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Havemann, Paul --- "No Rights Without Responsibilities? Third Way and Global Human Rights Perspectives on Citizenship" [2001] WkoLawRw 4; (2001) 9 Waikato Law Review 75

NO RIGHTS WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITIES? THIRD WAY AND GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES ON CITIZENSHIP

BY PAUL HAVEMANN[*]

1. Introduction

Third Way thinking is informed by recognition of the impacts of globalisation, the emergence of the Risk and Network societies, reflexive modernisation, and detraditionalisation. Third Way politicians and intellectuals have made much of the need to modernise political, economic and cultural institutions and processes in the face of these revolutionary changes yet have mostly neglected to concretise ideas about citizenship rights and obligations. To combat exclusion, poverty and authoritarianism this article calls for the modernisation of citizenship based on a “Human Rights Way”.

2. The Third Way: Modernisation of Subjecthood or of Citizenship?

Intellectuals on both the Right and Left,[1] with the notable exception of Anthony Giddens,[2] consistently revisit the theme that there is little new or utopian in the Third Way, and critiques of the Third Way now abound.[3]

In early 1999 the Prime Ministers of Britain and Germany provided the critics with plenty of ammunition in a manifesto: “Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte”. Blair and Schroeder begin encouragingly enough with the assertion that “(f)airness and social justice, liberty and equality of opportunity, solidarity and responsibility to others” are “timeless values”.

The word “liberty” almost never appears again in the document, as Ralf Dahrendorf pointed out shortly after the manifesto was released. He notes with apparent approval that “equality” is dispensed with as a goal and replaced by social inclusion and justice. Dahrendorf likens much Third Way governance to the “Singapore model” in its authoritarian tendencies. He cites the rise of law and order politics, the split between rowing and steering in the new public management, the proliferation of “quangos”, and the internationalisation of decision-making at the level of undemocratic and unaccountable bodies such as NATO, the IMF, and the EU Council of Ministers. I would add the OECD and WTO.

In their Third Way manifesto, Blair and Schroeder make only a fleeting reference to the need to shape a society with equal rights of men and women. This reference occurs in the context of combating crime, social disintegration and drug abuse, and in recognition of changing gender roles and life expectancy and consequent pressure on social security systems. They also suggest that safety on the street should be a civil right[4] (sic) and, ominously, that there should be no rights without responsibilities. Otherwise, there is virtually no articulation of the content of Third Way citizenship in terms of human rights.

Anthony Barnett, founding director of Charter 88, the UK group promoting the case for a written constitution and Bill of Rights for Britain, is highly critical of the current Blairite version of the Third Way.[5] He critiques the strong centralising, conservative and incrementalist tendencies of some of its leaders (Straw, Mandelson, and Irvine). Barnett decries the “corporate populism” that is providing the ideological spin to capture New Labour’s navigational coordinates, as it steers between the consensus politics which led to and sustained the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) and the conviction politics which drove the Thatcherite revolution down the path to market fundamentalism. The problem he identifies is that New Labour has attended to the overwhelming feeling of a need for change, while retaining its predecessors’ relatively authoritarian mode of governance and preoccupation with productivism. Barnett describes the result as the “modernisation of subjecthood”.

This “modernisation of subjecthood” seems not only to involve de-emphasising ideas about a free society in the form of liberty (civil and political) rights, but also to consign economic, ecological, social and cultural rights to the back burner.

I argue that, if the specific content of citizenship rights continues to be neglected in Third Way political thought, this omission will constitute the fundamental flaw in the architecture of Third Way governance, and that the Third Way ought to be about the modernisation of citizenship. A basic project for progressives must be to ask how Third Way politics contribute to this. Part of my answer is that, for renewal of radical politics in late modern times, the state and supra-state entities must work actively with civil society to respect, fulfil and protect all human rights as citizenship rights.

