


TOWN PLANNING QUARTERLY /13





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TOWN PLANNING QUARTERLY

Number thirteen September 1968

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
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Progress calls for Planning

And wise planning calls for **experience**. This is one of the reasons why Fletcher Trust, in a consortium with Dillingham and Mainline Constructions has been entrusted with the Auckland Harbour Board's multi-million redevelopment scheme.

Fletcher Trust, whose land and property developments include Pakuranga Town Centre, and other shopping centres in Auckland, Wellington, Nelson and Christchurch, industrial estates in the main centres, residential developments, high

rise flats and office and shop blocks, have built up a background of experience unparalleled in New Zealand and are thereby able to offer services of a calibre until recently available only from overseas.

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FACT & OPINION

An editorial notebook

Toward a better environment

In 1957 a meeting was called at Lambeth Palace, London, by the Archbishop of Canterbury to launch the Civic Trust. The aims of the trust were as laudable as they were ambitious:

- to encourage high quality in architecture and planning;
- to preserve buildings of artistic distinction or historic interest;
- to protect the beauties of the countryside;
- to eliminate and prevent ugliness, whether from design or neglect;
- to stimulate public interest and inspire a sense of civic pride.

The Civic Trust is an independent and unofficial body founded by Duncan Sandys as Minister of Housing and Local Government, because, as he said, "I realised that the improvements in civic design, which we want to see, will never be achieved by official action alone. Though local authorities can do a great deal to influence things in the right direction, their powers are primarily negative."

A number of people must have felt that the Civic Trust movement was something peculiarly British: a product of that section of society which believed that, by tradition, birth and training, it had a duty to see to it that certain minimum levels of taste were observed, especially in any development which affected the smaller towns and the rural areas of the nation. But the organisers recognised the more obvious pitfalls that such a movement might be tempted to fall into: "We have no desire to dictate what


is good architecture and what is bad. That is a matter of taste, on which there will always be divergent opinions. But, since public indifference is the main enemy, controversy is all to the good. It not only sharpens the wits of designers, but also stimulates general interest."

Yet, in the event, they do seem to have been unduly preoccupied with repainting shop fronts in carefully blended pastel shades and persuading the local signwriters to work overtime on approved "Architectural Review" style lettering. Such is the impact of these exercises in civic uplift, in fact, that to come across one is to feel that one has blundered into some lesser known part of Disneyland doing its technicolour best to imitate an English provincial shopping street.

Inevitably the members of the Civic Trust have had clear ideas as to what, for them, is good in exterior decoration and those ideas have tended to dominate their activities. But the considerable publicity which has accompanied each project has meant that many people for the first time must have been encouraged to look about them with less indifferent eyes. Some will have reacted favourably to the changes, while others will have scorned them, and each in the process will have been stimulated to make comparisons.

Public indifference is the main enemy and the British Civic Trust has so well combatted it that it can rely upon an income of \$NZ80,000 each year to carry out its self-appointed task of education by example.

Not surprisingly, the Auckland Civic Trust, the inaugural meeting of which we referred to in our last issue, has modelled itself upon its



OF EACH PAGE

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British counterpart and its aims are virtually the same. But it does not have a paid staff and it certainly has nothing remotely resembling such a fortune in money. Measured on an equivalent population basis, however, the amount would be of the order of \$1000 per annum and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that sponsors could be found to guarantee that sum.

It is likely that its members will find the painting of shop fronts low down on their list of priorities. Nevertheless, they will find it a strong temptation to tackle much in a short space of time and this they will do better to resist. In their case it will be very much a matter of nothing succeeding like success and clear success in their first projects will be vital. They will be judged as a serious body of people, competent in their advice and permanently on the Auckland scene, or merely as another briefly enthusiastic body too casually organised and too lacking in skill to be worthy of the sustained attention of either councillors or citizens.

The Civic Trust will be aware that it is not enough to point out what it is that they believe to be wrong with aspects of the appearance of towns and countryside. The bad is not replaced merely because it is bad, but because a clearly better alternative is shown to be available. In the last resort, what is better and what is worse is a matter of judgment based upon levels of discernment and taste. Willingness to accept and, more importantly, to act upon that judgment will depend upon the degree of confidence engendered by the authors. We certainly wish its members every success in their efforts to establish themselves and will watch their progress with great interest.

Anyone wishing to give moral and material support to the trust should write for details of the various grades of membership to the secretary, Box 5221, Auckland.

Here comes the chopper

At Hamilton recently 200 people held a picnic on the banks of the Waikato River. The day was a Friday, the season winter, it was pouring with rain.

An attendance of 200 people at Hamilton, a

city of 65,000 population, for any event which does not involve kicking, throwing or hitting a ball, suggests an attraction of some consequence. But no, the magnet was merely the announced intention on the part of the city council to cut down 20 trees. Some people were even overheard to threaten to chain themselves to the trees to prevent their destruction: in Hamilton, New Zealand.


In Wellington City, population 130,000, there used to be some trees, too, down on the flat. There was once even an avenue of pohutukawas along Kent and Cambridge Terraces and a small group of the same species at Courtenay Place. But trees do not grow easily in Wellington and that, perhaps, is the reason why the council preferred to see the survivors replaced with beds of pansies and other seed packet annuals. At the time there were a few heart-felt "Letters to the Editor," but no one stepped forward with a padlock and chain. There was not even a picnic. A different set of values, one supposes: or no values.

Is it not interesting to see how trees in towns set up such a series of reactions either for or against? Is it not interesting to see how a country town can produce 200 people to stand in the pouring rain for two or three hours to protect something which they hold to be important to the appearance and well-being of the city, while the capital has undergone greater disturbances than the mere chopping down of trees with nothing but the faintest of man-made rumbles for comment?

Large streams from little fountains

There has been some unrest in Auckland recently over the plans for the first building to be erected as part of the redevelopment of the extensive Harbour Board properties around Lower Queen Street. The district scheme, at this moment undergoing its first five-yearly review, provides for a normal maximum building height of 110 feet in that part of the city. The developers want to put up a building 266 feet in height and they have made an application for consent as a conditional use. If we resist the temptation to

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
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debate the issue of why the council should stipulate a maximum of 110 feet and why the designers should so far disregard that maximum as to seek approval for something two and a half times in excess, the matter seems straightforward enough.


But the proposed building is at the northern extremity of the total redevelopment site and immediately to its south is the much-publicised, much-acclaimed proposed Square. It is to be located on the western side of Queen Street and directly opposite the chief post office. From autumn through to spring and from late morning to early afternoon the square would lie, literally, in the shadow of the building.

The square may well prove to be a space with no other function than that of a gap between buildings. Or so runs the argument (courageously or vindictively depending upon one's viewpoint) pursued by the younger architects and one lawyer of the city.

The merits of the application will be debated before the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board with considerable vigour amidst the mounting concern of the developers at the, for them unanticipated, delays to the project. They see the building as a magnificent addition to that part of Auckland and one which will be in real jeopardy unless difference can be settled quickly.

But we cite the case here not to anticipate all the pros and cons, but as an example of public participation pursued to lengths well beyond that dictated merely by motives of casual interest. Is it imagination, or is there growing confidence in asking questions and increasing expectation of intelligent answers?

Perhaps, in some parts of the country at least, councillors need no longer fear that whatever they propose or do will be greeted with indifference bordering on apathy — unless it implies another cent on the rates. Perhaps local civic trusts will have more receptive audiences than, at first glance, seemed possible. Perhaps we are approaching the end of the era of complete austerity in local affairs. Perhaps, as individuals, we are beginning to reason that whatever physical changes occur in our communities affects each of us and that the difference is merely of degree, not of kind.



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OT 14

The second generation

The official retirement of Professor R. T. Kennedy from the chair in town planning at the University of Auckland marks the end of the first decade in the life of the University's Department of Town Planning. This occasion is worthy of much more than an editorial note and space is reserved in a later issue to return to the subject at length.

