|
|
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
New Zealand Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence |
Last Updated: 12 April 2015
Stamping Out Global Tobacco Smuggling
BY NEIL BOISTER AND RICHARD BURCHILL*
Introduction
Since the 1980s, the smoke from illegally smuggled tobacco products has been 'blowing south'.' As concern over tobacco usage in the developed world has led to greater efforts to reduce demand, tobacco manufacturers have looked elsewhere to market their products. This article is concerned with the extent to which developed states effectively address the problems of smuggling, involving companies based in the developed state, to developing states. The United Kingdom (UK) will be examined as a useful example of a developed state with a contradictory approach to tobacco smuggling. The UK exhibits great enthusiasm for the reduction of tobacco usage at home as well as for the prevention of smuggling into the domestic market. Yet at the same time it is only slowly coming alive to the involvement of large tobacco companies domiciled in the UK in the smuggling of tobacco products into the developing world. The purpose of this article is to provide suggestions for enhancing the legal suppression of tobacco smuggling in order to achieve a comprehensive global approach to reducing the supply of illicit tobacco.
Part I of the article will outline the efforts taken by the UK to suppress tobacco usage in the domestic market. Part II will look at the impact of tobacco suppression measures on tobacco companies and their responses in relation to developing markets. Part III will examine the response of the UK government to allegations regarding the involvement of British tobacco companies in smuggling into the developing world. Part IV will look at the inadequacy of existing penal provisions in the UK for addressing the alleged illegal behaviour of British tobacco companies abroad. Part V will investigate the use of
* Dr Neil Boister, Law, University of Nottingham, UK, and Dr Richard Burchill, Law, University of Hull, UK.
Panos Media Briefing No. 13 (September 1994) 'Tobacco: The smoke blows south', available at <www.panos.org.uk/briefing/tobacco.htm>.
54 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence Vol 5
the United
Nations Transnational Organised Crime Convention in the suppression of
extraterritorial tobacco smuggling.
I. The suppression of tobacco use in the UK
On 30 October 2000, the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry in the United Kingdom, Stephen Byers, announced that he was accepting the 'unanimous recommendation of the Select Committee that the DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] should investigate the allegations of BAT' s [British American Tobacco] involvement in smuggling.'2 This decision followed extensive media coverage of the alleged role played by British tobacco manufacturers in smuggling tobacco products into the UK, other European states and other parts of the world.3 It was precipitated by the conclusion of the House of Commons Select Committee on Health, which had examined the allegations, that there was sufficient evidence to justify a DTI in vestigation .4
The findings of the Select Committee are not limited to the behaviour of one company. They reveal that tobacco smuggling is a major and general problem within the tobacco business and that UK companies are implicated. The report observes that as the use of tobacco products has declined in developed societies, tobacco manufacturers have gone to great lengths to increase market share in developing societies where the use of such products is historically low. The report notes that participation in smuggling is alleged to be part of the corporate strategy of tobacco manufacturers for increasing market share around the world. The Select Committee concludes that the UK government needs to be more active in monitoring the action of tobacco manufacturers. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that:
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco Smuggling 55
[i]t would be a hollow victory if, as a result of more stringent action taken on tobacco control in the developed world, smoking related deaths were merely exported to the world's poorer nations.5
The UK government, however, does not see such monitoring of tobacco companies as part of its role." This response is unfortunate and surprising, given not only the UK government's commitment to reducing the harmful effects of tobacco nationally but also its expressed support for measures aimed to decrease tobacco consumption globally.'
In developed states where major tobacco manufacturers have corporate headquarters and much cigarette manufacturing goes on, smoking is considered a potentially harmful activity.8 This potential harm is considered to be great enough to justify a wide range of legal measures to suppress tobacco use and thus restrict its adverse impact on health.9 In the UK the government's position on tobacco usage and its action plan are set out in Smoking Kills — A White Paper on Tobacco. The White Paper makes it clear that the UK government considers tobacco usage to be a major threat to the general health of society.'" The UK
