Costi, Alberta --- "International Human Rights Law - Year in Review" [2008] NZYbkIntLaw 31; (2008) 6 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 295

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The year 2008 was significant for human rights – both internationally and domestically. The 10^th of December 2008 marked the 60^th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),^[1] with a number of commemorative events held throughout the year to mark the occasion. During 2008, the United Nations Human Rights Council also held the first sessions of the new Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism, with New Zealand to be reviewed in May 2009. For New Zealand in particular, 2008 marked the 30^th anniversary of the establishment of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission. New Zealand also ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)^[2] and submitted reports to two of the human rights treaty bodies. This review details New Zealand’s 2008 state practice in the area of human rights.

II. 60^TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UDHR

A. Declaration on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

A number of initiatives were undertaken by the United Nations General Assembly during 2008 to mark the 60^th anniversary of the adoption of the UDHR. The General Assembly adopted a declaration on 10 December, noting that the UDHR ‘will remain a source of progressive development of all human rights’ and ‘remains a relevant ethical compass that guides us in addressing the challenges we face today.’^[3]

B. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Of particular note in terms of protection of human rights at the international level was the consensus adoption by the General Assembly of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.^[4] The adoption concluded a twenty-year campaign for a Protocol, although the actual drafting phase was less than two years. It remedies a significant gap in the international human rights framework by finally providing a mechanism for the protection of economic, social and cultural rights similar to that available for civil and political rights. Once in force, it will enable individuals in those states which are party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)^[5] and have ratified the Protocol to take individual communications to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The Protocol also provides for an inquiry procedure, for interim measures to be ordered and establishes a trust fund for the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. Whether it becomes an effective mechanism for the protection of economic, social and cultural rights at the international level remains to be seen. It is however noted that although the Protocol was adopted by consensus, a number of states expressed reservations about various aspects of it.

Activities commemorating the 60^th anniversary of the UDHR at the domestic level included the re-issue by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the New Zealand Handbook on International Human Rights,^[6] an MFAT essay competition for secondary school students on the relevance of the UDHR, and various awareness-raising activities held by the New Zealand Human Rights Commission, other institutions such as the New Zealand Centre for Public Law,^[7] and non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty International Aotearoa New Zealand.

In September 2008, Parliament enacted the Disability (United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities) Act 2008 to give domestic effect to the provisions of the Convention. This Act amended a number of other statutes and regulations in order to bring New Zealand’s law into conformity with the CRPD. This was followed on 25 September by New Zealand’s ratification of the CRPD. As noted in last year’s review, New Zealand’s contribution to the negotiation and drafting stage of the CRPD was significant.^[8] In May 2008, in the same month that the CRPD entered into force, this contribution was recognised with the award to New Zealand of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt International Disability Award. This Award recognises countries that have made significant improvements in the lives of disabled people through economic, humanitarian and social efforts.

New Zealand continued to be an active observer at the Human Rights Council and its special sessions in 2008, sponsoring a range of thematic and country resolutions including the renewal of country mandates. Along with Mexico, New Zealand led a resolution supporting the mainstreaming of the rights of persons with disabilities including in the work of special procedures.^[9]

During 2008, New Zealand submitted one periodic report and one report with additional information to two of the human rights treaty bodies. New Zealand did not meet the deadline for submitting its third periodic report under ICESCR. Due on 30 June 2008 it was finally submitted in April 2009.

In August 2008, New Zealand submitted additional information^[10] to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination further to a request from that Committee in its concluding observations on New Zealand’s fifteenth-seventeenth periodic report that New Zealand supply further information in relation to four matters.^[11] The first matter concerned the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi Deletion Bill, and New Zealand reported that that non-government Bill had been defeated at its second reading in Parliament.^[12] The second issue concerned the implementation of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, and New Zealand provided information on the status and outcome of various negotiations with certain hapu, as well as applications for customary rights orders under the Foreshore and Seabed Act.^[13] The third issue concerned the references to the Treaty of Waitangi in the New Zealand Education Curriculum, and information on inclusion of such references was provided.^[14] The fourth issue concerned access to schooling for children with parents of illegitimate immigration status, and information on the approach to this issue in the Immigration Bill was provided along with interim measures in place until that Bill is passed.^[15]

In November, New Zealand submitted its third and fourth periodic report^[16] to the Committee on the Rights of the Child under the Convention on the Rights of the Child.^[17] The report covers the period January 2001 to October 2008.

In Van der Plaat v New Zealand,^[18] the Human Rights Committee found that Mr Van der Plaat’s communication against New Zealand was inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.^[19] Mr Van der Plaat had alleged that New Zealand had breached articles 9 (arbitrary detention), 15 (availability of lighter penalty) and 26 (equality before the law) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)^[20] by failing to apply a new sentencing regime to him. Mr Van der Plaat had been found guilty of a number of sexual offences against his daughter spanning a ten-year period. At the time of his conviction and sentence, the applicable provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 entitled Mr Van der Plaat to conditional release after serving two-thirds of his sentence. These provisions were subsequently repealed and replaced by a new sentencing regime in the Sentencing Act 2002 and the Parole Act 2002. Mr Van der Plaat argued that the new sentencing regime introduced in 2002 established a lesser penalty which should have been applied to him. In essence, the claim was that the failure to apply the new sentencing regime (introduced after his conviction and sentence) resulted in direct and consequential breaches of articles 9, 15, and 26 of the ICCPR.
The Human Rights Committee found the communication to be inadmissible on the basis that Mr Van der Plaat had failed to show that he was a ‘victim’ of the alleged violations complained of. The Committee referred to its earlier jurisprudence on changes in sentencing and parole regimes where it had noted that it was not the Committee’s function to make a hypothetical assessment of what would have happened if a new regime had applied.^[21] Arguments such as Mr Van der Plaat’s required speculation and prediction in relation to hypothetical actions of the sentencing judge, and Mr Van der Plaat himself. Release on parole in New Zealand is neither an entitlement nor automatic, and in part depended on the author’s own behaviour. The Committee accordingly found the communication to be inadmissible.

VII. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO NEW ZEALAND

A. Regional Human Rights Mechanisms in Asia-Pacific

The Asia-Pacific region remains the only region in the world without a formal mechanism for protecting and promoting human rights. There were some developments of note during 2008 in this context. Given the diversity and complexity of the wider Asia-Pacific region, it seems unlikely that a pan-Asia-Pacific human rights mechanism will be established. Political focus in recent years appears to have shifted to the possibility of separate mechanisms for the sub-regions of Asia and the Pacific.
In Asia, discussions of a sub-regional human rights mechanism are centring around the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the 2007 ASEAN Charter.^[22] Article 14 of the ASEAN Charter calls for the creation of an ASEAN human rights body. In February 2008, ASEAN established a high-level panel to draft the terms of reference for a regional human rights body. It is expected that a final proposal may be adopted by ASEAN during 2009.^[23] In the Pacific, discussions of a sub-regional mechanism are focused on the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the 2005 Pacific Plan.^[24] Initiative 12.5 of the Plan refers to the possibility of a regional human rights arrangement. In April 2008, a non-governmental Symposium was held in Samoa which considered the possible development of a regional Pacific human rights mechanism.^[25]
In September 2008, the Australian Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade commenced an inquiry into Human Rights Mechanisms and the Asia-Pacific.^[26] Further developments in relation to sub-regional human rights mechanisms are likely to have implications for New Zealand’s future state practice in this area.

On 18 December 2008, New Zealand was one of 66 countries which supported a historic non-binding joint statement calling for an end to human rights abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity and seeking to decriminalise homosexuality.^[27] The statement, read by Argentina at a plenary session of the General Assembly, marked the first time that the General Assembly has formally addressed rights violations based on sexual orientation and gender identity.

The Human Rights Commission was involved in a number of activities during 2008 associated with the 60^th anniversary of the UDHR, as well as New Zealand’s ratification of the CRPD. A notable achievement during 2008 was the publication in January of the Commission’s report on its Transgender Inquiry, the world’s first inquiry by a national human rights institution into discrimination experienced by transgender people.^[28] The report focuses on three key areas – experiences of discrimination, access to health services, and barriers to legal recognition of gender status. In March, the Commission released its third biennial benchmark report, the New Zealand Census of Women’s Participation 2008 which monitors women’s progress in a number of areas of governance, management and employment.^[29] In September, a significant milestone was reached with the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the New Zealand Human Rights Commission on 1 September 1978.

Compared to 2007, when, for example, the UN General Assembly adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration),^[30] there have been fewer major developments in Indigenous peoples’ rights under international law in 2008.^[31]

Nonetheless, international jurisprudence on Indigenous peoples’ rights under international law continues to develop, as international institutions, especially the UN human rights treaty bodies, continue to apply international law on Indigenous peoples’ rights to concrete situations. This jurisprudence reinforces the legitimacy of Indigenous peoples’ rights under international law and, moreover, will continue to impact on New Zealand as it reports to, or appears before, international institutions.

New Zealand has continued to display a reluctance to recognise the Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration or, indeed, international legal obligations related to Indigenous peoples. It omits references to Indigenous peoples and their rights during speeches in international fora where it would have been appropriate to comment upon them,^[32] and in one case sought to delete a reference to Indigenous peoples’ rights in a draft international document related to climate change.^[33]

A. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

New Zealand supported the UN General Assembly’s (unanimous) adoption of an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR Optional Protocol),^[34] which provides a right for individuals to bring communications to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR Committee). The ratification process will begin in 2009. The ICESCR is of utmost significance to Indigenous peoples particularly because of its express mention of peoples’ right to self-determination and cultural rights.
New Zealand indicated its view, in the UN General Assembly, that collectives, like Indigenous peoples, should not be able to bring a communication based on the collective right to self-determination given that the ICESCR Optional Protocol permits communications from individuals, and not collectives.^[35] Individuals should not be able to bring claims based on collective rights. New Zealand relied on the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee (that applies the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), which has refused to hear communications from Indigenous collectives on the ground that only individuals can bring communications.^[36] However, the Human Rights Committee has also established precedent that it will consider Indigenous collectives’ rights to self-determination when interpreting the Indigenous individuals’ right to culture, which could well be followed by the CESCR Committee.^[37]

New Zealand, along with Australia, Canada, and the United States (CANZUS), successfully sought the removal of a reference to Indigenous peoples’ rights in a draft decision on Reduced Emissions Deforestation and Forest Degradation negotiations conducted under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.^[38] Many other states, such as Mexico and Norway, attempted to include the reference to Indigenous peoples’ rights. Indigenous peoples loudly criticised CANZUS for its position internationally.^[39]

III. ADOPTION OF NATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS ON MATTERS OF INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

After the 2008 elections, the National Party and Maori Party agreed in their coalition agreement that the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 (FSA) would be reviewed in 2009. The review is likely to consider the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’s 2005 decision that the FSA discriminates against Maori and that the Government,^[40] and the criticisms of it expressed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of fundamental freedoms and human rights of Indigenous peoples (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples).

IV. INTERNATIONAL OVERSIGHT OF NEW ZEALAND’S COMPLIANCE WITH INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHTS

A. UN Special Rapporteur Oversight

In 2007 the UN Special Rappoteur on the situation of fundamental freedoms and human rights of indigenous peoples (SR on Indigenous Peoples), the UN Special Rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights and the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Human Rights Defenders sent a letter to New Zealand. It expressed concern about the Police’s treatment of a number of people, including Māori, when it searched and seized them, and their property, under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 in October 2007.^[41]

New Zealand responded by explaining that the Solicitor General had declined to charge those arrested under the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 and stressed the application of human rights guarantees and challenges to police action.^[42]

In September 2008 New Zealand provided responses to questions asked by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the CERD Committee) in 2007. The Government stated that references to the Treaty of Waitangi would continue to be included in legislation and that it had been in negotiations with two Maori tribes in connection with the Foreshore and Seabed Act.^[43]

The New Zealand Human Rights Commission also sent a letter to the CERD Committee describing its activities in support of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.^[44]

V. DISCUSSION OF INTERNATIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA

In its statement on Indigenous issues at the UN General Assembly Third Committee, New Zealand focused on support for Maori education and language, and omitted, again, any reference to the Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration or their rights under international law generally.^[45] Similarly, New Zealand called for attention to indigenous languages and women in its comments on the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of fundamental freedoms and human rights of Indigenous peoples (Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples).^[46]

At the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, New Zealand highlighted its policies to deal with Maori issues, especially socio-economic disparities,^[47] and its role in the Pacific, particularly highlighting its support for customary law in Vanuatu.

