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New Zealand Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence |
Last Updated: 25 April 2015
New Zealand’s Free Trade Agreement with China in Context:
Demonstrating Leadership in a Globalised World
Hon Jim McLay CNZM QSO*
I. IntroductIon: PuttIng the FtA Into context
There are many ways to put New Zealand’s Free Trade Agreement with
China into context; one might be to contrast the signing
of the Closer Economic
Relationship Agreement (CER) with Australia in March 1983 with that of the China
FTA almost 25 years later,
in April 2008. The ceremonies — if the first
could even be so described — could not have been more different. CER which
is still regarded as the world’s ‘cleanest’ free trade
agreement — was not exactly signed in secrecy, but
it might as well have
been. Neither country attended and the ‘signing’ was done by video
link. Signing was delayed because
Australia’s incoming Labor Government
wanted to review CER’s terms before agreeing to them. Prime Minister
Muldoon, only
a convert to CER,1 was worried about the economic and
political implications of a deal strongly opposed by New Zealand manufacturers
and not seen to
advantage by exporters.
Twenty-five years later, the China deal was ushered in with great ceremony. The then Prime Minister, Helen Clark, attended the Beijing signing, as did her Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, whose presence signified the importance of the agreement, and 150 business and local government representatives bore witness. The media gave justifiable publicity, and speculated widely
— often wildly — on its prospects. How is it that, over twenty-five years, New Zealand has come from (at best) qualified to full support for free trade to a situation where, today, all our major political parties support free trade.2
We have, of course, always advocated open borders for agriculture;3
but our manufacturers were deeply suspicious of anything more. Indeed,
National
* I express my appreciation to Tom Groser MP and Hon Hugh Templeton, who provided valuable input and original thinking to this address. Wherever possible, I have tried to attribute those sources; but, any errors or omissions — and, above all, the views expressed
— remain my personal responsibility.
1 This conversion was largely achieved through the efforts of Hugh Templeton.
2 On the political Left, that’s due, in no small part, to the efforts of Mike Moore in the 80s and 90s.
3 Tim Groser MP, to the writer, in May 2008. Groser advises he never had to convert Prime
Minister Muldoon to that particular cause; he was always a believer.
Party folklore had it that, just before the 1972 election, manufacturers put
notes into pay packets warning that National was freeing
up imports, and that
would cost jobs — so, it was understandable that older MPs regarded free
trade with apprehension.
CER has been a great success because it was the first step in opening up the
New Zealand economy. However it has also been a disappointment:
first, because
many companies still think primarily of a New Zealand market, not a combined CER
market; and second, because, in addition
to the political reluctance in New
Zealand4, its logical progression, a Single Economic Market, is not a
big enough issue for any Australian politician to ‘champion’.
That
disappointing situation contrasts with both NAFTA and CER, which had
enthusiastic champions such as Jack McEwen and Jack Marshall
championing of
NAFTA, and the championing of CER by Brian Talboys, Hugh Templeton, and Doug
Anthony.
II. Why Should countrIeS trAde together?
Trade should be one of the best guarantees of peace — common sense
dictates countries should not bomb their markets, and largely
that is true.
Woodrow Wilson saw ‘equality of trade conditions among all the
nations’ as one of his Fourteen Points5 embodying the idea that
countries that traded with one another wouldn’t fight one another. There
is some experience to the contrary:
the pre-1914 trade between Britain and
Germany being a case in point, but Europe’s strong, largely trade-based
peace since
1945 suggests that was an exception that proves the rule. Moreover,
since 1945, there’s been plenty of
4 Hon Hugh Templeton clearly rues the lost opportunity. In a note to the writer (June 2008):
‘A major failure of New Zealand (and Australian) governments has been in not carrying CER through to a Single Market by 1995-2000 ... both countries needed, as globalisation proceeded, to maximise [their] strength, and to combine and cooperate in negotiating with ASEAN, Asia, the Americas, Europe ... cooperation in my view was essential in the food
— eg dairy, meat, horticultural (think Tasmania) — wood and fibre, minerals, energy ... and water (that problem was already obvious) ... Doug Anthony did push the case for a Common Market ... [in] a major speech he made in 1987.... [he was] very strong on the value of a combined Australasia ... he knew how it helped in negotiation with say Japan ... they looked on us as a region ... I suspect so do the Chinese and Indians ... it was so obvious
... even Time magazine [14 September 1992] ran a cover story “Let No Man Put Asunder”
... we should be pursuing an Economic Union now in Anzac ... and South Pacific interests
... in relating to the four great entities you specify ... America Europe China and India. By failing to join with Australia, New Zealand’s investment in growth, specially in energy and in productivity, has remained lower than it might have been, and our workforce has begun to move to the bigger centres at an alarming rate.’
