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New Zealand Law Students Journal |
Last Updated: 30 August 2012
IS PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR IMMUNE FROM
ARREST?
DANIEL
JACKSON[*]
Introduction
This paper considers whether states parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court[1] are
required to arrest Omar al-Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan, if he
enters their territory. It concludes that the
better view is that they have no
obligation to do so. In fact, doing so would violate customary international
law, since he possesses
immunity ratione personae.
Background
The conflict in Darfur started in February 2003. The Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army and the Justice and Equality Movement began an
armed struggle,
accusing the Sudanese government of oppressing black Africans, who form the
majority of the population in Darfur
and other regions in the south of the
Sudan. Arabs, who predominate further north, are the majority of the national
population and
dominate the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government has
been accused of involvement or complicity in atrocities (as have rebel
groups).
On 31 March 2005 the United Nations Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted Resolution 1593,
referring
the situation prevailing in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court (in accordance
with Article 13(2) of the
Statute).[1] On 4 March 2008 Pre-Trial
Chamber I of the Court issued an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir on
charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity but, by a majority, refused to
include a charge of genocide.[1] On an
appeal by the Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber overturned the decision regarding
the genocide charge and remanded the case to
Pre-Trial Chamber
I,[1] which issued another arrest
warrant in respect of
genocide.[1]
President
al-Bashir has subsequently travelled to Chad and Kenya, which are both parties
to the Rome Statute, without being arrested.
This followed the adoption by the
Assembly of the African Union of a resolution calling on members not to arrest
him. The failure
to arrest President al-Bashir caused considerable controversy.
Several European Union states summoned Kenyan Ambassadors to explain
the failure
to arrest President al-Bashir.[1]
Pre-Trial Chamber I reported the visits to the Assembly of States Parties and
the Security Council “in order for them to take
any measure they may deem
appropriate.”[1]
Analysis
International law accords a serving head of state immunity ratione
personae: that is, personal immunity for all acts, whether or not done in an
official capacity. This is to be distinguished from immunity
ratione
materiae, or functional immunity, which protects only acts that a person
does in an official capacity.[1] The
arrest of a head of state by another state would violate this immunity. Since
President al-Bashir is a head of state, he would
appear to be protected by this
immunity.
The prohibition of genocide is a jus cogens
norm.[1] The prohibitions on war
crimes and crimes against humanity are probably also jus cogens
norms.[1] It has been contended that
immunity is displaced in cases involving international crimes that involve the
violation of a jus cogens norm, since such norms prevail over all other
international law norms. The minority of the Grand Chamber of the European Court
of
Human Rights in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom put it this way in a case
about torture:[1]
The acceptance therefore of the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture entails that a state allegedly violating it cannot invoke hierarchically lower rules (in this case, those on state immunity) to avoid the consequences of the illegality of its actions.
In Jones v Ministry of Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Lord Hoffmann exposed the fallacy in this
reasoning:[1]
The jus cogens is the prohibition on torture. But the United Kingdom, in according state immunity to the Kingdom, is not proposing to torture anyone. Nor is the Kingdom, in claiming immunity, justifying the use of torture. It is objecting in limine to the jurisdiction of the English court to decide whether it used torture or not.
Similarly, Hazel Fox QC
notes:[1]
State immunity is a procedural rule going to the jurisdiction of a national court. It does not go to substantive law; it does not contradict a prohibition contained in a jus cogens norm but merely diverts any breach of it to a different method of settlement.
Lord Hoffmann observed:[1]
To produce a conflict with state immunity, it is therefore necessary to show that the prohibition on torture has generated an ancillary procedural rule which, by way of exception to state immunity, entitles or perhaps requires states to assume civil jurisdiction over other states in cases in which torture is alleged.
The view that there was such a rule was rejected by the International
Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant
case.[1] That case related to
immunity ratione personae of a minister of foreign affairs, but the
immunity of ministers of foreign affairs can hardly be supposed to be more
extensive than
that of heads of state. It was also rejected in the context of
state immunity by the Grant Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights in
Al-Adsani.[1]
A rule
of customary international law requires two elements. The first is state
practice, which must be extensive, representative
and virtually
uniform.[1] The second is opinio
juris, which means that states must have considered themselves legally bound
to act in the way that they did.[1]
Since the general principle, which pre-dates the development of jus
cogens norms, is that heads of state have immunity, the burden is on those
claiming there is an exception for alleged breaches of such norms
to meet the
requirements for a rule of customary international law. It is not necessary for
the claimed rule to meet the more stringent
criteria for a jus cogens
norm, since it is simply an exception to an ordinary rule of customary
international law.
