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New Zealand Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence |
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New Zealand Yearbook of New Zealand JurisprudenceLast Updated: 24 April 2015
Advocates’ Immunity: What Makes Australian
Lawyers So Special?
Julia Werren* and Amanda Williamson#
i. intrOdUctiOn
In this article, we examine the nature of advocates’ immunity in light
of an Australian High Court decision maintaining the
doctrine. That case upheld
and arguably extended advocates’ immunity from suit for work intimately
connected with court proceedings
in Australia, and is in stark contrast to the
position in other comparable jurisdictions. We explore the history and extent of
advocates’
immunity, as well as evaluating the current justification for
retaining the immunity in Australia, canvassing comparative perspectives
from
other jurisdictions. We argue that the justification for retaining and extending
the immunity in Australia is problematic, and
should be reconsidered to ensure
that public confidence in the legal profession is not eroded.
Following the High Court decision of D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian
Legal Aid and Another1
(‘D’Orta-Ekenaike’), it is clear that in the
short term, advocates’ immunity is to remain a doctrine of the Australian
legal system. In
this decision, the majority determined that advocates’
immunity should be retained, affirming and arguably extending the earlier
decision of Giannarelli v Wraith2
(‘Giannarelli’). In Giannarelli, it was noted
that both barristers and solicitors acting as advocates enjoy common law based
immunity from suit for both in-court
work, as well as for out of court work that
is intimately connected with the case. In D’Orta-Ekenaike however,
this immunity was also extended to an instructing solicitor not appearing as an
advocate in the trial. The majority’s
rationale for preserving and
extending the immunity is based upon the premise that it was a ‘central
and pervading tenet’
of the judicial system that finality of cases, once
litigated, remained.3 Allowing the re-litigation of cases, it was
argued, detracts from the binding nature of decisions, and furthermore, the duty
of the
advocate to the court.
* BA, LLB (NE), MHlth&MedLaw (Melb), Associate Lecturer, School of Law, University of New England.
# BCom, LLB (Hons), Grad. Dip. Legal Practice; PhD Candidate, School of Law, University of New England; Legal Practitioner of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The views expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors.
1 [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92.
3 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid and Another [2005] HCA 12; (2005)
214 ALR 92.
What is not so certain however is support for the retention of the doctrine
in Australia, both from the public at large, legal commentators,
and even from
some members of the legal profession. Indeed, the immediate past president of
the NSW Bar Association, Bret Walker,
SC, argued that State parliaments should
intervene to allow litigants the opportunity to appeal decisions that were made
as a result
of the ‘flagrant incompetence of counsel.’4
Justice Kirby, the only dissenting judge in D’Orta-Ekenaike,
noted that compared to other professions, lawyers are the only professionals in
Australia that enjoy such an immunity, with doctors,
architects and accountants
held responsible for their actions with no benefit of an immunity from
suit.5 Further, Justice Kirby pointed to the fact that in other
jurisdictions, where the immunity has been abolished (such as the United
States
of America and Canada) there has not been a flood of re-litigation as feared by
the majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike.6
It is the purpose of this paper therefore to explore firstly the history and
extent of the immunity, concentrating in particular on
the recent decision of
D’Orta-Ekenaike to determine the current precise scope of the
immunity. In canvassing these issues, the paper examines issues of public policy
pertaining
to advocates’ immunity, and assesses the current justification
for the retention of the doctrine. The paper concludes with
a critical analysis
relating to the validity of the doctrine within the contemporary Australian
legal system.
ii. hiStOricaL BaSiS OF advOcateS’ immUnity
Rondel v Worsley7 is the chief modern authority for the
doctrine of advocates’ immunity, though as seen in the judgments in the
Court of Appeal
decision of Rondel,8 a number of earlier
decisions have also highlighted the existence of the immunity. As Lord Denning
notes in the Appeal case, many
of these earlier decisions9 were based
upon the premise that advocates did not have a contract with their clients, thus
providing no basis for an action. However,
in Rondel, the lack of a
contract between advocate and client was deemed no longer sufficient to form the
basis of advocates’ immunity,
as a result of the decision of Hedley
Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd.10 Rather, a range
of public policy grounds were proposed as underpinning the immunity,
including:
5 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid and Another [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 169 (Kirby J).
6 Ibid.
7 [1969] 1 AC 191.
9 Fell v Brown (1791) Peake 131.
1. The fact that barristers owe a duty first and foremost to the court as
officers of the court.11 As such, this duty to the court should not
be compromised by fear of litigation on the part of a disgruntled client.