5 US President Woodrow Wilson, President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen
Points, Address to joint session of the US Congress,
8 January 1918, available
at
<http://avalon.law.yale. edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp>
accessed 14 December 2009.
evidence that ‘[market] economies that engage in trade grow rich together, not at each other’s expense ... As each country grows more prosperous, it becomes a bigger market for another’s exports, helping it, in turn to advance
... Trade is a positive sum game.6
A. Why New Zealand?
For New Zealand, grabbing the opportunity to negotiate an FTA with China
should have been a ‘no-brainer’ — after
all, China is our
third-largest trading partner (after Australia and the US). China already had
FTAs with developing economies;7 but why, of all countries, did it
choose New Zealand for its first developed country agreement? Maybe it is
because, in 2004, we were
the first to acknowledge China as a market economy;
possibly because New Zealand is a small country with no
‘threatening’
trade patterns; probably because we are an open
market. Nevertheless, we are, in every way, irrelevant to China’s export
drive.
Above all, however, for China, the central issue is food; this was just
one small step towards food security — and so, it was
negotiating with a
significant, successful and unsubsidised food exporter. China is so intent on
achieving food security it is even
considering buying farm-land in other
countries.8 The latter is probably the wrong strategy because, as Tim
Groser has observed, land is only the ‘hardware’ of food security
— the real key is productivity itself. China’s growing population
requires food, water and arable land and (like India,
another FTA target for New
Zealand) it is short on all three whereas food still accounts for 60 per cent of
all New Zealand’s
exports.9
All-in-all, this situation provides New Zealand with very strong future
prospects; and that is despite the fact that, twenty-five
years ago, some
politicians saw ‘agriculture [as] ... a sunset industry ... instead,
information
6 Editorial, The Economist; 13 November 1993.
7 For example, with Jordan and Pakistan.
8 Jamil Anderlini, ‘China Eyes Overseas Land in Food Push’, the Financial Times, 8 May
2008. Under a proposal drafted by its Ministry of Agriculture, the Chinese government plans to encourage companies to buy farmland abroad, particularly in Africa and South America, to help guarantee food security. This plan faces several obstacles, including legal barriers to foreign ownership of farmland, and possible export bans. For example, Argentina has banned beef exports, Egypt and India have stopped shipments of rice, Kazakhstan has prohibited wheat exports, Russia has imposed a 40% export duty on shipments, and Pakistan a 35% duty and Cambodia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam — even China itself
— have imposed export controls or rationing to ease the current food crisis.
9 Dairy, meat, horticulture and seafood contribute about 60% of our exports and employ one
in five workers.
technology, biotechnology and the creative and performing arts were regarded
as the great hopes for the economy ... agriculture lacked
the silver screen
factor.’10
As Mark Twain said of his own, premature obituary, reports of food’s
demise were ‘greatly exaggerated’. To take
full advantage of this
situation, New Zealand must increase its exports, and, to achieve that increase,
it needs higher productivity.
The requirement of increased productivity begs the
question of whether we are not already productive, most particularly in
agriculture.
New Zealanders work more hours than Canadians, Australians,
Americans, and all Europeans, but we are less productive; and the difference
comes down to a lack of productive investment. For the whole of this decade, we
have had weak labour productivity growth. Since 2000,
it has averaged just 1.1
per cent. By comparison, Australia’s higher ratio of capital to labour
delivers faster labour productivity
growth.
