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Business rehabilitation: discussion document. Insolvency Law Review [2002] NZAHGovDP 7 (1 May 2002)
Last Updated: 18 July 2021
Insolvency Law Review
Business Rehabilitation:
Discussion Document
May 2002
ISBN 0-478-24286-7
Table of Contents
SUBMISSIONS 1
Purpose of the Discussion Document 1
Making a Submission 1
Official Information Act and Privacy Act Requirements 2
Disclaimer 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
PART A - BACKGROUND 5
What Is Business Rehabilitation? 5
What Are the Benefits Ascribed to Business Rehabilitation? 5
Business Rehabilitation in Other Jurisdictions 6
Australia 7
The United Kingdom 7
The United States 8
Canada 9
International Trends and Adopting Best Practice 9
Linkages with Statutory Management 10
PART B - SHOULD NEW ZEALAND ADOPT A BUSINESS REHABILITATION
REGIME? 11
Economic Development Policy Objectives 11
Does the Current Law Achieve Business Rehabilitation Outcomes? 11
Description of the Current Law 11
Problems with the Current Legal Regime 13
Rehabilitation v Liquidation 14
PART C - OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED WITH CURRENT NEW
ZEALAND
LAW 17
Problems with the Current Law 17
Options for Addressing Problems Identified 17
Option One - Amendments to Strengthen the Current Law 17
Option Two - Adoption of Business Rehabilitation (Including an Automatic
Stay against Actions of Secured Creditors) 17
Analysis of Options 18
PART D - DESIGN ISSUES 19
Adoption of the Australian Approach 19
Business Rehabilitation Design Issues 20
Safeguards for Creditors 20
Initiation 21
Length of the Stay 22
Procedure on Failure 23
Control of Management 24
Post-Filing Finance 25
Creditor Voting on the Proposal 26
The Qualifying Criteria for Administrators 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY 31
APPENDIX I - THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO BUSINESS REHABILITATION 33
APPENDIX II - AUSTRALIAN QUALIFICATIONS FOR ADMINISTRATORS 37
Submissions
Purpose of the Discussion Document
- This
discussion document has been prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development in
consultation with other government agencies.
The document is the latest public
document on the topic of business rehabilitation, which is one issue that is
being considered as
part of the Government’s review of insolvency
law.
- This
document follows three earlier documents – David Brown’s report to
the Ministry of Economic Development, Corporate Rescue (November 2000);
the Law Commission’s study paper, Insolvency Law Reform: Promoting
Trust and Confidence (May 2001); and an economic review of the Law
Commission’s paper by the consultancy Charles Rivers Associates (Asia
Pacific
Ltd) (June 2001). This document and the three earlier reports are all
available on the Ministry of Economic Development web site
at: www.med.govt.nz/ri/insolvency/review.html.
- Public
consultation on those earlier documents undertaken in 2000/2001 has been
inconclusive. In particular, there was not widespread
support for the targeted
rehabilitation regime outlined in the Law Commission’s paper. The Ministry
therefore considers that
further policy development would be aided by seeking
stakeholders views on possible design options for a new business rehabilitation
regime. This document therefore aims to provide a broad outline of the policy
options available for a possible new business rehabilitation
regime and the
design issues relating to those options.
Making a
Submission
- The
Ministry invites written submissions on the issues and questions raised in this
discussion document from any interested parties.
The closing date for
submissions is Friday, 19 July 2002. After submissions have been
received, they will be evaluated, and further comments as required will be
obtained from submitters
before the Ministry develops recommendations for the
Government to consider on the issue of business rehabilitation.
- Submissions
should be sent either by email in Microsoft Word version 2000 or lower to darren.baars@med.govt.nz, or in
hard copy to:
Business Rehabilitation
Attention: Darren
Baars
Ministry of Economic Development
PO Box
1473
WELLINGTON
Tel: 04-470 2313
Fax: 04-471 2658
Official Information Act and Privacy Act Requirements
- The
contents of submissions provided to the Ministry in response to this discussion
paper will be subject to the provisions of the
Official Information Act 1982 and
the Privacy Act 1993. If the Ministry receives a request for information
contained in a submission,
it would be required to consider release of the
submission, in whole or in part, in terms of the criteria set out in these
Acts.
- In
providing your submission, please advise if you have any objections to the
release of any information contained in your submission,
and if you do not
object, the parts of your submission you would wish withheld and the grounds for
withholding that information.
Disclaimer
- Any
statements made or views expressed in this discussion document are those of the
Ministry of Economic Development and do not reflect
Government policy. Readers
are advised to seek advice from a qualified professional before undertaking any
action in reliance on
the contents of this discussion paper. While every effort
has been taken to ensure that the information set out in this paper is
accurate,
the Crown does not accept any responsibility whether in contract, tort, equity
or otherwise for any action taken, or reliance
placed on, any part, or all, of
the information in this paper or for any error in or omission from this
paper.
Executive Summary
- The
Ministry’s consultation on business rehabilitation conducted in 2000/2001
was inconclusive. This discussion document seeks
to obtain further and more
precise information from stakeholders so that it can be used as a basis for
providing policy advice to
the Government on the issue of business
rehabilitation.
- This
document is divided into four parts, with the discussion starting at a broad
level and becoming more specific part by part. The
issues discussed in Part C
and Part D are predicated on certain answers being given to questions raised
earlier in the paper. This
approach is being used in an attempt to gain
information about specific issues that we anticipate would need to be addressed
if the
Government agreed that New Zealand should adopt a new approach to
business rehabilitation.
- Part
A and Part B of the paper describe:
- the nature of
business rehabilitation;
- the main reasons
for and against having rehabilitation processes;
- the problems
with the existing New Zealand law; and
- business
rehabilitation in other jurisdictions.
- Part
B concludes that New Zealand’s business rehabilitation law is rarely used
and seems to serve little real purpose either
in terms of salvaging businesses
that are essentially sound, but may have got into difficulties, or increasing
returns to creditors.
- Part
C identifies and discusses two options for dealing with the substantive and
procedural issues with the New Zealand law as identified
in Part B.
- Option
One is a modified status quo, outlining changes that could be made to encourage
the use of the existing regime. In particular,
it canvasses the possibility of
introducing an automatic stay on debt recovery measures that binds unsecured
creditors.
- Option
Two canvasses the possibility of introducing a voluntary administration regime
modelled on the Australian law. The key feature
of this option is the inclusion
of a stay that binds all creditors.
- The
main disadvantage associated with Option One is that it may not be that
effective in addressing the objectives of business rehabilitation.
In many
instances of business insolvency there is often little, if anything, to be
distributed among unsecured creditors. Hence,
the automatic stay may simply have
the effect of delaying formal insolvency rather than being a more accessible
pathway towards business
rehabilitation.
- Option
Two may provide a way of promoting business rehabilitation in a much wider range
of circumstances. The main benefit of a rehabilitation
regime with a stay that
binds all creditors (including secured creditors) is that it could allow
economically
viable businesses to continue rather than liquidate,
thereby increasing overall returns to creditors in those cases. The other
benefits
of business rehabilitation are that it could:
- Preserve value
in the business as a going concern for all stakeholders including creditors,
employees, suppliers and owners;
- Minimise the
loss for those who deal with the insolvent business in having to
re‑establish business relationships with another
entity, e.g. employees,
creditors and suppliers;
- Reduce the
number of formal insolvencies and associated costs e.g. voidable transactions
and the disposal of assets; and
- Force reluctant
debtors and creditors to communicate and explore whether rehabilitation of the
business will maximise returns to creditors.
