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Proposed amendments to the Compulsory Acquisition Provisions of the Takeovers Code. A discussion document [2004] NZAHGovDP 1 (15 December 2004)
Last Updated: 9 July 2020
Ref: 750-000 / #65145
Proposed Amendments
to the Compulsory Acquisition Provisions of the Takeovers
Code
A Discussion Document
Takeovers Panel Level 8, Unisys House 56 The Terrace
PO Box 1171 WELLINGTON
Phone (04) 471 4618
Fax (04) 471 4619
Email
takeovers.panel@takeovers.govt.nz Website www.takeovers.govt.nz
15 December 2004
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
- One
of the Takeovers Panel’s functions, as provided by section 8(1)(a) of the
Takeovers Act 1993, is to keep under review the
law relating to takeovers of
specified companies and to recommend to the Minister of Commerce any changes to
that law that it considers
necessary.
- This
paper relates to the Takeovers Code and contains the Panel’s
recommendations for technical changes to the Code’s
compulsory acquisition
provisions.
- The
Takeovers Code came into force on 1 July 2001. The Panel has been responsible
for the administration of the Code since that time.
- The
Panel is committed to making the Code work and making it work well. The
proposals for amendment to the Code in this discussion
paper relate to rules 56
and 57 of the Code and arise from the Panel’s experience with the Code in
the past year.1
- The
proposed amendments in this discussion paper bring together recommendations for
amendment to the Code published on the Panel’s
website www.takeovers.govt.nz in March and
November 2004. Before making final recommendations to the Minister of Commerce
the Panel is seeking public comment on
the proposed
changes.
- To
provide the greatest level of assistance to the target audience of the main
professional law firms this paper includes proposed
drafting changes to the
Code. These proposals are put forward on the basis that the final responsibility
for drafting any changes
to the Code remains with Parliamentary Counsel
Office.
Date for submissions
- Submissions
on the proposed changes to the Takeovers Code should be sent to the Senior
Executive Officer, Takeovers Panel, PO Box
1171, Wellington or can be emailed to
takeovers.panel@takeovers.govt.nz.
The closing date for submissions is Friday 25 February
2005.
1 The proposals in this paper are additional to the
proposed technical changes put forward by the Panel to the Minister of Commerce
in December 2003. Those proposals are well advanced through the Government
processes but are being held back until the Panel has
reviewed and considered
public comment on the proposals in this paper.
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 56 OF THE CODE
Providing
outstanding shareholders under compulsory acquisition with the ability to choose
the form of consideration they are paid
- The
Panel proposes that rule 56 of the Code be amended to provide outstanding
securityholders with the ability to choose the form
of consideration they will
receive under compulsory acquisition in certain
circumstances.
Proposal
- The
Panel proposes that outstanding securityholders (those who have not accepted a
takeover offer):
(a) in circumstances where a dominant owner has obtained
dominant ownership through a takeover offer; and:
(b) the dominant owner has received acceptances in respect of
more than 50% of the equity securities that were the subject of the
offer;
and
(c) the takeover offer for the voting securities contained more
than one consideration alternative; and
(d) the takeover offer provided that one of the consideration
alternatives was the default consideration alternative in the event
that an
offeree accepting the offer did not indicate which consideration alternative he
or she wished to receive;
would be given the right, when returning their instruments of transfer under
rule 59, to specify which of the consideration alternatives
provided in the
offer they wish to receive in exchange for the securities being compulsorily
acquired.
Rationale for proposed change
- Under
rule 56(1) of the Code, if a person becomes the dominant owner by reason of
acceptances of an offer, and acceptances have been
received in respect of more
than 50% of the class of equity securities under offer, the consideration
payable in respect of equity
securities must be the same as the consideration
provided under the offer for equity securities in the same
class.
- However,
rule 56(3) states that if the offer provides alternative considerations, then
the consideration payable under compulsory
acquisition will be the consideration
payable under the offer if an accepting offeree fails to choose an alternative
or, if no provision
to that effect is included in the offer, is the alternative
consideration containing the greatest cash component.
