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New Zealand Yearbook of International Law |
Last Updated: 7 February 2019
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES IN EARLY CONFIRMATION DECISIONS OF PRE-TRIAL CHAMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Roger S.
Clark[∗]
I. INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
provides for the creation of ‘Elements of Crimes [which] shall
assist the
Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8 [of the
Statute].’[1] Ultimate control
over the consistency of The Elements with the provisions of the Statute (and
hence their validity) lies with the
Court. Paragraph 3 of the Statute thus
provides: ‘[t]he Elements of Crimes and amendments thereto shall be
consistent with
this Statute.’ Article 9 was adopted in Rome at the
insistence of the United States over the scepticism of most of the remainder
of
the participants in the negotiation. In practice, however, the drafting of The
Elements in the Preparatory Commission for the
Court[2] provided a useful opportunity
for clarification of many of the offence definitions in the Statute. Perhaps
more importantly, it formed
an opportunity for understanding how the General
Principles found in Part III of the Statute, notably Article 30 which is headed
‘mental element,’ play out in individual instances. How the ICC
itself deals with Article 30 and The Elements is of particular
interest in New
Zealand since Article 30 is one of the provisions of the Statute which is said
to ‘apply, with any necessary
modifications’ to prosecutions under
the New Zealand Criminal Court
Statute.[3] Moreover, in such
prosecutions, a New Zealand court ‘may have regard to any elements of
crimes adopted or amended in accordance
with article 9 of the
Statute.’[4]
The present
comment, after a few general remarks about the nature and structure of The
Elements, offers some thoughts about the remarkable
ways in which Pre-Trial
Chambers have been using the Elements to ‘assist’ the analysis in
confirmation proceedings. (Confirmation
proceedings represent the determination
that there are sufficient grounds to proceed to a trial.) This is particularly
the situation
with Pre-Trial Chamber I in the cases from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo of Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo[5] and of Germain Katanga &
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,[6] and
Pre-Trial Chamber II in the case of Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo[7] (Central African Republic).
As one who was involved in the drafting of The Elements, I found it very
heartening to see the product being used in a manner which
is central to the way
the Chambers have been going about their tasks. I shall, however, note some ways
in which Pre-Trial Chamber
I has, I believe, departed from the structure of the
Statute and Elements. In one respect (ultimately not shared by all its judges)
this is on substantive grounds, namely in contemplating responsibility based on
dolus eventualis/recklessness which is inconsistent with both the Statute
and its preparatory work. In other respects it is in terms of terminology
in
articulating the elements of the relevant offenses; the judges of Pre-Trial
Chamber I have often ignored the language of the
Statute which uses the terms
‘mental’ and ‘material’ elements, speaking instead in a
confusing manner of
‘subjective’ and objective’ elements. The
essential concepts may be the same, but ignoring the treaty language
and using
other modes of analysis carries with it a grave risk of picking up other baggage
that the drafters of the treaty had not
sought. Pre-Trial Chamber II has,
however, hewed much closer to the analysis in the Rome Statute and The Elements.
The early decisions have also found it necessary to address a matter
involving elements of crimes not dealt with by the Preparatory
Commission when
drafting The Elements, namely how to articulate the various modes of complicity
in crimes, including those dealt
with in Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute.
Part II of this Article recaps the conceptual framework of the Rome Statute,
in particular its notions of ‘mental’ and
‘material’
elements, and how this played out in drafting The Elements. Part III discusses
the pre-trial decisions from
two perspectives. The first part of it discusses
the use (and sometimes mis-use) of the concepts of mental and material elements.
The second part discusses ‘secondary’ parties and modes of
participation and the Chambers’ efforts to articulate
appropriate elements
here.
In view of the interesting structural use to which The Elements are put
in the so-called ‘In-Depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory
Evidence’ contained in the Annex to the Bemba Gombo Chamber’s
November 2008 decision concerning a Chart of Incriminatory
Evidence,[8] I have included that
Annex as an appendix to this note. It speaks for itself in providing a framework
for the organization of evidence
along the lines of The Elements!
II. MENTAL AND MATERIAL (PHYSICAL) ELEMENTS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Breaking ‘a crime’ or ‘guilt’ into physical (or
‘material’) components and mental (or ‘culpability’)
components provides a structure for pedagogy and for analysis for judges and
juries.[9] It also offers a
framework for some policy decisions on what kinds of culpability are appropriate
in the relevant context, in this
instance the ‘most serious crimes of
concern to the international community as a
whole.’[10] Since the
negotiations on both the general part of the Rome Statute and The Elements
proceeded on a basis of ‘consensus’
and nothing was ever forced to a
vote, one cannot be sure of the ultimate positions of particular States, other
than that they agreed
to ‘live with’ the results. My understanding
of the terms of this debate, however, was that most of the players did not
want
any of the crimes to involve strict liability; they were generally uncomfortable
with negligence-based liability;[11]
they were generally uncomfortable with liability based on recklessness or its
civil law (near) counterpart dolus
eventualis.[12] What they could
agree upon was a default rule in Article 30 of the
Statute[13] that ‘unless
otherwise provided’[14] the
‘material elements’[15]
had to be committed ‘with intent and
knowledge.’[16] For purposes
of the Article, a person was said to have ‘intent’ where (a) in
relation to conduct, that person means to
engage in the conduct; and (b) in
relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is
aware that it will
occur in the normal course of
events.[17] ‘Knowledge’,
for the purpose of the article ‘means awareness that a circumstance exists
or a consequence will occur
in the ordinary course of
events.’[18] In the next
paragraphs, I explain how the mental elements, at least as a default rule, got
stripped down to intent and knowledge,
as defined.
For our purposes, the
story begins in the General Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court which met in 1995 to examine
the draft Statute proposed by the International
Law Commission the previous
year. The ILC Draft did not include a general part and a Working Group of the
Ad Hoc Committee suggested a number of issues that ought to be
considered, in the expectation that there should be such a general part.
These
included, under the heading ‘mens rea’:
The
Ad Hoc Committee was succeeded in 1996 by the Preparatory Committee on
the Court. It produced a massive compilation of concrete proposals
that had
been made formally in the course of the discussion (because of its size, it was
known affectionately by the participants
as ‘The Phone Book’). In
addition to language on intent and knowledge that provided the basis for what
became Article
30, the proposals included a bracketed proposal as
follows:
[4. For the purposes of this Statute and unless otherwise provided, where this Statute provides that a crime may be committed recklessly, a person is reckless with respect to a circumstance or a consequence if:
(a) The person is aware of a risk that the circumstance exists or that the consequence will occur;
(b) The person is aware that the risk is highly unreasonable to take; [and]
(c) The person is indifferent to the possibility that the circumstance exists or that the consequence will occur.][20]
A ‘Note’ that followed this language in the Compilation,
stated, in relevant part:
The concepts of recklessness and dolus eventualis should be further considered in view of the seriousness of the crimes considered.
Therefore, paragraph 4 would provide a definition of ‘recklessness’, to be used only where the Statute explicitly provides that a specific crime or element may be committed recklessly. In all situations, the general rule, as stated in paragraph 1, is that crimes must be committed intentionally and knowingly.[21]
This was the last time that the words dolus eventualis appear in
any draft. It seems quite clear that the participants thought they were subsumed
into the discussion of recklessness. The
bracketed provision on recklessness,
however, continued in each of the subsequent drafts leading up to Rome, in
1997,[22] early in
1998,[23] and in April of that
year.[24]
The only thing to
emerge clearly from the discussions at Rome was that the definition of
recklessness was deleted when it was concluded
that it was redundant, the term
not appearing anywhere in the special part to which the definition could be
applied.[25] No further attempt to
introduce dolus eventualis appeared – I have no doubt that it went
into outer darkness along with recklessness.
Exactly what fits into the
ultimate category of ‘material elements’ in the Statute has to be
inferred from the definitions
of mental elements that are contained in Article
30 of the Statute, since each of those mental elements has some reference to a
material
element in its definition. In the preparations before Rome, an effort
was made to define what was meant by the physical element.
The draft that
came forward from New York[26] was
headed ‘Actus reus (act and/or omission).’ It did not
cover the whole field of what we normally think of in respect of physical or
material elements of a crime, being concerned
primarily with whether there could
be responsibility for omissions as well as acts, when that might be (when there
was a duty) and
with articulating some notions of causation as
attribution.[27] This part of the
drafting effort was abandoned in Rome, apparently as ‘too
difficult.’[28] Hence the need
to infer, from the definitions of the mental element in Article 30, a conceptual
structure for what now became ‘material
elements’. Notice that
Article 30 speaks of ‘conduct’ (in defining ‘intent’) of
‘a consequence’
(in defining both ‘intent’ and
‘knowledge’) and of ‘a
circumstance’[29] (in defining
‘knowledge’). While they are not defined further, conduct,
consequences and circumstances are a serviceable
set of categories for purposes
of analysis. The drafters of The Elements of Crimes ultimately adopted this
framework – as they
concluded the Statute required. Paragraph 7 of the
General Introduction to the Elements reads:
[30]
The elements of crimes are generally structured in accordance with the following principles:
As the elements of crimes focus on the conduct, consequences and circumstances associated with each crime, they are generally listed in that order;
When required, a particular mental element is listed after the affected
conduct, consequence or circumstance;
Contextual circumstances are listed
last.