Advocates’
or barristerial immunity therefore operates to ensure counsel
can uphold their duty to the court without concern that they would
be litigated
against by their clients. As noted by Lord Reid:
Every counsel has a duty to his client fearlessly to raise every issue,
advance every argument, and ask every question, however distasteful,
which he
thinks will help his client’s case. As an officer of the court concerned
in the administration of justice, he has
an overriding duty to the court, to the
standards of his profession, and to the public, which may and often does lead to
a conflict
with his client’s wishes or with what the client thinks are his
personal interests. Counsel must not mislead the court, he
must not lend himself
to casting aspersions on the other party or witnesses for which there is no
sufficient basis in the information
in his possession, he must not withhold
authorities or documents which may tell against his clients but which the law or
the standards
of his profession require him to produce. By so acting he may well
incur the displeasure or worse of his client so that if the case
is lost, his
client would or might seek legal redress if that were open to
him.12
2. The fact that other participants in the judicial process, such as judges
and witnesses, enjoyed protection from suit, and that
as a result of this,
advocates should be afforded the same protection. The Australian case of
Cabassi v Vila13 was noted, where it was held that:
...no action lies in respect of evidence given by witnesses in the course of
judicial proceedings, however false and malicious it
may be, any more than it
lies against judges, advocates or parties in respect of words used by them in
the course of such proceedings
or against juries in respect of their
verdicts.14
3. The existence of the cab-rank rule, which precludes barristers /
advocates from selecting clients to represent. A barrister is
bound to accept a
brief under this rule, the operation of which the House of Lords thought would
be problematic with the removal
of the immunity.15
4. Lastly, to ensure finality of proceedings. The finality argument proposes
that immunity should be upheld to ensure certainty in
the legal system, and as
noted in Rondel, there should be ‘procedure and machinery for
appeals
11 Rondel v Worsley [1967] UKHL 5; [1967] 3 All ER 993, 998.
12 Ibid.
13 [1940] HCA 41; (1940) 64 CLR 130.
14 Ibid, 140 (Starke J).
15 Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191, 227.
and the effectiveness of appeal procedure can be kept under review, but the
attainment of finality must be an aim of any legal system’.16
In Rondel, the undesirability of re-litigation was seen as adverse
to the public interest, and therefore, another sufficient incentive to retain
advocates’ immunity.
These policy reasons were discussed, but not approved in full, in the later
United Kingdom case of Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co,17
where the House of Lords upheld the immunity as stated in Rondel
(although finding that the immunity did not extend to the activities of the
barrister in question). In Australia, advocates’
immunity was approved by
the High Court in Giannarelli. The High Court in Giannarelli, in a
similar vein to the House of Lords in Saif Ali, did not approve of all of
the broad policy reasons used to retain the immunity in Rondel. Here, the
majority agreed that the most relevant policy grounds were those that related to
the barrister’s duty to the court,
the immunity that other participants in
the court process enjoyed, and also, ensuring the finality of proceedings. Mason
CJ in particular
noted the special position of the advocate, which underpins the
duty owed by the advocate to the court:
A barrister’s duty to the court epitomises the fact that the course of
litigation depends on the exercise by counsel of an independent
discretion or
judgment in the conduct and management of a case in which he has an eye, not
only to his client’s success, but
also to the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.18
Mason CJ also noted further the effect that relitigation of issues through
collateral means would have on this administration of justice,
with particular
relevance to the issue of finality:
Exposure of counsel to liability for such negligence would unquestionably
encourage litigation by unsuccessful litigants anxious to
demonstrate that, but
for the negligence of counsel, they would have obtained a more favourable
outcome in the initial litigation19
Deane, who provided a dissenting judgement (in addition to Toohey and
Gaudron), spoke forcefully against the retention of the immunity:
I do not consider that the considerations of public policy which are
expounded in Rondel v Worsley and in the majority judgments in the
present case outweigh or even balance the injustice and consequent public
detriment involved
in depriving a person, who is caught up in litigation and
engages the professional
16 Rondel v Worsley [1967] UKHL 5; [1967] 3 All ER 993, 1015.
18 Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543, 556 (Mason CJ).
19 Ibid, 558 (Mason CJ).
services of a legal practitioner, of all redress under the common law for
‘in court’ negligence, however gross and callous
in its nature or
devastating in its consequences.20
The outcome of Giannarelli remained good law in Australia, with the
immunity surviving review in the decision of Boland v Yates Property
Corporation Pty Ltd.21 The United Kingdom decision in Arthur J
S Hall & Co v Simons22 followed soon after Boland,
where the House of Lords abolished advocates’ immunity, and dismissed
emphatically the public policy reasons that were used
to support the immunity in
Rondel. Lord Steyn rejected the notion of the cab-rank rule as
justification for the immunity, noting that whilst a ‘valuable
professional
rule’ it was not sufficient to justify ‘depriving all
clients of a remedy for negligence causing them grievous financial
loss.’23 Similarly, the duty of the advocate to the court was
not seen as a sufficient basis for the immunity due to the fact that many other
professionals experienced conflicts with duties to clients and professional
codes.24 He noted further that the risk of relitigation through
collateral attack would be slim if the immunity were removed, based on precedent
from the case of Hunter v Chief Constable of the West Midlands
Police,25 where it was held that courts could strike out matters
that were an abuse of process.26 In addition to this, Lord Steyn
noted that frivolous or unmeritorious claims would not be successful as
litigants bringing such a
claim ‘will face the very great obstacle of
showing that a better standard of advocacy would have resulted in a more
favourable
outcome.’27
Lord Hoffman dismissed the argument that lawyers were in a special position
due to the ‘difficult’ nature of advocacy,
noting that other
professionals in similarly complicated predicaments did not enjoy such an
immunity.28 With respect to the policy reasons raised in
Rondel, Lord Hoffman noted:
In the conditions of today, they no longer carry the degree of conviction
which would in my opinion be necessary to sustain the immunity.
The empirical
evidence to support the divided loyalty and cab rank arguments is lacking; the
witness analogy is based upon mistaken
reasoning and the collateral attack
argument deals with a real problem in the wrong way. I do not say that
Rondel
20 Ibid, 588 (Deane J).
21 [1999] HCA 64; (1999) 167 ALR 575.
22 [2000] UKHL 38; [2000] 3 All ER 673.
