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Towards Open Government. Committee on Official Information [1980] NZAHGovRp 1 (19 December 1980)
Last Updated: 17 April 2020
TOWARDS OPEN GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE ON OFFICIAL INFORMATION
1
GENERAL REPORT
Rt. Hon. R. D. Muldoon, C.H., Prime Minister,
Parliament Buildings, Wellington.
Dear Prime Minister,
I have the honour to present the General Report of the Committee
on Official Information which sets out the conclusions reached by
the Committee
on the questions raised in its terms of reference.
Certain aspects of our work require further development and a
more detailed examination of them is in progress. A Supplementary Report
together with a draft Official Information Bill and associated legislative
proposals will therefore be presented in the early part
of the coming year.
On behalf of the Committee
Yours
sincerely
ALAN DANKS.
Wellington,
19 December 1980.
CONTENTS Page
The Argument
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5
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The Committee’s Tasks
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The Essence of the Proposals
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The Present Law ...
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Reasons for Openness ...
Participation
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Accountability Effective Government
Concern with Individuals
Reasons for Protection ... ... ... ... ... 17
Interests of the Country as a Whole Interests of the Individual
Public Health and Safety Commercial Confidences
Effective Government and Administration
The Changing Presumption ... ... ... ... ... 21
Overseas Solutions
Towards a New Zealand Solution
A Process with a Purpose
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The Legislative Base
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25
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Principles
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Narrowing Protection
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Mechanisms for the Process
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29
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Policy and Procedures Within the Administration A Channel for Public
Grievance
A Regulatory Body
The Process at Work
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34
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Costs
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37
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Towards Open Government
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Summary
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39
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Appendices:
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- Terms
of Reference ... ... ... ... ... 40
- Committee
Membership ... ... ... ... 41
- Submissions ... ... ... ... ... 42
Private
Organisations and Persons Government Corporations and Agencies Government
Departments
- Interviews ... ... ... ... ... 45
Private
Organisations and Persons Government Corporations and Agencies Government
Departments
Members of Parliament
- Draft
Provisions for an Official Information Act
(Title, Purposes,
Criteria) ... ... ... ... 47
- Selected
Exemption Provisions in Overseas Legislation
(United States,
Australia, Canada) ... ... ... 49
THE ARGUMENT
The Committee on Official
Information was set up by the Government “to contribute to the larger aim
of freedom of information
by considering the extent to which official
information can be made readily available to the public”, and in
particular to
“examine the purpose and application of the Official Secrets
Act 1951”.
The submissions received by the Committee show that the Government's aim is
widely shared. There is a growing desire in various sections
of the community
for fuller information about the policies and activities of the Government. And
there is a growing recognition by
the Government itself of the need to take the
public into its confidence, especially when making decisions that affect large
numbers
of people. These developments are partly due to the changing climate of
opinion throughout the Western world, but they arise also
from the changing role
of government in New Zealand. For example, the large-scale development of
natural resources is involving the
Government even more deeply in the life of
the people, and increasing the need for public understanding and
co-operation.
The present arrangements for handling official information are not well adapted
to the situation in New Zealand. The Official Secrets
Act is based on the
British Statute of 1911, and the system of security classifications is closely
related to it. The Act assumes
that official information is the property of
government, and should not be disclosed without specific reason and
authorisation. Those
who want information must take the initiative and provide
justification, and those who supply it must ask themselves whether they
have
authority and good reason to do so. Criminal sanctions are attached to
“wrongful communication”.
The assumptions implicit in the Act are not in keeping with contemporary
attitudes in New Zealand and in practice it is not strictly
enforced. This
difference between law and practice is in itself good reason why change is
necessary. Nowadays it is generally accepted
that the Government has a
responsibility to keep the people informed of its activities and make clear the
reasons for its decisions.
The release and dissemination of information is
recognised to be an inherent and essential part of its functions.
In practice though not yet in law, the onus of proof is shifting from those who
want information disclosed to those who want it withheld.
The assumption on
which both the Government and interested groups are now tending to work is that
official information should be
made available to the public, unless there are
good reasons to withhold it in the interests of the community at large. Such
good
reasons may include national security (both internal and external), public
peace and order, economic stability (including industrial
relations), commercial
transactions, legal privilege (including client relationships), individual
privacy, and the effective conduct
of government business, as well as the need
to ensure the continued availability of information for any of these
purposes.
We believe that, if they are to be effective, rules for the handling of official
information must be brought into line with current
attitudes and practices. The
law must be such that it commands respect.
We therefore consider that the system based on the Official Secrets Act should
be replaced by a new set of arrangements. The Government
should, in our view,
reaffirm its responsibility to keep the public informed of its activities and to
make official information available
unless there is
good reason to withhold it. Grounds for withholding information from the public
should be set out clearly, along with the basic principle.
We do not think that an administrative directive to heads of departments and
agencies would meet the need in New Zealand. The changes
we propose are of such
constitutional importance that they deserve to be given the force of law; in
this way the Government and Parliament
will provide an assurance to the public
that no administrative directive could give. Legislation will also be required
to repeal
the Official Secrets Act and to replace it with more appropriate
measures of protection.
We therefore recommend that the proposals put forward below be incorporated in a
new Official Information Act, which enshrines the
central principle and sets out
the grounds for withholding information.
We are also of the view that the principle should be applied progressively and
with proper account being taken of practical considerations.
An attempt at a
sudden and definitive reform could easily fail.
The task of adjusting the formal arrangements for the protection and release of
official information to the changing needs and attitudes
of the community is
likely to be a continuing one. We have identified three distinct but related
tasks central to this adjustment:
(a) reviewing the practice of Government departments and agencies
to ensure that official information is in fact made readily available to the
public wherever
possible;
(b) hearing complaints from the public about the withholding of
official information, and resolving questions arising from these;
(c) identifying additional categories of official information
which can be made readily available to the public with minimal safeguards.
Our proposals are designed to use existing institutions as far as possible, and
to take advantage of their experience and public
standing. Thus we propose
widening the present powers of the Ombudsmen to investigate and make
recommendations on individual complaints
of denial of access to information. To
ensure that attitudes, practices, and systems in the State Services meet the new
requirements
we propose that a section of the State Services Commission be
expressly charged with responsibility for encouraging and guiding Government
departments and agencies. But the approach we recommend also requires a means of
systematically enlarging the range and scope of
information available to the
public. We are satisfied that no existing institution or agency is appropriate
to perform this broad
policy-making function. It is foreign to the Ombudsmen's
office, and it would be inconsistent with the spirit of our recommendations
for
the responsibility to be vested in any department of State. Equally it is
outside the proper province of the courts, which are
concerned in New Zealand
with interpreting the law and judging disputes.
We therefore recommend that the progressive extension of the area of official
information available to the public should be achieved
by Order in Council under
the proposed Official Information Act on the public recommendations of a new
body of high standing which
is independent of ministerial control. Accordingly
we propose the establishment of an Information Authority with the composition,
procedures, and powers set out in later paragraphs of this report.
In addition we believe that there should be some immediate enlargement of the
area of available information. Change need not be left
entirely to the future
and to the machinery we envisage. An Official
Information Act should itself make additional categories of information
available to the public. One such category should be what
is sometimes referred
to as informal administrative law - the principles and criteria on which
administrative decisions affecting
the individual are made, and (with limited
exceptions) the reasons for these decisions.
The area of individuals' access to personal information about themselves is
another instance, and one that merits special attention.
We consider that
explicit provision should now be made for individuals to have proper access to
information concerning them held
by Government departments and agencies. We
believe there should be guidelines for official use and handling of such
information.
The practical question of resources - both of people and money - is an important
one. Our proposals, while they do entail a measure
of new expenditure, are put
forward on the basis that the sort of shifts of attitude and emphasis we are
seeking cannot, and should
not, be imposed overnight. Many skilled man-hours are
already devoted to meeting parliamentary, individual, interest group, and media
information requirements. It is difficult to look ahead and estimate how much
more it would cost to induce the desired shifts. But
we envisage a programmed
course of action, pragmatic and flexible enough to be modified as the sequence
progresses. We assume that
identification of detailed costs will be taken into
account in the process.
The essential purpose of the new system we propose is to improve communication
between the people of New Zealand and their government.
The effectiveness of the
reforms recommended by the Committee will depend largely on the attitudes of
those directly concerned -
not only of Ministers and officials, but also
individuals, interest groups, and the public media. A new approach will be
required
from Ministers and officials, to place greater emphasis on the positive
information functions of the Government. By making intelligent
and fair use of
the official information that is made available, the interest groups and the
media can in turn encourage ministers
and officials to adopt a still more open
approach, and thus speed up the process of change. Unfair or inept use of
information may
have the opposite effect. Balance is a goal that can seldom be
fully achieved, but if it is not actively sought after the credibility
of those
involved may suffer. Bodies responsible for upholding the standards of the media
may wish to reconsider their own procedures
in the light of this report. The
proposed Information Authority may also wish to address the problem at an early
stage, to see what
further action may be required in this area to improve
communication between Government and people.
Greater freedom of information cannot be expected to end all differences of
opinion within the community, or to resolve major political
issues. If applied
systematically, however, with due regard for the balance between divergent
interests, the changes we propose should
help to narrow differences of opinion,
increase the effectiveness of policies adopted, and strengthen public confidence
in our system
of government.
Inset 1*
THE COMMITTEE'S TASKS
- Our
terms of reference (appendix 1) are both general and specific. The
basic task is “to contribute to the larger aim of freedom of information
by
considering the extent to which official information can be made more readily
available to the public”. Our two specific assignments
involve
redefinition of the current system of protecting information by
“classification”, and amendment of the Official
Secrets Act. In
dealing with these questions we are to have regard both to that larger aim and
to “the need to safeguard national
security, the public interest and
individual privacy”.
- This
General Report gives the substance of our proposals, and the bases from which
they have been developed. The Supplementary Report
to be submitted later will go
into more detail and indicate how each of our recommendations might be put into
practice.
- For
the purposes of our inquiry we have regarded “official information”
as material held by Government departments and
Government agencies. We have not
extended our study to information generated and held by Parliament, the courts,
administrative tribunals,
and local government, but we would expect our
proposals to affect in due course practices in those areas, and also in the
private
sector. We recognise that the term “government agencies” is
not precise. While we consider that the term includes all
the organisations
named in Part II of the First Schedule to the Ombudsmen Act 1975, other agencies
will be included for the purpose
of the draft Bill to be appended to our
Supplementary Report and we will examine in that report the position of
independent statutory
officers. We shall also take up there the question of the
extent to which the new system might apply to documents created before
its
introduction.
- We
have followed closely the debate in Britain, Canada, and Australia since their
experience of information problems arises in settings
similar to our own. We
have also studied the systems adopted in the United States and Sweden. Our aim
has been, however, to find
solutions relevant to New Zealand needs and
circumstances. In seeking the way which might serve best to promote the aim of
freer
information flows in this country we have relied heavily on local sources
- the studies prepared within our own organisation, and
the written submissions
we received, supplemented by dialogues with a representative selection of their
authors.
- We
have kept in touch with public comment. In an effort to provide better
understanding of some of the complex issues involved, we
have circulated a
series of newsletters to the media and to those who made submissions. These
newsletters summarise progress of
the Committee's work programme and discuss
important areas of the background material made available to us both from New
Zealand
and overseas.
- To
test reactions from the community on the central issues, the Committee decided
very early in its work to call for submissions from
the public. Government
departments and statutory agencies were also invited to comment on the issues
they considered to be most important
in terms of their
responsibilities.
- In
response to its invitation the Committee received a total of 135 written
submissions (appendix 3). Of these 69 could be classed
as nonofficial, coming
from professional bodies, local authorities, parliamentarians, individuals,
companies, interest groups, and
associations of
people with a common concern. A further 29 submissions came from Government
agencies and statutory corporations, and 37 from Government
departments. These
submissions have been a major source of material for the Committee. They have
been followed up by a series of
80 interviews (appendix 4), spread over a period
of 16 months, to supplement and in some cases clarify our understanding of
particular
issues and how they affect the different interested parties.