- The
risks associated with a rehabilitation procedure that binds all creditors are
that it could be used:
To impede the business failure element of the
dynamic process of business creation;
By debtors to defeat the legitimate interests of creditors;
By unsecured creditors at the expense of secured creditors. The paper
identifies possible ways of mitigating these risks.
- Part
D of the paper is based on the assumption that if a new approach to business
rehabilitation is warranted then the Australian
voluntary administration regime
is likely to be the preferred model. It identifies a number of design issues,
describes how Australia
deals with each of those issues and considers whether
there are reasons for departing from the Australian
approach.
Part A - Background What Is Business
Rehabilitation?
- In
its widest sense, a business rehabilitation regime provides an alternative to
liquidation under which a debtor company or individual
can enter into a binding
compromise or arrangement with its creditors and keep trading, with a view to
maximising returns to creditors.
- In
its advisory report to the Ministry of Economic Development, Insolvency Law
Reform: Promoting Trust and Confidence, the Law Commission noted, from the
work of the United Nations Commission on International Law (UNCITRAL)
that:
“(business rehabilitation) schemes in other
jurisdictions typically contain the following elements:
- Voluntary
submission by an entity to the process, which may or may not involve judicial
proceedings and judicial control or supervision;
- Automatic and
mandatory stay or suspension of actions and proceedings against the property of
the entity affecting all creditors for
a limited period of time;
- Continuation of
the business, either by existing management, an independent manager or a
combination of both;
- Formulation of a
plan which proposes the manner in which creditors, equity holders and the entity
itself will be treated;
- Possibly the
judicial sanction of an accepted plan; and
- Implementation
of a plan."1
- Many
different terms are used to describe the general concept of a process of either
rehabilitating or putting together a plan to
rehabilitate a business entity.
These include “corporate rescue”, “corporate
rehabilitation”, “voluntary
administration”, “business
re-construction” and “company re-organisation”. For the
purpose of consistency
and to avoid confusion the term used throughout this
paper to describe the general concept of a legislative rescue regime for
companies
is business rehabilitation. Otherwise, all mechanisms that
currently exist in New Zealand and in other jurisdictions are referred to by
their actual name.
What Are the Benefits Ascribed to Business
Rehabilitation?
- There
are a number of potential benefits of having a regime that facilitates the
continuation of a business rather than its liquidation.
These
include:
1 New Zealand Law Commission. Insolvency Law
Reform: Promoting Trust and Confidence. NZLC SP11 (Wellington: New Zealand
Law Commission, 2001), paragraph 183.
The preservation of the economic value of the company as a going concern for
all stakeholders in that business;
Minimising the loss for creditors, including employees, and others who deal
with the insolvent company from having to re-establish
relationships with
another entity; and
A business rehabilitation procedure can also provide for a more measured
distribution of the assets of a company if it does eventually
fail, thereby
increasing returns to all creditors.
- There
are, however, also potential costs associated with such a regime. These
include:
An increase in the cost of credit as a result of the
inability of creditors to enforce contractual rights during a stay on
proceedings
against the company;
The cost of allowing a company to trade on which, in some cases, may further
erode its value; and
The financial costs to the company of the administration of a business
rehabilitation procedure.
- Most
international research concerned with business rehabilitation focuses on the use
of regimes and levels of returns to creditors.
These studies indicate that
creditors receive a range of levels of returns under business rehabilitation. In
Australia for example,
empirical studies provide evidence that eventual returns
to creditors after voluntary administration are slightly higher than returns
after company wind-ups. These Australian studies suggest that voluntary
administration produced an average return to creditors of
between 21.5% to 10%
compared to the average return of 7.35% in wind-ups.2
- The
design of a business rehabilitation procedure can act to maximise the instances
where, in relation to particular companies, the
benefits of rehabilitation will
outweigh the costs involved. The discussion of options and design features for a
business rehabilitation
regime presented later in this paper includes
consideration of the extent to which those features identified could maximise
the benefits
and minimise the costs of a regime.
Business
Rehabilitation in Other Jurisdictions
- Business
rehabilitation regimes have been previously adopted in a number of other
developed countries. In recent years there has been
a growing international
trend towards countries reviewing the effectiveness of their existing business
rehabilitation procedures
and adopting new regimes.
2
These studies are discussed in S. McColl, "Voluntary Administrations: How Well
Are They Working?" Australian Journal of Corporate Law, LEXIS 2 (2001):
23-24.
Australia
- In
1992 Australia introduced a voluntary administration procedure in its Corporate
Law Reform Act 1992. Until 1992 there had been a rescue procedure known as
“official management”, which required a high threshold of proof
that
the company could be rescued.
- Administration
is “voluntary” in Australia since it is the company or its directors
that usually initiates the procedure.
The procedure does not require any initial
court hearing. Secured creditors with charges over all, or substantially all, of
the assets
may initiate appointment of an Administrator. An automatic stay of 21
or 28 days is imposed and the company is placed in the hands
of a qualified
administrator who must be a registered state-licensed liquidator. The Australian
voluntary administration procedure
is explained in more detail in Appendix I,
Appendix II and Part D of this paper.
The United Kingdom
- In
1985 the United Kingdom made provision for two forms of rescue procedure, which
are interrelated. Following the Cork report in
1982, an administration order was
conceived as filling the gap where there was no secured creditor with power to
appoint a receiver
over all or most of the company’s undertaking.
Receivers were generally seen to be doing a good job in ensuring survival or
sale of viable businesses as going concerns, however the duties of such
receivers were slightly increased in 1985 to make them more
accountable to
general creditors.
- In
the United Kingdom the administration order is a court order which can be made
on various grounds, by petition of the directors,
the company or creditors (in
most cases). In addition to satisfying the court that the company is, or is
nearly, insolvent, it has
to be demonstrated that one or more of four purposes
would be served by the order. One purpose relates to the other new procedure
introduced in 1985, the “Company Voluntary Arrangement” (CVA). This
was conceived as a simple form of compromise procedure
whereby a debtor company
could put a proposal to creditors, supervised by an independent practitioner who
would report to court on
the viability of the proposal. The other purposes of an
administration order are the survival of the company as a going concern,
an
“old style” court sanctioned composition or arrangement and lastly,
if it can be shown that there is likely to be
a better realisation of assets
than if a liquidation occurred.
- The
CVA is very similar to Part XIV of the New Zealand Companies Act 1993, though
without the need for class meetings. However, unlike the procedure introduced at
the
same time for individuals in the United Kingdom, the CVA does not have a
moratorium against creditor action attached to it.
- Within
the United Kingdom legislation the court has discretion whether or not to make
an administration order, and will expect a report
by an independent insolvency
practitioner (usually the proposed administrator) to be filed. A person entitled
to appoint a receiver
who would have control over all or most of the
company’s assets can effectively “veto” the administrators
appointment
by appointing a receiver in a five day decision period, similar to
the ten day period in Australia. The moratorium imposed from the
time of an
administration petition is quite large compared to that
on
liquidation, extending to all proceedings, enforcement of
security and other legal processes. However, it is not as wide as the moratorium
in the United States (see below).
