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New Zealand Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence |
Last Updated: 24 April 2015
The Legal Implications of Geo-identification*
Dr Dan Jerker B. Svantesson#
i. intrOdUctiOn
Location may determine whether a person falls within the jurisdiction of a
particular state, it may determine which law is applicable
to a person’s
conduct, and it may determine whether or not a judgment can be successfully
enforced. Indeed, it could be said
that, as far as private international law is
concerned, location almost always matters. However, until recently it was often
said
to be impossible to link those active on the Internet to a geographical
location (“geo-identification”). This is all
changing. A recent
survey revealed that a large number of companies, particularly in the US, seek
to identify the geographical location
of those who visit their websites.
Further, the courts’ perception of the possibility (in some cases) or
impossibility (in
other cases) of geo-identification has been determinative in
several court cases.
This article aims at providing a basic overview of so-called geo-location
technologies, their technical structure and their legal
and regulatory
implications.
ii. the cOntext
While geo-location technologies can be used for a wide range of purposes,
such as fraud detection, authentication, content targeting,
security and network
efficiency, this article focuses on their use for regulation compliance and for
risk-exposure limitation. It
is not rare for website operators to be forced to
defend themselves in foreign courts under foreign laws. The reason for this is
that currently many, not to say most, countries’ rules of private
international law are focused on the location of the effect
of conduct, rather
than on the location of the conduct. For example, The High Court of Australia
ruled that a resident of the Australian
state Victoria was allowed to sue a US
based
* This article is based on Dan Svantesson, ‘Geo-location technologies and other means of placing borders on the ‘borderless’ Internet’ (2004) Vol XXIII John Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 101-39.
# Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law Bond University, Queensland,
Australia. Research Associate, Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre
- Contributing
Editor, World Legal Information Institute (www.worldlii.org) - National Rapporteur
(Australia), Data Protection Research and Policy Group (The British Institute of
International and Comparative
Law).
publisher in Victoria and have Victorian law decide the dispute, based on the
fact that allegedly defamatory material, on the publisher’s
website, was
available to people in Victoria.1
As the geographical reach of a website operator’s legal risk exposure
ordinarily is, at least, equal to the geographical reach
of the website itself,
it is obviously valuable for website operators to be aware of the geographical
location of the people who
access their website. If a website operator can know
the location of those who access the website, he/she can, due to the reactive
nature2 of a webserver, control what material is presented, and
indeed, accessible to each access-seeker. In addition to business advantages,
such as targeted advertisement, a structure allowing for geo-identification has
the advantage of providing the website operator with
the means to comply with
local regulations. Indeed, as the provided content can be adjusted depending on
the access-seekers geographical
location, geo-identification has the advantage
of providing the website operator with the means to comply with multiple,
varying,
and even contradictory, local regulations. The value of this cannot be
emphasised enough in a world where substantive laws vary considerably
from state
to state, but material may be accessible from every state where Internet
connection is
possible.
1 Similar reasoning, in the context of online defamation, can, for example, be found in the British Harrods case (Harrods Ltd. V Dow Jones & Company Inc. [2003] EWHC 1162 (QB)), the Canadian Bangoura case (Bangoura v Washington Post (January 27, 2004), OSCJ
03-CV-247461CM1) and the Investasia case (Investasia Ltd and Another v Kodansha Co
Ltd and another HKCFI 499 (18 May 1999)) from Hong Kong SAR.
2 A web server’s function is most accurately described as
reactive (A term, to my knowledge, first used by Roger Clarke in Clarke,
R., ‘Defamation on the Web: Gutnick v. Dow Jones’ at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/Gutnick.html
(last visited May 25, 2004). The content of a website is not constantly
broadcasted, or even available in any humanly
comprehensible format, but at the
moment the server receives an access-request, the content becomes available
– the server
reacts to the browser’s request/action. Describing the
web servers’ role as reactive is, further, preferable as it indicates
active steps of both the one imparting the information and the one receiving the
information (i.e. the receiver acts and the sender
reacts).
iii. the technOLOgy
Currently, the most relevant form of geo-location technology is based on the
translation of IP addresses3 into geographical locations, by the use
of information stored by the provider of the geo-location service. The figure
below illustrates
a common model of how this form of geo-location technology is
applied:
3 There is currently approximately 1.3 – 1.6 billion IP addresses
in use, out of the 4.25 billion possible addresses that
can be issued under the
four block range from 0 to 255. See further: van Leeuwen, A.,
‘Geo-targeting on IP Address: Pinpointing
Geolocation of Internet
Users’ Geo Informatics (July/August, 2001); Olsen, S., ‘Geographic
tracking raises opportunities,
fears’ CNET News.com, Nov. 8, 2000; and
Spangler, T., ‘They Know – Roughly – Where You Live’
eWEEK,
Aug. 20, 2001.