New Zealand participated in the inaugural meeting of the UN Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (EMRIP), stressing: the need to mainstream Indigenous peoples’ perspectives in the work of the UN Human Rights Council;^[48] the need to coordinate the work of the EMRIP with that of the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples;^[49] and the importance of an Indigenous peoples’ right to education.^[50]

D. 1991 Convention on Biological Diversity Conference of the Parties
(COP 9)

New Zealand ratified the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1994 and, since then, has participated in various work programmes associated with the Convention and the bi-annual meetings of the Conference of the Parties (COPs). The ninth COP met in Bonn, Germany in May 2008.
There are a number of specialised working groups that guide the work of the COPs and many are of relevance to Indigenous peoples, including the Working Group on Article 8(j) of the Convention, which requires States parties to respect, preserve and maintain Indigenous communities’ knowledge, innovations, and practices.
The CBD’s Working Group on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS Working Group) is also important for Indigenous peoples as it is tasked to develop guidelines to assist States Parties and other stakeholders with the implementation of the CBD’s access and benefit sharing provisions, including in relation to Indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge. It met in January 2008, producing a working document on the international regime relating to access and benefit sharing of biodiversity.^[51] New Zealand is recorded as suggesting

using traditional knowledge only with the approval of knowledge holders; identifying individuals or organizations to grant approval on behalf of a community; resolving conflicts between rights holders at the national level; and recognizing existing customary rights.^[52]

The 9^th COP in 2008 requested that the ABS Working Group ‘complete the elaboration and negotiation of the international access and benefit-sharing regime.’^[53]

The World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources (IGC) continued its work on traditional knowledge in 2008. Its mandate is to debate and dialogue on the interplay between intellectual property, traditional knowledge, genetic resources and traditional cultural expressions and, in that context, to consider the possible development of an international instrument or instruments.
During the February and October 2008 meetings of the WIPO IGC, New Zealand:

VI. EVENTS/DEVELOPMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND/OR OF PARTICULAR RELEVANCE TO NEW ZEALAND

There have been a number of developments in international human rights treaty bodies’ jurisprudence on the rights of Indigenous peoples that contribute to the development of customary international law on Indigenous peoples’ rights and are of particular relevance to New Zealand, particularly for any future reports or communications by Maori.

The human rights treaty bodies’ strong support for Indigenous peoples’ land, political and cultural rights, including an Indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior and informed consent to activities that may impact upon them, is of particular note. New Zealand’s decision to vote against the Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration was premised on its objection to Indigenous peoples’ land and political rights in particular.^[60]

Moreover, a number of the human rights treaty bodies, and the Human Rights Council, recommended that states take measures to implement the Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration and/or ratify the International Labour Organisation’s Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples No 169.^[61]

As one would expect, CESCR Committee urges states to particularly respect and protect Indigenous peoples’ economic, social and cultural rights. In doing so, it also requires states to respect Indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands and territories. In 2008, it:

In 2008 the CEDAW Committee also indirectly supported Indigenous peoples’ land rights by expressing concern about states’ failures to adequately protect Indigenous women’s access to land.^[72]

The CERD Committee has some of the most progressive jurisprudence on Indigenous peoples’ rights, and has recommended that states read their CERD Convention obligations in the light of the Indigenous Peoples’ Declaration. For example, in 2008, it:

Under the early warning and urgent action procedure, the CERD Committee sent a number of letters to states expressing concern about violations of Indigenous peoples’ rights including:

The Human Rights Committee similarly sought to uphold indigenous peoples’ political, cultural and land rights. For example, in observations on state reports, it:

The Human Rights Council’s universal periodic review of states’ human rights records began in 2008. While the Human Rights Council is made up states, it, too, encouraged the recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights, which will be relevant when New Zealand presents its report to the Human Rights Council in 2009. For example:

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

In the light of New Zealand’s leadership role in its negotiation, the successful conclusion of the Cluster Munitions Convention was the defining achievement for New Zealand in 2008. Less dramatically, but important nonetheless, significant progress was also made in the area of protection of cultural property in armed conflict. The year was a relatively routine one in terms of New Zealand’s involvement in international criminal law, although there were indications of potential complications looming on the horizon.

On 3 December 2008, New Zealand signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo. The treaty bans the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention or transfer of cluster munitions (Article 1). It requires states parties to destroy all cluster munitions under their jurisdiction and control within eight years (Article 3). It contains extensive obligations regarding clearance and destruction of existing cluster munitions remnants within ten years and regarding the provision of victim assistance (Articles 4 and 5). States parties are required to report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations within six months of the treaty’s entry into force on progress with implementation and thereafter submit annual reports (Article 7). At the signing ceremony, 94 states signed the treaty, and four ratifications had already been deposited by the end of 2008. It was hoped that the treaty would attract the requisite 30 ratifications and enter into force during the course of 2009.^[95]
The successful conclusion of the treaty had been a priority for New Zealand, and one that had domestic support across the political spectrum. New Zealand was one of six countries (the others being Austria, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Peru) to form a ‘core group’, the aim of which was to work towards concluding a treaty banning cluster munitions outside of the Conventional Weapons Convention framework. Starting with a meeting in Oslo in February 2007 and culminating in Dublin in May 2008 when the treaty text was adopted, the so-called ‘Oslo Process’ involved a series of major conferences convened to discuss in general terms the contours of the treaty.^[96] The last of those was hosted by New Zealand in February 2008. The treaty negotiation proper was conducted in Dublin from 19-30 May 2008, at the conclusion of which 107 states adopted the treaty. The treaty opened for signature in Oslo on 3 December 2008 and New Zealand was among the 94 states to sign at that time. In line with established practice, having signed the treaty, New Zealand will now move to enact domestic legislation and submit the treaty for the treaty examination procedures, before ratification. The signature at the opening ceremony signals that the incoming centre-right government, led by the National Party and in office only a matter of weeks at the time, is continuing New Zealand’s position of supporting the treaty.
Turning to the treaty text itself, an important aspect is its humanitarian focus, a point repeatedly made by states participating in the negotiations and evident from the treaty text in a number of respects. First, the Preamble has a strong emphasis on the human impact of cluster munitions, stressing the determination of states to ‘ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munitions victims and recognising their inherent dignity’.^[97] Second, the victim assistance provisions are unprecedented. While earlier treaties have included victim assistance provisions, the Cluster Munitions Convention goes much further. First, victims are defined and that definition is very broad. Pursuant to Article 2, victims are

all persons who have been killed or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected families and communities.

Thus, the treaty provides redress for those directly and indirectly affected by cluster munitions. Second, the treaty imposes specific victim assistance obligations. Article 5(1) provides:

Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.

Article 5(2) goes on to enumerate a non-exhaustive list of actions a state ought to take in protecting victims. States parties are also required to ensure victim assistance is developed and implemented in national laws and policies, to develop national plans and budgets for activities, and to closely consult and actively involve cluster munitions victims in carrying out victim assistance.
A third aspect of the text to underscore the humanitarian focus of the treaty is the way in which the obligation to protect victims is couched in mandatory language. Reflecting the mandatory nature of the provision, states are required to include information on their assistance to victims in their reporting on compliance with the treaty (Article 7(1)(k)).
The combined effect of these provisions is an unprecedented concern with the humanitarian impact of the weapons in a disarmament treaty and manifests the idea that disarmament ought to be seen as a question of human security, not exclusively one of state security.^[98] However, despite the general ‘human security’ tenor of the treaty, issues of national security were, as one would expect, highly contested. This is reflected in the narrow and detailed definition of cluster munitions in Article 2(2):

‘Cluster munition’ means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not mean the following:

(iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a single target object;

(iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-destruction mechanism;

(v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-deactivating feature; ... .

The overall effect of the cumulative criteria in Article 2(2)(c) is that the cluster munitions banned by the treaty are a relatively narrow category of cluster munitions. While the vast majority of existing cluster munitions will fall within the definition, the detail of this definition will inevitably lead to future development of cluster bombs that do not fall foul of the definition.
The question of ‘interoperability’ in the negotiations also reflected the traditional national security concerns among the negotiators and was one of the most difficult issues. Interoperability refers to the question of how the treaty applies during military activities undertaken jointly between states parties to the treaty and those states remaining outside. The question was particularly important for the NATO states because of their involvement in Afghanistan and the need to continue cooperating with the United States, which has remained firmly outside the negotiations.
In legal terms, the problem arose from the precise formulation of Article 1(1):

The question arises as to whether the effect of Article 1(1)(c) is to prohibit a state party involved in joint military operation with a non state party from providing security for storage of cluster munitions, or providing transportation of those munitions, or even for providing defence for such transportation. The aim of the interoperability provision in Article 21 is to clarify this. Article 21(3) provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.

Understandably, not everyone was happy with the compromise, or indeed wanted a compromise at all. However, the reality was that in light of the ongoing joint operations in Afghanistan with the United States (which has remained outside all the negotiations and is not expected to adopt the treaty at any time in the foreseeable future), some explicit acknowledgement of the interoperability question had to be made. It remains to be seen how it will play out in practice.
A final aspect of the treaty to be noted briefly is the way in which it was negotiated. This is the second disarmament instrument to be negotiated outside of the traditional multilateral framework, specifically to avoid the consensus stalled mechanisms within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. While New Zealand was an active supporter of the Oslo Process, it has been careful to express continued support for the more traditional, ‘pure’ multilateral avenues of negotiation.^[99]
New Zealand does not possess, and has not possessed cluster munitions, so in that respect domestic implementation will be relatively simple.^[100] However, the New Zealand Superannuation Fund had about NZ$21million invested in Lockheed Martin Corp, a manufacturer of cluster munitions. With the signature of the treaty, the Fund announced its intention to sell those shares in order to comply with its investment policy to avoid prejudicing New Zealand’s reputation as a responsible member of the international community.

III. CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND ITS PROTOCOLS^[101]

New Zealand ratified the Convention (not the Protocols) on 24 October 2008, having been a signatory state since 1954, when the treaty was originally concluded. As its name suggests, the treaty puts in place a series of obligations designed to protect cultural property in armed conflict. Cultural property is defined as being ‘movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people’ as well as centres containing such property, such as museums, monuments and so on (Article 1). The obligations in the treaty are broadly threefold. First, in peacetime parties are required to identify cultural property within their territories and take steps to safeguard that property in the event of conflict (Article 3). The second obligation arises during armed conflict, whereby states undertake to refrain from using cultural property or its immediate surroundings for purposes likely to expose that property to destruction or damage, and to refrain from directing acts of hostility against such property (Article 4). Thirdly, states undertake to prohibit, prevent and put a stop to theft, pillage, vandalism, requisitioning or misappropriation of cultural property and to refrain from any acts of reprisal against cultural property (Article 4(3)). These obligations are supplemented by provisions providing for a special emblem to clearly identify protected property and also by Article 7, which obliges States Parties to educate its Armed Forces in order to ‘foster a spirit of respect’.
The delay in ratification (over 50 years) does not appear to be caused by any opposition to the ideals of the treaty itself. It is more likely that ratification was not a priority, indeed may have been considered redundant in that the obligations in the treaty are already met in domestic law and in any event, have to a great extent been overtaken by other instruments. For example, the Article 4(3) requirement to provide criminal legislation had already been met. In terms of the peacetime obligation to put in place measures to protect cultural property, consultations carried out by the Ministry for Culture and Heritage seemed to reveal that such safeguards were already in place.^[102] Further, in terms of the wartime obligations, current operational practice (training and field operations) already comply with the treaty’s obligations. The latter is not surprising given the subsequent provisions in the 1977 Additional Protocols, to which New Zealand is party. Article 53, First Additional Protocol prohibits ‘attacks against historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples’. It goes on to prohibit the use of cultural property in support of the military effort and says that they cannot be the object of reprisals. Dealing with non international armed conflict, Article 15 of the Second Additional Protocol prohibits acts of hostility against cultural property. Thus, regardless of ratification of the 1954 Cultural Property Convention, New Zealand was obliged to protect cultural property in any event.^[103] It is also worth noting that the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to prosecute related war crimes (Articles 8(2)(b)(iv) and 8(2)(e)(iv)).
The likely explanation for the ratification at this point is that New Zealand wished to ratify the treaty’s two Protocols. The First Protocol, concluded at the same time as the parent treaty in 1954, deals with the exportation of cultural property and the restitution of illegally exported objects, and was not included in the main part of the treaty owing to disagreement about these provisions.^[104] The Second Protocol (1999) sets out a system of enhanced protection for property that is of the ‘greatest importance for humanity’, reflecting the developments in the 1977 Additional Protocols.^[105]
Treaty examination process of all three instruments took place in May 2008, when the National Interest Analysis (NIA) was tabled as per Standing Orders. The NIA, which is exceptionally thorough and informative, covers all three instruments.^[106] The treaty and the Protocols, together with the NIA, were considered by the Government Administration Committee which reported to Parliament that it had no matters to bring to the attention of the House. Legislation necessary to implement the Protocols, prior to ratification, has been prepared and is currently before Parliament.^[107]

In April 2008, the Supreme Court held that evidence presented in the course of a refugee appeal case could be disclosed to other New Zealand government agencies for purposes other than determining the appeal.^[108] The claimant is a Rwandan national and the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the Rwandan authorities, alleging that he committed the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity during the Rwandan genocide. Thus, X was seeking an assurance that the evidence led in the refugee determination proceedings could not be used by the New Zealand government to engage in any subsequent prosecution or consider any extradition request made by the Rwandan authorities.
The case demonstrates many of the potential difficulties facing a country in dealing with an alleged perpetrator of international crimes and to balance that with ensuring the integrity of a safe and credible refugee determination process. While the International Crimes and International Criminal Court Act 2000 creates jurisdiction for the courts to prosecute genocide committed outside New Zealand, relying on that legislation will inevitably raise vexed questions of the legality (as a matter of international law) of the assertion of universal jurisdiction. There are also the closely related questions of whether there might be a duty on New Zealand to prosecute, or at least investigate X. Questions also arise as to whether, in light of concerns about Rwanda’s criminal justice system, New Zealand would breach its human rights obligations if it attempted to return X to Rwanda.
While none of these questions fall to be considered as yet (the refugee appeal is still pending), the case itself illustrates some of the complexities involved in domestic prosecutions of international crimes.