- The
non-official submissions show an overwhelming interest in greater
openness and freer flows of information. A majority of them do nevertheless
recognise a need
to protect some classes of officially held material. The
highest priority for protection is given to personal information on individuals;
national security and defence are given substantial support as areas meriting
protection; others often mentioned are foreign affairs,
police records, and
commercial information. A number of submissions commented on what they saw as
impediments to availability: the
Official Secrets Act, of course, Public Service
Regulations, and attitudes. The majority of the submissions that considered ways
of achieving greater freedom saw this as calling for a legislated right of
access, though a few mentioned guidelines or directives
as appropriate. Another
widely held view was that there should be a means for testing the need for
secrecy where this is considered
absolutely necessary: a provision for appeal
where access is initially denied.
- Government
departments and agencies also recognised the need for more information
to be publicly available. Some written submissions, in response to the
Committee's specific
request, emphasised areas seen as needing protection if
government institutions were to be able to discharge what they saw as their
proper functions. Submissions drew to our attention an array of statutes and
provisions concerned with the release and protection
of official information.
These were listed over and above the Official Secrets Act, State Services Act,
and Public Service Regulations
which affect Crown servants. Permanent heads and
others who appeared at interview indicated nevertheless their general support
for
greater openness of information.
- All
the reasons for protection cited in the non-official submissions were covered in
those from government institutions, but once
again special importance was given
to protecting personal information on individuals. And attention was also drawn
to the area of
commercial information (including trade secrets). Not
surprisingly, the official submissions spent more time than those from private
organisations and individuals on the need to give a measure of protection to
certain processes of government, particularly in the
economic and financial
field, and showed special concern that the ability of departments to put forward
impartial advice to ministers
should not be impaired. Some departmental
submissions raised the likely resource demands which substantial public access
to their
records would create.
- Our
consultations have made us aware that public attitudes towards freedom of
information have divergent and mutually inconsistent bases. There are
pressures towards greater openness generated by the media, for example, or by
interest groups, or within the parliamentary
system. At the same time, there are
concerns that run counter to the general movement: about individuals in respect
of whom information
is held officially, about protecting commercial viability,
about maintaining sources of information, and about the ability of the
Government to govern. We have heard representations of the views
of
most of the main groups actively seeking access to official information at the
present time. We could not conclude, however, that
these are representative of
the full spectrum of information needs in this country.
- Access
to official information is part of a wider general issue. It involves the whole
interrelationship of government and the community,
and the mutual advantage in
communication and co-operation. The increasing complexity of official
interventions undoubtedly contributes
to community attitudes, and to the
generalised concern about ability to influence government action that has, in
turn, spurred debate
on open government. It is clear that there is a widely
perceived need to have more information about the actual operations of
government;
that the service to the general public in this area should be more
forthcoming; and that it should reach the more remote parts of
the country as
well as urban centres. The focus of public concern with official information can
however, be expected to shift from
time to time. And the complex pressures which
government has to reconcile as part of the governing process make it essential
that
there be a flexible means of responding to these shifts.
THE ESSENCE OF THE PROPOSALS
- On
the “specific assignments” in our terms of reference we propose
-
- a new
system of security classifications, with fewer and more circumscribed
gradations;
- the repeal
of the Official Secrets Act 1951. The matters dealt with in that Act, to
the extent that they still need to be covered by legislation, as in the case of
spying and
the wrongful release of information which could seriously harm New
Zealand's interests, should be the subject of appropriate amendments
to the
Crimes Act 1961, and perhaps other Acts, and of provisions in the Official
Information Act we propose.
- To
promote the larger aim of making information more readily available to the
public, we have developed a group of measures resting
on a legislative base
-
- an
Official Information Act would set out purposes, principle, and
criteria:
- the purposes would call for the progressive increase in the availability of
information, and for proper access by individuals to
information relating to
them, while conceding the required protection of some records;
- the principle would be that information should be available unless there is
good reason for withholding it;
- the criteria would constitute the basic guide for all concerned with the
release and protection of information, and access to it.
- legislative
and executive decisions would set up the mechanisms for reforms needed
to give effect to the above purposes:
- an information unit within the State Services Commission would be given
management responsibility to promote a more effective flow
of information;
- the Ombudsmen would have additional powers to deal with complaints about
refusals to release information in accordance with the
criteria established by
the new Act;
- an independent Information Authority would be the instrument for the
progressive enlargement of the area of information. which
is to be publicly
available; not only through the issue of guidelines and the audit of progress,
but also through recommendations,
to be put into effect by government decisions
through Orders in Council, identifying additional categories of material which
should
be released or accessible after due consideration of claims for
exemption.
- the Official
Information Act would make appropriate statutory provision for the availability
of the principles and criteria on which
administrative decisions affecting the
individual are based and (with limited exceptions) the reasons for these
decisions; and, in
the field of individual privacy, it would provide a new basis
for the proper collection, use, and protection of personal information,
and
provide for proper access to it by those to whom it relates. It would set out
statutory principles, and provide for the issue
of guidelines and the vesting of
recommendatory powers in the Information Authority.
- We
were required to look at the classification system and the Official Secrets Act.
These subjects, and the generality of the wider
aim stated in the terms of
reference, obliged us to consider not only the output of information and access
to it, but also the privacy
of personal information, the principles and
mechanisms which were likely to be most effective here, and the desirable
structure of
legislation. We do not offer final answers on all issues, but each
finds its place in our report.
THE PRESENT LAW
- The
principal inhibition in law on the handling of official information is the
“catch-all” provision of section 6 of the
Official Secrets Act 1951.
Section 6 makes it an offence for an officer to communicate official information
to any person “other
than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate
it or a person to whom it is in the interest of the State his duty to
communicate
it”. The Act goes on to provide severe penalties for
unauthorised disclosure.
- The
Official Secrets Act is of course not the only statute which protects official
information. The State Services Act 1962 and Public
Service Regulations 1964
prescribe disciplinary action in the event of unauthorised disclosure. The
Crimes Act 1961 contains a section
about communicating secrets. And there are a
large number of other statutes which prohibit disclosure. Some specify
particular persons
to whom disclosure is permitted, or particular circumstances
in which it is permitted. They cover, broadly speaking, such information
as:
- personal details
provided by individuals (e.g., Inland Revenue Department Act 1974, Statistics
Act 1975);
- information
gained by inspectors of factories and business premises under industrial welfare
legislation (e.g., Factories Act 1946,
Equal Pay 1972);
- details of
manufacture, sale and storage of products (e.g., Clean Air Act 1972, Food and
Drug Act 1969);
- information
gained during inspection of company records (e.g., Companies Act 1955);
- information
provided to obtain a privilege or licence (e.g., Mining Act
1971).
- The
Official Secrets Act is nevertheless most often referred to because of its
universal application and because officers newly appointed
to the Public Service
are required to sign a declaration that they are aware of the terms of section 6
and also of regulation 42
of the Public Service Regulations 1964, which is as
follows:
“42. Official information not to be given - (1)
...
“(2) An employee shall not use for any purpose, other than for the
discharge of his official duties, information gained by
or conveyed to him
through his connection with the Public Service.
“(3) No information out of the strict course of official duty shall be
given, directly or indirectly, or otherwise used by
an employee without the
express direction or permission of the Minister.
“(4) Communications to the press or other publicity media on matters
affecting any Department of the Public Service shall be
made only by the
employee authorised to do so.”
- In
all, the law clearly establishes a rule that information should not be
disclosed without authorisation. Many Government departments proceed on
the assumption that there is in practice an implied authority to disclose
a great deal. But the nature of the information which is seen to be
covered by such an authority has depended heavily on departmental and
ministerial
attitudes. The uneasy compromise and the conflicts inherent in this
situation do not square with present day needs and attitudes
of the New Zealand
community.
Inset 2
THE REASONS FOR OPENNESS
- The
case for more openness in government is compelling. It rests on the democratic
principles of encouraging participation in public
affairs and ensuring the
accountability of those in office; it also derives from concern for the
interests of individuals. A no less
important consideration is that the
Government requires public understanding and support to get its policies carried
out. This can
come only from an informed public. These are recognised arguments
and are well represented in the literature on the subject. There
is in addition
a special feature of the New Zealand setting for these arguments to which we
wish to draw attention.
- New
Zealand is a small country. The Government has a pervasive involvement in our
every day national life. This involvement is not
only felt, but is also sought,
by New Zealanders, who have tended to view successive governments as their
agents, and have expected
them to act as such. The Government is a principal
agency in deploying the resources required to undertake many large scale
projects,
and there is considerable pressure for it to sustain its role as a
major developer, particularly as an alternative to overseas ownership
and
control. No less striking is the extent to which Government is involved in
economic direction, regulation, and intervention.
Along with the impact of the
State budget and expenditures, there are important controls on, for example,
wages, prices, the use
of labour, transport, banking, and overseas investment.
Our social support systems also rely heavily on central government. History
and
circumstances give New Zealanders special reason for wanting to know what their
government is doing and why.
Participation
- For
many people the arguments for greater access to official information start with
participation, on the principle that a better
informed public is better able to
play the part required of it in the democratic system - and to judge policies
and electoral platforms.
It is expected too that the critical and at times
difficult choices that governments have to make for our society will be better
resolved if the community is well informed. In this way also political decisions
would have a stronger claim to be made in the name
of the community. A number of
structures and procedures have been set up in New Zealand in recent years which,
it has been hoped,
could work specifically to involve more groups in policy
discussion before decisions are taken, and so to take public consideration
of
policy options a stage further than previously. The Securities Commission under
the Securities Act 1978 is one example, and the
procedures laid down in the Town
and Country Planning Act 1977 another. These statutes demonstrate the growing
acceptance by Parliament
of the value and importance of the wider participation
of individuals who are affected by regulatory and planning decisions or who,
for
other reasons, can usefully contribute to the process of
decision.
Accountability
- Another
argument often stressed is that access of citizens to official information is an
essential factor in making sure that politicians
and administrators are
accountable for their actions. Secrecy is an impediment to accountability, when
Parliament, press, and public
cannot properly follow and scrutinise the actions
of government or the advice given and
options canvassed. Divisive suspicion of government and its advisors is
encouraged when decisions are made without recognisably comprehensive
public
presentation of how they have been arrived at.
- In
the New Zealand context the pressure for accountability applies increasingly not
only to the political executive on which it has
traditionally focussed in the
Westminster model of government, but also to the permanent administration. As
the State becomes involved
in more and more areas of community life public
servants are being called on to make more decisions affecting individuals and
corporations
- in the granting of special benefits for example, or tax
concessions, or the administration of the many other conditions, obligations,
and liabilities that affect our work and personal activities. So we find that
the public is wanting to know more about the background
of and reasons for these
decisions, and to know if the bureaucracy is faithfully reflecting the stated
policies of government and
the interests of people.
- As
the complexity of government administration has grown, it has become evident
that it is no longer possible, even if it were desirable,
for ministers to act
as the sole information source for all aspects of their portfolios. There are in
addition many independent statutory
officers and bodies not accountable to
ministers for their individual decisions. We see the development of what is
referred to in
the report of the Royal Commission on Australian Government
Administration as “more frequent and systematic attempts to communicate
directly with officials”. Some departments and agencies consider such
consultation to be an important and even essential part
of their work. Two-way
communication between officials and public is becoming a necessary procedure for
effective administration
of government policy. This shift has important
implications for the Public Service and its stewardship of official information,
not
least in the allocation of responsibility for decisions. Clarification of
the possible impact of greater openness on the relationship
between ministers
and senior officials is discussed later in this report. It has been an important
factor in our choice of an evolutionary
approach to the opening-up
process.
Effective Government
- Notwithstanding
the need for participation and accountability, the Government's essential task
is still to govern. If it is to do
this effectively it has to win votes and
secure public support, not least for the major development decisions in which it
is involved
and which may not necessarily be foreshadowed in election platforms.
Better information flows would in these circumstances help towards
more flexible
development of policy. New Zealand society has been criticised as being too
closed, too resistant to change. But preparation
for change and flexible
responses to it become more urgent as external and internal economic and social
pressures bite. The role
of improved information flows and discussion in this
process is recognised by the Government. The 1980 Budget statement concludes
by
referring to major developments shaping up, and observes: “Change requires
public understanding and agreement on what are
often complex and difficult
issues. The Government has worked, and will continue to work, to secure that
understanding and agreement
and to make these
changes.”
