions
similar to those that may be imposed during home detention can also be used
post-detention.[28]
B. Application in the Courts: Legal Issues
1. The approach to sentencing
The courts consider the decision to grant home detention as a two stage
process.[29]
The first stage involves setting a sentence of imprisonment and determining
whether it is “short” (less than two years).
If this is the case,
the second step is whether to commute that sentence to home detention. At the
first stage, a judge should not
consider home detention, to ensure that home
detention commuted at stage two is “reserved for those who would truly
otherwise
have been
imprisoned”.[30]
This is important to reduce so called “net-widening”; where an
offender who should have received a lesser sentence is
given home detention due
to a mischaracterisation of the sentencing hierarchy by the
judge.[31]
Purposes of
sentencing, such as denunciation and deterrence, are best accounted for at the
first stage. These purposes do not logically
control the stage two decision as
to home detention.[32] The stage two
decision is appropriately based, for the most part, on the personal
circumstances of the offender and their circumstantial
suitability for home
detention.[33] That is not to say
that principles and purposes of sentencing cannot be considered in the second
stage, and that judges cannot prefer
imprisonment to home detention on the
grounds that home detention would not send the “right message”, but
judges should
be “cautious” when doing
so.[34] Two offenders may have the
same culpability for an offence and receive an equal starting sentencing of
imprisonment, yet one may
have their sentence commuted to home detention and the
other may not due to differing personal characteristics. The balancing of
home
detention and imprisonment through the s 8(1)(g) and s 16 tests is crucial; home
detention is to be preferred unless imprisonment
is demonstrably
necessary.[35] The courts have
accepted that home detention is a “real alternative to
imprisonment”,[36] and can
sometimes be better for society’s interests than
imprisonment.[37]
2. Selection of offenders
There is some debate about what offenders should be sentenced to home
detention. Rackmill notes a number of United States’ guidelines
which
state that home detention is not appropriate for violent offenders, offences
involving firearms, drug use or dealing, or “predatory
property
offenders”.[38]
In other jurisdictions, persons with specified convictions are barred from
receiving home detention.[39] In New
Zealand, less rigid tests are applied to determine suitability for home
detention.[40] Much depends on the
pre-sentence report provided by a probation officer and the level of family
support available to the
offender.[41] A further
consideration is the likelihood of reoffending and, to the extent that
reoffending is possible, how effective will home
detention be in incapacitating
the detainee.
Home detention is occasionally used for serious violent
offending, but typically only where the circumstances of the offending or
offender are particularly unusual, such as where an offender had low
culpability, had shown a significant, self motivated attempt
at rehabilitation,
or their violence was out of
character.[42] Home detention had
been used for a wide spectrum of offending (see Table 1). This is largely due to
the two stage approach set out
in Vhavha which examines the suitability
of the offender separately from the offence. Home detention can also be used
where imprisonment would
create undue hardship on an
offender,[43] or their
family.[44]
Offence
|
Percentage
|
Number
|
Homicide and related offences
|
0.2%
|
6
|
Acts intended to cause injury
|
13.1%
|
387
|
Sexual assault and related offences
|
3.0%
|
90
|
Dangerous or negligent acts endangering persons
|
2.4%
|
70
|
Abduction, harassment, offences against the person
|
1.1%
|
33
|
Robbery, extortion etc
|
4.4%
|
131
|
Unlawful entry/burglary, break and enter
|
8.5%
|
252
|
Theft etc
|
5.6%
|
167
|
Fraud, deception etc
|
9.9%
|
292
|
Illicit drug offences
|
13.1%
|
388
|
Prohibited and regulated weapons/explosives offences
|
0.8%
|
23
|
Property damage etc
|
2.5%
|
75
|
Public order offences
|
0.6%
|
18
|
Traffic and vehicle regulatory offences
|
28.6%
|
846
|
Offences against justice procedures, Government security and Government
operations
|
5.3%
|
158
|
Miscellaneous offences
|
0.9%
|
26
|
Totals
|
100.0%
|
2962
|
Table 1: Home Detention by Offence Type 2009 (source: Statistics New Zealand)
3. Sentencing Principles
(a) Deterrence and Denunciation
The Courts have grappled with the new sentence of home detention in a
number of immigration fraud cases. In R v Hassan the Court of Appeal
noted that the importance of maintaining the integrity of a country’s
immigration system meant that deterrence
was an “important sentencing
principle in this area” and that “those who dishonestly challenge
the immigration
system can expect deterrent sentences and can expect to be sent