Following elections in November, the change to a centre-right National-led government may well herald a shifting of New Zealand’s priorities in foreign policy. However, in the specific context of international humanitarian law and international criminal law, immediate indications are that there will be no major departures from the previous government’s positions.

In this year of election, there were few substantive changes to New Zealand’s international environmental law obligations. The state acceded to the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships Ballast Water and Sediments 2004.^[109] The discharge of ballast water in New Zealand waters risks the release of pest organisms and this, in turn, endangers the marine environment and has potential deleterious economic, social and cultural consequences. The Convention establishes a strict, standardised regime to control such risks by including, for example, performance standards that will provide for ballast water to be disinfected prior to discharge. The level of protection provided by the procedures established under the Convention exceeds those currently operating pursuant to the Biosecurity Act 1993 (NZ). Domestically, amendments to the Marine Transport Act 1994 (NZ) will be required to give effect to the obligations imposed by the Convention. The Convention will enter into force twelve months after thirty states (representing thirty five percent of world merchant shipping tonnage) have become members. To date there are fourteen member states.
In the sphere of climate change, the Labour Government (2005-2008) promulgated both the Electricity (Renewable Preference) Amendment Act 2008 which sought to place restrictions on the development of new base-load electricity generation from fossil fuel sources and the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008 which established the rules for an ‘all sectors, all greenhouse gases’ emissions trading scheme to be implemented from 2008 onwards. This legislation was introduced to assist New Zealand in meeting the greenhouse gas mitigation obligations imposed by the 1997 Kyoto Protocol^[110] to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992.^[111] The incoming National-Act Government quickly repealed the Electricity (Renewable Preference) Amendment Act 2008 in December 2008 and, at the time of writing, is in the process of reviewing the emissions trading legislation. Internationally, New Zealand continues to play a role in negotiations within the COPS / MOPS but has not accepted any further mitigation commitments for post 2012.

In September 2008 the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) issued recommendations regarding the limits of New Zealand’s continental shelf beyond the exclusive economic zone (the outer continental shelf).^[112] With the CLCS’s recommendations, New Zealand’s rights to approximately 1.7 million km² were confirmed.^[113] Although New Zealand had rights to the resources of the seabed prior to the CLCS’s deliberations, once New Zealand sets its continental shelf boundaries in accordance with the recommendations, they are binding on other countries.^[114]
New Zealand’s submission, the fifth such claim, was made in April 2006 following a $44 million project to determine the geophysical nature of the continental shelf. New Zealand’s submission was expressed as a partial submission, noting that coordinates relating to the continental shelf off the Ross Dependency (New Zealand’s claim to Antarctic territory) may be submitted in future.^[115] Japan and the Netherlands submitted notes verbales to the CLCS confirming their position that they do not recognise claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica and their consequent view that no claim to the resources of the continental shelf off Antarctica is possible.^[116]
As is usual practice, the submission was considered by a Subcommission of the CLCS. 11 meetings were held between the Subcommission and the New Zealand delegation. The Subcommission’s recommendations were then referred to the CLCS, which held 2 meetings with the delegation.
New Zealand acted quickly to make its submission before a nominal deadline of 13 May 2009. Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention originally were expected to make submissions within 10 years of the entry into force of the Convention for states,^[117] but it became clear that this was unrealistic, and was extended to the 2009 deadline.^[118] It has been suggested that no legal consequences would attach to a state’s failure to make a submission by the deadline because a state’s rights to continental shelf resources are considered not to be reliant on a prior claim.^[119] Nevertheless, there are concerns about the workload of the CLCS as increasing numbers of states make submissions, which could result in lengthy delays in issuing recommendations. Therefore New Zealand gained an advantage by making an early submission and getting an early result.
With the CLCS’s recommendations, only a few issues remain to be resolved in respect of New Zealand’s maritime boundaries. The boundary of the extended continental shelf and exclusive economic zone with Australia was determined in 2004.^[120] Potential boundaries with Fiji, Tonga and France (in respect of New Caledonia) remain to be agreed.
Two sets of regulations were issued in 2008, establishing three safety zones around installations related to oil exploitation off the Taranaki coast. The Continental Shelf (Umuroa Installation Safety Zone) Regulations 2008^[121] established a safety zone around the floating production, storage and offloading installation Umuroa. Ships unrelated to the servicing of the oilfield and the installation are not permitted to enter the safety zone which is big enough to allow the vessel to pivot above its mooring point plus 500 metres. The Continental Shelf (Maari Development Safety Zones) Regulations 2008^[122] established two further safety zones on similar terms around a wellhead platform and the floating production, storage and offloading installation Raroa. As the largest safety zone is a circle of 1507 m in diameter, it is not expected that these zones will impact detrimentally on navigation in the area.

New Zealand has continued to be heavily involved in the work of the International Whaling Commission. The government has been involved in the small working group on the future of the IWC, although that group only made moderate progress in 2008. New Zealand continues to express its opposition to Japanese Scientific permit whaling, particularly that conducted in the Southern Ocean. One significant development in 2008 was the announcement that Australia, Chile and New Zealand would cooperate in a research project in the Southern Ocean.^[123] The intention was to demonstrate the value of non-lethal research and the planning of the project will commence in 2009.

Progress continues to be made in the negotiations towards a convention establishing a South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, to apply to non-tuna species in the Pacific. The independent chair of the negotiations, Bill Mansfield, is a New Zealander, and New Zealand is funding the interim secretariat until July 2009. Two meetings were held in 2008: in Guayaquil, Ecuador in March; and in Canberra, Australia, in October. A workshop on Chilean Jack Mackerel was held in Santiago, Chile in July 2008.
As reported in 2007, states negotiating SPRFMO created a series of interim measures to be applied before the entry into force of the Convention giving effect to General Assembly Resolution 61/105 aimed at protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems.^[124] New Zealand has implemented the SPRFMO Interim Measures for high seas bottom trawl fisheries through regulation of New Zealand fishing vessels operating in the SPRFMO area. The Ministry of Fisheries has analysed the historic fishing data to identify areas in which New Zealand vessels have fished, and divided them into heavily fished, moderately fished, and lightly fished areas.^[125] Lightly trawled blocks have been closed to further fishing. Moderately trawled blocks are subject to a ‘move on’ principle, where vessels will be required to move 5 nm away from any position where there is evidence of a vulnerable marine ecosystem on the sea floor, usually determined by the level of by-catch. Finally, heavily trawled blocks are considered to be open fishing areas. A small sample of the heavily and moderately fished blocks will also be closed as representative samples of more intensely fished areas.
Measures have also been undertaken in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) to constrain bottom fishing and avoid adverse impacts on vulnerable marine living resources in the CCAMLR area. New Zealand gave effect to these measures during 2008 through the conditions on high seas fishing permits issued to vessels operating in the CCAMLR area. CCAMLR has prohibited the use of bottom trawling in the high seas unless there are conservation measures in place in that area for use of bottom trawling gear.^[126] Because no such conservation measures have been created, New Zealand has restricted its vessels to using only bottom longlines.^[127] In addition to the prohibition on bottom trawling, CCAMLR has required a range of information collection and procedural rules to ensure that vulnerable marine ecosystems can be identified and protected,^[128] which have also been implemented by New Zealand.
In November 2008, the Ministry of Fisheries published the New Zealand Plan of Action for Sharks,^[129] pursuant to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisations International Plan of Action for Sharks. Recommended actions include reviewing regulations for currently managed shark fishing; improving information collected about shark habitat, abundance and harvesting; education about shark finning; and strengthened enforcement of domestic legislation.

The extent of New Zealand’s rights as a port state to conduct an inspection of a foreign flagged vessel and report violations of international fisheries regulations to the relevant regional fisheries management organisation were unsuccessfully challenged in this case. The Paloma V, a fishing vessel flagged to Namibia, entered New Zealand on 16 May 2008 after fishing in the Southern Ocean. New Zealand and Namibia are both members of CCAMLR. The Commission requires member states to inspect vessels entering their ports carrying toothfish, to determine whether the vessel has complied with CCAMLR conservation measures.^[131] If a violation is detected, the port state must not allow the catch to be landed, and reports to this effect are sent to the flag state, the CCAMLR Secretariat, and other member states. One potential outcome of such a report is that the vessel may be put on a list of vessels conducting illegal fishing (IUU vessel list), with serious consequences for the vessel including denial of fishing licences and entry into port.
New Zealand has implemented this conservation measure through the Fisheries Act 1996. Foreign flagged fishing vessels that have caught fish outside New Zealand waters and wish to enter New Zealand ports must apply for approval in advance to possess the fish in New Zealand waters.^[132] Conditions may be attached to that approval. General powers of search and seizure are granted by the Act, and the Act also implements the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement through section 113S, which provides that fisheries officers may inspect foreign vessels on the high seas or in New Zealand waters under certain circumstances.
Upon entry into the port of Auckland, the Paloma V was searched pursuant to the Fisheries Act 1996 and the CCAMLR conservation measures. Evidence was found indicating that the vessel had interacted with vessels on the CCAMLR IUU vessel list, that crew had recently worked on IUU vessels, and that the Paloma V had been involved in refuelling and resupplying IUU vessels. The Paloma V’s approval to land its catch was revoked, and New Zealand intended to report the conduct to CCAMLR member states.
The owner of the Paloma V sought an injunction in the High Court preventing New Zealand reporting to CCAMLR on the basis that the search was contrary to the provisions of the Fisheries Act which provided for specific procedures in section 113S where officers wish to search a foreign fishing vessel. Justice Mallon rejected that argument on several grounds, including the broad rights of a port state to impose conditions for entry into internal waters.^[133] Mallon J also found that the conditions of the approval were not ultra vires. The Fisheries Act 1996 requires the powers under the Act to be exercised consistently with New Zealand’s international obligations, and the Judge found that New Zealand was entitled to deny entry to its ports to vessels that have been involved in illegal fishing.^[134] New Zealand ultimately submitted a report on the vessel’s activities to CCAMLR.
Although the decision is brief due to the urgent nature of the case, it is useful confirmation that the Fisheries Act 1996 permits fisheries officers to use their search and seizure powers when conducting port inspections of foreign fishing vessels for their compliance with conservation measures established by regional fisheries management organisations. The case was made somewhat easier by the fact that the Paloma V was flagged to Namibia, a member of CCAMLR, and that CCAMLR has issued measures supporting port state inspections.

New Zealand continued its participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative Operational Experts Group in 2008. The major event for New Zealand was Exercise Maru, held in Auckland in September 2008. In addition to a range of New Zealand government agencies, other countries were involved in the exercise including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Singapore, United Kingdom and the United States. The exercise involved live ship-boarding exercises, container inspections and a desk-top exercise.

The New Zealand government is continuing to consider becoming party to a number of international maritime conventions. These include the Convention on Liability for Maritime Claims Protocol 1996; the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 and the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Cooperation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000. No final decisions on these were reached in 2008. Plans are under way to give effect to MARPOL 73/78 Annex IV in the short term. The government has agreed in principle to New Zealand becoming a party to the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments 2004. Legislation allowing for the implementation of the Convention should be completed in 2009.^[135] In 2008 a decision was made to not pursue becoming party to the International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea 1996.
New Zealand continued to contribute to the work of the International Maritime Organisation in 2008. One notable contribution was New Zealand’s lead role in coordinating a Correspondence Group on developing international measures for minimising the transfer of invasive aquatic species through bio-fouling of ships.^[136] The Correspondence Group recommended the development of guidelines based on best practice for dealing with the problems caused by bio-fouling of ships.

I. 1980 CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING RESOURCES (CCAMLR)

In many respects the case of the fishing vessel Paloma V dominated New Zealand’s year in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in 2008. A key outcome for New Zealand in the fight against illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Southern Ocean in 2008 was the agreement of the Commission at its 27^th annual meeting to confirm the Paloma V on CCAMLR’s Non-Contracting Party IUU Vessel List.

On 27 June 2008 a full substantive hearing took place in the High Court in Wellington in the judicial review proceedings brought against the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Fisheries by the owners of the Namibian-flagged fishing vessel Paloma V which had called into the port of Auckland in May 2008 to unload toothfish.^[137] New Zealand Fishery Officers had examined the vessel and found information aboard showing that it had been involved in supporting IUU fishing operations, under the direction of the Spanish company Vidal Armadores S.A. The vessel’s owners had then instructed lawyers to try to stop New Zealand reporting this information to CCAMLR and proposing the vessel for inclusion in CCAMLR’s Contracting Party IUU vessel list. On 20 June the Court had granted interim relief and New Zealand had been ordered not to report to CCAMLR pending the full hearing on 27 June.
On 1 July the Court released its decision on the substance of the case. New Zealand was successful on all points, with the Court accepting the central issue that, as the Ministries contended, the Ministry of Fisheries could rely on the general power to examine vessels in port under section 199 of the Fisheries Act 1996 (and the related power to take and copy records under section 206) and was not, as the vessel owners contended, required to follow the special, more limited, high seas boarding and inspection regime under Part 6A of the Act. The applicant decided not to appeal. Accordingly, New Zealand provided the CCAMLR Secretariat and Namibia (as flag State of the vessel) with a report on its examination of the Paloma V. Namibia shortly thereafter deregistered the vessel.
The Paloma V was confirmed on CCAMLR’s Non-Contracting Party IUU Vessel List based on evidence found during its inspection that it had transhipped, resupplied and participated in joint fishing operations with vessels identified by CCAMLR as carrying out IUU fishing activities. The material found on the Paloma V provided important insights into how IUU fishing operations in the Southern Ocean are organised and conducted.