This left causation, the subject of much discussion pre-Rome,
somewhere in limbo. Probably most of the participants saw it as included
(at
least implicitly) in either conduct or consequences; some perhaps saw it as an
extra category that could safely be left for another
day.[31]
III. THE PRE-TRIAL DECISIONS
A. Material and mental elements, alias objective and subjective ones
There is some thoughtful, but far from definitive, discussion of aspects
of Article 30 in the first reasoned opinion from the Court
on substantive
matters, the Lubanga Confirmation
decision.[32] Lubanga Dyilo was
charged (in what is a remarkably sparse set of charges for an international
court) with the war crimes of conscripting
and enlisting children under the age
of fifteen into an armed group and using them to participate actively in
hostilities.[33] He was alleged to
be connected to the crimes as a
‘co-perpetrator.’[34]
The Pre-Trial Chamber found it necessary to traverse the elements of the crimes
charged. In what seems to be a lapse into the Judges’
national modes of
thinking, the Chamber assumes, in significant parts of the argument, that a
crime can be described in terms of
‘objective’ and
‘subjective’
elements.[35] I think that
‘objective’ elements are what the Statute describes as
‘material’ and ‘subjective’
ones are those the Statute
terms ‘mental,’ but the Chamber does not explain its assumptions and
they may, in fact, be
different
ones.[36]
Going fairly directly
to The Elements, the Pre-Trial Chamber, after discussing some preliminary and
procedural matters, has a lengthy
part of its judgment (Part IV) devoted to what
it calls ‘Material Elements of the
Crime.’[37] The Chamber does
not explain in this part of the Decision what it means by ‘material’
in this Part, but the usage is
not inconsistent with the usage in Article 30 of
the Statute – later in the decision, the Chamber lost track of the
usage,[38] as it did again in the
Katanga/Ngudjolo decision.[39] Here,
the Chamber first discusses the existence and nature of the armed conflict
(international or non-international) in the area
involved, turns to an
examination of the ‘existence of the offence’ under the two relevant
provisions of the Statute,
analyzes the elements of the crimes, using precisely
the language of The Elements. It then concludes the Part with a discussion
of
the nexus between the armed conflict and the alleged
crimes.[40] The Elements, in short,
are well in the foreground of the reasoning.
It is when it moves to another
part of its judgment, Part VI on ‘Criminal Responsibility’, that the
Chamber moves away
from the structure of the Statute. I deal later in this note
with the question of the liability of different participants in criminal
activities; here the focus is on mental elements. The discussion of what the
Chamber calls ‘subjective’ elements of the
‘crime in
question’ (which the Chamber believes must be shared with other
co-perpetrators)[41] is interesting
but contains some doubtful assumptions. Apparently meaning to offer an
interpretation of Article 30’s references
to intent and knowledge, the
Chamber says that this entails a ‘volitional
element.’[42] This
‘encompasses, first and foremost, those situations in which the suspect
(i) knows that his or her actions or omissions
will bring about the objective
elements of the crime, and (ii) undertakes such actions or omissions with the
concrete intent to bring
about the objective elements of the crime (also known
as dolus directus of the first
degree).’[43] This must be the
classic situation of intent (or intent and knowledge) of which Article 30
speaks. The Chamber adds that the ‘volitional’
element also
encompasses other forms of the concept of dolus’ which it says
‘have already been resorted to by the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals.’[44] These
are:
i. situations in which the suspect, without having the concrete intent to bring about the objective elements of the crime is aware that such elements will be the necessary outcome of his or her actions or omissions (also known as dolus directus of the second degree), and
ii. situations in which the suspect (a) is aware of the risk that the objective elements in the crime may result from his or her actions or omissions, and (b) accepts such an outcome by reconciling himself or herself with it or consenting to it (also known as dolus eventualis).[45]
These categories are hardly what emerges from the literal language of the
Statute, nor, if my analysis of the history is correct,
from the travaux
préparatoires. The first of these (dolus directus of the
second degree) comes close to one of the definitions of knowledge in Article 30
(‘awareness that ... a consequence will
occur in the ordinary course of
events’) and may thus pass muster. But dolus eventualis and
its common law cousin, recklessness, suffered banishment by consensus. If it is
to be read into the Statute, it is in the teeth
of the language and
history.
In one other respect, the Chamber was faithful to the intentions of
the drafters, in this case the drafters of The Elements. The Court
notes
that,[46] in respect of the war
crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of fifteen years and
using them to participate
actively in hostilities, the third element is that,
concerning the age of the
victims,[47] ‘[t]he
perpetrator knew or should have known that such person or persons were under the
age of 15 years.’[48] This
was a compromise on the part of the drafters, and controversial among them in
view of the general exclusion of
negligence.[49] Charles Garraway,
British representative in the drafting, describes the provision on children as a
compromise between those who thought
strict liability appropriate (and thus that
anyone who engaged young soldiers did so at the risk they would turn out to be
under
age) and those who wanted the default rule to apply. He adds that
‘[t]hose with reservations as to the vires of this provision were
reassured by article 9 (3) of the Statute providing that elements ‘shall
be consistent’ with the
Statute. Any inconsistent element would be struck
down by the judges.’[50] The
Chamber, in this instance, refers to the ‘unless otherwise provided’
language in Article 30 and describes the element
as ‘an
exception.’[51] The relevant
passage of the Chamber’s opinion shows that it clearly understood the
approach of the drafters of The Elements
in addressing separately the mental
element for each of the material elements of a particular crime (although the
Chamber uses the
term ‘objective’ instead of
‘material’).[52] The
passage is worth quoting in full:
As a result, the ‘should have known’ requirement as provided for in the Elements of Crimes in relation to articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) is an exception to the ‘intent and knowledge’ requirement embodied in article 30 of the Statute. Accordingly, as provided for in article 30(1) of the Statute, it will apply in determining the age of the victims, whereas the general ‘intent and knowledge’ requirement will apply to the other objective elements of the war crimes set forth in articles 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute, including the existence of an armed conflict and the nexus between the acts charged and the armed conflict.[53]
At this stage of the proceedings, the Chamber was prepared to accept the
position of The Elements uncritically. Whether the negligence
exception is
consistent with the Statute, as understood in Article 9(3), is a question that
will no doubt be argued by the defence
at a later stage.
In Katanga and
Ngudjolo Chui,[54] the Chamber
was faced with a much more complex set of allegations. The defendants were said
to have committed both war crimes and
crimes against humanity. The war crimes
included using children under the age of fifteen to participate actively in
hostilities,
directing an attack against the civilian population, wilful
killing, destruction of property, pillaging, sexual slavery and rape,
inhuman
treatment and outrages upon personal dignity. As crimes against humanity,
murder, sexual slavery, rape and other inhumane
acts were alleged.
In its
discussion of these various offences, the Chamber makes copious and useful
references to the elements of each of the crimes
as defined in the product of
the Preparatory Commission. The Judgment starts with a section labeled
‘I. Introduction,’ followed by another entitled ‘II.
Preliminary Evidentiary
Matters.’ Then comes a long section entitled
‘III. Material Elements of the Crimes.’ Again, the Chamber does not
explain how it is using the term
‘Material’[55]. This
time, however, it is clear in context that it is not using it the way the
Statute does to describe the physical elements of
an offence. Instead it
discusses the existence and nature of the armed conflict in
question,[56] the existence of
appropriate offences under the Statute (and their elements – broken into
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’
elements), the existence of
a nexus between the armed conflict and the alleged crime and the
perpetrators’ awareness of the
factual circumstances that establish the
existence of such armed conflict. It then makes a similar analysis of crimes
against humanity,
starting with the necessary widespread or systematic attack
directed against a civilian
population[57] and continuing with
an analysis of the particular offences. As in the case of its previous
decision in Lubanga Dyilo, the Pre-Trial Chamber uses the terms
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ to describe (I think) what
the Statute
calls ‘material’ and ‘mental’.
On one
significant matter, there is some difference of opinion touched upon among the
judges. Speaking in the context of the war crime
of using children in
hostilities, the Chamber says that:
In respect of the subjective elements of this war crime, the perpetrator must satisfy the intent and knowledge requirement of article 30 (1) and (2) of the Statute as well as a negligence standard set out in the phrase ‘should have known’ with regard to the requirement that the victim be under the age of fifteen. Therefore this offence encompasses, first and foremost, cases of dolus directus of the first or second degrees.[58]
The Chamber does not say to what element of the crime the ‘first
and foremost’ requirement of Article 30 applies, but
in context it seems
to be the element that the soldiers were
‘used’.[59] At all
events, the paragraph quoted is followed by an interesting footnote which is
also worth quoting in full:
The definition of the concept of dolus directus of the first and second degrees, and of dolus eventualis, can be found in ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEn, para. 351. In the Lubanga decision, the Chamber found that article 30(1) of the Statute encompasses also dolus eventualis. The majority of the Chamber endorses this previous finding. For the purposes of the present charges in the present Decision, it is not necessary to determine whether situations of dolus eventualis could also be covered by this offence, since, as shown later, there are substantial grounds to believe that the crimes were committed with dolus directus. Judge Anita Usacka disagrees with the position of the majority with respect to the application of dolus eventualis. Judge Usacka finds that, at this time, it is unnecessary for her to provide reasons, since the issue of whether article 30 of the Statute also encompasses cases of dolus eventualis is not addressed in the present Decision.[60]
Some of the reasoning by the judges reads like a lapse into national
modes of thinking rather than an effort to come to grips with
the language of
the Statute itself. It is apparent that the question of dolus eventualis
merits further consideration. Again, defence counsel can be expected to return
to the fray on that.
