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Care of Children Bill (Inconsistent) (Section 19) [2003] NZBORARp 1 (11 June 2003)
Last Updated: 5 January 2019
E.63
Report of the
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Care of Children
Bill
Presented to the House of Representatives pursuant
to Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and Standing Order 260,
as varied by Sessional Order of 5 September 2002, of the Standing Orders of the
House of Representatives
- I
have undertaken an examination of the Care of Children Bill (PCO 4783/8)
(“the Bill”) for consistency with the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act
1990 (“the Bill of Rights Act”). I conclude that clause 27 of the
Bill, which provides that guardianship
in respect of a child continues until
that child reaches the age of 18, appears to be inconsistent with the freedom
from discrimination
on the grounds of age affirmed by s 19(1) of the Bill of
Rights Act and s 21(1)(i) of the Human Rights Act 1993 and does not appear
to be
justifiable in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. I do not consider there
to be any other objection to the Bill.
- As
required by section 7 of the Bill of Rights Act and Standing Order 260, I draw
this inconsistency to the attention of the House.
The Bill
- The
Bill is intended to replace the Guardianship Act 1968 and provide for
arrangements for the care of children that will promote
their welfare and best
interests and will facilitate their development.
The Bill of Rights Issue
- Under
s 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act and s 21(i) of the Human Rights Act, everyone
has the freedom from discrimination on the grounds
of age. Age is defined by the
Human Rights Act as any age commencing with the age of 16 years. While age
limits of any kind are likely
to involve a degree of arbitrariness, the choice
of 16 as a starting point under the Human Rights Act means that any differential
treatment based upon an age over 16 that results in disadvantage is prima facie
inconsistent with the right of non-discrimination
and must be justified in terms
of s 5.
- It
must be recognised that there is a wide range of minimum ages contained in
legislation.1 It is also noteworthy that the legal age
of transition has tended to be reduced in recent years, presumably reflecting a
community
perception that younger people are able to exercise greater legal
rights. This Bill itself is an example, in that the relevant age
is reduced from
20 to 18 years.
- Nevertheless,
Parliament decided in relation to discrimination that 16 years was the
appropriate threshold for differential treatment
by reason of age. As a result
of this it creates a starting point: legislation or practice which sets an older
age must be justified
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights.
1 Several examples include:
Age of Majority Act 1970, s 4: full age is reached for all purposes of the
law of New Zealand at 20 years;
Children, Young People and Their Families Act 1989, s 21: a ‘young
person’ means any person who has attained the age of
14 but who has not
yet turned 17;
Crimes Act 1961, s 21: No criminal proceedings may be brought against a
person of or over the age of 10 years and under 14 years except
where the
offence is murder or manslaughter;
Marriage Act 1995, s 18: Parental consent to marriage is required for people
under 20 years.
See, further, Ministry of Youth Affairs Does Your Policy Need An Age
Limit? A Guide to Youth Ages from the Ministry of Youth Affairs (undated),
9.
Assessment
Prima facie inconsistency
- The
apparent inconsistency in the Bill arises from cl. 27, under which guardianship
continues until the child reaches the age of 18,
marries or enters into a de
facto relationship. It should be noted that marriage and, for the purposes of
the Bill, entry into a
de facto relationship require parental consent under the
ages of 20 and 18 respectively (s 18(2) of the Marriage Act 1955 and cl.
9(3) of
the Bill).
- A
guardian may, with or for the child, exercise responsibility in a wide range of
matters (cll. 14 & 15). The matters within the
powers of a guardian are not
exhaustively defined but do include matters such as that person’s name,
education, religious
practice, entry into de facto relationships and other
matters (cll. 9(3) and 15(2)). The control exercisable by the guardian will
be
limited by a right of recourse by 16 and 17 year olds to the Family Court in
respect of “important matters” (cl. 40(1)).
There is also specific
provision for such young people in respect of other matters, including medical
consent (cl. 35) and limiting
the scope for parenting orders (cl. 33(2)(a) &
45(1)).
- Nonetheless,
a person who is 16 or 17 years of age and unmarried is, other than in relation
to these specific exceptions, ultimately
subject under cll. 14 and 15 of the
Bill to the control of his or her guardian(s) in a way that an older person is
not. There is
therefore differential treatment of such people on the grounds of
age.
- Further,
while that control is broadly to be exercised in the best interests of each
child, it remains that such people lack autonomy
across a potentially very broad
range of matters, some or all of which are plainly important to each individual.
Such lack of autonomy,
regardless of its purpose, can only be regarded as
disadvantageous treatment on the basis of age, contrary to s 19(1) of the Bill
of Rights Act and s 21(1)(i) of the Human Rights Act.
- The
potentially disadvantageous character of decisions made by guardians in exercise
of powers under the Bill is apparent from the
provision in cl. 40 and in the
current provision in s 14 of the Guardianship Act 1968 for a 16 or 17 year old
to seek the intervention
of the Family Court.