5 Ibid, para 230.
56 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence Vol 5
government justifies its position on tobacco usage based on the impact it has on human health — smoking kills over 120,000 people in the UK each year" — and on cost — the NHS spends up to £1.7 billion per year on health problems related to tobacco usage.12 The UK government's action plan to minimise tobacco usage involves, in the government's own assessment, a 'comprehensive package of measures' .13 Some measures have a domestic and regional focus. These include ending tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsorship; increasing tax on tobacco products; taking action against smuggling; supporting the NHS, undertaking health promotion through the media; reviewing smoking policies in public areas; supporting European initiatives on health; and creating codes of conduct for tobacco manufacturers. Practical measures taken by the government include the recently passed Tobacco Advertising and Promotion Act 2002 that bans most forms of advertising which promote tobacco products. The government believes that this one measure will reduce tobacco consumption in the UK by 2.5% and save almost 3000 lives a year.14 Other measures have an international focus as the government is also committed to ending the promotion of tobacco products or events overseas while supporting international efforts on tobacco control."
Despite these measures, smuggling remains a problem. The demand for tobacco products is sensitive to price, making high taxes on tobacco products an obvious means for decreasing consumption." Smuggling
11 White Paper (supra n 7) para 1.1.
12 Ibid, para 1.24.
13 Ibid, para 1.13.
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco
Smuggling 57
of a wide range of otherwise licit products is a common response
to high levels of taxation and excise duties. Tobacco is considered
to be no
different. Researchers estimate that, globally, almost a third of legal tobacco
product exports disappear into the contraband
market, which leads to major
losses in tax revenue.17 More crucially, however, smuggling
exacerbates public health problems because it floods the market with cheap
tobacco products, thus
stimulating consumption and increasing ill
health.'8 The aim of suppressing smuggling is not to reduce supply
for its own sake, nor to increase government revenue, but to help the effective
implementation of price increases that reduce demand.19
The introduction of smuggled cigarettes into the UK's domestic market directly undermines the UK government's health objectives. In response, the UK government has invested some £209 million into the efforts of Customs and Excise to reduce smuggling. Through measures targeting both the licit and illicit use of tobacco products in the UK, the government is committed to reducing consumption in the UK, with the goal of ensuring a healthier society. But what of the UK government's concern about the health of the citizens of other states, given that the legal suppression of tobacco use in developed states is a significant contributing factor to the globalisation of tobacco's harmful effects?2°
II. The impact of suppression on tobacco manufacturers and the development of new markets, licit and illicit
Legal suppression measures like those described above have resulted in decreased sales and profits for tobacco manufacturers.21 However,
18 Joossens and Raw (supra n 17) 947.
19 See the World Bank Report (supra n 16) 63.
20 The capitalist imperative of increasing profits also plays a significant role.
58 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence Vol
5
the sale of tobacco products is an extremely lucrative business," and
tobacco companies have attempted to counter regulation in developed
states by
increasing their advertising and promotional activity." At the same time the
globalised nature of the world economy has
provided other avenues for escaping
punitive taxation in traditional markets. In a push-down, pop-up response to
legal suppression,24 tobacco companies have developed new
markets for their products, and the developing world has become an important
target for the
creation of these new markets.25 In order to
penetrate and maintain these new markets, tobacco manufacturers employ a number
of tactics, including aggressive advertising.
Smuggling also appears to play a
significant role. Joossens and Raw argue convincingly that tobacco smuggling is
not caused primarily
by 'market forces' but is supply driven, caused mainly by
fraud through the illegal evasion of taxes.26 The developing
world offers many such 'tax free' opportunities because of weak law enforcement
infrastructures. A study commissioned
by the World Bank concluded that factors
such as corruption in the target- or transit-state and public acceptance of
black markets
— factors prominent in developing states — also
contribute to smuggling.27
The nature of the smuggling process points to the important role of tobacco companies in smuggling. Joossens and the World Bank have
26 Joossens and Raw (supra n 17) 947.
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco
Smuggling 59
identified a number of key features of global tobacco
smuggling.28 These include the transportation of non-duty paid
(or general trade) tobacco products 'in transit' which allows them to be
exported
without duty being paid and then to disappear into the contraband
trade; passage through a number of owners making it impossible
to trace the
final consignee; and the involvement of criminal networks.
The bulk export by tobacco companies of popular international cigarette brands 'in transit' to undeclared final consignees is critical to the smuggling process.29 Manufacturers benefit directly from smuggling because in addition to the large-scale evasion of duty, it allows trade barriers to be avoided and increases market penetration due to the affordability of the product.'"