On the other hand, the discussion by Pre-Trial Chamber
II in the Bemba Gombo confirmation
decision[61] tracks closely the
analysis that I believe is required by the language of the Statute and the
preparatory work which has been outlined
above.[62] Bemba Gombo was charged
in respect of a number of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in
the Central African Republic.
The Prosecutor sought to connect him to the crimes
either as a principal, pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, or as a
commander
responsible under Article
28.[63]
In its judgment, the
Chamber makes copious references to the Elements of Crimes and the discussion is
based on a structure of mental
and material elements. It analysis of both crimes
against humanity and war crimes begins with an examination of the relevant
‘contextual
circumstances’ – a ‘widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population’ in the case of crimes against
humanity
and an ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ in the
case of the war crimes in
question.[64] The discussion of
specific instances of the two crimes also tracks closely the structure of The
Elements. Particularly interesting
is a later section of the judgment that
addresses the Chamber’s understanding of Article 30 and of the general
structure of
offences.[65]
The
Chamber notes, for instance, that in its opinion, ‘the Statute is
constructed on the basis of an element analysis approach
– as opposed to a
crime analysis approach, according to which different degrees of mental element
are assigned to each of the
material elements of the specific crime under
consideration.’[66] It then
recalls the ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ language of Article
30 and continues in language obviously
intended to bridge the common law and
civil law modes of characterizing culpability. This part of the Judgment is
important enough
to warrant extended quotation:
357. The Chamber stresses that the terms ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ as referred to in article 30(2) and (3) of the Statute reflect the concept of dolus, which requires the existence of a volitional as well as a cognitive element. Generally, dolus can take one of three forms depending on the strength of the volitional element vis-à-vis the cognitive element – namely, (1) dolus directus of the first degree or direct intent, (2) dolus directus of the second degree – also known as oblique intention, and (3) dolus eventualis – commonly referred to as subjective or advertent recklessness.
358. In the view of the Chamber, article 30(2) and (3) of the Statute embraces two degrees of dolus. Dolus directus in the first degree (direct intent) requires that the suspect knows that his or her acts or omissions will bring about the material elements of the crime and carries out these acts or omissions with the purposeful will (intent) or desire to bring about those material elements of the crime. According to the dolus directus in the first degree, the volitional element is prevalent as the suspect purposefully wills or desires to attain the prohibited result.
359. Dolus directus in the second degree does not require that the suspect has the actual intent or will to bring about the material elements of the crime, but that he or she is aware that those elements will be the almost inevitable outcome of his acts or omissions, i.e., the suspect ‘is aware that [...] [the consequence] will occur in the ordinary course of events’ (article 30(2)(b) of the Statute). In this context, the volitional element decreases substantially and is overridden by the cognitive element, i.e. the awareness that his or her acts or omissions ‘will’ cause the undesired proscribed consequence.
360. With respect to dolus eventualis as the third form of
dolus, recklessness or any lower form of culpability, the Chamber is of
the view that such concepts are not captured by article 30 of the
Statute. This
conclusion is supported by the express language of the phrase ‘will occur
in the ordinary course of events’,
which does not accommodate a lower
standard than the one required by dolus directus in the second degree
(oblique intention). . . .
[67]
Common law analysis does
not come to grips with the various relationships between cognitive and
volitional aspects that are such a
feature of civil law analysis of
culpability.[68] Thus some of this
discussion is, at first sight, a little strange to the common law mind.
Nevertheless, thoughtful common lawyers
and civil lawyers alike ought to be able
to embrace this discussion as finding common ground to bring together their own
working
constructs, in order to elucidate the unique provisions of the Statute
that provide the building blocks for this part of international
criminal law.
B. ‘Secondary’ Parties, and Modes of Participation
By and large, the drafting of penal codes proceeds on the basis that the
actor whose deeds are described in the special part is what
we think of as a
‘principal’ – the one who does it
himself.[69] Other participants are
linked through a provision in the general part. The Rome Statute is no
exception, although, in Article 25(3),
it devotes a little more attention to the
principal than do some codes. It also contains provisions on command
responsibility as
an alternative theory of liability for certain superiors in
Article 28.
The responsibility of a ‘co-perpetrator’ as
principal was the focus of the Lubanga Dyilo and Katanga/Ngudjolo Chui
decisions.
Article 25 (3) of the Statute provides in relevant part, that
a person[70] shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court if that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the
crime.
Subparagraph (a) covers principals and co-principals and the
people who act through those who are not criminally responsible, such
as
children or the insane (perhaps even the un-knowing and the mistaken).
Subparagraph (b) is also aimed at the big fry, perhaps
those ‘most
responsible’ for what occurs even though they do not personally do the
evil deeds. As Professor Schabas
has noted, to describe such persons as
‘secondary’ parties in respect of genocide is to miss the
point.[71] The same must be true of
those involved in crimes against humanity and war crimes. Subparagraph (c) deals
with more obviously ‘secondary’
parties like aiders and abettors.
Subparagraph (d) was characterized by the Chair of the Working Group on General
Principles in Rome
as related to the ‘very divisive issue’ of
‘conspiracy, a concept strongly advocated by common law countries, but
unknown in some civil law
systems.’[72] It was also
closely related to the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise that had found a
substantial toehold in decisions of the
Ad Hoc
Tribunals.[73] Ambassador Saland
comments:
We were helped by the successful negotiation in 1997 of the Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings,[74] which had been adopted
by consensus. In Rome, it was easy to reach agreement to incorporate, with
slight modifications, the text
from that Convention which we now find in
paragraph 3(d) of Article 25 of the Rome
Statute.[75]
Subparagraph (d)
is thus a classic example of a very useful principle of international
negotiation, the ‘previously agreed text’
principle – there is
a presumption that whoever negotiated it knew what they were doing, so it is
safe to use it.
There is, however, more here than meets the eye. United
States conspiracy doctrine is twofold. Conspiracy is both an inchoate offense
and (in a development that has not gained much traction in the rest of the
common law World) a mode of
complicity.[76] As such, it catches
people on the fringe of criminal activity who would not meet the aid or abet
category, especially those associated
recklessly or negligently, rather than
intentionally (or even knowingly), with the relevant
activities.[77] Conspiracy as
complicity is what was in play here. The preparatory work on the Terrorist
Bombing Convention makes it clear that this
kind of conspiracy doctrine was what
people had in mind in the present
context.[78] But there was the
other kind of conspiracy, the inchoate one. That should have been put more
forcefully on the Rome agenda by considering
the conspiracy provisions in the
Genocide Convention.[79] It got lost
in the shuffle, I think because people thought they had solved the whole problem
in Subparagraph (d). These problems
have not yet emerged as issues in the
Pre-trial Chambers but will undoubtedly be relevant in the future.
In the
case of Article 25, the Court has not been furnished with Elements to assist it.
In fact, the United States introduced a proposal
to deal with some aspects of
Article 25 (along with Article 28 on command responsibility) at the Preparatory
Commission.[80] It was a useful
first draft[81] but was never taken
up by the Preparatory Commission, largely I thought because of drafting fatigue.
The judges are, therefore, on
their own!
Some valuable first thoughts on how
to interpret Article 25(3)(a) appear in the Lubanga confirmation
decision.[82] The Chamber
assumed (quite correctly in my opinion) that complicity issues are amenable to
the same sorts of element analysis as
the provisions of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of
the Statute. I part company with its analysis to the extent that it couches the
discussion
in terms of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’
elements rather than ‘material’ and ‘mental’
ones, but I
thought that it made a very good effort at unscrambling the issues
concerned.