23 Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2000] UKHL 38; [2000] 3 All ER 673, 680 (Lord Steyn).
24 Ibid, 682 (Lord Steyn).
25 [1981] UKHL 13; [1982] AC 529.
26 Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2000] UKHL 38; [2000] 3 All ER 673, 681 (Lord Steyn).
27 Ibid, 683 (Lord Steyn).
28 Ibid, 690-1 (Lord Hoffman).
v Worsley was wrongly decided at the time. The world was different
then. But, as Lord Reid said then, public policy is not immutable and your
Lordships must consider the arguments afresh.29
Clearly, this statement dealt another blow to the stability of the policy
reasons used to support the immunity in contemporary times.
Their Lordships were
unanimous in removing the immunity in civil matters, and through a 4-3 majority
also removed the immunity for
criminal matters. There was clear agreement that
the policy reasons previously used to justify the retention of the immunity were
no longer sufficient to uphold it.
With the outcome of Arthur Hall removing advocates’ immunity in
the United Kingdom, and with a similar position enjoyed in the United States and
Canada, many
commentators believed that the next time the immunity came up for
review before the High Court in Australia they would follow suit.
The House of
Lords had rendered fragile the policy arguments upon which the immunity rested,
and many believed that the same reasoning
would also persuade the High Court to
remove the immunity. Further, many believed that D’Orta- Ekenaike
would be the vehicle through which the revision of the immunity would be
achieved.
A decision from the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Chamberlains v
Lai,30 reached immediately prior to that in
D’Orta-Ekenaike, added weight to the assumption that the High Court
would abolish the immunity. In Chamberlains v Lai, the New Zealand Court
of Appeal, by a 4-1 majority, followed the House of Lords in Arthur Hall
and removed the immunity in New Zealand. In following the justification set
down in Arthur Hall, the majority noted that the policy arguments
surrounding conflicting duties between client and court, re-litigation through
collateral
attack and the general increase in litigation, and the cab-rank rule
were insufficient to justify the immunity.31 In response to such
concerns, Hammond J, in the majority judgment, noted that the competing duties
between court and client were mirrored
in other professions, and that
professional frameworks existed to temper such duties.32 He also
noted that the cab-rank rule did not impact greatly upon the administration of
justice and was therefore inadequate to support
the immunity.33
Finally, in response to the re-litigation and over-litigation policy
grounds, Hammond J commented
29 Ibid, 704 (Lord Hoffman).
30 Unreported, CA (NZ) 8 March 2005.
31 Chamberlains v Lai, Unreported, CA (NZ) 8 March 2005.
32 Ibid, (Hammond J).
33 Ibid.
that excessive litigation was already a problem that was not related to the
immunity, and that in any event, the New Zealand legal
system was able to manage
issues of relitigation, as other comparable jurisdictions had
done.34
Soon after Chamberlains v Lai was determined, the decision in
D’Orta- Ekenaike was handed down, with the High Court surprising
many with their decision to retain the immunity.
iii. D’orta-ekenaike: wOULd aUStraLia FOLLOw
SUit?
When Ryan D’Orta-Ekenaike was charged with raping a female he retained
Victoria Legal Aid to defend the charge. Victoria Legal
Aid briefed McIvor, a
barrister, to appear for D’Orta-Ekenaike at the committal proceedings. The
applicant had two meetings
with McIvor and an employee of Victoria Legal Aid,
where he told them he was not guilty of the charge. Notwithstanding this
information,
the barrister and solicitor still advised him to plead guilty at
his committal hearing, as he would receive a reduced custodial sentence
if he
pleaded not guilty and was subsequently convicted. Upon following their advice,
he was committed for trial where he changed
his plea to not guilty. His earlier
plea however was entered into evidence and he was convicted and sentenced to
three years’
imprisonment. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of
Victoria sometime later quashed the applicant’s conviction and ordered
a
retrial on the ground that the trial judge’s directions in respect of the
guilty plea were inadequate.35 In 1998 at the retrial a jury
acquitted the applicant of rape. In 2001, the applicant commenced an action for
damages in the County
Court of Victoria against Victorian Legal Aid, his
solicitor, and Ian McIvor, the barrister. He alleged that he had suffered and
continues to suffer injury, loss and damage as a result of the failure to warn
by his legal advisers. The particulars of injury included
loss of liberty, a
psychotic illness, loss of income and the costs and expenses of the appeal and
retrial.
The Majority Judgment
The majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike concentrated on the following
three issues. Firstly, whether or not the immunity should protect both
solicitors who are acting as
advocates as well as barristers; secondly, whether
the scope of the immunity should be reconsidered; and thirdly, whether the
decision
in Giannarelli should be reconsidered, and if so, what the
current justification for either retaining or abolishing the immunity would be.
The first
to issues are quickly dealt with, the third is the issue to which this
article is directed.
34 Ibid.
35 R v D’Orta-Ekenaike [1998] 2 VR 140.
1. To Whom Does the Immunity Apply?
In relation to the first issue the majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike
explored the fusion of the legal profession in relation to section 5 of the
Legal Profession Practice Act 1891 (Vic) and section 10 of the Legal
Profession Practice Act 1915 (Vic). The majority justices found that even
though there was legislative intention to fuse the legal profession in Victoria
in 1891
this fusion was never entirely accomplished.36 In line with
this reasoning, it was found in D’Orta-Ekenaike that the immunity
should cover both solicitors and barristers.