The lesson that there is money to be made out of tobacco smuggling appears not to have been lost upon the major tobacco companies. The media have directly implicated major British tobacco manufacturers in smuggling.3' Many of the allegations are supported by the tobacco manufacturers' own internal documents, which suggests involvement
60 Yearbook
of New Zealand Jurisprudence Vol 5
in smuggling is endemic within the
tobacco industry." Whatever the legal merits of particular cases, it would be
absurd to suggest
that tobacco companies are completely ignorant of the
destination of many obviously suspicious bulk exports of their products. It
would, for example, be kind to UK tobacco companies to believe that exporting
more than 1520 million cigarettes to Andorra in 1997,
which has a population of
63,000, was done at most recklessly as to the fact that they were destined to be
smuggled out of Andorra."
The particular legal loophole being exploited by tobacco companies is the difficulty of proving their direct and intentional participation in smuggling. A spokesman for Gallaher, when interviewed on the BBC, explained:
We will sell cigarettes legally to our distributors in various countries. If ... those distributors subsequently sell those products on to other people who are going to illegally bring them back into this country, that is something outside of our contro1.34
BAT holds a similar position, explaining:
Where a market involves myriad and diverse secondary transactions, it is impossible for any manufacturer, however prudent in managing its primary distributors, to control all aspects of supply.35
The Chairman of BAT stated before the Select Committee that tobacco manufacturers, while unable to control all aspects of their supply chain, nonetheless know that smuggling is occurring, and that this 'is hardly a surprise.' He went on to say, 'Knowledge of what is happening in a market is not, as far as I have understood, a criminal offence.'36
34 Quoted by Joossens and Raw (supra n 17) 949.
35 BAT, Smuggling: Our View, available on their website <www.bat.com>.
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco Smuggling 61
III. The UK
government's responses to tobacco company involvement in smuggling into the
developing world
The Health Select Committee rejected this abdication of responsibility. It stated that the regulation of tobacco usage depends 'on a responsible approach being taken by the tobacco companies.'" While it would be difficult to set out the precise details of what this responsible approach entails, it does at the least include a duty upon companies to adhere to existing laws and to prevent or remedy any detrimental effects of their actions.38
Governments and international organisations recognise the need for a global effort aimed at minimising the harmful effects of tobacco usage along with the illegal activities associated with tobacco products. The World Bank notes that in spite of objections from tobacco companies that higher taxes are an incentive for smuggling,39 taxation remains one of the most effective methods for reducing tobacco consumption. It believes that the appropriate response to smuggling is to suppress smuggling,40 not decrease taxation.4' Governments, the UK included, appear to support this view.42 Legislators in developed states also recognise that raising taxes and using other measures to suppress tobacco consumption and pursue public health at home without doing anything at the international level to prevent smuggling to developing states is untenable. Unfortunately, official rhetoric does not reveal how far these developed states are prepared to go in constraining tobacco
37 Ibid, para 230.
40 See the World Bank Report (supra n 16) 63.
42 White Paper
(supra n 7) paras 2.12-2.19.
62 Yearbook of New Zealand
Jurisprudence Vol 5
companies based within their jurisdictions and
implicated in illegal activity elsewhere. The UK government, for example, has
recognised
that the harmful effect of tobacco use is a global problem, and it
has declared its support for global action.43 It has expressed
support for international codes of conduct for tobacco manufacturers and for the
work of the WHO.44 It is questionable, however, whether these
measures adequately address the fact that the UK is the source of many of the
cigarettes
smuggled to the rest of the world. The UK government's response to
the Select Committee's recommendations is that it is not the role
of governments
to monitor the behaviour of companies.45
IV. The inadequacy of existing penal provisions in the UK
The focus of the extant UK legislation is the control of the import of tobacco products into the UK. This activity is regulated by the Tobacco Products Duty Act 1979 (TPDA), the Customs and Excise (General Reliefs) Act 1979 (CEGR) and most significantly the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA). These statutes provide for the imposition of duty on tobacco.46Although UK citizens returning from abroad are legally entitled to import as much alcohol and tobacco as they want for their own use, importation of any quantity of tobacco for resale is an offence. A wide range of criminal, civil and administrative enforcement options are available to Customs and Excise such as prosecution, compounding, seizure, forfeiture and civil penalties. Under CEMA, section 50 penalises importation of non-duty paid goods, section 68 exportation, and section 170 fraudulent evasion of duty. Section 170 is heavily relied on in the prosecutions initiated by Customs and Excise, and a breach is potentially a serious offence: it can carry