The prosecution contended that the theory that ‘best
represents the criminal responsibility’ of the accused was under
Article
25(3)(a) as a
‘co-perpetrator.’[83]
After examining various theories of what constitutes a co-perpetrator, the
Chamber settled for a concept of ‘control over the
crime’.[84] ‘The notion
underpinning this ... approach,’ said the Court, ‘is that principals
to a crime are not limited to
those who physically carry out the objective
elements of the offense, but also include those who, in spite of being removed
from
the scene of the crime, control or mastermind its commission because they
decide whether and how the offence will be
committed.’[85] According to
the Chamber, there are two ‘objective elements’ of co-perpetration
‘based on joint control over the
crime.’ These are (i)
‘[e]xistence of an agreement or common plan between two or more
persons,’ and (ii) ‘[c]o-ordinated
essential contribution by each
co-perpetrator resulting in the realization of the objective elements of the
crime.’[86] There is some
obvious (and perhaps unavoidable) overlap here with the common purpose category
in Article 25 (3) (d). The choice of
the term ‘objective
elements’[87] is, once again,
curious. I think the items the Chamber discusses are examples of
‘conduct’ elements that would fit the
category of
‘material’ elements in Article 30 of the
Statute.[88] Describing them as
‘objective’ is probably a lapse into the national thinking of the
judges and the word ‘objective’
appears through the remainder of the
relevant discussion. Perhaps the habits of a professional lifetime spent
thinking in a particular
way explain also why the judges go on to discuss the
‘subjective elements’ that must accompany these
‘objective’
ones, rather than the ‘mental’ elements of
which Article 30 speaks. The ‘subjective elements’ of
co-perpetration
are said to be threefold: the suspect must fulfill the
subjective elements of the crime in question; the suspect and the other
co-perpetrators
must all be mutually aware and mutually accept that implementing
their common plan may result in the realization of the objective
elements of the
crime; and, the suspect must be aware of the factual circumstances enabling him
or her to jointly control the
crime.[89]
The Chamber followed
a comparable mode of analysis in the Katanga and Ngudjolo confirmation
decision. The prosecution argued that the defendants were responsible either
pursuant to Article 25(3)(a) as co-perpetrators of a common plan
or under
Article 25(3)(b) for ordering the commission of war crimes or crimes against
humanity. Having found sufficient evidence
to establish substantial grounds to
believe the defendants were co-perpetrators, the Chamber could treat the
prosecution’s
alternative theory as
moot.[90]
In its examination of
the elements of co-perpetration, the Chamber recalled its discussion in
Lubanga Dyilo and insisted that the ‘control over the
crime’[91] approach was the
one that best achieved ‘consistency with the Statute, which is the first
source of applicable law for this
Court under article 21(1)(a) of the
Statute.’[92]
‘Accordingly,’ the Chamber adds a little later, ‘assigning the
highest degree of responsibility for commission
of a crime – that is,
considering him a principal – to a person who uses another, individually
responsible person to
commit a crime, is not merely a theoretical possibility in
scarce legal literature, but has been codified in Article 25(3)(a) of
the
Statute.’[93] The Chamber
continues:
The most important reason for this Chamber’s deciding for this mode of liability is that it has been incorporated into the framework of the Statute. The crimes falling within the jurisdiction of this Court – those of ‘the most serious [...] concern to the international community as a whole’ [Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute], and which ‘threaten the peace, security, and well-being of the world’ [Preamble to the Rome Statute] – will almost inevitably concern collective or mass criminality. The Chamber finds that by specifically regulating the commission of a crime through another responsible person, the Statute targets the category of cases which involves a perpetrator’s control over the organisation.[94]
In a strong reference to the need to apply the Statute as written, the
Chamber distinguishes the case-law of the ICTY on co-perpetrators.
In
Prosecutor v. Stakic, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY had ‘relied on
the liability theory of co-perpetration of a crime through another person as
a
way to avoid the inconsistencies of applying the so-called ‘Joint Criminal
Enterprise’ theory of criminal liability
to senior leaders and
commanders.’[95] This decision
was reversed by the Appeals Chamber on the basis that this mode of
responsibility did not form part of customary international
law.[96] Referring to this episode,
the Pre-Trial Chamber reiterated:
However, under article 21 (1) (a) of the Statute, the first source of
applicable law is the Statute. Principles and rules of international
law
constitute a secondary source applicable only when the statutory material fails
to prescribe a legal solution. Therefore, and
since the Rome Statute expressly
provides for this specific mode of liability, the question as to whether
customary law admits or
discards the ‘joint commission through another
person’ is not relevant for this Court. This is a good example of the
need
not to transfer the ad hoc tribunals’ case law mechanically to the
system of the Court.[97]
In
Bemba Gombo, Pre-Trial Chamber II was prepared to accept the analysis of
Pre-Trial Chamber I in respect of Article 25(3)(a) and co-perpetrators,
in
particular the centrality of ‘control over the
crime’.[98] The
difficulty was that it was not persuaded that the Prosecutor had produced
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there were reasonable
grounds to believe
that the accused was criminally responsible on this theory. In particular,
there had not been sufficient proof
of intent or knowledge. Accordingly, the
Chamber had to examine the alternative prosecution theory of liability via
Article 28 as
a military commander or one acting as a military commander. The
relevant parts of Article 28 provide:
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
- (i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
- (ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.[99]
The
Pre-Trial Chamber had commented earlier in its opinion on Article 28 (a) as an
‘unless otherwise provided’ example
for the purposes of Article 30
of the Statute. It remarked that ‘the application of the “should
have known” standard
pursuant to article 28(a) of the Statute justifies a
deviation from the default rule as it requires a lower fault element than that
required under article 30 of the
Statute.’[100] Now the
Chamber comments on the nature of this standard. It notes that Article 28(a)
‘encompasses two standards of fault element.’
The first,
‘encapsulated by the term “knew”, requires the existence of
actual knowledge.’ ‘The second,
which is covered by the term
“should have known”, is in fact a form of
negligence.’[101]
Much
more could be said about this groundbreaking discussion of Article 28 which will
no doubt receive the careful attention of commentators.
Suffice it for present
purposes to note also the discussion of the causal connection required between
the commander’s failures
and the commission of the offences by
subordinates. It cannot be the case that some stringent form of ‘but
for’ causation
is required. As the Chamber put it:
425. .... However, contrary to the visible and material effect of a positive act, the effect of an omission cannot be empirically determined with certainty. In other words, it would not be practical to predict exactly what would have happened if a commander had fulfilled his obligation to prevent crimes. There is no direct causal link that needs to be established between the superior’s omission and the crime committed by his subordinates. Therefore, the Chamber considers that it is only necessary to prove that the commander’s omission increased the risk of the commission of the crimes charged in order to hold him criminally responsible under article 28(a) of the Statute.
426. Accordingly, to find a military commander or a person acting as a
military commander responsible for the crimes committed by
his forces, the
Prosecutor must demonstrate that his failure to exercise his duty to prevent
crimes increased the risk that the forces
would commit those crimes.
[102]
This is a very plausible
reading of a provision in the Statute which does not appear to have much by way
of preparatory history.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is very important, as the Chambers are discovering, that attention be
given to the Statute and Elements that the drafters in fact
adopted. They do
not correspond exactly to any national system of law of which I am aware. But
that is the point. For a structure
and conceptual framework that is sui
generis, it makes sense to try to get rid of one’s own intellectual
baggage and come to terms with what was actually drafted.
ANNEX
IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS CHART OF INCRIMINATORY
EVIDENCE[103]
ELEMENTS
|
REFERENCE TO INCRIMINATORY EVIDENCE
|
CRIMES
|
|
1. Crimes against Humanity |
|
Common (contextual) elements
|
|
(1) Attack |
|
|
|
(2) Widespread or systematic |
|
|
|
(3) Directed against a civilian population |
|
|
|
(4) Knowledge of the attack |
|
|
|
Specific constituent elements of the counts
|
|
Count 1 – Rape – Article 7(1)(g)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
Count 3 – Torture – Article 7(1)(f)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
Count 7 – Murder – Article 7(1)(a)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
|
|
2. War Crimes |
|
Common (contextual) elements
|
|
(1) Armed conflict |
|
|
|
(2) Non-international |
|
|
|
(3) General Requirement: i.e. awareness of the factual circumstances that establish the existence of an armed conflict |
|
|
|
Specific constituent elements of the count
|
|
Count 2 – Rape – Article 8 (2)(e)(vi)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
Count 4 – Torture – Article 8(2)(c)(i)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
Count 5 – Outrages upon personal dignity – Article
8(2)(c)(ii)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
Count 6 – Murder – Article 8(2)(c)(i)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
Count 8 – Pillaging – Article 8(2)(e)(v)
|
|
Specific elements following the text of the elements of crimes
|
|
MODES OF LIABILITY
|
|
Article 25(3) (a)
|
|
(i) Jointly with another
|
|
(ii) Jointly through another person
|
|
[∗] Board of Governors
Professor, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden, New Jersey. The author
represented the Government of Samoa
at Rome when the treaty setting up the ICC
was finalized and in the drafting of the Elements of Crimes. Any positions
expressed here
should not be attributed to that
Government.
[1] Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187
UNTS 3, art 9(1) (entered into force 1 July 2002). Paragraph 2 deals with the
procedure for amendments. For The Elements see ICC,
<http://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-AB0B-68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf>
,
at 11 December 2009.
[2] Adopted by
consensus in the Preparatory Commission for the Court in 2000, The Elements were
approved by consensus and without change
at the first meeting of the
Court’s Assembly of States Parties in 2002. See Roger S Clark, ‘The
Mental Element in International
Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences’ (2001) 12
Criminal Law Forum 291; Roger S Clark, ‘Drafting a General Part to
a Penal Code: Some Thoughts Inspired by the Negotiations on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court and by the Court’s First Substantive Law
Discussion in the Lubanga Dyilo Confirmation Proceedings’
(2008) 19
Criminal Law Forum 519. Some of the material herein is adapted from
those articles.
[3]
International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 (NZ),
Section 12(1)(a).
[4] Ibid Section
12(4)(a). See also Section 8 of the International Criminal Court Act
2007 (Samoa) (‘the court shall take into account any Elements of
Crimes adopted and amended under article 9 of the
Statute’).