- As
the major force in national activity the Government needs to have its aims
broadly supported, its decisions understood and accepted.
It is not to be
expected that every one of these decisions will be popular;
but
Inset 2*
the Government depends ultimately on public co-operation with the changes its
decisions impose upon people.
Concern with Individuals
- Within
the context of greater availability of information, frequent concern has been
expressed that individual citizens should be
able to ascertain the existence of,
and have access to, information on their personal affairs that government has
collected and holds.
This concern has been shown principally but by no means
solely in relation to information held in computer
databanks.
- Although
we have not had evidence of any significant abuses, we appreciate this concern.
The problem is a real one and it impinges
on our terms of reference. Later in
this report (para.
39) we refer to the legitimate use and importance of limiting the collection of
this material. Apart from that, many decisions affecting
individuals are
influenced by information about their personal affairs which is gathered either
voluntarily or compulsorily.
- Where
individuals institute legal proceedings, information of this nature ordinarily
becomes available to them. Moreover by law or
practice it is normally disclosed
in proceedings before administrative tribunals, by way of appeal or otherwise.
But recourse to
courts or tribunals is not always available or appropriate. For
instance, individuals may not wish to challenge a decision unless
they know that
it is in fact based on wrong information.
- There
is a strong body of opinion, which we share, that, with only the necessary
exceptions, individuals affected should be able to
know and if necessary have
corrected what personal information is held by departments or agencies. A
precedent, which shows Parliament's
acceptance of the principle, is to be found
in the Wanganui Computer Centre Act 1976.
- We
recognise a risk that in responding to the need set out here personal
information may be aggregated into an extended system of
dossiers. This should
be avoided.
THE REASONS FOR PROTECTION
- In
no country where access to official information has become an issue has the case
been made for complete openness. Few dispute that
there are good reasons for
withholding some information and for protecting it.
- What
are these reasons? They concern:
- the interests of
the country as a whole;
- the interests of
individuals and organisations; and
- the interests of
effective government and administration.
The reasons are of varying force. In some cases they can be seen as having
absolute effect, and as inherently defeating any request
for disclosure. In
other cases they may be only a factor to be weighed against the basic principle
of availability. So a properly
founded claim of prejudice to the defence of New
Zealand would justify withholding. But it is by no means now the case - if it
ever
was - that the canvassing of options within government administration must
always be protected by confidentiality. This distinction
is reflected in the
draft legislation - the clause giving the principle and criteria - set out in
appendix 5.
Interests of the Country as a Whole.
- One
general area for which it is generally accepted that protection is needed, can
be collectively described under a “national
interests” heading. It
includes such fields as security, defence, and international relations.
We consider that the maintenance of law and order and the
substantial economic interests of New Zealand also merit assurances of
protection, so that government can operate in the best interests of the public
as a whole.
- In
police operations and the general maintenance of law and order the requirements
for effective action, protection of the due process
of law, and upholding of
basic individual rights combine in many instances to call for
protection.
- The
nation's economic interests have always demanded that it should be possible to
protect the processes of negotiation and fiscal
regulation. The
“intangible capital of economic organisation” is seriously open to
damage if options are prematurely
canvassed or predictions come to be self
fulfilling. Internationally, economic affairs are equally susceptible to loss of
confidence
and actual damage if confidentiality is unable to protect
negotiations with overseas governments or organisations.
- It
is also widely recognised that much of the information under these headings can
be sensitive not so much for what it reveals as
for the need to protect
its sources. The then Chief Ombudsman, in his report on the Security
Intelligence Service (1976, p. 20), reached the conclusion that information
received by New Zealand from its friends is of major importance in the
political, economic, and strategic policy making fields. It
is in the national
interest to continue to get as much of this information as possible. While a
good deal of it is in the public
domain, some is not. Much of the latter is
provided on the clear understanding that it will be afforded in New Zealand
substantially
the same degree of security as it is afforded in the country of
origin. These considerations have led us to propose that in the areas
described
in this section (and set out in the draft provision on criteria in appendix 5)
protection from disclosure shall be
absolute if disclosure is likely to prejudice essential interests including the
continued flow of information.
Interests of the Individual
- Few
would question the need to safeguard and protect the privacy of individual
citizens, and their legal rights. Government amasses a great amount of
detail about individuals, and it is important that this information should
be:
- gathered only
where the State has established a need for it;
- handled
appropriately (that is, securely stored, and accessible only to those using it
for authorised purposes);
- used only for
the purposes for which it has been obtained, or suitable and approved extensions
of these (in preparation of aggregated
statistics, for
example).
The present body of legislation does not deal consistently with these issues.
Our recommendations provide for further study.
- We
do not consider that the interests of privacy will always require protection of
information concerning individuals. Indeed there
are many instances now where
personal information is not only available in practice but is a matter of public
record, as for example
in birth, death, and marriage registers, and registers
under the Land Transfer Act 1952.
- In
some cases the public interest, for instance in the health of the community,
will require the disclosure of some personal information
which is normally kept
confidential. The sensitivity of the information also varies. An absolute rule
cannot be stated.
Public Health and Safety
- While
at first thought public health and safety might seem to demand openness,
decisions in this area could also involve a difficult
balancing of interests.
The Government has statutory powers to take action to protect public health and
the financial interests of
individuals. The premature disclosure of information
about steps to be taken to contain an epidemic, for example, could in some
circumstances
undermine their effectiveness. Similarly the disclosure of action
being taken to protect investors against loss from the pending
collapse of a
large financial institution could well frustrate its purpose. In some cases the
relevant facts might not yet have been
adequately tested. In this area we would
not see an absolute directive for release or protection of information as being
conducive
to the public's best interests. A flexible approach would serve
better.
Commercial Confidences
- Much
commercial information is gathered by government, some compulsorily and some
voluntarily, for various purposes. As in other fields,
confidentiality for such
miscellaneous inputs of information will often be a necessary condition for
their continuing and effective
supply. No general rule about protection will
fit; judgments will need to take account of the purposes for which the data is
collected.
- There
is also the intercommunication between government and private business or
outside organisations which arises from the needs
of public regulation, or the
desire to take advantage of concessions, incentives or the like. Import
licensing is one case in point;
wage negotiations another. Here the balance
between the public's right to know
and the need for privacy imposed by the conditions of negotiation or trade
cannot be subjected to a simple ruling; the merits of
each case must be
judged.
- When
government itself engages in business a first view might hold that the
conventions of confidentiality which are accepted for
private commerce should
equally apply to publicly operated activities. Where the activity can be readily
related to commercial practice,
as in buying and selling, it seems reasonable
that government should “do and suffer”, on behalf of its
taxpayer-shareholders,
no less confidentially than does the private
sector.
- But
the matter cannot end there. Not all government business activity has the
profit-seeking, competitive colour of private enterprise.
And where
national matters of economic or social moment such as the pursuit of regional
development or of fuller employment become
objectives, taxpayers who are called
upon to subsidise such quasi-commercial activities should be informed about
strategies and costs. Where commercial, social, and economic
objectives become conjoined, as in the case of the Railways, it is impossible to
find a comprehensive
rule which will apply, and again judgments on the merits of
each case will be called for.
Interests of Effective Government and Administration
- The
area which involves protection of “the interests of effective government
and administration” raises some of the most
difficult questions in our
exercise. There is widespread interest in the activities of government.
The fact that the release of certain information may give rise to
criticism or embarrassment of the government is not an adequate
reason for
withholding it from the public. To run the country effectively
the government of the day needs nevertheless to be able to take advice and to
deliberate on it, in
private, and without fear of premature disclosure. If the
attempt to open processes of government inhibits the offering of blunt
advice or
effective consultation and arguments, the net result will be that the quality of
decisions will suffer, as will the quality
of the record. The processes of
government could become less open and, perhaps, more
arbitrary.
- It
has been argued in the freedom of information debate that as Ministers are
accountable for their decisions, so should officials
be obliged to reveal their
part in and share the consequences of these decisions. The possible outcomes of
this sort of development
would need to be carefully weighed. The requirement of
openness could be evaded, for example, by preparing and giving advice orally,
or
by maintaining parallel private filing systems; the record of how decisions are
arrived at would be incomplete or inaccessible;
public confidence would suffer,
and if the relative roles and responsibilities of ministers and officials became
the subject of public
debate, mutual recriminations could all too often develop.
The desire to avoid this sort of situation could incline governments to
look for
politically acceptable or compliant people at senior levels in the public
service; such a service is not likely to be able
to recruit and retain staff of
ability and integrity.
- These
dangers are not such as to deter us from supporting greater openness. But they
should be taken carefully into account in mapping
out the critical path for
change. A new and sharper definition of areas of responsibility at senior
levels, and the development of
new and perhaps more explicit codes governing the
relationship between Ministers and
officials might be required. The importance of careful adjustments in this area
does point yet again to an evolutionary approach
to openness.
- We
therefore conclude that there should be continuing protection as needs be
for the free and frank exchange of views between Ministers and their colleagues,
between Ministers
and officials, or between other officers of the Government in
the course of their duty. Such protection would not always be needed,
will certainly often need to be of only a short-term kind, and should not
preclude sensible
steps to involve public servants in public debate about policy
options and national choices before decisions are taken. Nor should
it prevent
the release of information explaining the bases of decisions and policies after
they have been adopted.
- It
is implicit in what we say that much of the business conducted within the
Cabinet system does not need blanket protection as a
special category of
exempted information because it will be safeguarded by the above criterion or
because the subject matter involves
one or more of the various interests
mentioned earlier. We note that the deliberations of the Executive Council are
protected by
the oath taken by Executive Councillors under the Oaths and
Declarations Act 1957.
- There
are a number of its functions for which government needs to be able to conduct
public business on the same basis as similar
private sector operations. These
include negotiations, legal proceedings, audit and personnel matters. There will
often be a case
nevertheless for release of general statistical or descriptive
information.
- In
general then the conclusion emerges that it is no longer acceptable to set
out a sweeping rationale for the protection of official information or
to expect that the public will accept in the future that certain areas of
government business are inviolate simply because government
says so. It is
necessary to be at once more specific and more careful about the issues involved
in protecting information. The question
is one of degree and of having a guiding
principle and a means of establishing how much and what kind of protection is
appropriate
to the New Zealand political and social setting.
THE CHANGING PRESUMPTION
- Against
this background of countervailing interests, the presumption of
non-disclosure is no longer helpful, or indeed, valid. The
pressures have in fact been shifting towards greater openness over a period of
years, and practice has become a good deal more
flexible than the existing
legislative framework might suggest.
- In
1962 the Royal Commission of Inquiry on the State Services pointed out that
“Government administration is the public's business,
and the people are
entitled to know more than they do of what is being done, and why”. The
point was taken up by the State
Services Commission, which said in a circular to
permanent heads in 1964 “Too often information is only given if there is a
good reason for doing so. The rule should be that information is only withheld
if there is a good reason for doing so.” This
amounted to a reversal of
the basic presumption about the release of official information. Since then more
information has been made
available to the public. So far, however, the new
presumption has not received legal recognition, and no change has been made in
the Official Secrets Act. It is high time to bring the law, and the arrangements
based on it, into line with public attitudes and
with the frequent practice of
Government itself. We accordingly propose that the resumption henceforth
should be that information is to be made available unless there is good reason
to withhold it.
Overseas Solutions
- There
are two principal methods of dealing with this situation which have been tried
overseas in political systems akin to our own.
They are the administrative or
“code of practice” approach, and the single-stroke legislation of a
right of access. We
have studied both as they have operated in other countries
and their relevance to New Zealand circumstances.
- The
“code of practice” approach has been preferred in the United Kingdom
(some legislative proposals have come forward
but firm government policy on
legislation has yet to evolve). It proposes a set of principles which could be
endorsed by ministers
and which would provide for greater exercise of discretion
by departments and agencies, with a firm steer towards openness. A number
of
administrative steps have been taken, including the 1977 “Information
Directive” to permanent heads, designed to secure
release of background
material relating to policy studies and reports unless ministers declined this.