Globally, agriculture uses 70 per cent of all fresh, available water.11
New Zealand ‘exports water’. Water is one of our most valuable
resources, but it is difficult to acquire and heavy to
transport and, above all,
it is not managed well as New Zealand did little more than carry forward the
‘first-come-first- served’
water right provisions of the old Water
and Soil Conservation Act when the Resource Management Act was passed in 1991.
The Ministry
for the Environment has urged introduction of tradable water rights
to ensure efficient resource allocation. In May 2008, the Green
Party proposed a
water resource levy but it stopped short of proposing tradable rights. By
comparison, New Zealand’s fishery
resource is managed under Individual
Transfer Quotas (ITQs), bitterly resisted when first introduced, but now
recognised as International
Best Practice. Arguably then, if fish swim in it, it
is probably in need of more efficient allocation.
Overall, however, there is a clear message. Other countries need our food and
taking account of ‘our science capabilities, entrepreneurial
excellence in
agriculture and hopefully better management of our abundant water
supplies’, we have what former trade negotiator
Tim Groser has described
as ‘a fantastic
future’.12
10 Professor Jacqueline Rowarth, The Price of Milk, Alumni and Friends; issue 24; April 2008
Massey University.
11 It is over 80% in the US.
12 Tim Groser MP, NZ — Food Basket for East Asia?; May 2008.
III. nZ—chInA FtA: A SPrIngboArd For other FtAS?
The New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement was not just a significant
relationship milestone; it was also, as Helen Clark said, ‘the
most
important event in the 2008 trade calendar.’ It is a potential springboard
for deals with Japan, Korea and India, as well
as ASEAN. It opens up other
possible deals, maybe in the Gulf. The FTA might prompt others to accelerate
their negotiations with
New Zealand and it may mean we have stolen a march on
others, such as Australia, whose previously parallel negotiations with China
had
stalled some time ago. One of the advantages of FTAs with China and, possibly
Japan and Korea, would be access to those markets
should they ever follow the EU
model of a customs union or single economic market.Following the China
agreement, the former Prime
Minister received indications that Japan would
consider something similar. However, although the ‘promise’ was
ambiguous,
and came from a weakened Japanese Prime Minister who may not have
been able to deliver, it was still important. Japan is New Zealand’s
third
largest market, and many of our exports there presently face tariff and other
barriers but since Japan is only 39 per cent
self-sufficient, its real issue is
food security.
Our trade gains from the China FTA are currently estimated at $350 million,
with a further $100 million in tariff savings; but as
CER shows, potential
returns are much higher. The China FTA has its shortcomings. It will take more
than a decade for significant
sectors such as dairy and forestry to achieve free
trade; and enforcing contracts will not always be easy — but even that
situation
is ‘slowly changing for the better’.13 Overall,
however, it’s ‘phase- to-zero’ for nearly all products over
time; basically, within ten years, China’s
market will be fully open to
New Zealand. We will eliminate all tariffs on Chinese goods by 2016 and China
will remove tariffs on
96 per cent of our goods. The end of 2008 saw the end of
duty on nearly one third of our exports. As Helen Clark said, ‘It
is in
all our interests that China is involved in rules- based multilateralism ... the
commitment China has made to New Zealand,
and in its World Trade Organisation
accession agreement, shows that it is serious about that
too.’14
A. Policy continuity
Policy continuity is one of the keys to a successful, long-term, treaty-based
trade relationship. New Zealand has that continuity
with trade policy unanimity
among the major parties and China gives every similar indication.
13 James, above n.
14 Rt Hon Helen Clark Prime Minister, Address at New Zealand Labour Party
Congress, Wellington 12 April 2008. Emphasis added.
B. The economic context
There are a few slightly worrying signs. In 2008, China’s inflation was expected to increase, and, just as the agreement was signed, Chinese exports and investment were both softening. However there will be many such cycles over the life of such agreements, in both countries, and these should not be a deterrent.Moreover, there is reason to expect China’s strong growth to continue well beyond the Olympics — it is estimated that, from 2007 to 2010, the Games will continue to feed its 12 per cent plus annual growth, creating
745,000 more jobs; and it’s spending $US 40 billion on Olympic-related infrastructure, making Beijing almost unrecognisable.15 China’s current five- year plan will see $US 420 billion invested in new infrastructure. A couple of other startling figures indicate China’s potential such as the purchase of
44 million cellphones in the first six months of 2008 and the building of 500
coal-fired plants in the next decade. Only the most
anti-trade and insular could
ignore that potential.
