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Review of the Plant Variety Rights Act 1987. Options paper [2019] NZAHGovDP 1 (1 July 2019)
Last Updated: 30 July 2020
Options Paper
Review of the Plant Variety Rights Act 1987
July 2019
MBIE 4920
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE)
Hikina Whakatutuki - Lifting to make successful
MBIE develops and delivers
policy, services, advice and regulation to support economic growth and the
prosperity and wellbeing of
New Zealanders.
MBIE combines the former Ministries of Economic Development, Science +
Innovation, and the Departments of Labour, and Building and
Housing.
More information
www.mbie.govt.nz 0800 20
90 20
Information,
examples and answers to your questions about the topics covered here can be
found on our website www.mbie.govt.nz
or by calling us free on 0800 20 90 20.
Disclaimer
This document is a guide only. It should not be used as a substitute for
legislation or legal advice. The Ministry of Business, Innovation
and Employment
is not responsible for the results of any actions taken on the basis of
information in this document, or for any errors
or omissions.
ISBN (online) 978-1-98-857092-1
July 2019
©Crown Copyright 2019
The material contained in this report is subject to Crown copyright
protection unless otherwise indicated. The Crown copyright protected
material
may be reproduced free of charge in any format or media without requiring
specific permission. This is subject to the material
being reproduced accurately
and not being used in a derogatory manner or in a misleading context.
Where
the material is being published or issued to others, the source and
copyright status should be acknowledged. The permission to reproduce
Crown
copyright protected material does not extend to any material in this report that
is identified as being the copyright of a
third party. Authorisation to
reproduce such material should be obtained from the copyright holders.
How to have your say
Submissions
process
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) seeks written
submissions on the issues raised in this document by 5pm
on Monday, 9 September
2019.
Your submission may respond to any or all of these issues. Where possible,
please include evidence to support your views, for example
references to
independent research, facts and figures, or relevant examples.
Please use the submission template provided at:
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/have-your-say/plant-
variety-rights-act-1987-review-options-paper. This will help us to
collate submissions and ensure that your views are fully considered. Please also
include your name and (if applicable)
the name of your organisation in your
submission.
Please include your contact details in the cover letter or e-mail accompanying
your submission. You can make your submission by:
Corporate Governance and Intellectual Property Policy Building, Resources and
Markets
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment PO Box 1473
Wellington 6140 New Zealand
Please direct any questions that you have in relation to the submissions process
to
PVRActReview@mbie.govt.nz.
Use of information
The information provided in submissions will be used to inform MBIE’s
policy development process, and will inform advice to
Ministers on changes to
the Plant Variety Rights regime. We may contact submitters directly if we
require clarification of any matters
in submissions.
3
Release of information
MBIE intends to upload PDF copies of submissions received to MBIE’s
website at www.mbie.govt.nz . MBIE will
consider you to have consented to uploading by making a submission, unless you
clearly specify otherwise in your submission.
If your submission contains any information that is confidential or you
otherwise wish us not to publish, please:
- indicate this on
the front of the submission, with any confidential information clearly marked
within the text
- provide a
separate version excluding the relevant information for publication on our
website.
Submissions remain subject to request under the Official Information Act 1982.
Please set out clearly in the cover letter or e-mail
accompanying your
submission if you have any objection to the release of any information in the
submission, and in particular, which
parts you consider should be withheld,
together with the reasons for withholding the information. MBIE will take such
objections
into account and will consult with submitters when responding to
requests under the Official Information Act 1982.
Private information
The Privacy Act 1993 establishes certain principles
with respect to the collection, use and disclosure of information about
individuals
by various agencies, including MBIE. Any personal information you
supply to MBIE in the course of making a submission will only be
used for the
purpose of assisting in the development of policy advice in relation to this
review. Please clearly indicate in the
cover letter or e-mail accompanying your
submission if you do not wish your name, or any other personal information, to
be included
in any summary of submissions that MBIE may publish.
4
Contents
Glossary
Descriptions
of key terms here are not intended to be definitions.
2005 draft Bill The draft Plant Variety Rights Amendment Bill
released for
consultation in 2005
biological resources Includes genetic resources, organisms, parts of
organisms,
populations and any other biotic component of an ecosystem with actual or
potential use or value for humanity (CBD definition) (e.g.
honey)
bioprospecting The collection of biological material and the analysis of its
material
properties, or its molecular, biochemical or genetic content, for the purpose of
developing a commercial product
botanical variety A naturally occurring plant grouping within a species. They
are
generally used to distinguish groups of plants of a species that have a common
single characteristic or one or more defining common
sets of characteristics.
Some botanical varieties are known as subspecies
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
Commissioner The Commissioner of Plant Variety Rights. The Commissioner is
part of the Plant Variety Rights Office, within the Intellectual Property Office
of New Zealand
CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership
cultivated variety A plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the
lowest
rank, whose horticultural or agricultural origin is primarily due to intentional
human activity, and is defined by traits which are
consistently expressed, and
can be propagated unchanged (e.g. the kiwifruit variety ‘Zesy002’
which is commonly sold
under the brand SunGold®). Includes any clone,
hybrid, stock, or line, of a plant, and excludes botanical varieties
DUS Distinct, uniform and stable (requirement)
EDV Essentially derived variety
EU European Union
genetic resources Genetic material of actual or potential value. ‘Genetic
material’ is
any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing
functional units of heredity (CBD definition) (e.g. mānuka plant)
genotype The genetic makeup of an organism
hybridise To cross-breed two different varieties or species of plant, often to
attain desired characteristics in the parent plants
IPONZ Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand
ITPGRFA International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture
kaitiaki Guardian, protector, caretaker (Wai 262 report)
kaitiaki relationship recommendations
The Waitangi Tribunal’s two main recommendations in the Wai 262
report:
- that the
Commissioner be empowered to refuse a PVR that would affect the kaitiaki
relationship; and
- that the
Commissioner be supported by a Māori advisory committee in his/her
consideration of the kaitiaki interest
kaitiakitanga The obligation to nurture and care for the mauri of a taonga;
ethic
of guardianship, protection (Wai 262 report)
mātauranga Māori The Waitangi Tribunal referred to mātauranga
Māori as “the
unique Māori way of viewing the world, incorporating both Māori
culture and Māori traditional knowledge” (Wai
262 report)
mana Authority, prestige, reputation, spiritual power (Wai 262 report)
mauri The life principle or living essence contained in all things, animate and
inanimate (Wai 262 report)
MBIE Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
Nagoya Protocol Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention
on Biological Diversity
phenotype The set of observable characteristics of an organism resulting
from
the interaction of its genotype with the environment (e.g. leaf shape)
PVR Journal A journal published quarterly by the Plant Variety Rights Office.
It
includes notice of every decision to make or decline a grant, and all prescribed
particulars relating to applications and grants
PMAC In this paper, PMAC refers to the Patents Māori Advisory Committee
(not the Plant Market Access Council, which will be
familiar to farmers)
propagating material Any part of a plant that is normally or traditionally used
to
propagate plants, including reproductive (e.g. spores, seeds) and vegetative
(e.g. cuttings) propagating material
While the term ‘reproductive material’ is used in the PVR Act to
describe all propagating material, we consider that
‘propagating
material’ is more accurate and have used this term in this paper
PVR Plant variety right
PVR Act Plant Variety Rights Act 1987
PVR regime New Zealand’s plant variety rights regime
PVR Office Plant Variety Rights Office
reproductive material Any part of a plant that is normally or traditionally used
to
reproduce a plant (e.g. seeds). Reproductive material is a subset of propagating
material. See ‘propagating material’
RMA Resource Management Act 1991
rangatiratanga Chieftainship, self-determination, the right to exercise
authority;
imbued with expectations of right behaviour, appropriate priorities, and ethical
decision-making (Wai 262 report)
rohe Traditional tribal area, territory (Wai 262 report)
rongoā Traditional Māori medicine, including herbal medicine made from
plants, physical techniques like massage, and spiritual
healing
taonga A treasured possession, including property, resources and abstract
concepts such as language, cultural knowledge, and relationships
(Wai 262
report)
taonga species Taonga species are native birds, plants and animals of
special
cultural significance and importance to Māori
tino rangatiratanga The greatest or highest chieftainship;
self-determination,
autonomy; control, full authority to make decisions (Wai 262 report)
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement
Tribunal Waitangi Tribunal
TRIPS Agreement World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Aspects
of
Intellectual Property Rights
UNDRIP United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UPOV International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(Union Internationale pour la Protection des Obtentions
Végétales)
UPOV Convention International Convention on the Protection of New Varieties
of
Plants
UPOV members Countries that have ratified the International Convention on the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants
UPOV 78 The 1978 revision of the International Convention on the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants
UPOV 91 The 1991 revision of the International Convention on the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants
variety See ‘cultivated variety’
variety denomination A generic name which allows the protected variety to be
identified vegetative propagation A form of asexual
reproduction of plants (e.g.
reproduction by
bulbs or tubers, the planting of cuttings, or grafting and budding of fruit
trees)
Wai 262 report Waitangi Tribunal 2011 report entitled Ko
Aotearoa Tēnei: A
Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting
Māori Culture and Identity
whakapapa Genealogy, ancestral connections, lineage (Wai 262 report)
whanaungatanga Ethic of connectedness by blood; relationships,
kinship; the web
of
relationships that embraces living and dead, present and past, human beings and
the natural environment (Wai 262 report)
Foreword
As the Minister of Commerce
and Consumer Affairs, I am pleased to release this Options Paper as part of the
review of the Plant Variety Rights Act 1987.
This paper follows public consultation on an Issues Paper carried out from
September to December 2018. That paper sought feedback
on issues with the Plant
Variety Rights (PVR) Act, and has informed the development of the options in
this paper. I would like to
thank all those who engaged with the
issues stage consultation and took the time to make a submission on the Issues
Paper and attend the workshops and regional hui.
New Zealand’s plant variety rights regime makes an important contribution
to economic activity in the agricultural, horticultural
and ornamental sectors.
New varieties of kiwifruit, apples and hops— along with our world-leading
ryegrasses that play such
an important role in our pastoral sector—are all
examples of innovation facilitated by the granting of PVRs. These rights give
plant breeders the opportunity to get a return on the investment they make in
their breeding programmes. They also encourage overseas
breeders to bring their
new varieties to New Zealand.
The current Act is more than 30 years old and we need to modernise the regime to
reflect the changes that have taken place in the
plant breeding industry in this
time. Many of the options in this paper are informed by New Zealand’s
obligations under the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) to align our regime with the most recent version of
the
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 91).
We also need a regime that protects kaitiaki interests in indigenous plants
consistent with the Treaty of Waitangi – a central
focus of this review.
This means having a regime that encourages early and meaningful engagement
between plant breeders and kaitiaki,
and puts kaitiaki interests at the heart of
PVR decision-making.
This paper sets out options to improve the PVR regime, consistent with our
Treaty of Waitangi and CPTPP obligations. As we consider
these options, it is
important that we find the right balance between encouraging innovation by plant
breeders and ensuring this
innovation is available to growers, breeders and the
general public, so that New Zealand as a whole will benefit from the PVR
regime.
I encourage you to have your say on the options discussed in this paper. The
information and evidence you provide will inform decisions
on how to amend the
Plant Variety Rights Act.
Hon Kris Faafoi
Minister of Commerce and Consumer
Affairs
Executive summary – structure and
key recommendations
- This
paper discusses options for change to the Plant Variety Rights (PVR) regime.
Broadly speaking, the three key issues this paper
addresses
are:
- how
we meet our obligations under the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to either accede
to the 1991 version of the
International Convention on the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV 91)
or “give effect”
to it;
- how
we propose to make the PVR regime compliant with te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty
of Waitangi (the Treaty);
- what
other changes are required to align our regime with UPOV
91.
- The
structure of the paper reflects these key issues. Following an introduction
(Part 1), the paper starts with a discussion of the objectives of the PVR Act
(Part 2) followed by a brief summary of the economic analysis
MBIE commissioned
to support our analysis in this paper (Part 3). We then address how we propose
to meet our CPTPP obligations (Part
4) and Treaty of Waitangi obligations (Part
5).
- The
remainder of the paper then focuses on the third issue, namely what changes we
propose to align our regime with UPOV 91. We first
set out our criteria for
analysing options (Part 6) and then group the UPOV 91 issues as follows:
Definitions (Part 7), Scope of
the right (Parts 8 and 9), and Post-grant issues
(Part 10). We finish with discussion of some additional issues (Part
11).
- Given
our CPTPP obligation to align our regime with UPOV 91 (subject to Treaty
obligations) we generally start each section by describing
the differences
between the current PVR Act and the requirements of UPOV 91. We then give a
brief overview of what we heard from
submitters during the Issues stage. We then
set out the options for change in response to these issues (where we retain some
domestic
policy flexibility over and above that required to meet our Treaty
obligations), along with our preliminary analysis of these options.
In most
instances we indicate a preferred option.
- Below,
we briefly summarise each part and our key preferred
options.
Part 3: The Sapere report – economic analysis of the PVR system
- To
support the analysis in this paper, MBIE commissioned the Sapere Research Group
to undertake an independent economic analysis of
the current state of the plant
varieties innovation system. Part 3 presents a brief summary of this
analysis.
- The
analysis focuses on the role of the legislative settings in the innovation
system and examines the question of whether New Zealand
is missing out on new
varieties as a result of current settings. The analysis also looked in some
detail at the issues of farm-saved
seed, rights over harvested material and
compulsory licences. The analysis paints a healthy picture of the current state
of the system,
though acknowledges the concerns for the future raised by
breeders and researchers.
- The
full report is available here.1
Part 4: CPTPP obligations and UPOV 91
- Part
4 discusses the options we have under CPTPP in relation to UPOV 91 –
namely to either accede to UPOV 91, or “give
effect” to it –
and the provision in CPTPP that gives New Zealand the necessary flexibility to
meet its obligations under
the Treaty of Waitangi.
- Our
preferred option is to “give effect” to UPOV 91 as this would enable
us to implement our preferred package of options
in relation to compliance with
the Treaty of Waitangi (which we discuss in Part 5).
Part 5: Treaty of Waitangi obligations
- Part
5 considers the Government’s obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi in
the PVR regime. We discuss the Wai 262 recommendations
in relation to PVRs as
well as what we heard through written submissions and the regional hui we held
during the issues stage.
- We
present a package of proposals designed to incentivise early and meaningful
engagement with kaitiaki when breeders are considering
working with plants where
there is a kaitiaki interest. The package includes additional information
disclosure requirements, the
establishment of a Māori advisory committee
and options for consideration of kaitiaki interests in decision-making
processes.
Our preferred decision-making option implements the Wai 262
recommendation that a PVR grant may be refused to protect kaitiaki interests.
This option is incompatible with acceding to UPOV 91. As discussed in Part 4,
our preferred option in relation to our CPTPP obligations
is, therefore, to
“give effect” to UPOV 91.
- A
summary of the package of proposals for Treaty compliance is available on the
PVR Review “Have your say” page
here.2
1 https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/5885-what-is-really-driving-innovation-in-our-plant-based-
sectors
2 https://www.mbie.govt.nz/have-your-say/plant-variety-rights-act-1987-review-options-paper
Part 6: Criteria for options analysis
- Part
6 describes the analytical framework we use for our preliminary analysis of the
options to align our PVR regime with UPOV 91.
That is, we discuss the criteria
that we use when assessing options for change to the PVR Act. Discussion and
analysis of these options
form the rest of this Options Paper (Parts
7-10).
Part 7: Definitions
- Part
7 discusses issues with the consistency of definitions used in our domestic
legislation compared to those used internationally
(e.g. in UPOV 91). We have to
ensure that the definitions in our domestic legislation (such as for
“breeder” and “variety”)
align with those in UPOV 91. We
also recommend adding a definition of “breed” to clarify that a
plant discovered in the
wild cannot get a PVR, as human input is required to
develop a new cultivar. This definition was endorsed by the Waitangi Tribunal
in
the Wai 262 report.
Part 8: Scope of the right – general issues
- Parts
8 and 9 discuss the scope of the right (i.e. what the right allows the rights
holder to do). Part 8 sets out the compulsory
changes required by UPOV 91. These
are the new exclusive rights provided for in UPOV 91, and the compulsory
exceptions to those rights.
We do not discuss options in this part as there is
no domestic policy flexibility here, other than that which may be required to
meet our Treaty of Waitangi obligations (which is discussed in Part
5).
Part 9: Scope of the right – specific issues
- Part
9 sets out options for areas where we retain some domestic policy flexibility
(over and above that permitted by CPTPP to meet
our Treaty obligations). It
covers (i) the term of the right, (ii) essentially derived varieties (EDVs),
(iii) rights over harvested
material and (iv) farm saved
seed.
- In
relation to each of these:
- Term
of the right – this concerns the maximum period that a PVR can last. Our
preferred option is to provide for the minimum
periods required by UPOV 91 (25
years for woody plants and rootstock and 20 years for all other
plants).
- Essentially
derived varieties – these are varieties that are distinct in their own
right (so would be eligible for a PVR), but
retain the “essential
characteristics” of the variety they are derived from. Our view is that
the wording in UPOV 91
is too ambiguous and so our preferred option is to follow
an approach similar to Australia, which is to restrict EDVs to
“copycat”
varieties that add no new significant features to the
variety.
- Rights
over harvested material – this concerns the extent to which rights are
extended to the harvested material grown from
the protected propagating
material. Our preferred option is to provide for the minimum required by UPOV
91, namely that rights extend
to harvested material when the material was
obtained through the unauthorised use of the
propagating material and the PVR owner did not have a reasonable opportunity to
assert their rights in relation to the propagating
material.
- Farm
saved seed – this concerns whether the new rights under UPOV 91 should
cover farmers saving seed from one season to plant
the next season’s crop.
Our preferred option is to implement the exception for farm saved seed in UPOV
91 so that farmers can
continue to save seed without the authorisation of the
breeder, and allow for regulations to be made that limit that exception if
there
is a clear case for this.
Part 10: Post-grant issues
- Part
10 considers post-grant issues, i.e. those aspects of the regime that are
relevant only after a PVR has been granted. This covers
(i) compulsory licences,
(ii) enforcement, (iii) exhaustion of the right, and (iv) cancellation and
nullification of the right.
- In
relation to each of these:
- Compulsory
licences – we propose a number of changes in response to concerns raised
by submitters (e.g. the need for clear procedures,
restrictions on export and
clarifying that compulsory licences must be non-exclusive). We only consider
options in relation to (i)
the “grace period” and (ii) section
21(3). Our preferred options are retaining the status quo in relation to both of
these.
- Enforcement
– this covers both infringements and offences. While we acknowledge the
issues with enforcement in relation to infringements
of a plant breeder’s
rights, there are no easy fixes to this issue. We propose a number of changes to
clarify the provisions
in the Act (e.g. in relation to the remedies for
infringement and where disputes should be held). In relations to offences (which
are mostly concerned with false and/or misleading information), we indicate our
preferred option is to remove the offence provisions
from the Act, as they are
mostly covered by other pieces of legislation.
- Exhaustion
of the right – we discuss what is required to align with UPOV
91.
- Cancellation
and nullification of the right – we discuss what is required to align with
UPOV 91. We also propose that a claim
for cancellation/nullification can be a
counterclaim to an alleged infringement.
Part 11: Additional issues
- Part
11 considers a number of additional issues. These are:
- Algae
– whether the PVR regime should be extended to include
algae.
- Provisional
protection – this refers to the protection an applicant for a PVR receives
between application and determination
of whether a grant will be made. Currently
an applicant can commence action for an alleged infringement during this period,
but the
Act makes no provision for the situation in which a PVR is not granted.
We prefer an approach that action for infringement cannot
be commenced until
after a grant is made.
- Transitional
provisions – these concern what happens to current applications/grants
when the new regime comes into effect.
- We
also indicate that MBIE will run a consultation process on a range of
administrative issues, including what regulations will be
required under the new
legislation, later in 2019.
1 Introduction
Purpose
of this Options Paper
- The
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) is reviewing the Plant
Variety Rights Act 1987 (PVR Act). The PVR Act provides for the grant of
intellectual property rights called ‘plant variety rights’ (PVRs).
Plant
breeders and developers may apply for PVRs over new plant varieties that
they have developed. The purpose of the PVR regime is to
incentivise the
development and importation of new varieties of plants.
- In
September 2018, MBIE released the Plant Variety Rights Act Review Issues
Paper (the Issues Paper) for public consultation. The purpose of the
consultation was to better understand the issues with the current PVR
regime
from the point of view of industry stakeholders, Treaty of Waitangi partners and
other interested parties. MBIE also held
a number of industry workshops and
regional hui during the consultation period (the Issues stage). The consultation
closed on 21
December 2018.
- MBIE
received 36 written submissions on the Issues Paper and these, along with the
feedback received at the workshops and hui and
our international commitments,
have informed the options for change to the PVR regime that are set out in this
Options Paper.
- The
purpose of this paper is to seek your views on the proposed options and our
preliminary analysis of these options. In most instances
we have indicated a
preferred option. Your views will inform the advice we provide to Ministers once
analysis of submissions is complete.
Where possible, please provide evidence of
costs and benefits to support your submission.
- Submissions
are due by 5pm on Monday, 9 September 2019.
Background to the review
- The
Issues Paper that was released last year provides a comprehensive background to
the review and the PVR regime. This can be found
on the PVR
review3 pages of the MBIE website. Readers are referred to
these pages for more information. Here we provide a brief
summary.
- There
are three key drivers for this review:
- The
PVR Act is now over 30 years old and is in need of modernisation to reflect the
significant changes in the plant breeding industry
over this time.
Internationally, PVRs are
3 https://www.mbie.govt.New
Zealand/business-and-employment/business/intellectual-property/plant-
variety-rights/plant-variety-rights-act-review/
governed by the International Convention on the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants (UPOV Convention). Our PVR Act gives effect
to the 1978 version of this
convention (UPOV 78), whereas the majority of our main trading partners
(including Australia, the United
States of America, Japan, the European Union
(EU) and Canada) have ratified the more recent, 1991, version (UPOV 91).
- The
PVR regime needs to reflect the Crown’s obligations to Māori under
the Treaty. In 2011, the Waitangi Tribunal released
its report, Ko Aotearoa
Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting
Māori Culture and Identity (Wai 262 report). This included a number of
recommended changes to the PVR regime to recognise and protect Māori
interests in
taonga plant species. These recommendations were used as the
starting point for our engagement during the Issues Paper consultation
to better
understand how the PVR regime could be made Treaty
compliant.
- On
30 December 2018, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP) came into force for New Zealand.
The CPTPP requires New
Zealand to either (i) accede to UPOV 91, or (ii) implement a PVR regime that
gives effect to UPOV 91. The
options were negotiated specifically by New Zealand
to ensure that the Crown could implement measures it deems necessary to fulfil
its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.
- Prior
to the release of the Issues Paper last year, MBIE had undertaken some
pre-consultation engagement with some interested groups
to assist with
information-gathering and planning for the Issues stage consultation. The Issues
stage was the first stage of public
consultation in the review of the PVR
regime. The release of this Options Paper represents the second stage of public
consultation
in this review.
- The
individual submissions received in response to the Issues Paper, along with a
summary of these submissions, and notes from our
regional hui are all available
on the PVR review pages of the MBIE
website.
Process and timeline
- An
outline of the intended review process is below. The stages in dark green
represent opportunities for you and other members of
the public to provide your
input into the process.
Stage of the
review
|
What does this involve?
|
Timing
|
Issues stage
|
Pre-consultation phase: information gathering, planning, engagement with
interested groups to support development of Issues Paper
and Māori
Engagement plan
|
2017/first half of 2018
COMPLETE
|
Release of Issues Paper for public consultation (following Cabinet
agreement) including regional hui and public meetings
|
September to December 2018
COMPLETE
|
Options stage
|
Development of options in response to
feedback received during the Issues stage
|
January to June 2019
COMPLETE
|
Release of Options Paper for public
consultation
|
July to September 2019
|
Drafting legislation
|
MBIE provides advice to Ministers following analysis of submissions,
Cabinet makes policy decisions, Bill is
drafted
|
September 2019 to April 2020
|
Legislative stage
|
PVR amendment Bill is introduced to
Parliament
|
April/May 2020
|
Select Committee process, including public submissions on the Bill
|
Commences May 2020, timing depends on general election
dates
|
Select Committee reports back, Bill goes
through final stages
|
Bill passed first half 2021
|
Implementation
stage
|
Implementation and transition to new
regime
|
New regime in place by 30
December 2021
|
2 Objectives of the PVR Act
Objectives
of the PVR Act
Original proposal
- In
the Issues Paper we proposed that the main objectives of a modern,
fit-for-purpose PVR regime should be:
- to
promote innovation and economic growth by incentivising the development and
dissemination of new plant varieties while providing
an appropriate balance
between the interests of plant breeders, growers and society as a
whole;
- compliance
with New Zealand’s international obligations; and
- consistency
with the Treaty of Waitangi.
- The
first objective reflects the social contract at the heart of any intellectual
property regime, and the main purpose of the PVR
regime.