As the access-seeker enters the appropriate Uniform Resource Locator
(“URL”)4 into his/her browser, or clicks on the
appropriate hyperlink, an access-request is sent to the server operating the
requested website.
As the server receives the access-request, it, in turn, sends
a location request (e.g. forwards the access-seeker’s Internet
Protocol
(“IP”) address)5 to the provider of the geo-location
service. The provider of the geo-location service has gathered information about
the IP addresses
in use, and built up a database of geo-location
information.6 Based on the information in this database, the provider
of the geo-location service gives the website server an educated guess as
to the
access-seeker’s location. Armed with this information, the web server can
provide the access-seeker with the information
deemed suitable (e.g. a message
along the lines of: “Sorry. This website is intended for the people of
Sweden only,”7 or perhaps provide advertisement specifically
targeted at people from the access-seeker’s particular location). There
are currently
several products on the market utilising this type of
systems.8 This technology is not necessarily prohibitively expensive
for larger website operators, nor does it appear particularly difficult
to
operate.9
4 “[URL], Abbreviation of Uniform Resource Locator, the global address of documents and other resources on the World Wide Web. The first part of the address indicates what protocol to use, and the second part specifies the IP address or the domain name where the resource is located.” http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/U/URL.html (last visited May 25, 2004). For more details, see, e.g., Chappell, Laura A. & Tittel, Ed Guide to TCP/IP (2002) 271.
5 See further http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci212381,00.
html (last visited May 25, 2004).
6 The methods of collecting this information are discussed below.
7 For example, when using a computer at University of New South Wales (Australia), to access Showtime’s website, http://www.sho.com (last visited May 25, 2004), I received the following message: “We at Showtime Online express our apologies; however, these pages are intended for access only from within the United States.”
8 See, e.g., http://www.quova.com/ (last visited May 25, 2004), http://www.akamai.com/ (last visited May 25, 2004), http://www.caida.org/tools/utilities/netgeo/ (last visited May 25,
2004) and http://www.digitalenvoy.net/ (last visited May 25, 2004). See also the following geo-location products that can be tested for free online:
http://www.perl-studio.com/iptocountry/index.php (last visited May 25, 2004), http://www. activetarget.com/livedemo.asp (last visited May 25, 2004), http://www.ip2location.com/free. asp (last visited May 25, 2004) and http://www.geobytes.com/IpLocator.htm (last visited May 25, 2004).
9 The author does not have sufficient information, and is anyhow not qualified, to independently
assess the accuracy of these products. But, for example, Geobytes’ product is available from
$500 US per annum, appears easy to operate (see demo: http://www.geobytes.com/demo. htm (last visited May 25, 2004)), and the producers argue that the product is accurate to
97% on country-level and 75-80% on city-level. See further: http://www.geobytes.com/
(last visited May 25, 2004).
The accuracy of these products is, however, difficult to gauge. While the
providers indicate the potential accuracy to be very high,
“over 99% at a
country level and approximately 92% at a city-level,”10 it
should be remembered that they are after all trying to sell a product, and these
impressive figures have been criticised.11 There is a range of
factors affecting the accuracy of geo-location technologies. Due to the dual
nature of the geo-location process,
these factors can be divided into two
categories: ‘source problems’ and ‘circumvention
problems’.
The source problems are the problems associated with building up and/or
collecting accurate geo-location data. In relation to IP addresses,
there is no
real equivalent to the address registers listing physical addresses, or the
phone registers listing phone numbers, at
least not currently. Consequently the
ones creating databases of geo-location information must rely on other, less
straightforward,
methods. Obviously, the accuracy of the material in the
geo-location databases depend on, and can never be better than, the accuracy
of
the collection of that data. Common methods of collecting relevant material
include, for example, gathering data from registration
databases,12
network routing information, DNS systems, host name translations, ISP
information and Web content.13 As discussed in detail by Edelman, all
of these sources may provide inaccurate information.14
Turning to circumvention problems, it can be noted that, while some
circumvention techniques are technologically advanced (e.g. deep
linking to
streaming video content without accessing the HTTP server),15 others
are easy enough to be used by virtually anyone (e.g. ‘anonymising’
techniques)16
10 Digital Envoy product sheet (on file with the author).
11 Information Technology Association of America, ECommerce Taxation and the Limitations of Geolocation Tools, at http://www.itaa.org/taxfinance/docs/geolocationpaper.pdf (last visited May 25, 2004), 6.
