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Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 5, 21, 22, 25(c)) [2004] NZBORARp 28 (24 August 2004)
Last Updated: 19 March 2021
Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill 2004
24 August 2004
Attorney-General
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990:
Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill 2004 (PCO 5726/13)
Our Ref:
ATT114/1298(2)
- We
have considered the above Bill for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 ("NZBORA"). We advise that the Bill
appears to be consistent
with the NZBORA, for the reasons set out fully below.
Key
Provisions of the Bill
- The
Bill amends the Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 ("the 1975 Act") and the Misuse of
Drugs Amendment Act 1978 ("the 1978 Act"). In summary,
the Bill:
2.1
Fixes the quantity at which a presumption of supply becomes operative
(‘trigger amount’) in respect of methamphetamine
at 5g (Sch. 2 to
the Bill creating a new Schedule 5 to the 1975 Act).
2.2 Provides that the setting and amending of trigger amounts for controlled
drugs will be dealt with in future through the Order
in Council procedure (cl.
6).
2.3 Creates two new offences in relation to the import and / or export of
precursor substances (i.e. listed substances or chemicals
which are used in the
manufacture of controlled drugs) (cl. 11). The offences are:
2.3.1 Importing or exporting a precursor substance knowing that the substance
will be used to produce a controlled drug (new section
12AB); and
2.3.2 Importing or exporting a precursor substance without reasonable excuse
(new section 12AC).
2.4 Creates powers of search and seizure without a warrant for ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine, and applies certain powers in the Customs
and Excise Act 1996
to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine (cl. 15).
2.5 Allows "controlled deliveries" (where officials track the prohibited
substance to its intended destination) under s. 12 of the
1978 Act to be
conducted in respect of precursor substances.
2.6 Gives Customs and the police a specific power to conduct searches and to
detain individuals during the course of controlled deliveries
(clauses 25
– 26).
2.7 Provides Customs and the police with additional search powers regarding
individuals who are held under the internal concealment
provisions
(cl. 27).
2.8 Extends the provisions on laundering the proceeds of drug offences
(s. 12B of the 1975 Act) to the offence in new s. 12AB of the
Act
(importing precursor substances knowing they will be used in the production or
manufacture of controlled drugs) (cl. 12).
2.9 Amends s. 12 of the 1975 Act, which relates to offences of possession of
needles (cl. 14).
Presumption of supply matters
- Section
6(1)(f) of the Misuse of Drugs Act creates an offence of having any controlled
drug in one’s possession for certain
proscribed purposes (e.g. to supply,
or to administer, or to sell). Section 6(6) provides that for the purposes of
s 6(1)(f), if
the person is in possession of stipulated quantities of
certain controlled drugs he or she shall, until the contrary is proved,
be deemed to be in possession of a controlled drug for one of the purposes
proscribed by s 6(1)(f). The effect of s 6(6) is that
in bringing a prosecution
under s 6(1)(f) the Crown must prove to the criminal standard of beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused
person possessed the required quantity of the
controlled drug. If so proved, then it is for the defendant to prove to the
balance
of probabilities that he or she did not possess the drug for a
proscribed purpose (R v Phillips [1991] NZCA 23; [1991] 3 NZLR 175).
- The
legislature has prescribed significantly severer sentences for offences of
dealing with controlled drugs. Thus in the case of
a Class "A" drug, simple
possession carries a maximum offence of six months imprisonment with no
prescribed minimum, whereas possession
for the purpose of supply carries a
maximum of life imprisonment together with a presumption of a custodial
sentence.
- This
Bill makes two innovations relating to presumption of supply:
5.1 It
sets a quantity of 5g as a ‘trigger amount in respect of methamphetamine,
which is a Class A drug. Methamphetamine was
not previously subject to a
specific ‘trigger amount.’
5.2 It moves the power to set and amend the ‘trigger amounts’ for
presumptions of supply from the body of the Act into
a new Schedule 5, and
provides that the power is to be exercised through the Order in Council
process.
- The
Bill’s provisions extending the presumption of supply regime to
methamphetamine engage s. 25(c) NZBORA. That section provides
as
follows:
"25. Minimum standards of criminal procedure -
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of
the charge, the following minimum rights: ...
(c) The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law."
Methamphetamine
Prima facie breach of s. 25(c) NZBORA
- The
proposed amendment to the Misuse of Drugs Act in relation to methamphetamine
prima facie breaches s. 25(c) NZBORA because it creates a presumption
that the accused intended to deal or supply drugs to others (a critical
element
of the offence), and requires the accused to disprove this presumption on the
balance of probabilities.
- There
are a number of cases that have held that presumptions of this kind are prima
facie breaches of the presumption of innocence. Most notably, the cases of
R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200) Canadian Supreme Court, S v
Bhulwana; S v Gwadiso (1995) 2 SACR 748, South African Constitutional Court
and R v Sin Yau-Ming [1992] LRC (Const) 547, Hong Kong Court of Appeal.