to prison”.[45] This
proposition was approved in R v Chatha and R v
Vhavha.[46] The majority in
Vhavha noted that home detention was a “more relaxed” regime
that may undermine deterrence of those seeking to commit immigration
fraud.[47]
These sentiments
ran contrary to an earlier decision which held that home detention provided,
“in considerable measure, the
principles of deterrence and
denunciation”, albeit less than
imprisonment.[48] Further, William
Young P, dissenting in Vhavha, was sceptical as to whether there was any
marginal increase in deterrence between a short prison sentence and a sentence
of home
detention.[49] As the Court
of Appeal later rhetorically questioned in Osman v R, “how would
refugees in a tent camp in Africa be deterred by a short sentence of
imprisonment vis-à-vis home
detention?”[50] In light of
the Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision in Osman it would seem
that the position as to the deterrent effect of home detention is now settled.
Home detention can be a deterrent sentence
and does have the effect of holding
offenders to account.[51]
(b) Incapacitation
Home detention entails a level of incapacitation, enhanced by electronic
monitoring and
surveillance.[52]
However, home detention has a lesser incapacitative effect than imprisonment;
offenders can easily violate their detention and commit
further crimes before
they are picked up by monitors.[53]
Two points can be made in this regard. First, there is a risk of reoffending
whenever an offender receives a community based sentence;
there will typically
be little difference in the nature of offenders serving a community sentence and
those serving home detention.[54] So
long as the sentencing judge makes a sufficient inquiry into the circumstances
and nature of a particular offender (including
this risk to the community), risk
of reoffending is minimised. Secondly, the level of incapacitation that
characterises imprisonment
is a poor comparator for home detention; home
detention is not designed to provide complete incapacitation but it does
nevertheless
have an incapacitating effect for many
detainees.[55]
(c) Rehabilitation
Home detention has strong rehabilitative potential. If detainees are
motivated to reform themselves, home detention can both facilitate
this
rehabilitation and foster a sense of self-responsibility. It enables detainees
to remain in society (to some extent) and provides
access to employment and
rehabilitative programmes that is unmatched in a custodial
environment.[56] Home detention has
the added advantage of keeping young offenders out of prison, away from the
influence of seasoned criminals. It
is likely that rehabilitation occurring in
the offender’s own community has a greater chance of
success.[57] However, rehabilitative
potential is highly dependent on rehabilitative programmes being adequately
funded, otherwise the sentence
risks becoming one of “mere
surveillance”.[58]
C. Policy Issues
1. By the
Numbers[59]
Home
detention appears to be an underutilised sentence, possibly as it is still only
a new sentencing option, comprising only some
2.9 per cent of total
sentences.[60] However, its use is
likely to grow in coming years as greater pressure is put on prison
capacity.[61] The data reveals other
insights. The statistical description of an “average” person serving
home detention is a male
European over 30 years of age convicted of traffic or
vehicle related offences, minor assaults or drug related
offending.[62]
As a proportion of relevant total sentences, men and women received an
approximately equal number of home detention sentences, while
more Maori than
European, and more young (10-16) than old offenders received home detention (see
Table 2).[63]
Age group
|
10-16
|
7-19
|
20-24
|
25-29
|
30-39
|
40+
|
Unknown
|
Total
|
Number
|
32
|
434
|
596
|
443
|
711
|
736
|
10
|
2962
|
Table 2: Home Detention by Age Group 2009 (source: Statistics New
Zealand)
A pre-2007 study of home detention found it had a very
low reconviction rate of only 27 per cent after 12
months.[64]
Data shows some 27 percent of detainees breach
conditions.[65] However, it is
likely many of these breaches are minor, such as returning home late from an
approved absence. Home detention is a
double-edged cost saver for governments
– not only is it cheaper to administer than imprisonment, it also saves
the cost of
creating new prison
capacity.[66] It was estimated in
2006 that a stand-alone sentence of home detention would save some 310 prison
beds.[67] This gives the potential
for significant fiscal savings. The cost of monitoring a person sentenced to
home detention is $21,640 per
annum, compared to $59,170 for a minimum-security
prisoner.[68] Further, if an
offender remains working the Government retains tax
revenue.[69]
(a) Effect on offenders
Home detention enables offenders to be rehabilitated aided by the
maintenance of employment and family
relationships.[70] Many detainees