In the meantime, we record the appointment of the new professor, Dr. Boileau. Ivan Boileau, MA, PhD, TPDip. MTPI, FAPI, has been for the past ten years a senior lecturer at the University of Sydney and prior to that he lectured at the University of Manchester. His undergraduate and graduate work at Cambridge was in engineering and his doctorate dealt with aspects of traffic generation. His present interests lie particularly in the field of planning administration.

Dr. Boileau will take up his appointment at Auckland in September, 1969, and, until his arrival, Professor Kennedy will remain on as the head of the department. We take this opportunity to congratulate Dr. Boileau on his success and we look forward with interest to marking the influence that he will have upon the second generation of New Zealand planners.

Surveyors' conference

This year's annual conference of the New Zealand Institute of Surveyors will be held at Christchurch from the 20th - 23rd October.

The theme of the conference is "Cadastral Survey Systems," with papers by R. P. Gough on "The New Zealand Survey System" and L. Esterman on "Legislation for Surveys and Subdivisions" in the first section, and further papers on more technical aspects of surveying in the second.

Advisory editor

Mr. M. H. Pritchard, whose article, "Some Implications of Economic Factors on Land Use Planning," appears in this issue, has been acting as advisory editor to the journal for the past twelve months. It is in the nature of such work that the existence of advisory editors is only noticed when there is a failure in completion: when the journal is late in arriving through the mail box or when the content is such that circulation begins to be adversely affected. On neither


count have we been given cause for worry. Mr. Pritchard took to the task as though of the manner born and we record our thanks to him for his energy and efficiency.

continued page 26

The review of a scheme

The Auckland City Council in the matter of district scheme experience, for some years had the field largely to itself. The code of ordinances which it developed, although inevitably based as it was on the primitive guide lines offered by the Fourth and Fifth Schedules to the Town and Country Planning Regulations, served as a model upon which other municipalities could draw. It was the result of an evolution of emerging understanding based upon more than a decade of practical administration.

Recently, the same City produced its reviewed scheme for public assessment. It has stretched evolution almost to the point of revolution - of a discreet New Zealand kind, of course. The Council has taken the opportunity to make that introductory essay, the scheme statement, something more than a vague, disjointed, generalised list of meaningless statistical information. It has looked at, and attempted to understand, the significance of spatial distribution and trends before writing its revised code of ordinances. It has had sufficient confidence to produce a multitude of residential zones to match what it sees to be the distinguishing characteristics of what exists and



Dr. Ivan Boileau

Acknowledgments to ASPO Newsletter.

THE PLAN'S THE THING

Gate Keeper: And on earth you were . . . ?

New Arrival: I was a planner.

G.K.: You were a planner. What did you plan?

N.A.: Cities. I planned cities. And regions, I planned regions, sometimes. But mostly cities.

G.K.: I see. That city over there . . . not that one . . . the one under the pinkish yellowish greyish cloud . . . that's where you came from, isn't it?

N.A.: Yes, that's it, good old . . .

G.K.: Did you plan **that**?

N.A.: That's where I came from, all right. I was the head planner there, but no, I didn't exactly plan it.

G.K.: I don't understand. You planned cities . . .

N.A.: And regions . . .

G.K.: And regions . . . You were the head planner. But you didn't plan the city?

N.A.: Well, no. You see, a planner doesn't exactly **plan** cities. He makes plans **for** cities.

G.K.: Maybe I'm a little rusty . . . all these languages, you just wouldn't believe it, six hundred from Africa alone. Anyway, I thought a plan meant you say this is how we are going to do it. Then you go ahead and do it. They say the Other Fellow has a grand plan for sparrows and the like.

N.A.: Well, yes and no to your definition. A plan is like saying, "This is how we are going to do it," all right. Only we don't do it.

G.K.: I'm afraid I don't . . .

N.A.: You see it's this way. Planning is a process, it's continuing, it's ongoing. You have to keep updating the comprehensive plan.

G.K.: Comprehensive plan?

N.A.: Maybe you heard it called the master plan.

G.K.: Master plan?

N.A.: Well yes, the general plan. Once you've made it, you've got to revise it, because things change. You can't beat change, can you? You've got to accommodate to change.

G.K.: So you make a master plan, or a comprehensive plan, or a general plan. Then you fix it up a little, erase a line here, add a line there . . .

N.A.: It's not quite that simple. First you make a plan in, say, 1950. You start it in 1950, that is, and you finish it in 1955. But by 1955 it is out of date, things have changed, your data is obsolete. That's why the data bank.

G.K.: Then you erase a line . . .

N.A.: No, it's very technical. In 1955 you start to prepare another plan. You have to more or less start from scratch . . .

G.K.: From whom?

N.A.: Not **Old Scratch**. That's just an expression. Means you start all over.

G.K.: Then nothing is worth saving?

N.A.: If you had a good base map, you don't have to do that all over. Don't stint on the base map, I always say, do it carefully the first time and you can use it for a lot of plans. Except consultants, of course, consultants always have to make a new base map.

G.K.: So you start a plan in 1950, then another one in 1955, and a completely new one in 1960 . . .

N.A.: Except for the base map . . .

G.K.: . . . except for the base map. Then still another one in 1965, and then . . .

N.A.: We were really just getting going on the next one when I had to leave. I expected to have it ready for public hearing in late 1968 or early 1969 — data bank and simulation models and all those new techniques speed things up. I wouldn't be surprised if some day we got things so we could turn out a new comprehensive plan annually.

G.K.: A new one every year? I see. Let's get back to that city of yours. From here it looks pretty messy — when the smog clears enough for me to see it. Now it looks that way because it got rebuilt according to a new plan every five years, is that right?

N.A.: Oh no, you don't seem to understand. You see, a plan is an **ideal**. You never expect the city to look like the plan. You aren't **supposed** to achieve it, as the saying goes, just use it as a guide to what the city would look like if you implemented the plan, which you don't. At the same time, the plan must be realistic, it must be based on what exists at the time you are making it. In five years there will be a lot of changes made. So you've got to start over.

G.K.: From scratch?

N.A.: From scratch.

G.K.: Except for the base map?

N.A.: Except for the base map.

G.K.: Well, I think I begin to see how you came here. You meant well, didn't you? Even though your plans weren't implemented, as the saying goes?

N.A.: Oh yes, all my intentions were good.

G.K.: You did a first rate paving job.

N.A.: Paving . . . ?

G.K.: The road to hell . . .

N.A.: . . . is paved with good intentions! So that's where I am, I thought . . .

CURTAIN

IN view by Lucifer

Comprenez-vous?



Comprehensive development, including redevelopment, is financially shaky, or so the private developers claim when they are seeking huge sums of public subsidy. It is a technically cumbersome process requiring larger and larger "planning teams," which produce an environment more artificial than anything built by previous generations. Its results are basically dull and depressing in spite of their superficial gimmickry and they brutally expose a lack of comprehension by the planners when faced with problems of comprehensive size. Yet we are so anxious to be a la mode that we are in danger of losing sight of the wood for the trees in tubs, and other such sugar-coating that is supposed to make the pill of comprehensive destruction easier to swallow.

One of the problems facing the planner is that comprehensive destruction is a whole lot easier as a planning task than the problem of changing and guiding the city in a way which does not bring half the population clamouring to the planners' doors with cries of "vandal! destroyer!" and the other half with their own plans of how to do the same job so much better.

It seems that we operate under the peculiar delusion that "we" (given a clean sheet), will do so much better than "they" (who had a clean sheet in the colonisation of New Zealand). But we do not seem willing to take notice of the lesson that they can teach.

If the reputed shocking and obsolete development which is to be replaced on a comprehensive scale is so bad, then there is a basic question that must be answered **before** the neat lettraset trees are dotted gaily about the handsomely-drawn plans. That question is: **why** has it become imperative to undertake such a costly and unrewarding operation for which there is much criticism and little praise?

The **cause** of the pressing need to do something is not that properties are old or obsolete or unattractive — such facts of life are with us all the time — but that they all grew old and obsolete at the same time. And the reason for that is that they were either developed at the same time or over a period during which little or no change took place.