2. The Scope of the Immunity:
In reference to whether or not the ‘intimate connection’ test
should be extended or reduced, the joint majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike
held that there was no sufficient reason to alter the test.37 The
immunity was retained to include work done in court or ‘work done out of
court which leads to a decision affecting the conduct
of the case in
court.’38 Interestingly, the joint majority found that the
advice to plead guilty at the committal satisfied this intimate connection test
as
the advice led to a decision, which affected the conduct of the case at the
subsequent trial.39
The third issue, the ‘whys’ of advocates immunity, requires much
more discussion.
iv. the JUdiciaL prOceSS aS an aSpect
OF gOvernment and FinaLity
The primary policy issue that was used to justify the retention of the
immunity in D’Orta-Ekenaike was ‘finality’.
The majority held
that the community has a vital interest in the final suppression of
controversies, as ‘the central and pervading
tenet of the judicial system
is that controversies, once resolved, are
36 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 97 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Hayden JJ).
37 Ibid, 113 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Hayden JJ).
38 Ibid. McHugh J also stated that:
Immunity should extend to any work, which, if the subject of a claim of negligence, would require the impugning of a final decision of a court or the re-litigation of matters already finally determined by a court. On that basis, no distinction should be drawn between the role of the solicitor and a barrister in the context of advising a client regarding the entering of a plea in criminal proceedings. If the immunity were applicable to the barrister and not the solicitor in the present case, it would not serve the public policy purpose of preventing the rehearing of the applicant’s charge.
Ibid, 134.
39 Ibid, 113.
not to be reopened except in a few, narrowly defined,
circumstances.’40 It has been suggested that public confidence
in the legal system would be undermined if these principles were not adhered to,
as re-litigation
can undermine the earlier decision and also waste
resources.41 In D’Orta-Ekenaike, their Honours also suggested
that if allowed, a ‘peculiar type of litigation would arise.’42
This was described as being ‘relitigation of a controversy (already
determined) as a result of what had happened during, or
in preparation for, the
hearing that had been designed to quell that controversy’ which would be
of a ‘skewed and limited
kind,’ as the immunity of other actors in
the judicial process (judges and witnesses) would prevent their
‘contribution’
to the outcome being scrutinised.43 Thus,
unlike the House of Lords in Arthur Hall, the threat of relitigation was seen by
the majority to be a dominant threat to ensuring
finality of proceedings, and
ultimately, public confidence in the legal system.
Civil and Criminal Convictions
In particular, the majority noted that the finality issue was most pervasive in criminal cases, an issue that also arose in Arthur Hall (and resulted in the House of Lords only rejecting the immunity by a 4-3 majority as far as criminal cases were concerned). The main concerns here were the potential repercussions on a criminal case and conviction if the criminal plaintiff was successful in an action against his or her advocate. This finding of liability in such a case would establish that ‘but for’ the negligence of the barrister the criminal litigant would not be in jail. Obviously, this opens up a whole range of connected issues; should the criminal litigant be acquitted or at least receive early parole? How would the differences in onus and burden of proof be dealt with? Could lawful imprisonment constitute compensable damage?44
Interestingly, these issues were not of importance in the
D’Orta-Ekenaike case because D’Orta-Ekenaike had been acquitted
of
his criminal conviction. The joint majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike however
rejected the applicant’s submission that it
was enough to show that he
would not impugn the final result of the previous
litigation.45
40 Ibid, 100-01 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Hayden JJ).
41 Matthew Groves and Mark Derham, ‘Should Advocate’s Immunity Continue?’ [2004] 28
MelbourneULR 80, 107.
42 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 104 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Hayden JJ).
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid, 109 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Hayden JJ).
45 Ibid, 110 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Hayden JJ).
The Likely Success of an Action Against an Advocate
Further to the distinction between civil and criminal matters, the difficulties of suing an advocate in negligence was discussed by McHugh J in detail, where the difficulties of proving causation in claims against advocates in particular were discussed.46 Justice McHugh considered that the difficulties in determining causation actually provided a reason for maintaining this immunity. One of the concerns that seems to motivate this thinking was that
‘unsuccessful litigants whose principal action was without much
substance are those most likely to bring a later, equally unsubstantiated,
claim
against their representative.’47 The concern about frivolous
and vexatious claims can also be seen reflected in recent tort reform as well as
many recent High Court
judgments.48
In relation to whether or not the litigation (if allowed) in
D’Orta-Ekenaike would have been successful, Cane posits that it is
at least arguable that D’Orta-Ekenaike would not have been found guilty if
he had not originally pleaded guilty.49 In furtherance of this
argument Cane suggests that the ‘more immediate cause of
D’Orta-Ekenaike’s conviction was
the conduct of the judge and jury
in the first trial.’50 Therefore, Cane suggests that this
rationale is not a sufficient argument to maintain the immunity, as in other
professions the ‘risk
of being the target of weak claims’ is not a
stable justification to maintain any immunity.51 In other words, the
solution to the predicament of unmeritorious claims ‘does not involve
bolting the door against meritorious
plaintiffs.’52
Other Policy Grounds
In proposing finality as the sole justification for retaining the immunity,
the majority considered that the policy issues that had
been discussed in
preceding cases were no longer relevant or persuasive.53 Similar
justifications to those outlined in Arthur Hall, as far as the remaining policy
grounds apart from finality were concerned,
were canvassed. The connection
between a barrister’s immunity and an inability to sue the client for
professional fees was
considered
46 Ibid, 133, 141 (McHugh J).
47 Ibid, 133, 127 (McHugh J).
48 See, e.g., The Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) ss 198L, 198N, 198J, 198M and Tame v
New South Wales [2002] HCA 35; (2002) 191 ALR 449.