find that the experience of home detention creates positive changes in their
attitude and self-discipline, and embrace
the ability to attend rehabilitative
programmes.[71] A New Zealand study
found that men who have been subject to home detention learn to be more
self-responsible.[72]
Public
perceptions of home detention often see it as a “soft” or
“easy” option.[73]
However, home detention is the next most restrictive sentence to
imprisonment.[74] Studies of
detainees show than many face similar pains to
imprisonment.[75]
Detainees often struggle to avoid the temptations that a non-custodial sentence
brings.[76] A detainee faces a
significant curtailment of their liberty and autonomy; they may only leave their
house as approved, their home
may be inspected as required by a probation
officer and if subject to electronic monitoring their location can always be
found.[77] This adds to the
significant boredom, stress and frustration felt by detainees. Home detention
may entail significant financial consequences
for detainees; this can be
compounded by difficulties in obtaining or retaining employment due to the need
to involve the employer
in the monitoring process and the infeasibility of
monitoring some jobs. This is unfortunate as it may limit the rehabilitative
advantages
of home detention. Although home detention can be difficult, most
detainees compare it favourably to
imprisonment.[78]
Interestingly, many offenders believed some time in prison was necessary to
fully appreciate home detention.[79]
This is something lost when home detention is used as a stand-alone sentence,
rather than in conjunction with imprisonment.
(b) The Home as a Prison
Home detention arguably turns homes into pseudo-prisons or
“surrogate
prisons”.[80]
George notes that, consistent with other governmental cost-shifting measures,
home detention essentially “seconds private homes
into public prison
space” with the cost of running this “prison” being borne by
families.[81]
This may somewhat overstate the point. Sponsors must consent to their homes
being used for home detention and the state still provides
monitoring –
but it is certainly true that families, and offenders, bear a substantial
cost.
Some scholars have argued that home detention is inherently
inequitable; the nature of the house and home life affect the quality
of
detention.[82] It could be argued
that a detainee sentenced to live in a lavish abode has a vastly different
experience to one who must reside in
comparative squalor. However, as Rush
notes, this issue is only really concerning from a ‘just deserts’ or
retributive
perspective;[83] it has
little bearing on other purposes on sentencing.
(c) Effect of Home Detention on families
Home detention can have a major impact on sponsors’ lives. The
majority of home detention sponsors are
women,[84] and many are willing to
sacrifice their quality of life to help a co-residing
detainee.[85]
To this end, women are potentially vulnerable as they often feel “more
obliged than men to sponsor home detainees, to be responsible
for the welfare of
the children and for harmony within the
household”.[86] This results
in women “bearing the main burden and stress associated with home
detention”.[87] Given these
factors there is a risk that the consent procedures provided for are
“disingenuous”,[88]
sponsors would usually always rather see their family member avoid prison, so
arguably they have little choice at
all.[89]
Martinovic argues
that in many instances co-residents are penalised along with
detainees.[90] Sponsors often feel
obliged to help detainees comply with conditions of
detention;[91] this may involve
limiting their own freedom and paying for essential requirements of the
detention scheme.[92] All family
members are disrupted by monitoring regimes and surveillance strategies (such as
phone calls at all hours of the day,
or inspections), this often causes distress
and upset,[93] compounded by a
feeling of lost privacy.[94] There
is also a risk that the confines of home detention can create a ‘pressure
cooker’ environment.[95] This
may strain relationships and lead to conflict. There is a concern that when this
manifests in violence or other abuse, sponsors
may be afraid to report it as
they do not want to be responsible for a revocation of the detainee’s home
detention.[96]
A New Zealand
study of detainees and their families found that, on the whole, periods of home
detention either had little effect,
or had a positive effect, on the
relationship between detainees and their sponsors (typically parents or
partners).[97] However, a
significant minority of sponsors thought that the confinement created by home
detention caused more tension and
arguments.[98] In some cases
respondents were particularly positive about their detainee partners being able
to spend more time with their children
than had previously been possible
However, some were concerned about social stigmas being attached to their
children,[99] and
themselves,[100] as a
result.