CCAMLR’s response to United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 61/105 on sustainable fisheries was a focus for the Commission meeting in 2008.^[138] A new interim Conservation Measure on bottom fishing activities encountering potential Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (VMEs) in the Convention Area, proposed by New Zealand, was adopted. The Measure was essentially addressed to bottom long-lining as CCAMLR has prohibitions in place on bottom trawling and gillnetting in the high seas areas of the Convention Area. The aim of the CM was to provide for the acquisition of additional data during the 2008-09 season while taking a precautionary approach to potential impacts on VMEs.

Antarctic tourism was a particular focus of ATCM XXXI, given the concern of many Parties at the industry’s continuing uncontrolled growth (32,637 passengers had landed in Antarctica over the 2007/08 season compared with 29,530 in 2006/07), the risks to the environment and human life of a major incident in the Treaty area and the undesirability of tourism facilities being developed on land. In particular, the loss of the Liberian-registered tourist vessel M/V Explorer in the Bransfield Strait near the South Shetland Islands in November 2007 was seen by many as a “wake-up call”.^[139]
In addition the International Hydrographic Commission Hydrographic Commission on Antarctica conducted a seminar during the meeting which further heightened Parties’ concerns around passenger shipping in the Treaty area. During the seminar it was noted that only fifteen percent of the Antarctic Peninsula had been surveyed and, of that, less than ten percent had been surveyed to modern standards. Seminar participants suggested it was not a case of “if” but “when” a major accident involving a tourist vessel would occur in the Antarctic Treaty area.^[140]
New Zealand’s offer to host an Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts (ATME) on the Management of Ship-borne Tourism in the Antarctic Treaty Area in Wellington in December 2009 was welcomed by the meeting. It was agreed that the terms of reference for the meeting would be confirmed at ATCM XXXII in Baltimore in April 2009.
New Zealand also introduced Resolution 6 (2008) on Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres and Search and Rescue in the Antarctic Treaty Area, which was approved by Treaty Parties. The Resolution recommends that vessels operating inside the Antarctic Treaty Area report their positions to the relevant Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre on a regular basis.

Trevor Hughes
Head, Antarctic Policy Unit
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

2008 was a frustrating year for multilateral trade. The year began with hopes that members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) would work together to bring a conclusion to the Doha Development Round that began in 2001. Alas, it was not to be, and while some progress was made, not only did the year end without a Doha deal, but international trade flows had begun to decline at their most rapid rate since the 1930s, prompting fears of a retreat into protectionism.^[141] The economic crisis presents the WTO with one of its greatest challenges to date. Will its relevance decline as political interests dominate domestic policy decision-making, or will its role be strengthened as one of the few international legal institutions actually capable of holding Members to their commitments? The obstacles facing the multilateral agenda only served to heighten countries’ enthusiasm for bilateral and regional trade negotiations in 2008. New Zealand was no exception in this regard. This review details multilateral, regional, and bilateral developments and New Zealand’s participation therein. It also reviews dispute settlement matters of particular interest to New Zealand.

The most notable event during 2008 from a multilateral perspective was the failed Ministerial held in Geneva in July. The Ministerial aimed to resolve outstanding items on the Doha agenda. However, negotiations foundered on the question of a ‘special safeguards mechanism’ (SSM) for developing countries that would allow them to raise tariffs to protect farmers from import surges. It had been agreed prior to the Ministerial that developing countries should have access to an SSM. The difficulty was in agreeing on the details, such as whether and when developing countries should be able to raise tariffs above commitments made in the Uruguay Round. Various compromises in this regard suggested by WTO Director General, Pascal Lamy, and the EC, failed to gain traction with the main players, the US, India, and China. Thus, on July 30, Pascal Lamy declared that the meeting had collapsed, explaining that ‘Members have simply not been able to bridge their differences’.^[142]

Work continued despite the July collapse, and WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, tentatively planned a mini-Ministerial for December 2008 with the goal of reaching agreement before the year’s end. However, as it became clearer that Members remained too far apart on key issues to reach agreement, he cancelled the meeting, citing the importance of avoiding a second failure in one year.^[143] The cancellation came just days after the release of revised draft agriculture and non-agriculture modalities texts^[144] on December 6. These were revisions of a succession of drafts already in circulation and are to serve as the basis for further negotiations.^[145] In announcing the cancellation, Lamy exhorted Members to work in 2009 to conclude the Round but stressed that doing so will require resolving issues not only in agriculture and non-agriculture, but also other areas including trade facilitation and aid-for-trade.^[146]

New Zealand is heavily involved in the full range of negotiations under the Doha agenda but particularly in the Agriculture and Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations.

New Zealand continued its central role in the agriculture negotiations. Its interest in the negotiations is both systemic (it desires a fair, rules-based international trading system) and specific (at a sectoral level, it has much to gain from maintaining and enhancing market access for agricultural products and reducing market distortions resulting from government market interventions).
In December, Ambassador Crawford Falconer’s official term concluded as New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to Geneva and Chair of the Agriculture Negotiations. Mr Falconer has played a central role in the agriculture negotiations, and given the importance of the ongoing work in this area, his term was temporarily extended to continue the negotiations and to allow him to release the December modalities text as noted above. Speaking to this text at a meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee on 17 December, Mr Falconer expressed his view that Members had made much progress since the July Ministerial, but that considerable work remained.^[147]

New Zealand has played a key role in the Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations in the Negotiating Group on Rules (NGR). These negotiations aim to reduce government support for overcapacity and overfishing in world fisheries. This is an endemic problem, with more than three quarters of the world's fisheries currently incapable of sustaining further harvest expansion. Government subsidies undermine sustainable management and thus contribute significantly to the problem.^[148]
In May, the Chair of the NGR released a draft text of a fisheries subsidies agreement setting out a range of prohibited subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing as well as a prohibition of subsidies that affect fishing on ‘unequivocally overfished’ stocks.^[149] Developing countries may use otherwise prohibited subsidies under certain conditions and there are flexibilities for developing country subsistence and small scale fishing. Most non-prohibited subsidies are subject to requirements that a fisheries management system based on internationally-recognized best practices be in place, and that subsidies must not create overcapacity or cause harm to stocks in which another Member has an identifiable interest.
In July, New Zealand, Australia, and the US circulated a communication to WTO Members.^[150] The communication emphasizes that even sophisticated management systems in developed countries have failed in many cases to preserve stock sustainability, and management does not address the market and trade-distorting effects of subsidies. It argues therefore that a WTO agreement must be premised on ‘what the WTO does best’, that is, imposing meaningful disciplines on subsidies. The communication thus calls for Members to work to narrow differences on core issues, particularly with respect to the scope of the prohibition and related exceptions. It also calls for more work on the conditions for providing special and differential treatment to developing countries. The year ended with the release on 19 December by the Chair of the Negotiating Committee on Rules of a ‘conceptual roadmap’ for further negotiations, which are to continue to 2009.^[151]

On 7 April 2008, New Zealand became the first developed country to sign a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with China. The China FTA covers trade in goods and services, and investment. In addition, New Zealand and China have signed binding agreements on labour and the environment. The FTA provided for immediate elimination of tariffs on over $200 million worth of New Zealand exports to China and the elimination by 2007 of tariffs on 96 percent of New Zealand’s current exports to China.^[152] It is expected to increase New Zealand’s export revenue from China by between NZ$225 to NZ$350 million every year.^[153] The Agreement came into force on 1 October 2008.

In September 2008, the US announced that it would enter into negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (the Trans-Pacific Agreement, previously known as P4).^[154] This Agreement had been signed by New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and subsequently Brunei in 2005. Australia, Peru and Vietnam also announced their intention to participate in the negotiations.

2008 saw the conclusion of negotiations to form an ASEAN – Australia and New Zealand FTA.^[155] These negotiations had been launched in 2004 and agreement came at the end of 15 rounds of negotiations. The agreement, which is scheduled to come into force in 2009, will liberalize trade in goods, services, and investment. The ASEAN region together makes up New Zealand’s third largest export market and the agreement provides for removal of tariffs on 99% of New Zealand’s current exports to the four key markets of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

Various other negotiations continued throughout 2008, including with the Gulf Cooperation Council, Malaysia, and with Australia regarding a CER Investment Protocol. Agreement was reached to recommence negotiations for an FTA with Hong Kong, work continued on the New Zealand – India FTA Joint Study, and two rounds of preparatory talks were held with Korean officials in anticipation of the beginning of negotiations for an FTA with Korea in 2009.

In June, New Zealand lodged its first written submission in the Apples dispute.^[156] The parties presented their first oral submissions at the panel hearing in Geneva in September and a second panel hearing in Geneva is scheduled for 30 June - 2 July 2009. New Zealand’s key complaint is that Australia’s measures for importation of New Zealand apples are inconsistent with Article 2.2 of the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). Pursuant to Article 2.2, Australia is obliged to ensure that its SPS measures are supported by scientific evidence. New Zealand submits that there is no rational or objective relationship between Australia’s measures and scientific evidence in respect of any of the diseases which it is seeking to control, namely, fire blight, European canker, and apple leafcurling midge.^[157] Further, New Zealand argues that Australia has failed to ensure that its measures are based on a risk assessment as required by Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS Agreement. It also argues that Australia has failed to ensure that its measures are no more trade restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of protection, and that in taking almost eight years to complete its approval procedures for access for New Zealand apples, it has violated obligations in Article 8 and Annex C which require that such procedures be undertaken and completed without undue delay.

New Zealand participated as a third party in the US – Continued Suspension of Concessions in the EC – Hormones Dispute case. One of the most interesting aspects of this case from New Zealand’s perspective was the Appellate Body’s discussion of the appropriate standard of review when panels are reviewing a country’s scientific evidence under the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body criticized the Panel for having essentially decided for itself whether or not the science in question was good science.^[158] It stated that a Panel’s role is

not to determine whether the risk assessment undertaken by a WTO Member is correct, but rather to determine whether that risk assessment is supported by coherent reasoning and respectable scientific evidence and is, in this sense, objectively justifiable.^[159]

In this, the Appellate Body appears to be treading a sound path between affording countries flexibility to reach their own scientific conclusions, but ‘minimizing the risk of unjustified regulations enacted in the name of science but really designed to protect local producers’.^[160] This approach is to be welcomed by New Zealand which often faces difficult decisions over whether to impose trade restrictive SPS measures to protect our biosecurity.

VI. OTHER SIGNIFICANT WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT DECISIONS OF RELEVANCE TO NEW ZEALAND

One of the most pressing issues for New Zealand in the Doha negotiations is the continued use of export subsidies by industrialized nations which have a negative impact on the ability of New Zealand's agricultural exporters to succeed in key international markets. One of the most important subsidies cases to date involves a complaint brought by Brazil in 2002 concerning the US provision of subsidies to support domestic producers of upland cotton. New Zealand joined these proceedings as a third party, supporting Brazil’s claim. The Panel and Appellate Body ruled that the US subsidies violated several provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. Brazil subsequently brought another complaint^[161] alleging that the US had failed to comply with the Dispute Settlement Body’s recommendations and rulings. Once again, New Zealand joined the proceedings as a third party. A panel ruled in Brazil’s favour and this finding was upheld by the Appellate Body in June 2008.^[162] These decisions are of systemic importance for New Zealand in that they may support future findings of violation in similar cases. Unfortunately for cotton producers in Brazil and elsewhere, however, domestic political realities in the US are such that it remains uncertain as to whether or not the US will actually comply and eliminate its subsidies.

New Zealand continued its involvement in matters relating to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and international security in 2008. Notable contributions included a focus on gaining support for greater transparency and confidence-building in the area of non-proliferation, as part of the preparation for the 2010 review of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).^[163] This follows New Zealand’s alignment with other nations in the New Agenda Coalition (NAC).^[164] New Zealand’s representatives were active in the General Assembly. In October, New Zealand was also elected to the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a position it will hold for two years.
Beyond matters relating to nuclear weapons, New Zealand has actively supported measures aimed at reducing threats to international security. New Zealand representatives voiced support for the pillars underpinning General Assembly and Security Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorist measures. New Zealand’s commitment to international security has also resulted in the enactment of certain regulations in accordance with international moves to sanction Iran and North Korea.
This review considers the outcome of the Second Prepcom for the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly as they relate to nuclear weapons, non-proliferation and international security, a brief summary of Security Council actions, New Zealand’s involvement with the IAEA, New Zealand policies and statements, and New Zealand regulations.