Giddens makes a number of brief and skeletal suggestions in support of a human rights-based approach to the modernisation of citizenship.[6] These are very much at a macro and global level, leaving the implications for micro and local applications yet to be addressed. For instance, Giddens supports Sen’s “capabilities” approach to measuring development progress based on civil and political freedoms as well as rights to health and education and other human rights. In this framework, as in the one I advance, human rights are basic, not superstructural luxuries. In the context of the redefinition of state sovereignty being brought about by globalisation, Giddens identifies the salience of the growth of the rights of the individual in international law, a body of law in which states have hitherto been the prime subjects. He promotes the idea that the EU can take a lead in animating transnational codes and modes of human rights-based governance for the sustenance of a global cosmopolitan regime.[7] So far, so good, on the intellectual front.

3. The Third Way: Learning from which Experience?

I confess to misgivings about the depth and breadth of commitment of Third Way European politicians to a human rights-based approach to modernising citizenship. These doubts were confirmed by a section in the manifesto entitled “Learning from Experience”. It consists of an analysis of the KWS project which echoes New Right fundamentalism[8] far more than it articulates an auto-critique of the centre left from the centre left. For instance, we are told that the lessons not to be repeated derive from the experiences that:

∑ social justice was confused with equality of outcome;

∑ social spending became the way social justice was measured;

∑ collective interests were unduly privileged over individual achievement, success, the entrepreneurial spirit and responsibility and community spirit;

∑ rights must be accompanied by responsibilities;

∑ governments’ ability to secure growth and jobs was unduly exaggerated;

∑ wealth was under-valued;

∑ weaknesses of markets were over-stated; and

∑ “community spirit” was subordinated to universal social safeguards.

In a 2000 Dissent piece, Joanne Barkan has critically annotated the “Europe: The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte” manifesto. She makes a telling point that:

many people argue that universal safeguards (such as health care) foster solidarity and build a cohesive citizenry. So what is meant by community spirit here?[9]

Surely, we learnt more than a decade before the manifesto came out that the Fordist class compromise was a relatively short-lived settlement that served to deliver some trophies of class struggle, and that the KWS was also profoundly functional to capital and economic growth while it lasted.[10] Among the lessons to be avoided, should not Third Way politicians also, or instead, have listed the atrocities wreaked on citizens by market fundamentalism?

Jeff Faux’s 1999 Dissent piece “Lost on the Third Way”[11] lists flaws in the Clinton version:

∑ the US Third Way is primarily a rationalisation for a political compromise between left and right;

∑ Clinton’s 1994 strategy was simply “to take an essentially conservative programme and repackage it for liberals” so that the Democratic Party’s base has “shrunk to those whose politics is driven by fear of the Republicans”;

∑ under Clinton’s Third Way, Wall Street dominates American politics more than ever, and social investment in health care and the social safety net have further deteriorated;

∑ by joining the Right’s attack on government, Third Way-ers have in fact undermined public support for investment in the public sector and demoralised it as well;

∑ Third Way-ers, it must be conceded, do stress that rebuilding efficient as well as compassionate government is an important element in the reconstruction of social democracy;

∑ Clinton’s Third Way has narrowed focus from the governance of society to the governance of the public sector; the issue of poverty has become the issue of managing welfare; the issue of health care has become the issue of Medicare and Medicaid budgets; and the issue of the redistribution of income and wealth has become the issue of the distributional impact of government spending;

∑ the Third Way does not therefore constitute the sought-after vehicle for the “alliance of progress and justice”. Instead, this way merely lowers the public’s expectation of governments’ capacity to deliver either progress or justice.

Robert Reich, Clinton’s former Secretary of Labor, also saw little promise in the Clintonite version of the Third Way. In an article in The American Prospect,[12] he cites its perilous path, its lack of a natural constituency, and the inescapable and banal dilemma USA Third Way-ers (practical idealists) pose for themselves: how to liberate market forces while easing the transition for those who would otherwise fall behind. He concludes that Third Way leaders must broker a new social contract between those who have been winning and those who have been losing in the US prosperity stakes. The Bush Administration will no doubt follow the Clinton path further to the right: after 11 September 2001, patriotism has been increasingly militarised and given respectability.