[5] Prosecutor
v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Pre-Trial Chamber I,
Decision on the confirmation of charges, 29 January 2007 (‘Lubanga
confirmation
decision’).
[6]
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, ICC No.
ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the confirmation of
charges, 30 September 2008 (‘Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui confirmation
decision’).
[7]
Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC No. ICC-01/05-01/08-232,
Pre-Trial Chamber III, Decision on the Submission of an Updated, Consolidated
Version of the In-Depth
Analysis Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, with Annex, 10
November 2008; Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC No.
ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a)
and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges
of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, 15 June 2009 (‘Bemba Gombo confirmation
decision’). Pre-Trial Chamber III was merged into pre-Trial Chamber
II on 19 March 2009, so the later decision was made by Pre-Trial Chamber
II.
[8] Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre
Bemba Gombo, ICC No. ICC-01/05-01/08-232, Pre-Trial Chamber III, Decision on
the Submission of an Updated, Consolidated Version of the In-Depth
Analysis
Chart of Incriminatory Evidence, with Annex, 10 November
2008.
[9] Article 66(3) of the
Rome Statute states: ‘In order to convict the accused, the Court must be
convinced of the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.’
‘Guilt’ seems to encompass all the ‘elements’ of the
crime. ‘Elements’
are all those matters that the prosecution must
prove in order to establish its case for criminal responsibility. See Clark,
‘Mental
Element’, above n 2 at 317-9. An examination of Elements is
crucial at all stages of the Court’s proceedings. At the
stage of issuing
a warrant, a Pre-Trial Chamber must be satisfied that there are
‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that
the suspects are criminally
responsible (art 58). At the confirmation stage, the issue is whether there are
‘substantial grounds
to believe’ (art 61). At each stage,
significant attention must be given to what the elements are that the
prosecution must
ultimately establish beyond reasonable doubt. A Trial or
Appeals Chamber may ultimately analyze the relevant elements (and especially
the
evidence pertaining to them) differently, but the practice so far has been for
the Pre-Trial Chambers to engage in a very sophisticated
analysis of elements at
the confirmation stage. In the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui confirmation
decision, above n 6,158-60, there are clear indications that prosecution,
defence and counsel for victims reserved the right to make further
arguments
about the standards of liability at the trial stage. Thus, the discussions in
the Pre-Trial Chambers represent, as one
would expect, a first round – but
a very helpful one. An attentive observer will want to follow developments in
the Bashir case where the refusal of Pre-Trial Chamber I, by a majority
decision, to issue a warrant for genocide has been appealed by the Prosecutor
(a
warrant was issued for war crimes and crimes against humanity). While
disagreeing on how to assess to evidence, both the majority
(Judges Kuenyehia
and Steiner) and the dissent (Judge Usacka) make thorough use of The Elements.
They differ on the interpretation
of the controversial ‘contextual
element’ that the relevant acts take place ‘in the context of a
manifest pattern
of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct
that could itself effect such destruction.’ Prosecutor v Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan
Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009.
[10] Rome Statute, preambular
paragraph 4.
[11] They did not
include any express reference to negligence in the Statute. But in
Article 28(a) they did include what amounts to a negligence test in respect of
the responsibility of military commanders
(below n 101). The Elements include
examples of a negligence standard as to some circumstance elements (below n
48-50). ‘Manifestly
unlawful’ in Article 33 must also be a
negligence test (a standard of ‘reasonable soldier in all the
circumstances’).
[12] The
word ‘recklessness’ does not appear in the Statute. But in Article
28 (b) the drafters did include a type of recklessness
test in respect of the
responsibility of other superiors. A draft definition of (subjective)
‘recklessness’ carried forward
to Rome was deleted when it was
concluded that it was redundant, the term not appearing anywhere in the special
part to which the
definition could be applied: Per Saland, ‘International
Criminal Law Principles,’ in Roy Lee (ed), The International Criminal
Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, Issues, Negotiations, Results (1999)
189, 205. See discussion of recklessness issue below at n
19-25.
[13] Article 30, headed
‘mental element’, provides:
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, ‘knowledge’ means
awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur
in the ordinary
course of events. ‘Know’ and ‘knowingly’ shall be
construed accordingly.
For a useful account of Article 30 by one of its
principal drafters, see Donald K Piragoff & Darryl Robinson,
‘Article 30, Mental Element’, in Otto Triffterer (ed), Commentary
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2nd ed.
2008), 849.
[14] ‘Unless
otherwise provided’ is an enigma. It marks out the article as a default
rule. But how is the default over-ridden?
Obviously something could be otherwise
provided, expressly and perhaps even impliedly, in another part of the Statute.
But does the
phrase permit reference out via the applicable law provisions in
Art. 21 of the Statute to, say, the case-law of other tribunals?
Could the
Elements of Crimes make free use of such material, or strike out in new
directions even in the absence of strong clues
within the Statute? The way the
committee structure worked in drafting the Statute, the drafters of the special
part (mostly Foreign
Office and Military lawyers) seemed determined to remain in
ignorance of what their counterparts (mostly from Justice Ministries)
were doing
in the drafting of the general part. To the extent they used other language than
that in the general part, it seems hardly
to have been in a coherent effort to
apply different mental elements in particular cases. For the most part, they
tracked language
aimed primarily at State responsibility contained in such
instruments as the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The drafters of The Elements
were reluctant to depart from the default rule of intent and knowledge without a
good reason in the Statute or common sense. For
a disputed departure, see below
n 47-53 and 58 (imposing negligence liability). I believe that Gerhard
Werle and Florian Jessberger, ‘‘Unless Otherwise Provided’:
Article 30 in the ICC Statute
and the Mental Element of Crimes Under
International Criminal Law’, (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 35, 55, grossly misstate the position of the drafters of both the
Statute and the Elements when they conclude that ‘[i]n most
cases, the
mental element is “otherwise provided”’. They place great
reliance on the special part language and
on what they believe to be customary
international law (found in case-law), and underplay what the drafters thought
they were doing,
including in removing the reference to recklessness at Rome.
See also Otto Triffterer, ‘Can the ‘Elements of Crimes’
narrow
or broaden responsibility for criminal behaviour defined in the Rome
Statute?’ in Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter
(eds), The Emerging
Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009)
381.
[15] The negotiation of
Article 30 had been concluded in the Working Group of the Whole in Rome using
the term ‘physical element’
when someone in the Drafting Committee
(apparently France) changed the terminology so that the non-mental elements
became described
as ‘material’ ones. Nothing substantive seems to
turn on it, but the terminology is especially confusing to common lawyers,
most
of whom are not familiar with the usage. Care has to be used in distinguishing
how ‘material’ is used here compared
with the way it appears in
other contexts. In the Model Penal Code, for example ‘material
elements’ can include mental
elements, physical elements and matters of
justification and excuse. A ‘material element’ is ‘an element
that
does not relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction,
venue, or to any other matter similarly unconnected with
(i) the harm or evil,
incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or
(ii) the existence of a justification
or excuse for such conduct’: Model
Penal Code, § 1.13(9) and (10). In the MPC, the prosecution bears the
burden of proof
as to all elements (including jurisdictional ones,) and as to
material elements there is a presumption that culpability of at least
recklessness is required. Model Penal Code §§ 1.12 and 2.02(3).
Thus, under the MPC as in most places, there can be strict
liability as to
jurisdictional elements.
[16] The
‘and’ in ‘intent and knowledge’ was especially important
for some civil lawyers. The common lawyers tended
to see the concepts as
alternative rather than cumulative and ‘knowledge’ as especially
useful for thinking about the
relationship of an actor and
‘circumstance’ elements. On the concept of a circumstance element,
see below n 29.
[17] Article
30(2).
[18] Article 30(3). Note
the overlap between intention and knowledge as to consequences in these
definitions.
[19] Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, UN GAOR, 50th sess, Supp. No. 22, 59, UN Doc A/50/22
(1995). General and specific intent were deemed too confusing as concepts and
were not pursued.
The age of responsibility was dealt with
‘jurisdictionally’ by denying jurisdiction to the Court over anyone
under the
age of eighteen at the time of the alleged commission of crime (Art
26).
[20] Report of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court, Vol. II, Compilation of Proposals, UN GAOR, 51st sess,
Supp. No. 22, 92, UN Doc A/51/22
(1996).
[21]
Ibid.
[22] Decisions Taken by
the Preparatory Committee at its Session held in New York from 11 to 21 February
1997, 27, UN Doc A/AC.249/1997/L.5 (1997). This version was accompanied by
footnotes reading: ‘[f]urther discussion is needed on
this
paragraph’; ‘[t]he need for this paragraph will be re-examined once
a decision has been taken on the definition
of crimes’; and ‘[a]
view was expressed to the effect that there was no reason for rejecting the
concept of commission
of an offence also through negligence, in which case the
offender shall be liable only when so prescribed by the statute.’
The word
negligence does not appear anywhere in the Rome Statute. See also above n
11.