New Zealand has noted its own active role in the Second Preparatory Committee Meeting for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.^[165] The First Prepcom, held in Vienna in May 2007, resulted in a stalemate between the nuclear-weapons states and the non-nuclear-weapons states, although there was also a special focus on the Middle East and the importance of Israel acceding to the NPT and Iran complying with its obligations under the NPT.^[166] The Second Prepcom was held in Geneva from 28 April to 9 May 2008. This session decided more procedural matters in anticipation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The Chairman’s Working Paper noted that the three pillars of the NPT were reaffirmed, namely nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and respect for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.^[167] It also called upon India, Israel and Pakistan ‘to accede to the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon states, promptly and without conditions’.^[168]
The lack of consensus in some areas represents an ongoing concern for the effectiveness of the NPT. For example, there continued to be little movement from nuclear-weapons states; the United States, for example, focused on the non-compliance of the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (North Korea) and Iran, rather than on its own outcomes under the NPT.^[169] For its part, North Korea signalled its withdrawal from the NPT.^[170] France’s decision to modernise some of its nuclear arsenal was highlighted in the Chairman’s Working Paper as a cause for concern, particularly with regard to realising outcomes under Article VI of the NPT.^[171]
Focus continued on the Middle East and the importance of establishing NPT compliance in the region. Several states expressed concern about the situation in Iran. New Zealand also stressed the importance of ensuring a diplomatic resolution to the Israel-Palestine situation.^[172] The United States’ Working Paper on the Middle East focused mainly on the non-compliance of Iran and the potential destabilisation of the region resulting from this.^[173] The United States’ approach to the Prepcom suggests that there will be little progress on the three pillars identified in the Chairman’s Working Paper, given that the United States’ report did not contain a significant focus on these, concerning itself more with identifying ‘violators’ as opposed to working towards satisfaction of treaty objectives.
Overall, New Zealand was an active participant in the second Prepcom. As well as submitting reports as part of the NAC^[174] and the Vienna Group of Ten,^[175] New Zealand submitted a report on its own efforts to realise the terms of the NPT.^[176] It urged nuclear-weapons states to continue to move towards compliance with the terms of the NPT and, as noted above, focused on the implementation of NPT terms in the Middle East, and on a diplomatic resolution to the Israel-Palestine situation. Both are essential to the successful implementation of the NPT.
Other significant contributions came from Canada, Australia and Japan, each of which presented reports on various aspects of their own outcomes in implementing NPT terms, as well as broader foci on regional non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East.
Concerns regarding non-state actors and their ability to gain access to nuclear weapons, technical assistance or facilities were also raised. The interrelationship between the Security Council (especially SC Resolution 1540 (2004)), the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism^[177] and the strengthening and enforcement of the NPT was seen as a significant factor in the successful outcome of a multilateral, United Nations based approach to allay such concerns.^[178] The important role of the IAEA in ensuring compliance and the peaceful use of nuclear technologies and in combating terrorism was also noted.^[179]
Although facing long-standing issues around the adherence of nuclear weapons states to matters of disarmament and transparency, the second Prepcom at least affirmed some of the key expectations arising out of the NPT and, from a New Zealand perspective, reinforced New Zealand’s active role in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The United Nations General Assembly was active in adopting resolutions relating to nuclear weapons and non-proliferation.^[180] It is worthwhile noting the steadfast opposition of the United States to virtually all resolutions relating to nuclear non-proliferation, in several cases alone in opposition to a resolution. This adds further weight to suggestions that the United States might be ensuring a position of persistent objector should any resolutions crystallise into, or become indicative of emerging, customary international law norms in this area.

1. Nuclear Disarmament

The General Assembly adopted numerous resolutions relating to nuclear disarmament. The more significant are considered below (all are listed in Table I).

- 63/13 Cooperation between UN and Prepcom^[181]
In Resolution 63/13, the General Assembly decides to include in the provisional agenda of its 65^th session the sub-item entitled ‘Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation’. This resolution passed 64 votes to 1 (United States). New Zealand supported.

- 63/43 Regional Disarmament^[182]
In Resolution 63/43, the General Assembly stresses that sustained efforts are needed to make progress on the entire range of disarmament issues. It affirms that global and regional approaches to disarmament complement each other and should therefore be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security. It calls upon states to conclude agreements, wherever possible, for nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and confidence-building measures at the regional and sub-regional levels. It welcomes initiatives towards disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and security undertaken by some countries at the regional and sub-regional levels. It supports and encourages efforts aimed at promoting confidence-building measures at the regional and sub-regional levels to ease regional tensions and to further disarmament. Introduced by Pakistan, it was adopted by consensus.

- 63/58 Nuclear-Weapon-Free World^[183]
In Resolution 63/58, the General Assembly, mindful of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, emphasises the central role of the NPT, calling upon states to comply fully with all commitments made regarding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It also urges North Korea to rescind its announced withdrawal from the NPT, while recognising the efforts of the Six Party Talks to achieve denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. It welcomes the Second Prepcom and stresses the need for a constructive and successful preparatory process leading to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. This resolution passed 166 votes to 5 (including India, Israel, Pakistan, United States), with 7 abstentions (including France, North Korea, United Kingdom). New Zealand was a co-sponsor, the resolution being introduced by the NAC.

- 63/59 Compliance with Non-Proliferation, Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments^[184]
In Resolution 63/59, the General Assembly underscores that compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements enhances confidence and strengthens international security and stability. It urges all states to implement and comply fully with their respective obligations. It calls upon

all concerned States to take concerted action, in a manner consistent with relevant international law, to encourage, through bilateral and multilateral means, the compliance by all States with their respective non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and with other agreed obligations, and to hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their non-compliance in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.^[185]

This resolution passed 158 to 0, with 18 abstentions (NZ supported it).

- 63/87 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty^[186]
In Resolution 63/87, the General Assembly stresses the vital importance of the signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It urges states not to carry out nuclear-weapon testing and calls for the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. It further urges states that have signed but not yet ratified the Treaty to do so, particularly those states whose ratifications are required for the Treaty to enter into force. This resolution passed 175 to 1 (United States), with 3 abstentions (India, Mauritius, Syria). New Zealand was a co-sponsor.

2. Nuclear Doctrine

- 63/39 Assuring Non-Nuclear-Weapons States against Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons^[187]
In Resolution 63/39, the General Assembly reaffirms the urgency of reaching effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons states against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. Inter alia, it recommends that the Conference on Disarmament actively continue intensive negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement and concluding effective international agreements to assure the non-nuclear-weapons states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This resolution passed 122 votes to 1 (United States), with 58 abstentions. New Zealand abstained. This resolution was introduced by Pakistan.

- 63/41 Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems^[188]
In Resolution 63/41, the General Assembly calls for practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status. It urges states to update the General Assembly on progress of this resolution’s implementation. The General Assembly remains seized of the matter. This resolution passed 141 votes to 3 (France, United Kingdom, United States), with 34 abstentions. New Zealand was a co-sponsor.

- 63/49 Follow-Up to ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons^[189]
In Resolution 63/49, the General Assembly underlines again the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith, and to conclude, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament. It calls once again upon all states immediately to fulfil that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting development, testing and use of nuclear weapons, and providing for their elimination. It requests all states to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures taken. The Secretary-General is then to apprise the Assembly of that information in the 64th session. This was passed 127 to 30, with 23 abstentions. New Zealand supported.

3. Nuclear-Free Zones

- 63/38 Middle East^[190]
- 63/56 Mongolia^[191]
- 63/63 Central Asia^[192]
- 63/65 Southern Hemisphere^[193]
The General Assembly adopted resolutions supporting the creation of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Central Asia, Mongolia and the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas. The first two were adopted by consensus, whereas the latter two were adopted by majority vote. Resolution 63/63 was adopted 141 votes to 3 (France, United Kingdom, United States) with 36 abstentions. Resolution 63/65 was adopted 171 to 3 (France, United Kingdom, United States) with 7 abstentions (including India, Israel, Pakistan and Russia). New Zealand supported both resolutions, and was a co-sponsor for Resolution 63/65.

Many of these resolutions were adopted by consensus. However, in a few cases, the United States acted as the sole objector. These are detailed below and listed in Table I.

- 63/36 Development and manufacture of new types of WMDs^[194]
In Resolution 63/36, the General Assembly reaffirms that effective measures should be taken to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction. It requests the Conference on Disarmament to keep the matter under review. It calls upon states to give favourable consideration to the Conference on Disarmament’s recommendations. This resolution passed 175 to 1 (United States), with 1 abstention (Israel).

- 63/37 Information and telecommunications developments^[195]
In Resolution 63/37, the General Assembly calls upon member states to promote further multilateral considerations of existing and potential threats in the field of information security. It invites all member states to continue to inform the Secretary-General of their views and assessments on several questions, including efforts taken at national level to strengthen information security. This resolution passed 178 to 1 (United States).

- 63/40 Prevention of an arms race in outer space^[196]
In Resolution 63/40, the General Assembly reaffirms the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, and that the legal regime applicable to outer space does not in and of itself guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It emphasises the necessity of further measures with appropriate and effective provisions for verification to prevent such an arms race. It calls upon states, particularly those with major space capabilities, to contribute actively to the objective and peaceful use of outer space. Further measures urge states to strengthen transparency and to work with the Conference on Disarmament. This resolution passed 177 votes to 1 (United States), with 1 abstention. New Zealand supported.

New Zealand generally supported resolutions that favoured compliance with the NPT or CTBT. But, as was noted last year,^[197] New Zealand did not always support anti-nuclear resolutions. Graham’s suggestion of a political motive to not supporting a resolution is borne out when examining the resolutions against which New Zealand voted, namely Resolutions 63/47 and 63/75. Both were introduced by India and related to reducing nuclear danger and disarmament. In both situations, members of the NAC were divided in their support or opposition to the resolutions. In each vote, Brazil, Egypt, Mexico and South Africa supported, while Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden opposed. This is the same pattern exhibited during the 62nd session, with Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden breaking rank and opposing a resolution aimed at reducing nuclear proliferation.^[198]

The Security Council adopted five resolutions relating to nuclear weapons and counter-terrorism measures. The Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT and called upon Iran to take without delay the necessary steps required in SC Resolution 1737 of 27 December 2006^[199] to ensure compliance with IAEA standards.^[200] A second resolution again urged Iran to comply with the IAEA’s requests, and noted that the Security Council would remain seized of the matter.^[201] This reinforces the earlier SC Resolution 1737, which instructed Iran to implement Resolution 2006/14 of the IAEA Board of Governors.
Non-proliferation matters were closely linked with counter-terrorism measures. The Security Council’s resolutions focused on encouraging stronger relationships between counter-terrorism agencies (for example, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate) and member states^[202] and included a prohibition on dealing with, and supporting, terrorist organisations (primarily Al Qaeda).^[203] One resolution aimed to strengthen SC Resolution 1540^[204] against the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.^[205] New Zealand expressed its support for these counter-terrorist measures in the General Assembly, at the adoption of the report of Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force during the 62nd Session of the General Assembly (2007-8).^[206]
New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations spoke on threats to international peace and security at the meeting of the Security Council on 9 December 2008.^[207] She noted New Zealand’s support for global initiatives to combat terrorism, and drew attention to condemnation of terrorist activities by leaders and ministers from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation at its November 2008 meeting in Lima. New Zealand also noted its active participation in Pacific and Southeast Asian counter-terrorism capacity-building initiatives.

New Zealand became an IAEA Board Member on 3 October 2008, a role that will last for two years. New Zealand was elected alongside Afghanistan, Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cuba, Egypt, Malaysia, Romania, Spain, Turkey and Uruguay. The Board numbers 35 Members, including the newly elected Members. New Zealand’s Permanent Mission to the Office of the United Nations in Vienna covers New Zealand’s involvement at the IAEA.