Reich urges a new “patriotic” communitarianism on us. This sounds like revivified Fordism without the collective memory of World War Two to legitimate it, or possibly a slogan for the particular US version of the workfare state with a tincture of nationalism masquerading as patriotism thrown in to make it palatable to Americans.

In the diagram below, adapted from Giddens’ diagram,[13] the Third Way paradigm is contrasted with its immediate predecessors:

Some prescient academic analysts[14] classify the conception of the state exemplified in the political practice of Third Way politicians as that of a Schumpetarian Welfare State (SWS). The SWS differs markedly from the KWS ideal. The basis for both belonging to and governance of KWS was social contract citizenship, consisting of a universally enjoyed bundle of political freedoms, civil rights, civic obligations and social rights. Official discourse was social solidaristic and tried to call up notions of radical, egalitarian, cooperative and emancipatory communitarianism.

In contrast, in the SWS or workfare-welfare state, local and global market imperatives prevail. The process of a modernising subjecthood demands new fealty and homage to the market. Citizens are transformed into stakeholders (some of them shareholders, all of them consumers) whose individualised “stake in the action” is underwritten by the state only so long as they perform a set of duties, principally to earn a living in order to support themselves and their dependents. The space between citizen/subject and state is hollowed out and replaced by the market.[15] Official discourse continues to be based on social contractarian solidarity but tends to conservative communitarianism tempered by moral authoritarianism on the one hand and competitive individualism on the other. This still closely resembles a New Right societal paradigm

I think it is important to try to distinguish between the Third Way as an intellectual project and the manifestations of the Third Way in the political arena, for the time being anyway. So, before trashing the Third Way, one must remind oneself that the concept may offer more space than New Right market fundamentalism ever did for progressive politics. Andrew Gamble and Gavin Kelly, for instance, suggest that the Third Way combines “new and heterodox ideas ... which recognise that there has been a sharp break in political continuity which may render many former political certainties obsolete”.[16]

This theme is also central to Giddens’ utopian realist articulations of the shape of radical politics in the future[17] as well as his more pragmatic recent writings.[18] Giddens’ Third Way blueprint embodies what are for me largely unexceptional values such as:

∑ equality

∑ protection of the vulnerable

∑ freedom as autonomy

∑ no authority without democracy

∑ cosmopolitan pluralism

4. Philosophic Conservatism[19]

While I appreciate much of the utopian Third Way idea, I would criticise its failure to articulate adequately rights-based citizenship and its related tendency to promote the workfare state. Giddens listed “No rights without responsibilities” as one of the values of the Third Way. This principle has already been co-opted into the hegemonic ideology of the workfare state. For instance, we find it used in a passage entitled “Learning from Experience” in the manifesto I referred to earlier. The context in which it is used is specially revealing:

Too often rights were elevated above responsibilities, but the responsibility of the individual for his or her family, neighbourhood and society cannot be offloaded onto the state. If the concept of mutual obligation is forgotten, this results in a decline of community spirit, lack of responsibility towards neighbours, rising crime and vandalism, and a legal system that cannot cope.[20]

Solidaristic but opaque and, for a long while now, highly contested, notions of “community spirit”, “the family”, and “the neighbourhood” are invoked. Even the spectre of lawlessness is subtly coupled with ideas about “rights without responsibilities”. The workfare state is premised on the modernisation of subjecthood based on new obligational, rather than rights-based, settlements. The language remains contractarian—for instance a “contract with the people”, a “bond of trust”, a “contract with America” - but, as with most contracts, rights flow to the powerful and responsibilities from the powerless. We ought also to remember that an obligational discourse, couched in the language of duties and hostile to rights talk, framed some of the attack on the KWS from both left and right.[21]

It is unsettling when Giddens also argues that a “prime motto” of the new politics ought to be no rights without responsibilities - though he says that it is highly important that social democrats stress that this applies not just to welfare recipients but to everyone.[22] Giddens’ version of no rights without responsibilities stresses the universality of the application of the principle to the rich, to corporations and to politicians, as well as to the poor as a term of the new social contract. Furthermore, he locates responsibility in government to enforce rights and responsibilities in terms of the need for those who profit from social goods to give back to the community.[23]