- A
temporary, commercial monopoly is granted because it is considered that, with
the correct settings, there will be a net benefit
to society. In the case of
PVRs, breeders will be incentivised to develop new varieties knowing they will
get an adequate return
on that investment and New Zealand as a whole will
benefit from the flow-on economic effects of that innovation. If rights are too
weak, plant breeders will not have sufficient incentive to invest in breeding
new, innovative varieties and New Zealand will lose
out on the economic benefits
that flow from this innovation. If rights are too strong, costs (such as reduced
competition, higher
costs for growers and reduced incentive for follow-on
innovation) can outweigh the benefits.
What submitters said
- We
received a lot of feedback on the objectives both in submissions and at the
stakeholder meetings and hui. Key themes were:
- the
meaning of some words is unclear and they should either be clarified or
replaced. Several submitters commented that:
- “dissemination”
should be replaced with “use”, as it implies plant material should
be distributed widely;
- the
phrase “appropriate balance” needs defining.
- an
“efficiency and effectiveness” objective is
needed;
- the
regime needs to provide greater certainty for both rights holders and
users/growers;
- the
interests of users/growers needs to be more clearly
stated;
- the
objective relating to the Treaty of Waitangi is weak, suggestions
included:
- providing
explicit protection of Māori rights and responsibilities as set out in
international agreements the Crown is a party
to (e.g. the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples);
- changing
it to “Compliance with Crown’s Treaty of Waitangi”
obligations, or “Giving effect to the Treaty of
Waitangi” (as in
section 4 of the Conservation Act 1987);
- providing
greater clarity of what Treaty of Waitangi compliance means, e.g. explicit
recognition of tino rangatiratanga over taonga
species, mātauranga
Māori, and kaitiaki relationships with native
species.
- consider
better alignment with other intellectual property legislation, e.g. the
Patents Act 2013.
MBIE comment
- It
is important to note that the specific wording of the objectives we are working
towards is likely to differ in any eventual bill
developed by the Parliamentary
Counsel Office to give effect to the Government decisions that will be made in
this review.
- However,
we largely agree with the feedback we have received on the original objectives.
It is important that terms are as clear as
possible. We broadly agree with the
“dissemination v use” issue. We consider that another way to think
about this is
that the balance is primarily about encouraging innovation on the
one hand (through ensuring that breeders can get a reasonable return
on their
investment) and ensuring reasonable access to that innovation on the other hand
(e.g. so that products can be developed
that satisfy consumer demand, supporting
New Zealand’s economic growth, and so that researchers can continue to
develop new
varieties). If the balance is right, then New Zealand will stand to
benefit overall.
- We
agree that there needs to be reference to having an efficient and effective
system to capture the importance of having a regime
that has proportionate
compliance costs and that provides certainty to both rights holders and the
public (including growers).
- We
have also changed our language from “Treaty consistency” to that of
“Treaty compliance”. This is intended
to put it beyond doubt that we
are seeking to meet the Crown obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi in the
PVR Act through this
review.
Objectives of the PVR Act
Do you have any further comment to make on the objectives of the PVR
Act?
1
- The
Sapere Report – economic
analysis of the PVR System
- To
support the options analysis in this paper, MBIE commissioned the Sapere
Research Group (Sapere) to undertake an independent economic
analysis of the
plant varieties innovation system, and the role the legislative settings play in
that system. The key questions MBIE
put to Sapere were:
- What
is the current ‘state of health’ of the plant varieties innovation
system?
- What
is the role of our legislative settings in this system?
- Is
there evidence that New Zealand is missing out on new varieties, either because
of insufficient returns on investment in domestic
breeding programmes, or
because overseas breeders are reluctant to bring new varieties to New
Zealand?
- The
report by Sapere begins by setting out a framework for considering the drivers
of innovation in plant varieties, and identifies
three mutually reinforcing
drivers:4
- the
industry structure and innovation in the “value
chain”;
- the
plant characteristics and technical innovation in plant
cultivation;
- the
legal protections for rights and innovation in the law.
- It
then applies this framework to the following sectors: agricultural and vegetable
crops; pasture plants, amenity grasses and fungi;
fruit and nuts; and
ornamentals, trees and other plants.5 For each of these sectors, the
report considers both the current state and possible evolution
of:
- breeding
activity and financial flows;
- industry
structure;
- plant
characteristics;
- legal
and social institutions;
4 While the Sapere Report only briefly mentions this,
another important consideration is access to plant germplasm, including
cultivars
and species material. For example, a key concern of breeders –
though outside the scope of this review – is delays in
importation of
genetic material.
5 The report also briefly comments on algae, which are not
currently covered by the PVR Act.
- characteristics
of market demand.
- The
Executive Summary of the report summarises the general conclusions of the
analysis as follows:
“The review finds that the balance
between providing an opportunity for a plant breeder to obtain a reward for
their effort
in developing a new plant variety, and the benefits to growers and
society from having access to new and improved plant varieties,
has been
reasonably well- set.
We did not see evidence that New Zealand is missing out on
new plant varieties as a result of the PVR regime (although many comments
were
made on challenges associated with the import regime).
While breeders and growers pointed out costs and
uncertainties associated with some parts of the system (particularly
enforcement),
we have observed a relatively healthy, dynamic system for
generating new cultivars from within New Zealand. Joint venture arrangements
between CRIs and private entities have emerged and are becoming more
sophisticated, and these are working to generate and commercialise
new
cultivars. We have observed (on the whole) outcomes that show trust and
confidence in New Zealand’s systems for protecting
plant- related IP. We
have seen a combination of legal instruments being used to protect property
rights in new plant varieties,
including PVRs, contracts and patents. These
legal instruments are being used in parallel with industry structure to
strengthen the
appropriability of plant innovations.”
- For
example, even though the number of applications has fallen from 170-200 in the
second half of the 90s to 125-150 in the period
2012-2018, this trend is
mirrored in UPOV 91 countries. The report considers that this is a result of (a)
advances in plant breeding
in the 80s and early 90s, which are now tailing off,
and (b) a decrease in the share of ornamental varieties as effort is put into
lower volume, higher profitability crops such as fruit and agricultural plants.
Apples, kiwifruit, hops, berries and ryegrasses are
all noted as examples of a
healthy plant varieties innovation system in New Zealand.
- However,
the report also acknowledges the concerns raised by breeders and researchers,
summarised in the Executive Summary as follows:
“Despite
these apparent successes, we spoke with numerous parties who emphasised to us
their view that the PVR system is starting
to fray at the seams. They told us
that New Zealand’s legislative settings are starting to introduce
uncertainty, which will
affect innovation if not addressed soon. We have not
seen evidence of this uncertainty playing out in the statistics, but this does
not mean that it does not exist. In particular, our legislative settings were
seen by many of the people interviewed as:
- lagging
behind the rest of the World by not aligning with the most recent UPOV
convention
- lacking
enforcement power
- being
constrained in the ability to extend enforcement to unauthorised harvested
material (in particular, from offshore)
- uncertain,
particularly in regards to compulsory licensing
- not
future-proofed, particularly in regards to evaluation settings
- preventing
reasonable methods of royalty capture, particularly for farm saved
seeds.
The plant-based industries are overwhelmingly
supportive of moves to modernise the Plant Variety Rights Act. The new Act needs
to reflect a new reality in which plant technology is changing, industry
structures are changing and the plant-based
industries are among New
Zealand’s largest producers.”
- The
report then looked in more detail at three elements of the PVR regime: farm
saved seed; rights over harvested material; and compulsory
licensing. The
conclusions of the report in relation to these will be covered in the relevant
sections of this Option Paper.
- The
full report is available here.6
6 https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/5885-what-is-really-driving-innovation-in-our-plant-based-
sectors
4 CPTPP obligations and UPOV 91
- The
CPTPP requires New Zealand to either (i) accede to UPOV 91, or (ii) implement a
PVR regime that “gives effect” to
UPOV 91. The options were
negotiated by New Zealand to ensure that the Crown could fulfil its obligation
under the Treaty. Specifically,
New Zealand can
adopt:7
“any measures it deems necessary to
protect indigenous plant species in fulfilment of its obligations under the
Treaty of Waitangi,
provided that such measures are not used as a means of
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against a person of another
Party.”
- This
provision sits alongside to the general ‘Treaty exception’ clause in
CPTPP which gives New Zealand the policy space
in relation to any matter covered
by the CPTPP to implement measures it “deems necessary to accord more
favourable treatment
to Māori ... including in fulfilment of its
obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi”.8 Under both
provisions, what is “necessary” is for New Zealand to
determine.
- Together,
these provisions mean that if we determine that a particular policy that is not
compatible with UPOV 91 is nonetheless necessary
to meet our Treaty obligations,
then we can choose not to accede to UPOV 91. Instead we can “give
effect” to UPOV 91
by aligning our regime with UPOV 91 outside of what is
required to comply with the Treaty, and still meet our CPTPP
obligations.
Preliminary analysis of options in
relation to our CPTPP obligations
- As
we have noted above, New Zealand can choose to depart from UPOV 91 as opposed to
accede to UPOV 91 if any of the measures we deem
necessary to meet our Treaty
obligations are incompatible with acceding to UPOV 91.
UPOV 91 and the Treaty of Waitangi
- Our
Treaty of Waitangi obligations are discussed in detail in Part 5. There we
present a package of proposals intended to make the
regime compliant with the
Treaty. Here we only provide a brief summary to set out how we arrive at our
preferred option in relation
to our CPTPP obligations, which is to “give
effect”, rather than accede, to UPOV 91.
7 CPTPP, Annex 18-A
8 CPTPP, Article 29.6
- We
consider that the Treaty of Waitangi requires the Crown to consider kaitiaki
interests – in a meaningful and mana-enhancing
way that facilitates
protection of those interests – in the PVR regime. This requires a genuine
and balanced consideration
of kaitiaki interests at all stages of the PVR
process, from the start of the breeding programme to the decision on whether or
not
to grant a PVR.
- Insofar
as compliance with UPOV 91 is concerned, the key issue for achieving Treaty of
Waitangi compliance relates to PVR decision-making
processes. In Part 5, we
present three options for this process, and set out the criteria against which
we assess each of these options.
- Our
preferred option is to introduce a new power to allow the refusal of a PVR if
kaitiaki interests would be negatively affected
and the impact could not be
mitigated to a reasonable extent such as to allow the grant (Option 2 in Part 5
below).
- We
consider that Option 2 best provides the degree of protection of kaitiaki
interests necessary to meet our Treaty obligations, without
creating too much
uncertainty for breeders. It represents a genuine and balanced consideration of
kaitiaki interests, and reflects
the main recommendation of the Waitangi
Tribunal in the Wai 262 report. It is also consistent with other intellectual
property regimes.
For example, in the Patents Act 2013, a patent can be
refused on the grounds that the commercial exploitation of the invention is
likely to be contrary to Māori
values.
- We
consider Option 2 is necessary to meet our Treaty obligations. Option 2 is not
compatible with UPOV 91 as UPOV 91 does not permit
UPOV member states to impose
additional criteria for a grant of a PVR. The implication of this is that New
Zealand cannot accede
to UPOV 91, but must instead “give effect” to
UPOV 91. This is, therefore, our preferred option in relation to our
CPTPP
obligations.
Implications of “giving effect” to UPOV
91
- Implementation
of our preferred Treaty compliance option means that the regime would look like
UPOV 91 for over 90 per cent of PVR
applications (as well as the great majority
of our trade relating to plant varieties), but would implement additional
protections
in relation to varieties where there is a kaitiaki interest,
consistent with the Treaty.
- Some
stakeholders have argued that full accession to UPOV 91 is important as it is a
clear demonstration to our trading partners that
we take PVR protection
seriously, and provides clear assurance as to the level of protection
provided.
- Our
CPTPP obligations do not permit us to take into account economic considerations
when deciding which option to choose, nor would
we propose weighing these
against Treaty considerations. However, we do note there is no clear evidence
that acceding to UPOV 91
would be significantly more advantageous to New Zealand
than “giving effect” to UPOV 91,
i.e. having a regime that is UPOV 91 in all but name (with some variation that
only applies to the minority of PVRs that relate to
varieties where there is a
kaitiaki interest).
- Our
current PVR Act is based on UPOV 78 which falls well short of the standards of
protection in UPOV 91. Yet there is no clear evidence
that New Zealand is
currently missing out on new varieties either through foreign breeders not
bringing their intellectual property
here, or through domestic R&D being
hampered by insufficient return on investment in breeding
programmes.
- This
is supported by the independent economic analysis MBIE
commissioned:
“we have observed a relatively healthy, dynamic system
for generating new cultivars from within New Zealand. We have observed
(on the
whole) trust and confidence in New Zealand’s systems for protecting
plant-related [intellectual property]”
“we did not see evidence that importers of plant
material are being dissuaded from bringing propagating material into New Zealand
because of our PVR regime (although this is hard to assess
quantitatively)”
- “Giving
effect” to UPOV 91 means that New Zealand remains a member of UPOV 78,
despite the fact the regime will look
like UPOV 91 for over 90% of protected
plant varieties, and close to UPOV 91 for varieties where there is a kaitiaki
interest. UPOV
78 also does not permit additional criteria for the grant of a
PVR but unlike UPOV 91 it does not require the provisions be extended
to all
plant genera and species.
- Finally,
the outcome of our Treaty compliance analysis at this time does not mean that
acceding to UPOV 91 could never be Treaty of Waitangi-compliant. The
difficulty in crafting effective Treaty-compliant options that are consistent
with UPOV 91 stems
in part from the lack of policy development relating to
Māori rights and interests in taonga species generally in New Zealand.
We
discuss this further in Part 5.
Meeting our CPTPP obligations
Do you agree with our analysis and conclusion of the CPTPP options? If not,
why not?
2
UPOV 91 – other policy
issues
- Whatever
final decision the Government makes on accession to UPOV 91 and how we
incorporate the Treaty into the regime, the future
PVR regime must still be
consistent with UPOV 91 as far as is possible, subject to the flexibility we
have to meet our Treaty obligations.
- For
instance, the definitions we use (such as breeder, propagating material etc.)
must be consistent with UPOV 91 (see Part 7); we
must provide at least the new
exclusive rights in relation to propagating material and, in certain
circumstances, harvested material;
and we must implement the compulsory
exceptions to the exclusive rights (see Part 8). In this Options Paper we will
make it clear
when we are discussing UPOV 91 provisions that we have no
flexibility as to how they are implemented (subject to our Treaty
obligations).
- However,
there remain a number of provisions within UPOV 91 that leave room for domestic
policy flexibility (over and above that required
to meet our Treaty
obligations). The main ones are:
- the
term of the right (beyond the minima provided for in UPOV
91);
- how
we implement the new provisions relating to “essentially derived varieties
(EDVs)”;
- whether
we extend the rights to harvested material and the products of harvested
material beyond the minimum required by UPOV 91;
- how
we address the issue of farm saved seed;
- how
we implement the compulsory licence provisions;
- how
infringements are enforced;
- what,
if any, offence provisions we need.
- These
are discussed in Parts 9 and 10.
5 Treaty of Waitangi obligations
- Following
our discussion of our preferred option in relation to meeting our CPTPP
obligations, in this part we now go into the detail
of our proposals and options
for making the PVR regime Treaty compliant.
- We
start by providing a recap of our Issues Paper discussion of Treaty
considerations in the PVR regime, and provide an overview of
the responses on
Treaty issues from submitters and participants at our regional hui and industry
workshops.
- We
then outline our understanding of the issues to be addressed. We cover this at
two levels. First, we explain, at a high-level,
our understanding of what Treaty
compliance means in this review. Then, we describe a package of proposals for
Treaty compliance
in the PVR Act review. As part of our package, there are three
options for decision-making to protect kaitiaki interests. The majority
of our
analysis relates to these options.
- Our
recommended package of proposals is to:
- introduce
new information disclosure requirements for breeders, requiring them to provide
information about the origin of the plant
material used to develop their
varieties and if applicable, who kaitiaki are, any engagement the breeder has
had with kaitiaki, and
the breeder’s assessment of whether kaitiaki
interests would be affected by the commercialisation of the new
variety;
- establish
a PVR Māori advisory committee, to:
- develop
guidelines for breeders and kaitiaki on engagement;
- provide
advice to breeders and kaitiaki at the pre-application
stage;
- provide
advice to the Commissioner of Plant Variety Rights and the Chair of the
Māori advisory committee as to whether kaitiaki
interests would be
adversely affected by the grant of a PVR and, if so, whether the impact can be
mitigated to a reasonable extent
such as to allow the
grant.
- empower
the Commissioner of Plant Variety Rights, jointly with the Chair of the
Māori advisory committee, to decide whether,
on the basis of the Māori
advisory committee’s advice, the PVR should be
granted.
- We
have discussed in Part 4 above the implications of our recommended approach to
Treaty compliance for CPTPP compliance. Introducing
a new power to refuse a PVR
to protect kaitiaki interests is inconsistent with UPOV 91, as UPOV 91 does not
permit states to implement
new criteria for a grant of a PVR. We propose that
New Zealand not accede, but instead “give effect”, to UPOV
91.
Recap of our Issues Paper
discussion
The Waitangi Tribunal’s recommendations on plant
variety rights
- In
our Issues Paper, we discussed the Waitangi Tribunal’s findings and
recommendations in the 2011 Wai 262 report, Ko Aotearoa
Tēnei.
- The
Wai 262 report has provided a useful starting point for considering the PVR
regime from a Treaty perspective. You can find more
information about the Wai
262 inquiry and report on the Waitangi Tribunal website
here.
- The
Waitangi Tribunal made recommendations on the genetic and biological resources
of taonga species in Chapter 2 of the Wai 262 report.
This is relevant to the
PVR regime because it regulates matters relating to cultivated varieties of
plant species, including taonga
plant species.
- The
Tribunal’s key finding on the genetic and biological resources of taonga
species was that the Treaty does not guarantee
ownership in taonga species (or
mātauranga Māori relating to taonga species), but it does guarantee
tino rangatiratanga.
- For
the Tribunal, the principle of tino rangatiratanga requires recognition and
protection of kaitiaki relationships with taonga species
and mātauranga
Māori. This means providing kaitiaki with a level of control over the use
of genetic and biological resources
of taonga species sufficient for kaitiaki to
protect their relationships with those species to a reasonable
degree.
- After
reviewing New Zealand’s law and policy regulating the continuum of
activities from bioprospecting through to research
and development and finally,
commercialisation, the Tribunal concluded that there was not adequate protection
for kaitiaki relationships.
It made a range of recommendations on
bioprospecting, genetic modification and intellectual property law and policy to
address this.
- On
the PVR Act, the Tribunal made two recommendations (which we refer to as the
kaitiaki relationship recommendations).9 These were
that:
- the
Commissioner of PVRs be empowered to refuse a PVR that would affect the kaitiaki
relationship;
- the
Commissioner be supported by a Māori advisory committee in his/her
consideration of the kaitiaki interest.
- The
Tribunal also supported two Government proposals in the 2005 Plant Variety
Rights Amendment Bill that was put on hold in 2007 in anticipation of the
Wai 262 report. These were:
9 Those changes were never enacted, however, as the
work was put on hold in 2007 in anticipation of the Wai 262 report.
- to
clarify the level of human input into the development of a plant variety for the
purposes of PVR protection (‘discovered’
varieties);10
- to
enable the Commissioner to refuse a proposed name for a plant variety if its use
would be likely to offend a significant section
of the community, including
Māori (offensive names).
- We
asked for feedback on these proposals and the issues underlying
them.
Additional issues
- We
also discussed concerns raised in our pre-consultation engagement about the
availability of information to facilitate Māori
engagement with the PVR
regime in the Issues Paper. Participants in our pre-consultation workshops had
been interested in understanding
how varieties are developed (for example,
whether a variety is developed using plant material from an indigenous species)
and by
whom (for example, whether the breeder identifies as a
kaitiaki).
- To
explore this issue further, we asked what information submitters felt should be
accessible on the register, and queried whether
breeders should be required to
disclose more information (for example, disclosure of origin) as part of their
application.
What did we hear at the issues
stage?
Protecting kaitiaki relationships in the PVR
regime
- In
submissions and hui, Māori emphasised the significance of kaitiaki
relationships with native plants. Key ideas we heard about
in connection to
kaitiakitanga were:
- whakapapa,
which connects all life forms to each other and to Papatūānuku and
Ranginui, and underlies the obligations of
kaitiaki;
- mauri,
and concern about how plant breeding may affect the mauri of plants used in
breeding programmes as well as native plants in
the wild.
- Many
were frustrated that the Treaty was not mentioned, and Māori rights and
interests not explicitly protected, in the PVR Act.
Some submitters considered
that this review was an opportunity for the Crown to update the PVR Act and
acknowledge the roles and
responsibilities of Māori as kaitiaki, which they
considered the Crown had thus far failed to do.
- We
did not encounter any opposition to incorporating the Treaty into the PVR Act in
our workshops, hui or submissions. In general,
Māori and breeders were
supportive of the Wai 262 recommendations. Some Māori considered that the
Wai 262 recommendations
did not go
10 This issue is discussed in Part 7.
far enough or that the ability of breeders to gain PVRs over varieties derived
from indigenous plant species was not consistent with
the Treaty. Breeders were
open to meeting additional requirements. The key differences in views related to
what those requirements
might be.
- Some
breeders expressed concern about clarity on key questions,
including:
- What
are taonga plant species?
- How
should breeders identify kaitiaki of taonga species plant material they may seek
to use in their plant breeding programmes?
- What
is likely to be of concern to kaitiaki in their breeding
programmes?
- Some
breeders were concerned about what it would mean to implement the Waitangi
Tribunal’s recommendations. They were concerned
about New Zealand’s
PVR regime disadvantaging domestic breeders, given that genetic material from
indigenous plant species
is “freely available overseas to overseas
breeders”. All submitters who commented on the Waitangi Tribunal
recommendation
to allow offensive names to be refused by the PVR Office were
supportive of the proposal.
Māori advisory committee
- In
general, feedback and submissions on the Māori advisory committee favoured
introducing a Māori advisory committee mechanism
into the PVR regime. Views
tended to differ however on what the function of the committee should
be.
- There
were some tensions in how Māori perceived the role of the committee. Some
felt the Māori advisory committee should
have a decision-making role in the
grant process, i.e. the committee’s consideration of applications
shouldn’t be a “tick
box” exercise. Others suggested that the
committee should play an intermediary role between kaitiaki and the PVR Office,
noting
concern about the committee replacing genuine consultation and that only
mana whenua can represent their own interests, not a
committee.
- It
was also suggested that our interpretation of the Waitangi Tribunal’s
recommendations on the PVR regime was too narrow, and
that we should take into
account comments made on the patents Māori advisory committee. This was the
model the Tribunal had
recommended for PVRs (but is not the design of the
committee that has been implemented in the Patents
Act).
- Industry
was generally supportive of establishing a Māori advisory committee. Those
who commented on the effect of the committee’s
advice generally did not
think it should be binding on the Commissioner. One submitter expressed concern
about the potential powers
of the Māori advisory committee, and was keen to
ensure that safeguards would be built in to ensure that its function would
not
be “window dressing for commercial self-interest”.
Transparency and participation in plant breeding and the PVR
regime
- One
of the key questions we sought to better understand was how industry currently
works with kaitiaki in the development of plant
varieties, and any examples of
how the kaitiaki relationship has been considered in the development of new
varieties. We understand
from our engagement with breeders and Māori alike
that, currently, this happens sparingly, and we did not receive any examples
via
submissions.
- Few
breeders submitted on the origin of genetic material used in plant breeding, but
those who did confirmed that they gather this
information. These submitters also
suggested other information that breeders could provide to assist kaitiaki in
engaging with the
PVR register, including pedigree records, DNA fingerprinting
information, and a summary of breeding methodology (as required in
Australia).
Approach to Treaty of Waitangi
compliance in the PVR regime
- In
our Issues Paper, we stated that we considered that one of the main objectives
of a modern, fit-for-purpose PVR regime is “consistency
with the Treaty of
Waitangi”. As we have noted in Part 2 (in which we discussed the
objectives of the PVR Act), we are now using the term “Treaty of Waitangi
compliance”. Before we discuss our proposals and options for Treaty
compliance, we think it is useful to explain our perspective
on Treaty
compliance in this review.
This review remains focused on the plant variety rights regime
...
- The
PVR regime forms part of a wide range of law and policy that relates to how
plants can be accessed and used, by whom, and for
which purposes. We have heard,
through our hui and other channels, frustration with lack of Crown policy work
on the fundamental
issues around who owns or controls taonga species and
mātauranga Māori, particularly in the context of the Wai 262
inquiry.
- Many
people have told us that they think our review should cover these underlying,
and other related issues including: bioprospecting
policy (and an access and
benefit sharing regime); accession to the Nagoya Protocol; government funding of
(Māori) research
and science; protection of rongoā Māori; and
more.
- These
kinds of issues are outside of the scope of the current review. However, there
is work happening across government to consider
how the Crown might take a
joined-up approach to addressing them. We will be able to update you on this
work and its relationship
to the PVR Act review shortly.
... but our view on Treaty compliance in the PVR regime
responds to the legislative context...
- The
PVR Act allows the Government to provide exclusive rights to plant breeders over
the propagating material of new plant varieties
they develop. In our view, the
Treaty of Waitangi requires the Crown to consider kaitiaki interests – in
a meaningful and mana-enhancing
way that facilitates protection of those
interests – in the PVR regime. This requires a genuine and balanced
consideration
of the interests of kaitiaki at all stages of the PVR process,
from the start of the breeding programme to the decision on whether
or not to
grant a PVR.