49 Peter Cane, ‘The New Face of Advocate’s Immunity’ (2005) 13 TortsLJ 93, 96.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Peter Hecrey, ‘Looking over the Advocate’s Shoulder: An Australian View of Rondel v
Worsley’ (1968) 42 AustralianLJ 3, 8.
53 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 98
(Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Hayden JJ).
to only be partially relevant, as it could not support the immunity of a solicitor who was acting as an advocate.54 The conflicts of duties an advocate owes to the court and to their client was also considered to be of marginal importance, as the duty to the court is paramount and further, because the immunity cannot support protection from liability that is not based on a duty of care to the client.55 The desirability of preserving the cab rank rule was also dismissed, because, like the remuneration issue, this principle is only relevant to barristers and not solicitors acting as advocates.56 The majority also disregarded the submission that advocates often need to make decisions in court quickly as a justification for the immunity.57 In fact, the joint majority felt that this issue was ‘distracting and irrelevant’, and acknowledged that many others (by which one assumes to be other professionals and workers) also have the same amount of pressure to make decisions quickly.58 Their Honours also noted that the
‘chilling’ effect of the threat of a civil suit was of some importance but could
not constitute a justification for retaining the
immunity.59
Ultimately, the retention of the immunity had nothing to do with protecting
the participants in the judicial process, but simply ensuring
the
‘finality’ of the process itself.
Kirby: The Lone Dissent
In Justice Kirby’s dissenting judgement in
D’Orta-Ekenaike, the changing nature of the legal profession and
professional liability in general, both here and in overseas jurisdictions, was
highlighted as sufficient motivation to rethink the suitability of
advocates’ immunity in the contemporary Australian legal
system. Kirby J
pointed both to the lack of immunity for other professionals, including
‘legal account architects, civil engineers,
dental surgeons and specialist
physicians and surgeons, anaesthetists, electrical contractors, persons
providing financial advice,
police officers, builders, pilots, solicitors (in
respect of out-of-court advice) and teachers;’60 and in direct
response to the concerns regarding finality, the lack of immunity in other
jurisdictions, including the United States
of America, Canada, the European
Union, Singapore, India, Malaysia and England,61 as being a
satisfactory basis for the removal of the immunity. Kirby J suggested:
54 Ibid, 99 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Hayden JJ).
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, 100 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Hayden JJ).
60 Ibid, 144 (Kirby J).
61 Ibid, 145 (Kirby J); of course, this now also includes New Zealand in
light of the decision in Chamberlains v Lai Unreported, CA (NZ), 8 March
2005.
Such disparity in a matter of legal principle does not necessarily mean that
this court is wrong. But it certainly suggests the need
for justification by
reference to identified errors of so many other courts and legal systems or
proof of such local divergencies
as warrant Australian law taking its own
peculiar direction.62
For Kirby, the majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike63 certainly did not make this justification. The finality argument, the sole policy argument used by the majority to support the retention of the immunity, was not sufficient to
‘warrant’ the High Court’s decision in
D’Orta-Ekenaike, and the retention of the immunity in the face of
the position in other comparable jurisdictions was difficult to
sustain.64
v. prOBLemS with FinaLity aS the SOLe JUStiFicatiOn
FOr advOcateS’ immUnity
As Kirby J notes, comparable legal systems both ‘within, and outside,
the common law world operate perfectly well without the
immunity.’65
For the majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike though, a number of
differences between the Australian legal system and these comparable systems
warranted care in comparison between
jurisdictions when considering the
immunity.66 Richard Ackland, in the Sydney Morning Herald,
sarcastically recalled the majority’s dismissal of the fact that other
jurisdictions
have abolished the immunity:
You’d be in awe at the convolutions the majority performed to cast the
House of Lords decision as unworthy of being followed.
The House was divided in
aspects of the decision. The Poms were influenced by the European Convention on
Human Rights and the Human
Rights Act which, thank heavens, we don’t have
to worry about here because everyone has the protection of the common law and
the High Court itself. The legal profession is organised differently in England.
We don’t have to follow the House of Lords,
and particularly when English
jurisprudence is now infected with a lot of foreign human rights
stuff.67
62 Ibid, 146 (Kirby J).
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid, 169 (Kirby J).
66 Ibid, 144-45.
67 Richard Ackland, ‘Majority ruling gives the minnows little chance’ Sydney Morning Herald,
11 March 2005, 11.
Indeed, to the public, the arguments of the majority in
D’Orta-Ekenaike68 in support of the immunity did seem to
be along these lines. Their Honours urged that there was a necessity when
comparing Australia
to other jurisdictions69 to ‘look beyond
the bare statement that there is, or is not, an advocates’
immunity.’70 The majority noted for example that there were
exceptions to the broad assumption that no immunity exists in either Canada or
the
United States, as in both these jurisdictions there is protection for
prosectors, as well as immunity for judges in the United States.71
Further to this, they argued that regard must be had to the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, and also the fact that principles of
finality found
‘different expression’ in other jurisdictions.72 The
point regarding finality, with respect to the position in the United Kingdom in
any case, rested upon the United Kingdom’s
adherence to Art 6 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
and the Human Rights Act
1998 (UK).73 As the majority points
out, the High Court is no longer compelled to follow decisions of the House of
Lords, especially where such
a decision is based upon judicial and social
changes in the United Kingdom which could not be applied to the Australian
judicial
system.74
Kirby responded to these arguments by noting that it was a ‘mistake’ to suggest that the removal of the immunity in the United Kingdom in Arthur Hall is based on the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK).75 He points out that the Convention was not a key feature of the judgments of any of their Lordships in Arthur Hall (indeed the case was examined outside of the boundaries of the Convention in any case), and further, that the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) was not even in force when the decision was made.76
Despite these two factors, Kirby indicates that in any case, Australia is
also a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which is underpinned by the same principles that inform the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.77
68 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 144-45.