If this thesis of contemporaneous development is the correct one, then we seem to be suggesting that we have sufficient confidence — or is

it shortsightedness — to avoid the laying up of similar and even greater problems for the future. To prevent this repetition was one of the reasons, so we are led to believe, for current planning activities. But planners seem too often to take the highly-dubious view that they can cure diseases without knowing causes. Yet the chances of stumbling on the "right" solution are beyond calculation. Nor is it any use removing the problem to some distant time. Our contribution to future generations must be in the clearer identification of causes. It seems inevitable, if only because of the human element, that our solutions will be looked upon as inadequate, but the reason for the inadequacy should lie in the inadequacy of our technology, not in our inability to see the problem for what it is.

We must decide, also, whether the enormity of **our** problem is caused by the apparent stupidity of previous generations in allowing **their** towns to develop in a way which does not suit ours (conveniently forgetting that it may have suited them) or whether our technological achievements have made us unable to turn to advantage inherited disadvantages.

Each technological breakthrough gives a new confidence in our ability to carry out development on this scale. Technological invention is a spiral process; the demands for better ways will make the attainment of solutions easier and this, in turn, will encourage the refinement of the means to an end. But technological response, or the willingness of technology to respond, is no test of the validity of the stimulus. Technology will respond, like that obedient servant the computer, to the questions set with no thought for the quality of the question. If we want to travel to the moon technology will produce the means. If we want wholesale, time-static rebuilding of huge areas of land, technology will show us how it can be done.

Comprehensive or comprehension

The response to the demands for comprehensive development has been: comprehensive design teams. Each failure of wholesale development has been blamed on a lack of comprehensiveness in the design team; rarely on the lack of comprehension.

We cannot understand why no one seems to

be interested in taking on the problem of the run-down areas in the way that they are clamouring, almost, to spend millions of dollars on piecemeal (the planners' label) developments. For some it is a mystery that such untidy thinking should be so popular. But if there is any major disadvantage at all in this haphazard approach to building cities, it seems to be that the areas which have been developed in a piecemeal manner in the first place, are the very ones where redevelopment is taking place and the structures being replaced are the ones which have **not** reached the end of their useful lives. Ample land, statistically, is allocated for high intensity development in the "problem" areas, but applications for redevelopment approval always come from outside those areas because, almost surprisingly, it is there that the greater attraction lies.

The challenge is to renew the fabric of the city in a way that will not create the **same** problems for the future that we are struggling to solve today.

Great cities have grown, but in this Age of Planning that is no longer allowed. The planners, with their comprehensive schemes, take away the community's power to do things for itself. There is a difference between persuading ourselves that planning is merely a new expression of the growth process, and the comprehensive delusion that the planners will ever move fast enough to create something as genuine and as complex as a city.

Planners who succumb to this delusion have started on the process of attempting to create an organisation that would have to be very similar to society itself in its complexity and its range of understanding. When they have achieved this and perfected their "art" (or is it science?) to produce planned cities, indistinguishable from the real thing, and when they have stopped congratulating themselves on how clever they have been, they may stop also to pause and wonder what exactly it is that they have gained by all that expenditure of effort.

M. H. Pritchard

Some implications of economic factors on land use planning

Land use planning has contained a noticeable bias toward the physical aspects of environment. "Physical planning" is a term often used but little understood in any specific way. At the outset I must make it quite clear that I have adopted a more liberal interpretation of the term than is usual. There are two reasons for this.

First, town planning (hereinafter referred to as planning) is often divided into economic, social and physical areas to the overall detriment of planning, in the past at least, because of the tremendous emphasis on physical planning. For example, even where planning has been undertaken for the highest social or economic reasons there has been a great concern, both in New Zealand and elsewhere, to further those aims by legislating for the control of the physical constituents of the city or town, the roads, parks, or the bulk and location of buildings, because these things are "easiest" to control.

A more specific example within the definition of physical planning would be the one where a predominantly social and economic problem, such as "slum" housing, is "solved" by redeveloping the physically decayed areas of cities with better structures. This type of policy not only shifts the cause of the problem elsewhere, it even affects the economics of the solution because the gain in housing stock will have to be offset against the

□ M. H. Pritchard, BSc, is a Senior Lecturer in Town Planning at the University of Auckland. This article is the text of a paper presented to a seminar on "Cost Benefit Analysis in Project Evaluation," held at the University of Waikato in November, 1967.

accelerated depreciation of other housing elsewhere in the city. It would not be unjust in this and similar situations to say "the plan of one generation becomes the social problem of the next" (1) or today's "benefit" becomes tomorrow's "cost."

Second, on a close analysis, such physical aspects of towns emerge as individual items which are the prime concern of others and only to a certain degree affect planning. This confusion of roles is probably the cause, for example, of the sometimes unjustified antagonism of the planner toward the motorway engineer. "So long as 'planning' can mean almost anything, planners can both use the approbation the concept brings and avoid the limitations imposed by any single designation of function." (2)

What follows will attempt to justify this more general interpretation and will, I hope, be of more assistance than a direct account of the use of cost benefit analysis in physical planning.

The relevance of cost benefit analysis

Cost benefit analysis, a useful technique when assessing a specific project such as a motorway, the construction of an office block or the subdivision of a piece of rural land for housing, may have little application in the formulation of general principles and techniques for the planning of a city or region.

It should be a sobering thought for many planners that no one has yet made a serious attempt to apply the principles of cost benefit analysis to planning itself. Certainly no planner-economist has shown whether we are accumulating any real benefit from planning as carried out at present, although some are beginning (3). Nor has anyone been able to convincingly calculate whether all the resources at present directed into the planning process would be better spent on something else.

The British new towns were one of the boldest attempts at physical planning and they are a success in that they are now self-sufficient units operating in much the same ways as any other town of 80,000 people. But have they merely replaced one set of social disadvantages with another — overcrowding for the "New Town Blues"? Serious doubt (4) has also been cast on their effect in halting the concentration of industrial development in the conurbations (5). Whether these doubts are justified or not the fact that an

objective answer is unlikely to be forthcoming is of great importance in assessing the value of planning action. Because the new towns exist we have no way of calculating what the situation would have been if the British government had done **nothing**, or if it had diverted the resources employed to build the new towns to, for example, a direct attack on the problems in the conurbations themselves.

It is all too easy to point out **after** planning action that the planners have paid little attention to the social or economic consequences of their actions, with the result that they have been forced to take further action when the economic (or social) consequences have become obvious (6). With a subject such as planning this is a risk that must be taken. The very failure to include such factors has been the major contribution to our realisation that they exist. The cost of our mistakes becomes the benefit of experience.

It is unlikely that planning will ever be more than an experimental discipline and its theories (which are the basis for those benefits thought essential at any given time) will change as and when the observed results fail to meet up to the current goals of the community doing the experimenting. In this context a better criticism might be that planning, as executed, has been such a haphazard experiment.

Any utilisation for planning purposes, of the technique of cost benefit analysis in major public or private works proposed for a city, will produce comparative figures for losses and gains, both private and social (in the sense of being incurred by all other persons as a result of the activity). But these comparative costs depend on an agreement as to what is to be measured.

In the case of urban sprawl it becomes quite unrealistic for the planner to compare the costs of providing a certain range of services — sealed roads, reticulated water and sewerage systems, rubbish collection, for example — in different situations because it seems that in the long run it is other factors gained and lost that count. In some cases we know what these are and they can be accounted in some way, but in most cases they are not identified until after the action has been taken, or, if they are known, there is no satisfactory way of accounting them in a convincing manner.

“We can never do merely one thing”

Because planning has as its task the responsibility for the development of the town as a whole, the single actions of individuals (whether they are private persons or private or public organisations) never function in isolation and set in train a series of adjustments. “The mythology of our time is built around the reciprocal dream — the dream of a highly specific agent which will do only one thing. The moral of the myth can be put in various ways. One: Wishing won’t make it so. Two: Every change has its price. Three: We can never do merely one thing” (7) This is surely saying one man’s cost is another man’s benefit. Until we know what these effects are we have no way of calculating the costs and benefits.