- It
is open to an offeror to specify alternative considerations under an offer and
to nominate one of those alternatives as the default
consideration in the event
an accepting securityholder does not nominate the alternative it wishes to
receive. There is no requirement
under the Code that each consideration
alternative be in the same form, or have the same value, as long as the offer is
made on the
same terms and provides the same consideration to all
offerees.
The effect of rule 56(3) is that any shareholders whose shares are compulsorily
acquired by the dominant owner will be given the
default alternatives, and will
have no choice in the matter. The outstanding shareholders have no right under
the Code to object
to the consideration.
- This
outcome could be particularly unfair, and is likely to have quite a coercive
effect in any takeover. An offeror, by including
an unattractive and unfair
default consideration alternative in its offer, could effectively force
shareholders to accept a takeover
offer for fear of being compelled to take the
unwanted consideration alternative under compulsory
acquisition.
- The
sentiment of rule 56 is clear. If there is no default consideration specified in
the offer then shareholders whose shares are
compulsorily acquired are to get
the alternative with the greatest cash component. But the practical effect of
the clause is just
the opposite. Offerors can stipulate the least attractive
consideration alternative as being the default consideration and that will
be
the one that they will have to pay under compulsory acquisition, should they
reach that point of dominant ownership and have achieved
50% acceptances of the
equity securities that were under offer in the takeover.
- One
way to ameliorate the problem caused by the present construction of rule 56(3)
would be to require the dominant owner to give
securityholders whose securities
are being compulsorily acquired under rule 56(1) and (2) (i.e. where there is an
offer and acceptances
of the class of securities under offer are over 50%) the
ability, when they return their instruments of transfer under rule 59, to
specify which of the consideration alternatives that were available under the
offer they wished to be paid in exchange for their
securities.
- All
outstanding securityholders in these circumstances would have the opportunity to
stipulate the consideration they wanted to receive
during the compulsory
acquisition process, even if not all choose to exercise that right. Offerees
could no longer use an aspect
of the Code to coerce offerees into accepting an
offer they did not want solely to avoid the undesirable compulsory acquisition
outcome.
- Where
a takeover offer includes consideration alternatives that provide (for the
purpose of determining the final amount to be paid
to accepting shareholders)
for cash scaling or an equivalent adjustment that is dependant on the level of
acceptances, it is important
to ensure that securityholders whose securities are
compulsorily acquired receive the same consideration as those securityholders
who accepted the same alternative under the takeover
offer.
- Without
this there would be an incentive for shareholders not to accept an offer in the
hope of receiving better consideration under
compulsory acquisition. This in
turn would most likely result in an offer failing to reach 90%, just the
opposite of the present
situation. The Panel believes it is important that the
compulsory acquisition provisions should be as outcome-neutral as possible.
The
Panel’s suggested drafting aims to achieve this.
Recommended change
- The
Panel recommends that, in the applicable circumstances of compulsory acquisition
outlined above:
(a) Rule 56(3) be amended to provide that where;
- a
dominant owner has attained dominant ownership through acceptances of an offer;
and
- the
acceptances comprise more than 50% of the class of securities under offer;
and
- the
takeover offer for the voting securities included more than one consideration
alternative; and
- the
takeover offer identified one of the consideration alternatives as the
consideration that would be paid where an accepting offeree
did not specify the
consideration alternative it wished to take;
then:
- the
outstanding security holder, when returning his or her instrument of transfer
under rule 59, would be given the option to choose
which of the consideration
alternatives available under the offer it wished to be
paid.
- The
amendment would provide that the amount to be paid would be the same as the
consideration paid to an accepting shareholder at
the close of the
offer.
- If
the outstanding securityholder did not nominate the consideration alternative it
wished to be paid then the present rules of the
Code would
apply.
(b) Rule 55(c), relating to the contents of the acquisition
notice, and rules 60 and 61, relating to the return or non-return of the
instrument of transfer to the dominant owner, would be consequentially amended
to ensure consistency.
Compliance Costs
- There
should be no compliance costs associated with this proposal. The only cost
associated with this proposal is the opportunity
cost for offerees of losing the
ability to exploit the compulsory acquisition rules in a coercive manner in a
takeover offer.