There is hardly any state practice supporting the
view that there is an exception to immunity ratione personae for breaches
of jus cogens norms. Suits against various head of state and foreign
ministers were brought under Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law, but
this led to Belgium’s loss at the International Court of Justice in the
Arrest Warrant case. The logic of the reasoning of the Italian Court of
Cassasion in Ferrini v Federal Republic of
Germany[1] would suggest the
recognition of such an exception, but the case itself related to state immunity,
so its value as state practice
in this context is doubtful.
Immunity
ratione personae has been upheld by the French Court of Cassation in a
case against Muammar Qadaffi,[1] the
Spanish Audienco Nacional in a case against Fidel
Castro,[1] the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in a case against Robert
Mugabe,[1] and the Bow Street
Magistrates Court in England in cases against President
Mugabe[1] and Shaul Mofez, at that
time the Israeli Minister of
Defence.[1] The Danish government
refused to arrest the Israeli Ambassador, Carmi Gillon, who was accused of
responsibility for torture, on the
basis of immunity ratione
personae.[1] In the
Pinochet case none of their Lordships contended that immunity ratione
personae would be inapplicable. Lord Millett, while concluding that immunity
ratione materiae did not apply, made clear that the position would be
different in relation to immunity ratione personae, emphasising its
absolute character.[1] The immunity
has been upheld in cases of espionage, drug smuggling, murder and plots against
the head of state.[1] It has been
held that a foreign diplomat cannot be arrested even if he threatens the
security of the state.[1] The state
practice is overwhelming against the suggested norm, and accordingly it must be
rejected.
Does the Rome Statute place an obligation on states parties to
arrest President al-Bashir if he enters their territory? Two provisions
of the
Statute relate to immunity. Article 27(2) provides:
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over a person.
Article 98(1) provides:
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the co-operation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
These two provisions may seem contradictory at first glance. But they
relate to different situations: Article 27(2) to invoking immunity
before the
Court and Article 98(1) to immunity from
arrest.[1] There has been
uncertainty over whether the term “third state” refers to all states
other than the “requested State”
or only to states not party to the
Statute. The context supports the wider reading. This phrasing occurs nowhere
else in the Statute,
while the phrase “State not party to this
Statute” is used on several occasions. It would appear that the term is
used
in contradistinction to the term “requested State”, which is
used earlier in the provision.[1]
This forecloses the argument that Article 98(1) is not applicable because Sudan
is to be treated, in relation to his case, as a party
to the Statute. So Article
98(1) means that, if President al-Bashir possesses immunity, the Court’s
act in requesting his arrest
was ultra vires and states do not have to comply
with it.[1]
It has been
contended that the Security Council’s referral of the situation in Darfur
to the Court must be taken as removing
President al-Bashir’s
immunity.[1] The Security Council
has the power under Chapter VII of the Charter to abrogate immunity when it
considers this to be necessary for
the maintenance of international peace and
security. The Charter prevails over other norms of international law, except
jus cogens norms.[1]
Paragraph 2 of the Resolution reads:
Decides that the Government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution and, while recognizing that States not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute, urges all States and concerned regional and other international organizations to cooperate fully...”
The Council did not expressly remove immunity. Can it remove it by
implication? There is an analogy to waiver of immunity. A state
can waive its
immunity or that of its officials. It is well established that this waiver may
be either express or by submission to
the jurisdiction of the court. But the
state practice and authorities do not support the notion that a state may
impliedly waive
immunity by
treaty.[1] In Argentine Republic
v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corporation the Supreme Court of the United States
rejected a submission that Argentina had impliedly waived immunity by certain
treaties. Rehnquist
CJ, delivering the judgment of the Court, said: “Nor
do we see how a foreign state can waive its immunity ... by signing an
international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of
immunity...”[1]
Oppenheim’s
International Law states:[1]
A state, although in principle entitled to immunity, may waive its
immunity. It may do so by expressly submitting to the jurisdiction
of the court
before which it is sued, either by express consent given in the context of a
particular dispute which has already arisen,
or by consent given in advance in a
contract or an international agreement ... A state may also be considered to
have waived its
immunity by implication, as by instituting or intervening in
proceedings, or taking any steps in the proceedings relating to the
merits of
the case...
Implied waiver of immunity is only referred to in relation to
participation in proceedings, which is regarded as constituting submission
to
the jurisdiction of the court. The International Law Commission’s Draft
Articles on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and their
Property[1] also support this view.