IV. Why Free trAde?
Historically, free trade was one of the great public policy debates and was certainly so in Britain in the mid-to-late1800s. Governments were once protectionist, but gradually stopped trying to protect against economic forces from outside their borders. Rather, the move away from protectionism was more than just a change of policy because, in today’s globalised world, Governments are simply less able to provide such protection. Moreover, changes in domestic societies — in ideas, interests or national policies
— have both resulted from and been driven by international changes such
as globalisation, as well as development of new institutions
(such as the WTO
and its GATT predecessor), changes in the relative power of different
countries.
A. Free trade in the context of domestic politics
Domestic politics are also key to a successful FTA and to trade policies in
general, as can be seen with NAFTA and, more so, with
CER. We saw political
opposition to the Chinese agreement, albeit only from small parties accounting
for only 13.1 per cent of the
2005 party vote,16 which argued either
on human rights grounds or on the concern that China’s lower wage and
labour standards would make it difficult
for our firms to compete. However,
because New Zealand’s tariffs on other countries’ goods are already
low, trade diversion
15 China’s Post-Olympic Economic Swoon? Forecast by Jonathan Anderson of UBS.
BusinessWeek; 6 August 2007, forecast by Jonathan Anderson of UBS.
16 The Green (5.3% party vote in 2005 election), New Zealand First (5.7%) and the Māori
(2.1%) parties voted against legislation ratifying the agreement in May
2008.
will be limited and adjustment will be minimal compared with the time when import licensing was removed and tariffs were reduced. While substantial public support for the FTA was clear, opinion polls suggested just under one third of New Zealanders were opposed to the deal.17 This figure is consistent with other countries where antagonism to FTAs can be even more pronounced. Such deals are currently a hot political issue in the United States where,
‘NAFTA and Mexican immigrants are the culprits of first resort of
laid-off Midwest workers ... .’18 In April 2007, President Bush
submitted a Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (not even a Free Trade
Agreement) to Congress for approval under the ‘fast-track’
authority — and the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives
immediately suspended the 90-day approval time frame, an unprecedented departure
from the statutory requirements for trade agreements
and we can expect more of
the same.
V. the FtA In the context oF globAlISAtIon
The term globalisation means different things to different people; but for
convenience in this context, it might simply (but narrowly)
be described as
‘international economic integration’. Globalisation is not, of
course, the only force at work in the
world; there are many important
contemporary, social, political or economic challenges: inequality, economic
growth, employment,
job creation, development, democracy, culture, environment
and innovation.
Is globalisation just another of these issues or is it also an external force
that influences those issues? I incline to the latter
view. There is concern
that globalisation might weaken governments, making it difficult to maintain
welfare, labour or environmental
policies, or other fiscal or redistributive
measures; but ‘strong evidence for [such claims] has so far proved to be
hard to
come by.’19 Indeed, there is still a strong view that
globalisation is beneficial for long-term economic growth, and the debate on
globalisation
raises further questions such as whether it is irreversible In the
face of globalised communication and travel, I would suggest that
it is only
reversible at the margins. In response to questions relating to the effects on
wages, inequality, social safety nets,
production and innovation, such effects
must surely be beneficial, if one accepts that globalisation promotes trade, and
trade begets
17 New Zealand Herald DigiPoll, 12 May 2008. The Poll showed 49.1% support and 32.7% opposition to the FTA. Methodology: Interviews of 769 New Zealand eligible voters, conducted between 5 and 26 April 2008 with a margin of error of 3.6%.
18 Albert N Milliron, Chief Political Correspondent, Politisite Political Projections: Pennsylvania is Key; Iron Mill Interactive Media, Inc; 21 April 2008.