Analysis at this level of complexity and of this type must depend on a very accurate understanding of the inter-related systems that go to make up the town. We are probably not even on the edge of this problem. The concept of information for planning is paid little more than lip service by all but a few. This means that, to a large extent, we are working in the dark when either producing a planning scheme or trying to establish which criteria are to be considered when accounting the costs and benefits of a specific project. Even if a particular course of action is decided, such as the construction of a road along one of three alternative routes, the stage at which cost benefit analysis will be most useful to the planner is at the point when it is decided whether to build the road at all or spend the money on a park. It has been argued that if the social costs and benefits analysis is used for this purpose, “ethical and political opinion will enter into these pseudo-economic calculations” (8).

One way around this problem is that the “market,” whether economic, social or political, will soon correct any mistakes in the allocation of resources (9). There exists a system that is self-regulating and which will correct (in time) any deficiencies caused by individual actions. It is largely because of the social imperfections of this market that we now have planning. Economic forces left to themselves seem to produce situations which the social market attempts to correct.

Although cost benefit analysis applied to planning as a whole may not yet be possible, and in spite of the fact that economic considerations have found an expression in planning through largely physical controls, it is in the “economic” aspect

of planned development that there may be found the basis of a self-regulating mechanism through which towns might grow.

Costs in one sector which produce benefits in another sector must, where possible, be used to further planning goals. As far as the planner is concerned this is using “real” costs to produce “true” benefits. It is clear that planners need to know a lot more about linkage to be this clever; to learn how to manipulate the system; and, last but not least, to know in some detail what these goals should be.

In considering this last point, I will confine the discussion to those goals that are clearly economic in expressed intent, but carry implications of costs other than monetary ones.

The Town and Country Planning Act, 1953, clearly intends the goals to include economic matters: “District schemes shall provide for the development of the area to which they relate to promote and safeguard the health, safety and convenience and the **economic** and general welfare of the inhabitants.” It could be claimed that this is of no more help in deciding what factors are to be considered in assessing a proposed work than such high sounding phrases as “to the greatest good” or “the most economic use of land.”

However, the draft scheme statement included in the regulations is much more specific and therefore potentially of greater help:

“Future building and other development in the district will be so directed as —

- (a) To avoid the indiscriminate mixture of incompatible uses;
- (b) To economise in the servicing of the district;
- (c) To maintain the stability of individual property values;
- (d) To maintain and provide amenities appropriate to every locality; and
- (e) So far as it practicable to avoid the encroachment of urban uses upon land of high actual or potential value for the production of food.

“These objectives shall be secured as far as is possible by allocating particular areas or zones for compatible uses of land and buildings, by grouping future building and other development in the appropriate zone, and in some cases by securing compatibility by imposing special conditions.”

On the surface it is clear what items are to be considered in any analysis of development proposals or public works, and it is almost as clear that there is considerable potential for conflict, for example, between items (b) and (e). This has been the subject of considerable study which I shall not repeat here.

It would not be stretching the intention of the legislation to make the assumption that by "economic and general welfare" is meant "the greatest benefit at the least cost to the community."

Property values as a measure of success

Lean proposes that town planning is justified if it leads to the better use of land. Whether it does this can be determined by the value of land. "The only sensible question that the economist-planner can ask is which plan will lead to the most efficient use of an urban area, and therefore maximise aggregate land values" (10). This in effect says that the best way of assessing the benefit of planning lies in the operation of the market as it is reflected in the value placed upon land.

There is little doubt that the general forces operating in the urban areas to produce the pattern we see today are accessibility and availability. Both these have an undeniably high economic content. The "classical" planning argument is that planning the pattern of land uses in an area will lead to the more efficient use of land. The reply to this is, of course, "it depends on the plan."

It is not unnatural to seize upon the fact that, when planning a city, similar patterns of land uses have emerged for a very wide range of cities, both by size and country. It has been assumed that such a formal expression is a reflection of the **most efficient** arrangement. If this is so it will of course be **most economic** and therefore form the basis on which to construct the proposals for the future development of urban complexes. This point of view is justified by claiming that if it is not the best utilisation of resources and not in the public interest in a free society, the public will do something about it. The inadequacies of the market in this situation cannot be stressed too strongly (11). It has been the obsession with this expression of benefit accumulating from a very narrow range of the urban spectrum that has produced so many of the other costs that confront us. Not least of which is a growing resistance to planning.

Explanations of the pattern of land uses in city areas, from which value accrues through competition, can be summarised in the following general manner:

- (a) the functional interdependence of certain activities;
- (b) the profitability of clustering through the sharing of common or public facilities;
- (c) the need for special facilities such as a port;
- (d) prestige value from the right address;
- (e) similar rent paying ability, which equates with space requirements;
- (f) the exercise of controlled segregation of uses by planning;
- (g) miscellaneous factors such as inertia, historic accident or physical difficulties of the site. (12)

We are probably too anxious to regard patterns of land use expressed now as following some immutable law and therefore a guide to the future.

Although these patterns exist, we have no examples in New Zealand of attempts to assess the costs and benefits of the factors producing them to the development of the urban areas.

For example, the use of such assumptions as: that activities in the central area of a town or city attempt to find a location which maximises their need for an accessible central location; that around this central location there will be zones of decreasing accessibility and therefore decreasing land values; that this may in some cases lead to the clustering of uses in groups of similar activity type; to use these as a basis upon which to formulate planning proposals of an economic type, is to confuse opinion with knowledge. We do not know that such a physical expression of the distribution of uses is the most beneficial. Zoning of land in a way which perpetuates or encourages purely economic phenomena could produce social costs which, in "normal" — i.e., without planning — circumstances would have been prevented.

The danger in planning is to seize on such simplistic views and then use them as the basis for the production of plans — of whatever type.

The segregation straitjacket

The rigid segregationist policies of the present legislation are often supported on economic

grounds. Examples from the draft Scheme Statement, Town and Country Planning Regulations, 1960, are:

“Residential Zones . . . protect uses against detriment arising out of mingling of incompatible uses. Commercial zones shall as far as is possible provide continuity of shop frontages without the intrusion at street level of any other use which would tend to affect detrimentally the business or goods of retailers. . . . Industrial zones are intended to minimise interference of industry with other uses and within industrial areas to minimise interference of industries with one another. Industries will be grouped according to common characteristics and differences. . . .”

It is not hard to demonstrate that there are losses to the “whole” when a noxious industry is allowed to establish in a non-industrial area. In a commercial area it could lead to an adverse effect on the existing offices, reducing their profitability and therefore lowering the general values in the area.

Planners, slow to realise the means of segregating land uses by functional groups, have ignored a very basic point that the industry (in this case) wanted to locate there. It has been prevented from doing so by a form of monistic thinking that sees everything in terms of name generalisations. In doing this planners have taken an entirely negative attitude toward the economics of some urban situations. If such an industry were required to reduce its generated characteristics to a level where they conform to those of the area in which it wishes to locate, it will introduce more costs to the industrialist, but it will still leave him the **choice** of location. At the moment he is denied this for particularly narrow reasons. In the absence of any means of assessing the actual harm of such a course of action, we are only at the beginning of a problem which must concern all planners.

Finally I would like to return to a point made earlier — the need for information (particularly economic information) about the city if the planner is to control its development in a less self-conscious way than he is doing at the present.

I have discussed land use as being one of the key factors in assessing the goals and merits of planning schemes, yet we have only the crudest techniques in use to analyse the land use activities

that are carried on in urban areas. We only know in general terms a few of the characteristics generated by land use activities and we are **in no way** certain whether these are economically desirable or undesirable from a planning point of view. It is not relevant here to discuss what is planning, especially as there are almost as many views as there are planners. What should be clear is that some economic aspects that at present we know little about could be immensely important in producing improvements in the theory of the subject, and, because of this, those things that planners have considered important in the past and which have formed the basis for cost benefit analysis for various public works, may be far less important in the next few years.