The United States
- The
United States formal rescue procedure contained in Chapter 11 of the Federal
United States Bankruptcy Code is the oldest of the
formal rescue regimes
discussed here, being enacted in 1978. Chapter 11 has now become the major
insolvency procedure in preference
to Chapter 7 liquidation (there are various
specific procedures under other Chapters for agricultural industry and
municipalities
for example). Chapter 11 filings at court trigger an extremely
wide automatic stay under Section 362 of the Code. The conversion
process
between reorganisation and liquidation proceedings is relatively
straightforward, unlike in jurisdictions such as the United
Kingdom. In
practice, most Chapter 11 filings are voluntary.
- The
distinguishing feature of Chapter 11 over many English-speaking
jurisdictions’ procedures, other than Canada, is that there
is no
automatic appointment of a professional “outsider” to any management
role. The company retains control and management
functions, subject to a raft of
duties and powers which distinguish it from the corporate entity pre-filing. The
powers include the
ability to challenge preferences and unperfected security
interests. The duties are fiduciary in nature. The court must sanction
any
disposals outside the ordinary course of business. In addition, there is
provision for the appointment of a trustee and/or an
examiner by the court, but
this is rare, such as in cases of fraud. The examiner would usually be appointed
at the request of creditors
to conduct an investigation as to the viability of
reorganisation, or where the assets are over $5 million, but the functions of
the examiner are largely at the discretion of the court.
- Within
the United States regime there is no requirement that an entity
be
insolvent for Chapter 11 to be initiated, so that the automatic
moratorium triggered by filing can be used tactically. However, it
has to be
borne in mind that in some cases filing for reorganisation may be a genuine
attempt to deal with anticipated insolvency
and might follow from a major
philosophical commitment to the concept of “fresh start” which seems
to extend to corporate
as well as individual debtors, and to pre‑date the
1978 reforms. This means that once a debtor files, the wide moratorium protects
the debtor from almost any creditor action for a relatively lengthy
“exclusivity period” of 120 days during which the
debtor is supposed
to put together a reorganisation plan. The court may extend this period of
exclusivity.
- In
the United States regime the debtor must put any reorganisation proposal to
class meetings of creditors, so that all classes of
creditors whose rights have
been impaired by the proposal get a chance to vote. The debtor generally has at
least 60 days after the
120 day period in which to negotiate. Dissenting classes
after voting can be “crammed down”, in other words bound by
the
scheme despite voting against it. However, this happens rarely in practice. In
addition, the plan has to be approved by the court,
which applies a number of
fairness criteria and has to be satisfied that the scheme is
“feasible” and that individuals
who dissent will receive at least as
much as they would on a liquidation.
Canada
- Along
with Australia, Canada has passed legislation designed to avoid most of the
problems of delay and abuse possible under Chapter
11 in the United States, yet
avoiding the costs involved in the United Kingdom approach.
- The
main features of the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act procedure are that a
debtor may file either a proposal for a reorganisation
(for example if the
company is already in receivership), or a notice of mere intention to file one
(creditors cannot file for a debtors
reorganisation, unlike in the United
Kingdom and Australia). A wide moratorium against creditor action is triggered
for an initial
30 day period. However, a trustee has to attest to creditors the
accuracy of the debtors cash flow projections. The trustee’s
role is
deliberately “light-handed”, though he must report to the official
receiver any “material adverse change”
since the original filing.
The court is not involved in initiation of the procedure, but where more than
light monitoring is required,
may be involved in defining the trustee’s
powers that can be quite wide.
- In
the Canadian regime there is a very strict timetable during which the debtor
must effect a proposal and, if it is not approved
by creditors, automatic
liquidation follows. While there is some judicial flexibility for extensions of
the moratorium period, there
is a maximum cumulative period beyond which the
court cannot go under any circumstances.
- Unlike
the situation in the United Kingdom and Australia, in Canada a secured creditor
who wishes to appoint a receiver over all or
most of the company’s
business and assets, must give the debtor company ten days notice, during which
time the company can
file for protection. If the charge holder is genuinely
concerned that assets may disappear in that time, it can apply to the court
for
the appointment of an interim receiver to safeguard the
assets.
International Trends and Adopting Best Practice
- As
previously stated, there has been an increasing trend internationally towards
countries reviewing and modifying their existing
business rehabilitation regimes
or adopting new regimes. The 1998 financial crisis in South-East Asia has, with
the assistance and
encouragement of organisations such as the World Bank and
UNCITRAL (the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), triggered
the review and development of insolvency laws in many jurisdictions.
- As
can be seen from the discussion above, the business rehabilitation regimes of
other countries are all in different stages of development,
with arguably the
best developed regimes being those of Canada and Australia.
- If
New Zealand is to review its current business rehabilitation laws and develop a
new regime, then it is important that the new regime
conforms to international
best practice in the area. This is because overseas investors may be deterred
from investing in New Zealand
if they perceive differences between New
Zealand’s business rehabilitation regime and that of other jurisdictions.
Co-ordinating
with the Australian approach to business rehabilitation would also
mean that it would be easier and less costly to conduct rehabilitations
for the
growing number of businesses that operate on both sides of the
Tasman.
Linkages with Statutory Management
- Stakeholders
have previously noted the linkages between business rehabilitation and the
existing statutory management procedures contained
in the Corporations
(Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (the "CIMA").
- These
existing statutory management procedures enable the Governor General in Council
to replace the management of a company with
a statutory manager in certain
situations. Currently, the statutory management procedure is commenced by Order
in Council on the
advice of the Minister of Commerce. The Minister can only do
this on the recommendation of the Securities Commission. In practice,
decisions
are normally made on the recommendation of the Securities Commission following
an investigation by the Registrar of Companies.
- The
Securities Commission may recommend that a corporation be placed in statutory
management:3
To preserve the interests of stakeholders,
creditors, beneficiaries, or the public interest;
- To enable the
corporation’s affairs to be dealt with more quickly or in a more orderly
way; or
- If they believe
that the corporation was acting fraudulently or recklessly.
- The
CIMA only applies where the public interest or the interests of members,
creditors or beneficiaries of a corporation cannot be
protected under the
Companies Act 1993 or in any other lawful way.4
- Statutory
managers are granted wide powers under the CIMA to manage the corporation and an
extensive moratorium is imposed on claims
against the corporation.
- If
a new business rehabilitation regime were introduced, the potential scope of the
application of statutory management will be arguably
reduced because there would
be an extension of member, creditor and beneficiary interests under the
Companies Act in accordance with
section 4 of the
CIMA.
3 Section 4 of the Corporations
(Investigation and Management) Act 1989.
4 Ibid.
Part B - Should New Zealand Adopt a Business Rehabilitation
Regime?
Economic Development Policy Objectives
- In
February 2002 the Government released its policy framework for economic
transformation in New Zealand - Growing an Innovative New Zealand. This
framework forms the broader policy context in which the Government will consider
the possibility of New Zealand adopting a
new business rehabilitation
regime.
- Growing
an Innovative New Zealand states that the next phase of New Zealand’s
economic development must be characterised by innovation. We must become a
nation
known internationally for our innovation, our creativity, our skills and
our lifestyle. In order to fulfil this objective the Government
is committed to
working in all parts of the economy. Growing an Innovative New Zealand
states that the Government intends to continue giving priority to
maintaining the integrity of the economy by ensuring:
- A stable
macroeconomic framework;
- An open and
competitive microeconomy;
By improving the conditions for New
Zealand businesses, including reducing compliance costs.
By providing programmes to help businesses grow.