19 Mark Thirlwell, Second Thoughts on Globalisation, Lowy Institute for International Policy;
2007.
economic growth. According to Mark Thirwell, national institutions dealing
with tax systems or commercial regulation can cope with
globalization.20
As to whether globalisation affects relations between developed and
developing countries, the answer must surely be that it does so
favourably if
they are trading together. The question may also be asked as to whether free
trade is the same as or is different from
capital mobility and whether one can
be supported but not the other. The answer to both questions is
‘yes’ — but
a combination of both free trade and
capital mobility is better. There is the further question whether attitudes
towards free trade and capital flows depend on the economic
interests of those
taking those positions. This question must, almost certainly, be answered in the
positive — arguably, there
is no reason as to why positive attitudes
should not prevail. There is a final question relating to the influence of
globalisation
on democracy. I would suggest that the influence is positive,
particularly as successful economies tend also to be democracies.
Nevertheless, the question remains to be asked; has the globalisation tide started to ebb? The Wall Street Journal recently observed that we should, ‘Say adios to the flat world of multilateralism and deregulation ... Natural barriers have risen as states increase control over resources, boost protectionism
— even seek borders on the World Wide Web ... [and that we should]
expect increased resistance to immigration and more difficulty
reaching global
environmental accords.’21 However that change is all at the
margin, and does not herald a return to full-blown protectionism; the
globalisation genie is well
and truly out of the bottle. We are past the time of
uncritical acceptance of globalisation; but we are also well past the point
where it can be significantly reversed. Indeed, ‘many of the forces
driving globalisation are likely to persist and so counterbalance
any change in
policy direction.’22
There are certain facts that cannot be ignored. First: One third of the world’s people have ‘been brought into the global goods and services trading system and that has created competitors for the previously dominant rich countries.’23
Secondly, ‘Developed economies are increasingly trading with developing economies’24 which increases their prosperity. Thirdly, ‘the big economic story of the last twenty-five years has been the lifting of hundreds of millions of people from the US$1 dollar a day bracket to the $2 a day income bracket.’25
In short, while globalisation might not have seen ‘the triumph of
western
20 Ibid.
21 A New Turn: Global Ties Fray as Governments Reassert Roles, Wall Street Journal, 29
April 2008.
22 Thirlwell, above n 19 .
23 Colin James, Hugo Group CEOP Conference, April 2008.
24 Ibid.
25 Groser, above n 12.
capitalism’26 it has genuinely benefited lesser economies,
to the point where there are no longer one or two globally dominant players
— there
are now at least four, the US, China, India and the EU.
Globalisation does have its risks. A recent Ernst & Young survey observed that, as companies become more and more global, compliance becomes a greater challenge, forcing them to manage diverse regulations in different markets:
‘... managing regulations in ten jurisdictions is one thing ... what
happens when a firm has significant markets in 30-40 countries
at varying levels
of development and with very different regulatory traditions
...?’27
V. bIlAterAl FtAS In the context oF
MultIlAterAl trAde AgreeMentS
In April 2008, an eloquent plea for progressing the Doha Round from the
Secretary General of the OECD fell on predictably deaf ears.28 As
politicians know, it takes a crisis — a real crisis — to drive
reform; highlighted by the urging from UN Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon in June
2008 for immediate suspension of price controls and other agricultural trade
restrictions to bring down soaring
food prices. Speaking at the special FAO food
crisis summit, he pressed for easing of farm taxes, export bans and import
tariffs
to help millions
26 James, above n 23.
27 Ernst & Young; Strategic Business Risk: 2008: the top ten risks for global business’, 2007, p 10, available at <www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Strategic_business_risk:_2008_-
_the_top_ten_risks_for_business/$FILE/EY_Strategic_Business_Risk_2008.pdf> accessed
15 December 2009.
28 According to Angel Gurria, Secretary General of the OECD:
Amid the hand wringing [about weakening economies and soaring food prices], an important and immediate step ... to help would be to agree on a new multi-lateral trade deal.
Freeing up trade in goods and services can give the world economy a powerful boost in terms of increased innovation and productivity ... a 50% reduction in tariffs and other trade-distorting support in agriculture and manufactured goods alone would generate global welfare gains estimated at annual $44 billion.