- We
consider that this reflects both the Waitangi Tribunal’s Wai 262
recommendations and, to a large extent, what we have heard
in our engagement
process.
- We
have heard from Māori in this review that, in general, legislation relating
to taonga plant species (which largely predates
the release of the Waitangi
Tribunal’s Wai 262 report) does not protect their interests. Our
proposals, options and criteria
for complying with the Treaty in the PVR regime
reflect this legislative context.
- For
example, we do not consider that excluding new varieties derived from taonga
plant species from the PVR regime would facilitate
protection of kaitiaki
interests. In our consultation process, some people have suggested that plant
breeders should not be granted
exclusive rights to authorise the propagation of
the new varieties derived from indigenous plant species under any circumstances.
While we can understand this perspective, we do not agree with it. Excluding new
varieties derived from the plant material of indigenous
plant species from PVR
protection would result in little to no regulation of plant breeding of these
species. This review provides
an opportunity to ensure plant breeding in New
Zealand (and perhaps, internationally) is inclusive of kaitiaki interests. We
discuss
our proposals for achieving this in detail below.
... and our proposed approach is subject to change as related
legislation comes up for review.
- Our
conception of what is necessary to comply with the Treaty in the PVR regime is
heavily influenced by the current legislative context,
and is subject to change
as underlying issues relating to the protection of taonga plant species and
mātauranga Māori come
up for consideration.
- One
hui participant described the current PVR Act review, and the changes that can
be made, as part of a broader continuous improvement
process. This is how we see
it, too. Any new PVR Act arising from this review may be improved at a later
date to reflect the broader
legislative context around taonga plant species as
it evolves.
The issues to be addressed
- Our
understanding of the issues to be addressed in this review is based on our
understanding, as outlined above, that the Treaty of
Waitangi requires the Crown
to consider kaitiaki interests
– in a meaningful and mana-enhancing way that facilitates protection of
those interests – in
the PVR regime. This requires a genuine and balanced consideration of the
interests of kaitiaki at all stages of the PVR process,
from the start of the
breeding programme to the decision on whether or not to grant a PVR.
- The
PVR Act contains no references to the Treaty or te ao Māori. It does not
explicitly provide for consideration of the kaitiaki
relationships that
Māori hold with plants and mātauranga Māori to be considered in
the PVR grant decision-making process.
This creates a risk that PVRs may be
granted that negatively affect kaitiaki relationships. The current
decision-making process does
not provide sufficient consideration of kaitiaki
interests as required under the Treaty of Waitangi.
- Because
there is no provision for taking kaitiaki interests into account in
decision-making in the PVR Act, information about these
interests, and the
potential impact of PVRs on them, is not provided by PVR applicants and it is
generally not sought by the PVR
Office. In general, breeders do not gather this
information as there is no expectation that they do so. We understand that it is
rare for plant breeders to engage with kaitiaki at all.
- If
this information was gathered and provided by breeders as part of the
application process, the PVR Office would have limited capacity
currently to
consider this information, which requires a good understanding of te ao
Māori and, more specifically, kaitiaki
interests.
- We
consider, then, that there are three related key issues to be
addressed:
- a
lack of engagement by breeders with kaitiaki, which limits breeders’
understanding of the impact of their breeding activity
on kaitiaki interests and
their capacity to provide information on these matters to the PVR
Office;
- a
lack of provision for consideration of kaitiaki interests in the PVR grant
decision-making process, which risks negatively affecting
these
interests;
- a
lack of capacity in the PVR Office to consider matters related to kaitiaki
interests.
Proposals and options analysis
High-level overview
- To
achieve Treaty compliance in the PVR regime, we have developed a package of key
proposals to address the three issues identified
above (the
package).
- The
package contains proposals relating to:
- Disclosure
requirements: the information on kaitiaki interests that we propose must be
provided by plant breeders when they apply
for a PVR;
- Decisions
relating to kaitiaki interests: how decisions are made in relation to
information on kaitiaki interests provided in a PVR
application;
- Decision-makers
and advisors: who is involved in considering kaitiaki interests in the PVR grant
decision-making process, and how.
- The
package reflects the Wai 262 recommendations, and feedback received through
consultation and other engagement.
- Within
the proposal on decisions relating to kaitiaki interests, we have outlined three
options. These options represent different
levels of consideration for kaitiaki
interests and are the main focus of our analysis.
Criteria
- Taking
into account the current PVR regime, potential changes that could be made, and
the broader legislative context, we have considered
how the PVR regime as a
whole could be made compliant with the Treaty of Waitangi. Our criteria for
assessing our options and proposals
for implementing this are necessarily
different from those applied to other proposals in this paper (see Part
6).
- For
Treaty compliance, our criteria for options development and assessment
are:
- facilitates
meaningful and mana-enhancing consideration of kaitiaki interests in PVR
decision-making processes;
- provides
clarity for plant breeders for whom kaitiaki interests will be a relevant
consideration in the PVR grant process;
- minimises
additional compliance costs.
- In
assessing the options, we assign a double weighting to criterion (a) as it
directly responds to the problem definition. Criteria
(b) and (c) are secondary
objectives and require us to consider the workability of changes we may seek in
the specific context of
the PVR regime.
Treaty compliance –
criteria for analysis
Do you agree with the criteria that we have identified? Do you agree with the
weighting we have given the criteria? If not, why not?
3
Approach to key terms
- Before
we continue on to our proposals, it is useful to set out our approach to key
terms.
- A
major concern we have heard from breeders and Māori relates to how new PVR
legislation will deal with the concepts of ‘taonga
species’ and
‘kaitiaki’ used in the Wai 262 report.
- We
do not think at this stage that the terms ‘taonga species’ and
‘kaitiaki’ should be defined within the
PVR Act, in advance of a
broader and more comprehensive policy development process around the protection
of taonga species generally.
The new PVR Act would not be
the
appropriate vehicle for defining these terms in legislation (if at all), given
the Act’s narrow application and, consequently,
the narrow nature of the
discussions we have had on these issues.
- We
are also unsure of how useful the concept of ‘taonga species’ is in
the PVR context. The more helpful focus is likely
to be on the origin of plant
material used in breeding programmes,
i.e. whether it originated in New Zealand from indigenous plant species or other
species of significance to Māori, given that
not all species indigenous to
New Zealand are endemic (indigenous to New Zealand only). For example, we
consider that there are unlikely
to be kaitiaki interests in sticky hopbush or
ake ake (dodonaea viscosa) where this has been sourced from Australia
(where it is also indigenous), but there may be kaitiaki interests where it has
been
sourced from New Zealand.
- However,
we agree it is important that (i) we provide certainty to plant breeders about
whether the new requirements we propose below
apply to their breeding
programmes, and
(ii) provide clarity to iwi, hapū and whānau about how their interests
in plants will be considered in the PVR Act specifically.
- We
suggest proceeding on the basis of the following
principles:
- Where
plant material originating in New Zealand from indigenous plant species
(indigenous plant material) has been used to develop
a new plant variety, there
is a presumption that there are kaitiaki who may have interests in the
indigenous plant material.
- Generally,
iwi, hapū or whānau who hold mana whenua over the rohe in which the
plant material has been sourced in the wild
may have kaitiaki interests in
indigenous plant material.
- Iwi,
hapū and whānau may also have kaitiaki interests in plant material
from species that are not strictly indigenous to
New Zealand – for
example, species that were introduced to New Zealand on the migrating waka, like
kumara. We refer to these
in the remainder of this Part as non-indigenous
species of significance.
- Where
the indigenous plant material or plant material from non-indigenous species of
significance has been used to develop a new plant
variety but its regional
origin is not able to be identified, those who hold mana whenua over the rohe
where the variety has been
developed (e.g. the location of the nursery) may have
a kaitiaki interest in the new variety.
- Our
preference at this stage is that these principles be expressed, and further
explained, in guidelines produced by the Māori
advisory committee, building
on the findings of the Tribunal and in collaboration with kaitiaki and breeders.
We are interested in
your views on these general principles and how they might
be expressed and apply in practice in the PVR regime – for example,
whether it would be useful to specifically list non-indigenous species of
significance in any new legislation.
Treaty compliance – key
terms
Do you agree with our proposed approach to these key terms?
Do you have any comments on the principles listed above and how they might
apply in practice? For example, would it be useful to specifically
list
non-indigenous species of significance?
4
Key proposals
- Here
we set out our proposals and options in relation to the three elements of the
proposed package:
- disclosure
requirements;
- decisions
relating to kaitiaki interests;
- decision-makers
and advisors.
New information disclosure requirements
- A
key message we heard in our hui and submissions from Māori was that there
would be considerable value from early, meaningful
and ongoing engagement with
kaitiaki by plant breeders in their breeding programmes. As we have mentioned,
this happens rarely if
at all. This means that breeders are not considering the
impact of their breeding programmes on kaitiaki relationships, and that
kaitiaki
have low or no awareness about breeding programmes that may affect their
kaitiaki obligations.
- To
incentivise quality engagement between kaitiaki and breeders – and
facilitate consideration of kaitiaki interests by the
PVR Office – we
propose adding new disclosure requirements to the PVR regime. This would require
breeders to first indicate
whether their new variety is derived from plant
material from either indigenous species or non-indigenous species of
significance.
If so, the breeder will also be required to
disclose:
- who
the kaitiaki are;
- a
record of engagement with kaitiaki, and the outcome of that
engagement;
- their
assessment of whether kaitiaki interests would be affected by the
commercialisation of the relevant variety and if so, how the
impacts will be
mitigated.
- If
an applicant does not provide information requested by the Commissioner within a
specified period, the application will lapse.
This means that the application
will not proceed to testing, with the effect that a PVR will not end up being
granted. Information
provided by breeders would be made available on the PVR
register, unless confidential.
- These
information disclosure requirements implicitly require breeders and kaitiaki to
work together to understand and balance each
other’s interests, and decide
how they might work together throughout a potential breeding programme and
beyond.
- Engaging
with kaitiaki to understand their interests will be new to many breeders.
Different kaitiaki will have different interests
and require different levels of
engagement. To facilitate effective engagement between kaitiaki and breeders, we
propose a collaborative
process involving the PVR Office, breeders and kaitiaki
to establish engagement protocols at some stage following policy decisions.
These protocols should be informed by the criteria discussed above (and where
possible will draw on existing tools such as the Te
Puni Kōkiri registered
iwi database).
Decision-making on kaitiaki interests
- We
envisage that over time, with sufficient guidance, advice from the Māori
advisory committee and goodwill from all parties,
kaitiaki and breeders will be
able to agree among themselves how their interests in relation to any new
variety should be balanced
and provided for, leading to a straight-forward grant
process.
- However,
there will inevitably be situations where the engagement has not gone so well or
perhaps not even happened at all. It is
important that there is a genuine
balancing of interests in the decisions on the PVRs as a backstop measure for
these situations
where breeders and kaitiaki have been unable to work matters
through themselves.
- We
suggest three options for achieving this:
Option 1: introduce a new power to limit the exercise of a PVR over a variety if
the Commissioner of PVRs and the Chair of the proposed
PVR Māori advisory
committee consider that kaitiaki interests are affected by the grant of the
PVR
Option 2: introduce a new power to allow the refusal of a PVR by the
Commissioner of PVRs and the Chair of the proposed PVR Māori
advisory
committee if kaitiaki interests would be negatively affected and the impact
could not be mitigated to a reasonable extent
such as to allow the grant
Option 3: introduce both of the Option 1 and Option 2 powers.
- Option
1 is a UPOV 91-compliant option. Under UPOV 91, a PVR must be granted if it
meets five criteria (the variety is new, distinct,
uniform, stable, and has an
acceptable name). UPOV 91 members cannot require additional criteria (such as
that proposed in the Wai
262 kaitiaki recommendations) for a grant of a
PVR.
- UPOV
91 does, however, allow parties to restrict PVR owners’ free exercise of
their PVRs if this is in the public interest.11 We consider that
protecting the kaitiaki relationship as an example of Treaty partnership is in
the public interest.
- Option
2 is not consistent with UPOV 91 as it adds a sixth criterion for a grant of
PVR. It is the first of the kaitiaki recommendations
of the Waitangi Tribunal in
the Wai 262 report, and is our preferred option.
- Option
3 combines both option 1 and option 2. This would give decision-makers the
widest suite of options to balance the interests
of kaitiaki with breeders,
giving them the option of not granting a PVR and/or limiting the exercise of a
PVR.
Decision-makers and advisors
- Currently,
the PVR Office does not have expertise in-house on te ao Māori or tikanga
Māori, and would be ill-equipped to
consider and advise on issues relating
to kaitiaki relationships.
- We
recommend that a Māori advisory committee be formed to assist in these
matters. In slight contrast to the Wai 262 recommendation,
we recommend that a
new committee is established for the PVR regime (rather than using the patents
committee). This reflects the
nature of the role that we envisage for the
committee. Roles that we consider the committee would do
include:
- developing
guidelines for breeders and kaitiaki on engagement;
- providing
advice to, and working with, breeders and kaitiaki at the pre-application
stage;
- providing
advice to the PVR Office and decision-makers on PVR grant matters,
including:
- advice
on whether variety names are likely to be offensive to
Māori;
- advice
on:
- how
information disclosed by the breeder might bear on the five criteria for
varieties for which there are kaitiaki interests (and
if the criteria are
met);
- whether
kaitiaki relationships would be affected by the grant of a PVR over the relevant
variety; and if so:
- for
Option 1 above, advice on how the exercise of the PVR should be limited to
protect kaitiaki interests;
- for
Option 2 above, advice on whether kaitiaki interests would be adversely affected
by the grant of a PVR and, if so, whether the
impact can be mitigated to a
reasonable extent such as to allow the grant;
11 See article 17(1) of UPOV 91.
- for
Option 3 above, advice on whether the grant should be refused, and if not, how
the exercise of the PVR should be limited to protect
kaitiaki
relationships.
- On
grant decisions for varieties for which there is a kaitiaki interest, the Chair
of the Māori advisory committee would sit
jointly with the Commissioner of
PVRs. This reflects feedback we have received through the hui and submissions
process that the purely
advisory role of any proposed Māori advisory
committee may not adequately reflect the Treaty principle of partnership. It
also
reflects the Waitangi Tribunal’s recommendations on the patents
Māori advisory committee in the Wai 262 report that “a
mechanism is
needed to augment the commissioner’s expertise when dealing with
applications raising Māori issues”
ensuring that “a Māori
voice is at the table when competing interests come to be
balanced”.12
- Administrative
law and policy considerations would need to be considered in designing this
proposal (for example, the Chair’s
functions may need to differ from the
committee’s, given this advisory and decision-making role). We will be
considering this
further.
12 Waitangi Tribunal Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A
Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Māori
Culture and Identity: Te Taumata
Tuarua (Wai 262, 2011) vol 1 at 201.
43
Summary table: Proposal package with decision-making
options
|
Package with Option 1 – UPOV
91-compliant
|
Package with Option 2 – not UPOV 91- compliant
|
Package with Option 3 – not UPOV 91- compliant
|
Disclosure requirements
|
Requires evidence of identification and engagement with kaitiaki, and
assessment of the effect of a grant on kaitiaki interests by
breeder.
Application can lapse if information not provided.
|
Decision in relation to kaitiaki relationships
|
No ability to refuse a grant if kaitiaki interests would be negatively
affected.
|
Grant of a PVR can be refused if kaitiaki interests would be negatively
affected, and impacts cannot be mitigated.
|
Post grant decision making
|
Restrictions on the exercise of the breeder’s right post-grant can be
made in the public interest.
|
No restrictions on the exercise of the breeder’s right post-grant can
be made in the public interest.
|
Restrictions on the exercise of the breeder’s right post-grant can be
made in the public interest.
|
Māori advisory committee
|
Roles would include:
- developing
guidelines for breeders and kaitiaki on engagement
- providing advice
to, and working with, breeders and kaitiaki at the pre-application stage
- providing advice
to the PVR Office and decision-makers on PVR pre-grant and/or post-grant matters
(depending on the option).
|
Decision- makers on varieties for which there is a kaitiaki interest
|
Commissioner of PVRs and Māori advisory committee chair.
|
Analysis
- Below
we outline our analysis (summarised in the following table) of the three options
for considering the kaitiaki relationship in
the decision-making process under
each of the criteria.
Analysis summary
|
Meaningful and mana-enhancing consideration of
kaitiaki interests
|
Clarity for plant breeders
|
Minimise additional compliance costs
|
Comment
|
Status quo
|
Currently no recognition of kaitiaki interests.
|
Clear, because no obligations on breeders in relation to protecting
kaitiaki interests.
|
No current costs because no obligations on breeders in relation to
protecting kaitiaki interests.
|
The current PVR Act currently does not provide explicit recognition of
kaitiaki interests.
|
Option 1 Post-grant
|
Does not allow a genuine balancing of the kaitiaki
interest with that of the
|
Middle option in terms of uncertainty.
|
All participants will experience some increase
in costs. Likely to be equal
|
This option is not Treaty compliant. It does not
allow the consideration of
|
consideration
|
breeder, but could allow
|
|
in all three packages.
|
kaitiaki interests in a
|
only
|
limited control if decision-
makers felt so minded.
|
|
|
mana-enhancing way
(though the outcome of
|
|
|
|
|
decision-making may be
|
|
|
|
|
similar to option 2).
|
Option 2 Pre-grant
|
Aligns with existing IP settings to consider
kaitiaki interests; is mana-
|
More uncertain than the status quo, but two clear
outcomes of grant (rather
|
As above.
|
This option is Treaty compliant. It strikes the
best balance between
|
consideration
|
enhancing for all parties.
|
than multiple possibilities
|
|
facilitating mana-
|
only (preferred
|
|
under Option 1and 3)
makes it the most certain
option.
|
|
enhancing consideration
of kaitiaki interests and
ensuring certainty for
|
option)
|
|
|
|
breeders.
|
Option 3 Both pre- and post- grant consideration
|
Provides widest suite of options for considering and protecting the
kaitiaki interest.
|
Most uncertain. Two layers of uncertainty apply for breeders: whether they
will be granted the right, and whether there will be limits
if a grant is
made.
Likely to introduce too much uncertainty for breeders, who may opt
out from the regime.
|
As above.
|
This option is Treaty of Waitangi compliant. However, if the uncertainty
disincentivises breeder engagement with the PVR regime, this
may be equivalent
to the status quo in terms of actual protection for kaitiaki interests.
|
Facilitating meaningful and mana-enhancing consideration of
kaitiaki relationships
- All
of the options represent an improvement on the status quo. However, they offer
different degrees of consideration of kaitiaki
relationships.
- In
the Wai 262 report, the Waitangi Tribunal describes mana as “authority,
prestige, reputation, spiritual power”. We
heard about the importance of
decision-making processes being mana-enhancing in our hui and in submissions. We
consider that a mana-enhancing
decision-making process should reflect the
principle that interests of all parties are valid and important, and worthy of
consideration
in a genuine and meaningful way. Engagement in the PVR regime
should enhance the mana of all involved: kaitiaki, breeders, growers,
other
parties and the Crown.
- For
comparison, in both the patents and trade marks regimes, the decision-making
process explicitly recognises that the provision
of intellectual property rights
may negatively affect Māori interests and that, in those cases,
intellectual property rights
should not be granted. In the case of patents, a
grant may be refused if the commercial exploitation of an invention is likely to
be contrary to Māori values. In the trade mark regime, a trade mark can be
refused if it is likely to be offensive to Māori.
These provisions
represent a genuine, mana-enhancing balancing of interests at the grant
decision-making stage of each of these regimes.
- Option
2 gives effect to the main recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal in the Wai
262 report and best aligns with current intellectual
property settings for
protecting Māori interests. It would require decision-makers to balance the
interests of kaitiaki with
those of breeders in the decision whether or not to
grant a PVR. We consider that this option is necessary to meet our Treaty
obligations
as assessed against the first of our criteria for Treaty
compliance.
- Option
1 is the UPOV 91-consistent option. It would result in the granting of PVRs over
all varieties that met the “five criteria”
under UPOV 91, but would
allow decision-makers to make restrictions on the exercise of the
breeder’s right post-grant in the
public interest. While the outcome of
the decision-making process under both Options 1 and 2 could often be similar in
practice,
we consider that Option 1 process is not mana-enhancing for kaitiaki.
The inability of decision-makers to choose not to grant the
right, where doing
so would negatively affect the kaitiaki relationship, has the effect of
prioritising the interests of breeders,
who can be given their PVRs before
kaitiaki relationships can be considered. This does not reflect a genuine
balancing of interests
and therefore falls short of what is required under the
Treaty (as set out in the first of our criteria for Treaty compliance).
Furthermore,
it is inconsistent with the Wai 262 recommendations and other
intellectual property regimes.
- Option
2, as compared to Option 1, also reinforces the idea that breeders have a
responsibility to engage with kaitiaki and consider
their interests in the first
instance (though this does not discharge the Crown’s duties to Māori
under the Treaty). As
we have noted above, these decision-making options are
intended to be a backstop measure in what we expect will be the minority of
cases where engagement has perhaps not been effective or not happened at all. If
breeders know that they will receive a right in
some capacity so long as they
meet the five criteria, as under Option 2, they may be willing to risk not
bothering with kaitiaki
engagement at all. This is not an outcome we are
seeking.
- Option
3, in combining Options 1 and 2, provides decision-makers with the widest suite
of options for providing consideration of the
kaitiaki interest – both in
the grant decision, and once the grant decision has been made. However, as we
discuss below, Option
3 introduces the most uncertainty for
breeders.
Clarity for breeders
- Certainty
and cost-effectiveness are important considerations. There are currently no
legal obligations on plant breeders to consider
the Treaty or the rights and
interests of kaitiaki in their plant breeding processes. There is a significant
gap in New Zealand’s
regulation relating to access and use of biological
and genetic resources generally.
- The
extent to which a new PVR regime can improve this is very limited. Any new
requirements that we put into place in the PVR regime
will only apply to
breeders who seek PVR protection. Some breeders may choose not to apply for a
PVR if they consider that the costs
of gaining protection will outweigh the
benefits. In such cases, plant breeders will put their varieties on the market
without protection.
- To
facilitate better protection for kaitiaki relationships, we need to ensure that
any new requirements to do so do not disincentivise
breeders from applying for
PVRs, given the current legislative context discussed
above.
- All
of the options add uncertainty for breeders to the PVR regime, however, we
consider that Option 2 provides the least amount of
uncertainty. Breeders will
know that when they come to apply for a PVR, they will either be given a full
grant or no grant at all.
If they have undertaken engagement with kaitiaki and
have agreed with kaitiaki how their interests will be protected, they can be
more certain that they will be given a grant of PVR.
- Options
1 and 3 introduce considerable uncertainty (Option 3 more so), as
decision-makers could make any number of restrictions on
breeders’ rights.
In our view, inconsistency across the regime in terms of the scope of PVRs would
likely deter breeders from
applying for PVRs over varieties derived from
indigenous species or species of significance to Māori. We expect that they
would
continue to breed such varieties but choose to avoid the cost and time it
takes to gain protection, given that the outcome would
be uncertain. Lack of
buy-in from breeders about any new PVR regime will limit the effectiveness of
any new requirements if it causes
them to opt out of the PVR
regime.
Minimising additional compliance costs
- Regardless
of what option we choose, the package, in general, will increase costs for all
parties, including breeders, as compared
to the status quo. We have not
undertaken an evaluation of the costs for breeders or kaitiaki, as these are
likely to vary significantly
depending on the nature of the kaitiaki
relationship, who identifies as kaitiaki, and the species. The PVR Office and
Māori
advisory committee will also play an important role in facilitating
relationships, particularly early on in the engagement process.
As we have noted
above, engagement protocols to be established together with breeders, kaitiaki
and the PVR Office will provide more
certainty on the expectations of each
party.
- We
consider that any difference between the costs of the three options is likely to
be negligible for breeders, the Māori advisory
committee/PVR Office and
kaitiaki. All options anticipate a similar level of engagement between breeders
and kaitiaki. The PVR Office
and Māori advisory committee will likely be
required to provide significant assistance to breeders and kaitiaki alike.
Kaitiaki
are also likely to have similar costs under all
options.
Conclusion
- In
the current legislative context, we consider that Option 2 best meets the
criteria and represents the level of consideration of
kaitiaki interests
necessary for Treaty of Waitangi compliance in the PVR
regime.
Treaty compliance – options analysis
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
5
- Criteria
for analysis of options for
aligning with UPOV 91
- As
discussed in Part 4, whether we accede to UPOV 91 or not, we are still required
to align our regime with UPOV 91, subject to meeting
our Treaty obligations. In
the remainder of this Options Paper, we discuss and set out our preliminary
analysis of options for aligning
our regime with UPOV 91. Some provisions of
UPOV 91 give us limited, if any, flexibility as to how they are implemented
(such as
the definitions and the exclusive rights it affords). These are mainly
discussed in Parts 7 and 8. Other provisions in UPOV 91 leave
considerable
domestic policy flexibility as to how they are implemented. Options to implement
these provisions are discussed in Parts
9 and 10.
