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New Zealand Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence |
Last Updated: 22 April 2015
Stylized Models of Corporate Governance
Dr. Andrew Clarke*
i. INTRODUCTION
The contemporary study of corporate governance is focused around the notion
of relationships between, and the influence over, certain
key drivers. At a
basic level, for example, there is a growing recognition that ‘the markets
themselves, in particular the
international securities markets, increasingly
influence company law, national as well as European and
international’.1 This might suggest a simple linearity between
markets and the emergent corporate form. The reality is that the study of such
relationships
and the power-influence binaries are far from static or agreed.
Klaus Hopt and Eddie Wymeersch, for example, note that:
The inverse relationship- the La Porta et al thesis that company law is
relevant for the capital and financial markets- has been observed
and hotly
debated, both on an empirical and theoretical level.2
The markets therefore provide another analytical entry point into the examination of corporate and employee governance. A basic categorization of national corporate governance systems based on markets is that of either
‘outsider’ or ‘insider’ systems.3 It
provides a useful ‘starting point for the examination of the
distinguishing features of the major models’.4 The models are
based on the ‘significant differences between the corporate ownership
structures across jurisdictions’5 and ‘has resulted in
the evolution of two different financial systems which are referred to as the
“insider system”
and the “outsider system”’.6
This convergence of corporate governance and financial systems reveals the
inexact and amorphous nature of the theoretical concepts.
The models spring from
seeking solutions to the set of ‘problems arising
* Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Canberra, Australia.
1 Klaus J. Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (2003) Preface.
2 Hopt & Wymeersch, ibid, Preface. See, for example, S Johnston, R La Porta, F Lopez-Silanes and A Shleifer, ‘Tunneling’ in Hopt, Klaus J and Eddy Wymeersch (eds), Capital Markets and Company Law (2003) 611-618.
3 Colin Mayer, ‘Stock-markets, Financial Institutions and Corporate Performance’ in N Dimsdale and M Prevezer (eds.), Capital Markets and Corporate Governance (1994)179-
94.
4 On Kit Tam, The Development of Corporate Governance in China (1999) 25.
5 Low Chee Keong (ed.), Corporate Governance: An Asia Pacific Critique (2002) 4.
6 Low Chee Keong, supra n 5 at 4-5.
from the separation of ownership and control.’7 These are
agency costs and transactions costs,8 and as we shall see, these
points overlap. The approach to these issues depends on the system under
examination.
Masahiko Aoki summarizes the long battle for supremacy of the two main forms
of governance:
For decades, legal and economic scholars, as well as practitioners, have been
debating regarding whether corporate governance ought
to be, and will be,
structured in the sole interests of investors or for a broader range of
objectives including public and other
stakeholders’ interests. Some of
them argue that the presence of different types of corporate governance
structure is a sign
of inefficient historical legacy and they ought to
eventually converge according to the same standard of investor interests. Others
argue that such convergence is not desirable or political from ethical,
political, historical, and other reasons.9
Aoki’s analysis configures the insider and outsider models against one
another, and also raises the analysis of Jonathon Charkham.10 His
thesis is that the ongoing tensions, dialogue and disagreement over the choice
of models will be a prevailing theme of 21st century debate in the
governance arena.
ii. COMPARING SYSTEMS
Insider Systems
Insider systems are characterized by ‘a high level of ownership
concentration, illiquid capital markets and a high degree of
cross-shareholding
between companies within a corporate group.’11 Such systems
‘tend to be characterized by concentrated ownership or
control.’12 Examples include Germany, Japan and continental
Europe.13 Such systems are ‘common in continental Europe which
exhibits elaborate sets of mandatory rules although its disclosure
7 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 25.
8 Ibid.
9 Masahiko Aoki, ‘Institutional Complementarities between Organizational Architecture and
Corporate Governance,’ RIETI Conference on Corporate Governance, January 8-9, 2003,
1. http://www.rieti.go.jp/em/events/03010801/report.html
10 Jonathon Charkham, Keeping Good Governance: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five
Countries (1994).