12 I.e. Réseaux IP Européens Network Coordination Centre (http://www.ripe.net (last visited May 25, 2004)), American Registry for Internet Numbers (http://www.arin.net (last visited May 25, 2004)), Asia Pacific Network Information Centre (http://www.apnic.net (last visited May 25, 2004)) and Latin American and Caribbean IP address Regional Registry (http://lacnic.net (last visited May 25, 2004)).
13 See, e.g., ‘Internet Geography Guide – A NetGeo White Paper’ (can be requested from:
http://www.netgeo.com/ (last visited May 25, 2004)).
14 Edelman, Benjamin ‘Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet Retransmissions of Over-the-air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users’ at: http:// cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf (last visited May 25, 2004)
3-7.
15 Ibid, 10.
16 Ibid, 8. For some examples of anonymising services, see e.g.: EPIC Online Guide to Practical
Privacy Tools
(http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html (last visited May 25,
2004)).
or even inherent in the system-structure (“tunnelling
methods”).17 With this in mind, it will presumably always be
possible to circumvent geo-location technologies. Having said that, it should
also
be noted that for most uses, these technologies do not need to be hundred
percent accurate and it consequently does not always matter
that they can be
circumvented by a limited group of people motivated to do so. Furthermore, the
accuracy is high enough to interest
website operators to use geo-location
technologies, and high enough for the courts to start taking notice of
geo-location technologies.
iv. geO-identiFicatiOn in the cOUrtS
The courts have started to take notice of geo-identification. In this
context, it is interesting to note the difference in approach
between the the
Australian Internet defamation case, Macquarie Bank Limited & Anor v
Berg,18 on the one hand, and the French Court’s 2000
decision in International League Against Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA)
and the Union of French Jewish Students (UEJF) v. Yahoo! Inc.19
on the other. In Macquarie Bank Limited & Anor v Berg, the
plaintiffs were seeking an injunction restraining the defendant from publishing
allegedly defamatory material on a particular
website, and Simpson J stated
that:
The limitation [to publication occurring in NSW only] is ineffective. Senior
council [for the plaintiffs] acknowledged that he was
aware of no means by which
material, once published on the Internet, could be excluded from transmission to
or receipt in any geographical
area. Once published on the Internet material can
be received anywhere, and it does not lie within the competence of the publisher
to restrict the reach of the publication.20
There can be no doubt that the technical features of the Internet played a
central role in the judge’s decision not to give
injunctive relief in
Macquarie Bank Limited & Anor v Berg. In contrast, based on the
expert evidence provided, Justice Gomez in the Yahoo! case, concluded
that geo-location technologies are sufficiently effective to allow the defendant
to implement them to prevent
17 Edelman, supra n 13 at 9.
18 Macquarie Bank Limited & Anor v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526.
19 International League Against Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA) and the Union of French Jewish Students (UEJF) v. Yahoo! Inc. County Court of Paris, interim court order of 20th of November 2000 (English translation available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/
001120yahoofrance.pdf (last visit May 25, 2005)).
20 Macquarie Bank Limited & Anor v Berg, supra n 18 at para
12.
access-seekers located in France from accessing the Nazi memorabilia/junk in
dispute.21 Here, the perceived existence of feasible technical
solutions was determinative.
The fact that courts have started to take account of geo-location
technologies is a huge incentive for continued technical developments
This, in
turn, is likely to lead to improved accuracy, and this improved accuracy can
motivate courts to place an even heavier emphasis
on these technologies. To be a
bit poetic, the wheels of geo-location technologies are in motion, and the
consequences for Internet
website operators are significant.
v. LegaL and regULatOry impLicatiOn OF geO-identiFicatiOn
As long as the rules of private international law focus on the location of
the effect rather than on the location of the acting party,
there is a huge
incentive for website operators to know the location of those who access their
content. Having obtained the means
for identifying the geographical location of
the access-seekers, a website operator has the possibility of deciding what
parts of
his/her content is available at which locations. Once it becomes common
for website operators to make access conditioned on location,
the nearly global
Internet of today will be replaced by an Internet taking account of geographical
borders. However, it has been
pointed out that reliable technology simply is not
enough.22 Even if geo-location technologies were widely utilised and
worked to a satisfactory degree, not all problems associated with the special
characteristics of the Internet would necessarily be solved. For example, the
simple fact that a website operator is aware of the
access-seeker’s
physical location does not mean that he/she can make an informed decision as to
whether imparting information
to that individual might mean that he/she is at
risk of being sued, for example, for defamation in the access-seeker’s
forum.
Bearing in mind the structure of current private international law rules,
the website operator would need to know both the substantive
defamation laws of
the location from which the access-seeker is located and that country’s
private international law rules
to make such a decision. Further, since
access-seekers may be geographically located virtually anywhere in the world,
the website
21 International League Against Racism & Anti-Semitism (LICRA) and the Union of French
Jewish Students (UEJF) v. Yahoo! Inc., supra n 19.