Developing countries in particular stand to gain GDP per capita growth of 2% from full liberalization of tariffs.
... [But] curbs on farm outputs and exports are exacerbating the current food crisis. Agreement on the Doha Round now, he said, ... would bring large and widespread economic gains. In today’s gloomy environment, this is no longer the unnecessary luxury some may have mistakenly considered it to be. It’s a matter of real urgency. Free markets benefit consumers. They create more competition, lowering prices. Protectionist, tariff barriers hurt consumers by artificially inflating prices.
Angel Gurria, Trade Agreement Needed Now, New York Times, 25 April 2008, available at
<www.nytimes.com/2008/04/25/opinion/25iht-edgurria.1.12346512.html?_r=1> accessed
15 December 2009.
of poor cope with the highest food prices in thirty years; and for phasing
out stupid (my word, not his) subsidies for food-based
bio-fuels that encourage
farmers to grow crops for energy rather than food.
This view is good news for New Zealand. Our unsubsidised dairy farmers pay,
on average, $40,000 a year in tariffs, sheep farmers pay
about $20,000. Such
moves would bring down food costs, benefiting the world’s poorest and
allowing third world farmers to produce
at worthwhile prices to sell into open,
competitive markets. It has also been pointed out, however, that the UN can only
suggest
such moves, which have long been urged by the World Bank and others to
relieve high food prices and shortages; so it was somewhat
surprising that, in
opening the FAO summit, Italian President Giorgio Napolitano should claim that,
‘World public opinion has
been taken by surprise by the explosion of a
rapid chain of events affecting food followed by the rapid, dramatic rise in the
price
of foodstuffs.’29
VII. the MorAl dIMenSIon oF Free trAde
What about the domestic policies of those with whom we trade, particularly
labour rules, environmental regulation or human rights?
Should we refuse to
trade with those who do not meet our standards? New Zealand is a truly
mercantile nation — heavily dependent
on trade with many countries. If we
started making those judgments, they would never end. But, is there a point at
which trade is
unacceptable? Obviously, with UN or Commonwealth sanctions, it is
easy to decide. In the absence of such measures, are there circumstances
in
which New Zealand should ‘draw a line in the sand’ or should we take
the view that trade relationships should not
be judgmental and that they might
even facilitate improvements in the conditions complained of?
When Helen Clark went to Beijing, her approach was cautious, simply urging
Prime Minister Wen to hold talks with Tibet’s Dalai
Lama. By contrast, in
the same week, when Australian Prime Minister Rudd addressed students at Peking
University, speaking in fluent
Mandarin, he referred to Tibet’s
‘significant human rights problems’.30 Understandably,
China reacted adversely, but his comments did not jeopardise his visit. Indeed,
he went home with agreements
29 Address by His Excellency Giorgio Napolitano, President of the Republic of Italy, High- Level Conference on World Food Security: the Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy, Rome, 3-5 June 2008, available at <www.fao.org/foodclimate/conference/statements/day1- am/en/> accessed 16 December 2009.
30 Hon Kevin Rudd MP, A conversation with China’s youth on the future, Peking University, April 2008, available at <http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/
0I4Q6/upload_binary/0i4q62.pdf;fileType%3Dapplication%2F.pdf> accessed 15 December
2009.
on climate change and a revival of stalled Australia-China trade
negotiations. It has been said that the ‘key to Rudd’s
early success
[had] been his sophisticated understanding of Beijing’s ‘red
lines’ in relation to the Olympic Games
and the Tibet issue.’31
Rudd made his criticisms as a Zhengyou (true friend) of China; and he also
reaffirmed Australia’s recognition of Chinese sovereignty
over Tibet and
stated his opposition to boycotting the Beijing Olympics. China relies on
Australian energy and resources, which might
give Rudd an unfair advantage over
his Western counterparts; but it is suggested that others, ‘would still do
well to examine
his approach in greater depth: [as] he may have uncovered a
viable “third way” between coddling and confronting China’s
Olympic sensibilities.’32
Australia and New Zealand have found different ways of placing these issues
on the diplomatic table. Without criticising New Zealand’s
choices, I
personally prefer the former’s more nuanced approach. Above all, the
message to New Zealand’s partners must
be that we will trade with you, but
when we do, we will bring our values with us and we will not be reluctant to
table them in an
appropriate manner; just as we seek to understand your issues,
we ask that you understand ours. The best way of addressing differences
is
through relationships (including trade) and through open and frank dialogue and
understanding, not through boycotts and megaphone
diplomacy. However, New
Zealand’s partners must also understand that our consumers are free to
form their own views, as they
may already be doing on food and product safety.