The 1979 Green Paper “Open
Government” explicitly supports an
evolutionary approach along these lines.
- The
single-stroke solution by way of legislation conferring “right of
access” has been preferred in the United States
and proposals on this
basis are now before the Parliaments of Canada and Australia. This approach is
regarded by many as a sine qua non of freedom of information, and as a
prerequisite to the citizen's right to know what is being done in his or her
name. In all of the
overseas cases where there is a legislated right of access,
it is in fact qualified by itemised areas of protection to which the
right does
not apply. Some examples are set out in appendix 6. These exemptions tend to be
drafted in broad terms which leave open
questions of interpretation, or they go
into extensive detail which sometimes appears to reflect defensive
attitudes.
Inset 3
- Broadly
drafted exemptions, as in the United States Freedom of Information Act, depend
on further interpretation if they are to be
workable in practice. In the United
States context, the courts, which do of course have long experience of
interpreting a written
Constitution and Bill of Rights, are given this
responsibility. The Act has given rise to extensive litigation to establish how
the
exemptions are to be interpreted and applied.
- Other
overseas texts, like the Canadian and Australian Bills, follow the alternative
of setting out in careful and lengthy detail
the areas of information to be
protected from general public access.
Towards a New Zealand Solution
- From
our study of the “code of practice” approach, we have concluded that
in New Zealand circumstances injunctions to
officials would not work without a
firm commitment by government to back them. And we doubt whether any commitment
which did not
have the force of law would either be acceptable to the community
as an earnest of government intentions, or give officials a sufficient
base to
take substantial steps towards further opening up official information in their
day-to-day operations.
- Our
Committee has, therefore, concluded that in the New Zealand context there
are strong grounds for preferring a legislative base. The principles and
criteria governing decisions to release and withhold information should be
stated in legislation. The process for
making these decisions should in part
take statutory form. Our proposals that certain information be available as a
matter of course
require legislation. These points are concerned with content;
but there are other important general considerations.
- One
which poses great difficulties is the need for balance - balance between the
presumption that greater openness should be sought,
and the need for protection
in certain sensitive areas. The elements in balance would undoubtedly change
over a period of time: reasons
for protection based on the experience of the
1970s might not hold up through the 1980s. A second major consideration is the
great
difficulty of simultaneously applying a single regime all at once to all
areas of government activity.
- These
two difficulties can be examined in the context of the process of advice and
opinion offered as a basis for government policy
decisions. All overseas
“right of access” legislation includes exemptions which cover the
advisory function. In New Zealand
however there is a general movement towards
more public discussion of options and advice: some at least of the advisory
process can
be undertaken in public. If the final line were to be drawn now in
respect of the whole range of government activities, on the basis
of overseas
precedent it would probably exclude most of the advisory process. The area of
commercial activity is another in which
there is an evolving interest in opening
parts of decision-making - where for example, public interest becomes a
substantial factor.
Yet in comprehensively drafted overseas texts aspects of
commercial information too are included in lists of
exceptions.
- Under
our proposals the judgments to be made about access have at least three
significant characteristics: they are to be made by
reference to broad criteria
which are to be weighed against the basic presumption of availability; they are
to be made by reference
to the particular circumstances of the area of
administration in question; and they are to be made from time to time by
reference
to any relevant changes in
circumstances. Judgments cannot, in our view, be properly and satisfactorily
made all at one time by legislation. We were faced early
in our work with the
choice of trying to design a once and for all static framework, with a complex
set of exceptions, or a more
flexible mechanism, operating by reference to
principles and competing criteria that reflect a continuing shift away from the
presumption
of secrecy. We opted for a flexible process.
- We
discuss in the next section of this report the institutions and procedures which
are seen as involved in this process. But it is
convenient to note here one
central feature of the process and to indicate why we do not consider that the
courts should have the
major role in resolving issues. The central feature is
that the executive will have final power of decision: in its political form
it
will make the basic commitment; it will set up the new practices within the
permanent administration; it will, having received
the recommendation of the
Ombudsmen, have the final power to resolve disputes about access to particular
documents; and it will,
having received a report from the Information Authority,
make final decisions about the opening up of areas of information. We propose
no
change in the location of final responsibility. We do, however, propose profound
changes in the processes leading to decisions
about release. In general the
Government will act following, and we expect in accordance with, the public
advice of powerful independent
bodies. The advice and action will be given and
taken in the context of the general presumption of openness, and of the growing
domain
of rulings which widen access to official
information.
- It
follows that we do not see the courts as having a central role in making
decisions about the release of information. The criteria
to be applied are very
broadly stated and the resulting political judgments are, in the end, for
ministers who are elected and accountable
to Parliament rather than for the
courts who are not elected and are not accountable. The judgments involve expert
and developing
knowledge of public administration in particular areas. They
involve, as well, flexible procedures different from those used by the
courts.
A PROCESS WITH A PURPOSE
- We
have been led to the conclusion that it would be more fruitful in the New
Zealand context to set in motion a process of opening
up which, on the basis of
a presumption of openness, would contribute and be responsive to changing
attitudes and circumstances.
The essential elements of this process would
be:
- A
legislative base that would:
- provide a
substantial advance on the present framework of policy and practice;
- commit
government and administration to principles; remove unjustified barriers;
- set up
mechanisms for the ongoing process.
- Mechanisms
to:
- enlarge
progressively the areas of information declared to be publicly available;
- establish a
channel for the public to test individual decisions on availability;
- ensure that
general progress towards the “larger aim” is appropriately monitored
and reviewed.
THE LEGISLATIVE BASE
- The
simple provision of a legislative base would in itself take us substantially
further than the present system. While there is already
a great deal of
information available for reference or on request, we consider it essential for
all parties concerned to have a clear
understanding of the framework within
which decisions are to be taken. We propose accordingly that the legislation
should, along
with procedures for areas of doubt, specify areas in which
information can be assumed to be available as a matter of
course.
- What
we have in mind involves two aspects - a duty on the part of the Government to
compile and provide certain information, and an
ability on the individual's part
to obtain certain other categories of information on request. As an example of
the first there is
information on the nature and functions of departments and
other Government agencies, and directories setting out the nature and
location
of information held in such departments or agencies. We see this as an almost
indispensible foundation for effective access
by the public to information that
is properly available. The individual seeking particular information needs to
know where it can
be found, and who to seek it from.
- The
second aspect would include access by individuals, with limited exceptions, to
personal information that has been obtained about
themselves. It would also
include what has been called the informal administrative law of precedents,
principles and criteria applied
by departments or by statutory officers in
making decisions affecting individuals, together with the reasons for such
decisions.
Some exceptions are unavoidable in this category also, for example in
the area of national security, or to allow time for new procedures
to be
instituted, but we believe that they need be very few. Subject to this we would
expect the legislation to make such information
available on
request.
Principles
- The
political commitment which is at the heart of this exercise has already been
acknowledged by the Government and Opposition parties
alike. It remains to be
codified into a form which provides a strong base for the necessary
administrative action. To help underline
the commitment of all parties
concerned, we have considered the appropriate principles to be included in
legislation.
- A
draft of the Title of an Official Information Act and a draft of a statement of
principles and criteria appear as appendix 5. The
draft provisions, which
presuppose the repeal of the Official Secrets Act 1951 and the revision of the
classification system, are
directed at all those involved in the administration
of the proposed law. They need little explanation beyond what we have already
provided under the heading “Reasons for Openness” and “Reasons
for Protection”. The provisions are unusual
in their assertion of the
underlying rationale of the legislation. We think this assertion is important in
the present case as emphasising
the legislative commitment and as guiding those
who are to apply the legislation.
- The
availability of official information is, subject to very limited
exceptions, to be determined in accordance
with the purposes of the Act
(as set out in appendix 5) and in accordance with the principle that
information shall be made available unless there is good reason
for
withholding it. Such good reason is to be determined having regard
to the need:
“(a) To protect the privacy of the individual:
(b) To protect information properly entrusted in confidence
–
- (i) To the
Government or to any officer of the Government; or
(ii) By or on behalf of the Government to any person outside the Government:
(c) To avoid prejudice to measures -
- (i) Protecting
the health or safety of the public; or
- (ii) Preventing
or mitigating material loss to members of the public:
(d) To maintain the principles and conventions of the constitution for the time
being including those relating to the tendering of
advice:
(e) To maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and
frank expression of opinions between officers of the
Government in the course of
their duty:
(f) To enable the Government to take and defend, without prejudice or
disadvantage, legal proceedings:
(g) To enable the Government to carry out, without prejudice or disadvantage,
its trading activities:
(h) To carry out negotiations (including commercial negotiations):
(i) To prevent the improper disclosure or use of official information for gain
or advantage.”
- Good
reason to withhold official information will in any event exist where it is
decided that the making available of that information
would be likely to
prejudice:
“(i) The security, defence, or international relations of New Zealand;
or
(ii) The entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand by the
government of any other country or any agency of such
a government or any
international organisation on a basis of confidence; or
(iii) The maintenance of law and order, including the investigation and
detection of offences; or
(iv) The substantial economic interests of New Zealand.”
- As
an exception to the general principle, absolute protection, is given to “specifically
protected information”. Information is within this category only where
making it available would
be contrary to any enactment or would constitute
contempt of court or of Parliament.
- One
area of information calls for separate comment in the context of exceptions. It
has been impressed upon us that the activities
and responsibilities of
scientists, many of whom are publicly employed, place them in a unique position
with respect to their right
to disclose.
They argue that scientific knowledge is most effectively increased by the
unrestricted flow of information. But this applies in the
whole area of
intellectual activity. Freedom of discussion is a vital part of that
“discipline of dissent” which enables
ideas to be replaced and
modified.
- Some
scientists also argue that their particular knowledge justifies a decision of
conscience to ignore other obligations. But most
professions have accepted that
a distinction has to be made between the situation in
which the over-riding objective is to extend the levels of knowledge, and that
in which a service in the form of skilled professional
advice which may be
confidential is required by a client whether it be government or private
citizen. It goes without saying that
the wise client will want to permit the
widest possible disclosure to ensure that the advice is well tested. But in the
final analysis
the client has the right to limit disclosure. We cannot accept
that any group has a peculiar right to the exercise of conscience
nor that
membership of it overrides the obligation to accept that there are areas where
the best interests of the community preclude
disclosure.
Narrowing Protection
- The
next element of the legislative base we are proposing would be the removal
of any unjustified legal barriers set around official information. Two
specific areas were indicated in our terms of reference.
- We
have consulted extensively on the impact of the Official Secrets Act
1951. The Act in its present form is, to the great majority of those we
interviewed or who forwarded written submissions, excessive in
the protection it
makes possible for the broad mass of official information. Most departmental
heads believed that it played little
or no part in the day-to-day decisions on
release required of their officers. Nor did they consider it an essential part
of the protection
of information in their custody, where protection is in fact
required.
- The
law is much too wide. It is not limited to the protection of important national
interests. It does not conform with the principles
of the criminal law. It does
not command general respect.
82. We recommend that the Act be repealed. The legislative
backdrop to protection, including definition of areas to be protected,
would
then be included in an Official Information Act, the primary purpose of which
would be to increase the availability of official
information.
- We
recommend also that criminal sanctions be applied much more narrowly.
Only information concerning important national interests in defence, security,
international relations, law and order, and the economy
should be so protected,
and then only if disclosure would seriously prejudice these interests. One of
these interests is the continued
access of the Government to such information.
Thus a high degree of protection will continue to be given to information
received
in confidence from other governments. Further, the new law would be
clarified and narrowed by incorporating expressly the basic requirement
that a
defendant in a criminal prosecution have the relevant intention (for instance
wilfully to disclose the information) and knowledge
(for instance about the
character of the information).
- It
does not follow from this narrowing of the application of the criminal sanctions
that there should be no penalty for unauthorised
disclosure of information not
protected by such sanctions. Public servants will still be subject to the
disciplinary provisions of
the State Services Act and the regulations made under
it, which will need consequential amendment. The principal safeguard will
continue
to be the professional integrity of the Public Service. The
Supplementary Report and its attachments will spell out our proposals
more
fully.