[23] Preparatory Committee on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Report of the
Inter-sessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The
Netherlands, 59, UN Doc A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (1998). This version included the
footnotes on need for further discussion and on retaining the possibility
of
negligence liability; it also had (in bold type) a note at the end reading
‘N.B. The inclusion of the notion of recklessness
should be re-examined in
view of the definition of crimes’. The drafters of the Nota Bene believed
intent and knowledge to
be a strong default rule and that any departure from it
must find clear expression in an offence
definition.
[24] Report of the
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
Draft Statute and Draft Final Act, 66, UN Doc A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1 (1998)
(same as Zutphen with footnotes and Nota Bene as in immediately preceding
footnote).
[25] Saland, above n
12. There were no summary records made of the deliberations of the Working Group
on General Principles, chaired by
Ambassador Saland, so his account is the best
record we have of the preparatory
work.
[26] Above n
24.
[27] Report of the
Preparatory Committee, above n
28.
[28] Saland, above n 12, 205.
[29] Circumstance elements are
seldom explicated helpfully in legal pedagogy. They are such things as a
‘human being’ in
homicide, or ‘property of another’ in
theft. International crimes are rife with such circumstances – such as an
ethnic group in genocide, a protected person in war crimes, a civilian
population in crimes against humanity. See also n 43
below.
[30] Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court: Addendum: Part II Finalized
Draft Text of the Element of
Crimes UN Doc PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000).
‘Contextual circumstances’ is a probably unnecessary separate
category of ‘jurisdictional’
or ‘threshold’ circumstance
items that give the crimes their ‘international’ character. There
appear to
be only three examples of the category in The Elements: a manifest
pattern of similar conduct, in the case of genocide; a widespread
or systematic
attack against a civilian population, in the case of crimes against humanity;
and an armed conflict (international
or non-international) in the case of war
crimes. They could just as easily have been lumped with the other circumstance
elements.
See also n 64
below.
[31] In the Katanga and
Ngudjolo Chui confirmation decision, above n 6,[296], Trial Chamber I
asserts that ‘The Chamber also adopts the ICTY conclusion that “the
conduct of the
accused must be a substantial cause of the death of the
victim”’. The Chamber’s authority for this is:
‘Dormann,
K., Elements of War Crimes under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Sources and Commentary, Cambridge, p. 40,
footnote 6 citing ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Judgment, 16 November 1998, para. 4245 and ICTY, The Prosecutor v.
Kordic and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment, 26 February 2001,
para. 229.’ The statement is made in the context of the killing of
protected persons. This view of causation (subject to debate about what
constitutes ‘substantial’) probably reflects
the position under the
Rome Statute, although there is not much textual support one way or the other
and the preparatory work is
thin. Much of Dormann’s surrounding
discussion of the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, however, (especially when
it refers uncritically
to recklessness liability) has to be re-evaluated in
light of the specific language of the Statute.
[32] Above n
5.
[33] The crime is defined,
identically for present purposes, in Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) (in
international armed conflict) and
Article 8(2)(e)(vii) (in non-international
armed conflict.)
[34] For
discussion of this issue, in this case and in the Katanga and Ngudjolo
Chui case, see below n 69-97 (discussing ‘modes of
liability’).
[35]
Lubanga Dyilo Confirmation decision, above n 5,116-24. The
(original) French text of the judgment is to the same effect. It uses the terms
‘subjectif’ and ‘objectif’
rather than the
Statute’s ‘psychologique’ and
‘matérial’.
[36]
The terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ were often used
during the debates pre- and at Rome, as were ‘physical’
and
‘mental’. Many of the later commentators use the same language. It
is often unclear whether the differences in terminology
mask quite different
ways of thinking about the relevant concepts. The Statute settled for
‘material’ and ‘mental’.
The common lawyers have had a
hard time getting their collective head around the term ‘material’
and it looks as though
some civilians do too. The reluctance to use the
language of Article 30 is manifested also in the warrant decision in
Bashir, above n 9.
[37]
Lubanga Dyilo Confirmation decision, above n 5,
57-101.
[38] Below n
82-89.
[39] Below n
54-57.
[40] The Elements require
that war crimes take place in the context of and be associated with an armed
conflict. (‘Contextual
circumstance.’)
[41]
Lubanga Confirmation decision, above n
5,118.
[42] Ibid 119.
‘Volition’ is used here in the sense of an attitude towards the
result, not as it is sometimes used in the
common law to describe the
voluntariness of an act (as opposed to acting, say, in a state of automatism).
[43] Ibid. Speaking of
‘[bringing] about the objective [material] elements of the offence’
makes sense in respect of conduct or
consequence elements. Typically, however,
the actor does not ‘bring about’ circumstance elements such as an
armed conflict
or the age of a child soldier. The actor acts against the
background of such circumstances. Article 30 of the Rome Statute itself
fails
to appreciate this problem; it speaks of the material elements being
‘committed.’ This must have been an oversight
in the drafting
– something more like ‘accompanied by’ captures the intended
meaning better.
[44] Ibid
referencing: ‘The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Appeal Judgment, 15 July 1999, paras. 219 and 200; The Prosecutor v. Milomir
Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, para.
587’.
[45] Ibid 119-20
(footnotes omitted). Cf. Kai Ambos, ‘General Principles of Criminal
Law in the Rome Statute’, (1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum 1, 21-2 who
finds no room in the Statute for recklessness or what he describes as the
‘higher threshold of dolus
eventualis.’
[46] Ibid
121.
[47] Age must be a
‘material’ (‘circumstance’) element in terms of the
structure of Article 30 and The Elements.
[48] Other examples of
‘should have known’ are Elements Article 6(e); genocide by forcibly
transferring children (perpetrator
‘knew, or should have known, that the
person or persons were under the age of 18 years’); and Article
8(2)(b)(vii)-1,
-2 and -4, war crimes of improper use of flags, insignias,
emblems, etc. (‘perpetrator knew or should have known of the prohibited
nature of such use’). They are all cases where mistake or ignorance is
likely to be a defence and perhaps would be hard to
refute in some
cases.
[49] Kevin Jon Heller,
‘Mistake of Legal Element, the Common Law, and Article 32 of the Rome
Statute: A Critical Analysis’
(2008) 6 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 419, regards the negligence provisions as ‘almost
certainly inconsistent with the Rome Statute’. Thomas Weigend,
‘Intent,
Mistake of Law and Co-perpetration in the Lubanga Decision
on Confirmation of Charges’ (2008) 6 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 471, 474 comments that the Chamber, in apparently accepting
The Elements on their face, took ‘a far-reaching step that should have
been accompanied by at least a modicum of explanation.’ See also next
note.
[50] Charles
Garraway, ‘Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) – Using, Conscripting or Enlisting
Children’, in Roy Lee et al (eds),
The International Criminal Court:
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2001) 205, 207. For
a sceptical view of the consistency of these provisions in The Elements with the
Statute, see Matthew Happold,
‘Child recruitment as a Crime under the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court,’ in José Doria,
Hans-Peter
Gasser and M Cherif Bassiouni (eds), The Legal Regime of the
International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Professor Igor Blishchenko
(2009) 578, 597-9. See also Otto Triffterer, ‘Can the “Elements of
Crimes” Narrow or Broaden Responsibility for
Criminal Behaviour Defined in
the Rome Statute?’ in Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter (eds), The
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009)
381.
[51] Lubanga Confirmation
decision, above n
5,122.
[52] Explaining the
drafting convention on which The Elements are structured – using article
30 as a default position – paragraph
2 of the General Introduction to
The Elements asserts:
As stated in article 30, unless otherwise provided, a person shall be
criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the
jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with
intent and knowledge. Where no reference is
made in the Elements of Crimes to a
mental element for any particular conduct, consequence or circumstance listed,
it is understood
that the relevant mental element, i.e., intent, knowledge or
both, set out in article 30 applies. Exceptions to the article 30 standard,
based on the Statute, including applicable law under its relevant provisions,
are indicated below.
[53]
Lubanga Confirmation decision, above n 5,122. An armed conflict
and a nexus to it are among the material (‘contextual’) elements
contained in all of the war crimes
provisions of The Elements. With respect to
the existence of an armed conflict, the Chamber noted, ibid., that The
Elements require only that ‘[t]he perpetrator was aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence of
an armed conflict,’
without going as far as to require that he or she conclude, on the basis of a
legal assessment of the said
circumstances, that there was an armed conflict.
This is typical of a finesse often used by the drafters of The Elements to avoid
the application of Article 32(2) of the Statute (on mistake of law) by
characterizing the situation as one of fact. There may ultimately
be some
challenges based on whether this strategy is consistent with the
Statute.
[54] Katanga and
Ngudjolo Chui confirmation decision, above n
6.
[55] The section of the
judgment on ‘Material Elements’ runs from ibid 71 to 155. In
context, I think the term ‘material’
is used to describe everything
that the prosecution must prove to establish a crime, including the necessary
mental element or elements.
If that is right, then the word
‘material’ is probably redundant – a ‘material
element’ here appears
to be what The Elements regards as an
‘element’. See above n
9.
[56] At 71-5. This is an
example of what The Elements call a ‘contextual circumstance’
– but the Chamber does not seem
to use this characterization, or any
other, simply accepting (correctly) that it is an element to be proved by the
prosecution.