43 White Paper (supra n 7) para 8.3.
44 Ibid, paras 8.20-8.21.
45 See supra n 6.
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco
Smuggling 63
seven years' imprisonment on indictment, or an unlimited
fine.47 However, the Court of Appeal has noted that prison is
not the only form of appropriate punishment," and it is not surprising that
Customs and Excise relies heavily on confiscation to deter smuggling. Under the
CEMA anything that is being taken into or out of
the UK contrary to any
legislation in force may be liable to confiscation, and the scope of
confiscation has been broadened by the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The problem
with these laws is that they do not extend liability to those who produce
tobacco within the UK which is then smuggled
into another state in breach of
that other state's laws.
It is facile to argue that the suppression of tobacco product smuggling is entirely a matter of the domestic criminal law of the developing states into which tobacco products produced in the UK are smuggled, and not the UK's business. Problems of effective implementation abound in the developing world, and even if these laws are implemented effectively, developing states may not be able to reach sufficiently far up the chain of supply to get at its source. The practical issue for their criminal justice authorities is that key accused are likely to be in the UK.49 These foreign authorities may, of course, make an extradition request to the UK. These requests cannot be denied on the basis of the fiscal offence exception to extradition, because the UK has abandoned it.' However, problems remain with double criminality in respect of
48 Kefford [2002] EWHC 1691; [2002] 2 Cr App R (S) 495.
64 Yearbook of New Zealand
Jurisprudence Vol 5
fiscal offences, due to the lack of correspondence
between UK fiscal offences and foreign fiscal offences and the omission of these
offences from bilateral extradition arrangements. Stanbrook and Stanbrook
note:
Outside Europe, the exclusion of purely fiscal offences from extradition arrangements has been a source of grievance for many developing countries for whom such offences have caused significant economic damage.51
The alternative is prosecution in the UK. Unfortunately, the existing penal measures relating directly to smuggling do not allow for legal action in the UK regarding the extraterritorial behaviour of UK companies alleged to be involved in smuggling where this behaviour does not occur in, or impact in some way on, the UK. This is not true of all crimes. Extraterritorial jurisdiction has commonly been established in English law in respect of crimes that cause harm at home such as High Treason52 and conspiracies to commit crimes that begin abroad with the intention of completion at home.53 The situation is more difficult in respect of offences that occur abroad and have no harmful effects at home. They can be brought within English jurisdiction in a number of ways. In terms of section 1A of the Criminal Law Act 1977, if a conspiracy to commit an offence abroad is hatched within England or Wales it falls under English jurisdiction notwithstanding that implementation of the agreement will occur extra-territorially.54 The conspiracy must be to bring about an 'act or event' abroad, which constitutes an offence in the country where it is to take place, and which would constitute an offence under English law were it to take place in England or Wales. Importantly, something relating to the conspiracy must be done within England and Wales by a party to the conspiracy or by an agent of the conspiracy. Section 1A of the
52 Treason Act 1351.
53 This is even the case where no steps are taken to put the agreement into effect in England or Wales — Somchai Liangsiripraesent v United States [1991] AC 225.
2001 Stamping Out Global
Tobacco Smuggling 65
Criminal Law Act 1977 could be used as an effective tool
against conspiracies to smuggle tobacco hatched in whole or in part in the
UK.
However, it appears to have been intended for use against terrorist groups
operating from the UK55 and its use in other contexts has been
very limited.56 Where no conduct of any sort occurs within
England or Wales, the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction is much narrower.
Extraterritorial
jurisdiction has, however, been established on the basis of
nationality in respect of specific crimes such as sex tourism because
of the
involvement of UK nationals and residents.57
The rationale for establishing jurisdiction over domestic conspiracies to commit offences abroad and nationality jurisdiction over entirely extraterritorial offences is relevant in the present context. These legislative actions recognise the responsibility of the UK for the prevention of harm abroad that either originates in the UK or is caused by UK nationals. This domestic concern about offences that do not harm the UK directly is equally apposite, we submit, to tobacco smuggling. In this regard, Section I A of the Criminal Law Act 1977 should be applied to conspiracies to smuggle tobacco products abroad, and nationality jurisdiction over purely extraterritorial tobacco smuggling must be established in the UK. But how is it possible to oblige the UK government to take these and other associated steps against extraterritorial tobacco smuggling?