In Giddens’ most utopian work (1994) he argues that responsibilities are the clue to agency in implementing an agenda for radical politics. He says that in late modern times providentialism must be disavowed and responsibility assumed. He is careful to contrast responsibility with duty. Duty is imposed, whereas responsibility is assumed. Responsibility involves the reasoned and voluntary assumption of commitments to take on risk and to promote positive values such as the sanctity of life, universal human rights, the preservation of species, and care for present and future generations.[24] Giddens is defining rights and responsibilities differently from workfare politicians, who conflate rights with welfare benefits. Their project seems to be the modernisation of subjecthood. For me, in contrast, the modernisation of citizenship must be based on the principle: no duties without rights.

Italian left democrat Michele Salvati reminds us of the historical evolution of variants of Third Way politics since the nineteenth century. Emancipatory politics has come about before from a blending of liberalism and socialism. He suggests that socialism’s contribution to progressive realisation of the welfare state came from Marxism’s focus on material conditions leading towards the welfare state. The KWS project came about for creating the material social, economic, cultural and political conditions that have to underpin civil and political and social rights for all citizens.[25] Such rights were not a medium for creating these conditions; they were an affirmation of these fundamental entitlements and the commitment to sustain them. Third Way politics again ought to be about creating the material conditions for citizenship through the state, civil society and supra-national modes of cosmopolitan governance.

Giddens’ Third Way implicitly, and occasionally explicitly, rests on a set of state- and supra-state-derived individual and social rights. In Giddens’ schema, government has an active role on behalf of citizens to promote the Third Way values cited above, through a programme involving:

∑ structurally responding to globalisation;

∑ expanding the public sphere;

∑ re-asserting the effectiveness of government in the face of markets;

∑ democratising democracy; and

∑ practising active risk management.

In contrast, in the Third Way manifesto, rights are conceived of in narrow terms and locked onto correlative duties in the labour market. This narrow conception of rights reflects a very narrow conception of the project of renewing social democracy which can hardly be said to show a new way or Third Way beyond left and right. There can be little doubt that in late modern times there is a most urgent need to promote good governance. Good governance, above all, means respect for human rights. Institutionalising respect for human rights will involve bringing the state back in to eradicate local and global polarities of wealth and poverty and to reverse the ever accelerating processes of ecocide and social exclusion. Achieving these aims depends on recognising entitlements in terms of human rights - doing social justice according to rights, rather than dealing with unmet needs according to when the state can afford it.

5. Social Exclusion in Late Modern Times

In the emerging workfare state era the term “social exclusion” has replaced poverty and taken on much of the ideological “work” it did. As Ruth Levitas points out, in official discourse the meaning of “social exclusion” seems confined to exclusion from the labour market process and wage relationship and thus normalises the adverse effects of the capitalist societal paradigm. Without an acknowledgment of the material conditions of poverty, the term “social exclusion” may further obscure the poverty and inequality that it should illuminate. Some social exclusion analysis tends toward “victim blaming” by characterising exclusion in terms of the subjective experience of the poor.

However we speak of poverty or social exclusion, the spectre of exclusion and poverty is easily exploited by workfare state rulers. They use it to separate workers from the reserve army of labour, subjects from citizens, the one third excluded from the two thirds included (or whatever the local inclusion/exclusion ratio), and North from South.[26]

Euro-American Third Way states seldom, if ever, articulate the logic of human rights or the modernisation of citizenship as inclusive and emancipatory elements of their programmes. Presumably, such talk would frighten the electorate and the money markets by sounding again like the “spend and borrow” KWS we have “learned from experience” to eschew.

The failure of Euro-American Third Way governments to articulate local policy in terms of the rights-based approach to modernising citizenship can be contrasted with the growing use of a “human rights approach” to development in the South.[27] Suffice it to say that late modernity[28] is characterised by many “negative signs” in the form of a plethora of inter-related global “bads”, each with its own local pathologies, and a few “goods”. Gross asymmetries of power, grossly unequal life choices, the fatal neglect of basic human needs[29] and rights, and radically unequal political opportunities remain the fundamental dimensions of late modernity. There is an abundance of indicators of exclusion and polarity, almost all of them signalling fundamental breaches of human rights and deficits in the opportunity to participate as a citizen.