11 Low Chee Keong, supra n 5 at 5.
12 M Maher & T Andersson, ‘Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth,’ in McCahery, Joseph A, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc Renneboog (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (2002)
386-418, 386.
13 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 25.
requirements tend to be less stringent.’14 Typically,
insider based systems do not have ‘an active market for corporate control,
which is usually vested with large shareholders,
including banks.’15
Such systems have also been referred to as ‘blockholder
systems’16 in that they typically give rise to concentrated,
and inactive, shareholdings in the hands of a few key groups such as founders,
family
members or banks.
As we shall see in 1.7 below, these systems make extensive formal provision
for employees in their corporate governance arrangements.
Outsider systems
In contrast, outsider based systems are reliant on ‘active external
markets for corporate control through mergers and takeovers
of listed
companies.’17 These systems include many individual investors
and institutional investors quite prepared to buy and sell control of firms.
They
are characterized by ‘wide dispersed ownership.’18
The market is, as a result, likely to be more volatile and the
shareholders will sell their stake in the company, if it is in their
interests.
The outsider system ‘exhibits widely-dispersed ownership structures,
liquid stock markets, low levels of interlocking
shareholding between members of
the same corporate group and active market for corporate control.’19
Examples include the US, the UK and Australia where ‘corporate laws
tend to be a set of default rules since the financial markets
are subject to
tight regulation and strict disclosure requirements.’20 These
have also been referred to as ‘market systems,’21 in
contrast to blockholder systems. The range of labels reveals that the stylized
systems of governance are still in a fluid, and
somewhat embryonic
stage.
The picture painted of an outsider system is of a Darwinian environment where
the weak firm either implodes or is taken over. This
view accords with
Roe’s observation that:
14 Low Chee Keong, supra n 5 at 5.
15 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 25.
16 William W. Bratton & Joseph McCahery, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance and Barriers to Global Cross Reference,’ in Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers and Luc Renneboog (eds), Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (2002)
23-55, 25.
17 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 25.
18 Maher & Andersson, supra n 12 at 386.
19 Low Chee Keong, supra n 5 at 5.
20 Ibid.
21 Bratton & McCahery, supra n 16 at 25.
the American-style public corporation is a fragile contraption, filled with
contradictions, easy to destabilize and destroy. Although
it dominates American
business, due to its counter-balancing ability to agglomerate capital and
efficiently spread private risk,
it needs multiple preconditions to arise,
survive, and prosper.22
Outsider systems tend to make little or no formal provision for employees in
their corporate governance arrangements.
ii. THE PHENOMENON OF AGENCY COSTS
The genesis of the agency costs phenomenon lies in the work of Berle and
Means and their ‘classic text’23 of 1932, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property. Their thesis was that:
[O]wnership and control had become separated in America as corporations grew
too large and complex to be controlled by the single
dominant entrepreneurial
families, such as the Rockefellers, Carnegies and Fords, on whom modern American
industry was founded.24
In essence, managerialist corporations had replaced entrepreneurial fiefdoms.
This separation can be characterized in two ways. First
it can viewed as
‘an efficient arrangement for the division of labour between professional
managers and investors/risk bearers
to create wealth
together.’25
Alternatively, the very fact of separation of owner and manager creates
issues of distance and potential miscommunication and hence,
an agency problem.
Treating the separation of ownership and control ‘as a problem to be
resolved ... has, however, been the
main theme of the corporate governance
literature.’26
The shareholders, as principals, are separate from their agents, the managers. There will often be a ‘misalignment of interests’27 between the two groups because of the differing, postmodern perspectives they bring to bear in how the firm operates. Race Mathews notes that ‘the basic agency dilemma’ is a
‘core problem’ ‘because individuals are, by nature,
inclined to opportunism
22 Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate
Impact, (2003) 200.
23 David Uren, The Transparent Corporation: Managing Demands for Disclosure (2003)
135.
24 Uren, supra n 23 at 135.
25 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 23.