- A
new business rehabilitation regime could arguably assist in the Government
meeting these objectives by providing an opportunity
for some businesses verging
on insolvency to develop a plan to trade on, rather than liquidate. Business
rehabilitation could therefore
in some instances improve the overall operating
environment for New Zealand businesses and could enable New Zealand business to
grow
and be internationally competitive. This would have social and economic
benefits and would foster economic development.
Does the Current
Law Achieve Business Rehabilitation Outcomes?
Description of the Current Law
- Part
XIV (Compromises with Creditors) and Part XV (Approval of Arrangements,
Amalgamations, and Compromises by Court) of the Companies
Act 1993 allow
companies to enter into agreements with their creditors (including the
continuation of businesses) as an alternative
to liquidation. These legislative
provisions form New Zealand’s current business rehabilitation
regime.
Part XIV of the Companies Act 1993 (Compromises with
Creditors)
- The
major corporate rehabilitation procedure in New Zealand is contained in Part XIV
of the Companies Act 1993. The key elements of
the current business
rehabilitation regime set out in Part XIV of the Companies Act
are:
Either a company’s directors, its receiver or liquidator,
or a shareholder or creditor of the company (with leave of the Court)
may
propose a compromise between a company and its creditors;
The proponent of the compromise must call a meeting and provide detailed
information to the creditors about the proposal and its effect.
Pending the
meeting there is no automatic stay, although one may be sought from the Court.
Such a stay cannot be ordered against
secured creditors and is only available
from a date that is not earlier than the date on which the notice of the
proposed compromise
was given, and not later than 10 working days after the date
on which notice was given of the result of the voting on it. No stay
can be
obtained to enable a proposal to be prepared;
If different classes of creditors have different interests, it is usually
necessary to hold separate meetings for each class; and
A compromise is binding on all creditors (including secured creditors) that
received notice of the proposal if 75 percent at each
meeting vote in favour
(unless there is provision in the compromise for classes of creditors to be
separately bound). There is no
need for the Court to approve the compromise,
however, a creditor may apply to the Court for relief on certain prescribed
grounds
(insufficient notice, irregularity in obtaining approval, unfair
prejudice).
Part XV of the Companies Act 1993
- Part
XV of the Companies Act 1993 permits an application to be made directly to the
Court by the company, a shareholder, or a creditor
for an order that a
compromise is binding on the company and “on such other persons ... as the
Court may specify ... on such
terms ... as the Court thinks
fit.”5 The legislation gives no further direction as to how the
Court should exercise its direction, though some guidelines have been developed
through subsequent case law.
- Part
XV gives the Court power to make initial orders regarding the provision of
information and reports to shareholders and the calling
of meetings. It is
usually appropriate for such orders to be made before considering whether a
final order should be made.
Receiverships
- A
receiver may be appointed in respect of the property of a person by, or in the
exercise of a power conferred by, a deed or an agreement
to which that person is
a
5 Section 236(1) of the Companies Act 1993.
party. The receiver acts primarily in the interests of the creditor who
appointed him/her. Their purpose is not to act in the collective
interests of
creditors.
- Receivership
can work as a rescue procedure where it is in the interests of a debenture
holder to maintain the business as a going
concern. The receiver acts to recover
debenture holders debt as quickly and expeditiously as possible at lowest cost.
Once this is
done the receiver’s role is complete. Post-receivership the
debtor is often on the brink of liquidation, so in effect, receivership
asserts
the interests of the debenture holder above those of other
creditors.
Problems with the Current Legal Regime
Individual v Collective Creditors’ Interests
- The
lack of an easily initiated stay on all debt recovery measures effectively
inhibits business rehabilitation except in those few
cases where all parties
agree. This means there are situations where a minority of creditors, in seeking
to recover their debts,
can put their interests ahead of the majority. These
creditors do not factor the external cost or loss of value to creditors overall
of not continuing the business as a going concern, in part or as a whole, into
their decision to proceed with individual debt recovery.
High
Transaction Costs
- The
Part XIV procedure has not been greatly used.6 Anecdotal evidence
suggests it is not well understood and, in the absence of an automatic stay,
rehabilitation may be defeated by
the high cost of defending actions by
creditors pre-proposal.
- The
transaction costs associated with the current procedures include not only the
costs of a proceeding, but also the costs incurred
by the promoter of a proposal
in defending the debtor business against actions by individual creditors seeking
to recover their debts.
The expense of seeking to have statutory demands set
aside will often be enough to deter an individual creditor from acting for the
collective benefit of all creditors and seeking rehabilitation. Stakeholders
have previously noted current use of the statutory demand
process in this way,
especially in the case of SMEs (Small to Medium Size Enterprises) with a large
number of unsecured creditors.
Problems with Part XV Companies
Act
- The
main reasons why the current procedure in Part XV of the Companies Act 1993 is
used infrequently appear to be:
The need to apply to the Court for a
stay (thereby imposing costs and time delays);
A stay is only available once a proposal is developed and distributed;
6 New Zealand Law Commission. Insolvency Law Reform: Promoting
Trust and Confidence, paragraph 196.
A stay cannot bind secured creditors.
64. At present, a stay is only available from the date the notice of the
proposed compromise was given. Where it would be the most
effective would be
during the period where the proposal is being developed.
Questions for Submissions
- Do
you agree with this assessment of the problems with the current Companies Act
provisions?
- Can
you identify any other problems with the current business rehabilitation regime
not covered in this section?
Rehabilitation v Liquidation
65. Business rehabilitation law is about minimising the costs of
failure.7 The key issue regarding business rehabilitation in New
Zealand is whether, in the absence of an informal workout between the concerned
parties, the current insolvency law regime provides a viable alternative to
liquidation for a failed business.
66. As noted above, the lack of a general stay on all debt recovery measures
effectively inhibits business rehabilitation under the
current legislative
procedures except in those few cases where all parties agree. Therefore, in
effect, the current legislation promotes
liquidation.
67. The advantages of a regime which favours liquidation are that it:
- Encourages
individual creditors to monitor debtors and to act early when repayment issues
arise;
- Encourages the
movement of resources from poorly performing management and firms to more
efficient firms; and
- Is in many cases
shorter, administratively cheaper and simpler than
rehabilitation.
68. The main benefit of a rehabilitation regime with
a stay or moratorium that binds all creditors (including secured creditors) is
that it could allow economically viable businesses to continue rather than
liquidate, thereby increasing overall returns to creditors
in those cases. The
other benefits of rehabilitation are that it could:
- Preserve value
in the business as a going concern for all stakeholders including creditors,
employees, suppliers and owners;
7 David Brown,
Corporate Rescue: Report for the Ministry of Economic Development
(Wellington: Ministry of Economic Development, 2000), 5.
Minimise the loss for those who deal with the insolvent business in having to
re‑establish business relationships with another
entity, e.g. employees,
creditors and suppliers;
- Reduce the
number of formal insolvencies and associated costs e.g. voidable transactions
and the disposal of assets; and
- Force reluctant
debtors and creditors to communicate and explore whether rehabilitation of the
business will maximise returns to creditors.
Questions for
Submissions
- Do
you consider that the current regime favours liquidation over
rehabilitation?
- Keeping
in mind the Government’s economic development objectives, do you consider
the benefits of favouring liquidation over
rehabilitation outweigh the
costs?
Part C - Options for Addressing Problems Identified with
Current New Zealand Law
Problems with the Current Law
69. The key problems identified in Part A with the current regime can be
summarised as:
Individual creditors’ place their interests ahead of the collective
interests of creditors; and
- There are high
transaction costs involved in using the current regime.