22 See, e.g., Corn-Revere, Robert “Caught in the Seamless Webb: Does the Internet’s Global
Reach Justify Less Freedom of Speech?” Cato Institute, Briefing paper N0. 71 (July 24,
2002 6 and Clarke, Roger ‘Defamation on the Web: Gutnick v. Dow Jones’ at:
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/Gutnick.html
(last visited May 25, 2004).
operator would arguably have to know all substantial and procedural laws of
all the countries on earth – an unrealistic task.
This has led some
commentators to conclude that “[g]eographic location technology is a red
herring.”23
On the other hand, this line of reasoning appears to be based on the notion
that the ‘right’ or ‘ordinary’
thing to do, is to use
technology to its full potential. Maybe we must depart from such ideas? The
publisher of a newspaper, for
example, would ordinarily be publishing within a
local area, or a country or, if very large, a region. The technology of
newspaper
publications is such that a newspaper will only be available at those
places the publisher has targeted. It could be said that the
starting point is
zero percent publication-coverage, and for that number to increase the publisher
must target a community, country
or region with its newspaper. Web publication,
on the other hand, works in exactly the opposite way. Once the material is made
available
on the web, it has virtually one hundred percent publication-coverage,
and for that percentage to decrease, the publisher must take
action by
‘dis-targeting’ undesirable forums.24 As the appropriate
technology becomes available, and economically and practically feasible to use,
web publishers may need to change
their way of thinking.25 Maybe also
web publishers will have to, through the use of technology, take the zero
percent publication-coverage as their starting
point, instead of the one hundred
percent publication-coverage (which could be said to represent full utilisation
of the technology)?
Maybe web-publishers will need to choose the market where
they feel safe, to the exclusion of all other markets?
vi. cOncLUSiOn
SOme thOUghtS aBOUt the FUtUre OF geO-identiFicatiOn
It seems possible, or even likely, that geo-location technologies will
contribute to transforming the Internet, as we know it, into
something that more
closely resembles our world, so divided by borders of different kinds. In
evaluating the value of geo-location
technologies, we must recognise that
“the use of such technologies entail a cost – a financial cost to
content providers
and the social cost of a network that is no longer open and
neutral.”26 While such a development is far from ideal, it may
nevertheless be unavoidable, and
23 Eunjung Cha, Ariana ‘Rise of Internet ‘Borders’ Prompts Fears for Web’s Future’ Washington
Post, Jan. 4, 2002.
24 Any proposition to the effect that Internet activities are functionally identical to offline activities fits uneasily with this observation.
25 Indeed, maybe such a change in approach is justified already today with the available technology? Perhaps even the alternatives of ‘soft protection’, discussed above, justify such a change in approach?
26 Fagin, Matthew Regulating Speech Across Borders: Technology vs. Values, 9
MichTelecomm&TechLR 395, 421 (2003).
perhaps even the best option. The reality that different states have
different substantive laws simply cannot be ignored, and the
regulation of
activities on the Internet must in one way or another take account of this
reality. As long as the rules of private
international law focus on the location
of the effect rather than on the location of the acting party, there is a huge
incentive
for website operators to know the location of those who access their
content, and currently the most effective way of gaining such
knowledge is
arguably through the application of some form of geo-location technology. Thus,
the Internet will inevitably transform
from a relatively borderless dimension
into a medium that takes account of geographical and legal borders. Furthermore,
in light
of such a development, current “effect-focused” private
international law rules may make sense. In other words, from
the perspective of
Internet regulation, geo-location technologies may, to a large extent, eliminate
the regulatory difficulties associated
with the Internet’s
“borderlessness”. If it can be assumed that web content being
available in a particular state
is an indication of the web publisher’s
intention to make the content available in that particular state, the
application of
effect-focused private international law rules make sense. While
we must remain alert to their less than perfect accuracy, geo-location
technologies have the potential of making such assumptions valid prima
facie. It would thus seem that discussions of Internet regulation
necessarily must take account of these emerging technological solutions.
Considering the above, it is submitted that the courts now have a great
responsibility in ensuring that the potential of geo-identification
is
recognised and appreciated.
I would like to conclude this article with a quote from Mark I. Wilson and his colleagues: “[w]hile the power of distance has been eroded, it should not be confused with the diminishing meaning of place.”27 Geo-location technologies
‘merely’ make it possible and practical to consider location, or
place, also in the Internet
context.
27 Wilson, Mark I., et al., ‘Death of Distance/Rise of Place: The Impact of the Internet on Locality and Spatial Organization’(Paper prepared for Presentation at INET 2001, The 11th Annual Internet Society Conference (Stockholm, 5-8 June 2001).
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