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M. M. B. Latham

Lessons from Halifax, Nova Scotia

Part one

Halifax is a central city of about 85,000 people in a metropolitan area of about 200,000, located on Nova Scotia's south-east coast. Founded in 1749, the city was for two centuries a major sea-port for eastern Canada. The maritime provinces and Nova Scotia in particular have a rich cultural history which reaches back to great colonial battles between the British and the French, the residual influences of Quebec and Arcadian societies of the maritimes and the early colonisation of Boston and the New England states. Even today the economic and social links between Nova Scotia and New England are often stronger than those between Nova Scotia and other parts of Canada. Boston is much nearer Halifax than Montreal; New York is closer than Toronto.

Despite this rich heritage and the nearness of growing markets during this century, Halifax slipped into the past following the boom conditions during the 1939-45 war when the city was a major staging base for North Atlantic convoys. In the period after 1945 Halifax appeared to stand still, while the incredible surge of immigration, exploration and development overcame all of Canada.

The emergent crisis

Prior to 1955 Halifax was known only by descriptions that do not bear repetition. It was run down, worn out, dirty and tired. People did not live there; they got posted there. It was not until the early 1950s that the city began to reckon with its decadence. During those years a group of enlightened businessmen and citizens, in the best North American political spirit, set about studying the problems and recommending action to the city council. Nurtured in keen awareness of the effects of social deprivation and physical decay on large sections of the city, this group directed its activities essentially at one object — to get political recognition of, and action upon, the problems as they saw them.

The core of physical and social decay was then apparent, but not deeply appreciated. Alongside the northern end of the central business district was a nine-acre area crammed with two and three-storey timber frame box houses that were in turn filled with the human failures of the North American social and economic system. With 260 families this shanty town exhibited the highest crime

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rates, juvenile delinquency and fire response rates in the city. It also, as one would expect, had a high welfare commitment. Here is a representative example of the conditions being faced by families in this particular area:

"The family consisted of father, mother, grandfather and ten children, all of whom lived in four rooms, one of which was a kitchen. They shared a w.c. with nine other families." This family later moved to other accommodation where "they had a w.c. to themselves, but no bath. In this family the father, grandfather and one child have died of T.B. The second husband and three of the children now show positive T.B. patches. The father is unemployed a good part of the time and alcoholism and school attendance difficulties complicate the picture." (1)

A further, and in Canada, unique complication was the high incidence of third and fourth generation Negroes in several ghetto districts. Although only 2% of the city population, Negroes represented a much higher proportion than any other Canadian city. These people were early settlers who arrived well over a century ago and who probably escaped and migrated from the concentrations in the enslaved deep south of the United States. Their presence in Halifax never appeared as a major force in the drive for social and housing reform in the early 1950s, probably because their numbers were so small. This unfortunate minority did become a major influence during the early '60s on the wave of the Kennedy new-frontier administration in the United States. Their plight only then became the focus for a concern that had gone largely unnoticed by "decent" people for 100 years.

The objective of the original study group was reached in 1955 when Professor Gordon Stevenson, now of the University of Western Australia, but then at the University of Toronto, Ontario, was appointed by the city council to undertake a social and land use study of the worst sections of the city. These areas together made up the eastern slopes of the peninsula on which the city stands.

The Stevenson Report, published in 1957, isolated all of the worst problem areas and recommended twelve projects, ranging from a new development on unused land to full-scale clearance and redevelopment. Some of Stevenson's

projects were merged, some have long since been completed and some have never been begun. The programme set in motion by his study had, by 1966, exceeded a commitment of \$60,000,000 in the public and private sectors. All of these projects have or are contributing in dramatic fashion to the reformation of an old city. Other projects, initiated directly by private enterprise, bear varying relationships to the investments made in publicly sponsored renewal programmes.

Early action — the first mistakes

The process of moving the Stevenson recommendations from the table into reality was ironically eased by continuing incidences of delinquency, crime and tragic fires that were now being received by a much more aware public.

In Halifax, as in most places where social and physical urban renewal is necessary, it is the depth of the preceding crises which determines the extent of the ensuing action. In both North America and in Europe the early motivations of large scale urban renewal operations seem to have been the widespread sense of shame of existing social conditions, combined with the necessity to rebuild on war damaged sites or to replace obsolete buildings. It is only very recently that urban renewal and new development have taken on as urban ideals. A clear example is the development of downtown Montreal and the urban issues so clearly displayed by Habitat and Expo '67. (2)

The first urgent priority in Halifax was by 1956 alarmingly clear — decant the 1620 people in 260 families out of the worst of the downtown housing area into new public housing. A housing scheme was begun to provide 348 units in low and high blocks to accommodate those from this and other slums before razing those areas with the haste that only the burden of social conscience can impress upon the politicians who had for so long avoided the issue.

What happened in Mulgrave Park, this new housing estate finished in 1961, bears direct relationship to the social pressures which finally brought an end to the slums it replaced. Into Mulgrave Park were put, with little ceremony or explanation, several hundred families, many of whose standards of living were no match for the new and strange surroundings. Some of these people had not used baths and showers before. Many of them had never seen unmarked paint

and clean floors within their rooms. No attempt was made to achieve a social mix-in which the normal checks and balances that operate in a larger community would operate in this project to ease the behaviour of a social class that had for so long been under-privileged. It was not surprising that for a short time after initial occupation, prostitution, gambling and drinking were common activities.

While it was hardly the fault of the occupants, blame for these conditions cannot easily be laid at the door of the housing authority or the city council. Even had these problems been clearly foreseen by either of these bodies it is doubtful that correction would have met with acceptance at the political and social levels where pressure and, therefore, power was greatest. It would have meant rehousing at a slower rate and this would probably have been socially and politically untenable at the time. It is a natural condition of life that mistakes must be made in order that we learn, and had it not been for the mistakes made in early renewal projects at that time in North America, the quality of projects going up now would not have been achieved. Many writers, Jane Jacobs included, have failed to appreciate this point. (3)

Another mistake which falls into the same category of early errors in renewal was the repercussions of the project upon surrounding home owners. At that time the reaction of a white, middle class, home-owning neighbourhood to the acceptance of a low income, mixed race intrusion in a project of medium density (137 persons per acre) housing was, and largely still is, predictable in North America.

While doing their best to ignore the lowered status that Mulgrave Park and its early life bestowed upon an unwilling community, people in the vicinity had still to accept the reality even ten years later. The social stigma from an early urgency will take a generation or perhaps longer to remove. It is possible now in Halifax and in places facing similar problems to move more slowly and to act carefully to ease the transitions that urban renewal projects bring, but bearing in mind the social origin of Mulgrave Park, it could hardly have been possible to achieve the stated objectives of that slum clearance programme without upsetting both a transferred and a recipient community.

In Mulgrave Park the city learned a lesson and learned it well. With the initial pressure removed, the city showed by example that a new housing enclave could be grafted into the community more smoothly in different conditions. A later housing project, known as Westwood Park, besides being much better designed, was also significantly differently sited.

Westwood Park's 198 units were again accommodated in low rise and high rise blocks. The project's immediate neighbours are a long established army housing area, a beautifully landscaped park containing an old cemetery backing on to a railway and a number of poor quality two to four-storey walk-up apartment blocks with between eight and twelve units each. On the only boundary shared with single family dwellings, Westwood Park was separated from them by a wide boulevard.

The quality of the surroundings were such that almost any well designed housing project would, far from degrading the area, actually enrich the neighbourhood. Westwood Park was well designed and well landscaped. It was occupied by tenants who were carefully selected to represent the broadest income range possible in public housing of the type. The genuinely poor, whose rents were heavily subsidised, were neighbours to smaller families whose heads were in occupations like the police and fire services, transport and defence, and who were very nearly paying economic rents. As with Mulgrave Park, and as with all public housing in Canada, various races were not segregated.