V. Using the TOC Convention to combat tobacco company involvement in extraterritorial tobacco smuggling
The adoption and domestic implementation of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC Convention)5K concluded in November 2000 would, it is submitted, provide the ideal opportunity to address not just extraterritorial tobacco
57 Section 7(2) of the Sex Offences (Conspiracies and Incitement) Act 1996.
58 Annex to UN Doc. A/55/383.
66 Yearbook of New Zealand
Jurisprudence Vol 5
smuggling but all serious extraterritorial organised
crimes committed by UK nationals. Although not yet a party, the UK is a
signatory
to the TOC Convention along with 143 other states and the European
Community.59 The main purpose of the TOC Convention is to
increase cooperation in tackling the root causes of transnational crime. In
doing so
it provides for a major extension of criminal liability to offenders
who belong to criminal organisations but who may not get involved
directly in
offending.6° The TOC Convention is based on legislative measures
developed in the United States°' and Italy62 to counter
organised crime. In the United States this legislation has been used against
tobacco companies allegedly involved in smuggling.63 The
significance of the TOC Convention for the present discussion is that its broad
provisions would oblige the UK government to
take legal action against a tobacco
company based in the UK when it knowingly supplies tobacco products to groups or
individuals
who are engaged in smuggling activities elsewhere.
The major penal provision of the TOC Convention is article 5 on the criminalisation of participation in an organised criminal group. It reads:
I .Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity:
60 See generally Bassiouni, MC and Vetere, E (eds), Organized Crime: A Compilation of UN Documents 1975-1998 (Ardsley-on-Hudson: Transnational, 1998).
62 Decree No. 309 of 9 October 1990.
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco Smuggling 67
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit and, where required by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an organized criminal group;
(i) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part in:
- Criminal activities of the organized criminal group;
- Other activities of the organized criminal group in the knowledge that his or herparticipation will contribute to the achievement of the above-described criminal aim;
(b) Organizing, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating or counselling the commission of serious crime involving an organized criminal group.
Article 5(1)(a) obliges parties to adopt either one or two new organised crime offences. Both offences must be committed 'intentionally' but section 5(2) allows states parties to infer this mens rea from the facts.
Article 5(1)(a)(i) is a broadly-drawn conspiracy offence suitable for
penalising the involvement in tobacco smuggling by tobacco companies.
It would
apply to very broad agreements, and would appear to include any corporate
decision leading to or allowing for smuggling
activities. Where corporate
executives deny involvement, an agreement
68 Yearbook of New Zealand
Jurisprudence Vol 5
to smuggle could be inferred from documents that make it clear that a state is being targeted for the export of large quantities of potentially contraband products.64 In terms of article 10 of the TOC Convention, which obliges the criminalisation of juridical persons, the agreement could be between the tobacco company and any individuals or groups directly involved in smuggling. It could also be an agreement between individuals who are employed by the tobacco company and individuals or groups involved in smuggling. The agreement must be 'to commit a serious crime', something defined by article 2(b) as a crime with a maximum prison sentence of at least four years or more. It will be a question of fact whether smuggling of cigarettes carries a maximum prison sentence of four years or more in a state.65 In terms of the TOC Convention the agreement to commit the crime must be for a purpose `relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining of a financial or other material benefit'. Evidence that a tobacco company received financial benefit from the sale of greater quantities of tobacco products along with increased market penetration would suffice. There appears to be little doubt that tobacco companies that do intentionally conspire to supply smugglers would be liable in terms of any domestic offence that applies article 5(1)(a)(i) of the TOC Convention. It will, nevertheless, be difficult to prove intentional participation by a tobacco company in the supply of smugglers when they are in control of all
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco
Smuggling 69
records relating to the production and export of tobacco
products, and when they are free to export to any destination without
authorisation.66