Recommended drafting change
- The
Panel has suggested the following drafting change to incorporate this
recommendation in the Code (changes are underlined).
That rule 56(3) be amended to provide:
If the offer provided for alternative considerations, then the
consideration payable under subclause (1) is the consideration alternative
(in the form in which accepting offerees of that alternative were paid
out following the close of the offer) chosen by an outstanding security
holder when returning his or her instrument of transfer under rule 59 or,
if the outstanding security holder fails to return an instrument of
transfer in the time required by rule 59 or does not choose a
consideration alternative, is the consideration payable under the
offer if an accepting offeree failed to choose an alternative or, if no
provision to that effect
was included in the offer, is the alternative
consideration containing the greatest cash component.
That rule 55(c) be consequentially amended so that the
acquisition notice would:
Specify the consideration to be provided for the outstanding securities,
including, where rule 56(3) applies, the consideration alternatives
from which the outstanding security holder may choose if they elect to do
so and the consequences of not so choosing;
That rules 60 and 61 be consequentially modified. Rule 60 would
need to state:
If an outstanding security holder returns to the dominant owner the
documents referred to in rule 59, the dominant owner must send
the consideration
specified in the acquisition notice, or in any case where rule 56(3) applies,
determined in accordance with that rule, to the outstanding security
holder within 7 days after the dominant owner receives the documents referred to
in that rule.
That rule 61 would be correspondingly changed:
(1) If an outstanding security holder does not return to the dominant
owner the documents referred to in rule 59, then, in the case
of a compulsory
sale, the dominant owner must, within 7 days after the expiration of the 21-day
period referred to in rule 59, -
(a) deliver to the code company the consideration specified in the
acquisition notice, or in any case where rule 56(3) applies, determined in
accordance with that rule, in respect of which the documents referred to in
rule 59 have not been returned to the dominant owner; and ...
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 57 OF THE CODE
Removing
the requirement for a rule 57 independent adviser under the Code
- The
Panel proposes that the rule 57(1) adviser only be required in certain
circumstances and sets out a framework for an amended rule
57(1).
Proposal
- It
is proposed that the Code be amended to require a rule 57(1) adviser only where
a person attains dominant ownership when there
was no takeover offer involved,
or through acceptances of a takeover offer that was not for cash or had no cash
alternative, and
acceptances were received for 50% or less of the equity
securities under the offer. When a takeover offer was for cash or had a
cash
alternative, and acceptances were received for 50% or less of the equity
securities, the compulsory acquisition price would
be the offer price and no
rule 57 adviser would be required. Outstanding securityholders would still have
the right to object to
the price.
- The
proposal only affects compulsory acquisition following a takeover offer. It does
not affect compulsory acquisition when no takeover
offer is
involved.
Rationale for proposed change
- The
purpose of the Panel’s proposed amendment is to limit the time-consuming
and costly requirement of commissioning an extra
independent adviser’s
report to those circumstances where there is likely to be genuine benefit from
it.
Existing Code requirements
- Currently
under the Code, a rule 57(1) adviser is required following a takeover offer
when a person becomes the dominant owner of
a Code company by reason of
acceptances of the offer, but the compulsory acquisition price for the remaining
securities is not determined
by rule 56.
- Rule
56 determines the price when acceptances are received in respect of more than
50% of the equity securities that are the subject
of the offer. If this occurs,
the compulsory acquisition price will be the consideration payable under the
offer whether this is
cash, non-cash, or a combination of both (rule 56(2)).
Outstanding security holders have no right to object to that price. (See the
Panel’s proposals for amendment to rule 56(3) to give outstanding
securityholders the right to choose a consideration
alternative.)
- However,
rule 56 does not determine the price if acceptances are received for 50% or less
of the equity securities that are the subject
of the offer. If this occurs, the
consideration payable is set by the dominant owner, but must be a cash sum
certified as fair and
reasonable by an independent adviser pursuant to rule
57(1). Outstanding security holders are able to object to the proposed
consideration
(rule 57(2)). If within 14 days after sending the acquisition
notice, the dominant owner receives written objections to the consideration
from
outstanding security holders who hold the lesser of:
(a) 2% or more of a class of equity securities; or
(b) 10% or more of the outstanding securities of a class,
the dominant owner must immediately refer to expert determination the amount of
consideration to be provided to outstanding security
holders (rule 57(3)). The
expert for these purposes will be an independent person appointed by the Panel
(rule 58).