The moderating effects of the siting of Westwood Park were probably fortuitous, but the attempt to balance the occupants was deliberate and successful. Altogether Westwood Park is a successful project of moderate size representative of the good average public housing standard that the federal government's urban renewal agency had designed and was achieving in the late fifties and early sixties.

With two major public housing projects by the early 1960s, together with earlier, smaller and scattered projects, the city, in partnership with federal and provincial governments, had expended about \$10 million to narrow the gap between supply and demand in low income housing. Now the focus on urban renewal began to shift back

to the vacant lands from where the programme had originated, but not before a new crisis loomed in the central business district.

To the urban fringe and back

In the late 1950s, after the clearance of the slum area adjoining the central business district, one of the city's two major department stores was wanting to expand. Its existing site on the main street of the CBD was hemmed in on both sides and acquisition of adjoining properties was not possible. A new site had therefore to be found. If any interest was expressed by this particular department store in the cleared area that interest was never seriously taken up by the city. In shopping around for a new site this department store seemed to be influenced by at least three considerations of major importance. They were:

- (1) A mail order house which was part of the Canadian branch of the Sears Roebuck chain in the United States had been established on the isthmus of the Halifax Peninsula since 1919. Simpson Sears expanded gradually, so that by the late 1950s they were established as the largest and best, although isolated, department store in the region.
- (2) The department store seeking a new site was also part of a national chain, Eatons Ltd., and was therefore inclined to be attracted to the market place enjoyed by its major competitor.
- (3) The vogue at the time was for large suburban shopping centres to be created, with a major department store, junior department store and a major supermarket as prime tenants, with a varying number of smaller stores along the mall in between.

These influences all combined at the time Eatons began searching for a new site. Out of this search a large Canadian development company, Webb & Napp Ltd., put together the Halifax Shopping Centre, which now contains a total of about 600,000 square feet of gross retail and associated floor space developed in the classic suburban shopping centre concept.

The Halifax Shopping Centre is an enclosed mall development with Eatons 150,000 square feet as the major department store, a 30,000 square foot junior store, some smaller shops, a major food market, with office above and a bowling

alley below — all surrounded by more than 2200 parking spaces. Together with the Simpson Sears complex and a much earlier open shopping centre less than half a mile away, the isthmus contained by 1961 more than 530,000 square feet of net retail space, compared with 300,000 square feet net in the CBD, and thus was the dominant shopping centre in the metropolitan region. It was interesting to note that apart from the Simpson Sears operation, much of the space rented by shops in the new centres was taken by branches of existing downtown stores or by transfers of locations of those stores. This fact significantly reduced any opposition to the move of retailing from downtown to the suburban fringe, which might have been a factor in retaining a core of retailing in the CBD.

At the time it looked as if the public, that is the consumer, was going to gain very considerably from this shift in retailing location and that the centre city would survive in other ways. Even if the case against the Halifax Shopping Centre had been arguable in hard factual terms it is now quite apparent that the argument could not have succeeded against the fashionable trends of retailing at that stage and against the almost total inability of a city government to pay for and take those acts which were necessary to retain environmental quality for shopping in the downtown area. Besides there were probably more planners and developers who favoured moving shopping to suburban centres in the late 1950s than there were favouring renewal of the downtown area.

This matter may not have been so serious in a metropolitan area with a high population and housing expansion growth rate, or at least a high growth rate in disposable income. Halifax measured very considerably below the rates of growth enjoyed in other metropolitan areas of the country. Therefore the shift in retail location was, in effect, a complete move which milked the downtown area of its retail strength.

The first modern multi-storey serviced apartment appearing in the general vicinity of the several suburban shopping centres and the first signs of movement of office space out of the CBD also began to appear at this time. (4) The stage was set in the most unfavourable conditions possible for an attempt to renew the CBD by seeking imaginative, large-scale redevelopment

proposals on the old slum clearance site.

In his report which had predated the massive movement of major retail establishments Professor Stevenson produced a scheme plan for the reuse of the slum clearance area in a more or less conventional lay-out of commercial uses, realigned streets, off-street parking, a waterfront green space and so forth. This schematic diagram was representative of its time and was meant to serve merely as an indication of the kind of reuse to which the land should be put. (5)

Using this as a guide and in the middle of the building of the Halifax Shopping Centre, the city devised a method together with its federal partners of calling for development proposals from private companies or a consortium of companies on the downtown central redevelopment area, which had grown over the years from its original nine acres to seventeen acres. This procedure is now common practice in large renewal programmes or new development projects and has been followed in at least two New Zealand situations.

The call for proposals issued in Halifax was not the first of its type, but was the earliest of its kind in Canada. Its various sections included planning and design standards as well as proforma lease and agreement documents. Judgment of projects submitted was to rest on four bases which were then sound and which remain sound now. These were:

- (1) The quality and excellence of planning and design.
- (2) The expected tax return (rates).
- (3) The prospective financial success of the proposal.
- (4) The land rental return. (Freehold was to remain with the partnership.)

Each of these qualities was to carry equal importance.

The call went out internationally in mid-1962. Only one proposal was submitted. It was an exercise in grandiose design and it became a spectacular failure.

The story of its demise is a story on its own, but the political in-fighting that developed from it and the well-intentioned efforts to keep it alive during two years of negotiation warrant a brief summary here.

The original submission proposed a complex of large (30 to 40-storey) buildings, together with vast commercial developments amounting to a total of about \$50,000,000. It was submitted by an English entrepreneur through a group of developers whose experience in the field was unknown to the partnership. The partnership rejected the proposal for many reasons, but mostly because it was too massive, not architecturally acceptable and failed to integrate existing development in the CBD.

The developer accepted the partnership's rejection of the initial proposal and requested time in which to prepare a revision. As no other developers had indicated an interest, the partnership agreed to this request on condition that the developer would employ architects and planners capable of producing a well designed scheme and supply proof of ability to proceed within certain specified time limitations.

Subsequently the Edinburgh firm of Sir Robert Matthew and Percy Johnston Marshall prepared a new smaller proposal which became known as Cornwallis Centre. Judged from a planning and architectural viewpoint the scheme did look successful and did indeed seem capable of financial realisation. The partnership responded with an approval of the second submission, subject only to the developer providing adequate assurance that he could proceed in accordance with the lease and agreement documents.

Sadly, the mixed commercial and residential Cornwallis Centre, which would have been such a superb acquisition for the city, was also to slip into the bottomless pit of unrealised projects. The developer was unable to meet his commitments and the agreement lapsed. There were many reasons for the death of the Cornwallis Centre, but perhaps the following four were among the most important. Briefly they might be summarised as follows:

- (1) Throughout a long period of negotiation Halifax remained suspicious of a foreign company and foreign financial backing, that was to be raised by undeclared methods on an international market.
- (2) The issue inevitably split the city council because it had dragged for so long. It is part of the nature of North American politics to

debate issues in the open with no holds barred. This particular fight became unpleasant, even vicious. Calculated destruction of an ideal quickly turned into a weapon in the hands of people whom some would term political opportunists and others unscrupulous.

- (3) The English company had virtually no real contact with or understanding of the city in which it had elected to become so deeply involved. A project with a \$35,000,000 price tag calls for more than the odd trans-Atlantic visit from directors and financiers.
- (4) The political atmosphere finally boiled to the point where any remaining chances of suitable financing were wholly withdrawn by those financiers who were known to be possibly interested. This was a case of a city government being almost completely unaware of the extent to which its relative political stability could attract or detract from financial investment.

With the death of Cornwallis Centre the city sank into the depths of depression in that field of commercial renewal under public sponsorship. New public housing and private apartment building continued apace and the shopping centres continued their competitive attack upon the suburban consumer's disposable income.

During this period from late 1964 through 1965 the partnership engaged the services of a consultant firm to undertake an economic analysis of the CBD in the hope of establishing whether or not the central redevelopment area could accept a project of the size that had previously been envisaged. (6) This analysis did help in clarifying the development potential of the CBD, but failed to predict the possibility of attracting a major retail component in any new development project downtown. Cornwallis Centre had envisaged about 600,000 square feet of gross space — about the size of the Halifax Shopping Centre. The basis of the economic analysis was subject to considerable doubt from the partnership and largely because of this doubt the partnership again decided to go to the market place when the time seemed right.