Waiver by treaty is dealt with in Article 7(1), which
provides:[1]
1. A state cannot invoke immunity from jurisdiction in a proceeding before a court of another state with regard to a matter or case if it has expressly consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court with regard to the matter or case:
(a) by international agreement;
(b) in a written contract; or
(c) by a declaration before the court or by a written
communication in a specific proceeding.
The commentary states, in
relation to Article 7(1):[1]
...there appear to be several recognisable methods of expressing or
signifying consent...the consent should not be taken for granted,
nor readily
implied. Any theory of 'implied consent' as a possible exception to the general
principles of state immunities outlined
in this part should be viewed not as an
exception in itself, but rather as an added explanation or justification for an
otherwise
valid and generally recognised exception. There is therefore no room
for implying the consent of an unwilling state which has not
expressed its
consent in a clear and recognisable manner, including by the means provided in
Article 8 [which relate to submission
to the jurisdiction of a court].
It
is unsurprising that states would reject the notion of implied waiver of
immunity by treaty. States understandably attach great
importance to immunity
ratione personae, since it protects their most senior officials from
interference by other states and is an expression of the sovereign equality of
states. Further, as Lord Goff of Chieveley said in his dissenting opinion in
Pinochet (No 3), “what a trap would be created for the unwary, if
state immunity could be waived in a treaty sub
silentio.”[1] Some of their
Lordships disagreed with his Lordship’s conclusion on this
point,[1] but they were unable to
cite previous instances of states impliedly waiving immunity by treaty or
statements recognising implied
waiver by treaty. It seems that states are only
prepared to recognise implied waiver of immunity in the context of an
affirmative
act clearly consistent with the assertion of immunity, viz
submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Since, as noted above, the
rejection of implied waiver of immunity appears to be based upon the importance
attached to immunity, the principle is also applicable
in the context of a
Security Council resolution.
Even if immunity can be removed by
implication, it would have to be a necessary implication. This standard is not
met here. Security
Council resolutions are product of negotiation. It is
entirely possible that some members of the Council were prepared to allow the
situation to be referred to the Court but not to remove President
al-Bashir’s immunity. China, for instance, is on friendly
terms with him.
The Resolution is not deprived of effect by recognising his immunity. There are
many other people who do not have
immunity who could be charged. In addition,
the obligation on Sudan to cooperate with the Court probably includes a
requirement to
deliver him up to it. What the Resolution does not contain is a
clear statement that other states can ignore the fundamental principle
of head
of state immunity.
Dapo Akande has suggested that President’s
al-Bashir’s immunity is removed by the Genocide
Convention.[1] Article VI thereof
provides: “Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated
in Article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible
rulers, public officials or private
individuals.”[1] But again
immunity is not removed expressly. Its removal is not even a necessary
implication of the provision. As the International
Court of Justice noted in the
Arrest Warrant Case, immunity does not entail impunity. Sudan can try
President al-Bashir without violating his immunity. If he is guilty of genocide,
then Sudan is violating its obligation to punish him. Article IV is therefore
not deprived of effect by declining to read it as removing
his immunity
ratione personae.
Thus Article 98(1) is applicable. The
Court’s request for assistance is ultra vires and states do not have to
comply with it.
Conclusion
It is important to note the limited nature of the thesis that has been
advanced in this paper. It has not been contended that President
al-Bashir would
possess immunity before the Court. Nor it is denied that Sudan has an obligation
to procure him to the Court. The
claim is simply that states parties to the Rome
Statute (and other states) have no obligation to arrest him and would violate
customary
international law if they did so.
States place great
importance on immunity ratione personae. It protects a serving head of
state almost absolutely. States have not embraced any customary exception for
international crimes
breaching jus cogens norms. Article 98(1) of the
Rome Statute precludes the Court from requesting states to arrest a person when
that would conflict with
their international obligations. The Security Council
has not expressly President al-Bashir’s immunity and it cannot impliedly
do so. Article 98(1) therefore applies. Since the request for assistance was
ultra vires the Court, states are under no obligation
to comply with it. Doing
so would violate their customary international law obligation to Sudan to
respect the immunity ratione personae of its head of state.
It
may be thought this state of affairs is unsatisfactory. Frankly, the author
agrees. Sudan is most unlikely to transfer President
al-Bashir to the Court. The
Security Council has the power, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, to
expressly remove his immunity
in the interests of international peace and
security. It should exercise that power. It should also expressly require Sudan
to transfer
him to the Court and sanction non-compliance. The trial of President
al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court would send a salutary
message to
other political leaders who might be inclined to use their control of the state
to commit international crimes. In light
of recent events in the Middle East and
North Africa, including atrocities against protesters and other civilians, the
trial of a
local leader for crimes against his own people would be particularly
timely.