26 Ibid.
27 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 25.
and the pursuit of their own self-interest.’28 As John
Donahue notes in relation to the agency issue, it marks a ‘difficulty in
all but the simplest relationships, of ensuring
that the principal is faithfully
served, and the agent is fairly compensated.’29 Masahiko Aoki
describes the agency cost phenomenon in the following terms:
Agency theory casts the economic interaction of agents (in the generic sense)
in a certain domain of the economy as a principal-agent
relationship. Then it
inquires into what type of self-enforceable (incentive compatible) arrangement
can be established as a second-best
response to environmental and incentive
constraints when information asymmetry exists between the principal and the
agent.30
As Aoki notes ‘agency theory provides powerful partial equilibrium
analysis of an institution in a particular domain of interaction
between the
principal and the agent(s), with institutional arrangements in other domains
taken as given environments.’31 Whilst the theory is useful,
its limits are proscribed by the fact that the results of the principal-agent
model ‘may be valid
only relative to an implicitly assumed institutional
environment of the domain.’32
However, the basis of agency costs will differ depending on the type of corporate governance system under review. As Maher & Andersson note, ‘each country has through time developed a wide variety of mechanisms to overcome the agency problems that arise from the separation of ownership and control.’33
There is a basic difference between insider and outsider systems in terms of how the agency problem plays out in practice. In outsider systems, ‘the basic conflict of interest is between strong managers and widely dispersed weak shareholders.’34 In contrast, in insider systems ‘the basic conflict is between controlling shareholders (or blockholders) and weak minority shareholders.’35
Maher & Andersson conclude that ‘one of the most striking
differences between countries’ corporate governance systems
is in the
ownership and control of firms, and the identity of controlling
shareholders.36
28 Race Matthews, ‘The Mondragon worker co-operatives and their lessons for Australia,’ in Gollan, P & Patmore, G, (eds.), Partnership at Work: the challenge of employee democracy, Labor Essays 2003 (2003) 151-164, 159.
29 John D. Donahue, The Privatisation Decision: Public Ends, Private Means (1989) 38.
30 Masahiko Aoki, Towards a comparative institutional analysis (2001) 18.
31 Aoki, supra n 30 at 18.
32 Ibid.
33 Maher & Andersson, supra n 18 at 386.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
Beyond this basic distinction between insider and outsider systems, it is
ultimately difficult to quantify the exact function of agency
costs and its
relationship with other influences, such as, for example, the quality of a
nation’s corporate law. As Mark Roe
notes, ‘a currently popular
academic theory is that the quality of corporate law largely determines whether
ownership will
separate from control.’37 Whilst:
this theory is quite strong for understanding why ownership separation is
difficult to maintain in, say, Russia, the transition economies,
and many
developing nations, it does less well in explaining weak separation in richer,
democratic nations, some of which have good
corporate law and several of which
would not have had much trouble getting good corporate law if the polity had
sought to promote
a stock market.38
This paradox means that agency cost theory can provide a useful
‘additional explanation’39 for such separation. As Roe
concludes, ‘law might be fine, but if agency costs would be much higher
after separation because
weak product market competition constrains managers
only mildly, the founding owners would be reluctant to push
separation.’40
Incomplete contracting
As between managers and shareholders there will also be ‘incomplete
contracting’41 in the sense that much of the relationship will
be governed by assumptions and implied understandings. The relationship between
the
two groups has been governed by the articles of association that form a
contract between the company and each individual shareholder
and between each
shareholder inter se. More recently in Australia, the constitution or
replaceable rules have taken the place of the articles. Both forms of contract
are
incomplete; that is, they are not a complete code, but sketch out the basis
of good relations between the two. They are generic and
provide a starting point
only. As Gillian Rose, the philosopher puts it, ‘in professional life,
beyond the terms of the contract,
people have authority, the power to make one
another comply in ways which may be perceived as legitimate or
illegitimate.’42 Incomplete contracting therefore refers to
the gaps in the formal contractual arrangement and refers to all those facets of
the relationship
that make it work smoothly or make it work at
all.