Options
for Addressing Problems Identified
- This
section discusses two options for addressing these issues: Amendments to
strengthen the current law; and
The adoption of a more comprehensive
business rehabilitation regime, which would include a stay against actions of
secured creditors.
Option One - Amendments to Strengthen the Current Law
- This
option involves retaining the status quo (i.e. no stay against secured
creditors), but introducing an automatic stay against
unsecured creditors.
- Stakeholders
have suggested that Part XIV of the Companies Act 1993 could be strengthened to
reduce opportunities for a creditor minority
to defeat the interests of the
majority. At present the Part XIV moratorium is insufficient to prevent
creditors from taking action
against the debtor to the detriment of creditors
overall. In many instances, it will be too costly to defend these actions. Part
XIV could be amended to include an automatic rather than a court-ordered stay on
actions by unsecured creditors.
Option Two - Adoption of Business
Rehabilitation (Including an Automatic Stay against Actions of Secured
Creditors)
- As
noted above, a regime with a mandatory stay preventing secured creditors from
taking recovery action during the development of
a rehabilitation plan may
maximise returns to all creditors. A stay of this type is likely to result in
greater use of the business
rehabilitation procedure and possibly a higher
percentage of successful rehabilitations of economically viable companies.
- While
the continued use of secured assets is likely to be key to the successful
rehabilitation of a business, secured creditors could
retain the right to reject
a proposal through voting at the completion of the stay. Secured creditors would
also retain the right
to enforce their securities
post-proposal.
Analysis of Options
- Both
options would reduce transaction costs by reducing the need for court
involvement before a stay against actions against the company
can be
implemented.
- The
underpinning assumption of the current law is that where rehabilitation is most
viable and will provide the greatest returns to
creditors, that secured
creditors have both the commercial judgement and incentives to support the
rehabilitation. There is in many
cases an obvious financial incentive for
secured creditors to pursue rehabilitation where an asset realisation is worth
less than
the value of the asset as part of a going concern. In informal
workouts the “buy-in” of secured creditors is critical
to the
success or otherwise of any arrangement, as the realisation of the security may
effectively prevent any possibility of rehabilitation.
The key issue is whether
a legislative stay on secured creditors will result in a greater number of
successful rehabilitations of
economically viable companies and therefore
provide increased returns to creditors.
- The
potential advantage of a stay against actions by secured creditors is that it
could, if implemented properly, reduce the cost
of credit by increasing returns
to all creditors. However, the increased contractual uncertainty faced by
secured creditors may have
the opposite effect on the cost of credit.
Rehabilitation of businesses may, however, be encouraged as debtors and
administrators
will be able to focus on the preparation of a rehabilitation
proposal for creditors knowing that all individual recovery actions
are
stayed.
Questions for Submissions
- Do
you have any evidence or view that affirms or rejects the assumption that under
current New Zealand law creditors will have both
the commercial judgement and
incentives to support rehabilitation where it is most viable?
- Do
you believe that the interests of the business and creditors as a whole
would
be enhanced by introducing a more comprehensive business rehabilitation
regime that includes a stay on secured creditors?
Part D -
Design Issues Adoption of the Australian Approach
- The
Australian approach to business rehabilitation, voluntary administration, is
outlined in Appendix I of this paper. If New Zealand
were to adopt a business
rehabilitation regime which includes an automatic stay against secured
creditors, there are strong reasons
to consider adopting the Australian approach
to business rehabilitation or parts of that approach.
- There
are a significant and increasing number of firms which conduct business on both
sides of the Tasman. As capital markets become
more integrated and as barriers
to the supply of goods and services from New Zealand to Australia and vice versa
are reduced, it
has become more common for firms to have both assets and
creditors in both countries.
- Because
of the increasing incidence of trans-Tasman and international companies and
transactions, and in order to encourage greater
trans-Tasman activity, it is
important that New Zealand has insolvency laws that minimise the transaction
costs for a company operating
in both jurisdictions.8
- Where
a company does operate in both Australia and New Zealand, a rehabilitation
regime that applies in one country and not the other
is unlikely to fully
achieve its objectives. For example:
A creditor is likely to be able
to circumvent the stay by taking action in the other country, thereby preventing
the company from
trading on as a going concern; and
- If the stay in
one country begins at a different time from the stay in the other or ends
earlier, the effective length of stay will
be limited to the period where the
stay is operative in both countries.
82. In recognition of the
benefits of co-ordinating Australian and New Zealand law in this area, the
discussion of design issues in
this paper reflects a presumption in favour of
following the Australian approach, unless there are good reasons to take an
alternative
approach.
Question for Submissions
7. If New Zealand were to adopt a new business rehabilitation regime then
should
we co-ordinate with the Australian voluntary administration procedure? What
further reasons for and against co-ordinating with the
Australian approach can
you think of?
8 This is also consistent with the objectives of the Memorandum of
Understanding on the Co-ordination of Business Law that was signed
between the
New Zealand and Australian Governments in August 2000.
Business Rehabilitation Design Issues
83. The previous section of this paper noted that if New Zealand were to
reform its business rehabilitation regime along the lines
of one of the two
broad options previously stated, then there would be benefits in adopting the
Australian approach. Assuming that
New Zealand might want to reform its business
rehabilitation regime and adopt the Australian approach, the next section of the
paper
identifies the other important issues that would need to be considered in
the design of a business rehabilitation regime and for
each issue:
- Describes the
Australian approach;
- Assesses the
viability of adopting the Australian approach; and
- Considers
whether there are any reasons to adopt an alternative approach. Safeguards
for Creditors
- A
key risk of a stay against secured creditors is the potential for an abuse of
the procedure by the owners and/or the directors of
a business. For example, the
stay might be used to delay an inevitable liquidation with funds and assets
expended or transferred
defeating the interests of creditors. However, the
potential for this can be minimised by certain design features.
- In
Australia, major secured creditors have the ability to enforce their security
within 10 days of the initiation of an administration.9 This prevents
shareholders from using the procedure to defeat the interests of those
creditors.
- The
Court also has the power to make such orders that it thinks fit in relation to a
particular company. For example, if the Court
is satisfied that the
administration should end because provisions of Part 5.3A of the Act are being
abused, it may order the administration
is to end.10 An order may be
made on the application of various interested people, including a creditor. The
Court is also able, on the application
of a creditor or ASIC (the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission), to make any order it thinks necessary to
protect the
interests of a company’s creditors while the company is under
administration.11 In addition, creditors have the ability to apply to
the Court for the removal of an administrator.12
- The
Australian safeguards provide a balance between the interests of an efficient
administration and the interests of secured creditors.
While there was some
initial concern about the ability of major secured creditors to thwart
administration and
9 Section 441A of the Corporations Act
2001.
10 Section 447A of the Corporations Act 2001.
11 Section 447B of the Corporations Act 2001.
12 Section 449B of the Corporations Act 2001.
rescue attempts,13 to date, there appears to be little evidence
that this has occurred. A recent study reported that 80% of the sample companies
in
administration were subject to substantial charges, but that the vast
majority of chargees allowed the administration to proceed.14
- There
are no other features unique to New Zealand that would appear to rebut the
presumption in favour of adopting Australian law
in this
area.
Question for Submissions
8. Do you consider that the Australian safeguards of the interests of
creditors are
sufficient? Would you support the adoption of these safeguards in a New
Zealand business rehabilitation procedure? Why or Why Not?