69 As raised by the Applicants and noted in the majority judgment in D’Orta-Ekenaike at 106:
‘...in particular, Canada, New Zealand or the several jurisdictions in the United States of
America.’
70 Ibid, 107.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid, 105-6.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid, 169.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid, 170.
With respect, the arguments concerning differences between jurisdictions as
raised by the majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike are feeble.
Interestingly, the same issue arose in Giannarelli after the decision in
Arthur Hall, where once again a ‘cursory dismissal’ of valid
empirical evidence concerning the removal of advocates’ immunity
in other
jurisdictions took place.78 It appeared in D’Orta- Ekenaike
that once again the majority were willing to ignore valid evidence from
overseas based upon reservations about cross jurisdictional
differences that,
when examined with some rigour (as Justice Kirby did), appear to be arguments
that are quite weak. Given this fundamental
weakness in the arguments proffered
by the majority against allowing an inter-jurisdictional comparison, surely
regard must be had
to the evidence from other comparable jurisdictions about the
operation of the relevant judicial systems post- advocates’
immunity.
In D’Orta-Ekenaike, Kirby draws upon evidence from other jurisdictions to illustrate that re-litigation and the ‘fear of floods of litigation’ has not been a concern where there is a lack of finality through the abolition of advocates’ immunity.79 Kirby points out that a flood of litigation ‘brought by discontented litigants against barristers and their instructing solicitors’ has not occurred, for example, in the United States of America, despite being a
‘most litigious country’ where there has never been a blanket immunity for advocates’ generally.80 Nor has it occurred in Canada, where immunity has been removed for some time,81 a point also raised in Arthur Hall. In England, post Arthur Hall, there has not been a flood of re-litigation reported,82 and indeed in Victoria, where the immunity was unavailable between the initial Giannarelli83 hearing and the Victorian Full Court determination, there was
‘no objective evidence of any increase in the length of criminal
trials... or evidence of a sudden rise in negligence claims
against
lawyers.’84
78 The Hon George Hampel and Jonathan Clough, ‘Abolishing the Advocates’ Immunity from
Suit: Reconsidering Giannarelli v Wraith’ [2000] MelbULawRw 39; (2000) 24 MelbourneULR 1016, 1025.
79 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 173.
80 Ibid, citing Ferri [1979] USSC 178; 444 US 193 (1979); see also Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC
615, 721 (per Lord Hope of Craighead).
81 Ibid, citing Garrant v Moskal [1985] 2 WWR 80, 82; cf A Linden, Canadian Tort Law 7th
Ed (2001) 151.
82 Ibid, citing Seneviratne, ‘The rise and fall of advocates’ immunity’ (2001) Legal Studies
644, 662.
84 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92,
173 (Kirby J) citing Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Access to the law:
Accountability of the legal profession Report No 48 (1992) 35-36
[78].
Whilst some commentators have pointed to the range of malpractice suits in
general in the United States of America (which currently
account for US $4
billion per year) noting that it is only a matter of time before ‘fully
informed consumers target the legal
profession and legal
education,’85 there is no evidence from comparable
jurisdictions (and the USA in particular) that there has been a surge in
re-litigation, nor a
compromise in the finality of decisions, as a direct result
of the removal of advocates immunity. As Kirby J notes, the existence
of special
rules and provisions in these jurisdictions has mitigated a surge in
relitigation as a result of the removal of the immunity,
and a similar range of
circumstances are in fact present in Australia:
The general unavailability of legal aid in Australia to support negligence
claims against lawyers; the availability of summary relief
against vexatious
claims; and the rules against abuse of process by relitigation (not to mention
the empathy and understanding of
judges for co-professionals in unmeritorious
cases) makes it completely unnecessary to retain an absolute immunity of the
broad,
even growing, ambit propounded in this case.86
Kirby quotes from Lord Hoffman in Arthur Hall who described the immunity as ‘burning down the house to roast the pig.’87 Essentially, Lord Hoffman suggests that use of such a ‘broad-spectrum’ remedy as advocates’ immunity, which does come with side effects (especially as far as public perception of the profession is concerned), is unnecessary when a more ‘specific’ remedy can
‘handle the problem equally well.’88 Other
commentators have also evaluated the use of such sanctions which may be used as
more specific remedies in line with Lord Hoffman’s
suggestion above. In
particular, Hampel and Clough note that since 1990 United Kingdom courts have
been able to make wasted costs
orders against practitioners where there has been
negligence on the part of the practitioner.89 Lord Hoffman, in
Arthur Hall, noted that the use of such orders there had not
‘changed the standards of advocacy for the worse.’90
Groves and Derham note that similar remedies are available in all
jurisdictions in Australia, and argue that, whilst not without troubles,
the
wasted costs jurisdiction provides a remedy that has many benefits over
a
85 Anthony Papamatheos, ‘Abolition of the Advocates’ Immunity: Stealing a Knight’s Shield?’ [2004] SOLR 5, 8, citing Manuel R Ramos, ‘Legal Law School Malpractice: Confessions of a Lawyer’s Lawyer and Law Professor’ (1996) OhioStLJ 863.