37 Roe, supra n 22 at 142.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 25.
42 Gillian Rose, Love’s Work (1995) 54.
Contract, as forming the basis of relationships in wider society, have been highlighted by the US legal philosopher, John Rawls.43 In the seminal work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls links societal justice with the notion of contract. His has been called a theory of ‘contract ethics’44 or the ‘social contract model’.45
For Rawls, society is just if we associate with one another on the basis of
equality. He writes that ‘free and rational persons
concerned to further
their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining
the fundamental terms of their
association.’46 This basic
conception of justice as underpinned by equality, then forms the rationale for
law-making and of the institutions that
build upon it. As Rawls concludes
‘our social situation is just if it is such that by this sequence of
hypothetical agreements
we would have contracted into the general system of
rules which define it.’47 Rawls links the notion of contract
theory with rationality. He notes that ‘the merit of contract terminology
is that it conveys
the idea that principles of justice may be conceived as
principles that would be chosen by rational persons, and that in this way
conceptions of justice may be explained and
justified.’48
For present purposes, Rawls’ theory of the basic social contract can be
extrapolated to the contract theory that links shareholders
and the company, and
through it, the managers. The basis of their relationship is the more formalized
contract represented by the
articles of association or its various replacement
versions. Contract links the two groups, and forms the basis for more detailed
and complex relationship building. It is nonetheless incomplete, because no
contract can ever be a complete code that determines
and delineates the exact
boundaries of a relationship. The contractual nexus is therefore
incomplete.
The contractual relationship between shareholders and the company, and by
extension the board, does provide a strong foundation recognized
by the common
law tradition. Establishing a contract between parties has been the pre-eminent
engine for growth in the commercial
aspects of the common law for more than
eight hundred years.49
The situation of shareholders as contractually engaged vis-a-vis the
company is in contrast with employees. There is no contractual nexus between
owners and employees. Additionally, employees do
not enjoy the group contractual
rights afforded shareholders by the articles. Whereas the articles are a
generic
43 John A. Rawls, Theory of Justice (1972) 11-17.
44 Peter Singer, (ed.), Ethics (1994) 363.
45 Mary Midgley, ‘Duties Concerning Islands’ in Peter Singer (ed.), Ethics (1994) 374-87,
377.
46 Rawls, supra n 43 at 11.
47 Ibid, 12.
48 Ibid, 16.
49 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, (3rd
ed.) (1990).
public document provided to all of the same class of shareholders, employees
who are not subject to an industrial award, negotiate
their contracts in
private, one to one with the company. This style of employment arrangement has
been encouraged by the advent of
Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs).50
We will examine this phenomenon further in Chapter 6 dealing with
Australian employee provision.
The written contract of employment is essentially a private matter between
the company and employee. Contract forms the basis of the
relationship such
that:
the majority of the working population has access to the means of production
only through some contractual arrangement with their
owners, by means of which
the workers promise to obey all orders from management and deliver all products
of their labour, receiving
for their time or effort only a stipulated
wage.51
Asymmetric information
The agency costs will also be determined by the degree that information is asymmetric as between the managers and the shareholders. The term
‘asymmetric information syndrome’ has been coined by the US
economist, Joseph Stiglitz. Stiglitz refers to ‘the
differences in
information between, say, the worker and his employer, the lender and the
borrower, the insurance company and the
insured.’52 Such
asymmetries are ‘pervasive in all economies.’53 The
perceived value of this approach is that it provides ‘the foundations for
more realistic theories of labour and financial
markets.’54
This model has been referred to as ‘information
economics.’55 It sets up a useful dichotomy for investigating
the context of employee governance provisions. In basic terms, it points to the
inequality
between managers who are the repository of much confidential
information, and the owners whose access to the same is problematic.
The utility of the division needs to be tempered by corporate realities. For
example, if information access is asymmetric as between
managers as agents and
shareholders as principals, this is more so the case as between managers as
senior employees and the rump
of general or, by definition, junior
employees.
50 Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law: an Introduction (2000).
51 Paul Singer, ‘Capital and the National State: A Historical Interpretation’ in John Walton
(ed.) Capital and Labour in the Urbanized World (1985) 17-42, 17.
52 Stiglitz, J, Globalization and its Discontents (2002) xi.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid, xii.
We need therefore to be cognizant of the fact that firms, especially large
ones, are not simply amorphous entities where the term
‘employee’
has an agreed or undifferentiated status.