- In
accordance with our terms of reference we have reviewed the criteria for
applying the system of “classifications”
and their use
in Government departments. It is perhaps not generally appreciated that
only a few departments operate the
formal classification system on a
wide
scale; most departments classify documents only rarely; much sensitive
information is handled without any classification. It is an
untidy situation.
Briefly we have sought to narrow the scope of classification to
cover information which merits particular degrees of protection because of its
importance in terms of vital national security and
other interests; in other
words, “classifications” should be used only in the sense of
“security classifications”.
- Difficulties
with the present system arise from a temptation, in that small number of
departments which classify extensively, to classify
too highly. There is also a
lack of adequate and timely declassification. This arises from a persistent
difficulty in instituting
formal declassification procedures which do not make
too great a call on resources, especially the time of senior
personnel.
- The
revised classification system we are proposing, and which we recommend be
reflected in legislation, seeks to reduce and clarify
the areas of information
to which the classifications “Top Secret”, “Secret and
“Confidential: Protected”
would properly be attached.
Another important aspect will be to provide where practicable for a time
limitation since at present the vast bulk of classifications
remain in place
long after the information they protect has become public.
- As
in the case of criminal sanctions, classifications rest partly on content of
information and partly on presumed consequences of
disclosure. An exercise of
judgment is required on whether classification is warranted for any particular
item. It is our view that
classification does not in itself constitute
sufficient grounds for protection, or for the application of sanctions in the
case of
unauthorised disclosure. In the same way, the fact that a document or
other piece of information is not classified does not prove
that it should
therefore be available to the public.
- We
have not at this stage proceeded to detailed recommendations on declassification
for archival purposes. In the context of our present
exercise we accord higher
priority to changes in the handling of current information. At some stage,
however, the archives system
will have to be given a substantial injection of
resources if it is to be brought into line with the freer system of information
we are aiming for. The Information Authority to be set up could include some
aspects of the archival problem in its general review
of existing areas of
protection, in co- operation with National Archives, the universities and others
with research requirements,
- As
we have already mentioned there are, aside from the Official Secrets Act, many
other statutes which provide protection for specific
areas of information as
well as sanctions for unauthorised disclosure. It is not uncommon for protection
clauses to be included in
new enactments. One result the Committee would not
wish to see arising from the changes recommended in this report, would be a rash
of new protective measures. This would, we consider, seriously undermine the
Government's intention and we hope it can be resisted.
The compatibility
of protection accorded by existing statutes with the proposals we are developing
should be reviewed in due course.
This review will be part of the work
programme of the new machinery we are proposing.
- We
recognise, as did many of those who presented submissions, that there can be
good reasons for protecting information which is not
classified. Other methods
of protection can be invoked. They will be developed by reference to the new
statutory criteria which will
depend in part on proper exercise of discretion by
public servants in the normal course of their duties.
MECHANISMS FOR THE PROCESS
- Our
examination of these questions has led us to the belief that a set of
arrangements, an apparatus, is called for. It will:
- be capable of
pursuing the principle and reconciling the interests already discussed;
- get action
underway very soon;
- provide an
assurance of deliberate and programmed forward movement;
- be simple in
structure and sparing in resource demands; be flexible and adaptable both in
form and method.
Policy and Procedures Within the Administration
- To
stimulate change in public sector attitudes and practices we consider that the
State Services Commission should be given specific
management responsibilities
to implement our proposals.
- We
accordingly propose the establishment of a small (three to four staff
maximum)
information unit within the State Services
Commission. The unit would essentially:
- work with
departments and agencies to develop systems and standards which can help them
carry out their responsibilities under the
new legislation;
- advise on
mechanisms, develop training programmes, and co-ordinate the preparation of
first-line information aids such as directories
of Government organisations and
their functions and powers;
- advise the
Information Authority of progress made and problems encountered in these
areas.
- The
unit could be set up in advance of the legislation, to get our programmes moving
promptly; its duties will be heaviest in its
early years but there will be a
continuing responsibility for this work within the management structure of the
State Services Commission.
- The
co-ordinating unit aside, we have not at this stage set out to propose new
administrative structures because in the main we do
not see these as being
necessary - or necessarily productive
- in terms of the spirit of the legislation. Departments and agencies will
have a responsibility to improve communication with the public and this
will apply to all staff and functions as they are at present. Responsibility for
administering the letter of the new provisions
- on access for example - will
need to have a specific locus in most bodies. In general, those officers who
have immediate functional
responsibility should deal at least in the first place
with the information aspects of their work. We should expect departments
themselves
to work out with the State Services Commission the arrangements best
suited to their needs.
- It
is not possible to know in advance what degree of additional pressures will be
placed on each department; some may be little affected,
others may have an
influx of requests which may ebb or flow. Some requests may be capable of being
met by the preparation of special
material or a shift towards the use of more
participatory techniques. Administrative procedures by which the legislation is
translated
into practice will be particularly important. The style of
information provision we have in view - a forthcoming response combined
with
simple and
direct lines of access - will call for new methods. Staff training, for senior
as well as junior staff, will have a significant role
to play.
A Channel for Public Grievance
- We
have already made plain our view that decisions about disclosure of
information taken by departments and agencies must be subject to test by an
independent arbiter. The next element in the system we are
proposing is therefore a mechanism for reviewing these decisions and for
receiving and investigating
complaints from the public.
- We
propose that the Ombudsmen should deal with individual complaints about
the disclosure and non-disclosure of information, including those arising in
respect of a wider range of Government agencies
(see para. 3). In part this
proposal involves no change. The Ombudsmen already can and do handle cases in
the information field,
in accordance with their well established procedures and
with the mana that the office has acquired over two decades. Under our proposals
they would begin with the principle that information is to be made available
unless there is good reason to the contrary. They would
weigh competing
considerations against the principle. So, if national security were to be
prejudiced by disclosure, they would find
the complaint not to be
sustained.
- We
do, however, propose one important modification to the present powers of the
Ombudsmen. Under the present law they can investigate
and make recommendations
in respect of advice given to ministers, but not the actual ministerial
decision. In the information field
we consider that there are strong reasons for
varying this. Ministers often make decisions about the disclosure of
information, for
instance in announcing and justifying government decisions.
There are examples of information relating to a sensitive area of administration
being released only through the minister's office. Again, information decisions
may be taken without official advice. In neither
case would the Ombudsmen at
present have jurisdiction. But we believe there would be little point in
undertaking reforms which do
not provide for an unimpeded channel of review. The
credibility of Government's commitment to more open government would suffer if
it were not prepared to accept that the validity of ministerial decisions on
disclosure be subject to the independent test which
is already applied to its
departments. We recommend that Ministerial decisions concerning the
release of official information should come within the Ombudsmen's
purview.
- This
proposed change is not inconsistent with the principles underlying the office of
the Ombudsmen. The Ombudsman (Parliamentary
Commissioner for Administration) in
the United Kingdom has power to investigate and report in respect of ministerial
decisions.
- The
proposal is also compatible with the principle of ministerial responsibility.
Procedure would be informal rather than formal.
As at present the Ombudsmen
would not have powers of decision; they would investigate, and, if appropriate,
recommend a different
decision or practice. Ministers, subject to public and
parliamentary scrutiny, a scrutiny enhanced by the Ombudsmen's investigations
and reports, would in general still decide.
- We
do not propose any change in two central features of the powers and jurisdiction
of the Ombudsmen - the recommendatory nature of
their powers and the essential
immunity of their processes from judicial
control. We do not think that they should have powers of decision, nor that
their opinion should be subject to reconsideration by
the courts.
- There
have, it is true, been suggestions that the Ombudsmen should have power to
decide finally complaints of failure to release information.
These rest on the
attractive notion that the executive should not be judge in its own cause in
deciding to release or withhold information.
In our opinion this misconceives
the nature of the Ombudsmen's office and more importantly the proper role of the
executive in our
polity. Subject to the rule of law and to its accountability to
Parliament, a government must be able to make decisions in matters
it judges of
sufficient importance, whether of administration or of policy, and take
responsibility for those decisions. To enable
an Ombudsman to override the
considered judgment of a Minister or of Cabinet would confer on him a
far-reaching executive power and
essentially alter the character of his office.
It would appear to make the Ombudsmen the final arbiters in matters of major
political
importance. We believe that to talk of a government being “judge
in its own cause” in this context is to confuse judicial
and executive
concepts.
- The
Office of the Ombudsmen will not in the system we propose offer the only means
of dealing with disputes about the availability
and withholding of information.
The courts already have a role in deciding whether official information is to be
disclosed for the
purpose of litigation before them or to parties to matters
being decided by official bodies. They also, in the end, decide whether
there is
an obligation under legislation to make information available; we expect that
such obligations will become more common.
And it is the courts which decide
whether there has been a disclosure in breach of legislation making it an
offence to disclose particular
information.
- We
have already indicated in paragraphs 66 and 67 why we think that the courts
should not have a more significant role in dealing
with access complaints. These
reasons relate to the recognised advantages of the Ombudsmen's jurisdiction,
procedures, and powers.
They have relevant specific and general experience; that
experience develops by reference to a series of cases; their procedures
and
remedies are appropriate; and in the end their task is one of persuasion,
persuasion of those who bear the political responsibility.
A Regulatory Body
- The
administrative and review mechanisms we see as needed in our new system can
appropriately be provided within existing institutions.
The main elements of the
legislation as we have proposed them (para. 68) could not in our view be
satisfied, however, without some
independent body of sufficient status to
undertake continuing inquiry into and definition of categories of information,
and formulation
of rules moderating conditions of access. Such a body
would also prepare background material, criteria, and reports towards an
“audit”
of progress, stitch both monitoring and grievance experience
back into the wider context, and narrow the fields for uncertainty and
complaint. We could not see any other way of providing both a focus for public
expectations of action and progress, and at the same
time securing advice that
would be seen to be independent of adversarial political pressures as well as
the possibility of bureaucratic
defensiveness or
self-serving.
- We
are accordingly recommending the establishment of an independent Information
Authority responsible to Parliament, to include
a chairman with legal qualifications; the other members, either two or four,
would be appointed with due regard not only to their
personal attributes but
also to their knowledge of or experience in the requirements of the
communications media and an appreciation
of the constitutional principles and of
the working of government. Neither the head of the unit in the State Services
Commission
nor the Ombudsmen would be members of the information Authority as
such. It should nevertheless be required of the Authority that
it consult with
and receive reports from these officers.
- The
principal functions of the authority would be:
- a regulatory
function in the information area: to receive submissions; to conduct hearings;
to establish guidelines and criteria for
administrative action; to define and
review categories of information for the purposes of access and protection;
- a monitoring
function: to keep under review the Official Information Act and other
legislation and practice in the general information
field and to recommend
changes to the Government or other appropriate body, and to report to
Parliament;
- in the field of
personal information:
(a) to keep under review, and make recommendations on, means and procedures by
which individuals can find out what personal information
relating to them is
held by any department or organisation to which the Official Information Act
applies, and can request incorrect
information to be removed or corrected;
(b) on the reference of the responsible Minister, to examine existing or
proposed powers of such a department or organisation to
require individuals to
supply personal information about themselves or any other person, and to make
recommendations on whether such
powers are proper and reasonable;
(c) to inquire into the use of personal information held in any such department
or organisation by that or any other department or
organisation for purposes
other than the purpose for which the power to obtain the information was
conferred, and to make recommendations
on means and procedures to prevent any
improper use of such information for other purposes.
- The
recommendations brought forward by the Authority under its regulatory function
would, on the analogy of the Securities Commission,
be submitted to Government
for implementation by Order in Council. The recommendations would be published.
Initially the Authority's main task would be to enlarge systematically the
area of information available to the public; it would however, determine
its own agenda and priorities for action, and might introduce matters for
regulation as it sees fit.
- There
are several precedents for a body exercising this sort of power, but perhaps the
most pertinent and one of the most recent is
the Securities Commission
established under the Securities Act 1978. This is an instance of how a small
organisation, modestly staffed
and working by consultation and with an
understanding of the practical problems of different interests, can undertake a
useful and
acceptable task in our system.