86 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 173 (Kirby J).
87 Ibid, quoting Lord Hoffman in Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615, 703.
88 Ibid.
89 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (UK) c 41, s 4.
90 Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2000] UKHL 38; [2000] 3 All ER 673,
695.
separate action in negligence.91 Further, the existence of
doctrines such as res judicata and issue estoppel also prevent the
jurisdiction of the court from being attacked.92
It would appear that fears concerning the finality of litigation expressed by the majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike are ignorant of competing evidence from overseas. True, there are differences between the systems, including, as Groves and Derham note, differences in procedural matters,93 but there is nothing to suggest that the doctrines of issue estoppel and res judicata would be insufficient to strike matters out that were seen as an abuse of process, nor that the existence of supplementary remedies would be inadequate in providing aggrieved litigants with a resolution, in the absence of an immunity. Whilst Australia should not be tempted to conform simply because other jurisdictions have abolished the immunity, the evidence from other jurisdictions, despite being limited and somewhat pre-emptive, does provide some compelling reasons as to why the immunity should be abolished as it has been elsewhere. As Justice Kirby suggested, taking a different approach to other jurisdictions does not mean that the High Court is wrong – but it does seem a bizarre position to take in light of competing and convincing evidence from elsewhere.94
In particular, other comparable jurisdictions have abolished the immunity and
have not experienced the problems forecast by the majority
in D’Orta-
Ekenaike - there has not been a surge in re-litigation, there has not been
an undermining of the finality of decisions, and most importantly,
there are
still a range of remedies available through other supplementary means to assuage
litigants who have generally been the
victim of incompetent counsel. This has
ensured above all that public confidence in the legal system has been
restored.
In the previous section, the majority’s dismissal of competing evidence
from other jurisdictions concerning the removal of advocates’
immunity was
canvassed, where the inherent weakness in the finality argument was highlighted
– that is, that it simply has
not been an issue in other jurisdictions
where no immunity exists. The majority noted that the preservation of finality
ensures above
all that public confidence in the legal system will be
maintained,
91 Groves and Derham, supra n 41 at 113.
92 Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2000] UKHL 38; [2000] 3 All ER 673, 681 (Lord Steyn).
93 Groves and Derham, supra n 41 at 107. Groves and Derham do not discuss the implications of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 1999 (UK), but note that under this legislation collateral attacks can be dismissed at an early stage in proceedings.
94 [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 146 (Kirby J).
but it seems in light of the D’Orta-Ekenaike decision that the opposite
has in fact occurred – the public have perceived
this decision as peculiar
in light of the fact that other comparable jurisdictions have removed the
immunity; but most notably, they
have construed the decision as a case of
lawyers receiving preferential treatment under negligence law as distinct from
other professionals.95 The disdain that other professionals and the
media had for the majority judgment in D’Orta-Ekenaike was broadcast
widely, with
newspaper headlines dripping in sarcasm and reminiscent of lawyer
jokes published in the wake of the decision.
Many arguments have been offered by various commentaries to justify the
unique position of advocates compared to other professionals.
For example, Ian
Harrison SC, President of the New South Wales Bar Association, drew comparisons
between medical practitioners and
advocates when he stated that if a doctor was
to be sued as a result of alleged negligence during surgery he (or she) would be
able
to call his (or her) colleagues (other doctors and nurses) as witnesses
whereas a barrister who is sued for alleged in-court negligence
would be unable
to call as a witness the judge that was hearing the case or the members of the
jury.96 This point is strongly linked to the issue that judges and
members of juries have immunity from suit in relation to the relevant court
proceedings. This was an issue that the joint majority and McHugh in particular
emphasised in D’Orta-Ekenaike.97
Another point raised to defend the retention of the immunity for advocates is
that a number of other professionals also enjoy immunity
from suit in some
situations. McHugh J for example noted in D’Orta-Ekenaike that
professionals, such as auditors, who don’t owe a general duty of care to
their investors and journalists, do not owe a
legally enforceable duty to take
reasonable care not to injure a person’s reputation or financial position
by publishing careless
95 Justice Kirby forecast this reaction when he stated that:
[In] individual cases, the professional person concerned has won or lost. But liability has been decided by the application of the general principles of the law of negligence as elaborated at the time of the decision. None of the defendants in any of the foregoing cases claimed, still less received, the benefit of an absolute immunity from liability. So why are the lawyers in this case entitled to be treated in such a special, protective and unequal way? Is this truly the law of Australia, applicable to the case? If so, what is the justification? D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 144-5 (Kirby J).
96 ABC Radio National, ‘Suing Your Legal Representatives’, The Law Report, 22 March
2005, <http://www.abc.net.au/rn/talks/8.30/lawrpt/stories/s1329 117.htm> at 9 June 2005.