There may, of course, be other examples of asymmetric information. For
example, as between shareholders:
[I]ndividual shareholders with relatively small holdings have little
incentive to gather and bear the relatively fixed costs of collecting
information to enable them to monitor and control the behaviour of the board.
Alternatively, large shareholders may have sufficient
incentives to obtain the
information necessary to control management effectively if the benefits of such
monitoring outweigh the
associated costs.56
As David Uren notes, ‘the market is a deep source of information about
companies; it is a judge of management’s performance,
it dictates the
wealth of a company’s shareholders and it sets the company’s cost of
capital.’57 The problem with this analysis is that the
information market does not act evenly as between shareholders. For example, as
Uren notes,
‘an emerging trend is for directors, in particular the
chairman, to engage directly with institutional shareholders as a means
of
gaining an independent view of the company, other than that filtered through the
chief executive.’58 Under this practice, the information,
access and privilege afforded to institutional shareholders, places them in a
powerful and superior
position as compared with individual shareholders. As Mark
Roe notes in relation to contemporary US institutional shareholders:
[T]hey are no longer the 100-share individuals of the standard model. They
own bigger slices of a company’s stock. They are
informed about corporate
governance trends. And some of them are informed enough about a firm’s
operations and business to
give serious feedback to directors and
managers.59
CalPERS (the Californian based pension fund manager 60) is the
pre-eminent example of the informed, and indeed guiding, institutional behemoth.
Roe’s observation appears to be borne
out in practice. As David Sainsbury,
the then
56 Helen Short and Kevin Keasey, ‘Institutional shareholders and Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom’ in Kevin Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright, (eds.), Corporate Governance: Economic, Management, and Financial Issues (1997) 18-53, 29.
57 Uren, supra n 23 at 241-2.
58 Ibid, 242.
59 Roe, supra n 22 at 17.
60 California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS). As the
website claims, CalPERS provides retirement and health
benefits to more than 1.4
million public employees, retirees, and their families and more than 2,500
employers. http://www.calpers.com/index.
jsp?bc=/about/home.xml
Deputy Chair of the UK family grocery giant Sainsbury acknowledged in 1993
‘large shareholders at the top end tend to provide a greater identity
between management and shareholders.’61 This identity of
interests is a privilege of the large, elite, typically institutional,
shareholder.
Navigating the ‘moral hazards’
The term ‘moral hazard’ was originally used in the insurance
context to refer to ‘the tendency of people with insurance
to reduce the
care they take to avoid or reduce insured losses.’62 In the
context of agency cost discussions, moral hazard has been explained
thus:
Moral hazard arises when agents (such as managers) discover information that
is valuable to the principal (such as the shareholders)
after the principal has
contracted for their services. The problem produces a moral conflict because
morally the agent should inform
the principal about the newly discovered
situation and renegotiate if necessary. However, the agent stands to gain from
not doing
so.63
The moral hazards within a company are a result of differences in role and
location. They arise because of, and as part of, the broader
agency
problem.64
As trading opportunities expand geographically, it may become necessary for
merchants to hire agents to carry out their business on
their behalf in remote.
It may now be hard for the merchants to directly supervise and monitor the
operational activities of their
agents on a daily basis. So there arises the
possibility of the agents acting dishonestly, for instance, embezzling the
merchants’
goods, acting opportunistically or shirking their
obligations.65
In this sense, there is a constituency of ‘distant stockholders.’66 They ‘have two main worries’67 vis-à-vis the managers. These are the misdirection of resources which affect the agency costs68 and ‘the level of insider machinations.’69
The main context in which the moral hazard arises involves managers and their
relationship with the owners. This phenomenon has been
part of the historical
development of companies as owners withdrew from companies due to economic
imperatives. From the end of the
19th century, ‘as a
result
61 Richard Whittington, What is Strategy and Does it Matter? (1993) 52.
62 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 37.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid, 26.