- We
do not consider that the decisions of the Information Authority should
themselves have the force of law, any more than do those
of the Securities
Commission. A subordinate body should not have significant law-making functions
and, as we have said in relation
to the Ombudsmen
(para. 104), Government should retain its ultimate power and responsibility. We
have proposed that the Authority's recommendations
should be made public. We
likewise consider that if in any case the Government does not accept the
Authority's recommendation, its
reasons and any advice on which its decision was
made should also be made public. There could be an exception to this in such
areas
as national security and foreign relations, although it seems unlikely
that under the legislation we propose the Information Authority
would wish to
recommend that information affecting such matters be made available.
- The
initial workload facing the Authority suggests that it would need to accept a
full schedule of duties for the first 2 or 3 years,
if substantial progress is
to be made in that time with the opening up process. After the inaugural period
we would expect the Authority
itself might wish to review its
activities.
- An
integral and important element of our proposals is an agency outside the
ordinary administration and the executive government to
keep under review and
report on progress in implementing a regime of freeing of information. Public
confidence demands that the bureaucracy
should not be seen to be the final judge
of its own virtue in this matter. We believe that this overseeing role could
best be performed
by the Information Authority we are recommending, and we see
it as one of the Authority's primary tasks. The Authority in turn might
be
required to report from time to time, and at least annually, to Parliament as
the institution where ultimate responsibility should
lie. While it is not within
our terms of reference to raise matters of Parliamentary machinery, we see some
analogy with the relationship
which exists in the financial field between the
Public Expenditure Committee of Parliament and the Controller and
Auditor-General.
However, the Authority should in addition make public
statements in its own right. The analogy of the Ombudsmen is in point
here.
- It
would not be appropriate for the Information Authority to perform the sort of
detailed administrative functions listed for the
information unit within the
State Services Commission (para. 94). But in a general way the Authority should
keep itself abreast of
progress and developments in the public sector through
the information unit.
- It
is for Parliament to decide how active and detailed a role it
wishes to take in supervising the policy we propose. It may wish the Authority
members
to be appointed on its recommendations, as happens with Ombudsmen, and
the Privacy Commissioner under the Wanganui Computer Centre
Act, or it may
prefer the more traditional precedent of the Controller and Auditor-General who
is simply appointed by the Governor-General.
Parliament may or may not think it
appropriate to enlarge its association with the Information Authority by
establishing a select
committee. Whether or not this happens, the Authority
should itself have the overseeing function we refer to in paragraph 114 along
with its specific responsibility of developing and enlarging the territory of
available information. As an independent body it would
keep a watch on the
operation of information policies and practices, acting on its own initiative or
in response to representations.
THE PROCESS AT WORK
- There
are roughly three groups of official information:
(a) that which is generally available;
(b) that which, as a general rule, may not be disclosed (including information
protected by the classification system and criminal
sanctions); and
(c) that large bulk of information for which neither full protection nor
unqualified availability seems, for the time being, to be
appropriate.
- We
have made a number of proposals which, if adopted, would have immediate effect
in respect of the first and second groups. Our fundamental
concern has been to
propose ways to deal with, and to cut drastically into, information falling
within the third group. Such information
can become available in several ways:
by once-and-for-all provisions allowing access to certain categories of
information (with exemptions
if necessary for some sensitive sub-categories); by
a steady process of evolution towards freeing up the system; and finally by the
definition and adaptation of working precepts to achieve a more open overall
system. The processes of change could actually be prompted
by ministers and
officials, or through the work of the Ombudsmen in dealing with individual
complaints about the release of specific
pieces of information, or through the
work of the Information Authority in proposing general rules for opening up
areas of information.
- Our
proposals for the third group can, we think, be better understood if we give
some indication of the ways we see them working towards
the release of
information in that group. The following discussion is not intended to be
definitive. Our concern is not to evaluate
recent changes in information
practices. It is rather to point up some features relevant to the process: the
kinds of administrative
powers, the public and private interests affected, the
information involved, and the possible ways of handling its
release.
- The
area of government administration we choose to point up is one which was the
subject of considerable attention in submissions
and interviews: resource
development and use. As we have already noted, the forms of government
involvement are many and varied:
as direct participant, as partner, as the
granter of incentives and of licences, as regulator, as tax gatherer etc. The
commercial
interest also takes many and varied forms: sometimes a commercial
concern will be seeking a concession or incentive, sometimes in
a regulated
industry it will require a licence, sometimes it will be subject, not on any
initiative of its own, to regulations made
in the public interest (for instance,
in safety).
- The
information too is varied. It can, for example, be:
- facts relating
to geology, forestry, energy, economics; “facts” that will often not
be complete, fully tested, or agreed;
- trade secrets
and other information of value to commercial competitors;
- possible options
for elaboration and discussion within government;
- documents
preparatory to relevant government decisions or to the negotiation of
contracts.
- The
information will also come from a variety of sources. Some will be generated
within the Public Service, some will be in the public
domain,
some will be volunteered by commercial concerns, some will be provided under
compulsion, in some cases with an understanding of confidentiality,
in other
cases not.
- There
are other matters that might be weighed in settling new arrangements for the
disclosure of such information:
- where policy
changes of a non-recurring and substantive nature are in prospect and these may
embrace significant non-commercial values
or criteria, the case for open
argument of options, alternative listings, and the like is strong; such openness
is not necessarily
incompatible with conventional confidentiality affecting
detailed operations, but at times a conflict of interests will doubtless
ensue;
- the more
generalised the information, the better the case for releasing it; there are
analogies for this in private business and in
other areas of official
information;
- the closer the
resemblance of the public commercial activity to that of competitive private
business, the better the case for following
precedents of commercial
confidentiality.
- Timing
will also be a matter for consideration; arguments for the confidentiality of a
negotiating position do not necessarily continue
to apply after a negotiation is
completed.
- Some
of those affected by, or interested in, such government decisions will want to
have access to the information of the kind indicated;
others will want that
information protected. They might pursue their interest in at least two ways, by
complaining to the Ombudsmen
in respect of particular government's decisions
relating to the release of individual pieces of information, or by participating
in the proceedings of the Authority concerning the possibility of the opening up
of a relevant general category of information.
- An
Ombudsman considering complaints about particular decisions concerning
information would weigh against the statutory principle
of availability any
relevant protective criteria. He could no doubt draw on his knowledge of
information processes and of the particular
area of administration in question,
and consider matters such as those indicated above. If he thought that the
decision should be
reviewed or altered or further justified he would then enter
into discussion with, and, if need be, make a recommendation to, the
appropriate
Minister or responsible executive officer. The Minister would retain the final
power of decision about the release of
a particular
document.
- The
role of the Information Authority is to be sharply contrasted with that of the
Ombudsmen. It will be concerned with proposals
for the release of general
categories of information and not with particular pieces of information. There
are several ways in which
an area of administration might get on the Authority's
agenda. The Authority, might decide to take up an area (for instance
import licensing or social welfare records) in the light of the Ombudsmen's
experience
of particular complaints, or in response to the direct application of
some interest group or on its own initiative - or the matter
might be referred
to it by a Minister or the information unit in the State Services Commission who
could well see value in a dispassionate
assessment of some difficult issue. We
envisage that the Authority would not take up matters under the pressure of
immediate public
controversies but in circumstances which would allow for
proposals to be settled in terms of relevant principles. It would
have
the assistance of those affected and interested; they would have the opportunity
to participate in the hearings and to present argument
and evidence. The
Authority would weigh against the principle of availability any competing
protective criteria. It would consider
such factors as those indicated above and
the existing arrangements for release. It would then reach conclusions about
what (if any)
categories of information should be made available and the manner
and timing of release. So it might, in the area of resource development
and use,
make proposals for:
(a) the further release of relevant factual material;
(b) the public elaboration of options for development and use;
(c) the publication of proposed plans for the development and use of
resources;
(d) the publication, subject to appropriate safeguards, of contractual
arrangements concerning development and use; or
(e) the publication of periodic reports in certain cases.
Its proposals would take the form of public recommendations to the Government
which would give effect to them, if it so decided,
by way of Orders in
Council.
- We
stress that this discussion is only suggestive. Our purpose is to do no more
than sketch the procedures and indicate the matters
that might be weighed and
possible kinds of results.
COSTS
- We
have not found it possible to draw up any estimate of the comprehensive costs of
opening up official information, but we have considered
direct outlays. We
estimate these will be less than $500,000 per annum depending on specific
decisions by the Government. A figure
of this order would cover the new parts of
the apparatus to be set up - the Information Authority and the information unit
within
the State Services Commission. Including members of the Authority, this
will call for a total of about 15 people who will require
accommodation and
other services. The figure also includes provision for some publications such as
a directory of government functions.
In the first phase there will be some
direct costs in departments, e.g., for the preparation of departmental
manuals.
- Spread
over a longer period there will be other costs in departments such as those of
reorganising records systems, improving or establishing
lines of public inquiry
and access, staff training, and for the actual time spent by staff on access
requests. To a certain extent
the action involved would be necessary with or
without the change of approach we are proposing.
- The
fact is that the cost of supplying information is already considerable.
Questions from members of Parliament and Parliamentary
select committees,
questions asked of ministers by members of the public, Ombudsmen inquiries, and
replies to queries from the media
make heavy demands on the time of skilled
people. In addition to this there are positive information programmes initiated
by departments.
In proportion to the costs of these various activities the
additions we propose will (for most departments) not be great. An additional
penalty will be the delay in carrying out tasks from which skilled people are
diverted. There will undoubtedly be some requests for
access which will take up
significant time and effort. Charges to offset costs may be
necessary.
- The
question of costs is ultimately one of priorities. If it is accepted that the
Government has responsibility to keep the public
informed of its activities, it
will no doubt be recognised also that this aspect of its work must be given
priority over other demands.
- Some
of the positive outcomes of greater openness, such as better understanding of
public policies, are not measurable in money terms.
What price should be set on
a better informed public, or a more outward looking Public Service? If greater
openness enables Government
to work more smoothly and effectively in the long
run, a real gain in the efficient use of resources will be achieved.
TOWARDS OPEN GOVERNMENT
- One
message has emerged clearly from our inquiries and consultations. There is today
a strong desire in the community for a freer
flow of official information, and
for definite and simple understanding of how far this information is to be made
available. Public
expectations of change continue to rise. Developments overseas
can be expected to reinforce the movement. At this stage a decisive
step forward
is called for.
- That
step must in the first place involve a change in the presumption, from secrecy
to openness. At the same time we recognise that
there are legitimate reasons for
withholding some official information. The new system we propose provides means
of balancing these
two considerations. It includes new procedures and changes in
institutions. It also calls for changes in attitudes.
- Reforms
cannot easily be forced, and we recognise the importance of preserving the
confidence of those involved at all levels. It
must be faced that in the short
run the people doing the work are not going to change, nor is much of the
material they will be handling.
While working practices are changing, the
convention of ministerial responsibility and the neutral public servant will
remain the
constitutional basis of the working relationship between ministers
and officials.
- We
see the proposed apparatus of reform as necessary and suited to the needs of the
times. But no such structure can alone effect
a new dispensation. The will to
change must inform the working of the system if it is to promote the evolution
of attitudes and practice.
This applies to all concerned - ministers,
parliamentarians, officials, public interest groups, and the public media. But
the initiative
rests primarily with ministers and the public media. Undue
concern about the consequences of release or unwillingness to accept the
need
for withholding some information could only weaken the momentum for reform by
impairing the growth of confidence in the ability
of the system to produce
impartial and balanced judgment.
- The
system we have proposed is designed specifically for New Zealand and its results
will depend on the way the situation in this
country develops. Our community is
small, our affairs conducted within a comprehensibly human scale. The system we
work in is well
understood and able to absorb criticism because there is a
national sense of its underlying integrity. Here, surely, lie grounds
for hope
that reform can be fruitful.
SUMMARY
- The
case for more openness in government is compelling. It rests on democratic
participation in public affairs, on accountability,
on a concern for the
interests of individuals, and on the effectiveness of government (para.
20-32).