This decision was not taken without the background knowledge that conditions had changed during the preceding five years and that a real

threat emerged as the implications of a city centre without shopping vitality became clear. The real chance of declining central area property values and the possible return to a state of third class membership among Canadian cities was enough to fire the conscience of reticent Nova Scotians who then took up the challenge of the central redevelopment area.

The second call for proposals issued by the partnership was in fact a response to an announcement from a select group of Nova Scotians, all crusty, all rich, all sceptical and cautious with their millions. This group had at last recognised that the old home town needed a little assistance. With remarkably little effort the fine old gentlemen of the Halifax Club assured the community of access to the financial and other resources required if an invitation to develop were issued.

The atmosphere in the city changed instantly. If one group of Nova Scotians could attempt it, why not another, and if two, why not a third? The partnership issued its second call for proposals and received three projects in reply.

These three proposals received in March, 1966, were subjected to an exhaustive study by a joint committee consisting of officials from the federal agency and the city. Competition judgment is difficult at the best of times, but when two teams are each making independent judgments in an attempt to produce a unanimous decision to two superiors, one a local council and the other a federal corporation, each of which has distinctive views anyway, the stage was set for miniature war games of intense interest to the participants.

The city's view had long been that a big retail component was essential to uplift the tone of retailing in the CBD. The Federal Renewal Agency on the other hand took the view that too much space would saturate rather than catalyse CBD retailing. The winning scheme had planned 291,000 square feet of retail space, so in the delightful game of face saving, everyone, city, federal agency, economic consultant and developer, were all able to say each was right about the amount planned.

A joint staff report was finally hammered out and submitted in the middle of April, 1966, but only after a compromise on the methods of judgment and a deep conviction on the part of each

team that the other side didn't know what it was talking about anyway.

The joint staff report was duly approved by the various agencies and Scotia Square, the product of the group who set off the second call, came into being. At this stage a series of events followed which we had predicted, but knew we would be unable to control.

The development company's first action on the site was to install a tough team of real estate men, site engineers, project management executives and legal advisers.

The company's second action was to fire the outstanding firm of American architects and planning consultants, Carl Koch of Boston in association with David Crane of the University of Pennsylvania, as project consultants, in favour of a Toronto firm of development oriented production architects.

The company's third action was to take up immediately with the city the necessarily large area of unresolved technical and financial detail in a series of hard meetings among all parties — federal, provincial, city and private — to the project.

By this stage at mid-1966 the company's relative strength and the local authority's relative weakness were both abundantly clear. The company had set objectives, staged programmes, CPM procedures and a uniform drive to achieve a completed and profitable project. It could not accomplish its aims alone. The city's responsibilities for services, relocation of businesses still existing on site and further project land acquisition had to be dovetailed to the company's programme. Federal government had to be committed to cost sharing agreements and various negotiations had to go on with the province before the city could act on many of these matters.

Construction of Scotia Square was now a real, urgent and complex operation. The original site had grown to 23 acres with new highways, etc., all important to the project. There should have been a working understanding and mutual drive to move obstacles of concern to all the parties. Instead, fragmentation seriously threatened the initial building operation and caused needless ill-feeling between public and private parties. The city seemed unable to resolve internal rows over departmental responsibility for various sections of the work it had to do. The federal government

seemed to move at snail's pace through the round-about manoeuvres in deals on cost sharing agreements.

Naturally, through all these difficulties much of the original quality of the project suffered. Final designs for the first building (which is now completed) showed up the compromises and substitutions that always seem to follow in the wake of presentation models and drawings. In this the company itself must take most of the responsibility. It sought and won rights to a project on a scheme it could not afford to implement without an accumulation of detailed changes, the net effect of which will be to lower the quality of the entire design. In a system of competitive bidding in which judgment is passed in good faith, even if accompanied by scepticism, this kind of result is probably inevitable.

The fact remains, and this surely is all that really counts, that Scotia Square will place more than \$32 million worth of new development into a central area, along with a pump priming hand-out of \$12,500,000 of public money. All this will stand where a few hundred thousand dollars of rotten building stood before.

By the end of 1966 some of Scotia Square's marginal effects were already becoming clear. Speculation on nearby property was beginning to raise values and one proposal had even then been designed for a complete block redevelopment adjoining the most important corner of the Scotia Square proposal.

The city had come full circle. It had watched and apparently encouraged formation of three large shopping centres on its western fringe, less than three miles from downtown. The last of these swung the retail balance from the downtown area to the suburbs in a metropolitan area of 200,000 people. The city had then faced the cost — estimated at between \$1 million and \$2 million over the years — for the creation of new arterial streets linking these fringe centres, and their continued widening, extension and traffic management.

Despite all of the exodus of retail uses, or problems because of it, the city once again engaged in the intricate financial acrobatics to revitalise the downtown core.

There can be no doubt now that it was a mistake to allow a retail exodus to the suburbs on such a huge scale. At the same time I am sure that little could have been done to avoid it by

direct negation of those suburban proposals. Where the city did fail was in not keeping the downtown sufficiently alive and attractive to merchants.

In some cities and metropolitan areas it may be difficult or untimely to attempt to rectify some or all of these inbuilt inefficiencies in a central area. A fragmented physical form, very large areal spread and weak downtown organisation all assist suburban shopping centre development. Even here though I am doubtful that CBD's are unable to rebuild to meet demands that up to now have been partially solved by partial decentralisation. In smaller cities and metropolitan areas large suburban operations seem often more fashionable than lasting, and in bigger places such as Montreal, Toronto and now Sydney, it is downtown where the real excitement is.

(to be continued)

Notes:

- 1 A Redevelopment Study of Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1957, Gordon Stevenson, p. 34. City of Halifax, 1957.
- 2 It will be interesting to see if renewal in New Zealand cities is slowed by the relative newness of our buildings, the relevant absence of bad housing, ethnic ghettos and poverty, as well as almost complete lack of appreciation in the nation's political leadership of an urbane environment as a social goal.
- 3 Jane Jacob's denunciation of the Boston West End redevelopment was shared by a political and administrative team who later came together under Mayor Collins and Edward Logue. Since the Boston Redevelopment Authority has been in operation the mistakes learned from previous amateurish attempts at social and physical renewal have been carefully avoided. All that has happened since has not been successful, but Boston's accomplishments relate directly to early failures.
- 4 At the time of planning the Halifax shopping centre a short cul de sac street nearby became quickly built up with seven separate apartment buildings containing more than 450 units in total. It is doubtful that this street would have accumulated so many apartments so quickly had the retail shift been less intensive or abandoned. Other sites around the centres have since attracted apartment development.
- 5 A Redevelopment Study of Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1957, Gordon Stevenson. pp. 60, 61. City of Halifax, 1957.
- 6 CBD Economic Analysis for Redevelopment Planning, Canadian Urban Economics Limited (a division of Larry Smith & Company Limited), June, 1965. 75 pp., maps, tables, Toronto.

FACT & OPINION

(cont. from page 10).

what, in its opinion, should be. It has accepted that moves towards greater sensitivity in zoning mean greater complexity of defining and confining text. But this is not the occasion to comment at length upon the scheme, merely to draw attention again to it. Auckland City is to be congratulated for its brave attempt to break new ground. Other local authorities are urged to look at such examples as this offers when seeking for help in their own work. It would be a far more useful expenditure of time than any attempt to discern some relevance in the comparable sections of the Town and Country Planning Regulations.

In search of an audience

The Planning Division of the Auckland Regional Authority has just produced a handsome report of some 60 pages entitled "Development in The Auckland Region: A Summary." Its aim is threefold: to provide a concise statement of the major points arising out of the extensive survey data published during 1967; to help to identify the factors which need to be translated into aims and policies to guide regional development; to clarify which matters fall within the planning process and the level of government responsible for their consideration and implementation.