Criteria for preliminary options
analysis
- In
terms of the areas in which we retain domestic policy flexibility under UPOV 91
(beyond that required to meet our Treaty of Waitangi
obligations) – and
for which we need a framework for considering analysis of the different
potential options – the PVR
regime can be broken down into the following
main components:
- Scope
of the right – i.e. what acts does the right cover and what acts are
specifically excluded from coverage;
- Compulsory
licences – i.e. what protections are there for rights users against unfair
practices on the part of rights owners;
- Enforcement
– i.e. how do rights holders enforce their rights when they are
infringed.
Scope of rights
- This
sets out exactly what acts the right covers. Some areas are set by UPOV 91, but
there remains policy flexibility around:
- term
of the right;
- how
to implement the EDV provisions;
- how
far to extend the right in relation to harvested material (and products made
from harvested material);
- how
to address farm saved seed.
- The
aim of these provisions is to incentivise the development of new varieties by
providing rights holders with a reasonable opportunity
to get a return on the
investment they make in plant breeding. This must be balanced against the
interests of rights users, consumers
and others so that there is net benefit to
New Zealand. For New Zealand to benefit from this innovation, it is important
that there
is:
- sufficient
incentive for breeders to develop new varieties;
- reasonable
opportunity for the public to access new varieties and make products that will
satisfy consumer demand and support New
Zealand’s economic
growth;
- opportunity
for those who do not seek commercial benefit from new varieties to access those
varieties;
- opportunity
for those who wish to build on the innovation to access those
varieties.
- The
last two points are covered by the compulsory exceptions in UPOV 91 (see
discussion in Part 8) and so are not directly relevant
here.
- On
this basis, we consider the appropriate criteria for analysis of options
relating to the scope of the right to be:
- incentivises
the development of new varieties, and encourages foreign breeders to release
their new varieties in New Zealand, by providing
sufficient opportunity for
rights holders to get a reasonable return on their investment;
- ensures
that the public has reasonable access to new varieties so as to meet public
demand for the varieties and the products derived
from
them;
- provides
certainty to rights holders and the public about the scope of the
right.
- We
consider that criteria (a) and (b) should be given more weight than criteria (c)
as they directly respond to the objectives we
seek from the PVR regime, whereas
(c) is more about the workability of the changes we
propose.
Compulsory licences
- The
aim of the compulsory licence provisions is to protect the public interest by
providing a mechanism to counter behaviour by PVR
owners that is inconsistent
with the social contract involved in the grant of PVRs (such as unreasonably
restricting the availability
of propagating material). This needs to be balanced
against the interests of rights holders and the desire to not unreasonably limit
innovation.
- MBIE
proposes a number of changes in response to issues raised by submitters. These
mainly address issues of clarity with the current
provisions and are consistent
with other intellectual property regimes where appropriate.
- Only
on two issues are a number of distinct options for change considered (the three
year “grace period” and the provisions
of section 21(3)). Given the
aim of the compulsory licence provisions, the same criteria as for the options
for scope of the right
are appropriate here (with the third criterion amended
accordingly).
Enforcement
- The
issue of enforcement is divided into infringements and offences. MBIE proposes a
number of changes in response to issues raised
by submitters in relation to
infringements, mainly around clarity with infringement provisions. These are
primarily guided by considering
consistency with other intellectual property
legislation. However, we are not proposing any significant change to the current
framework,
and so do not present any distinct options for change in relation to
the infringement provisions.
- In
relation to offences (which are predominantly about misleading or deceptive
behaviour) the current framework is quite dated and
not utilised, so we do
present options for change. We consider the following criteria are appropriate
for assessing these options:
- the
extent to which the option deters misleading and deceptive behaviour in relation
to protected varieties;
- proportionality:
is the nature of the misleading or deceptive behaviour sufficient to justify
making it a criminal offence in the
PVR Act?
- is
the misleading or deceptive behaviour dealt with in other legislative
provisions?
- We
consider that all these criteria have equal weighting in our
analysis.
Treaty of Waitangi considerations
- Our
criteria for analysing the options for incorporating the Treaty in the PVR
regime were discussed separately in Part 5.
Options analysis summary
- We
will summarise the options analysis in each instance with a table based on the
template below. Where we indicate a preferred option,
we will do this by shading
(as with Option 2 below). The comment column summarises how the analysis has led
to our preferred
option.
Analysis summary
|
Incentivise investment
|
Ensure public access
|
Provide certainty
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
|
|
|
|
Option 2
|
|
|
|
|
Option 3
|
|
|
|
|
UPOV 91 alignment – criteria for analysis
Do you have any comment to make about our approach to, and criteria for, the
preliminary options analysis in this paper?
6
7 Definitions
- New
Zealand’s obligations under the CPTPP require us to (at least) implement a
regime that gives effect to UPOV 91 (if not,
accede to UPOV 91), subject to
meeting our Treaty of Waitangi obligations.
- This
means that the definitions considered in this part must, at least, meet the
standards required by UPOV 91. Each topic therefore
begins with a comparison of
the provisions of UPOV 91 and the provisions of the current PVR
Act.
- There
are also definitional issues to be addressed in relation to meeting our Treaty
of Waitangi obligations – in particular,
how we approach the terms
‘taonga species’ and ‘kaitiaki’. We addressed these
issues in Part 5.
Owner v breeder
|
PVR Act
|
“Breeder” means:
- the person who
bred, or discovered and developed, a variety,
- the person who
is the employer of the aforementioned person or who has commissioned the
latter's work, where the laws of the relevant
Contracting Party so provide,
or
- the successor in
title of the first or second aforementioned person, as the case may
be.
|
owner, in relation to any variety, means a person who bred or discovered
that variety, and includes a successor of that person.
|
- While
the choice of word itself is not prescribed by UPOV 91 – both refer to the
person with the rights over the protected variety
– the definition must be
made consistent with UPOV 91.13
- We
discuss below an option of including a definition of “breed” in the
legislation to address concerns raised about “discovery”
of
varieties in the wild. If this definition is accepted, the UPOV 91 definition of
“breeder” would need to be adjusted
accordingly.
- The
definition of “owner” in the PVR Act does not expressly include
employers, where the variety is bred by an employee.
It also does not include a
person who commissioned another to breed a new variety. To align with UPOV 91,
it will be necessary to
clarify that these are also included in the
definition.
13 We use the terms “PVR owner” and
“breeder” interchangeably in this Options Paper.
- Few
submitters commented on this issue, but those who did preferred terms along the
lines of “rights holder”. However,
this term would only apply once
the right had been granted, and the PVR Act also needs to refer to individuals
before the grant is
made (e.g. in the application process). Final terms will be
determined during the legislative drafting process.
Bred v discovered
- Currently
neither the PVR Act nor UPOV 91 has a definition of “breed”. This
issue was considered when the previous review
of the Act was undertaken in the
2000s to address the uncertainty in the term “developed” in the
definition of “owner”.
While in practice a variety that is simply
discovered will not be eligible for a PVR (human input to develop the plant into
a cultivar
that would meet the criteria for a PVR is necessary) the wording in
the PVR Act is not clear.
- The
draft 2005 Bill addressed this issue by incorporating a definition of
“breed”:
breed, in relation to a variety, includes the process of
selection within the natural variation of a plant or plant population, together
with the process of propagation and evaluation so as to enable the development
of the variety.
- This
definition was endorsed by the Waitangi Tribunal, and is one of the four
recommendations they made relating to PVRs in the Wai
262 report. For this
reason, our preferred option is to incorporate this definition in the new
legislation.
- The
alternative option is to adopt the definition of “breeder” in UPOV
91. This, arguably, addresses this issue through
the phrase “bred, or
discovered and developed”.
Definitions – breed
Our preferred option is to incorporate the definition of “breed”
that was considered in the previous review to address
concerns around discovery
of varieties in the wild.
Do you agree? If not, why not?
7
Variety
|
PVR Act
|
"Variety" means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the
lowest known rank, which grouping, irrespective of whether
the conditions for
the grant of a breeder's right are fully met, can be:
- defined by the
expression of the characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination
of genotypes,
- distinguished
from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one of the said
characteristics and
- considered as a
unit with regard to its suitability for being propagated
unchanged.
|
variety means a cultivar, or cultivated variety, of a plant, and includes
any clone, hybrid, stock, or line, of a plant; but does
not include a botanical
variety of a plant.
|
- The
UPOV 91 definition of “variety” is more prescriptive than the PVR
Act. The UPOV 91 definition of “variety”
only includes botanical
organisms of the lowest ranking.14 A person cannot obtain a PVR grant
for an entire plant species (for example, cabbage tree (Cordyline
australis)) but can obtain a PVR grant for a variety of a plant
species.
- It
has been raised that the term “variety” is not strictly correct in
this context as it has a specific definition in
Linnaean Rules.
“Cultivar” is the correct term. While we acknowledge this, we
consider that consistency with the terminology
of UPOV 91 is preferable.
Whatever term we use, it will be necessary that the definition is consistent
with UPOV 91.
Other UPOV 91 definition issues
- UPOV
91 uses different terms from the PVR Act in a couple more places
too:
- It
uses the term “uniform” (in the context of the criteria for a PVR
grant), whereas the PVR Act uses the term “homogenous”.
Homogeneous
implies that the plants must be identical whereas uniform allows for some
variation within the variety. In reality there
tends to be some variation within
a single variety.
- It
uses the term “propagating material”, whereas the PVR Act uses the
term “reproductive material”. Reproduction
is generally understood
as reproducing a new organism whereas plants can multiply via cloning
(vegetative propagation). “Propagating
material” is a broader term
and more accurately reflects this process.
- Whatever
terms are used in the final legislation, the meaning should be consistent with
UPOV 91.
Definitions – general
Do you have any comments on the definitional issues discussed in this
Part?
8
14 A “single botanical taxon” refers to
the taxonomical rankings given to plants (for example, the common taxa are
kingdom,
class, order, family, genus, and species).
8 Scope of the right – general issues
- Parts
8 and 9 cover all the issues associated with the scope of a plant variety right.
The issues are broken down as follows:
- scope
of the breeder’s right, including:
- extension
to harvested material;
- essentially
derived varieties (EDVs).
- exceptions
to the breeder’s right, including:
- the
farm saved seed exception.
- term
of the breeder’s right.
- In
this Part, we discuss the provisions of UPOV 91 relating to the scope of the
right for which there is no policy flexibility, i.e.
that we consider we have to
implement to be consistent with or give effect to it.
- Part
9 addresses the specific issues of term of the right, harvested material, EDVs
and farm saved seed. These are discussed in more
detail because there remains
considerable policy freedom in how these are implemented.
- As
already discussed, our CPTPP obligations require us to at least meet the
standards required under UPOV 91 in relation to each of
these policy issues.
Each topic therefore begins with a comparison of the provisions of UPOV 91 and
the provisions of the current
PVR Act.
- Implementation
of our CPTPP obligations in relation to UPOV 91 is always subject to the
flexibility required to meet out Treaty of
Waitangi
obligations.
Scope of the breeder’s right
What is the issue?
|
PVR Act
|
Scope of the breeder’s right (Article 14)
UPOV 91 requires that the following acts in respect of the propagating
material of the protected variety shall require the authorization
of the
breeder:
(i) production or reproduction
|
Rights of Grantees (Section 17)
Under the PVR Act, the PVR owner has the exclusive right to produce for
sale, and to sell reproductive material of the protected variety.
For vegetatively propagated varieties, the exclusive right also extends to
propagation of
|
(multiplication),
(ii) conditioning for the purpose of propagation,
(iii) offering for sale,
(iv) selling or other marketing,
(v) exporting,
(vi) importing,
(vii) stocking for any of the purposes mentioned in (i) to (vi),
above.
This is a significant extension of rights compared to the PVR Act.
It also provides that the breeder may make his authorization subject to
conditions and limitations.
Article 14 also considers both compulsory and optional extensions of these
rights to essentially derived varieties, harvested material
and the products
made from harvested material.
|
that variety for the purposes of the commercial production of fruit,
flowers, or other products, of that variety.
The PVR owner authorise any other person to do any of these things, subject
to any terms and conditions set by the PVR owner.
Section 19 of the PVR Act provides that a licensee has the same rights as
the PVR owner to take proceedings in respect of an infringement.
|
- The
current law is based on reproduction for sale whereas UPOV 91 is based on
commercial exploitation of the variety as a whole. To
give effect to UPOV 91,
New Zealand must expand the existing rights under the PVR Act so that they are
consistent with those set
out in Article 14(1) of UPOV 91.
Right to authorise the production or reproduction
- Expanding
the rights regarding the propagating material to all production or
reproduction will mean that the PVR owner’s permission (i.e. through
licensing) will be needed even if the production
of the propagating material is
not intended for sale, although the exceptions set out in Articles 15 of UPOV 91
(discussed below)
will apply.
- In
many cases, contractual agreements between PVR owners and growers already
provide for this. However, this change could mean that
some PVR owners generate
greater returns through increased royalties and sales of propagating material
which could lead to increased
reinvestment in breeding but additional costs for
growers and consumers.
Right to import
- Under
the current legislation, the PVR owner has certain rights over the importation
of protected varieties:
- Imported
reproductive material of a protected variety cannot be propagated, sold or used
as reproductive material without the authorisation
of the PVR owner.
- Produce
of a protected variety cannot be imported from a country that is not a UPOV
member, or from a country that is a UPOV member
but that does not extend
protection to that kind of variety.
- However,
there is no restriction on the import of reproductive material if it is not used
for reproductive purposes, or on the import
of reproductive material from a
country where it is possible to protect that variety.
- Under
UPOV 91, a person would not be able to import propagating material of protected
varieties without the PVR owner’s authorisation.
Extending the right to
cover importing would have no practical change where material is imported for
reproductive purposes, because
such use of imported material currently requires
the PVR owner’s authorisation.
- Import
of propagating material for consumption or other non-reproductive purposes is
also unlikely to be impacted. As discussed in
Part 10, the right is exhausted
when propagating material is exported for non-propagating purposes. So, with
regards importing this
material into New Zealand, if the country is a UPOV 91
member then exhaustion will apply. If the country is not a UPOV 91 member
(or is
a UPOV member but the particular variety is not from a genera or species that is
available for protection) then the PVR owner
would have the opportunity to
assert their rights in relation to that material.
Right to authorise conditioning for the purpose of
propagation
- Reproductive
material often needs to be “conditioned” (for example, seed drying
and cleaning) before being used to grow
new plants. This right would make it
easier for PVR owners to detect the unauthorised sale of reproductive material
because reproductive
material could potentially be identified and monitored
through the conditioning process before material is sold.
Right to authorise export of the propagating material
- The
PVR Act does not prohibit unauthorised export and PVR owners must rely on the
protection afforded to the variety in the country
of export. Under this
extension of the right, PVR owners would be able to take action in New Zealand
and might be able to prevent
the propagating material being exported in the
first place.15 This may make it more difficult for foreign growers to
“pirate” new varieties protected in New
Zealand.
Right to authorise stocking of the propagating material
- This
right means that the authority of the PVR owner is required to stock propagating
material of a protected variety for any of the
purposes listed above. This would
make it easier for PVR owners to prevent the user from undertaking other
infringing acts such as
unauthorised propagation of the protected
variety.
15 But only if the reproductive material is to be
used for further propagation of the variety: see Exhaustion of the right in Part
10.
Scope of the breeder’s right
Do you have any comments about these new rights required by UPOV 91?
9
Exceptions to the breeder’s
right
What is the issue?
|
PVR Act
|
Article 15(1) of UPOV 91 provides for exceptions to the exclusive rights
provided to PVR owners under Article 14. These exceptions
are:
- acts done
privately and for non- commercial purposes,
- acts done for
experimental purposes,
- acts done for
the purpose of breeding new varieties, and except where the new variety is an
“essentially derived variety”,
any of the acts set out in Articles
14(1) – (4) in respect of those new
varieties.
Article 15(2) of UPOV 91 provides for an
optional exception for farm saved seed. This is dealt with in Part 9.
|
Section 18 provides for the following exceptions to PVR owners’
exclusive rights:
- the propagation,
growing, or use of a protected variety for non-commercial purposes,
- the use of a
variety to breed a new variety, and sale of that new variety, unless the
production of the new variety requires repeated
use of the protected
variety,
- use of
propagating material of a protected variety for human consumption or other
non-propagating purposes.
|
- In
line with New Zealand’s CPTPP obligations, we must, as a minimum, align
our PVR legislation with UPOV 91. This section looks
at the UPOV 91 provisions
relating to compulsory exceptions to PVR rights.
- Exceptions
allow persons to do certain acts covered by the exclusive rights granted to PVR
owners, without the permission of the PVR
owner.
- The
PVR Act provides for exceptions for non-commercial use of a protected variety,
the breeding of a new variety (“the breeders’
exemption”) and
use or sale of that new variety16, and uses of protected varieties
that do not involve further propagation of the variety.
- Article
15(1) of UPOV 91 provides for compulsory exceptions to PVR rights that are
slightly different to those in the PVR Act. We
must align the PVR Act with
these.
16 Unless production of the new variety requires
repeated use of the protected variety.
What did submitters say?
- Few
submitters mentioned exceptions. One submitter argued that there should be no
exception for non-commercial uses as this submitter
believed that everyone
should pay a royalty for use of a protected variety to acknowledge the
breeder’s intellectual property.
However, intellectual property rights
involve a social contract (and, as argued in the Sapere report, are more akin to
a conditional
grant than a private property right). Breeders receive the right
on the condition that the innovation is made available so that there
is a net
benefit to New Zealand as a whole, and it is the exceptions that give effect to
this condition.
- Another
submitter expressed concern at any restriction of the current exemption for non-
commercial use to private and non-commercial
use. The submitter was worried that
this could mean that local bodies would have to pay royalties for non-commercial
use of protected
varieties (as such use is not “private”). There was
concern that this cost would be passed on to ratepayers.
What does MBIE propose?
- MBIE
proposes that the exceptions set out in section 18 of the PVR Act be replaced by
the exceptions in Article 15(1) of UPOV 91.
Article 15(1) does not contain
direct equivalents of sections 18(b) and (c). However, the issue of repeated use
of a protected variety
to produce another variety in section 18(b) is dealt with
in Article 14(5)(a)(iii) of UPOV 91.
- The
exception in section 18(c) is effectively a provision for
“exhaustion” of rights, and this issue is discussed in Part
10 of
this Options Paper.
Exceptions to the breeder’s right
Do you have any comments about the exceptions required by UPOV 91?
10
9 Scope of the right – specific issues
- In
this part, we look at the specific scope of right issues for which there remains
some domestic policy flexibility as to how they
are implemented. These are (i)
term of the right, (ii) essentially derived varieties, (iii) rights over
harvested material, and (iv)
farm saved seed. In each case, we present options
and analysis about how the provisions could be implemented (consistent with UPOV
91), and indicate our preferred option.
- The
policy flexibility discussed in this part is over and above that required to
meet our Treaty of Waitangi obligations. As discussed
in Part 4, our CPTPP
obligations in relation to UPOV 91 are always subject to the flexibility
required to meet our Treaty obligations.
Term of the right
What is the issue?
|
PVR Act
|
Article 19 of UPOV 91 specifies that the minimum term of a PVR shall
be:
- for trees and
vines, at least 25 years from the date of grant,
- for all others,
at least 20 years from the date of grant.
|
sets out the term of a PVR. This is:
- 23 years from
the date of grant for woody plants or their rootstock,
- 20 years for all
other plants.
In the case of woody plants, the term of a PVR can
be extended beyond 23 years by Order-in- Council. Any such Order-in-Council must
be made after the date of grant, but before the grant expires. No such
Orders-in-Council have been made to date.
PVRs must be kept in force by paying annual grant fees. Failure to pay the
fee results in the PVR being cancelled.
|
- Our
CPTPP obligations mean that we are required to provide the minimum PVR terms
required by UPOV 91. This means, at least, extending
the term for woody
plants/rootstock to 25 years. The duration of the grant for other species is
already in line with UPOV 91. New
Zealand is not required, but can choose, to
offer longer terms.
- For
comparison, Australia, the USA and Canada all provide the minimum PVR terms
required by UPOV 91. The Australian Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994
also provides that regulations may
be made to extend the term of a Plant Breeder’s Right within a specified
taxon beyond the minimum terms provided for in the
Act.
- The
EU provides a term of 30 years from grant for vine and tree species, and 25
years from grant for all other species. The term for
specific genera or species
can be extended for up to an additional five years. This provision has been used
to extend the term for
potato varieties to a maximum of 30 years from
grant.
What submitters said
- Four
submitters commented on PVR term. Two submitters (one a breeder and one an
importer of potato varieties) supported a longer term.
The importer specifically
wanted the term for potatoes extended to 30 years as in the EU. Both submitters
argued that longer terms
were necessary to compensate for the time taken to
propagate a variety to the point where it could be marketed, including
quarantine
time for imported varieties.
- The
other two submitters (one a breeders’ representative, the other a
growers’ representative) support retaining the current
term of 20 years
for plants other than woody plants/rootstock.
What the options are
- There
appear to be three options in response to this issue:
Option 1: Adopt the UPOV 91 minimum terms, with no provision for extension
Option 2: Provide for longer minimum terms than the UPOV 91 minima, with no
provision for extension
Option 3: Adopt either Option 1 or 2 but provide for extensions to the maximum
term under specified conditions.
- Option
1 is our preferred option.
- As
discussed in Part 6, the criteria for our preliminary options analysis for the
issues in this part are:
- incentivises
the development of new varieties, and encourages foreign breeders to release
their new varieties in New Zealand, by providing
sufficient opportunity for
rights holders to get a reasonable return on their
investment
- ensures
that the public has reasonable access to new varieties so as to meet public
demand for the varieties and the products derived
from
them
- provides
certainty to rights holders and the public about the scope of the
right.
Options analysis
|
Incentivise investment
|
Ensure public access
|
Provide certainty
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
Investment could be impacted if term is too short to get reasonable return.
This option increases term for woody plants (keeps term
the same for other
plants).
|
Increase in term for woody plants could increase costs, but New Zealand
must adopt these terms as a minimum.
|
Scope of the right is clear to PVR owners and the public.
|
No evidence that investment is being adversely impacted under current
terms. New Zealand must meet at least these minimum terms. No
case for extending
terms
beyond these minima.
|
Option 2
|
Longer terms could incentivise increased investment through greater
returns.
|
Increased terms could mean higher costs for growers/the public with the
effect of restricting
access.
|
Scope of the right is clear to PVR owners and the public.
|
No case for extending terms beyond the minima in Option 1.
|
Option 3
|
Longer terms for some plants could incentivise increased investment through
greater returns.
|
Increased terms for some plants could mean higher costs for growers/the
public with the effect of
restricting access.
|
Scope of the right is clear to PVR owners and the public.
|
No case for extending terms beyond the minima in Option 1.
|
Option 1: Adopt the UPOV 91 minimum terms, with no provision
for extension (preferred option)
- Under
this option, the term of a PVR would be set at the UPOV 91 minimum terms. There
would be no provision to extend these terms.
- The
main advantage of this option would be simplicity. Once a PVR is granted,
breeders and growers would know the latest date on which
the term of the PVR
would end.
- A
possible disadvantage of this option is that, for some species, the terms might
be too short to allow breeders to make a reasonable
return on their investment
on developing new varieties. This might discourage the development of new
varieties. However, with the
possible exception of potatoes, we are not aware of
any evidence that the UPOV 91 minimum terms would be too short. And, with the
exception of the EU, we are not aware of any other UPOV 91 countries that have
longer terms.
- In
the case of potatoes, one submitter, who is an importer of new potato varieties
(as opposed to a breeder) argued that that the
current PVR term of 20 years from
grant for potatoes is too short. This submitter argued that, by the time a new
potato variety is
ready to go to market, there are only 8 – 10 years of
the PVR term left. This, it is argued, is insufficient to provide an
adequate
return on the investment required to import and commercialise new potato
varieties. The submitter also argued that the disparity
with the 30 year EU term
created an opportunity for local competitors in New
Zealand.
- On
the other hand, the costs involved in importing new potato varieties are likely
to be less than the costs of breeding a new potato
variety. We are aware that
there are locally bred varieties of potatoes. No local potato breeder suggested
that the PVR term for
potatoes be extended. This suggests that the current 20
year term is sufficient to provide an adequate incentive for the development
and
commercialisation of new potato varieties.
Option 2: Provide for
longer minimum terms than the UPOV 91 minima, with no provision for
extension
- Under
this option, the maximum term of a PVR would be set at some value that is higher
than the UPOV 91 minimum terms. There would
be no provision to extend these
terms.
- Extending
the maximum PVR term beyond the UPOV 91 minima has the potential to increase the
costs of protected varieties to growers
and consumers compared with adopting
UPOV 91 minimums. This is because a longer term would mean that PVR owners could
collect royalties
on their protected varieties for longer.
- This
additional cost might be justified if there was evidence that providing longer
terms for all varieties would increase the incentive
for local breeders to
develop new varieties, or for foreign breeders to release their new varieties in
New Zealand. None of the submitters
on the Issues Paper provided any evidence
that this might be the case. The economic analysis MBIE commissioned concluded
that there
was no current evidence of New Zealand missing out on new
varieties.
- That
is, there appears to be no advantages, and potentially a cost in adopting a PVR
term that is longer than the UPOV 91 minimums.
Option 3: Adopt either Option 1 or 2, but provide for
extensions to the maximum term under specified conditions
- This
option involves providing for extensions to the maximum PVR term whichever of
Options 1 or 2 is adopted. The extensions could
be provided for particular
genera or species.