- There
are good reasons for withholding some official information. The reasons concern
the interests of the country as a whole, of
individuals and organisations, and
of effective government and administration (para. 33-53).
- The
presumption henceforth should be that official information is to be made
available unless there is good reason to withhold it
(para.
54-55).
- Legislation
is needed. It should be suited to New Zealand's circumstances. It should state
the principle of availability and the criteria
for protection and should set up
dynamic processes to give effect to that principle and those criteria (para.
61-62; 72-76).
- The
legislation should establish a flexible mechanism, capable of contributing and
being responsive to changing attitudes and circumstances
and leading to
increased availability of information. It is important to note that
responsibility would, in major respects, rest with the executive but that the
executive would act following,
and in general only in accordance with, the
advice of independent bodies (para. 63-67).
- The
legislation should make certain information available as a matter of course
(para. 69-71).
- The
Official Secrets Act 1951 should be repealed and replaced by provisions defining
much more narrowly the offences relating to the
wrongful communication of
official information (para. 79-84).
- The
scope of the classification system should be narrowed and clarified (para.
85-89).
- The
compatibility of specific protections accorded by other statutes with our
proposals should be reviewed (para. 90).
- A
small information unit within the State Services Commission should be
established to stimulate change in public sector attitudes
and practices (para.
93-95).
- Departments
and agencies would have a concurrent responsibility to improve communication
with the public (para. 96-97).
- Decisions
about the disclosure of information should be subject to test by an independent
arbiter. The Office of the Ombudsmen should,
in accordance with its statute,
deal with complaints about such disclosure. Decisions of ministers concerning
the release of official
information should be brought within the purview of the
Ombudsmen (para. 98-106).
- An
independent body, the Information Authority, should be, established with the
task of undertaking a continuing inquiry into and
definition of categories of
information which should be made available. The Authority's recommendations,
which would be made public,
would have legal effect once the Government had
implemented them by Order in Council (para. 107-115).
- The
Authority should also have monitoring functions and functions in the field of
personal information (para. 109;
114-116).
Appendix 1
Committee on Official Information
TERMS OF REFERENCE
- The
basic task of the Committee is to contribute to the larger aim of freedom of
information by considering the extent to which official
information can be made
readily available to the public. With this end in view and having in mind the
need to safeguard national
security, the public interest and individual privacy,
the Committee should, in particular:
(a) review the criteria for applying the classifications now in use and, if
necessary, recommend the redefinition of the categories
of information which
should be protected; and
(b) examine the purpose and application of the Official Secrets Act 1951, in
particular section 6, and any other relevant legislation,
and recommend amending
legislation.
- In
the light of the foregoing review the Committee should advance appropriate
recommendations on changes in policies and procedures
which would contribute to
the aim of freedom of information.
28 July 1978.
Appendix 2
Committee on Official Information
MEMBERSHIP
The Committee was established
in May 1978 with Sir Alan Danks as Chairman, Professor K. J. Keith, of the
Faculty of Law at Victoria
University of Wellington, as a member, and with other
members to be drawn from the State Services Commission, the Prime Minister's
Department, Department of Justice, and the Ministries of Defence and Foreign
Affairs. The Chief Parliamentary Counsel was co-opted
at an early stage.
This report has been prepared by:
Sir Alan Danks, K.B.E. (Chairman) Prof. K. J. Keith.
Mr B. J. Cameron (Deputy Secretary for Justice).
Mr VV. B. Harland (Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs). Mr W. Iles (Chief
Parliamentary Counsel).
Mr D. B. G. McLean (Secretary of Defence). Mr P. G. Millen (Secretary of the
Cabinet).
Dr R. M. Williams, C.B.E. (Chairman, State Services Commission).
Other participants from Government departments over the period of the
Committee's work have been:
Mr R. B. Atkins.
Mr B. M. Brown.
Mr F. H. Corner, C.M.G. Mr E. A. Kennedy, O.B.E. Mr G. S. Orr.
Mr J. F. Robertson.
Secretariat
Mr A. R. Perry was at the outset appointed executive secretary to the Committee.
Others assisting at different times were Ms S. Grant-Taylor,
Mrs W. Powley, Mr
F. J. Steel, and Mrs A. Smith. In April 1980 Miss C. J. Rowe was appointed
secretary, and Mr Perry continued to
assist as a consultant.
The Committee is also grateful to Dr C. C. Aikman, Mrs D. Moss, and Mrs S.
Pinfield who have assisted with background papers for
the report and in its
preparation.
Appendix 3
SUBMISSIONS: PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONS
Action
for Environment.
All-Party Committee for Freedom of Information and Privacy. Archives and Records
Association of N.Z.
Auckland Community Arts Council. Auckland District Law Society.
Dr Kevin Broughan.
Dr L. Cleveland.
Ecology Action (Otago) Inc.
Editors Committee, N.Z. Section, Commonwealth Press Union. Energy Watch.
Environment and Conservation Organisations of N.Z. (ECO). Federated Mountain
Clubs of N.Z.
Fourth Estate Group.
Friends of the Earth.
Friends of the Earth (Wellington Branch). Mr E. L. Gilchrist.
Glaxo Laboratories (N.Z.) Ltd. Mr J. D. Green.
Greenpeace Foundation of N.Z. Mrs A. R. Grigg.
IBM (N.Z.) Ltd.
International Commission of Jurists, N.Z. Section. Ivon Watkins-Dow Ltd.
Kelvin Industries (1958) Ltd.
Messrs H. G. I. Love and D. R. Gilmour. Mrs Marjorie Maslen.
National Council of Women in N.Z. Inc. Native Forests Action Council.
N. Z. Association of Scientists.
N.Z. Association of Social Workers Inc.
N.Z. Catchment Authorities Association.
N.Z. Combined State Unions.
N.Z. Computer Society Inc.
N.Z. Council for Civil Liberties.
N.Z. Ecological Society.
N.Z. Federation of University Women.
N.Z. Federation of University Women (Hutt Valley Branch).
N.Z. Foundation for Peace Studies Inc.
N.Z. Institute of Food and Science Technology.
N.Z. Institute of International Affairs.
N.Z. Institute of Public Administration.
N.Z. Library Association Inc.
N.Z. Library Association (Auckland Branch).
N.Z. Manufacturers Federation.
N.Z. Public Service Association.
N.Z. Society of Genealogists (Southland Group). Mr Peter Osborne.
PEN International N.Z. Centre. Political Renewal Group.
Sir Guy Powles.
Press Gallery Journalists. Mr Hugh Price.
Professorial Board, University of Canterbury. Dr James Ramsay.
Rangitikei County Council. Rohm Haas N.Z. Ltd.
Royal Society of N.Z. (Otago Branch). Dr Ian Shearer, M.P.
Mr P. V. Sim.
Dr G. J. Struik.
Student Teachers Association of N.Z. Dr O. R. W. Sutherland and U. E. Skold. Mr
R. Tattersfield.
Mr J. F. Tourelle.
United Nations Association of N.Z. Marilyn Waring, M.P.
Whangarei City Librarian.
Workers Education Association (Auckland Branch). Henry H. York and Co. Ltd.
SUBMISSIONS: GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries. Audit Department.
Crown Law Office. Customs Department. Ministry of Defence. Department of
Education. Ministry of Energy.
Commission for the Environment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
N.Z. Forest Service.
Government Life Insurance Office. Government Printing Office.
Department of Health.
Housing Corporation of New Zealand. Inland Revenue Department.
Department of Internal Affairs. Department of Justice.
Department of Labour. Department of Lands and Survey. Legislative
Department.
Department of Maori Affairs. Police Department.
N.Z. Post Office.
Prime Minister's Department. Public Trust Office.
N.Z. Government Railways.
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Department of Social
Welfare.
State Insurance Office. State Services Commission. Department of Statistics.
Tourist and Publicity Department. Department of Trade and Industry.
Ministry of Transport.
The Treasury.
Valuation Department.
Ministry of Works and Development.
SUBMISSIONS: GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND AGENCIES
Accident
Compensation Commission. Air New Zealand.
N.Z. Atomic Energy Committee. Broadcasting Corporation of N.Z. Cabinet
Office.
Commerce Commission. Consumers Institute of N.Z. Environmental Council.
N.Z. Export Import Corporation. Commission for the Future. Government House.
Government Stores Board. Higher Salaries Commission.
Human Rights
Commission.
N.Z. Intelligence Council.
Local Government Commission. National Archives.
National Library of N.Z.
National Research Advisory Council. National Roads Board.
Nature Conservation Council. Chief Ombudsman.
Petroleum Corporation of N.Z.
N.Z. Planning Council. Race Relations Conciliator. Reserve Bank of N.Z.
N.Z. Security Intelligence Service. Tourist Hotel Corporation. University Grants
Committee.
Appendix 4
INTERVIEWS: PRIVATE ORGANISATIONS AND PERSONS
All-Party
Committee for Freedom of Information and Privacy. Archives and Records
Association of N.Z.
Auckland District Law Society. Dr L. Cleveland.
Editors Committee, N.Z. Section, Commonwealth Press Union. Environment and
Conservation Organisations of N.Z. (ECO). Fourth Estate
Group.
International Commission of Jurists, N.Z. Section. Ivon Watkins Dow Ltd.
National Council of Women of N.Z. Inc.
N.Z. Association of Scientists.
N.Z. Combined State Unions.
N.Z. Computer Society Inc.
N.Z. Federation of University Women.
N.Z. Institute of International Affairs.
N.Z. Institute of Public Administration.
N.Z. Library Association Inc.
N.Z. Manufacturers Federation. Sir Guy Powles.
Press Gallery Journalists.
Professorial Board, University of Canterbury. Royal Society of N.Z. (Otago
Branch).
Henry H. York and Co. Ltd.
INTERVIEWS: GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS
Ministry
of Agriculture and Fisheries. Audit Department.
Crown Law Office. Customs Department. Ministry of Defence. Department of
Education. Ministry of Energy.
Commission for the Environment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
N.Z. Forest Service.
Government Life Insurance Office. Government Printing Office.
Department of Health. Housing Corporation of N.Z. Inland Revenue Department.
Department of Internal Affairs. Department of Justice.
Department of Labour. Department of Lands and Survey. Legislative
Department.
Department of Maori Affairs. Police Department.
N.Z. Post Office.
Prime Minister's Department. Public Trust Office.
N.Z. Government Railways.
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Department of Social
Welfare.
State Insurance Office. Department of Statistics. Tourist and Publicity
Department.
Department of Trade and Industry. Ministry of Transport.
The Treasury.
Valuation Department.
Ministry of Works and Development.
INTERVIEWS: GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND AGENCIES
Accident
Compensation Commission. Broadcasting Corporation of N.Z. Commerce
Commission.
Consumers Institute of N.Z. Environmental Council.
Government Stores Board. National Archives.
National Library of N.Z.
National Research Advisory Council. Nature Conservation Council.
Chief Ombudsman.
Petroleum Corporation of N.Z.
N.Z. Planning Council.
Reserve Bank of N.Z.
N.Z. Security Intelligence Service. University Grants Committee.
INTERVIEWS: MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
Government
Members of Parliament. Opposition Members of Parliament. Mr B. Beetham, M.P.
Mr M. Minogue, M.P.
Marilyn Waring, M.P.
Appendix 5
DRAFT PROVISIONS FOR AN OFFICIAL INFORMATION ACT
Title - An Act to make official information more
freely available, to give individuals proper access to official information
relating to
them, to protect official information to the extent required by the
public interest and the need to preserve individual privacy,
to establish
procedures for the achievement of those purposes, and to repeal the Official
Secrets Act 1951.
Purposes - The purposes of this Act are, consistently with the principle
of the Executive Government's responsibility to Parliament,
(a) To increase progressively the availability of official information to the
people of New Zealand in order to enable their more
effective participation in
the making and administration of laws and policies, and thereby to enhance
respect for the law and to
promote the good government of New
Zealand:
- (b) To provide
proper access by individuals to official information concerning
them:
(c) To protect official information to the extent consistent with the public
interest and the preservation of the privacy of the
individual.