There was evidence that the conflict could be described as both
international and non-international at relevant times; the Chamber
was content
to accept that there were substantial grounds to believe that there was an
international armed conflict going on.
[57] The sub-heading on the
threshold issue of the existence of an attack, ibid 125, is headed
‘Widespread or systematic attack
directed against civilian population:
contextual, objective and subjective elements.’ (Emphasis added.)
This discussion includes an examination of the relevant provisions of the Rome
Statute, The Elements,
and case-law of the Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia on the
question of what is meant by such an attack, plus a brief discussion of
the
requirement of knowledge on the part of the perpetrator, required in the chapeau
to Article 7(1) of the Statute and explained some in The
Elements.
[58] Katanga and
Ngudjolo confirmation decision, above n 6, 77,
[251].
[59] A very interesting
discussion of Article 30, which makes extensive references to the Lubanga
Dyilo confirmation decision, is Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘The Mental
Element in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary
from a Comparative
Criminal Law Perspective,’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law
Forum 473, 475. Badar makes the point that the structure of the Statute
‘assigns different levels of mental element to each of the material
elements of the crime in question.’ Thus, it is consistent with Article 30
for the mental element on ‘use’ to be
some kind of intent, whereas
the culpability element in respect of (knowledge of) age could be negligence
(assuming the compatibility
of negligence with other aspects of the Statute). To
the same effect, see Bamba Gombo confirmation decision, below n 66.
[60] Katanga and Ngudjolo
confirmation decision, above n 6, 77 n 329. See also 179-80 and Judge
Usacka’s Partially Dissenting Opinion at 217-8, both to the same effect.
Judge
Usacka replaced Judge Jorda, a member of the Chamber in the earlier
decision, after his resignation from the
Court.
[61] Above n
7.
[62] Above text accompanying n
9-31.
[63] Below text
accompanying n 98-102.
[64] On
this category of material elements, see above n 30. I believed them to be a
redundant sub-category of circumstance elements,
but given their presence in The
Elements, the Chamber’s utilization of the category is entirely
appropriate.
[65] It is
contained in Part VI of the judgment which deals with ‘Individual criminal
responsibility’ and in particular Article
25(3)(a), but is of fundamental
significance to the whole
analysis.
[66] Bemba Gombo
confirmation decision, above n 7,
[355].
[67] Ibid [357-60]
(footnotes omitted). The Chamber goers on to support the argument both with the
plain language of the text and the
preparatory
work.
[68] Clark, ‘The
Mental Element in International Criminal Law’, above n 2, 302 n 37.
‘Knowledge’ thought of as
‘oblique intent’ is, however,
a concept known to common lawyers through a classic article by Professor
Glanville Williams
cited by the Chamber: Glanville Williams, ‘Oblique
Intention’, (1987) 46 Cambridge Law Journal 417.
[69] The Elements of Crimes
follow this drafting convention and use the term ‘perpetrator’ to
describe such a person. Paragraph
8 of the General Introduction to The Elements
notes:
As used in the Elements of Crimes, the term ‘perpetrator’ is
neutral as to guilt or innocence. The elements, including
the appropriate mental
elements, apply, mutatis mutandis, to all those whose criminal
responsibility may fall under articles 25 and 28 of the Statute.
For an
excellent summary of the multifarious ways in which international tribunals have
approached these issues of connecting various
parties with ‘the
crime’, see Steffen Wirth, ‘Committing liability in international
criminal law,’ in Carsten
Stahn & Göran Sluiter (eds), The
Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009)
329.
[70] The Rome Statute
applies only to natural persons. Some legal systems still have hang-ups about
the liability of legal persons and
an effort to include them in the Statute
failed: Saland, above n 12,199. There are some obvious practical problems with
dealing with
corporations in an international court, such as who will
‘surrender’ them and how to punish them, but these are not
insuperable.
Among the NGO community, those who pushed hardest for
responsibility of legal persons were those most concerned with finding ways
to
compensate victims of international crimes. The same was true of France and
Solomon Islands which made the final unsuccessful
efforts in Rome to include at
least corporate responsibility. See generally, Joanna Kyriakakis,
‘Corporations and the International
Criminal Court: The Complementarity
Objection Stripped Bare’, (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum
115.
[71] See William A Schabas,
Genocide in International Law (Cambridge, 2000) 286:
Complicity is sometimes described as secondary participation, but when
applied to genocide, there is nothing ‘secondary’
about it. The
‘accomplice’ is often the real villain, and the ‘principal
offender’ a small cog in the machine.
Hitler did not, apparently,
physically murder or brutalize anybody; technically, he was ‘only’
an accomplice to the crime
of genocide.
My impression is that many common law
participants in the ICC negotiations did not appreciate the sharp way in which
some, but not
all, civil law systems tend to distinguish between principals and
those who are linked by complicity. Such distinctions typically
result in clear
differences in the penalties to be imposed. The common law tends to treat them
all as equally guilty, at most mitigating
the penalty for peripheral
participants as a matter of discretion at the penalty stage. See
generally, Joshua Dressler, ‘Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance
as a Lesser Offence?’ (2008) 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law
427. For example, the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, Section 66, treats everyone
as ‘party to and guilty of an offence’ who
actually commits, or who
aids, abets, incites, counsels or procures another to do so. Similarly, the
federal United States complicity
statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 2, provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by
him or another would be an offense against the United
States, is punishable as a
principal.
Many U.S. State statutes are to the same effect. See also, below
n 76 and 77 for related complicity doctrines. While everyone is
a
‘principal’ and liable to the same penalty in such
‘unitary’ jurisdictions, the categories are still significant
for
proof purposes – the prosecution must fit the accused into one or more of
them. Indeed, in a jury trial it may be possible
to leave the jury with
alternative theories that are supported by the evidence. The Rome Statute has
nothing in its substantive or
sentencing provisions to indicate that the
appropriate penalty turns on whether the actor is a primary or secondary party.
Article
78 merely requires, in very general terms, that in determining the
sentence, the Court shall ‘take into account such factors
as the gravity
of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.’ At
this stage of the development of
the Court’s jurisprudence, the obvious
question is what has to be proved to obtain a conviction. For sentencing
purposes,
the Court may later choose to create distinctions based on party
status.
[72] Saland, above n
12,199.
[73] See generally,
Shane Darcy, Collective Responsibility and Accountability under
International Law (2007), Chapter IV (Conspiracy, Common Plan and Joint
Criminal Enterprise Liability); Marja Lehto, International Responsibility for
Terrorist Acts: A Shift Towards More Indirect Forms of Responsibility (2008)
216-32 (Joint Criminal Enterprise). See also the Tokyo Judgment which
comes close to conflating this version of conspiracy and joint enterprise, Neil
Boister & Robert Cryer,
The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A
Reappraisal (2008) 221-27; Wirth, above n 69, 332-4. In a very thoughtful
discussion of the Pre-Trial Chamber decision in Lubanga Dyilo,
Héctor Olásolo considers joint criminal enterprise to be a
‘principal’ theory and Article 25 (3) (d) a
‘residual form of
accessory liability’. See Héctor Olásolo,
‘Developments in the distinction between
principal and accessorial
liability in light of the first case-law of the International Criminal
Court’, in Carsten Stahn &
Göran Sluiter (eds), The Emerging
Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009) 339, 349, 352. See
also, Hector Olàsolo, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and its Extended
Form: A Theory of Co-perpetration
Giving Rise to Principal Liability, a Notion
of Accessorial Liability, or a Form of Partnership in Crime?’ (2009) 20
Criminal Law Forum 263, 279 (discussing the branch of joint criminal
enterprise (‘JCE III’) developed in the tribunals that extends
liability
to ‘those crimes (i) committed beyond the scope of the common
criminal plan because they are not an integral part of it; but
(ii) are,
nevertheless, a natural and foreseeable consequence of its
implementation’).
[74]
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings,
opened for signature 12 January 1998, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered into force 23
May 2001). Adopted by GA Res 52/164, UN GAOR, 52nd sess,
72nd plen mtg, A/RES/52/164
(1997).
[75] Saland, above n
12,199-200.
[76] Recognized as
federal common law in Pinkerton v. U.S.[1946] USSC 113; , 328 US 640 (1946) and law in
some states of the United States. It is rejected by the Model Penal Code and
most state statutes based on that
Code. See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law
(4th ed. 2003)
684-86.
[77] The nearest New
Zealand equivalent, Section 66(2) of the Crimes Act 1961, casts a smaller
net:
Where 2 or more persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful
purpose, and to assist each other therein, each of them
is a party to every
offence committed by any of them in the prosecution of the common purpose if the
commission of that offence was
known to be a probable consequence of the
prosecution of the common purpose.
The Samoan counterpart, Crimes Ordinance
1961, Section 23(2), is identical except that the words ‘was or ought to
have been
known’ replace ‘was known’ in the New Zealand
section. Based on earlier New Zealand legislation, the Samoan negligence
standard is potentially as broad in its effect as the Pinkerton doctrine
in the U.S. The New Zealand and Samoan Acts do not use the term
‘conspiracy’ but the careful reader will notice
the words
‘common purpose’ which turn up again in Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome
Statute. Some versions of the common law felony-murder doctrine (in
jurisdictions that have not abolished it) deal with the common purpose
of say
burglars and robbers as rendering secondary parties liable for homicide, even if
that was the furthest thing from their minds.