[*] Daniel Jackson, Victoria
University of Wellington.
[1]Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (opened for ratification 17 July
1998, entered into force 1 July 2002).
2Resolution
[1]593 SC Res 1593, S/Res/1593
(2005).
3Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Prosecutor v Al
Bashir) ICC-02/05-0[1]/09-3, 4 March 2009.
4 Prosecutor v Al Bashir
ICC-02/05-0[1]/09-T-1, 3 February 2010.
5 Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a
Warrant of Arrest (Prosecutor v Al Bashir)
ICC-02/05-0[1]/09-94, 12 July 2010.
6“Kenyan ambassadors summoned over Omar
al-BashirR[1]s visit” (2010) “BBC
News”
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11156184>
7Decision
informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States
Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's
presence in the territory of
the Republic of Kenya (Prosecutor v Al Bashir)
ICC-02/05-0[1]/09-107, 27 August 2010 at 4;
Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of
the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir's
recent visit to
the Republic of Chad (Prosecutor v Al Bashir) ICC-02/05-01/09-109, 27 August
2010 at 4.
8 Robert Cryer and others An Introduction to
International Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2007) at 423.
9Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New
Application 2002) (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Rwanda) [2006] ICJ Rep
6 at 28.
[1]0 See M Cherif
Bassiouni “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga
Omnes” (1996) 59 LCP 63 at
68.
[1]1Al-Adsani v United
Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 273 at 298-299 (Grand Chamber).
[1]2 Jones v Ministry of
Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] UKHL 26, [2006] 1 AC 270 at
[44].
[1]3 Hazel Fox The Law
of State Immunity (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) at 525.
[1]4 Jones v Ministry of
Interior for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, above n 12, at [45].
[1]5 Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) [2002] ICJ Rep 3 at
21.
[1]6 Al-Adsani v United
Kingdom, above n 11.
[1]7
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 at 72.
[1]8 Ibid, at 73-74.
[1]9 Ferrini v Federal
Republic of Germany [2004] 128 ILR 658.
20 Qadaffi
(200[1]) 125 ILR
456.
2[1] Castro (1999) 32
ILM 596.
22 Tachiona v Mugabe
[1] 69 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)
23 Colin Wardrick “Immunity and International Crimes
in English Law̶[1] (2004) 53 ICLQ 769 at
770.
24 Ibid, at 77[1]-773.
25 Jacques Hartmann “The Gillon
Affair̶[1] (2005) 45 ICLQ 745.
26 R v Bartle, ex parte Pinochet
[[1] 999] UKHL 17, [2000] 1 AC 147 at 171, 179.
27 Cryer and others, above n 8, at 434.
28 Rose
v R [[1]947] 3 DLR 618 (Que KB).
29 Michiel Blommestijn and Cedric Ryngaert “Exploring the
Obligations for States to Act upon the
ICCR[1]s Arrest Warrant for Omar Al-Bashir:
A Legal Conflict between the Duty to Arrest and the Customary Status of Head of
State Immunity”
(Working Paper No 48, Leuven Centre for Global Governance
Studies, 2010) at 26.
30 Ibid, at 26 n 77.
3[1] Ibid, at 29.
32 See Dapo Akande “The Legal Nature of Security Council
Referrals to the ICC and its Impact on Al
BashirR[1]s Immunities” (2009) 7 JICJ
333.
33 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia)
(Further
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures)
[[1]993] ICJ Rep 325 at
339-440
34 Campbell McLachlan “Pinochet
Revisited̶[1] (2002) 51 ICLQ 959 at 961 n
20.
35 Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping
Corporation ([1]989) 109 US 683 at 693.
36 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds)
OppenheimR[1]s International Law
(9th ed, Longman, London, 1992) 351-355.
37 Yearbook
of the International Law Commission, [1]991
(United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1994) at Vol II, Part 2, at 13.
38 Ibid, at Vol II, Part 2, 25.
39 Ibid, at Vol
II, Part 2, 27.
40 R v Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, above n 26, at 223.
4[1] Ibid, at 114-15 per Lord
Browne-Wilkinson, 169 per Lord Saville of Newdigate, 190 per Lord Phillips of
Worth Matravers.
42 Dapo Akande “The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of
State Immune from ICC Prosecution?̶[1] in
Debating International Justice in Africa: OTJR Collected Essays 2008-2010
(2010) University of Oxford Centre of Socio-Legal Studies.
43
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (opened for
signature 9 December [1]948, entered into force
12 January 1951), art IV.
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