In the future, New Zealanders may even take a dim view of designer labels
produced
in less-than-ideal conditions and may be likely to express these
preferences through their buying patterns. Consumer choices may
well influence
future policy but that influence can only happen if we first facilitate
trade.
Can New Zealand insist that external rules, such as labour standards, be
incorporated into FTAs or future WTO agreements? That approach
is attractive. On
the face of it, as some would argue, it makes sense to call for improved
standards in countries known for poor
conditions. However, in that event, the
WTO, a forum for multi-lateral trade deregulation, would soon become an
international labour
and environmental regulator — and nothing would more
quickly destroy the cause of international trade and global economic
development.
Moreover, such insistence would be seen, in many countries at best,
as no more than thinly-veiled protectionism imposed by those
who fear job losses
to lower-cost countries and denying such countries one of
31 Brendan Taylor, Australia’s Turn with the Torch: An Illuminating Episode, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre: Australian National University, May 2008, available at <http://csis . org/files/media/csis/pubs/pac0825b.pdf> accessed 15 December 2009.
32 Taylor, ibid.
their few competitive advantages, that of a low cost structure. At its worst,
such insistence could be characterised as yet another
example of prosperous,
western-style hegemony.
In the aftermath of the 1999 Seattle WTO débâcle, a Brazilian
Minister correctly said that, ‘developing nations
[stood] absurdly
accused, by new and old protectionists alike, of taking advantage of the
doubtful benefit of being poor.’33 The best way to help poor
countries — particularly, to improve their environmental and labour
standards — is to give them
free and open access to the markets of the
rich. The easiest way to damage poor countries is to impose standards that they
cannot
possibly meet. Singapore is a prime example. Forty years ago, it was one
of Asia’s poorest countries, with low environmental
and labour standards.
Today, Singapore is richer per capita than New Zealand with higher standards,
all of which resulted from economic
growth.
Many countries with which we trade have, by our measures, poor labour,
environmental and other records. A leading head-hunter has
observed of the Gulf
States, which are increasingly significant as trade partners and a possibility
for a future FTA, ‘A lot
of people feel uncomfortable with the poverty ...
if you like civil rights and opera, then you are coming to the wrong
place.’34 The Gulf States admit hundreds of thousands of South
Asian labourers. They have poor records of non-payment of wages and bad living
conditions and low-income expatriates are not allowed to bring in their
families. However, trade was the basis for sustained pressure
from groups such
as Human Rights Watch, which led Dubai to agree to improve conditions for
migrants, although enforcement remains
an issue. Such improvement would probably
have been possible without a trade relationship. The record shows that
engagement offers
better prospects for progress on such matters than boycotts
and isolation. New Zealand has a proud human rights record, domestically
and
internationally, but it is best pursued separately from trade.
A. Understanding different approaches.
What if a trading partner is not compliant with an international accord, such
as Kyoto? There will be those at the extremes of, for
example, the climate
change debate who would advocate trade restrictions on countries that do not
adhere to their view of the world.
Even when we, as New Zealanders, ‘take
our values
33 WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE Third Session, Brazil, Statement by H E Mr. Luiz Felipe Lampreia Minister of Foreign Relations, 1 December 1999, WT/MIN(99)/ST/5, available at <www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min99_e/english/state_e/d5243e. pdf> accessed 15 December 2009.