King and Gibbs (2003) pose some potential solutions to the burden
faced by women as sponsors and co-residents of
detainees.[101] They suggest that
greater support needs to be provided to sponsors by Corrections staff. Given the
implicit understanding that sponsors
have a role to play in supervising
detainees, this may include some form of financial allowance to reimburse
sponsors for extra costs
the detention
entails.[102] Finally, the authors
suggest a relaxation of home detention rules to allow for “family
outings” or “time out”
may ease some of the stresses home
detention creates.
(d) Comparison and Interaction with other sentencing options
Home detention is only one of a number of non-custodial sentencing
options in the Sentencing Act 2002. The sentence of community work
– where
offenders are required to perform so form of community service – has long
been a widely utilised sentencing option.
The 2007 sentencing reforms introduced
a number of other options into the sentencing matrix forming a
“hierarchy” of
sentences based on
restrictiveness.[103] These were
the sentences of community detention and intensive supervision.
Community detention essentially entails a curfew – periods when an
offender is required to be a home – but at other times
the offender is
free to do as they chose.[104]
This is involves less restrictiveness than a sentence of home detention which
requires an offender to be in their approved residence
unless they have
otherwise been allowed to leave. Community detention looks to the causes of an
offenders offending, at least in
a temporal sense, and seeks to restrict their
behaviour to prevent them being in situations where they are likely to offend.
For
example, an offender who typically offends when they drink may have a curfew
placed on them at night. This is an effective sentencing
option as it enables
the offender to remain, for the most part, part of society, while taking them
away from situations likely to
trigger their offending. For many offenders this
sentence will be more effective than home detention and may invoke positive
change
in offenders. However, home detention will be more appropriate where
there is no clear pattern or situational trigger to an offender’s
offending or where high levels of deterrence or incapacitation are thought to be
warranted for community protection or denunciation.
Intensive
supervision expands on the pre-existing sentence of
supervision.[105] Intensive
supervision enables the court to grant a wider range of special conditions than
are currently possible under a sentence
of supervision while maintaining a
probation officer focus. It also allows the court to impose a sentence of up to
two years (ordinary
supervision is limited to between six months and one
year).
The introduction of these new non-custodial sentences has been
complemented with a greater flexibility for judges to combine different
sentences. This enables judges to more easily tailor sentences to meet the
characteristics of a particular offender. However, only
general comparisons can
be made with home detention. Community detention and intensive supervision sit
at the same level in the sentencing
hierarchy, directly below home detention.
Further, community detention and intensive supervision are targeted at offenders
who require
little incapacitation compared to those serving a sentence of home
detention.
Conclusion
On the whole, home detention is a valuable alternative to imprisonment in
New Zealand. The state benefits fiscally and offenders benefit
through an easier
road to rehabilitation, able to attend programmes and maintain work and family
ties. The introduction of a stand-alone
sentence of home detention, combined
with New Zealand’s increasing prison population, is likely to see home
detention becoming
more widely utilised.
Of course, home detention has
its flaws. In some cases, the ostensible benefits of home detention may belie a
darker reality. Home
detention may not only create similar pains to imprisonment
for some detainees but may also pass these to innocent sponsors –
often
spouses and parents – through family tension, disruption and loss of
privacy.
For these reasons, despite home detention being preferable to
imprisonment for many offenders, it must be remembered that it is only
one
solution to over-imprisonment and recidivism; there are numerous other, less
restrictive sentences or combinations of sentences
that may be even more
effective.[106] So long as this is
kept in perspective, home detention as a stand-alone sentence is likely to form
useful part of the sentencing
matrix in New Zealand. However, given the relative
infancy of this new sentence, a final verdict on its effectiveness may still be
a number of years away.