As an alternative to the 'conspiracy' offence, parties may choose to apply the 'Mafia Offence' in article 5(1)(a)(ii) of the TOC Convention, which specifically requires the involvement of an 'organised criminal group'. In terms of article 2(a) this means a structured group. Defined by article 2(c) such a group is one 'not randomly formed for the immediate commission of an offence' but one which 'does not need to have formally defined roles for its members, continuity of membership or a developed structure'. Such a group must consist of three or more persons, must exist for a period of time, and must act in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with the Convention. Various examples exist today of alleged involvement by tobacco companies with criminal organisations,68 so this element is potentially quite simple to establish 69 Article 5(1)(a)(ii) requires 'conduct by a person' — perhaps the action of the person in the tobacco company responsible for supplying the
70 Yearbook
of New Zealand Jurisprudence Vol 5
cigarettes, or perhaps the tobacco
company itself in terms of article 10's provision for corporate penal liability
— acting
'with the knowledge of either the aim and general criminal
activity of an organised criminal group or its intention to commit the
crimes in
question'. The individual must either take 'an active part in criminal
activities of the organised criminal group' or in
'other activities of the
organised criminal group in the knowledge that his or her participation will
contribute to the achievement
of the above described criminal aim'. If it cannot
be established that a tobacco manufacturer has engaged directly in smuggling,
then it becomes an issue of whether the behaviour of the manufacturer
contributed to the aim of the smuggler's criminal activities.
The latter test
should be relatively easy to satisfy.
Perhaps the simplest way the TOC Convention obliges parties to extend criminal liability to tobacco manufacturers involved in smuggling is through article 5(1)(b), which makes it an offence to engage in various acts of complicity in respect of 'the commission of a serious crime by an organised criminal group', viz.: 'organising, directing, aiding, abetting, facilitating, [and] counselling'.
Jurisdiction would be crucial to the application of article 5's offences in the present context. Article 15(1)(a) obliges a party to exercise jurisdiction over article 5 offences on the basis of the territoriality principle, and article 15(1)(b) extends the obligation to its vessels and aircraft.7° Following established state practice this means that if only one element of the smuggling offence occurs on the territory of the state concerned it will have jurisdiction. If all the elements of the offence occur extraterritorially a state may in terms of article 15(2) establish jurisdiction on a number of different bases, some not relevant here.71 Article 15(2)(b) provides for optional nationality-based jurisdiction, which would be an effective basis for UK legal action against tobacco companies and their personnel who are in the UK but have performed
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco Smuggling 71
article 5 offences elsewhere.72 The problem with nationality jurisdiction is that the UK would have to find the political will, as it has done with the sex-tourism offences, to establish its extraterritorial jurisdiction on this basis over tobacco product smuggling. Article 15(3) further extends the possible grounds for jurisdiction as it places an obligation on state parties to exercise jurisdiction over an alleged offender present in its territory who is not to be extradited 'solely on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals.' This aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) provision has the advantage of being an obligation and the alleged offender is in the custody of the state that will exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, its operation in respect of extraterritorial tobacco smuggling is likely to be limited because the UK does, in principle, extradite its nationals, and it must be triggered by an extradition request from a third-party state. Nationality jurisdiction is the better option, and practical problems like the gathering of evidence can be overcome by use of the legal assistance provisions of the TOC Convention?' If the UK government decides not to take the nationality option, it will in any event be obliged in terms of article 6 of the TOC Convention to criminalise money laundering74 where the predicate offences are 'serious crimes' as defined by the Convention.75 Moreover,
72 The nationality of the alleged offender is a very useful principle for establishing jurisdiction over extraterritorial crime to which there is no other connection. See Harvard Research in International Law, 'Draft convention on jurisdiction with respect to crimes' (1935) 29 AJIL 435 at 519. Civil law states justify its use on the basis that the defendant benefits from the protection of nationality and owes allegiance to it. Common law states do recognise nationality as a basis for jurisdiction, but are traditionally inclined to use it only if some essential state interest was threatened by a crime such as treason. However, some common law states have shown an increased willingness to establish nationality jurisdiction over offences endemic in developing states, when such states are unable for socio-economic reasons to suppress these offences themselves. See Bantekas et al (supra n 50) 24. In order to globalise the use of the principle, international society has included it in a large number of multilateral crime suppression conventions like the TOC Convention.