65 Aoki, supra n 30 at 68.
66 Roe, supra n 22 at 176.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
of the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution, which required much
larger firms to create economies of scale.’70 As a result,
shareholders ceased to manage companies
directly and hired professional managers-below board level- to run them
instead. As time went on the managers began to graduate to
board level, and
gradually came to form the majority of board members. The process of completely
separating ownership and control
was accelerated after the Second World War when
financial institutions started to build up their industrial investment
portfolios.71
We will now briefly examine relevant aspects of this agency issue.
iii.TECHNIQUES TO ALIGN THE INTERESTS OF
MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDERS
The need to align interests arises as a corrective to ‘the misalignment
of interests between shareholders (principal) and their
agents (managers) and
because of incomplete contracting.’72 The solutions have been
founded on developing ‘mechanisms for monitoring, and accountability, and
the design of ex ante managerial
incentive systems.’73
In particular, ‘managerial compensation potentially aligns shareholder
and manager interests by maintaining a close relationship
between pay and
performance.’74 This particular linkage is problematic. It
assumes that shareholders will think act and vote as a block. Heterogeneity is,
however,
likely to dominate a company whose shareholders include individuals and
institutions. The institutions are likely to wield more power
in light of their
larger holdings recorded in the share register. Such institutions are more
likely, as a species of professional
investor, to have access to better
information. This profile of the typical public company means that the majority
rule is likely
to be concentrated in terms of the share register. This, in turn,
challenges traditional notions of equality as between shares and
the ideal of
corporate citizenship.
Individual shareholders may get to speak at the AGM, but the company’s
share register operates essentially as a behind-the-scenes
device. This can mean
that individual antipathy to, say, a proposed remuneration package is overcome
by block voting by institutions.
The problem is that ‘the diminishing
marginal
70 N. Kendall & A. Kendall, Real-World Corporate Governance: A Programme for Profit-
Enhancing Stewardship (1998) 16.
71 Kendall & Kendall, supra n 70 at 16.
72 On Kit Tam, supra n 4 at 25.
73 Ibid, 25-6.
74 Klaus Gugler, (ed.) Corporate Governance and Economic Performance
(2001) 42.
utility of money makes the monetary reward required to induce good behaviour
larger than the monetary penalty needed to discourage
bad
behaviour.’75 One suggestion is that ‘one principle of
efficient compensation is that managers should be rewarded for outcomes over
which
they have control.’76 This raises the issue of
identifying such issues. It is part of a complex and ongoing debate. As Uren
notes, ‘the issue of how
to stop management from exploiting its position
has been wrestled with for centuries.’77
Improving communication within companies
The phenomena of incomplete contracting, asymmetric information and related
concepts are, in reality, styles of inefficient communication.
They are
blockages between the key cohorts of the company. Corporate governance in a
systemic sense is aimed at developing more complete
and more efficient
communication modes. In the idealized governance model, issues of control and
accountability would not be problematic.
There would be no gap or slippage
between constituent parts of the company. In an idealized company, information
(and its products,
risk awareness and insight) would be shared equally, subject
to the regulatory rules of the market place. Indeed, the goal of better
communication can be said to be a critically important feature of better
governance.
One of the aims of good governance is to keep steadily improving the
communication mechanisms within companies, to reduce the asymmetries
and to
continue to complete the gap in matters of contract, and in so doing
successfully diminish the scope of the moral hazards
inherent in a wealth-
generating entity.
According to recent Australian research ‘failures of corporate governance weren’t due to a lack of government regulation, board structure or the experience of directors.’78 According to Cairnes ‘the problem is the people. Boards fail because of the social system, the culture and the way people talk to each other.’79 The communication test is a crucial aspect of a systems failure;
‘what came out again and again is what makes boards work is a robust
culture of candour, honesty and respect; strong people
being prepared to put the
issues out there and have the debate.’80
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid, 43.
77 Uren, supra n 23 at 135.
78 Fiona Buffini, ‘Boards failing the talk test,’ The Australian Financial Review, 21 November,
2003, 16, quoting Margot Cairnes, author of ‘Boardrooms that Work.’