- The
only justification for providing for extensions of term would be that the
maximum terms specified in the PVR Act were not long
enough to allow breeders to
make an “adequate” return on their protected varieties (at least for
some genera or species).
Given that a similar provision has been in effect in
the PVR Act for many years and never been used, and that we have heard no
compelling
evidence for longer terms for any specific genera or species in
submissions or in the economic analysis, we do not favour this
option.
Term of the right
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
11
Essentially derived varieties
(EDVs)
What is the issue?
|
PVR Act
|
Scope of the breeder’s right (Article 15)
Article 14(5) provides that the rights which apply to protected varieties
shall also apply to “varieties which are essentially
derived from the
protected variety”. Article 14(5)(b) provides that an essentially derived
variety (EDV) is a variety derived
from an initial variety which is not itself
an EDV when:
(i) it is predominantly derived from the initial variety, or from a variety
that is itself predominantly derived from the initial
variety, while retaining
the expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or
combination of genotypes
of the initial variety,
(ii) it is clearly distinguishable from the initial variety, and
(iii) except for the differences which result from the act of derivation,
it conforms to the initial variety in the expression of
the essential
characteristics that result from the genotype or combination of genotypes of the
initial variety.
|
There is no concept of an essentially derived variety in the PVR Act. If a
new variety is “distinct’ from the protected
variety it was derived
from, the PVR owner has no rights over that new variety.
|
- If
a variety is an EDV, and the initial variety it was derived from is protected by
a PVR, then UPOV 91 requires that the EDV cannot
be commercially exploited
without the permission of the owner of the PVR in the initial variety. This will
be the case regardless
of whether or not the EDV is itself protected by a PVR,
and it will require the PVR owner of the initial variety and the breeder
of the
EDV to come to an arrangement about the commercial exploitation of the
EDV.
- Under
the PVR Act, a PVR owner does not have any rights over a variety derived from a
protected variety, as long as the derived variety
is distinct from the protected
variety.
- The
definition of EDV that appears in UPOV 91 is not very precise. Important terms,
such as “predominantly derived” and
“essential features”
are not defined.
- The
UPOV 91 definition of EDV does not provide a “bright line” test of
what is, or is not, an EDV. In theory, the line
between varieties that are EDVs
and those that are not EDVs can be drawn on a continuum. At one end, very few
derived varieties are
EDVs, while at the other most derived varieties are EDVs.
The wording of UPOV 91 means it is left to individual UPOV 91 members to
determine where the boundary lies, in accordance with their own national
interests. New Zealand therefore has some flexibility as
to where we choose to
draw the line.
What do other countries do?
- The
way in which UPOV 91 member states have implemented their EDV regimes may
provide a starting point for thinking about how we should
approach the issue.
All UPOV 91 member
states have to provide for EDVs in their PVR legislation. Many, including the
USA, Canada, Singapore and the United Kingdom, have
simply transposed the
wording of Article 14(5)(b) of UPOV 91 into their national legislation.
- The
EU definition retains most of the wording of UPOV 91 Article 14(5)(b), but omits
that last part of Article 14(5)(b)(i).
- Japan’s
legislation uses the following definition of EDVs:
“varieties which are bred by changing some of the
expressions of the characteristics of the registered variety while retaining
their essential expressions of the characteristics...”
- The
Australian Plant Breeder’s Rights Act 1994 does not simply
transpose the wording of Article 14(5)(b). The Act’s definition of an EDV
is set out below (see section 4):
- A
plant variety is taken to be an essentially derived variety of another plant
variety if:
(a) it is predominantly derived from that other plant
variety; and
(b) it retains the essential characteristics that result from
the genotype or combination of genotypes of that other variety;
and
(c) it does not exhibit any important (as distinct from
cosmetic) features that differentiate it from that other variety.
- The
Australian Act defines “essential characteristics”
as:
essential characteristics, in relation to a plant variety,
means heritable traits that are determined by the expression of one or
more
genes, or other heritable determinants, that contribute to the principal
features, performance or value of the variety.
- The
Act also sets out a process whereby the owner of the initial variety can apply
to IP Australia for a declaration that a derived
variety is an EDV. As far as we
know, Australia is the only UPOV member state that has this kind of process in
relation to EDVs.
What submitters said
- Twenty
submissions addressed EDVs and they all supported extension of PVRs to EDVs
derived from varieties protected by PVRs. The main
arguments were that the
current situation, where PVRs do not extend to EDVs, encouraged the development
of “copycat”
varieties.
- This
was described by submitters as the situation where a person takes an initial
variety protected by a PVR and derives a new variety
from it. The difference
between the initial
variety and the derived variety makes no difference to the commercial value of
the variety17. These will be referred to in this document as
“copycat” varieties.
- Under
the PVR Act, commercial exploitation of a copycat variety does not infringe any
PVR on the initial variety it was derived from
because it is distinct from the
initial variety. However, because it has the same commercially valuable
characteristics as the initial
variety, it competes with the initial variety in
the marketplace. This has the potential to reduce the returns to the breeder of
the initial variety.
- Submitters
considered that reduced returns from their protected varieties may discourage
breeders from breeding new varieties with
new, commercially valuable
characteristics. It could also discourage foreign plant breeders from releasing
their new varieties in
New Zealand. Many submitters argued that these outcomes
have actually happened, although no specific examples were given. It seemed
clear from submissions that submitters considered that copycat varieties at
least are EDVs.
- However,
some of the submitters who supported the extension of PVR rights to cover EDVs
of protected varieties also sounded a note
of caution. While recognising the
benefits of such extension, they noted that it could discourage plant breeding
activities if the
definition of EDV was too broad.
- These
submitters were concerned that an overly broad definition of EDV might have the
effect of discouraging investment in the development
of new derived varieties
that were more than just copycat varieties. As a result, new varieties that are
genuine improvements of
the varieties that they are developed from might not be
developed. In this context a genuine improvement is a derived variety that
has
one or more commercially valuable characteristics that are superior to, or
additional to, those in the variety it was developed
from.
- On
the other hand, some submitters, mainly larger plant breeders, appeared to be in
favour of a broad definition of EDV. They argue
that any derived variety that
includes the same commercially valuable characteristics as the initial variety
it was developed from
should be considered an EDV.
- These
submitters seemed to take the approach that this should be the case regardless
of whether or not the derived variety is a “copycat
variety”. They
argued that in these circumstances, the breeder of the derived variety was
benefiting from the work done by
the breeder of the initial variety, and that
the breeder of the initial variety should receive some compensation for
that.
What the options are
- There
appear to be four viable options:
17 An example of this might be a derived apple
variety where the only difference from the initial variety is in the shape of
the leaves.
Leaf shape makes no difference to the commercial value of an apple
variety, which will generally lies in other characteristics such
as fruit size
or colour, or disease resistance.
Option 1: Adopt the UPOV 91 definition of EDV
Option 2: Define an EDV as a “copycat” variety
Option 3: Define an EDV as any derived variety which possesses all of the
“essential features” of the initial variety
Option 4: Define an EDV by its “genetic distance” from the initial
variety.
- Option
2 is our preferred option.
- No
submitters raised the issue of a possible role for the PVR Office in assessing
EDVs, as happens in Australia. Our view is that
making such declarations is
likely to require expertise that the PVR Office does not have, so the PVR Office
would have to hire suitable
experts. This would be costly. In a small country
like New Zealand, it could also be difficult to find suitable experts who did
not
have a connection with one or other of the parties
involved.
- Furthermore,
any declaration by the Commissioner of PVRs, regardless of which way it went,
could be appealed to the courts, with the
Commissioner being a party to any
appeal. There could be substantial costs incurred by the Commissioner,
particularly if the Commissioner’s
decision was not upheld. These costs
would have to be recovered from fees charged to PVR applicants by the PVR
Office.
- Given
all these considerations, we are not advancing an option that gives the PVR
Office a role in making determinations in relation
to
EDVs.
Options analysis
|
Incentivise investment
|
Ensure public access
|
Provide certainty
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
Lack of clarity of definition risks hampering innovation.
|
Public access to new varieties could be impacted if innovation is
impacted.
|
UPOV 91 definition of EDV is ambiguous. Does not provide certainty to
breeders or the public.
|
This option is too uncertain and is not preferred.
|
Option 2
|
Breeders still incentivised to invest in developing varieties with
commercially significant attributes. Reduces risk that varieties
with no new
commercial attributes will compete with initial
varieties.
|
Maintains reasonable public access to new varieties.
|
Definition is clearer than Option 1, but some uncertainty will
remain.
|
This option strikes the right balance between incentivising the development
of new varieties while preserving return on investment
for breeders of initial
varieties.
|
Option 3
|
Breeders of new varieties with commercially significant attributes may
choose not to invest if they have to share returns with breeders
of initial
varieties. Breeders of initial varieties will retain greater control over
development of new varieties based on those
initial varieties.
|
Concentration of rights with breeders of initial varieties could hamper
public access.
|
Definition is clearer than Option 1, but some uncertainty will
remain.
|
Breeders of initial varieties may have more incentive to invest, though
other breeders who wish to build on that innovation may be
discouraged from
investing. Concentrates returns to those breeders of initial varieties as most
new varieties build on the innovation
of preceding
varieties.
|
Option 4
|
Depends on how “genetic distance” is determined.
|
Depends on how “genetic distance” is determined.
|
Could provide greater certainty than other options.
|
No other UPOV countries have adopted this. Many technical hurdles to
overcome.
|
Option 1: Adopt the UPOV 91 definition of EDV
- This
option involves transposing the wording of UPOV Article 14(5)(b) into the PVR
Act. This approach, however, is problematic. The
UPOV wording provides little
guidance to either plant breeders or the courts as where the boundary between
EDVs and non-EDVs should
lie. This approach leaves it up to individual
country’s courts to set the boundaries.
- However,
the boundary between EDVs and non-EDVs is a public policy issue as it affects
the economic interests of breeders and growers
and, ultimately, consumers.
Courts are generally not well-equipped to deal with public policy issues, and
there is a risk that the
courts could set the line between EDVs and non-EDVs at
a point which may not be in the best interests of society as a
whole.
- In
any case, there appear to be very few court decisions from other countries
regarding EDVs. This may be due to:
- the
relatively small number of PVRs granted worldwide, compared with, for example,
patents;
- the
high costs of litigation relative to the profits that PVR owners might make from
their protected varieties;
- possible
reluctance to set a precedent.
- In
relation to point (c) above, in light of the lack of case law dealing with EDVs,
parties to a dispute involving EDVs have little
certainty regarding the outcome
of any litigation. They may fear that resolving the dispute in court may result
in a decision that
may set the “wrong”
precedent.
- That
is, the court might make a decision that one or both of the parties may not
want, but would set a precedent that would be followed
in subsequent court
proceedings. As a result parties may prefer to settle “out of
court”. Which way the settlement goes
will likely be what the parties deem
to be in their best interests, rather than what might be the best outcome for
society as a whole.
- Adopting
this option would lead to uncertainty as to what derived varieties were or were
not EDVs until such time as the issue was
resolved the courts. It could be many
years (if at all) before this occurs. Even if the courts were to be given the
opportunity to
rule on what is or is not an EDV, there is no guarantee that any
decision would satisfy the public policy objectives set out
above.
Option 2: Define an EDV as a “copycat variety”
(preferred option)
- This
option involves defining an EDV as a variety where the difference between the
initial variety and the derived variety is “trivial”.
That is, the
difference is in a characteristic that
makes no contribution to the commercial value of the variety. The effect of this
is that only “copycat” varieties would
be considered
EDVs.
- Although
“copycat” varieties are “new” in the sense that they did
not previously exist, they add little or
nothing of value to society. Compared
with the variety they are derived from they have no additional or improved
characteristics
of commercial or social value.
- Taking
this approach would mean that where the difference between a derived variety and
the initial variety is one that contributes
to the commercial value of the
variety, the derived variety would not be an EDV18.
- Adopting
this option may discourage breeders from developing “copycat”
varieties from protected varieties. This is because
the breeders or growers of
the “copycat” varieties would have to obtain a licence, and pay a
royalty to, the owner of
the PVR over the initial variety.
- However,
this option would still encourage breeders to develop derived varieties that are
genuine improvements over initial varieties
that are protected varieties. These
derived varieties could be exploited without the need to seek the permission of,
or make a payment
to, the owner of the PVR in the initial
variety.
- A
derived variety that is a genuine improvement may compete on the market with the
initial variety, reducing the returns to the breeder
of the initial variety.
Some submitters to the Issues Paper argued that in these circumstances, the
breeder of the derived variety
was benefiting from the work done by the breeder
of the initial variety, and that the breeder of the initial variety should
receive
some compensation for that. Failure to provide for such compensation
could discourage investment in the development of genuine
improvements.
- However,
whenever a breeder develops and commercialises a new variety, that new variety
will be competing with existing varieties,
and any other new varieties that
might subsequently enter the market. In light of this, MBIE considers that
limiting the definition
of EDV to “copycat” varieties will not
significantly discourage investment in the development of new varieties that are
genuine improvements.
- MBIE
considers that, on balance, the benefits of limiting the definition of EDV to
“copycat” varieties are likely to exceed
any costs. For this reason,
this is MBIE’s preferred option.
- If
we decide to take this approach, we will need to carefully consider the way we
word the provision to ensure that it is workable
and achieves the objective of
limiting EDVs to copycat varieties. The Australian legislation is a good (though
untested) starting
point here as it seeks to achieve a similar
outcome.
- Whatever
approach we take, it is unlikely that it will provide a
“bright-line” definition of EDV. There will inevitably
be some
derived varieties which fall close to the boundary between
EDVs
18 An example of this might be where an apple variety
derived from an initial variety of apple differed from the initial variety in
colour
or size of the fruit. The colour or size of the fruit can contribute to
the commercial value of an apple variety.
and non-EDVs. For some varieties the distinction between features that
contribute to the commercial value of the variety and those
that don’t may
be “blurred”.
Option 3: Define an EDV as a derived
variety that retains one or more of the commercially valuable characteristics of
the initial
variety
- Under
this option, any derived variety that retained all of the “essential
characteristics” of the initial variety would
be deemed to be an EDV. In
this context, an “essential characteristic” could be defined as one
that provides commercial
value to the variety. This would be a broader
definition of an EDV than under Option 2.
- The
effect of this approach would be that derived varieties that are
“copycat” varieties and derived varieties that are
genuine
improvements would be deemed to be EDVs. For example, a derived variety that
possessed all the essential characteristics
of the initial variety would be an
EDV even if it possessed one or more essential characteristics not present in
the initial variety.
On the other hand a derived variety where one or more of
the essential features of the initial variety are not present would not
be an
EDV.
- In
effect, this option could mean that most varieties that are “genuine
improvements” would be EDVs. If the PVR over an
initial variety extends to
derived varieties that are “genuine improvements” this could
discourage breeders from using
PVR protected varieties in their breeding
programs, where they did not own the PVR in those varieties. This could
unreasonably favour
breeders who already own many PVRs, as they are free to use
their own protected varieties in their breeding programs. They would
not have to
seek permission to commercialise any EDVs they develop from
them.
- Adopting
this option could therefore actually reduce the incentive for some breeders to
develop new varieties. It could potentially
act as a barrier for entry to the
plant breeding industry. New entrants would not own any PVRs, and may only be
able to use varieties
that are no longer, or were never protected by PVRs in
their breeding programs.
Option 4: Define an EDV by its “genetic distance”
from the initial variety
- An
alternative approach to EDVs, suggested by some submitters, is to use
“genetic distance” to determine whether a derived
variety is an EDV
or not. The genetic distance is determined by comparing the genetic profile of
the initial variety and a variety
derived from it. If the genetic distance is
less than a certain amount, the derived variety would be deemed to be an
EDV.
- A
major problem with this is deciding how great the genetic distance would have to
be before a derived variety is deemed not to be
an EDV. It is likely that the
appropriate genetic distance would vary depending on the species. Who would
decide what the genetic
distance should be? How would this be determined? Would
the genetic distance be set in the Act or regulations, or would it be left
to
the courts?
- Genetic
distance might be seen to be a more reliable “bright-line” test for
what is or is not an EDV. However, the difficulties
involved in deciding how it
should be measured, and what the distance should be for each species suggest
that this is not a practical
alternative for the time being.
- As
far as we are aware, no other UPOV 91 member state has adopted the concept of
genetic distance as a means for determining whether
or not a derived variety is
an EDV.
Essentially derived varieties
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
12
Rights over harvested material
- The
concept of “harvested material” is not used in the PVR Act, instead
it refers to “produce”. The term “harvested
material”
does appear in UPOV 91, but it is not defined there. For the purposes of this
Options Paper, the term “harvested
material” includes entire plants
and parts of plants, which have been grown and harvested,
and:
- cannot
be used for propagating the variety (for example fruit, cut flowers);
or
- could
be used for propagating the variety, but can also be used for some other purpose
such as human or animal consumption (for example,
grains or
seeds).
What is the issue?
|
PVR Act
|
Rights over harvested material (Article 14(2)) Article 14(2) of UPOV 91
effectively requires that PVR owners be given rights to control
the commercial
exploitation of the harvested material when:
- the harvested
material was obtained through use of the propagating material of a protected
variety where that use was not authorised
by the PVR owner, and
- the PVR owner
did not have a “reasonable opportunity” to assert their rights over
the propagating material.
|
Section 17(6) of the PVR Act gives PVR owners only very limited rights over
the harvested material of their protected varieties, referred
to as
“produce” in the PVR Act. These limited rights allow PVR owners to
control the sale of produce of their protected
varieties when:
- produce of a
variety protected in New Zealand is imported into New Zealand, and
- the country the
produce is imported from is not a member of UPOV, or, if it is a member of UPOV,
it does not grant PVRs over the variety
concerned.
|
- The
effect of section 17(6) of the PVR Act is that if, say, a person wants to import
apples of a variety protected in New Zealand
from a country that is not a UPOV
member, or that does not grant PVRs over apples, the PVR owner’s
permission is required.
- Harvested
material is not protected in any other circumstance unless it is propagating
material. However, many PVR owners use contracts
to control the commercial
exploitation of the harvested material of their protected varieties. This can be
done, for example, by
requiring growers to sell the produce to specified persons
as a condition of supply of the propagating material of the variety.
- If
harvested material is also propagating material, for example cereal grains which
can be used to sow a crop but which can also be
used for human or animal
consumption, the PVR owner’s permission is not required to sell
propagating material of a protected
variety for purposes that do not involve
propagation of the variety. So, for example, arable farmers are free to sell
their wheat
to a miller to produce flour. However, they are not free to sell the
wheat to other farmers to sow another crop.
- UPOV
91 requires that PVR owners be given rights to control the commercial
exploitation of the harvested material when the material
was obtained through
the unauthorised use of the propagating material and the PVR owner did not have
a “reasonable opportunity”
to assert their rights over the
propagating material. In practice, this allows PVR owners to control the
exploitation of harvested
material of a protected variety if it is imported from
a country where the variety is not protectable.
- In
addition to the requirement in Article 14(2), UPOV 91 also allows members
to:
- provide
PVR owners with rights over products made from the harvested material, where
Article 14(2) applies (Article 14(3));
- provide
additional exclusive rights in addition to those explicitly provided for in
Article 14(1) (Article 14(4)).
- As
a result of our CPTPP obligations, New Zealand must provide PVR owners with the
rights over harvested material set out in Article
14(2). We do not have to
provide the rights provided for in Articles 14(3) or 14(4) of UPOV
91.
- As
far as we are aware, no UPOV 91 member state provides PVR owners with more than
the minimum exclusive rights over harvested material
provided by Article 14(2),
or have implemented the additional optional provisions in Article 14(4).
Australia has implemented Article
14(3) in its Plant Breeders Rights Act
(section 15), extending the rights to cover, in certain circumstances, the
products made from harvested material. The EU has left
open the possibility of
extending protection to products in this way.
What submitters said
- Nineteen
submitters commented on extending the rights in relation to harvested material
as provided for by UPOV 91. Submitters expressed
mixed views. Some considered
that it was important for PVR owners to have control over the harvested
material. They argued that this
was necessary to maintain quality standards or
to allow niche or speciality varieties to be marketed.
- Two
submitters considered that the provisions of UPOV 91 should be seen as the
minimum requirement, and one of those also wanted to
see the option in relation
to the produce of harvested material implemented. One submitter questioned why
the onus should fall on
the PVR owner to demonstrate that they haven’t had
a “reasonable opportunity” to assert their rights. The submitter
considered that the rights should automatically apply if the harvested material
is the product of unauthorised use.
- Other
submitters considered that contractual arrangements between PVR owners were
sufficient to allow PVR owners to maintain control
over the harvested material
of their protected varieties. One submitter expressed concern that New
Zealand’s competition laws
were not robust enough to protect growers and
farmers from onerous contractual terms.
What the options are
- There
appear to be three main options here:
Option 1: Provide only the minimum rights over harvested material required by
UPOV 91
Option 2: Extend the exclusive rights of PVR owners to harvested material
resulting from unauthorised propagation of their protected
varieties
Option 3: Extend the exclusive rights of PVR owners to include the harvested
material of their protected varieties.
- Option
1 is our preferred option.
- No
submitters commented on extending the rights to include the products of
harvested material (as per Article 14(3) of UPOV 91) and
we see no case for
doing so. We have therefore not advanced an option that would implement this
optional provision.
Options analysis
|
Incentivise investment
|
Ensure public access
|
Provide certainty
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
Provides breeders another opportunity to assert their rights if they have
been unable to do so in relation to propagating material.
Unlikely to
significantly
increase investment.
|
Does not really impact access to new varieties.
|
Some uncertainty as retailers of harvested material may not be aware of
whether the material comes from unauthorised use of propagating
material.
|
There is no argument to extend rights to harvested material beyond the
minimum required by UPOV 91.
|
Option 2
|
Provides breeders another opportunity to assert right (and they don’t
have to show they had no previous opportunity). Unlikely
to significantly
increase
investment.
|
Does not really impact access to new varieties.
|
Creates uncertainty for public (growers, retailers) as breeders essentially
get a choice when to assert their rights.
|
Slight benefit for breeders, but not consistent with the focus of the PVR
regime on propagating material.
|
Option 3
|
Significantly strengthens rights, so could incentivise more investment if
breeders could get better returns.
|
Significantly increases market power of breeders, potentially impacting
access to new varieties.
|
Scope of right is certain.
|
The PVR regime focuses on acts in relation to propagating material. This
would be a significant departure from that and risks concentration
of
market power.
|
- The
Sapere report notes that the current PVR Act creates a risk of a potential
“black market” in harvested material, because
if the unauthorised
use of the propagating material goes undetected, the harvested material derived
from it can be “used legitimately
without any
compensation or breach of PVR rights”. Breeders see this as a
“significant gap” in the current legislation that
the UPOV 91
extension aims to address.
- However,
the report also identifies potential costs of extending the rights to harvested
material further than the minimum required
by UPOV 91. The main risk is that
“PVR owners end up with excessive market power” with costs of
defending rights being
shifted “away from the beneficiaries of the PVR and
onto consumers”, undermining the “social bargain underpinning
the
PVR regime”.
Option 1: provide only the minimum rights over harvested
material required by UPOV 91 (preferred option)
- This
option involves providing PVR owners with the right to control the exploitation
of the harvested material of their protected
varieties when:
- the
harvested material was obtained through use of the propagating material of a
protected variety where that use was not authorised
by the PVR owner;
and
- the
PVR owner did not have a “reasonable opportunity” to assert their
rights over the propagating material.
- The
main purpose of this provision is to give the PVR owner an opportunity to assert
rights over harvested material if they have not
had a reasonable opportunity to
assert their rights over the propagating material at an earlier stage. The
principle is that, ideally,
the rights over propagating material should be
asserted in relation to unauthorised use of that material. But, if for some
reason
this has not been possible, this extension provides an opportunity at a
subsequent stage for the PVR owner to assert rights over
the harvested
material.
- The
most likely situation where this could occur is where harvested material of a
variety protected in New Zealand is imported from
a country where the variety is
not, or cannot be protected.
- As
this option is the minimum required by CPTPP, and in light of the problems
identified in relation to Options 2 and 3, this is MBIE’s
preferred
option.
Option 2: Extend the exclusive rights of PVR owners to
harvested material resulting from unauthorised propagation of their protected
varieties
- If
this option was implemented, PVR owners would have rights over the harvested
material of their protected varieties if the material
was produced through the
unauthorised propagation of their protected varieties. These rights would be
provided regardless of whether
or not the PVR owner had an opportunity to assert
their rights over the propagating material of the protected
variety.
- For
example, a PVR owner finds that produce (for example fruit) of one of its
protected varieties was being sold by a retailer. The
fruit has been bought from
a grower who did not have the PVR owner’s permission to grow the variety.
In this situation, the
retailer would be infringing the PVR by selling the
fruit.
- The
PVR owner could sue the retailer (as well as the grower) for infringement, and
might also be able to obtain a preliminary injunction
preventing the retailer
from selling the fruit. These actions would, however, require the PVR owner to
be prepared to incur the cost
of starting proceedings in the High Court, and
gathering evidence in support.
- One
potential problem with this option is that it could be seen to be putting an
onus on retailers or other sellers to enforce PVRs,
rather than the PVR owner.