[*] David Bullock, Victoria
University of Wellington. Submitted as part of the LLB(Hons)
programme.
[1] Criminal Justice
Reform Bill 2006 (93-1) (explanatory note) at 1. New Zealand’s rate of
imprisonment is greater than the OECD
average, see OECD Factbook 2008:
Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics (OECD, 2008).
[2] Sentencing Amendment Act 2007;
Sentencing Act 2002, ss
80A–80ZI.
[3] R v D
[2008] NZCA 254 at [36]. Despite bureaucratic misgivings and a less than
successful pilot programme, home detention was introduced as a form of parole in
New Zealand shortly before the 1999 general election. Regarding the pilot
programme, see A Church and S Dunstan Home Detention: The Evaluation of the
Home Detention Pilot Programme 1995-1997 (Ministry of Justice, Wellington,
1997).
[4] D King and A Gibbs
“Is Home Detention in New Zealand Disadvantaging Women and
Children?” [2003] 50 Probation Journal 115 at 115. Under the pre-2007
system home detention could potentially be granted for essentially the entirety
of a sentence, although
offenders would typically have to serve one or two
months in prison before a decision was reached. In exceptional circumstances a
sentencing judge had the discretion to delay the activation of prison sentences
so that probation reports could be made to determined
eligibility for home
detention without the offender needing to spend time in
prison.
[5] Criminal Justice Reform
Bill 2006 (93-1) (explanatory note) at 5. Home detention ranks directly below
imprisonment in the hierarchy
of sentences in s 10 of the Sentencing Act
2002.
[6] The level of bi-partisan
support of home detention is unusual for criminal justice policy in New Zealand.
The initial home detention
schemes were introduced by the then National-led
government in 1999, shortly before the general election. Successive Labour-led
governments
retained the schemes, expanding home detention to a stand-alone
sentence in 2007. Although the enacting legislation was opposed by
National,
then Justice spokesperson, Simon Power, said in debate on the Second Reading of
the Bill that the party was “warmly
enthusiastic” about the
introduction of home detention as a stand-alone sentence: (19 June 2007) 640
NZPD 9983.
[7] R v D, above n 3, at [65].
[8] It is not listed in the Sentencing Act 2002, s 44.
[9] Sentencing Act 2002, s 80A(5).
[10] Ibid, s 80A(3).
[11] Ibid, s 80A(1).
[12] R v Iosefa [2008] NZCA 453 at [41].
[13] Savage v Police HC Whangarei CRI-2008-488-1, 14 February 2008 at [27].
[14] Golding v Police HC
Whangarei CRI-2008-488-3, 14 February 2008 at
[16].
[15] Sentencing Act 2002, s
15A. As noted, a “short term” of imprisonment is interpreted as a
sentence of imprisonment of
less than two years.
[16] Ibid, s
26A(2).
[17] Ibid, s 26A(3). This
consent may be withdrawn at any time. The residence must also be located in an
area where a home detention programme
is operated.
[18] Ibid, s
19.
[19] Ibid, s 80C(2). The only
cases where approval is not required in the case of urgent medical or dental
treatment, or where there is
a serious risk of death to the offender or any
other person.
[20] Ibid, s
80D.
[21] Ibid, s
80C(3).
[22] Ibid, s
80D.
[23] Ibid, ss 80C(2) and
80E.
[24] Ibid, ss 80S, 80U and
80T.
[25] Ibid, s
80N.
[26]
Ibid.
[27] Ibid, s
80O.
[28] Ibid, s
80P.
[29] R v Vhavha
[2009] NZCA 588 at [31] per William Young P. It is important to note that while
the President was dissenting as the ratio decidendi in Vhavha the
majority accepted his framing of a two-stage test at [20]. The President’s
test was also accepted unanimously by the Court
of Appeal in the later decision
of Osman v R [2010] NZCA 199 at [20]. It now seems settled that this
two-stage approach is appropriate for the decision to commute sentences of
imprisonment to home detention.