Relevant General Conference resolutions focused on the risks of terrorism associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Resolution 10 in particular commended the Nuclear Security Plan 2006-2009, and looked forward to the development of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013.^[208] Members also welcomed Lesotho and Papua New Guinea to the IAEA.
Resolution 14 deserves close attention.^[209] This resolution is titled ‘Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’. The resolution expresses concern as to the ‘recent halt in disablement work at Yongbyon’. The resolution also stresses the desire for a diplomatic resolution to the developing impasse. The General Conference decided to remain seized of the matter until the 53^rd regular session. The desire for a diplomatic resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue fits well with New Zealand’s statements on such matters. Regarding the Iranian situation, New Zealand stated its hope for a diplomatic resolution of matters.^[210] This represents a high level of continuity with New Zealand’s position among the NAC and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group in NPT negotiations. It can be expected that New Zealand’s actions and involvement with the IAEA over the next two years will mirror policy objectives stated at the First and Second Prepcoms for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

New Zealand has been active in other fora in promoting security and counter-terrorist measures. In particular, it has contributed militarily to International Security Assistance Force efforts to counter terrorism in Afghanistan,^[211] to the Maritime Interdiction Operations in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea,^[212] to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)^[213] and to United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).^[214] As noted above, New Zealand used its statement to the United Nations Security Council to underline its commitment to both global and regional counter-terrorism and security initiatives.
Pursuant to SC Resolution 1373 (2001),^[215] New Zealand maintains a list of designated terrorist entities. In 2008, three persons were delisted (one due to death).^[216]
New Zealand has been an active member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2004. The PSI advances international cooperation to stop shipments of WMDs, delivery systems and related materials flowing to state and non-state actors of proliferation concern.^[217] Between 15 and 19 September 2008, New Zealand hosted a PSI exercise (Exercise Maru) in the Hauraki Gulf and Ports of Auckland. The exercise was led by the New Zealand Customs Service, alongside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Defence.^[218] Other members of the PSI Operational Experts Group were on hand to assist.^[219]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade administers two regional security funds, the Asia Security Fund, and the Pacific Security Fund. Both funds are available to support counter-terrorism capacity-building and regional security initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region.^[220]

The New Zealand approach to disarmament has been mentioned above regarding the 52^nd IAEA General Conference (2008). New Zealand policy clearly favours a diplomatic resolution to the difficult situations relating to Iran, the Middle East and North Korea. In his statement to the General Assembly, Don MacKay, speaking on behalf of the NAC, outlined New Zealand’s and the NAC’s policy direction in relation to nuclear disarmament.^[221] The key focus is towards the 2010 NPT Review Conference. MacKay noted five areas in particular that would form the basis of the NAC position:

The importance of a systematised nuclear accounting within the NPT was also emphasised. New Zealand’s co-sponsorship of the CTBT resolution^[222] (with Australia and Mexico) was mentioned as a key example of New Zealand’s involvement in the area of nuclear weapons and disarmament.
In response to SC Resolution 1737 (2006), New Zealand has passed regulations that impose sanctions on Iran. The United Nations Sanctions (Iran) Regulations 2007 (amended 2008) restrict the importation and exportation of prohibited goods to or from Iran. The powers granted to Customs include r 9, which grants a Customs officer the power to withhold clearance of a ship or aircraft carrying goods that the officer knows to be of a prohibited kind. The meaning of ‘prohibited goods’ is that found in ss 54 and 56 of the Customs and Excise Act 1996. This meaning is extended by r 6 of the United Nations Sanctions (Iran) Regulations to include the importation of nuclear weapon, missile, or enrichment-related goods (r 4), and the exportation of specified nuclear weapon, missile, or enrichment-related goods (r 5). Dealings, carriage, technical assistance (relating to nuclear weapon, missile, or enrichment-related goods, or arms), and funding are also prohibited (rr 10-16A). Ministerial discretion is provided for, and limited by certain preconditions, in r 17. The Minister must turn his or her mind to paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, and 12 of SC Resolution 1737 (2006), paragraphs 4 and 5 of SC Resolution 1747 (2007), or paragraphs 5, 7, and 8 of SC Resolution 1803 (2008) when making his or her decision. Any exercise of discretion must not be inconsistent with these paragraphs. Failure to comply with the Regulations is an offence under r 18, and renders one liable under s 3 of the United Nations Act 1946. The scheme of the United Nations Sanctions (Iran) Regulations is similar to the United Nations Sanctions (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) 2006.
Likewise, the United Nations Sanctions (Lebanon) Regulations 2008 give effect to SC Resolutions 1636 (2005) and 1701 (2006). Regulation 4 prohibits the direct and indirect exporting of arms to Lebanon. Regulation 5 is the same as r 6 of the United Nations Sanctions (Iran) Regulations 2007 in respect of s 56 of the Customs and Excise Act 1996. The sanctions also include the freezing of funds, other financial assets and economic resources in New Zealand that are owned or controlled by persons registered by the Lebanon Sanctions Committee, and a travel ban against persons from Lebanon suspected of involvement in the Hariri bombing in 2005. Ministerial discretion exists under r 9 with regard to exportation of arms (rr 4-8), and under r 16 with regard to rr 14 and 15, which cover funds of or for designated persons or entities.
Finally, New Zealand revoked its sanctions against Rwanda, put in place by the United Nations Sanctions (Rwanda) Regulations 1994, through the United Nations Sanctions (Rwanda) Revocation Order 2008.

New Zealand remained actively involved in matters relating to nuclear weapons, non-proliferation and international security throughout 2008. The emergence of politicised voting by New Zealand in General Assembly resolutions appears to be well-established, at least when India is the sponsor. This confuses New Zealand’s position regarding nuclear-related resolutions, but possibly reflects the current political climate. New Zealand has in other areas maintained a strong pro-non-proliferation stance. This is evidenced by New Zealand’s statements at the 52^nd IAEA Conference. New Zealand’s membership of the Board of the IAEA will doubtless realise a continued place of prominence for New Zealand among IAEA members and in related matters, especially regarding the lead-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference. New Zealand was a strong voice at the Second Prepcom for the 2010 Review Conference, working with like-minded nations to advance discussions, sometimes met by muted responses from the major nuclear weapons states. At both global and regional levels, New Zealand maintained its active role in counter-terrorism capacity-building.

TABLE 1: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SELECTED RESOLUTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 63^RD SESSION (2008)

Cluster	Res #	Resolution	Sponsor	For	Against	Abstain
Nuclear Dis-armament	63/13	Co-operation between UN and Preparatory Commission for the CTBT	Various	64 NZ	1 US	0
	63/43	Regional disarmament	Pakistan	Consensus
	63/46	Nuclear disarmament	Myanmar	117 NZ	45	19
	63/47	Reducing nuclear danger	India	118	50 NZ	14
	63/50	Promotion of multilateralism in disarmament and non-proliferation	NAM – Indonesia	126	5 Israel, UK, US	50 NZ
	63/58	Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments	NAC – South Africa	166 NZ (Co-sponsor)	5 India, Israel, Pak, US	7 Fr, N. Korea, UK
	63/73	Renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons	Japan	173 NZ, Fr, UK	4 N. Kor., India, Isr., US	6 China, Iran, Pak
	63/75	Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons	India	121	50 NZ, US	10
	63/84	The risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	Egypt	169 NZ	5 Israel, US	6 Aust.,Can., India
	63/87	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	Mexico	175 NZ (Co-sponsor)	1 US	3 Ind., Syria Mauritius
	63/62	Consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures	Germany	182 NZ	0	0
	63/64	The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation	France	159 NZ	1 Iran	18
	63/54	Effects of the use of armaments and ammunitions containing depleted uranium	NAM – Indonesia	141 NZ	4 Fr, Israel, UK, US	34
	63/55	Missiles	Iran	120	10 Fr, Isr. UK, US	50 NZ
	63/59	Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments	US	158 NZ	0	18
Nuclear doctrine	63/39	Assure non nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	Pakistan	122	1 US	58 NZ
	63/41	Decreasing operational readiness of nuclear weapons	Switzerland	141 NZ (Co-sponsor)	3 Fr, UK, US	34
	63/49	Follow-up to ICJ advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons	Malaysia	127 NZ	30 Fr, UK, US	23
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones	63/38	Middle East	Egypt	Consensus
	63/56	Mongolia	Mongolia	Consensus
	63/63	Central Asia	Kyrgyzstan	141 NZ	3 Fr, UK, US	36
	63/65	Southern hemisphere and adjacent areas	Brazil	171 NZ (Co-sponsor)	3 Fr, UK, US	7 Ind., Israel, Pakistan, Russia
Non-nuclear weapons	63/40	Prevention of outer space arms-race	Egypt	177 NZ	1 US	1 Israel
	63/37	Int’l telecomm’s in int’l security	Russia	178 NZ	1 US	0
	63/36	Prohibition on dev. and manufacture of WMDs	Belarus	175 NZ	1 US	1 Israel
	63/44	Conventional arms control at regional and sub-regional levels	Pakistan	175 NZ	1 India	2 Bhutan, Russia
	63/48	Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction	Poland	Consensus
	63/51	Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control	NAM – Indonesia	Consensus
	63/57	Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms	Argentina	Consensus
	63/61	Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus	Germany	Consensus
	63/69	Transparency in armaments	The Netherlands	160 NZ (Co-sponsor)	0	22
	63/71	Convention on Cluster Munitions	NAC – Ireland	Consensus
	63/76	UN regional centres for peace and disarmament	NAM – Indonesia	Consensus
	63/77	UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific	Nepal	Consensus
	63/78	Regional confidence-building measures: activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	Angola	Consensus
	63/80	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa	GAS – Nigeria	Consensus
	63/85	Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects	Sweden	Consensus
	63/88	Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction	Hungary	Consensus
Counter-terrorism	63/60	Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring WMDs	India	Consensus

^[1] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3^rd sess, UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948).
^[2] Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 13 December 2006, 46 ILM 443 (entered into force 3 May 2008).
^[3] Resolution on the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 63/116, UN GAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/116 (2008).
^[4] Resolution on Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GA Res 63/117, UN GAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/117 (2008).
^[5] International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976).
^[6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand Handbook on International Human Rights (3^rd ed, 2008).
^[7] This included the December 2008 Conference: Celebrating 60 years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (9-10 December 2008).
^[8] Natalie Baird, ‘International Human Rights Law’ [2008] NZYbkIntLaw 8; (2007-2008) 5 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 193, 193.
^[9] HRC Resolution 7/9, Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 27 March 2008, in Organizational and Procedural Matters: Draft Report of the Council, HRC, 7^th sess, UN Doc A/HRC/7/L.11 (2008) 27.
^[10] Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Information provided by the Government of New Zealand on the Implementation of the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD, UN DOC CERD/C/NZL/CO/17/Add.1 (2008).
^[11] Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, CERD, 70^th sess, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/CO/17 (2007). For discussion of concluding observations, see Baird, ‘International Human Rights Law’ above n 8, 195-196 and Claire Charters, ‘Indigenous Peoples Rights under International Law’ (2007-2008) 5 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 199, 200-201.
^[12] Reports Submitted by States Parties..., above n 10, [2]-[4].
^[13] Ibid, [5]-[22].
^[14] Ibid, [23]-[25].
^[15] Ibid, [26].
^[16] The report has not yet been given a United Nations document number, but is available at <www.myd.govt.nz/Publications/Rights.thirdandfourthperiodicreportforthe.aspx> at 21 April 2009.
^[17] Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).
^[18] Communication No. 1492/2066, CCPR/C/93/D/1492/2006 (2008).
^[19] Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature on 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
^[20] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976).
^[21] MacIsaac v Canada (Communication No 55/1979, 14 October 1982); Van Duzen v Canada (Communication No 12/50, 7 April 1982).
^[22] Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, opened for signature 20 November 2007 (entered into force 15 December 2008), <http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf> at 14 December 2009.
^[23] For further information, see <www.aseanhrmech.org> at 22 April 2009.
^[24] The Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration (October 2005), <www.forumsec.org.fj> at 22 April 2009.
^[25] For a summary of the symposium, see Sue Farran, Human Rights in the South Pacific: Challenges and Changes (2009), 285-286. The papers from the Symposium ‘Strategies for the Future: Protecting Rights in the Pacific’ (27-29 April 2008, Samoa, Apia) are to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Victoria University of Wellington Law Review (2009).
^[26] For further information, see <www.aph.gov.au> at 19 April 2009.
^[27] The text of the statement is available online: <www.ilga.org/news_results.asp?File10=1211> at 14 December 2009.
^[28] Human Rights Commission, To Be Who I Am (2008), <www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/
files/documents/15-Jan-2008_14-56-48_HRC_Transgender_FINAL.pdf> at on 22 April 2009).
^[29] Human Rights Commission, New Zealand Census of Women’s Participation 2008 (2008), available online: <www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/files/documents/28-March-2008_12-59-39_2008_Census_of_Womens_Participation.pdf> (last accessed on 22 April 2009).