73 Article 18.
74 Article 6(1).
72 Yearbook of New Zealand
Jurisprudence Vol 5
article 6(2)(c) provides specifically that each party
shall include as predicate offences 'offences committed both within and outside
the jurisdiction of the State Party in question' so long as the 'the relevant
conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic law
of the State where it is
committed and would be criminal under the domestic law of the State party
implementing or applying this
article had it been committed there.' Thus the UK
will be obliged to criminalise the domestic laundering of the proceeds of
extraterritorial
tobacco smuggling. Finally, the obligation in article 10 to
establish the possibility of corporate criminal liability will play a
key role
in the prosecution of tobacco corporations.76
The UK government currently appears to be unwilling rather than completely unable to police the behaviour of British tobacco companies overseas.' Ratification of the TOC Convention would oblige the UK to consolidate and put into effect legislative measures against transnational organised tobacco smuggling. In particular, the implementation through domestic legislation of article 5 of the TOC Convention would provide a means for prosecuting tobacco companies that get involved even if only indirectly in tobacco smuggling into developing states. This broad conspiracy provision would go a long way to counteract the tobacco companies' apparent position that while they may have mens rea for commission of a foreign smuggling offence (they do after all concede that they know their products are feeding the illicit trade), they do not have the actus reus because they are so detached from the smuggling process that they cannot be said to conspire in it.
Conclusions on comprehensive global action
Using the Transnational Organised Crime Convention against tobacco manufacturers based in the UK that are alleged to be involved in smuggling to the developing world presents many opportunities and equally many problems of proof and jurisdiction. However, its adoption
2001 Stamping Out Global Tobacco Smuggling 73
and application will make tobacco companies rethink their position on smuggling. The tobacco industry is a highly competitive global market and individual companies are determined to maintain and increase market share as well as ensure the industry remains relatively unregulated, which in turn contributes to the lure of smuggling." Yet tobacco companies deny any direct involvement and publicly state that they are against all forms of smuggling as it causes severe damage to their business and reputation.79 This response should be seen in the context of their general response to poor public perception about the industry. They have made substantial efforts to combat negative public perceptions of the industry.'" They support measures which attempt to limit the use of tobacco products by children, stress the beneficial impact the tobacco industry has on the economy, and emphasise that tobacco manufacturers are not evil but instead are 'good corporate citizen[s] which maintain high ethical standards.' 81 Tobacco companies
74 Yearbook of New Zealand
Jurisprudence Vol 5
have also mide efforts to deflect allegations about
the effect of tobacco smuggling on developing states. BAT, for example, stated
that international efforts led by the WHO to suppress the use of tobacco did not
correspond with the priorities of health ministers
from developing countries
who, it claimed, put more emphasis on issues such as malnutrition, poor
sanitation, infant mortality and
AIDS.82 This position was
soundly rejected in submissions to the Commons Health Select Committee by a WHO
representative and by the Chinese
Health Minister.83
As the Health Select Committee points out, the UK, like all developed states with an interest in tobacco product manufacturing, cannot allow the negative effects of tobacco use to be exported elsewhere. Governments in these developed states have a crucial moral and political responsibility for global suppression of illicit tobacco supply. Steps taken to provide a social defence in developed states have been at least partly responsible for tobacco companies seeking markets elsewhere. If governments in the developed world are serious about comprehensive measures to tackle problems of tobacco use, they must ensure that their efforts are not undermined by the behaviour of tobacco companies. Lawmakers in developed states are under a compelling obligation to ensure that the citizens of developing states are given the opportunity to compete on a level playing field with those in developed states when it comes to the health hazards of tobacco consumption. Domestic implementation of the TOC Convention in the developed world would provide a legal instrument that would prevent some of the harm caused by illegal tobacco from 'blowing south'.
describing the website as a public service: see 'United Kingdom American Tobacco exploits ad ban loophole', Marketing (30 March 2000) 1. Philip Morris states on its website that it is proud of its tobacco products and their advertising campaigns but will not include any tobacco brand imagery on the site. Whether or not such actions make tobacco companies 'good citizens' or even responsible ones is questionable. If tobacco companies are going to make the claim that they are good citizens then there is an expectation they will do much more 'good' for society then merely adhering to the letter of the law: see Whitehouse (supra n 38).
83 Ibid. para 227.
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/NZYbkNZJur/2001/4.html