Initiation
- A
business rehabilitation regime will generally provide for the process to be
initiated in one of two ways:
By filing of notice by a permitted
party (resulting in an automatic stay of proceedings by creditors); or
- By application,
generally, to a court (which will decide on defined criteria whether a stay
should be imposed).
- The
stay will vary accordingly, being either:
Automatic (avoiding
the need for a court application and the attached costs in time and expense);
or
Discretionary (which while more costly, will limit appointment of
incompetent or “friendly” administrators who consciously act in
favour
of the debtor).
- The
Australian voluntary administration procedure is initiated by appointment of an
administrator in one of three ways:15
By a resolution of
the board of a company;16
13 See, for example, K. Lightman, "Voluntary Administration: The
New Wave or the New Waif in Insolvency Law?" Insolvency Law Journal Vol.
2 (1994): 59.
14 J. Routledge, "An Exploratory Empirical Analysis of Pt 5.3A of
the Corporations Law (Voluntary Administration)" Companies and Securities Law
Journal, 4 (1998): 7.
15 Section 435C of the Corporations Act 2001.
16 Section 436A of the Corporations Act 2001.
By the holder of a charge over all or substantially all of the property where
the charge is enforceable;17 or
By a liquidator.18
92. The Australian regime has an automatic stay and does not require court
proceedings to initiate the administration procedure.
93. The initiation of administration in Australia is usually by the company
itself. The ability of the company to initiate the procedure
has two benefits
– it is less costly than a court-initiated procedure and it provides a
mechanism for a company to address
any financial issues itself, providing
incentives for the company to disclose its financial distress at an earlier
point. The key
risk of this approach is a perception that the company is able to
frustrate the interests of creditors by initiating the procedure.
However, as
outlined in paragraphs 86 to 88, other features such as the ability to enforce a
major security or apply to the court
for relief provide some balance
between
the respective rights of creditors and the company.
94. Another issue is whether the initial stay is automatic or discretionary.
Having an automatic stay, as in Australia, would avoid
the cost and time
required for a court application to enter the rehabilitation process and appoint
an administrator. An automatic
stay does, however, increase the likelihood of
abuse by the debtor as the initiation process is easier and the debtor has an
increased
opportunity to appoint a “friendly” administrator. These
same issues are relevant in considering the ability to extend
a stay (see
below).
Questions for Submissions
- Do
you favour appointment of an administrator by a business, creditor or
both?
What are your reasons?
- Do
you consider that the reduced costs associated with an automatic stay outweigh
the benefits of court involvement in the process?
Length of the
Stay
95. The length of the stay against creditor action in Australia is 21 days.
During this time the administrator must prepare a report
for consideration at a
meeting of creditors. However, this period is extended to 28 days if the
administration begins on a day that
is in December or is less than 28 days
before Good Friday. The Court may also extend this period on application made
within the 21
or 28 days (whichever is applicable).19
17 Section 436C of the Corporations Act 2001.
18 Section 436B of the Corporations Act 2001.
19 Section 439A of the Corporations Act 2001.
- The
New Zealand Law Commission has recommended a stay against secured and unsecured
creditors of 14 days, with the ability to extend
the stay for a further 14
days.20 Previously, some stakeholders have suggested that 14 days is
too short a period of time in which to prepare a realistic proposal.
- The
length of a stay should allow, within reason, for any necessary investigation
and assessment by an administrator or other party
to put together a viable
rehabilitation proposal. The period allowed for the length of a stay must
provide a balance between safeguarding
the interests of creditors and providing
adequate time for the debtor business and its administrator to construct a
viable proposal.
- One
issue is that the information available at the initiation of the rehabilitation
procedure to construct a financial profile of
a debtor will vary considerably
from case to case. In many instances, the debtor’s current difficulties
may be attributed to
a history of inadequate accounts and financial statements.
For such reasons there may need to be some flexibility in the regime to
ensure a
genuine assessment can be made of the viability of rehabilitation. This is a
feature of the Australian regime.
Question for
Submissions
11. Can you identify any reasons for departing from the Australian approach
in terms of the length of the stay?
Procedure on Failure
- A
related matter to the length of the stay is to consider what should happen at
the end of the stay period.
- The
Australian voluntary administration procedure provides flexibility for companies
to swap between procedures. At the meeting of
creditors to decide the
company’s future, creditors may resolve that:21
The
company execute a deed of company arrangement; or That the administration should
end; or That the company be wound up.
- One
method to discourage abuse of the rehabilitation process would be to provide for
the automatic liquidation of the debtor if, for
any reason, the proposal were to
fail. At present, under Part XIV of the Companies Act 1993, if creditors do not
approve a proposal the company is presumed to be insolvent. If retained in any
reform,
however, this provision would discourage companies approaching
insolvency to use the regime either at all or at least until the business
was
insolvent. The more incentives there are for debtors to face up to their debts
early the greater the returns to creditors are
likely to be. An alternative
method might be to limit or disallow future
use of the
rehabilitation regime by a business entity or its principals, or to seek court
approval for an alternative action should
the proposal fail.
- As
noted above, the purpose of a stay is to allow for required information to be
gathered and assessed that is not readily available
at the initiation of the
procedure. This same information gap can apply to companies that enter the
liquidation process. It is possible
that during the course of a liquidation
administration an assessment could be made that a company might be able to be
rehabilitated.
- As
in the Australian regime, a reformed New Zealand regime could define the
circumstances in which there could be a conversion from
one process to the other
and whether the stay would be available in such
proceedings.
Question for Submissions
12. Do you consider that there are any good reasons for departing from the
Australian procedure on the failure of an administration,
which allows
flexibility
for a company to swap between procedures at the end of the stay period?
Control of Management
- Another
issue is deciding who should manage the business during the rehabilitation
process.
- In
Australia Division 3 of Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 2001 provides that the
administrator has control of the company’s business, property and affairs.
They may carry on the business
and manage the property and affairs or may
terminate or dispose of any part of the business or property. They are also able
to perform
any function or exercise any power an officer of the company could
perform.
- While
a company is under administration within the Australian regime a person cannot
perform or exercise, or purport to perform or
exercise a function or power, as
an officer of the company except with the administrator’s written
approval.22 Generally, only the administrator is able to deal with a
company’s property.23
- An
alternative approach is that the existing management could be completely
replaced by a team of professional managers who are either
representatives of
the creditors or fully independent. While this would prevent any possible abuse
of the rehabilitation procedure
by the original directors there is a risk of a
loss in efficiency as the new management take time and incur costs in becoming
familiar
with the business. On the other hand, if the business is insolvent this
could be regarded as an indication that existing management
are not up to the
task. Proof of fraud by directors will also prevent their involvement in any
rehabilitation process.
22 Section 437C Corporations Act
2001.
23 Section 437D Corporations Act 2001.
- The
benefits of the Australian regime include that the existing management will be
able to run the day to day business in the short
term in the most cost-effective
manner. However, it also provides for supervision and decision-making by an
external party to prevent
the potential for further losses by the company as a
result of non-performing management.
Question for
Submissions
13. Can you identify any reasons to depart from the Australian regime in
respect of control of management? In particular, do you consider
this regime
creates the right balance between the continuing efficient operation of the
business and the prevention of further losses
to the company?
Post-Filing Finance
- A
related issue to the control of management is financing of the business during
the period of the stay.