^[∗] I thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade for providing some of the information for this review. The views expressed here are my own, as are any errors or omissions.
^[30] Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 61/295, 61^st sess, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007).
^[31] See Claire Charters, ‘Indigenous Peoples’ Rights under International Law’ (2007 – 2008) 5 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 199.
^[32] See, e.g., Don McKay (New Zealand) ‘60^th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, Statement delivered at the Human Rights Council Commemorative Session of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the UDHR, 12 December 2008, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2008/0-12-December-2008.php> at 11 March 2009.
^[33] ‘Indigenous Peoples Outraged at Removal of Rights in Conference Text’, South North Development Monitor, No. 6609, 12 December 2008, reproduced at Third World Network, <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/219-220/cover4.doc> at 10 March 2009.
^[34] Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by GA Res 63/117, UNGAOR 63^rd sess, 66^th plen mtg, UN Doc A/63/117, 10 December 2008.
^[35] Amy Laurenson (New Zealand), 18 November 2008, ‘UNGA 63: Third Committee: Item 58: Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights’ (Statement delivered at the UN General Assembly, 18 November 008), NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2008/0-18-November-2008.php> at 2 December 2009; see also UN Department of Public Information, Third Committee Recommends General Assembly Adoption of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2008), available <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/gashc3938.doc.htm> at 4 December 2009.
^[36] Chief Bernard Ominaya and Lubicon Lake Band v Canada Communication No 167/1984, CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (1990).
^[37] Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand Communication No 547/1993 CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993.
^[38] See, e.g., ‘Indienous People Outraged at Removal of Rights in Redd Outcome’ (12 December 2008), Third World Network Poznan News Update, <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/
news/TWNpoznanupdate12.doc> at 12 December 2009.
^[39] Ibid.
^[40] United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Decision 1(66): New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004, UN Doc CERD/C/66/NZL/Dec.1 (2005).
^[41] Maori Party, Government’s Human Rights Humiliation (Press Release, 17 January 2008).
^[42] Letter from New Zealand to the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, and the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the situation of human rights defenders, 30 January 2008, which is referred to in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Siutation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People: Addendums, Summary of Cases Transmitted to Governments and Replies Received, UN Doc A/HRC/9/9.Add.1, 15 August 2008, <http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/nztr0808.pdf> at 2 December 2009.
^[43] See CERD Committee, Reports Submitted by the States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Information Provided by the Government of New Zealand on the Implementation of the Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 23 September 2008, UN Doc CERD/C/NZL/CO/17/Add.1, 21 January 2009; see also New Zealand Government’s response to the CERD’s Request for Further Information on Recommendations 14, 19, 20 and 23, September 2008, available at New Zealand Human Rights Committee, <http://www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/hrc/cms/files/documents/10-Oct-2008_13-33-37_
CERD_report_NZ_Govt.DOC> at 2 December 2009.
^[44] Race Relations Commissioner, Follow-up to the Committee's Concluding Observations Concerning New Zealand, August 2007, 30 September 2008, <http://www.hrc.co.nz/hrc_new/
hrc/cms/files/documents/10-Oct-2008_13-24-13_CERD_Letter_HRC_30_Sept_2008.doc> at 2 December 2009.
^[45] Nicola Hill (New Zealand), ‘UNGA Third Committee, Item 64 Indigenous Issues’, (Statement at General Assembly, New York, 20 October 2008) <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/
Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/2008/0-20-October-2008.php> at 11 March 2009.
^[46] New Zealand, ‘HRC9, Item 3: Interactive Dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Fundamental Freedoms and Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples’, Statement at HRC, Geneva, 9 September 2008, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/
2008/0-9-September-2008.php > at 11 March 2009.
^[47] Pauline Kingi, Te Puni Kokiri, ‘Seventh Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Agenda Item 4: Implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals through the Maori Potential Approach’, Statement at Permanent Forum of Indigenous Issues (New York, 24 April 2008), <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/
2008/0-24-April-2008a.php> at 11 March 2009.
^[48] Amy Laurenson (New Zealand), ‘Indigenous Expert Mechanism: Item 3: Implementation of Resolution 6/36’ (Statement at EMRIP, Geneva, 1 October 2008), <http://www.docip.org/gsdl/collect/cendocdo/index/assoc/HASH011e.dir/EM08Amy0xx.pdf#search=%22Amy%20LAURENSON%22> at 13 March 2009.
^[49] Ibid.
^[50] Amy Laurenson (New Zealand), ‘Indigenous Expert Mechanism: Item 4: Lessons Learned and Challenges to the Implementation of the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Education’ (Statement at EMRIP, Geneva, 2 October 2008) <http://www.docip.org/gsdl/collect/cendocdo/

index/assoc/HASH015f.dir/EM08newzealandoxx.pdf#search=%22Amy%20LAURENSON%22> at 13 March 2009.
^[51] Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group an Access and BenefitSharing on the Work of its Sixth Meeting, UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/9/6, 31 January 2008.
^[52] ‘TK at WG ABS-6 Meeting Review’, Traditional Knowledge Bulletin, <http://tkbulletin.
wordpress.com/2008/02/05/tk-at-wg-abs-6-meeting-review/> at 13 March 2009.
^[53] CBD COP 9 Decision IX/12 Access and Benefit Sharing (2008), <http://www.cbd.int/
decisions/view.shtml?id=11655> at 13 March 2009.
^[54] WIPO Inter-Governmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Report of the 12^th Session Geneva 25 – 29 February, WIPO Doc WIPO/GRTKF/IC/12/9 [39], <http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_
details:jsp?doc_id=118812> at 13 March 2009.
^[55] Ibid [62].
^[56] Ibid [80].
^[57] Ibid [86].
^[58] Ibid [104].
^[59] Ibid [143].
^[60] See, for example, UN, ‘General Assembly Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples: “Major Step Forward” Towards Human Rights for All, Says President’ (Media Release, 13 September 2007), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm> at 15 March 2009.
^[61] Convention Concerning Indigenous Peoples and Tribal peoples in Third Countries (ILO No. 169), 72 ILO Official Bull 59; 28 ILM 1382 (1989). By way of example of such recommendations, see CERD Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Canada, UN Doc CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (25 May 2007), [27]; CERD Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Peru, UN Doc CERD/C/PER/CO/14-17 (3 September 2009); UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: FINLAND, UN Doc A/HRC/8/24 (23 May 2008) [50]; and UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: COLOMBIA, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/3/L.14 (15 December 2008), [87(61)].
^[62] UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: FINLAND, UN Doc E/C.12/FIN/CO/5 (16 January 2008) [11].
^[63] UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: NEPAL, UN Doc E/C.12/NPL/CO/2, (16 January 2008), [30].
^[64] UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: PARAGUAY, UN Doc E/C.12/PRY/CO/3 (4 January 2008) [17].
^[65] Ibid [18].
^[66] Ibid [34].
^[67] UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: BOLIVIA UN Doc E/C.12/IND/CO/5, (8 August 2008) [8].
^[68] Ibid [36].
^[69] UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: NICARAGUA UN Doc E/C.12/NIC/CO/4 (28 November 2008) [11].
^[70] Ibid [35]; UN Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: SWEDEN UN Doc E/C.12/SWE/CO/5, (1 December 2008) [15].
^[71] CESCR , Sweden, above n41 [15].
^[72] UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: BOLIVIA UN Doc CEDAW/C/BOL/CO/4 (8 April 2008), [11].
^[73] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: USA UN Doc CERD/C/USA/CO/6, (8 May 2008) [19], and in relation to CERD Commission Decision 1 (68) on the United States of America, adopted on 11 April 2006.
^[74] CERD, USA, above n 44, [29].
^[75] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: NICARAGUA, UN Doc CERD/C/NIC/CO/14 (19 June 2008), [18]; and UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: ECUADOR, UN Doc CERD/C/ECU/CO/19 (15 August 2008), [12].
^[76] CERD, Nicaragua, above n 46, [20].
^[77] Ibid [21].
^[78] CERD, Ecuador, above n 46, [10].
^[79] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: SWEDEN, UN Doc CERD/C/SWE/CO/18 (21 August 2008), [20].
^[80] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: NAMIBIA, UN Doc CERD/C/NAM/CO/12 (19 August 2008), [18].
^[81] Ibid [22].
^[82] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Letter: BRAZIL, 7 March 2008.
^[83] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Letter: GUATEMALA, 15 August 2008, (UNOFF. TRANS); and UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Letter: INDIA, 15 August 2008.
^[84] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Letter: PANAMA, 15 August 2008) (UNOFF. TRANS).
^[85] UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Letter: PERU, 7 March 2008, (UNOFF. TRANS).
^[86] Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: PANAMA, UN Doc CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3, (17 April 2008), [21].
^[87] Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: JAPAN, UN Doc CCPR/C/JPN/CO/5, (30 October 2008), [32].
^[88] Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: NICARAGUA, UN Doc CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3, (12 December 2008), [20].
^[89] Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: ARGENTINA, UN Doc A/HRC/8/34, (13 May 2008), [64].
^[90] Human Rights Council, Finland, above n 32, [50].
^[91] Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: GUATEMALA, UN Doc A/HRC/8/38, (29 May 2008), [89(12)].
^[92] Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: JAPAN, UN Doc A/HRC/8/44, (30 May 2008), [13].
^[93] Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: BOTSWANA, UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/3/L.1, (3 December 2008), [91(1)].
^[94] Human Rights Council, Colombia, above n 32 [87(61)].

^[∗] Ngati Whakaue. Senior lecturer in law, Victoria University of Wellington. I especially thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Health for the information they provided for this review. The views expressed here are my own, as are any errors and omissions.
^[95] Convention on Cluster Munitions, opened for signature 3 December 2008, [2008] ATNIF 24 (not yet in force). Article 17 provides that the treaty will enter into force on the first day of the sixth month following the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification.
^[96] Between the Oslo and Dublin meetings, there were three major conferences: Lima (May 2007), Vienna (December 2007) and Wellington (February 2008).
^[97] Sixth preambular paragraph. Of the 20 paragraphs in the Preamble, 14 make direct reference to civilians and the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions.
^[98] J Borrie and V Martin Radin (eds), Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice (2006).
^[99] See, for example, Joan Mosley (New Zealand), ‘First Committee, Conventional Weapons’, statement delivered at the General Assembly’s First Committee during the discussion of Conventional Weapons, 21 October 2008; and especially Don McKay (New Zealand), ‘United Nations General Assembly Sixty-Third Session: First Committee - General Debate’, statement delivered at the General Assembly’s First Committee, 8 October 2008, both available from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, <www.mfat.govt.nz> at 2 December 2009.
^[100] See for example New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 21 February 2008 (Phil Goff), 645, 14469-14471.