The Regional Authority, like the Regional Authority before it, has been inexplicably difficult in informing the public of its functions and its aspirations. But support will only follow from knowledge and a populace kept largely in ignorance is all too easily stirred into hostility when monetary demands are made upon it without an adequately prepared foundation of explanation.


The Regional Authority is a vital institution in the process of guiding, regulating and implementing aspects of Auckland's future growth. It is the essential coordinating link between central government and the counties and municipalities. It is not a luxury, but a necessity. It would find its task made a great deal easier if it were to develop sufficient confidence in its role to call again and again upon the range of public mass media to advertise its achievements and its potential.

May this report mark the end of the era of the cyclostyled sheet and the hesitancy of purpose that it so often implied.

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Correspondence

The cost of commuting in Auckland

Sir,

Professor Dahms' most recent article (TPQ 12) sets a high standard of systematic analysis to advance fresh knowledge of the intricate mosaic of commuting, and I was fascinated by the logic that a girl who wants to attract a lift would be well advised to live in a middle to upper income area.

If a student might be permitted to comment, I would just note in the main theme that no mention is made of the cost of **parking** a car, which would of course need to be added before considering the costs of central business area commuters.

In Wellington it is not uncommon for such commuters to pay \$1 per week for a car park which, if typical of corresponding Aucklanders, would increase the quoted "minimum running costs" per mile two to three times, depending on travel distance and size of car. On this particular basis, the "critics" of car commuting would presumably be correct that "public passenger transport is clearly a less expensive mode of travel than the private car."

I must confess that I am guilty of applying the word "commuters" particularly to workers in the central business area and this may be the real misconception of the critics.

—M. E. Jones (Wellington)

TOWN PLANNERS

PROSPECTS OF FUTURE PARTNERSHIP

Applications are invited for town planning work in a private consultant's office in Christchurch in which there are prospects of a future partnership. The practice includes a New Zealand-wide variety of private development work, applications and appeals, together with the preparation and administration of district planning schemes for three boroughs and eight counties in Canterbury and the West Coast.

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DEPUTY CHIEF PLANNER

The Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, as the Authority responsible for the metropolitan town planning scheme for Melbourne, Australia, invites applications for appointment as Deputy Chief Planner.

The position, vacant as a result of the retirement of the Deputy Chief Planner, offers a challenging opportunity to senior Town Planners as the metropolitan planning area has recently been trebled in size to now embrace approximately 1942 square miles, with a present population of 2½ millions, which is expected to increase to 5 millions by the turn of the century.

SALARY: \$A10,298 to \$A10,539 per annum.

DUTIES: To assist the Chief Planner in the administration of the Planning and Highways Branch of the Board, to act as the Chief Planner in all matters in his absence, and to carry out such other duties as may be required.

QUALIFICATIONS: Applicants must have had extensive experience in a senior capacity in a town planning office, particularly in the preparation and administration of a Planning Scheme or Interim Development Order.

The holding of an appropriate tertiary qualification would be preferable.

Conditions of employment include three weeks' annual leave, liberal sick and long service leave, and superannuation benefits.

Reasonable travel and removal expenses will be met by the Board.

Applications in writing, setting out personal particulars, including age, tertiary qualifications and experience, should be forwarded to reach the Personnel Manager at the Board's Head Office, 110 Spencer Street, Melbourne, Victoria, 3001, Australia, not later than **30th September, 1968.**

How to Understand an Act of Parliament, by K. H. Gifford.

New Zealand Edition (Wellington; Sweet & Maxwell, 1967). Paperback, pp. 98. \$3.

Kenneth Gifford, QC, is a man of considerable energy who will be especially known to readers of this journal for his editorship of *The Town Planning and Local Government Guide*.

He writes clearly and concisely and his penchant for citing the oddities of early law often adds the spice of entertainment to the pudding of instruction.

The stated object of the present book is "to set out as simply as possible the basic rules that the courts have laid down for the readings of acts of parliament," and the style of writing adopted on this occasion suggests that the author has as much in mind an audience of senior secondary school pupils as he does the older lay students of government intent and legal interpretation. Be that as it may, the book is a good example of modest ambition, modestly achieved. Regrettably, it is overpriced.

It explains the functions served by the various parts of an act of parliament and then sets out the guide lines which

should always be followed in any attempt to extract their meaning. It sympathises with the task of the law draughtsmen and emphasises that exercises in the written communication of intent are a highly skilled art.

Any person involved with legislation should be familiar with the ground covered by the book and I believe that the smaller local government offices in particular would find it a useful companion to such documents as their well-thumbed copies of the Municipal Corporations Act or the Counties Act, the Public Works Act and the Town and Country Planning Act.

—J. R. Dart

Institute affairs

MEMBERSHIP

The following have been elected to membership:

W. H. Barker, DipTP, MNZIS
F. S. Robinson, DipTP
R. G. Stroud, DipTP, MNZIS

New Student Members

A. L. Withy

RECENT MOVEMENTS

I. E. Boileau, MA (Cantab),
PhD (Manchester), TPDip
(Lond), MTPI, FAPI, appointed
as Professor of Town

★ APPOINTMENTS OFFERED

TOWN PLANNERS

MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA

The Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, the Town Planning Authority for Melbourne, Australia, has a planning area which was recently trebled to 1942 square miles, with a present population of 2½ millions, which is expected to increase to 5 millions by the turn of the century.

As a result of a reorganisation of the Town Planning staff, senior planning appointments are now available within the Board's service and applications are invited for the following positions in the salary ranges shown, viz:

SALARY RANGE: \$A8519 to \$A8728 per annum.

SUPERVISING PLANNER — RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT

SUPERVISING PLANNER — SCHEME CONTROL

SALARY RANGE: \$A7375 to \$A7584 per annum.

ASSISTANT SUPERVISING PLANNER —
DEVELOPMENT

ASSISTANT SUPERVISING PLANNER —
RESEARCH

DISTRICT SCHEME CONTROLLERS
(several vacancies)

SALARY RANGE: \$A6854 to \$A7063 per annum.

SENIOR RESEARCH OFFICER
SENIOR PLANNERS (several vacancies)

SALARY RANGE: \$A5507 to \$A6204 per annum.

PLANNING OFFICERS (several vacancies)

QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS — ALL POSITIONS:

Applicants must hold suitable qualifications of a recognised Degree or Diploma standard in Physical or Social Sciences, and must have had substantial practical experience with a Town Planning Authority.

Conditions of employment include three weeks' annual leave, liberal sick and long service leave and superannuation benefits.

Reasonable travel and removal expenses will be met by the Board.

Applications in writing, setting out personal particulars, including age, tertiary qualifications and experience, should be forwarded to reach the Personnel Manager at the Board's Head Office, 110 Spencer Street, Melbourne, Victoria, 3001, Australia, not later than **30th September, 1968.**

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Planning, University of Auckland (see editorial comment).

K. V. Clarke, BEstMan (Lond), DipTP (M), formerly head of the Town Planning Division of the Wellington City Council's Department of Works and Planning, has been appointed City Planner in a reshuffle of the city's senior administrative hierarchy. He now heads one of the four divisions which will have direct access to council.


I. G. Dudding, AMTPI (M), promoted to Assistant Director of Housing, Ministry of Works, Wellington.

T. W. Fookes, MA (Hons), resigned as Planning Officer with the Auckland City Council to take up a scholarship at the Centre of Ekistics, Athens, Greece.

D. R. Hall, LLB (NZ), from Investigating Officer, Town and Country Branch, Ministry of Works, to Lecturer, Town Planning Department, University of Auckland.

G. G. Macfarlane, DipTP, MNZIS, promoted to Chief Town Planning Officer, Auckland City Council.

O. McShane, BArch, DipTP, resigned as Planning Officer with the Auckland City Council to begin the two-year Master's Degree course in City and Regional Planning at Berkeley, California.



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
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Sensitivity of levels	10"/2 mm	Drum unit (D. U.)	~ 1"
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