This is because, to avoid the possibility of infringing a PVR, retailers would
have to determine whether
the harvested produce they were offered by a grower
came from a protected variety, and, if so, whether the grower had the PVR
owner’s
permission to grow the variety.
- Many
retailers and other sellers might lack the expertise to determine whether
harvested produce came from a protected variety. Implementing
this option might
therefore be seen as imposing an unfair burden on retailers and sellers of
harvested products.
- Another
problem is that it potentially creates a situation in which a PVR owner can
choose at which point to assert their rights.
The focus of the regime is rights
in respect to propagating material and the intent of the UPOV provision is to
provide an opportunity
for a PVR owner to assert their rights over harvested
material only if they have not previously had the opportunity to assert
their rights in relation to the propagating material.
- As
far as MBIE is aware, no other UPOV 91 member state has put in place a provision
along the lines of this option.
- In
light of the issues described above, and the fact that many submitters were
happy to continue to use contractual arrangements,
this option is not
MBIE’s preferred option.
Option 3: Extend the exclusive
rights of PVR owners to include the harvested material of their protected
varieties
- Under
this option, a PVR owner would have the right to control any commercial
exploitation of the harvested material of a protected
variety. This means that
any person wishing to exploit harvested material of a protected variety
regardless of the purpose to which
it will be put must obtain the PVR
owner’s permission.
- The
effect would be to give PVR owners a monopoly on the supply of the harvested
material of their protected varieties. This could
assist PVR owners in
maintaining the quality or reputation of the harvested material of their
protected varieties.
- However,
while this option would provide greater certainty for PVR owners than the other
two options, this approach may cause problems.
Where one entity owns, or has the
exclusive licence for, most of the PVRs of a particular species, this could have
the effect of
reducing competition for the harvested material of that species.
This could drive up prices and/or reduce supply to
consumers.
- Growers
would still be free to grow and sell harvested material of varieties of that
species that were no longer (or never) protected.
However, if the market demand
was for harvested
material of protected varieties, it might not be worthwhile for growers to grow
non-protected varieties.
- Currently,
PVR owners exercise control over the harvested material of their protected
varieties using contractual arrangements. Any
such arrangements are subject to
section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 which relates to taking advantage of
market power.
- However,
under section 36(3), actions to enforce a statutory intellectual property right
(such as a PVR) are not considered to be
taking advantage of market power. If
PVR owners were given exclusive rights over harvested material, license
agreements with growers
that lessened competition in the market for harvested
products might not be subject to scrutiny under the Commerce Act
1986.
- It
may well be that the competition issues mentioned above are a reason why no
other UPOV member state has provided PVR owners with
the exclusive right to
exploit the harvested material of their protected
varieties.
- In
light of the competition issues describe above, and the fact that many
submitters were happy to continue to use contractual arrangements,
this option
is not MBIE’s preferred option.
Rights over harvested
material
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
13
Farm saved seed
What is the issue?
|
PVR Act
|
Optional exception for farm saved seed (Article 15(2))
Under the new exclusive rights afforded by UPOV 91, farmers would not be
allowed to save seed without the authorisation of the PVR
owner.
However, UPOV 91 provides an exception that member states can choose to
implement (and, if so, under what conditions):
|
No restriction on farmers saving seed for use on their own holdings.
|
- A Contracting
Party may, within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the
legitimate interests of the breeder, restrict
the breeder's right in relation to
any variety in order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their
own holdings,
the product of the harvest which they have obtained by planting,
on their own holdings, the protected variety.
|
|
- It
has long been traditional for farmers to save seed from their harvests for
sowing future crops. This saved seed is often known
as “farm saved
seed”, and farmers’ entitlement to save this seed is often known as
the “farmer’s privilege”.
Farmers, in the past, have also
exchanged their saved seed with, or sold it to, other farmers. Under the PVR
Act, farmers in New
Zealand may save seed of protected varieties for their own
use, but they cannot sell it for the purposes of sowing another
crop.
- The
expanded rights provided under Article 14 of UPOV 91 would not allow farmers to
save seed of a protected variety without the plant
breeder’s consent. For
example, Article 14(1)(i) of UPOV 91 gives the plant breeder the exclusive right
to propagate the protected
variety. Article 15(2), however, does allow countries
to make an exception to the plant breeders’ rights for farm saved seed.
The effect of the exception would be to allow farmers to use saved seed of
protected varieties for propagation on their own holdings
without the
authorisation of the PVR owner.
- Farmers
would also be free to sell harvested material from saved seed if it was not to
be used for further propagation, as the exhaustion
provision (Article 16 of UPOV
91) means that once propagating material has been sold with the consent of the
PVR owner, the PVR owner
has no further claim on that material, or any material
derived from it, unless further propagation is involved.
- The
exception in UPOV 91 was aimed at crops where it is common practice to save seed
for further propagation and was not intended
to open the possibility of
extending the practice to other varieties where is not already common practice.
UPOV also considered a
number of ways in which limits might be placed on the
exception including: 19
19 https://www.upov.int/edocs/infdocs/en/upov_inf_6.pdf
(pages 74ff)
- differentiation
according to farm size (e.g. a broader exception for “small farms”,
different levels of remuneration);
- specifying
an amount of produce (e.g. percentage of overall harvest) to which the exception
applies;
- requirement
to pay remuneration (e.g. through a royalty).
- If
UPOV 91 is implemented without invoking the exception in Article 15(2), then
farmers may face higher costs, either because they
would have to buy new seed
for each year’s crop, or would have to pay royalties for using their own
saved seed.
- Plant
breeders argue that farmers should not be free to save and re-sow their saved
seed of protected varieties, without payment of
a royalty on this seed. This
reduces the return that the breeders can earn from their investment in
developing new varieties. This
may mean that breeders have less incentive to
develop new varieties, and that fewer new varieties are developed. It may also
mean
that foreign breeders are more reluctant to bring their new varieties to
New Zealand if they consider that they cannot get sufficient
return on their
investment.
- Farmers
argue that, aside from the tradition of saving seed, there are many other
advantages, including cost and availability of seed.
- In
New Zealand, the issue of farm saved seed relates predominantly to wheat and
barley in the cereals sector and ryegrass in the pastoral
sector. For the
cereals it is primarily their use as animal feed, as purchasers of milling wheat
and malted barley generally require
certified seed.
What do other countries do?
- As
far as we know, all UPOV 91 members have invoked the exception for at least
certain species.
- The
EU lists the species that the exception applies to. Regulations then dictate
that royalties should be paid that are “sensibly
lower” than the
royalty charged in relation to the initial propagating material of the protected
variety. “Small farms”
are exempt from the payment of a
royalty.
- The
Australian exception applies to all plant varieties, though regulations can be
made exempting a variety from the exception if
a clear case of market failure is
made by the breeder. The exception is implemented by specifying that the
conditioning and reproduction
of the material is not an infringement of the
breeder’s right.
- Canada
has a similar approach to Australia (though without the regulation making power
to exempt varieties from the exception), and
also includes
“stocking” insofar as it relates to the saved seed in the list of
acts that are not an infringement. However,
Canada is currently consulting on
introducing royalties for saved seed of certain varieties.
Royalty collection
- It
is important to consider the issue of farm saved seed in the broader context of
royalty payments in the PVR regime. There is nothing
in the legislation that
requires royalties to be paid. This is just the usual contractual arrangement by
which the authorisation
of the PVR owner is obtained for an act covered by the
exclusive rights. Royalties are generally either “seed point”,
i.e.
paid at the point of sale of the proprietary seed, or “end point
(EPRs)”, i.e. paid in relation to the amount of
harvested material
produced. This depends on the nature of the crop and its end user(s). It is also
worth noting that EPRs are unlikely
to distinguish between produce harvested
from saved seed and produce harvested from the initial seed purchase of the
proprietary
variety, and so saved seed will already be attracting a royalty
payment in some instances.
- There
is also nothing that would preclude a royalty being agreed in relation to an act
not covered by the exclusive rights. So the
farm saved seed exception could be
invoked, but industry participants could still agree royalty payments in
relation to farm saved
seed.
- Breeders
have concerns about the royalties they are missing out on in relation to farm
saved seed and have also raised concerns about
growers avoiding royalty payments
through mislabelling. Growers have also raised concerns about the current
mechanisms for collecting
royalties. They cite examples of royalties being
charged for non-proprietary varieties, and comment on the lack of transparency
in
contracts leading to concerns of “double dipping” (royalties
being charged at both seed point and end point).
- MBIE
understands that there have been initial conversations between the New Zealand
Plant Breeding and Research Association (NZPBRA)
and Federated Farmers on what a
more formal royalty collection mechanism might look like, but that there remain
many areas of disagreement,
including on what basis royalties should be set
(i.e. seed point or end point, what the level should be and how it should be
set).
- These
issues suggest that a more transparent royalty regime, whether it includes farm
saved seed or not, is likely to benefit all
industry
stakeholders.
What submitters said
- Sixteen
submitters commented on the farm saved seed issue. The majority of these (ten)
were breeders or breeders’ representatives.
There was only one submission
representing growers/farmers (from Federated Farmers). We have heard that some
farmers are concerned
that expressing views on this issue could impact the
contractual relationships they have with breeders/PVR owners (or their
licensees,
e.g. seed companies).
- There
is broad agreement across submitters that farmers should retain the right to
save seed. The issue is what conditions this practice
should continue
under.
- Most
breeders support the ability for farmers to continue to save and use seed on
their own holdings. However, they argue that farmers
should have to pay a
royalty when they use saved seed, and that there should be some statutory basis
to this ability to collect a
royalty.
- The
NZPBRA estimates that at least $2million is “lost” annually through
farmers not paying a royalty on saved seed. The
estimates are based on
assumptions of average yield compared to amount of seed sold. The figures
suggest that use of saved seed in
wheat is around 30%, and is over 50% for
barley. For ryegrass, the estimate is that around 10% of proprietary ryegrass
used is from
saved seed.
- The
principle argument put forward by the breeders is that the lack of a royalty on
farm saved seed is impacting investment in domestic
plant breeding and is also
discouraging overseas PVR owners from bringing their new varieties to New
Zealand. One submitter commented
that the “cost saving” argument
that supports the use of saved seed for farmers needs to be weighed against the
“increased
value farming businesses capture from implementation of the
improvements and technological advances achieved through plant breeding,
and the
flow-on benefits to the economic competitiveness of New Zealand primary
industry”.
- It
is also argued that the current arrangements do not reflect the changes in
farming practices, from smaller, family run farms, to
large scale, vertically
integrated farms. The consequence of this is that an unfair proportion of the
value derived from the innovation
is being retained by these large farming
operations, rather than being returned to the breeder who invested in this
innovation in
the first place.
- Breeders
also raised concerns about illegal multiplication and selling of seed, the
transfer of seeds within large corporate entities
(e.g. farms that have both
arable and dairy operations) and the consequences of loss of genetic integrity
when seed is saved over
successive seasons.
- Federated
Farmers submitted that there are many good reasons for the current saved seed
arrangements to continue, but does accept
that there may be justified reasons
for a royalty on farm saved seed under certain circumstances. They commented
that the advantages
of being able to save seed include that it is a reliable way
of getting seed into the ground in time (and they cited examples of
PVR seeds
not being available at optimal planting time or not supplied to required
standard), the quality is assured, and the cost
of seed is reduced. They have
also commented that farmers are more likely to be open the idea of royalties
being paid on farm saved
seed if they can be assured that those royalties are
being directed into breeding programmes that will benefit
them.
What the options are
- There
seem to be three broad options in response to the farm saved seed
issue:
Option 1: Provide no exception for farm saved seed
Option 2: Provide an exception for farm saved seed either (i) with limitations
imposed in the primary legislation, or (ii) with a
provision to impose
limitations in regulations
Option 3: Provide an exception for farm saved seed with no limitations.
- Under
Option 1, a farmer would have no automatic right to save seed. Any production,
reproduction, condition or stocking of seed would
require the authorisation of
the PVR owner.
- Options
2 and 3 would require invoking the exception in Article 15(2) of UPOV
91.
- Under
Option 2 limitations could be imposed on the exception either up front in the
primary legislation or (if the case was made in
relation to certain varieties
later on) in regulations. These could include limitations on which varieties the
exception applies
to, what types/size of farm the exception applies to and what
amount of produce the exception applies to, and could also include
regulations
relating to royalty payments for varieties that the exception applies
to.
- Option
3 is essentially the status quo.
- Option
2(ii) is our preferred option.
Options analysis
|
Incentivise investment
|
Ensure public access
|
Provide certainty
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
Extending rights to FSS could increase returns for breeders and so
incentivise investment, though farmers could choose to buy non-
proprietary
varieties if they perceive costs are too
high.
|
Increasing costs could have the effect of restricting public access to new
varieties.
|
Provides certainty of scope of the right.
|
There is no current evidence that New Zealand is missing out on new
varieties. This option would increase costs for farmers.
|
Option 2(i)
|
Extending rights to FSS on some varieties could increase returns for
breeders and so incentivise investment, though farmers could
choose to buy non-
proprietary varieties if they perceive costs are too
high.
|
Increasing costs could have the effect of restricting public access to new
varieties.
|
Certainty depends on the nature of any limitations on the exception for FSS
that are imposed.
|
There is no current evidence that New Zealand is missing out on new
varieties, so no case for selecting certain varieties up front.
This option
would increase costs for farmers on those varieties.
|
Option 2(ii)
|
Extending rights to FSS on some varieties if a case has been made would
help ensure breeders are getting sufficient return on their
investment, and so
encourage innovation.
|
Increasing costs could have the effect of restricting public access to new
varieties.
|
Certainty depends on the nature of any limitations on the exception for FSS
that are imposed.
|
This option acknowledges that, in the future, a case may be made to limit
the exception for FSS in certain cases. It is the best balance
between the
interests of breeders and
the interests of farmers.
|
Option 3
|
Could discourage innovation in the future if return on investment becomes
insufficient for breeders.
|
Access to new varieties unaffected.
|
Provides certainty of scope of the right.
|
This option is essentially the status quo. With no ability to limit the
exception in the future, it would make it harder to address
issues if they
arise.
|
Option 1: Provide no exception for farm saved seed
- Under
this option, there is no exception from the exclusive rights provided for in
UPOV 91 for farm saved seed. This means that any
of the acts that would be
associated with saving seed and sowing it
(production/reproduction/conditioning/stocking of propagating
material) would
require the authorisation of the breeder, usually by means of a royalty payment.
Performing
any of these acts without that authorisation would be an infringement of the PVR
owner’s rights. No UPOV member states, as
far as we know, have gone with
this option. All invoke the exception, at least to some extent.
- This
option would increase royalty returns to PVR owners and this may encourage
further investment in new varieties. This could benefit
farmers and consumers.
However, it would also impose additional costs on farmers, which they may
struggle to pass on. Or they may
simply choose not to purchase protected
varieties, which could affect both PVR owners and the wider
public.
- A
strong case would need to be made to proceed with this option and we do not
think that case has been made. The argument that the
“loss” of
royalty income from the use of farm- saved seed is impacting the development and
availability of new varieties
is not borne out – at least currently
– by the economic analysis MBIE commissioned (the Sapere
report).
- The
report comments that there are many factors that influence the return that PVR
owners get on their investment in new varieties,
including industry structure,
the contractual arrangements they enter into with growers and the legislative
settings. It concludes
that there is no strong evidence that the costs of the
current arrangements are outweighing the benefits:
“If [farm saved seed] was causing significant problems
in the innovation system one might expect to see evidence of local breeders
developing fewer new varieties and reluctance in foreign plant breeders to allow
their new varieties to be imported and grown in
New Zealand. We might also
expect to see farmers incurring very high or inequitable costs in obtaining
seeds, or problems with supply.
We have found that in practice, neither scenario appeared to
be happening. Applications for PVR for new varieties of agricultural
and
vegetable crops and pasture plants and amenity grasses have consistently grown,
and the royalties received and returned back
into R&D have been sufficient
for large-scale breeding and testing programs to be maintained in multiple
locations. International
interest in New Zealand as a breeding destination has
been demonstrated by new entrants like DLF entering and remaining in the market
(using acquisition to acquire more rights over licensed products and breeding
activities).”
- However,
the report does note that the future picture is not so clear. While some
technological advances may be beneficial, e.g. advances
in genetic testing
making it easier to identify “cheating” and so reduce the risk of
infringements, breeders expressed
concerns that New Zealand could start to lag
behind under the current legislative settings.
- In
response to this we note that, due to our CPTPP obligation to bring our regime
in line with UPOV 91, the rights of PVR owners will
already be strengthened in
other ways, with the result that returns should increase regardless of whether
or not farm saved seed
attracts royalties. And in New Zealand (as opposed to
other markets) breeding programmes are not predominantly funded by royalties
due
to the small size of the market. Even if no exception was made for farm saved
seed, it is unlikely that the additional revenue
gained would mean a significant
increase in the returns breeders were getting (relative to overall R&D
spend).
Option 2: Provide an exception for farm saved seed either
(i) with limitations imposed in the primary legislation, or (ii) with a
provision to impose limitations in regulations (2(ii) is our preferred
option)
- As
we note above, other UPOV 91 members have gone with either Options 2 or 3. The
EU would fall under Option 2(i), Australia under
Option 2 (ii), and Canada
(currently) and the US under Option 3.
- As
noted above, there is no clear evidence of current market failure in relation to
the return on investment for any protected varieties.
For this reason, we do not
consider that Option 2(i) is appropriate. However, we cannot discount the
possibility that a case may
be made in the future, so providing the exception
for farm saved seed combined with regulation-making provisions to limit this
exception
is our preferred option.
- Limitations
could include:
- exempting
certain varieties from the exception (so the PVR owner’s exclusive rights
apply);
- requiring
a royalty to be paid in relation to certain specified varieties which, in turn,
could be restricted by:
- requiring
that the royalty be lower than the royalty in relation to the purchase of the
proprietary seed;
- exempting
certain farming operations (e.g. small farms) from the royalty
payment;
- exempting
a certain percentage of the saved seed used (or harvested material derived from
saved seed) from the royalty payment.
- Australia
allows for a variety to be exempted from the exception (i.e. so saving seed
would be covered by the PVR owner’s rights)
in regulations if a case of
market failure has been made by the breeder. To date no regulations have been
made.
- As
already noted, some discussion has already taken place between plant breeders
and farmers and we think this should continue. Having
a regulation making
provision means that, should it be decided that some formal regulation into farm
saved seed is desirable on the
basis of those discussions, this would be easy to
implement.
Option 3: Provide an exception for farm saved seed with no
limitations
- Given
the analysis in relation to the above options, this is not our preferred option.
The future is uncertain, and any changes to
address issues that may arise would
be harder under this option as they would require change to the primary
legislation.
Farm saved seed
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
14
10 Post-grant issues
- This
part covers what we have termed “post-grant issues”. These refer to
issues in the regime that are only relevant after
the grant of a PVR has been
made. They are (i) compulsory licences, (ii) enforcement (infringements and
offences), (iii) exhaustion
of the right, and (iv) nullification and
cancellation of the right.
- Some
of the policy considerations discussed in this part are requirements related to
UPOV 91, and others are domestic policy matters.
As with the discussion in Parts
7, 8 and 9, our CPTPP obligations in relation to UPOV 91 are always subject to
the flexibility required
to meet our Treaty of Waitangi
obligations.
Compulsory licences
What is the issue?
|
PVR Act
|
Article 17 of UPOV 91 allows for the grant of compulsory licences “in
the public interest”.
If a compulsory licence is granted, the PVR owner must be paid
“equitable remuneration”.
|
Section 21 of the PVR Act provides for the grant of compulsory licences
over protected varieties. Any person may apply to the Commissioner
of Plant
Variety Rights for a compulsory licence. The Commissioner may grant a compulsory
licence if the PVR owner has not made reasonable
quantities of reproductive
material of reasonable quality of the variety concerned available for purchase
by members of the public
at a reasonable price. The Commissioner will then
consider application and if it meets the requirements set out in the PVR Act, a
licence will be granted.
|
- The
grant of a compulsory licence allows the licensee to reproduce and sell
propagating material of the variety without the PVR owner’s
permission.
The licensee must pay a royalty set by the Commissioner of PVRs to the PVR
owner.
- The
Commissioner may grant a compulsory licence over a protected variety
if:
- the
application for the licence was made at least three years after the PVR was
granted; and
- the
PVR owner has not made reasonable quantities of propagating material of the
variety available to the public at a reasonable price.
- In
deciding whether or not condition (b) above is met, the Commissioner must ignore
propagating material that has been made available
only subject to the condition
that all or any
of the produce of that variety must be sold or offered to a specified person or
group of persons (section 21(3) of the PVR Act).
- If
a compulsory licence is granted, the Commissioner can require the PVR owner to
sell propagating material of the variety concerned
to the licensee. This power
is necessary, as the licensee will need propagating material to propagate the
variety.
- Only
two compulsory licences over PVRs have been granted. These were in the early
1980s, under the predecessor to the PVR Act. In
recent years there have been
five applications for compulsory licences, all for hops varieties. These
applications were resolved
through negotiations between the parties involved,
and no compulsory licences were issued.
What submitters said
- In
general, submitters accepted the need for some form of compulsory licence
provision. However, they also considered that the current
compulsory provisions
were deficient to some extent. The main issues identified were:
- lack
of a clear procedure that the Commissioner must follow when considering
applications for compulsory licences;
- no
requirement for an applicant for a compulsory licence to demonstrate that they
had made reasonable efforts to obtain a licence
from the PVR
owner;
- no
restriction on compulsory licensees exporting propagating material of the
variety concerned;
- lack
of a “public interest” test;
- the
three year “grace period” in section 21 is too short to allow PVR
owners to bring a variety to market;
- the
requirement in section 21(3) of the PVR Act that the Commissioner must ignore
propagating material that has been made available
only subject to the condition
that all or any of the produce of that variety must be sold or offered to a
specified person or group
of persons.
What are the options?
- As
discussed in detail in the Sapere report, PVRs are not a property right in the
traditional sense, but are better characterised
as a “conditional
grant”. As with other intellectual property rights, they are based on a
“social contract”.
In return for being granted the exclusive rights
associated with a PVR, the PVR owner undertakes to make the variety available so
as to provide a benefit to society as a whole.
- In
most cases, PVR owners will make propagating material of their protected
varieties available to the public on reasonable terms.
It will usually be in
their interests to do so, so as to
maximise their return from exploiting their protected varieties. There may,
however, be situations where the PVR owner’s interests
lie in restricting
access to a protected variety. In such cases, the social contract between the
PVR owner and the public may not
be fulfilled. It is this situation that the
grant of a compulsory licence is intended to remedy.
- In
light of the purpose of providing for compulsory licences, and the fact that
submitters generally accepted the need for compulsory
licence provisions, MBIE
considers that the PVR Act must continue to make provision for compulsory
licences.
- If
compulsory licence provisions are to be retained, it is clear that there are
aspects of the current provisions which will need
to be clarified regardless of
whichever of the options set out later in this section is adopted. These are the
issues listed as issues
(a) – (d) above, and which are discussed in more
detail below.
- Issues
(e) and (f) listed above are more “substantive” issues. These are
discussed later in this section.
Clear procedure for compulsory licence
applications
- Neither
the PVR Act nor the PVR regulations set out how the Commissioner must deal with
an application for a compulsory licence. This
lack of a prescribed procedure may
have led to a perception that, if an application for a compulsory licence is
filed, it will probably
be granted, with the only cost to the applicant being
the application fee.
- MBIE
proposes that the PVR Act require that the application be dealt with in a manner
prescribed in regulations, and that the parties
be given a reasonable
opportunity to be heard before making a decision on the
application.
- It
is not intended to look at possible procedures for dealing with compulsory
licence applications in this Options Paper. This will
be dealt with during the
consultation on the regulations that will be required to support the new
legislation. The Patents Regulations 2014 and the Trade Marks
Regulations 2003 contain examples of procedures that could be adapted for
use in applications for compulsory licences over protected
varieties.
- In
the most recent compulsory licence applications, a procedure based on the
opposition procedure in the Trade Marks Act 2002 was
used.
Requirement to make reasonable efforts to obtain a voluntary
licence
- There
is no requirement in the PVR Act that an applicant must have made reasonable
efforts to obtain a licence from the PVR owner,
on reasonable terms and
conditions. In practice any person who applies for a compulsory licence is
likely to have attempted to negotiate
a licence on reasonable terms and
conditions before making an application.
- Nevertheless,
there would be value in making this a requirement so as ensure that a compulsory
licence can be granted only if the
PVR owner has unreasonably refused to grant a
licence.
- MBIE
proposes that the PVR Act provide that a compulsory licence must not be granted
unless the applicant can show that:
- They
have made reasonable efforts to obtain a licence over the variety concerned from
the PVR owner on reasonable terms and conditions;
and
- Has
not been able to obtain such a licence within a reasonable period of
time20.
Restrictions on export
- There
is nothing in section 21 of the PVR Act that would require compulsory licences
to be granted subject to a condition that propagating
material of the variety
concerned must not be exported if it is to be used for the purposes of
propagation. The Commissioner has
the power to include such a condition if a
compulsory licence is granted. However, there is no guarantee that such a
condition would
be imposed.