^[101] Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, opened for signature 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 240 (entered into force 7 August 1956); First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, opened for signature 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 358 (entered into force 7 August 1956); Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, opened for signature 17 May 1999, 2253 UNTS 212 (entered into force 9 March 2004).
^[102] Ministry for Culture and Heritage, National Interest Analysis: Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (UNESCO, The Hague, 1954), (2008) [24], <http://www.mch.govt.nz/projects/heritage/NIAConventionApril08.pdf> at 30 November 2009.
^[103] Quite apart from any other customary international law obligations.
^[104] Above n 7.
^[105] Above n 7..
^[106] Ministry for Culture and Heritage, above n 8.
^[107] Cultural Property (Protection in Armed Conflict) Bill, No 275-1, 2008.
^[108] Attorney-General v X [2008] NZSC 48; [2008] 2 NZLR 579 (SC).
^[109] Opened for signature 13 February 2004 [2005] ATNIF 18 (not yet in force).
^[110] Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change opened for signature 16 March 1998, 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005).
^[111] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature June 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994).
^[112] Recommendation of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in Regard to the Submission Made by New Zealand 19 April 2006, (2008), <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/
downloads/global-issues/cont-shelf-recommendations.pdf> at 30 November 2009. The website of the Commission of the Limits of the Continental Shelf contains most of the formal documents associated with the submission. See online: <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new
/submissions_files/submission_nzl.htm#Recommendations_> at 30 November 2009.
^[113] Helen Clark, ‘UN Recognises NZ’s Extended Seabed Rights’ (Press Release, 22 September 2008), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/un+recognises+nz+extended+seabed+rights> at 30 November 2009.
^[114] United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, (entered into force 16 November 1994), (UNCLOS), art 76(8).
^[115] Note verbale, New Zealand Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Note NZ-CLCS-TPN-02, 19 April 2006 <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/nzl_doc_es
_attachment.pdf> at 30 November 2009.
^[116] Note verbale, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, SC/06/459, 28 June 2006, <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/japan_e.pdf> at 30 November 2009; Note verbale, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DJZ-IR 178/2006, 19 December 2006, < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/nzl06/
clcs_07_2006_nld.pdf> at 30 November 2009.
^[117] 1982 UNCLOS, Annex II, art 4.
^[118] Decision Regarding the Date of Commencement of the Ten-Year Period for Making Submissions to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, set out in article 4 of Annex II to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc SPLOS/72, 29 May 2001.
^[119] 1982 UNCLOS, art 77(3).
^[120] Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand establishing Certain Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Boundaries, signed 25 July 2004 (entered into force 25 January 2006); Continental Shelf (Australia) Order 2005, SR 2005/324, 5 December 2005.
^[121] SR 2008/11, 11 February 2008.
^[122] SR 2008/125, 19 May 2008.
^[123] Steve Chadwick, ‘New Zealand and Australia Working Together on Whale Conservation’ (Press release, 10 September 2008) <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz+and+australia+
working+together+whale+conservation> at 30 November 2009.
^[124] J Mossop, ‘Law of the Sea and Fisheries’ (2007-8) 5 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 217.
^[125] A Penney et al, New Zealand Implementation of the SPRFMO Interim Measures for High Seas Bottom Trawl Fisheries in the SPRFMO Area, SPRFMO-V-SWG-09, 2008; A Penney, S Parker and J Brown, New Zealand Implementation of Protection Measures for Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in the South Pacific Ocean, SP-07-SWG-INF-01, March 2009.
^[126] Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Conservation Measure 22-05(2008): Restrictions on the Use of Bottom Trawling Gear in High-Seas Areas of the Convention Area, <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/08-09/22-05.pdf> at 30 November 2009. This is further discussed by Trevor Hughes in ‘The Antarctic Treaty System’ (2008) 6 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 333.
^[127] Report on New Zealand’s Implementation of Operative Paragraphs 80 and 83-90 of Resolution 61/105 SP-07-INF-08
^[128] Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Conservation Measure 22-06 (2008): Bottom Fishing in the Convention Area, <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/08-09/22-06.pdf> , Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Conservation Measure 22-07 (2008): Interim Measure for Bottom Fishing Activities Subject to Conservation Measure 22-06 Encountering Potential Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in the Convention Area, <http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/
cm/08-09/22-07.pdf> all at 30 November 2009.
^[129] Ministry of Fisheries, New Zealand National Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks, October 2008, <http://www.fish.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/F0530841-CD61-4C3E-9E50-153A281A4180/0/NPOAsharks.pdf> at 30 November 2009.
^[130] High Court, Wellington, CIV 2008-485-1310, 1 July 2008, Mallon J. Hereafter Omunkete Fishing. This is further discussed by Hughes above n 15.
^[131] Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-03 (2008), <http://www.ccamlr.org/Pu/E/e_pubs/cm/08-09/10-03.pdf> at 14 December 2009.
^[132] Fisheries Act 1996, s113(1)(a)(ii).
^[133] Omunkete Fishing, [57]-[64].
^[134] Omunkete Fishing, [67].
^[135] See further discussion of this development in Ceri Warnock, ‘International Environmental Law’ (2008) 6 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 325.
^[136] Report of the Correspondence Group on the Development of Measures to Minimise the Transfer of Invasive Aquatic Species through Bio-Fouling of Ships, Sub-Committee on Bulk Liquids and Gases, BLG 13/0 (28 November 2008).
^[137] Omunkete Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Fisheries and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, High Court, Wellington, CIV 2008-485-1310, 1 July 2008, Mallon J. This case is further discussed above in Joanna Mossop, ‘Law of the Sea and Fisheries’ (2008) 6 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law 326.
^[138] See further Mossop above n1.
^[139] See further, Bureau of Maritime Affairs Liberia, Report of Investigation in the Matter of the Sinking of Passenger Vessel EXPLORER (O.N.8495) 23 November 2007 in the Bransfield Strait near the South Shetland Islands (IP 120) (2009) submitted by Belgium to the XXXIII ATCM (Baltimore, 6 – 17 April 2009), iv, <http://www.ats.aq/documents/ATCM32/att/
ATCM32_att079_e.pdf> at 24 November 2009.
^[140] See IHO, Report by the Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) on ‘Cooperation in Hydrographic Surveying and Charting of Antarctic Waters’ (IP5) (2008) submitted to the XXXI ATCM (Kyiv, 2 – 13 June 2009), <http://www.ats.aq/documents/ATCM31/ip/ATCM31_ip005_e.doc> at 30 November 2009.
^[141] Richard Baldwin and Simon Evenett (eds), The Collapse of Global Trade, Murky Protectionism, and the Crisis: Recommendations for the G20 (2008).
^[142] ICTSD, ‘WTO Mini-Ministerial Ends in Collapse’, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 30 July 2008.
^[143] ICTSD, ‘Planned WTO Mini-Ministerial Postponed as Prospects for Doha Deal Diminish’, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 10 December 2008.
^[144] ‘Modalities’ is a term used in the WTO to describe a document that sets out how negotiations will proceed. Essentially, modalities texts set out broad outlines upon which formal commitments will be made. These might include, for example, formulas for tariff reductions.
^[145] ICSTD, ‘Revised Ag Text Reflects Progress, But Final Deal Still Elusive’, Bridges Weekly Trade News Digest, 10 December 2008, 5.
^[146] WTO, News Item, ‘WTO to Move Quickly on Wider Front in 2009 – Lamy’, 18 December 2008, <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news08_e/tnc_dg_stat_17dec08_e.htm> at 2 December 2009.
^[147] He referred in particular to the areas of cotton, sensitive products, tariff rate quota (TRQ) creation, remaining high tariffs of developed countries, tropical products and preferences. Trade Negotiations Committee, Minutes of Meeting held 17 December 2008, WTO Doc. TN/C/M/29, 30 January 2009.
^[148] Figures from the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), cited in Communication from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, Fisheries Subsidies, Negotiating Group on Rules, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/235, 21 July 2008.
^[149] Specific types of subsidies are excluded from the prohibition if they meet appropriate conditions (e.g., for programs to reduce fishing capacity).
^[150] Communication, above n 8.
^[151] WTO, ‘Rules Chair Issues New Negotiating text’, 19 December 2008, <http://www.wto.org.english/news_e/news08_e/rules_19dec08_e.htm> at 2 December 2009.
^[152] MFAT, Key Outcomes (2008) <http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/1-key-outcomes/index.php> at 14 December 2009.
^[153] Helen Clark, ‘Historic first – NZ-China Free Trade Agreement signed’ (Press Release, 7 April 2008).
^[154] In early 2009, the United States postponed negotiations pending confirmation of its new Trade Representative and an ensuing review of its trade policy.
^[155] The members of ASEAN are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
^[156] Australia – Measures Affecting the Implementation of Apples from New Zealand: First Written Submission of New Zealand, (2008) WTO. Doc WT/DS367), Executive Summary.
^[157] Ibid.
^[158] United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC-Hormones Dispute, WTO Doc WT/DS320/AB/R (Appellate Body Report).
^[159] Ibid [590].
^[160] Tracey Epps, International Trade and Health Protection: A Critical Assessment of the WTO’s SPS Agreement (2008), 197-198.
^[161] Under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
^[162] United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Brazil, WTO Doc No WT/DS267/AB/RW (Appellate Body Report).
^[163] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature on 1 July 1968, 729 UNTS 161 (entered into force on 5 March 1970).
^[164] The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) is a group of middle power States seeking to build international consensus to make progress on nuclear disarmament. It comprises Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden.
^[165] NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Disarmament: IAEA General Conference, 29 September – 4 October 2008: New Zealand Statement <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Disarmament/0--Statements/0-iaea-general-conference-2008.php> at 19 November 2009.
^[166] See Kennedy Graham, ‘Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation’ (2007-8) 5 New Zealand Yearbook of International Law, 236, 240.
^[167] Chairman’s Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.43, (2008) [3].
^[168] Ibid [7].
^[169] United States, Compliance and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.27 (2008).
^[170] Republic of Korea, Article X: Withdrawal: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.29 (2008).
^[171] Chairman’s Working Paper above n 5, [14]-[16].
^[172] New Zealand, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Report, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/11 (2008), [30]-[31]
^[173] United States, Non-Proliferation and the Middle East : Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.33 (2008).
^[174] See New Zealand, New Agenda Coalition Paper, Un Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.26 (2008).
^[175] Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden. See Australia et al, Article III and Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their Relationship to Article IV and Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7: Compliance and Verification: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.12 (2008); Australia et al, Article III and Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their Relationship to Article IV and Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7: Physical Protection and Illicit Trafficking: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.13 (2008); Australia et al, Article V, Article VI and Preambular Paragraphs 8 to 12: Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.14 (2008); Australia et al, Article III and Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5, especially in their Relationship to Article IV and Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7: Export Controls: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.15 (2008); Australia et al, Article III(3) and IV, Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their Relationship to Article III(1), (2) and (4) and Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5: Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.16 (2008); Australia et al, Article III(3) and IV, Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their Relationship to Article III(1), (2) and (4) and Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5: Nuclear Safety: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.17 (2008); Australia et al, Article III(3) and IV, Preambular Paragraphs 6 and 7, especially in their Relationship to Article III(1), (2) and (4) and Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5: Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy: Working Paper, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/WP.18 (2008).
^[176] New Zealand Report, above n 10; New Zealand, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Reports Corrigendum, UN Doc NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/11/Corr.1 (2008).
^[177] International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, opened for signature 13 April 2005, 44 ILM 815(entered into force 7 July 2007).
^[178] Chairman’s Working Paper, above n 5, [8]-[9].
^[179] Ibid [53]-[55].
^[180] Following the model in Graham above n 4, 251, resolutions have been grouped into categories, namely nuclear disarmament, nuclear doctrine and nuclear-free zones. There is a corresponding table (Table I) that sets out each resolution and the voting breakdown, including principal sponsor(s).
^[181] Cooperation between the United Nations and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization GA Res 63/13/ UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/13, (3 November 2008).
^[182] Regional Disarmament, GA Res 63/43, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/43 (2 December 2008).
^[183] Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: Accelerating the Implementation of Nuclear Disarmament Commitments, GA Res 63/58, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/58 (2 December 2008).
^[184] Compliance with Non-Proliferation, Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, GA Res 63/59, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/59 (2 December 2008).
^[185] Ibid [4].
^[186] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty GA Res 63/87, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/87 (2 December 2008).
^[187] Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements To Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, GA Res 63/39, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/39 (2 December 2008).
^[188] Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems, GA Res63/41. UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/41 (2 December 2008).
^[189] Follow-Up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, GA Res 63/49, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/49 (2 December 2008).
^[190] Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of the Middle East, GA Res 63/38, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/38, (2 December 2008).
^[191] Mongolia’s International Security and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Status, GA Res 63/56, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/56, (2 December 2008).
^[192] Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, GA Res 63/63, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/63 (2 December 2008).
^[193] Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas, GA Res 63/65, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/65 (2 December 2008).
^[194] Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons: Report of the Conference on Disarmament, GA Res 63/36, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/36 (2 December 2008).
^[195] Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, GA Res 63/37, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/37 (2 December 2008).
^[196] Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, GA Res 63/40, UNGAOR, 63^rd sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/40 (2 December 2008).
^[197] Graham, above n 4, 249-250.
^[198] Ibid 259 (Table II).
^[199] Security Council Resolution 1737 (1006) on Measures against Iran in Connection with its Enrichment–Related and Reprocessing Activities, including Research and Development, SC Res 1737, UNSCOR, 5612^th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1737 (27 December 2006).
^[200] Security Council Resolution 1803 (2008) on Further Measures against Iran in Connection with its Development of Sensitive Technologies in Support of its Nuclear and Missile Programmes, SC Res 1803, UNSCOR, 5848^th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1803 (3 March 2008).
^[201] Security Council Resolution 1835 (2008) on Iran's Obligations to Comply with Security Council's Resolutions and to Meet the Requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, SC Res 1835, UN SCOR, 5984th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1835 (2008).
^[202] Security Council Resolution 1805 (2008) on Extension of the Mandate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) as Special Political Mission under the Policy Guidance of the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), SC Res 1805, UN SCOR, 5856th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1805 (2008); Security Council Resolution 1822 (2008) on Continuation of Measure Imposed Against the Taliban and Al-Qaida, SC RES 1822, UN SCOR, 5928th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1822 (2008).
^[203] Security Council Resolution 1822, above n 40.
^[204] Security Council Resolution 1540 on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons, SC Res 1540, UN SCOR, 4956th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1540 (2004).
^[205] Security Council Resolution 1810 on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and on Extension of the Mandate of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) Concerning Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons, SC Res 1810, UN SCOR, 5877th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1810 (2008).
^[206] The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, GA Res 62/272, UNGAOR, 62^nd sess, UN Doc A/RES/62/272 (5 September 2008).
^[207] Rosemary Banks (New Zealand), ‘United Nations Security Council: Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts’ (Statement delivered at Security Council, 9 December 2008) <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Media-and-publications/Media/MFAT-speeches/
2008/0-9-December-2008.php> at 26 November 2009.
^[208] IAEA, National Security Measures to Protect against Nuclear Terrorism: Progress on Measures to Protect against Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism, GC(52)/RES/10 (October 2008).
^[209] IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement between the Agency and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, GC(52)/RES/14 (October 2008).
^[210] MFAT, Disarmament, above n3.
^[211] Murray McCully, ‘New Zealand Statement on Afghanistan’ (Press Release, 31 March 2008), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new+zealand+statement+afghanistan> at 26 November 2009.
^[212] SLT Paddy Baker RNZN, HMNZS TE MANA Deploys, Royal New Zealand Navy, <http://www.navy.mil.nz/know-your-navy/official-documents/navy-today/nt08webformat/
may08/te-mana-deploys.htm> at 26 November 2009.
^[213] New Zealand currently has 35 police and 45 defence personnel in Solomon Islands, as part of a broad Pacific taskforce. See NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), <http:www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Pacific/Solomon-Islands.php#ramsi> at 26 November 2009.
^[214] UNMIT extended its mission by one year in 2008. New Zealand increased its deployment in Timor-Leste in early 2008, taking the total number of New Zealand personnel there to 25 police officers, two military liaison officers with the United Nations and 142 New Zealand soldiers serving in the International Stabilisation Force as peacekeepers. New Zealand also had two Iroquois helicopters and associated personnel working with the Australian Defence Force. Phil Goff (Press Release, 26 February 2008), <http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/extension+
commitment+timor+leste> at 26 November 2009.
^[215] Security Council Resolution 1373 (1001) on Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Acts, SC Res 1373, UNSCOR, 438^5thmtg, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001).
^[216] A full list of terrorist designations is available at New Zealand Police, New Zealand’s Designated Terrorist Individuals and Organisations <http://www.police.govt.nz/service/
counterterrorism/designated-terrorists.html> at 26 November 2009.
^[217] See MFAT, New Zealand Proliferation Security Initiative – NZ Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, online: <http://www.nzpsi.govt.nz/index.php> at 26 November 2009.
^[218] See MFAT, About Exercise Maru <http://www.nzpsi.govt.nz/maru/index.php> at 26 November 2009.
^[219] The Operational Experts Group comprises 20 members and acts as the ‘steering committee’ for the PSI. The members are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. See MFAT, Participating Countries, <http://www.nzpsi.govt.nz/about/countries.php> at 26 November 2009.
^[220] Further information, see MFAT, Asia Security Fund <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/International-Security/0-Asia-Pacific-Regional-Interfaith-Dialogue.
php#asf> and MFAT, Pacific Security Fund, <http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/
Pacific/0-pacsecfund.php> at 26 November 2009.
^[221] Don MacKay (New Zealand), United Nations General Assembly: First Committee – Nuclear Weapons (Statement delivered at General Assembly, 15 October 2008) <http://www.mfat.govt.
nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Disarmament/0--Statements/0-15-October-2008.php> at 20 November 2009.
^[222] Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, above n 24.

^[*] The reporter is especially indebted to Mr Jeremy Purton for putting together the materials used for this review.