[30] R v Vhavha, above n
29, at [31].
[31] See Geoffrey G
Hall Sentencing: 2007 Reforms in Context (LexisNexis New Zealand Ltd,
Wellington, 2007) at 345.
[32] R v Vhavha, above n 29, at [45].
[33] Ibid, at
[33].
[34] Ibid, at [36]. An
example of a case where this approach was appropriate was Connolly v R
[2010] NZCA 129. In that case a police officer was convicted of inducing a sex
worker to have sexual connection with him with her consent being induced
by a
threat. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal upheld
the sentencing judge’s decision not to
commute the sentence to one of home
detention, despite the offender’s characteristics otherwise being suited
to this, because,
at [82], “the sentencing purposes of denunciation and
general deterrence called for nothing less than a sentence of imprisonment
in
the circumstances of this
case”.
[35] R v D,
above n 3, at [66]. Section 8(g) of the Sentencing Act 2002 requires a court to
impose the least restrictive outcome that is appropriate
in the circumstances,
in accordance with the hierarchy of sentences and orders set out in s 10A.
Section 16(1) requires the court,
when considering the imposition of a sentence
of imprisonment for any particular offence, to have regard to the desirability
of keeping
offenders in the community as far as that is practicable and
consonant with the safety of the community.
[36] R v D, above n 3, at
[60]; R v Iosefa, above n 12, at
[41].
[37] R v Hill [2008]
NZCA 41 at [33]. One such case was R v Faithfull HC Auckland
CRI-2007-044-007451, 14 March 2008. In Faithfull, a man pleaded guilty to
attempting to murder his terminally ill wife. The Court held that this was a
case where it was not in society’s
interest to send the offender to prison
and a sentence of 12 months home detention was sufficient. In R v Hall
[2008] NZCA 207 the Court took a similar approach with a young man who was
convicted as a party to an aggravated robbery. The Court held that given
his
good previous record and positive prospects for rehabilitation it would be in
society’s interest to impose a sentence of
eight months home
detention.
[38] Stephen J
Rackmill “An Analysis of Home Confinement as a Sanction” [1994] 58
Fed Probation 45 at 48. While dated, Rackmill’s paper provides an
interesting perspective on home detention as at the time of writing he was
serving as Chief United States Probation Officer, Eastern District of New
York.
[39] See for example the
Australian state of Victoria where convictions for various types of sexual
offending, firearms offending, stalking
and a number of other specified offences
permanently statutorily bar an offender from receiving home detention:
Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), s
18ZV.
[40] Savage v
Police, above n 13, at [20]. The Court noted, “it is clear that the
legislature intended to confer a broad discretion and the weight
to be given to
relevant factors will be a matter for the sentencing Judge”.
[41] Golding v Police,
above n 14, at [12] and
[15].
[42] Smith v Police
HC Rotorua CRI-2009-463-000110, 18 December 2009; R v Faithfull, above n
37.
[43] R v Riri [2008]
NZCA 441. In Riri an offender was sentenced to two years and three months
imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of supply.
Riri
was severely paraplegic man who required 24 hour nursing care. The Court of
Appeal quashed his sentence of imprisonment as it
concluded the prison system
could not meet his needs. A sentence of six months home detention was
substituted.
[44] Garnett v R
[2010] NZCA 173. The Court noted that while mothers of young children are
not exempt from sentences of imprisonment, the appellant’s difficult
family circumstances could not be overlooked. The appellant was the mother of
very two young children, one with serious health problems.
A sentence of home
detention was found to be appropriate in those circumstances.
[45] R v Hassan [2008]
NZCA 402 at [27] per Ronald Young
J.
[46] R v Vhavha, above
n 29; R v Chatha [2008] NZCA
547.
[47] R v Vhavha,
above n 29, at [23] per Chisholm and Priestley JJ.
[48] R v Iosefa, above n 12, at [41].
[49] R v Vhavha, above n 29, at [40].
[50] Osman v R, above n 29 at [23].
[51] Ibid, at
[25].