David Held’s term “nautonomy” well describes the constellation of conditions of powerlessness embedded in the dystopian reality of late modern times. Such powerlessness derives from socially, politically and economically conditioned patterns of asymmetrical life chances.[30] At the heart of the condition of nautonomy lie polarities of wealth and poverty, as well as social exclusion. Globally, most people are denied the capacity to have any participatory agency in structuring their destiny; consequently, the idea of making rights for such people conditional on their fulfilling responsibilities, in Giddens’ terms - let alone conditional on the imposition of duties - is absurd. For Giddens, Third Way politics must assist citizens to navigate through the major revolutions of our time: globalisation, and transformation in personal life and our relationship to nature.

Combating nautonomy, poverty and social exclusion ought to be a fundamental element of Third Way politics and the modernisation of citizenship. A basic focus of Third Way political thought and action ought to be on the bundle of rights and responsibilities associated with actualising citizenship. The absence or denial of these rights signals most clearly a state of nautonomy. It is therefore surprising how little attention rights and the revival of social citizenship get in Third Way discourse from politicians and intellectuals.

The practice of citizenship involves asserting and enjoying access to the life choices legitimated and codified as human rights; it also involves fulfilling responsibilities based on the principle “from each according to his or her ability; to each according to his or her need and sometimes merit”. Citizenship critically involves engagement in participatory political processes that contribute to the actualisation of rights and the performance of the responsibilities constituting the status of citizen.

I have drawn on Held’s identification of key sites of power (and powerlessness) and types of rights to highlight the centrality of rights to create and sustain the capacity for autonomously making life choices:

The politics of modernising citizenship must continue to preserve and promote basic yet fragile civil and political rights for the democratising of democracy; as well, a number of problems must be addressed in entirely new and robust ways:

∑ the adverse material conditions created by turbo-capitalist globalisation in the market and workfare state-type governance require that the promotion of positive material conditions be enshrined in social, economic,[31] development and cultural rights;

∑ the ordering of nature, now determined by practices that manufacture ecocidal risks, must be replaced by conditions for a sustainable ecology reflected in the protection of ecological rights and the recognition of inter-generational and precautionary responsibilities, for instance with respect to the biotechnology revolution;

∑ reflexive self-identity must be enhanced, not limited by the growth of informational black holes in the Network society. Rights of access to information and communication technologies, information, knowledge, and opportunities to generate knowledge, must become paramount concerns for the democratisation of democracy in both North and South. A cyber commons is needed as an alternative to the increasing concentrations of power in the increasingly commodified Web.

6. Social Citizenship: The Human Rights Way to Modernising Citizenship

Since World War Two an “ethic of humanity”[32] has steadily permeated the international governance area. There is broadening and deepening global consensus on what constitute basic human rights and that these are intrinsic to good governance[33] and development.[34] International Human Rights law-based “charters of rights” and their domestic equivalents now define and codify a minimum list of civil, political and social rights of citizens. The international Bill of Rights (UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR) and other instruments notably in the European Union set the precedent in terms of aspirational standards for the rights required by everyone to realise his or her life choices. There has been an enormously high level of “symbolic” formal ratification by states of the international human rights’ instruments making up the international Bill of Rights. The human rights embodied in these instruments have been summarised as follows:

Britain’s New Labour Government is presently far more eloquent, upfront and forceful about the place of human rights in its vision for the development of the South than it was in the manifesto for the governance of the North. Clare Short, UK Minister for International Development, recently issued a consultation piece entitled “Human Rights for Poor People” (2000) that does contain very sound strategies for modernising citizenship for all people. Indeed, the paper expresses what I think should be core principles for the modernisation of citizenship:

All peoples are entitled to all human rights. These rights include economic, social and cultural rights, such as rights to the highest attainable standard of health and education, as well as civil and political rights such as rights to life and liberty. All these rights share characteristics of indivisibility and universality. Participation, inclusion and obligation are identified as ... the three operational principles which apply to the achievement of all human rights for all.[36]