General criteria - (1) The question whether any official information (not
being specifically protected information) is to be made available, where
that
question arises under this Act, shall be determined in accordance with the
purposes of this Act and the principle that the information
shall be made
available unless there is good reason for withholding it.
(2) In deciding for the purposes of subsection (1) of this section whether there
is good reason for withholding information regard
shall be had to the need -
(a) To protect the privacy of the individual:
(b) To protect information properly entrusted in confidence -
- (i) To the
Government or to any officer of the Government; or
- (ii) By or on
behalf of the Government to any person outside the Government:
(c) To avoid prejudice to measures
- (i) Protecting
the health or safety of the public; or
- (ii) Preventing
or mitigating material loss to members of the public:
(d) To maintain the principles and conventions of the constitution for the time
being including those relating to the tendering of
advice:
(e) To maintain the effective conduct of public affairs through the free and
frank expression of opinions between officers of the
Government in the course of
their duty:
(f) To enable the Government to take and defend, without prejudice or
disadvantage, legal proceedings:
(g) To enable the Government to carry out, without prejudice or disadvantage,
its trading activities:
(h) To carry out negotiations (including commercial negotiations):
(i) To prevent the improper disclosure or use of official information for gain
or advantage.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) of this section, it shall, for the purposes
of subsection (1) of this section, be good reason
for withholding information if
the making available of that information would be likely to prejudice
-
- (i) The
security, defence, or international relations of New Zealand; or
(ii) The entrusting of information to the Government of New Zealand by the
government of any other country or any agency of such
a government or any
international organisation on a basis of confidence; or
(iii) The maintenance of law and order, including the investigation and
detection of offences; or
(iv) The substantial economic interests of New Zealand.
(4) Nothing in this section shall derogate from any provision of this Act or of
any other enactment which -
(a) Authorises or requires official information to be made available; or
(b) Imposes a prohibition or restriction in relation to the availability of
official information; or
(c) Regulates the manner in which official information may be obtained or made
available.
Specifically protected information - Official information is specifically
protected information for the purposes of this Act if the making available of
that information
would -
(a) Be contrary to the provisions of any enactment; or
(b) Constitute contempt of court or of
Parliament.
Appendix 6
SELECTED EXEMPTION PROVISIONS IN OVERSEAS LEGISLATION
- Advisory
Processes
- United
States
The Freedom of Information Act (5 United States Code, section 552 (b) (5))
exempts from the general obligation of disclosure:
“inter-agency or intea-agency memorandums or letters which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the
agency.”
United States courts, in interpreting this provision, have held that the test is
whether the production of the information would
be injurious to the consultative
functions of government. The provision's purpose is to ensure that federal
agencies enjoy a free
flow of ideas essential to making reasoned decisions and
to encourage open and frank discussions on policy matters within the government.
It follows, for instance, that documents setting out recommendations and
internal deliberations leading to the formulation of government
decisions and
policy are exempt from disclosure.
- Australia
The Freedom of Information Bill introduced into the Australian Parliament in
1978 contains a part setting out documents which are
exempt from disclosure. The
Part includes the following clauses:
“Cabinet documents
- (1)
A document is an exempt document if it is
(a) a document that has been submitted to the Cabinet for its consideration or
is proposed by a Minister to be so submitted;
(b) an official record of the Cabinet;
(c) a document that is a copy of, or of a part of, a document referred to in
paragraph (a) or (b); or
(d) a document the disclosure of which would involve the disclosure of any
deliberation or decision of the Cabinet, other than a
document by which a
decision of the Cabinet was officially published.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a certificate signed by the Secretary to the
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet certifying
that a document is one
of a kind referred to in a paragraph of sub-section (1) establishes
conclusively that it is an exempt document
of that kind.
(3) Where a document is a document referred to in paragraph (1) (d) by reason
only of matter contained in a particular part or particular
parts of the
document, a certificate under sub-section
(2) in respect of the document shall identify that part or those parts of the
document as containing the matter by reason of which
the certificate is
given.
(4) Sub-section (1) does not apply to a document by reason of the fact that it
was submitted to the Cabinet for its consideration
or is proposed by a Minister
to be so submitted if it was not brought into existence for the purpose of
submission for consideration
by the Cabinet.
(5) A reference in this section to the Cabinet shall be read as including a
reference to a committee of the Cabinet.
Executive Council documents
- (1)
A document is an exempt document if it is -
(a) a document that has been submitted to the Executive Council for its
consideration or is proposed by a Minister to be so submitted;
(b) an official record of the Executive Council;
(c) a document that is a copy of, or of a part of, a document referred to in
paragraph (a) or (b); or
(d) a document the disclosure of which would involve the disclosure of any
deliberation or advice of the Executive Council, other
than a document by which
an act of the Governor-General, acting with the advice of the Executive Council,
was officially published.
(2) For the purposes of this Act, a certificate signed by the Secretary to the
Executive Council, or a person performing the duties
of the Secretary,
certifying that a document is one of a kind referred to in a paragraph of
sub-section (1) establishes conclusively
that it is an exempt document of that
kind.
(3) Where a document is a document referred to in paragraph (1) (d) by reason
only of matter contained in a particular part or particular
parts of the
document, a certificate under sub-section
(2) in respect of the document shall identify that part or those parts of the
document as containing the matter by reason of which
the certificate is
given.
(4) Sub-section (1) does not apply to a document by reason of the fact that it
was submitted to the Executive Council for its consideration,
or is proposed by
a Minister to be so submitted, if it was not brought into existence for the
purpose of submission for consideration
by the Executive Council.
Internal working documents
- (1)
Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if it is a document
the disclosure of which under this Act -
(a) would disclose matter in the nature of, or relating to, opinion, advice or
recommendation obtained, prepared or recorded, or
consultation or deliberation
that has taken place, in the course of, or for the purposes of, the deliberative
processes involved
in the functions of an agency or Minister or of the
Government of the Commonwealth; and
(b) would be contrary to the public interest.
(2) In the case of a document of the kind referred to in sub-section 7 (1), the
matter referred to in paragraph (1) (a) of this section
does not include matter
that is used or to be used for the purpose of the making of decisions or
recommendations referred to in sub-section
7 (1).
(3) This section does not apply to a document by reason only of purely factual
material contained in the document.
(4) This section does not apply to -
(a) reports (including reports concerning the results of studies, surveys or
tests) of scientific or technical experts, whether employed
within an agency or
not, including reports
expressing the opinions of such experts on scientific or technical matters;
(b) reports of a prescribed body or organisation established within an agency;
or
(c) the record of, or a formal statement of the reasons for, a final decision
given in the exercise of a power or of an adjudicative
function.
(5) Where a decision is made under Part III that an applicant is not entitled to
access to a document by reason of the application
of this section, the notice
under section 22 shall state the ground of public interest on which the decision
is based.”
The Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs, in its report
on the Bill, proposed several changes to these and
related provisions to narrow
them. The Government has not accepted the proposals.
3. Canada
The Access to Information Bill introduced into the Canadian Parliament in 1980
also includes clauses setting out exemptions. Among
them are the following:
“Operations of Government Memoranda to Cabinet,
discussion papers and other Cabinet documents
- (1)
The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any record
requested under this Act that falls within any of the
following
classes:
(a) memoranda the purpose of which is to present proposals or recommendations to
Council;
(b) discussion papers the purpose of which is to present background
explanations, analyses of problems or policy options to Council
for
consideration by Council in making decisions, before such decisions are
made;
(c) agendas of Council or records recording deliberations or decisions of
Council;
- (d) records
used for or reflecting consultations among Ministers of the Crown on matters
relating to the making of government decisions
or the formulation of government
policy;
- (e) records the
purpose of which is to brief Ministers of the Crown in relation to matters that
are before, or are proposed to be
brought before, Council or that are the
subject of consultations referred to in paragraph (d); and
(f) draft legislation before its introduction in Parliament.
Records containing information about Cabinet records
(2) The head of a government institution shall refuse to disclose any
record requested under this Act that contains information about
the contents of
any record within a class of records referred to in paragraphs (1) (a) to
(f).
Limitation
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply in respect of any record within
a class of records referred to in paragraphs (1) (a) to (f),
(a) where disclosure of the record is authorised by the Prime Minister of Canada
or a person delegated by the Prime Minister to so
authorize or pursuant to
guidelines established by the Prime Minister; or
(b) where a request is made under this Act for access to the record, or to a
record that contains information about the contents
of the record, more than
twenty years after the record came into existence.
Definition of “Council”
(4) For the purposes of this section, “Council” means the
Queen's Privy Council for Canada, committees of the Queen's Privy
Council for
Canada, Cabinet and committees of Cabinet.
Advice, etc.
- (1)
The head of a government institution may refuse to disclose any record requested
under this Act that contains
(a) advice or recommendations developed by or for a government institution or a
Minister of the Crown,
(b) an account of consultations or deliberations involving officials or
employees of a government institution, a Minister of the
Crown or the staff of a
Minister of the Crown,
(c) positions or plans developed for the purpose of negotiations carried on or
to be carried on by or on behalf of the Government
of Canada and considerations
relating thereto, or
(d) plans relating to the management of personnel or the administration of a
government institution that have not yet been put into
operation,
if the record came into existence less than twenty years prior to the
request.
Exercise of a discretionary power or adjudicative
function
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a record that
contains
(a) an account of, or a statement of the reasons for, a decision made in the
exercise of a discretionary power or in the exercise
of an adjudicative function
affecting the rights of a person; or
(b) a report prepared by a consultant or adviser who was not, at the time the
report was prepared, an officer or employee of a government
institution.”
B. Commercial Confidences
l.
United States
The Freedom of Information Act (S 552 (b) (4)), exempts:
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential.”
2. Australia
Among the exempted documents in the 1978 Bill are those relating to trade
secrets, the economy, and those subject to
confidence:
“Documents relating to trade secrets,
etc.
- (1)
A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would disclose
information concerning a person in respect of
his business or professional
affairs or concerning a business, commercial or financial undertaking, and
-
(a) the information relates to trade secrets or relates to other matter the
disclosure of which under this Act would be reasonably
likely to expose the
person or undertaking unreasonably to disadvantage; or
(b) the disclosure of the information under this Act would be contrary to the
public interest by reason that the disclosure would
be reasonably likely to
impair the ability of the Commonwealth or of an agency to obtain similar
information in the future.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) do not have effect in relation to a
request by a person for access to a document by reason
only of the inclusion in
the document of information concerning that person in respect of his business or
professional affairs or
of information concerning a business, commercial or
financial undertaking of which that person, or a person on whose behalf that
person made the request, is the proprietor.
Documents affecting the national economy
- A
document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would be
contrary to the public interest by reason that it would
be reasonably likely to
have a substantial adverse effect on the national economy.
Documents containing material obtained in confidence
- A
document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would constitute
a breach of confidence.”
The Government has accepted in principle certain amendments to clause 32,
proposed by the Senate Committee, to protect the interests
of the supplier of
the information.
The Senate Committee proposed the deletion of clauses 33 and 34. The Government
has not accepted those proposals.
3. Canada
Among the exempted documents in the 1980 Bill are those relating to commercial
matters:
“Third Party Information
Third party information
20. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), the head of a government institution
shall refuse to disclose any record requested under
this Act that contains:
(a) trade secrets of a third party;
(b) financial, commercial, scientific or technical information that is
confidential supplied to a government institution by a third
party and is
treated consistently in a confidential manner by the third party;
(c) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result
in material financial loss or gain to, or could reasonably
be expected to
prejudice the competitive position of, a third party; or
(d) information the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to
interfere with contractual or other negotiations of a third
party.
Product or environmental testing
(2) The head of a government institution shall not, pursuant to
subsection (1), refuse to disclose any record that contains the results
of
product or environmental testing carried out by a government institution
unless
(a) the testing was done as a service and for a fee; or
(b) the head of the institution believes, on reasonable grounds, that the
results are misleading.
Release if a supplier consents
(3) The head of a government institution may disclose any record that
contains information described in subsection (1) with the consent
of the third
party to whom the information relates.”
BY AUTHORITY:
P. D. HASSELBERG, GOVERNMENT PRINTER, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND--1981
59184J - 4500/ 1 /81PT
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