[52] Fred L Rush Jr
“Deinsitutional Incapacitation: Home Detention in Pre-trial and
Post-conviction Contexts” (1987) 13 N. Ky. L. Rev. 375 at
393.
[53] Ibid, at 394. However,
with improvements in monitoring technology it is now becoming harder for
detainees to abscond.
[54]
Rebecca Checketts “Should Big Brother Be Watching? An Assessment of Home
Detention in New Zealand” (LLB (Hons) Dissertation,
University of Otago,
2005) at 29.
[55] Rush, above n 52, at 394.
[56] Randy R Gainey, Brian K
Payne and Mike O’Toole “The relationships between time in jail, time
on electronic monitoring,
and recidivism: An event history analysis of a
jail-based program” (2000) 17 Justice Quarterly 733 at
737.
[57] Joan Petersilla
“Exploring the Option of House Arrest” [1986] Fed. Probation 50 at
53.
[58] Dorothy K Kagehiro
“Psycholegal issues of Home Confinement” (1992) St Louis U L J 647
at 656.
[59] Data on the nature of
offenders and the use of home detention is my own analysis of Statistics New
Zealand’s unprocessed data
on sentencing in New Zealand. See Statistics
New Zealand <www.stats.govt.nz>, under the “Table Builder”
tool.
[60] This may also be due
to some reluctance by the judiciary to apply new sentences as alternatives to
imprisonment. This has been the
experience in some Australian states where
“the courts are, both in principle and practice, reluctant to depart from
the use
of the prison.” See N Keay “Home Detention - an alternative
to Prison?” (2000) 12 Current Issues Crim Just 98 at
98.
[61] The Ministry of Justice
forecast (to 2013) shows a slow but steady increase in home detention. See
Ministry of Justice 2009-2017 Criminal Justice Forecast Report (Ministry
of Justice, Wellington, 2009) at
6.
[62] These characteristics are
very similar to the findings of Whitfield who described the typical home
detainee as male, over 30 years
of age, few previous convictions, employed and
typically convicted of a property related offence. See D Whitfield D Tackling
the tag: The electronic monitoring of offenders (Waterside Press,
Winchester, 1997); Whitfield D The magic bracelet: Technology and offender
supervision (Waterside Press, Winchester, 1997) cited in A Gibbs and D King
“The Electronic Ball and Chain? The Operation and Impact of
Home Detention
with Electronic Monitoring In New Zealand” (2003) 36 The Australian and
New Zealand Journal of Criminology 1 at
3.
[63] While this data is
broadly indicative it is not as useful as it could be. The best comparative data
would have compared sentences
of home detention as a proportion of those
offenders eligible for home detention (i.e. facing sentences of less than two
years imprisonment).
Unfortunately such data was not readily available for this
paper.
[64] A Gibbs and D King
“Alternatives to Custody in the New Zealand Criminal Justice System:
Current Features and Future Prospects”
(2002) 36 Social Policy and
Administration 392 at 397. This compares favourably to imprisonment which has an
80 per cent reconviction
rate and community service with 52 per cent However,
reconviction rates alone may tell a misleading story. There are many relevant
factors not controlled for in such statistics – the variation in
reconviction statistics is likely to be due in large part
to the nature of the
offenders subject to a particular sentence; those subject to home detention
sentences are less likely to reoffend
regardless of their sentences. There is
likely to be an element self-selection bias in this data. See Hall, above n 31,
at 344.
[65] NZPA “Home
detention breached by 27% of offenders” The Dominion Post
(Wellington, 3 September 2010) at 4.
[66] Rackmill, above n 38, at
47.
[67] “Effective
Interventions” Cabinet Policy Committee Paper 7: Home Detention. Ministry
of Justice at 1.
[68] Hall, above n 31, at
344.
[69] Ronald P Corbett and
Ellsworth AL Fersch “Home as Prison: Use of House Arrest” [1985] 49
Fed Probation 13 at 16.
[70] Hall, above n 31, at 344.
[71] Gibbs and King, above n 64, at 10.
[72] King and Gibbs, above n 4,
at 123.