79 Buffini, supra n 78.
80 Ibid.
The way that issues concerning employees are handled can be a key barometer of the effectiveness of a firm’s communications. For example, ‘executive pay is arguably the primary mechanism by which the board can control and monitor top executives or at least signal to management what is important to the shareholders.’81 As a result ‘boards must continually evaluate the public relations impacts of their actions in addition to the pay/performance linkage.’82
Communication is both direct and coded, express and implied. The symbolic
meaning of a company’s treatment of its stakeholders
is an important
feature in the life of the postmodern firm.
The theory underpinning the need for good communication is that 20th
century firms became so vast that they were forced to embrace
decentralization. This phenomenon was recognized by Peter Drucker in
1946.83 Drucker argued that:
decentralisation is the condition for the conversion of bigness from a social
liability into a social asset. Bigness, if centralized
– whether for lack
of a policy or because the units of production have been allowed to grow too
large for effective decentralization
– carries with it dangers to the
stability and functioning of society, just as it carries dangers to the
stability and functioning
of the corporation.84
Drucker’s work underpins the work of theorists such as Henry Mintzberg, who postulated the view that very large firms needed to guard against certain risks that inherently seemed to accompany large firms. That development was a network or ‘system of work constellations’ where ‘quasi-independent cliques of individuals who work on decisions appropriate to their own level in the hierarchy.’85 The firm, therefore, needs to provide the mechanisms for communication – whether formal or informal – that overcome the potential resistance of these self-filling constellations. There are, as a result, complex
‘flows of information’ within an
organization.86
Peter Drucker notes the centrality of good communication for effective
managers. ‘Setting objectives, organizing, motivating
and communicating,
measuring, and developing people are formal, classifying
categories’87 of
81 Kay, Ira T, CEO Pay and Shareholder Value: Helping the US Win the Global Economic
War (1998) 77.
82 Kay, supra n 81 at 77.
83 Peter Drucker, Concept of the Corporation (1946) 228.
84 Drucker, ibid, n 83 at 228-9.
85 Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research (1979)
54.
86 Ibid, 12. See also Kolb, D. et al (eds.), Organizational Pyschology: A book of readings, 2nd
Ed (1974).
87 Peter Drucker, Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices
(1999) 22.
management. There is a direct link between effective communication and
optimizing the skills and contribution of the employee. The
manager, he
notes,
works with a specific resource: people. And the human being is a unique
resource requiring peculiar qualities in whoever attempts to work with it.
‘Working’ with the human being always means developing him or her. The direction which this development takes decides whether the human being
– both as a person and a resource – will become more productive
or cease, ultimately, to be productive at all.88
For Drucker, a firm needs to be studied by looking at its social aspects
ahead of other features. He notes that Frederick Taylor (1856-1915),
the pioneer
of workplace analysis started out with social rather than engineering or profit
objectives.89
This is similar to Abraham Maslow’s90 ‘hierarchy of needs’ approach that places a five step pyramid of needs as the blueprint for worker satisfaction, the base being physiological, and then up to safety, social, esteem and finally, self-actualization.91 For Maslow, communication was also the ‘key to effective management.’92 This was borne out by the size of corporations governed by
‘the necessity for integrating the advantages of bigness with those of
smallness and for avoiding the disadvantages of bigness
and those of
smallness.’93
iv. CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to highlight some of the rich and dynamic intersections
between law and other disciplines in the ongoing development
of corporate
governance. As John Farrar has noted, corporate governance is too important a
subject to be left to the lawyers alone.94 It is a project informed
by several sources. These include politics, economics, cultural studies and
psychology. It is at these points
of overlap, intersection and departure that
the models will grow both nationally, and internationally. This takes the debate
beyond
the sometimes narrow realms of legal analysis and descriptors. As a
result,
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid, 29.
90 Abraham Maslow was a US psychologist whose work embraced management theory and
has since been widely influential in terms of the development of such theories.
91 Ann R. Kaplan, The Maslow Business Reader (2000) 153.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 John Farrar, Corporate Governance: Theories, Principles, and Practice 2nd Ed. (2005)
xxvi.
the debate about corporate governance architectures and their relationship with global forces, looks set to play an ever more prominent role as the 21st century unfolds.
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