- The
expert will determine the amount to be paid by the dominant owner to all
outstanding security holders. If it is higher than the
acquisition price all
outstanding security holders will receive the increased amount. However, if it
is lower, all outstanding security
holders can be required to return the
difference to the dominant owner.
Rule 57(1) adviser not necessary in certain
circumstances
- The
Panel considers that the rule 57(1) adviser is an unnecessary additional
imposition where the takeover offer was for cash or had
a cash alternative.
Shareholders have already received valuation advice through the rule 21 report
on the merits of an offer. This
generally provides a range for the offer price
that the adviser considers is fair consideration for the target company. If the
offer
fails to achieve more than 50% of acceptances of the shares under offer,
for whatever reason, it does not need another independent
adviser to advise on
the value of the target company for the purposes of compulsory acquisition.
Instead, shareholders should be
told they will receive the same consideration as
under the offer and can object to that price. If sufficient securityholders
object
then the rule 57(3) expert will provide an authoritative decision on the
consideration to be paid for the remaining securities.
- However,
the position is different where the offer was not for cash, and did not carry a
cash alternative, and failed to achieve more
than 50% acceptances. In this
situation, the compulsory acquisition must be for cash. As no cash price has
been put forward in the
offer and been the subject of a rule 21 report, an
independent adviser’s report is appropriate. Objections can then be lodged
to this price and if the thresholds are met, expert determination will
apply.
- There
are several costs in obtaining a rule 57(1) report. First, it is a reasonably
substantial expense for what is the second or
third independent adviser’s
report required under the offer. Secondly, it may be time consuming to find both
an appropriately
qualified and experienced and sufficiently independent person
to prepare the report. It may be particularly difficult to meet the
independence
threshold set by the Panel, as the Panel considers that an adviser who has
previously acted in relation to the transaction
(for example, by preparing a
rule 21 report) should not generally advise again.
- For
these reasons, it appears warranted to remove the requirement for a rule 57(1)
adviser from the Code where the compulsory acquisition
results from a takeover
offer which was for cash or contained a cash alternative, but did not meet the
requirements of rule 56(2)
in achieving in excess of 50% acceptances of the
securities for which the offer was made.
Compliance costs
- The
Panel’s proposal should result in compliance costs being reduced quite
significantly by avoiding the unnecessary appointment
of an independent adviser
in certain circumstances of compulsory acquisition.
Recommended change
- The
Panel recommends that the Code be changed to require an independent
adviser’s report under rule 57(1) only where:
(a) there was no takeover offer made; or
(b) a takeover offer was made; and
(c) the takeover offer was not for cash or did not include a
cash alternative; and
(d) acceptances were received for 50% or less of the equity
securities under the takeover offer.
- This
recommendation is supplementary to the proposals set out in section N
(Compulsory acquisitions) of the Panel’s Technical
Amendments to the
Takeovers Code (December 2003).
Recommended drafting change
(b) is the
consideration payable for the outstanding securities.
If the
consideration cannot be established under rule 56, the consideration specified
in the acquisition notice –
(a) must –
(i) be a cash sum certified as fair and reasonable by an independent
adviser; or
(ii) where –
- (A) a person
becomes the dominant owner by reason of acceptances of an offer (whether or not
the dominant owner has also acquired
equity securities under rule 36);
and
- (B) the
consideration under the offer was a cash sum or included a cash alternative;
and
- (C) acceptances
of the offer were received in respect of 50% or less of the equity securities
that were the subject of the offer in
the class in respect of which
consideration is to be determined,
be the same cash sum or cash alternative provided as consideration under
the offer for equity securities in the same class;
and
(1)
Proposed replacement rule 57(1):
The Panel has suggested a drafting change to incorporate this recommendation
in the Code.
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