97 It has been suggested that neither judges (Sirros v Moore [1975]
QB 118), witnesses (Cabassi v Villa [1940] HCA 41; (1940) 64 CLR 130) nor counsel
(Munster v Lamb [1883] UKLawRpKQB 106; (1883) 11 QBD 588) can be sued for false and defamatory
statements made maliciously in the course of judicial proceedings. A
witness’s immunity
also extends to out of court conduct that is intimately
connected with the giving of evidence in court (Cabassi v Villa [1940] HCA 41; (1940) 64
CLR 130).
statements, unless it is defamatory.98 Similarly, McHugh J also
contends that medical practitioners and social workers employed by the state to
examine children for evidence
of sexual abuse owe no duty of care to persons
suspected of being guilty of the sexual abuse.99
Finally, in protesting that the role of the advocate in a highly pressured
courtroom environment is different to the role of surgeons
and others who are
placed in demanding and stressful workplace situations,100 Groves
and Derham argue that:
A surgeon uses a scalpel and, in doing so, performs the most important aspect
of surgery. Whether this function is described as responsibility,
authority or
power, it is the very essence of the medical procedure. By contrast, an advocate
retains no such responsibility. In
any judicial proceeding, the equivalent power
to administer justice is in the hands of the judge, sometimes with the
assistance of
a jury. While an advocate may provide submissions or examine and
cross-examine witnesses, he or she will never hold the responsibility,
authority
or power to determine the proceeding before the court. This role remains the
province of the judge and jury. The scalpel
is never passed to the
advocate.101
In other words, the advocate never has complete control over the court
proceedings, unlike a surgeon in surgery.
Each of these arguments, whilst they emerge as somewhat compelling, are still
no competition for the public perception that advocates
are receiving
preferential treatment in light of the fact that these differences were not seen
as salient enough to retain the immunity
in other jurisdictions. No suggestion
has been made that these issues pertain specifically to advocates in
Australia,102 and indeed, in cases such as Arthur Hall, these
points of difference between advocates and other professionals were disregarded
as irrelevant justifications for retaining
the immunity.103
Furthermore, they were not relied upon in D’Orta-Ekenaike to
justify the immunity, hence cementing the ideal that the immunity is not really
there to protect the actors in the process but
to ensure the definiteness of the
process itself.
98 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 116 (McHugh J). See also
Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241.
99 Ibid 117 (McHugh J). See Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562.
100 See, e.g., ABC Radio National, ‘Suing Your Legal Representatives’, supra n 96, where the Chairman of the Medico-legal section of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, Dr Tony Buzzard, was ‘unsympathetic’ to the courts reasoning, and suggested that surgeons are placed in just as stressful environments: ‘What about someone going into an operating theatre at 2am, dragged out of bed for a ruptured aorta?’
101 Groves & Derham, supra n 41 at 123.
102 See supra n 95.
103 Arthur J S Hall & Co v Simons [2000] UKHL 38; [2000] 3 All ER 673, 690-1 (per
Lord Hoffman).
vii. cOncLUSiOn
Advocates’ immunity is often perceived by the media and commentators as
‘an anachronism that is out of step with modern tort law’,
therefore, it is most important that sufficient reasons are
advanced for
retaining the immunity.104 The primary justification that was given
for maintaining the immunity in D’Orta- Ekenaike was the premise
that it is a ‘central and pervading tenet’ of the judicial system
that finality of cases, once litigated,
should remain unchanged.105
This paper has argued that whilst the majority in D’Orta-Ekenaike
do not cling to antiquated policy vestiges given in previous judgments, the
finality justification does not strike out as compelling
in its own
right.
One of the main justifications that the majority gave for relying on the
finality argument was that ‘finality’ of decisions
needs to be
preserved so as to uphold public confidence in the legal system. It is clear
however that the upholding of the immunity
based on the finality consideration
has had the contrary effect and has actually undermined the public’s
perception of the
administration of justice. This was clearly portrayed in the
media and from statements that were generated from other professionals
soon
after the decision was handed down. Therefore, it is not the preservation of
finality that will see such public confidence restored,
but the ability for
people to see openness and accountability demonstrated through placing lawyers
on an even playing field and removing
any perception that there is a system of
lawyers looking after their own, or that lawyers in Australia are treated
differently to
other comparable common law countries. In fact, evidence from
other jurisdictions has shown that the finality of decisions and the
administration of justice have not been undermined without the immunity, and
further, that there has not been a flood of re-litigation
or a destruction of
public confidence in the legal system, as feared by the majority in
D’Orta-Ekenaike.
A remark from Seneviratne concerning the legal process post-Arthur Hall
in the United Kingdom, perhaps best sums up the benefit of the removal of
the immunity from all sides:
The decision does not appear to have caused any great problems for the legal
profession. Indeed, the reaction of some in the profession
is that it is to be
welcomed, if it helps restore public confidence in the openness and
accountability of the profession.106
104 Groves & Derham, supra n 41 at 82.
105 D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid and Another [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92. This statement does not refer to appeal processes.
106 Seneviratne, ‘The rise and fall of advocates’
immunity’ (2001) Legal Studies 644, 662, as cited in
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victorian Legal Aid [2005] HCA 12; (2005) 214 ALR 92, 173 (Kirby
J).
However, continued retention of the immunity may well only serve to entrench
attitudes such as this in the public psyche:
But note how the stars of the Bar, most adept at playing the justice game on
behalf of others, skilfully avoid having to play it for
themselves. They cling
to their immunity from actions for negligence – an unjustified privilege
which protects incompetents
from being
sued.107
107 Robertson, G, The Justice Game (1999) 376.
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