34 Simeon Kerr, Boom in Gulf boosts quality of workforce, Financial Times,
29 April 2008, available at <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d2baed50-14c3-11dd-a741-0000779fd2ac,dwp_
uuid=24c62b4c-11c6-11dd-9b49-0000779fd2ac.html> accessed 15 December
2009.
with us’ as we do these deals, we also need to understand and accommodate the different approaches — cultural, political and economic — of other countries and cultures. Continuing with the example of climate change, one of the themes at the 2007 Sydney APEC meeting was the Asian view that, ‘while Europeans and Anglo-Saxons might like the notion of defined commitments and monitoring processes, Asian preferences are different’35 — that Asia ‘will act on climate change but will not accept Kyoto-type commitments’36 and that
‘the climate change debate needs some Asian pragmatism.’37 Such countries
‘are likely to approach the issue on the basis that human activity is
changing the atmosphere undesirably’, but with more
‘skepticism
about ‘tipping point’ arguments which are used to generate a sense
of urgency ... [and a view that]
difficulties which require new thought ... are
not helped by vehement assertion’.38 How should New Zealand
react to such an approach? I would suggest that, with understanding, we might
even learn something.
VIII. concluSIon
As will be clear, I support free trade and all it brings; and so, despite
some niggles, I applaud those responsible for this deal.
It enhances our ongoing
moves to an open, competitive economy; exporters will benefit from better access
to a large, rapidly growing
market; investment and business links will
strengthen; and it has attractive most-favoured-nation provisions and liberal
investment
and immigration arrangements. Like CER, it is clean and relatively
comprehensive, which enhances its wider strategic value. The quality
of this
agreement suggests that China might be willing to assume some leadership in
international trade negotiations — very
welcome in times of protectionist
pressure and when the Doha Round is faltering. Furthermore, domestically,
removal of most tariffs
and other trade barriers should improve our resource
allocation, thus contributing to economic growth, and will lower prices to our
consumers.
Above all, this agreement is founded on observable truths that trade is a
positive sum game; that countries that trade together grow
rich together, not at
each other’s expense; that trade is key to prosperity; that free markets
benefit consumers by creating
competition and lower prices; and that free trade
is in the interests of both countries. That is the case for the China FTA, as it
was for others, including CER — as well as North America’s
NAFTA,
35 Gary Hawke, Internationalisation and the Future of the School of Government, 4(1) Policy Quarterly, 2008, p 5, available at <http://ips.ac.nz/publications/files/17a92d0e8ea.pdf> accessed 15 December 2009.
36 B Desker, (2007) ‘ASEAN: act on climate change’, RSIS Commentaries 109/2007.
37 Hawke, above n 35, p 6.
38 Ibid, p 7.
the WTO, even the European Union. In the longer term, we must still focus on
multilateral trade negotiations such as Doha; but pursuit
of bilateral or
regional free trade agreements will continue to be of great value, particularly
now that tariffs are low and the
costs of trade diversion are small. To those
nay-sayers who oppose free trade, one can only point to the benefits of such
deals (not
least, 25 years of CER), and ask, ‘on what principle is it
that, when we see nothing but improvement behind us we are to expect
nothing but
deterioration before us?’39
When I took over from Sir Robert Muldoon as National Party leader, I said CER
might stand as his greatest achievement; and, with Trans-Tasman
trade having
grown at an annual average of nine per cent since 1983 (greater than our
combined GDP growth rates), that has proven
to be an accurate assessment. It is
one of the ironies of politics that Helen Clark left the political scene having
achieved free
trade agreements with Thailand,40 Singapore,41
Chile, Brunei and China,42 and having laid the ground for
potential deals with ASEAN, Korea, Japan, and India amongst others, thus
ensuring that trade liberalisation
may also be her greatest
legacy.
39 Thomas Babington Macaulay, ‘Southey’s Colloquies on Society (January 1830), Critical and Historical Essays Contributed to the Edinburgh Review’, Vol 1, (189), pp 215-265, at
265-266.
40 The New Zealand-Thailand Closer Economic Partnership Agreement came into force from
1 July 2005.
41 The New Zealand Singapore Closer Economic Partnership Agreement came into force on
1 January 2001.
42 The Trans Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement with Singapore, Chile and
Brunei Darussalam was concluded on 3 June 2005.
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