- The
compulsory licence provisions are concerned with the supply of propagating
material to the New Zealand market. Allowing compulsory
licensees to export
propagating material for the purposes of propagating the variety concerned could
unreasonably prejudice the interests
of the PVR owner. This could occur if the
propagating material was exported to a country where the variety concerned was
not protectable.
The PVR owner would not be able to obtain royalties on any sale
or use of the propagating material in such a country.
- MBIE
proposes that the compulsory licence provisions in the PVR Act be amended to
make it clear that the licence is limited to the
use of the propagating material
to propagate the variety in New Zealand. This is consistent with the approach
taken in section 170
of the Patents Act 2013.
Public interest test
- Some
submitters on the Issues Paper argued that the compulsory licence provisions in
the PVR Act should contain a “public interest”
test. That is, the
Act would provide that a compulsory licence should only be granted if it is in
the “public interest”
to do so. This argument appeared to be based
on the fact that some other countries do have an explicit “public
interest”
test in their PVR compulsory licence
provisions.
- However,
MBIE notes that many countries, including Australia, Canada and the United
Kingdom do not have a “public interest”
test. Singapore and the EU
do have such a test, and EU regulation does provide some guidelines as to what
might constitute the “public
interest”.
- MBIE
considers that there is no need for an explicit “public interest”
test.
- Merely
providing for such a test would, in itself, give no guidance to the Commissioner
as to what the public interest is. We consider
that the wording in section 21 of
the PVR Act reflects
20 These conditions are based on section 176 of the
Patents Act 2013.
the public interest in ensuring that propagating material of protected varieties
should be available in reasonable quantities on
reasonable terms.
Compulsory licences to be non-exclusive
- MBIE
also proposes that compulsory licences must be
non-exclusive.
- If
a compulsory licence was exclusive, this would prevent the PVR owner or anyone
else from exploiting the variety concerned without
the permission of the
compulsory licensee. This would be unfair to the PVR owner, and to any other
person who had obtained a voluntary
licence from the PVR
owner.
- While
it is unlikely that the Commissioner would grant an exclusive compulsory
licence, there is nothing in the PVR Act that prevents
the Commissioner from
doing so. Including an explicit provision that a compulsory licence must not be
exclusive, will make it clear
that exclusive compulsory licences cannot be
granted.
Compulsory licences – general issues
Do you agree with the discussion and the proposals in relation to the five
issues discussed above? If not, why not?
Other than the two substantive issues below, are there other issues we have
missed?
15
Options for substantive issues
- As
described above, there appear to be two “substantive” issues where
there are viable options to be considered:
- the
“grace period”;
- the
condition set out in section 21(3) of the PVR Act.
Options analysis
- Our
criteria for our options analysis are the same as those used for the scope of
the right options (with the necessary amendment
to the third criterion),
namely:
- incentivises
the development of new varieties, and encourages foreign breeders to release
their new varieties in New Zealand, by providing
sufficient opportunity for
rights holders to get a reasonable return on their
investment;
- ensures
that the public has reasonable access to new varieties so as to meet public
demand for the varieties and the products derived
from
them;
- provides
certainty to rights holders and the public about compulsory licences.
Grace period
- The
“grace period” is the period after grant of a PVR during which a
compulsory licence application cannot be filed. The
grace period reflects the
fact that many PVR owners will not begin to exploit their protected variety
until after a PVR is granted.
It can take time to produce sufficient propagating
material to place on the market. During this time the PVR owner may be unable
to
provide propagating material to the public.
- There
appear to be three viable options:
Option 1: Retain a three year grace period (the status quo)
Option 2: Provide for a grace period of more than three years
Option 3: Provide for different grace periods for different varieties.
- Option
1 is our preferred option.
Analysis summary
|
Incentivise investment
|
Ensure public access
|
Provide certainty
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
There is no evidence that the length of the grace period impacts
investment.
|
It is important that the public has an opportunity to make the case that
the breeder has not made reasonable quantities of
material available.
|
Provides certainty.
|
There is no compelling argument for changing the status quo.
|
Option 2
|
There is no evidence that the length of the grace period impacts
investment.
|
The longer the grace period, the longer a breeder can potentially abuse
their monopoly position and restrict public
access.
|
Provides certainty.
|
Firstly it is not clear what a longer period should be. Secondly, a longer
period has some risk associated with it and there are no
clear benefits.
|
Option 3
|
There is no evidence that the length of the grace period impacts
investment.
|
The longer the grace period, the longer a breeder can potentially abuse
their monopoly position and restrict public access.
|
Provides certainty.
|
The main argument here is that some varieties may take longer to be
commercially viable, but the Commissioner is highly unlikely to
grant a
compulsory licence if the breeder is unable to make a reasonable quantity
available because it does
not yet exist.
|
Option 1: Retain the status quo (preferred option)
- This
option involves retaining the three year grace period provided for in section 21
of the PVR Act.
- Some
submitters have argued that this is too short, as for some varieties at least,
PVR owners may not be able to put reasonable quantities
of propagating material
on the market within three years of grant. They argue it would be unfair to
grant a compulsory licence when
it had not been possible for the PVR owner to
produce sufficient propagating material to serve the market.
- We
note that in Australia and the UK, the grace period is two years. Canada and
Singapore appear to have no grace period.
- If
an application for a compulsory licence was filed more than three years from
grant, it would likely be refused if the Commissioner
was satisfied that the PVR
owner was unable to make reasonable quantities of propagating material available
for purchase. For example,
this could be because the PVR owner had not had
sufficient time to produce the material following grant of the
PVR.
- In
light of the points made above, MBIE considers that the three year grace period
is not unreasonable.
Option 2: Provide for a grace period of more
than three years
- Under
this option, the grace period would be fixed at some period longer than three
years. However, in light of the discussion on
Option 1, it is not clear that a
grace period of longer than three years would be
justified.
Option 3: Provide for different grace periods for different
species
- This
option would mean that different plant species would have different grace
periods before a compulsory licence could be applied
for. This could reflect the
fact that the time required to get reasonable quantities of propagating material
to market differs for
different species.
- This
would mean listing the grace periods in the PVR Act or regulations. It is not
clear how the grace periods would be determined,
or what criteria would be
used.
- In
any case, as noted in the discussion of Option 1, applications for compulsory
licences would likely be refused if the Commissioner
was satisfied that the PVR
owner was unable to make reasonable quantities of propagating material available
for purchase. This suggests
that there is no justification for providing
different grace periods for different species.
Compulsory licences
– grace period
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
16
Section 21(3) of the PVR Act
- Section
21(3) of the PVR Act provides a condition that the Commissioner must take into
account when deciding whether or not reasonable
quantities of propagating
material of a protected variety have been made available at a reasonable price.
This condition is:
“... the Commissioner shall not take
into account any reproductive material that is available only subject to the
condition
that any or all of the produce from that material must be offered or
sold to a particular person, or to one of a specified group
of persons, or to a
member of a specified class or description of person.”
- Some
submitters on the Issues Paper argued that this provision be repealed. It
appears to be common for PVR owners to use contractual
arrangements to require
persons growing their protected varieties to sell or offer to sell the produce
to a person specified in the
contract. These submitters argue that this is
important to enable PVR owners to maintain quality and brand reputation for the
varieties21.
- There
appear to be two viable options:
Option 1: Retain section 21(3) (the status quo)
Option 2: Repeal section 21(3).
- Option
1 is our preferred option.
Analysis summary
|
Incentivise investment
|
Ensure public access
|
Provide certainty
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
There is no evidence that
this provision impacts
|
This provision ensures that
the public has the
|
May create some
uncertainty for breeders
|
Applications for
compulsory licences are
|
|
investment in new
|
opportunity to challenge a
|
as to how the
|
rare which suggests that
|
|
varieties, or that current
|
breeder who is restricting
|
Commissioner may apply
|
the concerns of breeders
|
|
contractual arrangements
|
access by requiring
|
this provision.
|
are unfounded. It remains
|
|
are not working.
|
growers to sell their
|
|
important that the public
|
|
|
produce to specified
|
|
retains this ability to
|
|
|
persons.
|
|
challenge breeders.
|
Option 2
|
Removing this provision
open the possibility of
|
Removing this provision
would leave breeders free
|
Would remove that
uncertainty.
|
The potential costs of
removing this provision
|
|
breeders increasing
|
to dictate who they make
|
|
outweigh any potential
|
|
market power. This could
|
their propagating material
|
|
benefits.
|
|
mean bigger returns and
|
available to, potentially
|
|
|
|
so more investment in
|
limiting public access to
|
|
|
|
new varieties, but could
|
the new varieties.
|
|
|
|
also lead to rent seeking
|
|
|
|
|
behaviour.
|
|
|
|
Option 1: Retain section 21(3) (preferred option)
- This
option involves retaining section 21(3) in the PVR Act. This would mean that
where a PVR owner requires all or most growers of
a protected variety to sell,
or offer to sell, the produce of that variety to a specified person (as opposed
to, say, the general
public), it would be possible for a compulsory licence to
be granted.
- For
most PVRs, there may not be a problem if PVR owners require growers to sell, or
offer to sell, their produce to a specified person.
Growers may have sufficient
choice about the varieties they grow to ensure that if PVR owners require
growers to sell their produce
to specified persons, PVR owners must offer terms
that growers will find acceptable. It will usually be in the interests of PVR
owners
to license their varieties as widely as possible to maximise the return
they receive.
21 Note that grant of a compulsory licence will not
enable the licensee to use any trade marks used by the PVR owner to market their
produce.
- In
these circumstances, compulsory licence applications are unlikely. The lack of
compulsory licence applications since the PVR Act
came into force suggests that
in most cases, growers find the contractual conditions imposed on them by PVR
owners acceptable.
- There
may, however, be cases where one PVR owner or exclusive licensee controls all or
nearly all of the PVRs for a particular species.
Where market demand is largely
for produce of protected varieties of that species, the PVR owner or exclusive
licensee may be able
to impose terms which some growers may be unable or
unwilling to comply with.
- In
such cases this could lead to higher prices for consumers (because one seller
may have an effective monopoly over produce of that
species). It could also mean
that some intending growers are “locked out” of the market for
produce of that species.
This is not in the public
interest.
- This
was the situation that arose in the most recent compulsory licence application
in relation to hop varieties. Although no licence
was issued as the parties
involved negotiated a settlement, the application has enabled the establishment
of hop growing and breeding
activities that are not controlled by the exclusive
licensee concerned. This has led to economic activity and potentially increased
exports of hops that might not otherwise have occurred.
- So,
while we acknowledge that retaining this provision also retains a degree of
uncertainty for breeders as to how it is applied,
MBIE considers that section
21(3) be retained.
Option 2: Repeal section 21(3)
- This
option would involve repeal of section 21(3). This would mean that if PVR owners
make their varieties available to growers on
the condition that the produce be
sold back to a specified person, then this could be considered making reasonable
quantities of
propagating material available to the public at a reasonable
price. This could mean that no compulsory licence could be granted under
such
circumstances.
- As
noted in the discussion on Option 1, there may be occasions when making a
protected variety available on such terms may not be
in the public interest.
While these may be rare, it would be desirable that the possibility of grant of
a compulsory licence be available
to ensure that the public interest is
protected. For this reason, MBIE does not favour Option
2.
Compulsory licences – section 21(3)
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
17
Enforcement: infringements
- This
section looks at infringement of PVR owners’ rights over protected
varieties, and how they are enforced.
What is infringement of a PVR?
- Section
17 of the PVR Act provides that the following actions are infringements of a
PVR:
- import
of propagating material of the protected variety into New Zealand for use in
propagating the variety;
- import
of produce of a protected variety into New Zealand from a UPOV member state
where it is not possible to obtain PVR protection
for that
variety;
- import
the produce of a protected variety into New Zealand from a country that is not a
member state of UPOV;
- sale
under the denomination of a protected variety of propagating material of some
other variety, unless the groups of plants to which
those varieties belong are
internationally recognised as being distinct for the purposes of
denomination.
- Section
17 also provides that PVR owners have the exclusive right22
to:
- sell,
or offer for sale, propagating material of a protected
variety;
- produce
propagating material of the protected variety for sale as propagating
material.
- The
use of the term “exclusive right” in section 17 implies that if a
person does these things without the PVR owner’s
permission, this would be
infringement of the PVR owner’s rights, although this is not explicitly
stated.
- In
other intellectual property regimes, such as patents and trade marks, the nature
and scope of what actions would infringe an intellectual
property right is often
clarified by the courts. However, we are aware of only two PVR infringement
cases that have gone to court.
These are Winchester International Ltd v
Cropmark Seeds Ltd23 and Cropmark v Southern Grain and
Seed.
- In
the Winchester case, Winchester arranged for the sale of seeds of a
protected variety without the PVR owner’s permission. However, Winchester
had not actually grown the seed for sale, or sold the seed. The courts
determined that this conduct constituted infringement because
it
“diminished the [PVR owner’s] enjoyment of its exclusive
right”, even though arranging sale is not explicitly
mentioned as an
exclusive right in the PVR Act.
22In this context, an “exclusive right”
gives the owner of the right the ability to prevent others performing certain
actions
without the rights owner’s permission. It does not give the rights
owner a positive right to perform those actions.
23 Court of Appeal [2005] NZCA 301 (5 December 2005) http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZCA/2005/301.html
Enforcement of PVR owner’s rights
- As
with other intellectual property rights, the onus is on the rights owners to
enforce their rights through civil actions in the
courts. Infringement of a PVR
is not a criminal offence. This means that if a PVR owner thinks another person
is infringing their
rights in a protected variety, the PVR owner can start (or
threaten to start) infringement proceedings in the courts.
- The
PVR Act provides that, in awarding damages (including exemplary damages) or any
other relief, the Court shall consider:
- any
loss suffered, or likely to be suffered, by the grantee;
- any
profits or other benefits derived by the infringer;
- the
flagrancy of the infringement.
- The
PVR Act does not specify where PVR infringement proceedings must be heard.
Infringements involving other intellectual property
rights such as patents,
trade marks and patents are heard in the High Court. The two PVR infringement
cases that MBIE is aware of
were both heard in the High Court. The Winchester
case went on to the Court of Appeal.
- The
PVR Act does contain some criminal offences (see section 37), but as these do
not deal with infringement of a PVR, they will be
dealt with later in this
document.
What did submitters say?
- There
were a number of themes that were common to many of the submissions that
mentioned enforcement:
- it is
unclear what constitutes infringement;
- costs
of enforcement are seen as too high compared with the potential damages that
might be awarded;
- it
is unclear where disputes involving infringement should be
heard;
- there
should be some form of specialised tribunal to deal with disputes, infringements
and offences;
- it is
not clear what remedies are available where infringement is
proved.
- In
addition, a number of submitters appeared to be under the impression that
infringement was a criminal offence, and argued that
the penalties for
infringement were too low. As mentioned earlier, PVR infringement is not a
criminal offence.
What are the options?
Infringement
- A
number of submitters noted that there is a lack of clarity in the PVR Act as to
what constitutes infringement of a PVR. There was
also concern that some acts,
such as unauthorised export of propagating material of a protected variety were
not infringements.
- The
approach taken in other intellectual property legislation, such as the
Patents Act 2013 and the Copyright Act 1994, is to provide that
the relevant intellectual property right is infringed if a person does any of
the acts over which the rights owner
has exclusive rights, without the rights
owner’s permission.
- Our
CPTPP obligations mean that the minimum exclusive rights that we must provide
over protected varieties, and EDVs of protected
varieties, are those set out in
Article 14(1) of UPOV
- These
are the exclusive right to:
- produce
or reproduce the propagating material;
- condition
the propagating material for the purpose of propagation;
- offer
the propagating material for sale;
- selling
or other marketing24 of the propagating
material;
- export
the propagating material;
- import
the propagating material;
- stock
the propagating material for any of the purposes mentioned
above.
- MBIE
proposes that we take the same approach as in other intellectual property
legislation and provide that the PVR owner’s
right is infringed if a
person does any of the acts over which the PVR owner has exclusive rights,
without the PVR owner’s
permission.
Costs of enforcement
- A
common theme among submitters who commented on enforcement was the high costs
involved in enforcing a PVR. Enforcing a PVR is likely
to involve significant
costs, particularly if this involves starting infringement proceedings in a
court. Submitters considered that
these costs were too high, and in many cases
the costs might exceed any damages that the PVR owner might obtain from an
infringer.
24 In this context “other marketing”
could include “arranging the sale of seed” which was at issue in
Winchester International Ltd v Cropmark Seeds Ltd
- Issues
surrounding the high costs of enforcement are not confined to PVRs. Owners of
other intellectual property rights, such as patents
and copyrights also argue
that the costs of enforcement are too high in relation to the damages that might
be awarded.
- There
is no easy solution to the high costs of enforcing intellectual property rights.
The problem is made worse by the small size
of the New Zealand market. Because
the market is so small, the losses that an intellectual property rights owner
might suffer as
the result of an infringement are also going to be small. In
many cases the losses may be less than the cost of taking action against
an
infringer.
- Some
disputes involving alleged infringement can be resolved by negotiation between
the parties involved, or through alternative dispute
resolution. These are
likely to be cheaper than going to court. However, there will still be costs,
for example, in gathering evidence
and obtaining legal
advice.
- Some
submitters advocated for a cheaper way of resolving disputes involving PVRs,
such as through the PVR Office or a specialist tribunal.
However, at present,
this seems impractical. Neither the PVR Office nor IPONZ has the resources to
deal with disputes involving infringement
of PVRs.
- While
the idea of a specialist tribunal may sound attractive, who should pay for it?
Should such a tribunal be paid for by the government,
or out of PVR Office fees,
or by those who use it? As PVRs are private rights, it may be difficult to
justify using government funding,
or money raised through PVR fees to fund it. A
“user pays” tribunal might not be much cheaper than the
courts.
- It
is also unlikely that there would be sufficient work to support a full-time
tribunal dealing with PVR disputes. The members would
therefore have to be
part-time, and tribunal work would be in addition to their “day job”
which would be likely to take
priority. This may lead to long delays in
conducting hearings and producing decisions.
- If
tribunal members had to have specialist skills relating to plant breeding, there
may be difficulties finding suitably skilled members
who did not have a
connection with at least one of the parties to a dispute.
- Another
problem may be that the amount of damages that such a tribunal could award may
be too small to make using such a tribunal
worthwhile for PVR owners. For
example, the Copyright Tribunal established under the Copyright Act 1994
has jurisdiction to deal with people who infringe copyright through file
sharing. The maximum amount that the Copyright Tribunal can
award in damages is
$15,000. The Disputes Tribunals established under the Disputes Tribunals Act
1988 can make a maximum award of $20,000 if both parties
agree25.
- MBIE
acknowledges the issues relating to cost of enforcement, but does not see any
cost effective means of addressing it, and so does
not propose any change to the
status quo.
25 The Disputes Tribunal cannot hear disputes
involving intellectual property.
Who should deal with disputes involving infringement of
PVRs?
- The
PVR Act is silent on where disputes involving infringement of PVRs should be
heard. Disputes involving infringement of other IP
rights such as patents,
copyright and trade marks are dealt with in the High Court. The Patents Act
2013 and the Trade Marks Act 2002 both provide for the High Court to
hear infringement disputes.
- Ae
mentioned earlier, the two PVR infringement cases that we are aware of were both
adjudicated in the High Court.
- The
District Court has jurisdiction to hear civil disputes involving amounts between
$15,000 and $200,000. The potential awards in
many PVR infringement cases are
likely to fall within this range. District Court proceedings may be cheaper and
quicker than High
Court proceedings.
Remedies for infringement
- The
PVR Act is unclear about what remedies a court can award if it finds that a PVR
is infringed. Section 17(4) of the PVR Act provides
that a court can award
damages or other relief. This section specifies what factors a court must take
into account when granting
relief, but does not specify the nature of the
damages.
- Both
the Patents Act 2013 and the Trade Marks Act 2002 provide that a
court can award damages, or an account of profits, and/or grant an injunction.
An injunction could, for example, require
the infringer to cease their
infringing activities.
- MBIE
considers that the PVR Act should take the same approach to remedies for
infringement as the Patents Act 2013 or the Trade Marks Act 2002.
There does not seem to be any justification for going beyond those
remedies.
- MBIE
proposes that the PVR Act should provide that the remedies for infringement of a
PVR include:
- an
award of damages; or
- an
account of profits; and/or
- an
injunction.
Enforcement – infringements
Do you agree with the discussion and the proposals in relation to the four
issues discussed above? If not, why not?
Should the PVR Act provide that infringement disputes be heard in the
District Court? Are there others issues relating to infringements
that we have
missed?
18
Enforcement: offences
- This
section looks at the offence provisions in the PVR Act.
- Infringement
of a PVR is not a criminal offence, However, section 37 of the PVR Act makes it
an offence to:
- supply,
with intent to deceive, false or misleading information in connection with an
application for a PVR;
- falsely
represent that a person is a PVR owner or that a person has applied for a
PVR;
- falsely
represent that a variety is a protected variety or that a PVR application has
been made in respect of that variety;
- falsely
represent that a variety is some other variety which is protected by a PVR or
that is the subject of a PVR application;
- sell
a variety that is a protected variety, or that was a protected variety (because
the PVR has been surrendered or expired), without
using the denomination
(variety name) approved with it when the PVR was granted;
- represent
yourself as the PVR Office or to suggest that you or your business is officially
connected to the PVR Office.
- It
is also an offence for a person to apply for a PVR, or acquire an interest in a
PVR, if that person is a PVR Office employee, or
for 12 months after they have
left the PVR Office.
- The
maximum penalty for any of the offences is a fine of
$1000.
- The
PVR Act is silent as to who should enforce these offence provisions. Normally
such criminal offence provisions would be dealt
with by the police, after
receiving a complaint from a member of the public or another agency, such as the
PVR Office, which had
become aware of the offending behaviour. Neither the PVR
Office nor IPONZ has any enforcement powers under the PVR
Act.
- As
far as MBIE is aware, there have been no prosecutions under the offence
provisions since the mid-1990s. It is likely that any complaint
to the police
made under the offence provisions would be given a low priority.
- UPOV
91 does not require member states to prohibit the activities referred to in the
list above, with the exception of activity (e).
Article 20(7) of UPOV 91
provides that persons who sell propagating material of protected varieties must
be required to use the variety
denomination, even after the PVR has expired or
lapsed.
What did submitters say?
- Those
submitters who commented on the offence provisions considered that the penalties
were too low, and did not act as a deterrent.
Some submitters appeared to be
under the impression that infringement was an offence. One submitter queried
whether the offence provisions
served any real purpose, especially as some of
the activities involved may be already captured by provisions in the Fair
Trading Act 1986.
What are the options?
- There
appear to be three viable options:
Option 1: Retain the current offences and penalties (the status quo)
Option 2: Retain the current offences, but provide the PVR Office or IPONZ with
the power to enforce the offence provisions
Option 3: Repeal the offence provisions.
- Option
3 is our preferred option.
Criteria for assessing the options
- Most
of the offence provisions appear to be aimed at deterring misleading and
deceptive behaviour on the part of persons dealing in
plant varieties. These
persons may, or may not be, PVR owners or breeders. For example, the person
could be the owner of a garden
centre or nursery rather than a plant
breeder.
- MBIE
considers that the following criteria are relevant when assessing the options
set out above:
- the
extent to which the option deters misleading and deceptive behaviour in relation
to protected varieties;
- proportionality:
is the nature of the misleading or deceptive behaviour sufficient to justify
making it a criminal offence in the
PVR Act?
- is
the misleading or deceptive behaviour dealt with in other legislative
provisions?
Analysis summary
|
Deterrence
|
Proportionality
|
Addressed in other legislation
|
Comment
|
Option 1
|
Police are unlikely to prioritise prosecution of these offences, so minimal
deterrent effect.
|
Many of these offences are not offences in other IP legislation, but would
potentially be offences under other legislations,
e.g. the Fair Trading Act.
|
Most of these offences could be addressed in other legislation (e.g. the
Fair Trading Act) or by other sanction (e.g. cancellation
or
nullification of the grant).
|
It is not consistent with other IP legislation to keep these offences in
the PVR Act.
|
Option 2
|
Might increase deterrent if IPONZ can take prosecutions, though still
unlikely to be invoked often.
|
Many of these offences are not offences in other IP legislation, but would
potentially be offences under other legislations,
e.g. the Fair Trading Act.
|
Most of these offences could be addressed in other legislation (e.g. the
Fair Trading Act) or by other sanction (e.g. cancellation
or
nullification of the grant)
|
It is not consistent with other IP legislation to keep these offences in
the PVR Act.
|
Option 3
|
Deterrent is unlikely to be less than the status quo.
|
Many of these offences are offences under the Fair Trading Act. Persons
impacted by these breaches can also take civil
actions.
|
Most of these offences could be addressed in other legislation (e.g. the
Fair Trading Act) or by other sanction (e.g.
cancellation of the grant)
|
It is not consistent with other IP legislation to keep these offences in
the PVR Act. Most of them are adequately dealt with in
the Fair Trading Act.
|
Option 1: Retain the current offences and penalties
- This
would involve retaining the current offences and penalties. As discussed below,
this is not preferred by MBIE.
- As
noted earlier, there appear to have been no prosecutions under the offence
provisions since the mid-1990s. Only the police have
the power to take
prosecutions, as neither the PVR Office nor IPONZ has the authority to initiate
prosecutions other than by making
a complaint to the
police.