The principle of participation is defined as enabling people to claim their human rights to participate in, and have information about the decision-making processes that affect their lives. The principle of inclusion involves promoting all rights for all people to create inclusive societies in which people are encouraged to fulfil their duties to their communities. The principle of obligation involves strengthening state institutions and policies to ensure that obligations to protect and promote human rights are fulfilled. Duties seem to be understood as responsibilities in Giddens’ sense. Obligations seem to be understood as duties flowing from the powerful to the powerless, empowering them to make claims on governments that they fulfil their duties.

In advancing the need for a much more substantial emphasis on human rights in Third Way discourse, I am deeply conscious that rights discourse is not unproblematic in any context, North or South. Ideological conflict exists, for instance, over whether the idea of individual human rights is not cultural imperialism and in collision with Asian values, and about whether social and economic rights ought to be regarded as justiciable human rights at all. Legal, civil and political rights enjoyed a central place in American-dominated international human rights talk until the end of the Cold War, while social and economic rights were seen as the preoccupation of communist regimes. In spite of resistance from many governments and agencies, the idea that social and economic rights deserve parity of esteem with other types of rights is now gaining a little ground - ground that Third Way politics must build on for modernising citizenship in the North, South, and globally. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan sums it up:

the combination of underdevelopment, globalisation and rapid change poses particular challenges to the international human rights regime. ... [T]he pursuit of development, the engagement with globalisation, and the management of change must all yield to human rights imperatives rather than the reverse.[37]

The UN Development Program’s latest Human Development Report (2000), entitled Human Rights and Development, adopts a similar approach to DFID by deliberately locating human rights and development as parts of a common vision and purpose. The report’s themes are inclusive democracy, extending state-centred obligations and quantifying measures for promoting accountability. Most importantly, it stresses that the eradication of poverty is the central challenge for human rights, not just a development goal.

Philip Alston (a contributor to the UNDP 2000 report) and the Human Rights Council of Australia argue against attempts to use innocuous “motherhood and apple pie” euphemism - terminologies such as good governance, human security, human dignity, and human wellbeing - as a strategy for introducing human rights surreptitiously.[38] They warn that such a strategy dilutes the human rights standards, perpetuates a welfare model of development based on neediness, and undermines the hard-won post-1948 consensus reflected in the International Bill of Rights ‘that all peoples are entitled to all Human Rights and that all these rights share characteristics of indivisibility and universality”. I entirely support this defence of rights talk.

Alston castigates IGOs (International Governmental Organisations) such as the World Bank, the UNDP, the UN Social Summit, and agencies such as the OECD for ignoring human rights in their programme and policies. He is equally hard on some NGOs such as World Vision, CARE and Amnesty for their slow response to the human rights agenda and their failure to accept that social and economic rights’ dimensions are basic to their agendas. He contrasts these with OXFAM’s consistency and clarity in this regard. He concludes by suggesting that work to operationalise the human rights agenda must be practical. Human rights must be explicitly affirmed in government, IGO and NGO policy and programmes. Accountability benchmarks and mechanisms must be put in place. Given that judicial remedies are remote and impractical, other mechanisms, on the ground, must be found to articulate the human rights entitlement claims that are part of the modernisation of citizenship.

7. Conclusion

Until the material conditions produced by exclusion, poverty and authoritarianism are addressed, Third Way politicians in the North may not progress beyond New Right “business as usual”, and Third Way intellectualising will remain mere obscurantism. The modernisation of citizenship requires widespread acceptance of certain principles by intellectuals, politicians, IGOs (notably the World Bank and IMF), NGOs, state governments, the WTO, NAFTA, APEC, leaders in civil society, and transnational corporations (TNCs). These principles are that:

∑ there be no duties without rights;

∑ all people are entitled to all human rights;

∑ human rights include economic, social and cultural rights, such as rights to the highest attainable standard of health and education, as well as civil and political rights such as rights to life and liberty; and

∑ all human rights share characteristics of indivisibility and universality.