- More
widely, and as the Bill recognises, people of that age often undertake
significant adult responsibilities and may often disagree
on significant issues
with their guardians. Against that background, the constraints imposed by the
Bill cannot be regarded as inconsequential.
Accordingly, my view is that there
appears to be a prima facie inconsistency that must be considered in terms of s
5 of the Bill
of Rights Act.
Justification under s 5 of the Bill
of Rights Act
- Under
s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, the rights affirmed by that Act may be subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law
as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society. I have considered whether cl. 27 is
a justifiable limit on the
right of non-discrimination in terms of s 5.
- The
broad reason for cl. 27 is that children lack the level of maturity, experience
or competence to decide matters such as those
set out in cl. 15(2). The
decision-
making powers accorded guardians under the Bill are
intended to provide assistance and guidance through a child’s development.
More widely, the vesting of powers in guardians forms part of the legal
protection afforded to children under law and is generally
regarded as
inherently beneficial to children.
- There
is empirical evidence of the vulnerability of people around the ages of 16 to
18, although the relevant age band varies in the
material provided from 16-18
years to 15-21 years, and of the continuing dependence of most 16 and 17 year
olds upon their parents
or guardians. It is also noted that 18 is the age for
competence in some areas, for example in relation to the enforceability of
contracts under the Minors’ Contracts Act 1969 and appointment as a
director under the Companies Act 1993. It is also the default
age for the end of
childhood under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Finally, it is noted
that that Convention and a number
of other international instruments require
states party, including New Zealand, to provide various protections to people
under 18.
- Nonetheless,
in my view, the age limit contained in the Bill does not appear to be justified
in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act for several reasons:
- 16.1 It has not
been possible to establish that a single and essentially fixed age limit is
appropriate to the broad range of matters
over which a guardian has ultimate
control under the Bill;
- 16.2 The limit
contained in the Bill is not consistent with other age limits both in the Bill
itself and in other legislation;
- 16.3 The
necessity of the limit as a means of affording guidance and protection to young
people cannot be shown; and
- 16.4 The
recourse provided to 16 and 17 year olds through the Family Court and through
the exceptions under the Bill and elsewhere
do not remove the broader problem of
the age limit.
- On
the first of these, and as cl. 14 and the examples canvassed in cl. 15(2) of the
Bill indicate, the matters over which a guardian
may exercise control are
extremely broad. Further, these matters vary considerably both in their
importance and in the level of maturity,
experience or competence that they
require. It is not, in my view, possible to conclude that such a wide range of
matters are all
inappropriate for 16 and 17 year olds to decide for
themselves.
- Secondly,
the different levels of competence required in different areas covered by the
Bill are recognised elsewhere in the Bill
and in other legislation. For example,
medical treatment, religious observance and education are all matters identified
in cl. 15(2)
as falling within the responsibility of the guardian. However, the
Bill itself provides that a person over the age of 16 may consent
to medical
procedures while, under s 25A of the Education Act 1989, anyone over the age of
16 or that person’s parent or guardian may choose for that person
to be released from particular school classes for religious or cultural
reasons.
More widely, and as noted above, statutory minimum age limits vary considerably
across matters including criminal responsibility,
sexual consent, eligibility
for social welfare benefits and various licences and permits. Many of these age
limits relate to matters
of fundamental importance to a child.
Thirdly, it does not appear possible to justify the conferral of such broad
powers upon guardians by reference to the need to guide
and protect young
people, including the obligations arising under the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and elsewhere. I note
in relation to the Convention that it
specifically recognises that guidance is to be consistent the growing capacities
of children
over time (art. 5).
- The
imposition of broad responsibilities upon guardians and/or the state does not
necessitate the provision of broad and potentially
intrusive powers. Much of the
empirical material noted above indicated the value of having a guardian involved
in or assisting young
people with significant decisions, rather than of giving
the guardian the last word. Moreover, some such powers, such as control
over a
child’s name or religious denomination, are very unlikely to be required
for guidance or protection.
- Finally,
the provision for recourse to the Family Court under cl. 40 does not provide
sufficient flexibility to address these concerns.
As noted, the Court has
competence only in relation to important matters and, further, the current low
use of the equivalent provision
in s 14 of the Guardianship Act suggests that it
is not effective as a broad measure. Court recourse by young people does not
appear
to be a practical limitation on the broad powers afforded by the Bill.
However, it may be noted that if the role of the Court were
reversed, allowing
16 or 17 year olds to make such decisions subject to Court determination on
application by the guardian, the problem
would be resolved.
- Further,
the other exceptions contained in the Bill and in other legislation in relation
to 16 and 17 year olds are relatively narrow
and, again, do not alter the more
general problem represented by the broad powers afforded by the Bill.
- In
summary, the limitation imposed by cl. 27 of the Bill upon the right of non-
discrimination on the ground of age affirmed by s
19(1) BORA does not, in my
view, appear to be a justified limitation upon that right in terms of s 5.
Hon Margaret Wilson Attorney-General
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