- Given
that the police are likely to give offences under the PVR Office a low priority,
the likelihood of prosecution is low. In light
of this, the offence provisions
are unlikely to be a deterrent, even if the penalties were significantly
increased.
- Although
the behaviour that is the subject of the offence provisions is clearly
undesirable, similar behaviour in respect of other
intellectual property rights
is not a specific offence in the relevant intellectual property statue. For
example, there is no provision
in the Patents Act 2013 that makes it an
offence to falsely claim that a product is the subject of a New Zealand patent,
or that a patent has been applied
for. Such behaviour may however, be actionable
under other legislation, such as the Fair Trading Act
1986.
- The
behaviours (b) – (d) and (f) in the list above could be considered
breaches of the Fair Trading Act 1986 as they involve false or misleading
behaviour in relation to the provision of goods or services that of the sort
that this Act was
intended to deal with. Both the Commerce Commission and legal
persons have the power to take prosecutions under the Fair Trading Act.
The maximum fines for this behaviour are $200,000 for an individual and $600,000
for a body corporate. It is also possible for civil
action to be taken by
persons who are adversely affected by these activities.
Provision
of false or misleading information to the PVR Office
- Activity
(a) in the list above makes the supply of false or misleading information in
connection with an application for a PVR an
offence. The supply of false or
misleading information in connection with an application is not an offence under
other intellectual
property legislation, such as the Patents Act 2013 or
the Trade Marks Act 2002.
- However,
section 16 of the PVR Act provides that if incorrect information is provided to
the PVR Office in connection with an application,
and a PVR was granted on the
basis of that information, the PVR can be cancelled. The Patents Act 2013
and the Trade Marks Act 2002 provide that if the rights were obtained
through fraud or other misrepresentation, the right can be revoked or
invalidated.
- MBIE
considers that the possibility that PVR could be revoked if the applicant has
obtained it through the provision of false or misleading
information to the PVR
Office is likely to be a more powerful deterrent to the provision of such
information than an offence provision.
- In
light of this, and for consistency with other intellectual property legislation,
MBIE considers that there is no need to provide
that the provision of false or
misleading information to the PVR Office should be an offence. Instead the PVR
Act should provide
that the right would be nullified.
Use of variety denomination
- As
noted earlier, UPOV 91 provides that persons who sell propagating material of
protected varieties must be required to use the variety
denomination, even after
the PVR has expired or lapsed. The PVR Act makes it an offence to sell a
protected variety without using
the denomination, even if the PVR has expired
(activity (e) in the list above).
- MBIE
considers that failure to use a variety denomination is not sufficiently
egregious to justify a separate offence provision in
the PVR Act. In many cases
failure to use a variety denomination when selling material of a protected or
previously protected variety
will not disadvantage
purchasers.
- There
may be cases where failure to use a variety denomination could be considered
misleading or deceptive. In such cases purchasers
may be able to seek remedies
under the Fair Trading Act 1986 or in contract
law.
Officers of the PVR Office not to apply for, or acquire an
interest in, a PVR
- The
purpose of this provision is to ensure that there is no conflict between an
officer’s official duties and any commercial
interests they may have. MBIE
considers that such conflicts are more appropriately dealt with through the
public service code of
conduct, and the provisions of section 105A of the
Crimes Act 1961. Section 105A makes corrupt use of official information
an offence carrying a penalty of up to seven years
imprisonment.
Option 2: Retain the offences, but provide the PVR
Office or IPONZ with enforcement powers
- Under
this option, the offence provisions would be retained, with the PVR Office or
IPONZ being given the authority to investigate
offences. The powers could be
similar to those of enforcement officers appointed under the Copyright Act
1994 or the Trade Marks Act 2002.
- This
might increase the deterrent effect of the offence provisions if the PVR Office
or IPONZ were seen to be actively investigating
offences and taking
prosecutions. In practice, however the PVR Office or IPONZ are only likely to
take action if there is a compelling
public interest in taking a prosecution
(and only if they are sufficiently resourced to carry out this enforcement
activity). This
is the approach under the Copyright Act 1994 and the
Trade Marks Act 2002.
- As
a result it is likely that the power to investigate and prosecute an offence
will be rarely invoked. This suggests that providing
the PVR Office or IPONZ
with the authority to investigate offences will not significantly increase the
deterrent effect of the offence
provisions.
- In
addition, as discussed under Option 1 other intellectual property statutes do
not contain similar offence provisions. The behaviours
referred to in the
offence provisions appear to fall within the scope of other legislation, such as
the Fair Trading Act 1986.
Option 3: Repeal the offence
provisions (preferred option)
- This
option involves repealing the offence provisions. As discussed under Option 1,
the current offence provisions do not appear to
be acting as a deterrent to the
behaviours concerned.
- Also,
similar activities in respect of other intellectual property rights are not
offences. For example, it is not an offence to represent
an invention as being
patented, when it is not patented. On this basis, MBIE considers that there is
no reason why these behaviours
should be offences under the PVR
Act.
- MBIE
also considers that, because the activities that are treated as offences in the
PVR Act are adequately dealt with elsewhere (see
discussion in Option 1), there
is no reason for these activities to be treated as offences in the PVR
Act.
Enforcement – offences
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why
not?
19
Exhaustion of the breeder’s
right
UPOV 91
|
PVR Act
|
Article 16 of UPOV 91 relates to “exhaustion” of PVRs. This
means that the exclusive rights of PVR owners over the propagating
material of a
protected variety does not extend to acts involving any material of the
protected variety, or material derived from
that material, unless such acts
involve:
- further
propagation of the variety, or
- export of
propagating material to a country where protection for the species or genus to
which the protected variety belongs, unless
such export is for purposes that do
not involve propagation of the variety.
|
The PVR Act has no specific provision dealing with “exhaustion”
of PVRs. However section 18(c) provides that it is not
an infringement of a PVR
for any person to use propagating material of a protected variety for human
consumption or other non-propagating
purposes.
|
- In
line with New Zealand’s CPTPP obligations, we must, as a minimum, align
our PVR legislation with UPOV 91. This section looks
at the UPOV 91 provisions
relating to exhaustion of PVR rights.
- The
principle of “exhaustion” or rights in the PVR context means that
PVR owner’s ability to control the use of
any material of a protected
variety is limited once that material has been placed on the market by or with
the consent of the PVR
owner.
- The
PVR Act does not explicitly provide for “exhaustion” of rights.
However, section 18 of the PVR Act does provide for
what is effectively a form
of exhaustion. This section provides an exception that allows any person to use
propagating material of
a protected variety for purposes that do not involve
propagating the variety, for example for human or animal consumption, without
the PVR owner’s permission.
- Article
16 of UPOV 91 provides for exhaustion of PVRs. This provision requires that PVR
rights shall not extend to acts involving
protected varieties, or materials
derived from them that are placed on the market by or with the consent of the
PVR owner unless
these acts:
- involve
further propagation of the variety; or
- involve
export of propagating material of the variety to a country which does not
protect varieties of the species of genus to which
the variety belongs, except
where the exported material is for final consumption purposes.
- For
the purposes of Article 16, “material” means:
- any
form of propagating material;
- harvested
material, including entire plants and parts of plants;
- any
product made directly from the harvested material.
What did submitters say?
- No
submitters mentioned exhaustion of rights.
What does MBIE propose?
- MBIE
proposes that the PVR Act be amended to incorporate the provisions of Article 16
of UPOV 91. This is required by UPOV 91, there
is little or no flexibility in
how we implement it.
- The
effect of implementing Article 16 of UPOV 91 is that once material of a
protected variety (as defined above) is placed on the
market in New Zealand by
or with the consent of the PVR owner, the PVR owner has no rights to control the
further exploitation of
that material. The only exception to this is where the
material is used to further propagate the variety. Any rights that the PVR
owner
has in that material are said to be “exhausted” if it is not used to
propagate the variety.
- The
principle of exhaustion set out in Article 16 also applies to any material
derived from the material originally placed on the
market.
Exhaustion of the breeder’s right
Do you have any comments about the exhaustion provision required by UPOV
91?
20
Cancellation and nullification of the
breeder’s right
UPOV 91
|
PVR Act
|
Article 21 of UPOV 91 allows for PVRs to be “nullified” if it
is established that:
- the variety
concerned was not new or distinct at the time of grant, or
- that where the
PVR grant was based on documents provided by the applicant, the variety
concerned was not stable or uniform, or
- the PVR was
granted to a person who was not entitled to it, unless the PVR is transferred to
a person who is entitled.
Article 22 of UPOV 91 allows for
cancellation of a PVR if:
- the variety
concerned is no longer stable or uniform,
- the PVR owner
does not provide the relevant authority with material for verifying the
maintenance of the variety,
- the PVR owner
has not paid any annual
|
Section 15 of the PVR Act provides for “Objections after
grant”. Any person may make an objection to the continuation
of the grant
on the grounds that:
- the variety
concerned was not new, distinct, stable, or uniform at the time of grant,
or
- the PVR was
granted to a person who was not the owner of that variety.
Section
16 of the PVR Act permits a PVR to be cancelled if:
- the applicant
supplied incorrect information to the Commissioner,
- the variety was
not new and distinct at the time the application was made,
- the variety is
not stable and uniform,
- the PVR owner is
not the owner of the variety,
- the PVR owner
has not provided the Commissioner with reproductive material of the variety when
requested to do so,
- the PVR owner
has failed to provide the
|
Commissioner with information about measures to maintain the variety,
- the PVR owner
has failed to pay the annual grant fee.
maintenance fee,
- the PVR owner
does not propose a new denomination if the original denomination is cancelled
after grant.
- In
line with New Zealand’s CPTPP obligations, we must, as a minimum, align
our PVR legislation with UPOV 91. This section looks
at the UPOV 91 provisions
relating to nullity and cancellation of a PVR.
- The
PVR Act currently provides for “objections after grant” (section 15)
and cancellation of grant (section 16). Sections
15 and 16 are similar to, but
not completely consistent with, Articles 21 and 22 of UPOV 91, which deal with
“nullification”
and “cancellation” of a PVR
respectively. It will therefore be necessary to amend the PVR Act so that it is
consistent
with Articles 21 and 22 of UPOV 91.
- Under
Article 21 of UPOV 91 a PVR can be nullified if it is established that the
variety concerned should not have been granted a
PVR. This may be because, at
the time of grant:
- the
variety was not new or distinct;
- where
the PVR was granted on the basis of information supplied by the applicant, that
the variety was not stable or uniform;
- the
person to whom the PVR was granted was not entitled to be granted the PVR (for
example, the person was not the breeder or anyone
deriving title from the
breeder).
- Nullification
is analogous to the revocation of a patent. That is, if a PVR is nullified, it
is effectively deemed never to have been
granted. Once a PVR has been nullified,
it is not possible to start infringement proceedings for acts that took place
before the
PVR was nullified.
- Article
22 of UPOV 91 provides for cancellation of a PVR. A PVR can be cancelled because
the variety is no longer stable or uniform,
even though it was stable or uniform
at the time of grant. Alternatively, a grant may be cancelled if the PVR owner
has not paid
a renewal fee, or provided the relevant authority with information
about maintenance of the variety, or not proposed a new denomination
if the
original one has been cancelled.
- If
a PVR is cancelled, the PVR ceases to be in force, but it may still be possible
to take action for infringements that took place
before the PVR was
cancelled.
What did submitters say?
- The
main points made in submissions were that the relationship between sections 15
and 16 is unclear. In particular, there is some
overlap between the two
sections. While section 15 allows any person to make an objection after grant,
section 16 is unclear about
who can start proceedings for cancellation of
grant.
- One
submitter noted that it is unclear how the Commissioner should deal with cases
where the annual grant fee is not paid on time.
Section 16(3) provides that the
Commissioner must give notice to the PVR owner. If the PVR owner cannot provide
good reason for not
cancelling the grant within 28 days of receiving the notice,
the PVR will be cancelled.
- However,
the PVR Act is silent on what criteria the Commissioner should apply when making
a decision on whether or not to cancel a
PVR. It was suggested that there should
be a procedure for restoration of a PVR where it has been cancelled due to
non-payment of
the annual grant fee.
- Another
deficiency noted by submitters is the lack of clear procedures for dealing with
objections after grant or cancellation of
grant. Another issue identified was
that there is no power for a court to nullify or cancel a
PVR.
What does MBIE propose?
- MBIE
proposes that the PVR Act be amended to include provisions for nullification and
cancellation of a PVR consistent with Articles
21 and 22 of UPOV 91. It will be
possible for any person to apply to have a PVR nullified or cancelled. We also
propose to amend
the PVR Act to provide for:
- Explicit
procedures to be followed by the Commissioner when considering applications for
nullification or cancellation of a PVR. These
could be modelled on the
provisions for revocation of a patent in the Patents Act 2013 and the
Patents Regulations 2014;
- Procedures
to be followed for restoring a PVR that has been cancelled due to non- payment
of a renewal fee (or any other reason).
We propose that these could be modelled
on the provisions for restoration of a lapsed patent in the Patents Act
2013;
- Nullification
or cancellation of PVRs by the courts (as is the case with
patents).
Nullification or cancellation as a counterclaim to
infringement
- The
PVR Act is silent on whether a person who is accused of infringing a PVR can
counterclaim that the PVR is invalid; that is, that
the PVR should be nullified
or cancelled. If the counterclaim is successful, and the PVR is nullified or
cancelled the person would
not be liable for infringement.
- The
Patents Act 2013 allows alleged infringers to counterclaim for revocation
of the patent concerned. There seems to be no reason why persons accused
of
infringing a PVR should not be able to make a similar counterclaim in respect of
the PVR(s) they are alleged to have infringed.
- MBIE
proposes that the PVR Act be amended to provide that alleged infringers can
counterclaim that a PVR should be nullified or
cancelled.
Cancellation and nullification of the breeder’s
right
Do you have any comments about the cancellation and nullification provisions
required by UPOV 91, and MBIE’s additional proposals
discussed in this
section?
21
11 Additional issues
Algae
- In
the Issues Paper, we asked for views on whether the PVR regime should be
extended to include algae. Currently algae and bacteria
are excluded from the
definition of “plant” in the PVR Act. Two submitters responded to
this, both saying algae should
be included and referencing the inclusion of
algae in the Australian legislation. One commented that this would remove the
anomaly
that, whereas microscopic and macroscopic fungi are eligible for
protection, this is not the case for algae. This submitter also
noted a number
of US patents for algae.
- The
Sapere report also commented on this issue, including
that:
- algae
can be cultivated like any other plant;
- there
is no in principle reason that algae should not be included (both microscopic
and macroscopic algae can be shown to be distinct,
uniform and
stable);
- the
aquaculture industry is growing quickly and is focusing a lot of attention on
new forms of marine-based food production and nutraceuticals.
Basic research for
algae is dominated by the Crown Research Institute, the Cawthron
Institute.
- With
the exception of Australia (and there have been no applications for algae there
as yet), other countries do not provide PVRs
for algae. This raises the question
of whether there is any benefit to New Zealand of extending protection to algae.
There may also
be practical issues relating to testing whether an alga meets the
criteria for a grant of a PVR. There will also be Treaty of Waitangi
considerations.
Extending coverage to algae
Do you have any comments to make about whether or not algae should be
included within the definition of “plant” for the
purposes of the
PVR regime?
22
Provisional protection
- Section
9 of the PVR Act provides for provisional protection. The effect of provisional
protection is that:
- if an
application for PVR over a new variety is filed; and
- a
person produces for sale or sells propagating material of the variety without
the applicant’s permission;
- the
applicant can start proceedings for PVR infringement against that person before
a PVR is granted on the application, provide that
the application has not been
withdrawn, lapsed or refused.
- The
main reason for providing provisional protection is because there can be a
substantial time period between filing a PVR application
and grant of a PVR.
This raises the risk that other people may grow and sell the variety or its
harvested material without the applicant’s
permission. If this happens,
the returns that the applicant could make from the new variety if a PVR is
granted could be significantly
reduced if there were no provisional protection.
This could reduce the incentives to develop or import new
varieties.
UPOV 91
- Article
13 of UPOV 91 requires member states to provide provisional protection for a
variety during the period between the time that
a PVR application is filed, and
the date a PVR on the variety is granted. At a minimum, any person who exploits
the variety during
that period without the applicant’s permission must pay
“equitable remuneration” to the applicant. This only applies
if the
PVR is eventually granted.
- In
line with New Zealand’s obligations under the CPTPP, we must provide the
minimum level of provisional protection required
by UPOV
91.
Options
- The
issue with the current situation in the PVR Act is that, because a breeder can
commence infringement proceedings during the period
of provisional protection,
it is unclear what happens if the application subsequently lapsed, was withdrawn
or was refused. The alleged
infringer could suffer significant commercial
losses, and the breeder could make significant commercial gains, even though the
variety
developed by the applicant may not have been a new variety, and should
have been free for anyone to exploit.
- There
appear to be two viable options for dealing with the problem described
above:
Option 1: a compensation approach
Option 2: provide that PVR applicants can only start proceedings for
infringements that occur before grant after a PVR has been granted.
- Option
2 is our preferred option.
Option 1: a compensation
approach
- Under
this option, the breeder must agree to compensate the alleged infringer for any
losses they have suffered if and when the PVR
application subsequently lapses,
or is withdrawn or refused.
- This
option could deter abuse of the provisional protection provisions. However,
where a breeder takes action against in good faith,
it could expose the alleged
infringer to unnecessary hardship, as they would still have to incur the costs
of a court action, an
account of profits or damages, and any losses resulting
from being unable to exploit the variety. Any compensation due would not
be paid
until sometime later.
- For
this reason, this is not MBIE’s preferred option.
Option 2: provide that PVR applicants can only start
proceedings for infringements that occur before grant after a PVR has been
granted.
- Under
this option, a breeder who files an application for a PVR over a variety could
only take action against an alleged infringer
if and when a PVR has been
granted. However, this action would still include alleged infringements that
took place between the date
of application and grant.
- This
option would prevent abuse of provisional protection. Since the breeder can only
take action after grant of a PVR, the alleged
infringer is not exposed to
unnecessary hardship.
- This
approach is similar to that taken in the Patents Act 2013 and in the
Australian Plant Breeders’ Rights Act. This is MBIE’s
preferred option.
Provisional protection
Do you agree with our preferred option for dealing with provisional
protection? If not, why not?
23
Transitional provisions
- The
main effect of bringing our regime in line with UPOV 91 is the expansion of the
exclusive rights a PVR owner has over their protected
variety. The purpose of
transitional provisions is to set out how the changes to the PVR Act apply to
PVRs that have been granted
or applied for before the date that the changes
enter into force.
- There
are three broad options for transitional provisions relating to how the new
exclusive rights will apply to grants and applications
that are current before
the changes come into force:
Option 1: new rights apply to all existing grants and applications when the
changes come into force
Option 2: new rights apply to applications filed (and, therefore, grants made)
after the changes come into effect
Option 3: new rights apply to applications filed before the changes come into
effect, but only to grants made after the changes come
into effect.
- We
do not indicate a preferred option here (though we do not support Option 1), so
we seek your views on the workability of each.
Option 3 could be modified so as
to apply only to applications filed after a certain date, albeit a date before
the changes come
into effect.
Discussion
- While
Option 1 has the advantage of simplicity, a consequence would be that certain
acts in respect of a specific proprietary variety
that would not be an
infringement before the changes came into effect would become an infringement
after. This is undesirable from
both a principled and practical point of
view.
- For
example, a person conditioning seed of a protected variety would be free to do
so before the changes came into effect, but after
would be required to seek a
licence to perform the same act on the same variety. We consider this unfair.
And while it would increase
revenues for PVR owners, we note that these
varieties have been developed under the current regime, and so do not see a
benefit to
society from allowing those PVR owners to extract these additional
revenues.
- Option
2 is more consistent with the idea that varieties developed under the current
regime should not attract higher revenues than
the current regime offers as
breeders would have made a choice to invest based on the current settings and
decided they were sufficient.
- However,
it could cause administrative problems for the PVR Office as breeders would be
likely to withhold applications until the
new regime comes into force, leading
to a spike in applications filed after this date. This could result in delays in
examination
and grant of PVRs. These delays could impose significant additional
costs and uncertainties on PVR applicants.
- Option
3 mostly avoids the issues of Options 1 and 2 (depending on the details) but
also has some issues. For example, for the period
between the application being
filed and the new rights coming to force, what infringements would be covered by
provisional protection?
The PVR Office could also come under pressure to delay
the granting of a PVR until after the changes come into
effect.
Essentially derived varieties
- A
related issue is what should happen in relation to the new provisions concerning
essentially derived varieties. We would want to
avoid a situation in which a
variety that was already legitimately on the market became an EDV on
commencement of the new legislation.
- This
situation is somewhat dependent on what option is chosen above, but perhaps one
possible solution is that any derived variety
put on the market after an
application that will be considered under the new legislation is made, could
potentially be considered
an EDV once the
new legislation comes into effect. The rationale here is that the breeder of the
derived variety should be aware that the application
had been made and that
their variety could be an EDV.
Transitional provisions
What is your view on the options presented here in relation to this issue?
Are there alternatives we have missed?
How should transitional provisions apply to EDVs?
24
Administrative/process issues
- MBIE
is running a parallel process to review administrative and procedural issues
relating to the grant process, as well as a PVR
fees review. For example, we
have heard that:
- the
costs associated with PVR applications, including testing, can be prohibitive,
especially for SMEs, and this can lead to breeders
operating outside the PVR
system;
- the
PVR Office should be able to require breeders to provide propagating material
for PVR trial comparison;
- there
are no procedures for hearings either in relation to objections before grant or
compulsory licences;
- the
relationship between the provisions relating to objections after grant and
cancellation of grants are unclear;
- the
electronic format of the PVR Journal is not helpful.
- This
review is likely to identify proposals for change to the PVR Act, though these
will primarily be the concern of breeders. It
will also help us identify what
regulations will need to be amended or developed to support the changes to the
PVR Act discussed
in this Options Paper (and ensure that we have appropriate
regulation making powers in the legislation).
- For
example, we anticipate:
- changes
to the Plant Variety Rights Regulations 1988 to update and modernise
administrative and procedural requirements;
- changes
to the Plant Variety Rights (Fees) Order 1999 as a result of the fees
review;
- new
regulations setting out a processes for applications and (where relevant)
hearings in relation to objections before/after grants,
cancellation/nullification of grants and compulsory
licences;
- new
regulations (or possible guidelines) to support the Treaty of Waitangi
provisions.
- The
development of regulations will commence once policy decisions have been made in
relation to amendments to the PVR Act.
12 Recap of questions
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
|
Objectives of the PVR Act
Do you have any further comment to make on the objectives of the PVR
Act?
|
Meeting our CPTPP obligations
Do you agree with our analysis and conclusion of the CPTPP options? If not,
why not?
|
Treaty compliance – criteria for analysis
Do you agree with the criteria that we have identified? Do you agree with
the weighting we have given the criteria? If not, why not?
|
Treaty compliance – key terms
Do you agree with our proposed approach to these key terms?
Do you have any comments on the principles listed above and how they might
apply in practice? For example, would it be useful to specifically
list
non-indigenous species of significance?
|
Treaty compliance – options analysis
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
UPOV 91 alignment – criteria for analysis
Do you have any comment to make about our approach to, and criteria for,
the preliminary options analysis in this paper?
|
Definitions – breed
Our preferred option is to incorporate the definition of
“breed” that was considered in the previous review to address
concerns around discovery of varieties in the wild.
Do you agree? If not, why not?
|
Definitions – general
Do you have any comments on the definitional issues discussed in this
Part?
|
Scope of the breeder’s right
Do you have any comments about these new rights required by UPOV 91?
|
Exceptions to the breeder’s right
Do you have any comments about the exceptions required by UPOV 91?
|
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
|
Term of the right
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
Essentially derived varieties
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
Rights over harvested material
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
Farm saved seed
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
Compulsory licences – general issues
Do you agree with the discussion and the proposals in relation to the five
issues discussed above? If not, why not?
Other than the two substantive issues below, are there other issues we have
missed?
|
Compulsory licences – grace period
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
Compulsory licences – section 21(3)
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
Enforcement – infringements
Do you agree with the discussion and the proposals in relation to the four
issues discussed above? If not, why not?
Should the PVR Act provide that infringement disputes be heard in the
District Court? Are there others issues relating to infringements
that we have
missed?
|
Enforcement – offences
Do you agree with the proposed options? Are there alternatives we have
missed? Do you agree with our analysis and conclusions? If
not, why not?
|
Exhaustion of the breeder’s right
Do you have any comments about the exhaustion provision required by UPOV
91?
|
|
Cancellation and nullification of the breeder’s right
|
21
|
Do you have any comments about the cancellation and nullification
provisions required by UPOV 91, and MBIE’s additional proposals
discussed
in this section?
|
|
Extending coverage to algae
|
22
|
Do you have any comments to make about whether or not algae should be
included within the definition of “plant” for the
purposes of the
PVR regime?
|
|
Provisional protection
|
23
|
Do you agree with our preferred option for dealing with provisional
protection? If not, why not?
|
|
Transitional provisions
|
24
|
What is your view on the options presented here in relation to this issue?
Are there alternatives we have missed?
|
|
How should transitional provisions apply to EDVs?
|
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