- Under
the Australian regime, Schedule 8A of the Corporations Regulations 1990 sets out
provisions that must be included in a deed
of company arrangement. These
provisions include an express power for the administrator, for the purpose of
administering the deed,
to borrow or raise money, whether secured or unsecured,
for any period on such terms as the administrator thinks fit. The effect
of this
provision is to allow the administrator to secure finance for the purpose of
administering the provisions of the deed. As
the administrator is able to obtain
secured finance, the repayment of this debt would take priority over unsecured
creditors.
- In
addition, an administrator is expressly able to perform any function and
exercise any power that the company or any of its officers
could perform or
exercise if the company were not under administration.24 This allows
an administrator access to the company’s existing finances.
- The
New Zealand Law Commission has proposed that management be prohibited from using
existing company finances during the stay.25 The Law
Commission’s proposed regime would therefore require new capital to be
provided for the continuation of the business.
- Prohibiting
any use of existing finances may prevent any further losses to creditors but is
likely limit the company’s rehabilitation
potential and therefore inhibit
the use of the regime. This may be overcome by giving post-filing finance a
special priority, although
this is likely to have an effect on the cost of
credit if the repayment of the new finance is given priority over existing
secured
creditors.
Question for Submissions
14. Do you consider that there are any good reasons to depart from the
Australian approach to post-filing finance and use of existing
company
funds?
Creditor Voting on the Proposal
- The
assumption in this paper is that a business rehabilitation regime provides a
“breathing space” to allow a proposal
to be formulated and then
presented to creditors for their approval. Creditors would be required to
approve the rehabilitation proposal
before it becomes binding.
- In
the Australian voluntary administration regime, the voting procedure at
creditors’ meetings is set out in the Australian
Corporations Regulations.
The voting procedure used is the same as for company wind-ups under the
Corporations Act 2001. Voting is generally decided on a majority of voices by
declaration of the chairperson, unless a poll is required by the chairperson,
by
at least two creditors or by a creditor with more than 10% of the voting
rights.26 If a poll has been demanded, a resolution will be carried
if:27
A majority of the creditors voting vote in favour;
and
The value of the debts owed by the corporation to those voting in favour of
the
resolution is more than half the total debts owed to all the creditors
voting.
- The
resolution is not carried if:28
A majority of creditors
voting vote against; and
The value of the debts owed by the corporation is more than half the total
debts owed to all creditors voting.
- Where
there is no clear outcome the chairperson has a casting vote.29
- The
New Zealand Law Commission has recommended the requisite majorities currently
used in Part XIV of the Companies Act 1993 (75% of creditors attending a
creditors meeting) be retained in a new rehabilitation regime. The Law
Commission
has also suggested the requirements in the current legislation for
voting by different
26 Reg 5.6.19 Australian Corporations
Regulations.
27 Reg 5.6.21 Australian Corporations Regulations.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
classes be removed.30 Of relevance will be which creditors are
bound by the procedure and therefore which creditors, if any, are excluded from
voting.
- A
clear and simple voting procedure could attract a debtor to use the
rehabilitation regime and encourage creditors to participate
in the regime. In
setting voting requirements, a balance needs to be found between the need to
protect the collective interests of
creditors and protecting those interests to
such an extent that the regime will be unworkable.
- The
Australian voting provisions apply to all insolvency proceedings. These
provisions differ from current New Zealand insolvency
voting provisions.
However, the existence of differing voting requirements in New Zealand and
Australia would cause practical problems
in the event of a trans-Tasman
administration and could preclude the operation of any mutual recognition
regime.
Question for Submissions
15. Do you consider that the advantages of adopting voting provisions similar
to Australian provisions outweigh the potential costs,
which could include
inconsistency with other New Zealand insolvency provisions?
The Qualifying Criteria for Administrators
- An
issue that would need to be considered in the design of a new business
rehabilitation regime is the possible introduction of criteria
for the
qualification of administrators.
- The
Australian regime requires the appointment of an independent administrator to
undertake key duties following the initiation of
the procedure. Under Division
14 of Part 5.3A of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 an administrator
must:
Consent to being appointed; Be a registered liquidator;
and
iii. Not fall within a specified category of people that have a relationship
with the
company.
- The
individuals included under (iii) include:
A person who is indebted
to the company or related company by more than $5,000;
- A creditor of
the company or related company in an amount exceeding $5,000;
- An officer of
the company or a partner, employer or employee of an
officer;
30 See New Zealand Law Commission. Insolvency
Law Reform: Promoting Trust and Confidence.
An auditor of the company or partner or employee of an auditor; and
An officer of a body corporate that is a mortgagee of property of the
company.
- Registration
as a liquidator in Australia is governed by Part 9.2 of the Corporations Act
2001. Generally, the requirements include prescribed educational achievements
and at least five years relevant experience. These requirements
are set out more
fully in Appendix II.
- Currently
New Zealand has no occupational regulation of liquidators. There may, however,
be a greater case for adoption of occupational
regulation for administrators,
given that they would have a more active role in the management of a company.
There are various options
for addressing these concerns, such as legislative
prohibitions on administrators who have relationship with the company and the
ability for creditors to replace an administrator.
- If
New Zealand were to adopt qualifying criteria for administrators as part of a
new business rehabilitation regime, then there may
be benefits in adopting
qualifying criteria similar to, or the same as, the Australian criteria outlined
above. Under the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Act 1997, adoption of these
criteria would mean that New Zealand administrators would be eligible to
undertake administrations in Australia
and vice versa. This could increase the
pool of available skilled and experienced administrators available in both
countries. It
should be noted, however, that New Zealand insolvency
practitioners are currently entitled to gain an Australian registration,
provided
they meet the Australian criteria.
- There
are also potential costs with implementing an occupational regulation regime for
administrators similar to that in Australia.
These include the concern that it
could present a barrier to entry into the profession which would limit
competition and therefore
increase administrator’s fees. This would make
the procedure more expensive and therefore less accessible for smaller
businesses.
Questions for Submissions
- Do
you think that criteria similar to that in Australia for regulation of
administrators would be required in New Zealand for the
effective functioning of
a business rehabilitation regime ? In particular, can you identify any
particular risks associated with
having less regulated administrators involved
in the management of a company under registration?
- Do
you think that the benefits identified of co-ordination with Australia in this
area would outweigh the additional costs for New
Zealand administrators and
businesses wanting to use the procedure?
Summary of Questions
Questions for Submissions
- Do
you agree with this assessment of the problems with the current Companies Act
provisions?
- Can
you identify any other problems with the current business
rehabilitation
regime not covered in this section?
- Do
you consider that the current regime favours liquidation over
rehabilitation?
- Keeping
in mind the Government’s economic development objectives, do you consider
the benefits of favouring liquidation over
rehabilitation outweigh the
costs?
- Do
you have any evidence or view that affirms or rejects the assumption that under
current New Zealand law creditors will have both
the commercial judgement and
incentives to support rehabilitation where it is most viable?
- Do
you believe that the interests of the business and creditors as a whole
would
be enhanced by introducing a more comprehensive business rehabilitation
regime that includes a stay on secured creditors?
- If
New Zealand were to adopt a new business rehabilitation regime then should
we
co-ordinate with the Australian voluntary administration procedure? What further
reasons for and against co-ordinating with the
Australian approach can you think
of?
- Do
you consider that the Australian safeguards of the interests of creditors
are
sufficient? Would you support the adoption of these safeguards in a New
Zealand business rehabilitation procedure? Why or Why Not?