[*] Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Waikato

[1] See Halpern (ed), “The Third Way: summary of the NEXUS online discussion” at URL www.netnexus.org/library/papers/3way.html#Background 27/5/98.

[2] Giddens, A Beyond Left and Right: the future of radical politics (1994), The Third Way: the renewal of social democracy (1998), and The Third Way and its Critics (2000).

[3] See Barkan, “The Third Way / Die Neue Mitte” (2000) Spring Dissent 51-65 and Giddens (2000) supra note 2.

[4] Barkan, supra note 3, at 54.

[5] Barnett, “Corporate control” (1999) February Prospect 24-29.

[6] Giddens (2000), supra note 2, at 130, citing with approval Sen, A Development As Freedom (1999).

[7] Giddens (2000), supra note 2, at 161-2, citing with approval Held, D Democracy and the Global Order (1995).

[8] See Pierson, C Beyond the Welfare State (1991).

[9] Barkan, supra note 3, at 53.

[10] Therborn, “Welfare States and Capitalist markets” (1987) 30 (3/4) Acta Sociologica 237; Lipietz, A Towards a New Economic Order: Post-Fordism, Ecology and Democracy (1992); and Esping-Andersen, G Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990).

[11] Faux, “Lost on the Third Way”’ (1999) Spring Dissent 75-76.

[12] Reich, “We are all Third Wayers Now” (1999) March/April The American Prospect 46-51.

[13] Giddens, “After the left’s paralysis” New Statesman 1 May 1998.

[14] Dean, H and Melrose, M Poverty, Riches and Social Citizenship (1999) 102-105, citing Jessop, “The transition to Post Fordism and the Schumpetarian workfare state” in Burroughs, R and Loader, B (eds), Towards a Post Fordist Welfare State?(1994); and Gray, “Hollowing Out the Core” The Guardian, 8 March 1995.

[15] Havemann, “Social Citizenship, Re-commodification and the Contract State” in Christodoulidis, E (ed) Communitarianism and Citzenship (1998) 134.

[16] Halpern, supra note 1, cited 25 May 1998.

[17] Giddens (1994), supra note 2.

[18] Giddens (1998) and (2000), supra note 2.

[19] Giddens (1998), supra note 2, at 65-66.

[20] Barkan, supra note 3, at 53.

[21] Ignatieff, “Citizenship and moral narcissism” (1989) 60 (1) Political Quarterly 72; Parry, “Welfare state and Welfare society” (1985) 20(3) Government and Opposition 290; Twine, F Citizenship and Social Rights: The interdependence of self and society (1994); Roche, M Rethinking Citizenship: welfare, ideology and change in modern society (1992).

[22] Giddens (1998), supra note 2, at 65-66.

[23] Giddens (2000), supra note 2, at 52.

[24] Giddens (1994), supra note 2, at 20-21.

[25] Salvati, “The Third Way? A View from Italy” (1999) Spring Dissent 82.

[26] Levitas, “The concept of social exclusion and the new Durkheimian hegemony” (1996) 46, 16(2) Critical Social Policy 7, 19, cited in Dean and Melrose (1999), supra note 14.

[27] See the DFID White Paper on the Elimination of World Poverty: a Challenge for the 21st Century (1997).

[28] Giddens (1994), supra note 2, at 100-102.

[29] See Doyal, L and Gough, I A Theory of Human Need (1991).

[30] Held, D Democracy and the Global Order (1995) 171 and 191-212.

[31] Kenny, T Securing Social Rights Across Europe (1997) exemplifies this approach thoroughly; see especially Hunt, P Reclaiming Social Rights (1997).

[32] Heelas, “On things not being worse and the ethic of humanity” in Heelas, P et al (eds) Detraditionalisation (1996) 200-222; and Robertson, “Mapping the Global condition” in Featherstone, M (ed) Global Culture: nationalism, globalization and modernity (1990) 15-30.

[33] See Steiner, H J and Alston, P (eds) International Human Rights in Context (2000).

[34] UNDP, Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Human Development (1998).