[73] Nicola Shepheard
“Conflict over ‘soft’ home detention option” (2008) New
Zealand Herald <www.nzherald.co.nz>;
This is fuelled by the comments of
groups like the Sensible Sentencing Trust who lobby for ‘tougher’
sentences. See,
Beck Vass “Home detention for teacher who
‘groomed’ boys” (2010) New Zealand Herald
<www.nzherald.co.nz>;
Sensible Sentencing Trust “Home Detention a
Sham Says Watchdog” (press release, 2 May
2008).
[74] Gibbs and King, above
n 64, at 402. This has also been recognised in the Sentencing Act 2002, s10A and
by the High Court in Beedell
v MSD HC Wanganui CRI-2010-483-000009, 11 February
2010, at [15], where Dobson J noted that the prisoner was “not under any
illusion that a sentence of home detention is easier to serve than a term of
imprisonment. Particularly for home detention sentences
near the upper end of
the 12 month limit, there is no doubt that the constraints whilst living in the
community make them difficult
sentences to complete in a range of domestic
situations.”
[75] Brian K
Payne and Randy R Gainey “A Qualitative Assessment of the Pains
Experienced on Electronic Monitoring” [1998] 42 International Journal of
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 149 at 153.
[76]
Ibid.
[77] Ibid, at 154; Gibbs
and King, above n 64, at 402. Payne and Gainey cite a number of revealing
comments of detainees featured in their
study: “this is jail inside your
home”, “the only thing this lacks is the bars on the windows”,
“the
only difference between this and jail is that I’m not in a
cell, I’m in a house”.
[78] Gibbs and King, above n 64, at 10.
[79]
Ibid.
[80] K Heggie Review of
the NSW Home Detention Scheme (NSW Department of Corrective Services,
Australia, 1999) at 60.
[81]
Amanda George “Women and Home Detention – Home Is Where the Prison
Is” (2006) 18 Current Issues Crim Just 79 at 80.
[82] Rush, above n 52, at 380.
[83] Ibid, at
381.
[84] A Aungles “Three
Bedroomed Prisons in the Asia Pacific Region: Home Imprisonment and Electronic
Surveillance in Australia,
Hawaii and Singapore” [1995] 2 Just Policy 32
at 35.
[85] Martinovic, above n 89 at 93.
[86] King and Gibbs, above n 4, at 120.
[87] Ibid
[88] George, above n 81, at
84.
[89] Marietta Martinovic
“The Punitiveness of Electronically Monitored Community Based
Programmes” (Paper presented at the
Probation and Community Corrections:
Making the Community Safer Conference convened by the Australian Institute of
Criminology and
the Probation and Community Corrections Officers' Association
Inc and held in Perth, September 2002) at 8. See also King and Gibbs,
above n 4,
at 119. Most women reported that they felt they had a “choice” but
nevertheless felt “a sense of obligation
because they were keen to have
their loved one out of prison”.
[90] Martinovic, above n, at
89.
[91] A Gibbs and D King
“Home Detention with Electronic Monitoring: the New Zealand
Experience” (2003) 3 Criminal Justice 199 at
208.
[92] Martinovic, above n 89,
at 95. This may include paying to maintain a “suitable residence”,
paying for a telephone connection
and electricity (required for monitoring) and
paying for transport to and from rehabilitative
programmes.
[93] See generally,
Martinovic, above n 89, at 95; Church and Dunstan, above n 3, at 57; Heggie,
above n 80, at 70.
[94] George, above n 81, at 84, 86 and 87.
[95] Martinovic, above n 89, at 98.
[96] King and Gibbs, above n 4, 120.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid, at 121.
[99] Ibid, at 122.
[100] Martinovic, above n 89,
at 98.
[101] King and Gibbs,
above n 4, at 123. Martinovic, above n 89, at 100 makes similar
suggestions.
[102] It should be
noted that both detainees and sponsors can still be eligible for the
unemployment and emergency benefits “Home
Detention/Habilitation
programmes” < www.workandincome.govt.nz>.
[103] Sentencing Act 2002, s 10A.
[104] Ibid, ss 69B–69M.
[105] Ibid, ss 54B–54L.
[106] George, above n 81, at 88.
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