- Do
you favour appointment of an administrator by a business, creditor or
both?
What are your reasons?
- Do
you consider that the reduced costs associated with an automatic stay outweigh
the benefits of court involvement in the process?
- Can
you identify any reasons for departing from the Australian approach in terms of
the length of the stay?
- Do
you consider that there are any good reasons for departing from the Australian
procedure on the failure of an administration, which
allows flexibility for a
company to swap between procedures at the end of the stay period?
- Can
you identify any reasons to depart from the Australian regime in respect of
control of management? In particular, do you consider
this regime creates the
right balance between the continuing efficient operation of the business and the
prevention of further losses
to the company?
- Do
you consider that there are any good reasons to depart from the Australian
approach to post-filing finance and use of existing company
funds?
- Do
you consider that the advantages of adopting voting provisions similar to
Australian provisions outweigh the potential costs, which
could include
inconsistency with other New Zealand insolvency provisions?
- Do
you think that criteria similar to that in Australia for regulation of
administrators would be required in New Zealand for the
effective functioning of
a business rehabilitation regime? In particular, can you identify any particular
risks associated with having
less regulated administrators involved in the
management of a company under registration?
- Do
you think that the benefits identified of co-ordination with Australia in this
area would outweigh the additional costs for New
Zealand administrators and
businesses wanting to use the procedure?
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Administration: Final Report. Sydney: Companies and Securities Advisory
Committee, 1998.
Lightman, Kylie. "Voluntary Administration: The New Wave or the New Waif in
Insolvency Law?" Insolvency Law Journal 2 (1994): 59.
McColl, Sandra. "Voluntary Administrations: How Well Are They Working?"
Australian Journal of Corporate Law, LEXIS 2 (2001).
New Zealand Law Commission. Insolvency Law Reform: Promoting Trust and
Confidence. Advisory Report to the Ministry of Economic Development. Law
Commission Study Paper 11. Wellington: New Zealand Law Commission,
2001.
Routledge, J. "An Exploratory Empirical Analysis of Pt 5.3A of the
Corporations Law (Voluntary Administration)," Companies and Securities Law
Journal, 4 (1998): 7.
Appendix I - The Australian Approach to Business Rehabilitation
The Australian voluntary administration procedure applies to any insolvent
company registered under the Corporations Act 2001. The procedure was designed
to encourage greater use of company re-organisation as opposed to winding-up.
One of the reasons it had
been suggested that companies were not using the
previous re‑organisation procedures was because they were seen as being
expensive,
inflexible and cumbersome. This made re-organisation inefficient,
particularly for smaller companies. The current Australian procedure
was
designed with the aim that it would be:
Capable of swift implementation;
As uncomplicated and inexpensive as possible; and
Flexible, providing alternative forms of dealing with the financial affairs
of the company.31
The Australian voluntary administration regime has been in operation since
mid 1993. Voluntary administration is initiated by appointment
of an
administrator in one of three ways:
By a resolution of the board of a company (s 436A);
By a chargee over all or substantially all of the property where the charge
is enforceable (s 436C); or
Once appointed, the administrator has control of the
company’s business, property and affairs and acts as the company’s
agent (s 437B). During that period, its officers cannot exercise any function,
except with the administrator’s written approval (s 437D).
The administrator must notify a chargee whose charge relates to all or
substantially all of the property of a company of their appointment.
The chargee
is then permitted to enforce the charge within 10 business days of the
administrator’s appointment (s 441A).
When a company is under administration, there is a stay on actions against
the company and its property. This applies to:
- Secured
creditors (with limited exceptions) (s 440B);
31
Australian Law Reform Commission. General Insolvency Inquiry. Report 45.
(Sydney: Australian Law Reform Commission, 1988).
Owners or lessors of property possessed, used or occupied by the company with
limited exceptions (s 440C); and
Unsecured creditors (s 440D). The stay
prevents:
The company from being wound up voluntarily (s 440A);
Charges from being enforced (s 440B) (except charges over all or
substantially all the property of a company that are enforced within the 10 day
decision period (s 441A), charges where the enforcement action had begun before
the administrator was appointed (s 441B), and charges over perishable property
(s 441C);
An owner or lessor from recovering property which is being used by the
company (s 440C) (except where rights of repossession had already
begun to be
exercised (s 441F), or where the property is perishable (s 441G)); and
Proceedings against the company and any enforcement action in relation to
proceedings already taken (s 440D, 440F).
The administrator must hold a meeting of creditors within 5 days of
appointment (s 436E). At this meeting the creditors decide whether to appoint a
committee of creditors and also have the opportunity to replace the
administrator
with their own appointee (s 436E).
Within 21 days of the appointment of the administrator, the administrator
must convene a meeting of creditors to decide the company’s
future (s
439A). With the notice of the meeting, the administrator must give the creditors
a report about the company’s business, property,
affairs and financial
circumstances. The administrator must also provide a statement setting out his
or her opinion with reasons
on whether it would be in the creditors’
interests for (s 439A):
The company to execute a deed of company arrangement; The administration to
end; or
The company to be wound up.
If a deed of company arrangement is proposed, the report must also include a
statement setting out details of the proposed deed (s 439A).
If the creditors resolve to accept the deed, it must be executed by the
company and the deed administrator (s 444B). The administration ends once the
company becomes subject to the deed. Deeds are administered by the deed
administrator or the company’s
directors (s 435C).
A deed is binding on:
All unsecured creditors of the company (s 444D);
- Secured
creditors who have voted for the deed (s 444D);
- Owners or
lessors of property possessed, used or occupied by the company who have voted
for the deed (s 444D);
- The company (s
444G);
- The
company’s officers and members (s 444G); and
- The deed’s
administrator (s 444G).
The Court may also order that the deed is
binding on secured creditors and owners or lessors of property who did not vote
in favour
of the deed. It can only do so when it is satisfied that for the
creditor to realise or otherwise deal with the security would have
a material
adverse effect on achieving the purposes of the deed, and that the
creditor’s interests will be adequately protected
(s 444D, 444F).
Appendix II - Australian Qualifications for Administrators
Under Part 9.2 of the Corporations Act 2001, ASIC (the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission) must grant an application for registration if:
The applicant is a member of:
- The Institute of
Chartered Accountants in Australia, the Australian Society of Certified
Practising Accountants or any other prescribed
body; or
- They hold a
degree, diploma or certificate from a prescribed university or other prescribed
institution in Australia and have passed
examinations in subjects that the
institution certifies to ASIC to represent a course of study in accountancy of
not less than 3
years duration and in commercial law (including company law) of
not less than 2 years duration; or
- Has other
qualifications and experience that, in the opinion of ASIC, are equivalent to
these; and
ASIC is satisfied as to the experience of the applicant
in connection with the winding up of corporate bodies; and
iii. ASIC is satisfied that the applicant is capable of performing the duties
of a liquidator and is otherwise a fit and proper person
to be registered as a
liquidator.
ASIC Policy Statement 40 sets out the experience criteria applied by ASIC to
satisfy itself as to the experience of the applicant
in connection with the
winding up of bodies corporate. In general, an applicant must:
- Have had at
least five years in public practice;
- Have obtained a
wide range of experience in external corporate administrations under the
direction of an official liquidator for a
continuous period of not less than
three years, including windings up, receiverships, reconstructions and voluntary
administrations;
and
- Have supervised
external corporate administrations on a full-time basis for at least two
consecutive years during the five years immediately
before the date of the
application.
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