It is, in effect, strict liability
as to the mental element of intent to kill. The intent to rob or burgle
suffices, the prosecution
not being required to show knowledge, recklessness or
even negligence in respect of the intentions of the co-felon to kill or risk
killing.
[78] See Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996, UN GAOR, 52nd Sess, Supp. No. 37, 20, UN Doc
A/52/37 (1997) (preliminary working document from Group of Seven major
industrialized countries and
Russian Federation) (word ‘conspiracy’
appears), 38 (proposal by United States) (concept but not word
‘conspiracy’),
39 (proposal by Italy) (closer to final version).
The Terrorist Bombing provision (Article 2(3)(c) of the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing, G.A. Res. 164, U.N.
GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 389, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (1998), entered into
force May 23, 2001) was in turn
based on the Convention Relating to
Extradition between Member States of the European Union, 27 September 1996,
1996 O.J. (C 313) 12 which represented some recognition of conspiracy by
European States. Kai Ambos argues forcefully
that, to the extent that JCE III
(supra note 73) relies on a mens rea element of recklessness or
dolus eventualis, it is incompatible with Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome
Statute and its ‘knowledge’ standard. Kai Ambos, ‘Amicus
Curiae Brief in the Matter of the Co-Prosecutors’ Appeal of the Closing
Order against Kaing Guek Eav ‘Duch’ Dated
8 August 2008’,
(2009) 20 Criminal Law Forum 353,
369.
[79] Article III of the
Genocide Convention requires the criminalization of two inchoate, or
preparatory, offences, conspiracy to commit
genocide and direct and public
incitement to commit genocide. Direct and public incitement to commit genocide
got carried forward
into Article 25(3)(e) of the Rome Statute but
conspiracy was lost. I think the explanation is that many participants were
confused between conspiracy as inchoate offence and
conspiracy as complicity and
thought they had solved all the problems in Article 25(3)(d). See Clark,
‘Drafting a General Part
to a Penal Code’, above n 2,
550-1.
[80] Proposal Submitted
by the United States of America: Draft elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/1999/DP.4/Add.3 (1999). The Rome Statute, Article 9, required the
drafting of Elements in respect of Article 6, 7
and 8. It is not unreasonable to
believe that understanding those articles could be enhanced by spelling out the
effects of Article
25 on
them.
[81] Entitled
‘Inchoate offences’, it actually dealt not only with the inchoate or
preparatory offences of attempt (applicable
to all treaty offences) and
incitement to commit genocide, contained in paragraphs (3)(f) and (e) of Article
25 respectively, but
also ‘solicitation’ and ‘aiding and
abetting’ as modes of complicity (subparagraphs (b), (c) and (d)). It
seemed to misunderstand the distinction between inchoate offences and complicity
issues in general. It also treated incitement to
genocide not as the inchoate
offence that it is but as a mode of complicity. It did not deal with the
problems of individual and
joint responsibility contained in Article 25(3)(a)
which have been the focus of the Lubanga Dyilo and Katanga/Ngudjolo
Chui confirmation decisions. Perhaps it would be useful for the Assembly of
States Parties to return to the subject at some point and
create a working group
to draft appropriate elements for Article
25(3).
[82] Above n 5. There is a
very rich discussion of this aspect of the Lubanga Confirmation decision
in Weigend, above n 49,
476-487.
[83] Ibid 110. At one
point the Prosecutor had a ‘common purpose’ theory under Article
25(3)(d), but apparently abandoned
it in favor of what was thought to be a
stronger case. Ibid 109 n 406. Distinguishing between principals and
accessories is much
more significant for civil lawyers than for common lawyers.
Above n 71. I think this helps explain why there is a heavy reliance
on civil
law jurisprudence and commentators in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s discussion.
See below n 94. The Pre-Trial Chamber notes that Article 25(3)(a)
‘covers the notions of direct perpetration (commission of a crime in
person),
co-perpetration (commission of a crime jointly with another person) and
indirect perpetration (commission of a crime through another
person, regardless
of whether that person is criminally responsible.’ Ibid 109. The Statute
does not actually use the terms
‘perpetrator,’
‘co-perpetrator’ or even ‘principal’; it speaks of one
who ‘commits’
individually or jointly. Note the way The Elements
define ‘perpetrator’, above n 69. The Chamber is here grappling
(very thoughtfully) with what is there described as the mutatis mutandis
issue – the retreat into Latin signifying that the drafters were not sure
where they were going at this
point.
[84] Ibid
113.
[85] Ibid. There is
some obvious overlap here with those who order, solicit or induce (subparagraph
(b)). It is typical of parties provisions
at the domestic level such as those
statutes in n 71, 76 and 77 above that they give prosecutors alternative
theories to pursue.
[86] Ibid
116-7.
[87] I think the word
‘elements’ is used here the way it is used in arts 9 and 30 of the
Statute, but it is possible that
the judges have some other conceptual
framework; certainly they are treating these items as matters that must be
proved ultimately
by the
prosecution.
[88] In examining
the material elements of the offense as it would be carried out by a single
perpetrator, the Chamber looks to The Elements
and treats them as definitive.
When it comes to the corresponding material elements that must be proved in
respect of other parties,
its instincts are surely right: there must be some
mental and material (or objective and subjective) elements ‘out
there’
that can be found in the language or the jurisprudence.
[89] Lubanga Dyilo
confirmation decision, above n 5, 118-24.
[90] Katanga and Ngudjolo
Chui confirmation decision, above n 6,
156-7.
[91] In discussing the
nature of ‘control’ involved, the Chamber invokes what may be
regarded as three ‘circumstance’
elements – ‘control
over the organisation’ (ibid 168-73), ‘organized and
hierarchical apparatus of power’ (ibid 173-4) and ‘execution
of the crimes secured by almost automatic compliance with orders’ (ibid
174-5). There is also a
‘conduct’ element: ‘The leader must
use his control over the apparatus to execute crimes, which means that the
leader, as the perpetrator behind the perpetrator, mobilizes his authority and
power within the organisation to secure compliance
with his orders. Compliance
must include the commission of any of the crimes under the jurisdiction of this
Court’ (Ibid at
174). These seem to be additional to the
material/objective elements discussed in Lubanga Dyilo, above n 78, and
discussed in Katanga and Ngudjolo 177-8, namely: existence of an
agreement or common plan between two or more persons, and coordinated essential
contribution by each
co-perpetrator resulting in the realization of the
objective elements of the crime. The mental/subjective elements that accompany
these, as discussed in Lubanga Dyilo, above n 89, are reiterated here at
178-82.
[92] Katanga and
Ngudjolo Chui confirmation decision, above n 6,
161.
[93] Ibid168.
‘Codified’ is perhaps a little too strong to describe the effects of
the words ‘[c]ommits such a crime
... jointly with another or through
another person’ – the words cry out for further exegesis and the
preparatory work
on them is rather
sparse.
[94] Ibid 169. In an
omitted footnote to this paragraph and in a footnote that follows shortly after,
the Chamber refers mostly to German
scholars and to supportive decisions of the
courts in Germany, Argentina, Peru, Chile and Spain. I am not aware of any
common law
decisions that articulate these principles. My hunch is that, given
the way in which Anglo-American legislation has long treated
the accessory like
a principal, above n 71, there has simply been no need for the common lawyers to
focus too precisely on who is
a principal. The civil law doctrine that finds a
way to class major participants as principals is the civil law’s way of
arriving
at the same end.
[95]
Prosecutor v Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003.
Quote is from the Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui confirmation decision, above
n 6, 171.
[96] Prosecutor v.
Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, 22 March
2006.
[97] Katanga and
Ngudjolo confirmation decision, above n 6,
171-2.
[98] Bemba Gombo
confirmation decision, above n 7, 116-8. (The Chamber here does, however,
follow Pre-Trial Chamber I down the confusing path of speaking of
‘subjective’
and ‘objective’ elements, rather than
‘mental’ and ‘material’
ones.)
[99] Rome Statute,
Article 28(a). Article 28(b) deals with ‘superior and subordinate
relationships not described in paragraph (a)’.
Here the standard of
responsibility is one of recklessness or dolus eventualis, as opposed to
the negligence standard in paragraph
(a).
[100] Bemba Gombo
confirmation decision [354]. On Article 30 as a default rule see also n 14
above.
[101] Ibid [429]. Later
the Chamber notes that it ‘is mindful of the fact that the ‘had
reason to know’ criterion embodied
in the statutes of the ICTR, ICTY and
SCSL sets a different standard to the ‘should have known’ standard
under Article
28 (a) of the Statute’ and raises the question whether the
indicia developed by the ad hoc tribunals for assessing whether an
accused ‘had reason to know’ are helpful in the present context.
Ibid [434].
[102] Ibid
[425-6].
[103] From the Annex
of Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Submission of an
Updated, Consolidated Version of the In-Depth Analysis Chart of Incriminatory
Evidence, 10 November
2008, above n 7. Note that ultimately the Chamber went
beyond this Chart to consider the material also in the light of Article 28
of
the Rome Statute.
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