We note particularly the comment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Oakes
that the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty requires that
guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that it
is the State which
must bear the burden of proof. In general, a provision which requires an accused
person to disprove to the balance
of probabilities the existence of a presumed
fact, that fact being an important element of the offence in question, would
violate
the presumption of innocence.
- We
have taken into account the decision of the New Zealand High Court in Menzies
v the Police, unreported, HC Dunedin, AP 66/94, 19 July 1994, in which
Williamson J found (obiter) that s 6(6) of the Misuse of Drugs Act did
not breach s 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act. We note that his Honour appears to
have
reached that view in the absence of full argument on the question, (it
appears that Oakes was not cited) and in a factual vacuum. We therefore
attach little significance to that decision.
- The
better view is that the extension of the existing reversal of the criminal
burden of proof to a new category of persons (possessors
of methamphetamine), in
relation to an essential element of the offence, is a prima facie breach
of s. 25(c) NZBORA.
Justification under s. 5
- Section
5 BORA states that:
"Subject to s 4 of this Bill of Rights, the
rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such
reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society."
- The
current interpretation of s 5 by the New Zealand courts is somewhat
uncertain.[1] However,
we believe an appropriate summary is provided in the following passage from the
judgment of Richardson J in Noort v
MOT:[2]
"In
the end an abridging inquiry under s 5 is a matter of weighing
(1) the significance in the particular case of the values of the Bill of
Rights Act;
(2) the importance in the public interest of the intrusion on the particular
right protected by the Bill of Rights Act;
(3) the limits sought to be placed on the application of the [Bill of Rights]
Act provision in the particular case; and
(4) the effectiveness of the intrusion in protecting the interests put
forward to justify those limits."
In our view this passage strikes the right note by capturing the nuanced and
flexible standards that s 5 will ultimately require.
- In
essence, the inquiry is two-fold: First, whether the provision serves an
important and significant objective; and second, whether
there is a rational and
proportionate connection between that objective and the
provision.
Cases
- R
v Oakes (cited above – Supreme Court of Canada):
14.1 This
case involved a statutory reverse onus that was triggered where any
quantity of the narcotic was possessed.
14.2 The Court held the presumption of supply served the pressing social
objective of protecting society from the grave ills associated
with drug
trafficking and that this objective was of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right
or freedom in certain
cases. On the facts, however, the Court did not accept that the reverse onus
clause was rationally related to the objective of curbing
drug trafficking,
since the presumption of supply could be triggered by possession of a small or
negligible quantity of narcotics.
The section was thus over-inclusive and could
lead to results in certain cases which would defy both rationality and
fairness.
- Bhulwana
(cited above – Constitutional Court of South Africa):
15.1
On the facts, the Constitutional Court held that there was insufficient rational
connection between possession of 115 grams of
the drug in question (dagga), and
supply. The Court placed the purpose, effects and importance of the infringing
legislation on one
side of the scales and the nature and effect of the
infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The more substantial the
inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the grounds of justification
must be.
15.2 The Constitutional Court agreed that the need to suppress illicit drug
trafficking was an urgent and pressing one. However the
Constitutional Court
considered that it would not be unexpected for a regular user of dagga to
possess 115 grams of the drug. Criminalisation
of dagga possession might make it
more likely that ordinary users would purchase large quantities because of the
risks associated
with purchase. The figure was held to be arbitrary, and the
breach of the presumption of innocence unjustifiable.
15.3 In addition the presumption was not needed to ensure adequate sentencing
discretion, given that the Court had an adequate range
of available sentences
for possession (including a maximum period of 15 years imprisonment).
- R
v Sin Yau-Ming (cited above – Hong Kong Court of
Appeal):
16.1 On the facts (a ‘trigger amount’ of 0.5g
of salts of esters of morphine) the presumption was unjustifiable because
the
amount was in no way in excess of the average daily consumption of an average
addict.
16.2 In order to be compatible with the presumption of innocence, the Crown
must show cogently and persuasively that the presumption
of supply rationally
and realistically follows from the proven possession, and that the presumption
is no more than proportionate
to what is warranted by the nature of the evil
against which society requires protection.
16.3 The Court adverted to the tendency of addicts to buy in bulk to avoid
the constant danger of apprehension.
Consideration
- On
balance we conclude that the provisions in the Bill regarding methamphetamine
are a justified limitation under s. 5 and therefore
not inconsistent with s.
25(c) NZBORA.
- The
case law has established that control of the use and supply of illicit drugs is
a pressing social objective that might in certain
circumstances justify
limitations on the presumption of innocence. With respect to the question of
whether there is a rational and proportionate connection between
this important objective and the imposition of the presumption of supply, the
key factor that has led us to conclude
that the limitation on the right is
reasonably justified under s.5 NZBORA is the strength of the connection between
the proven fact
(possession) and the presumed fact (purpose to supply).
- The
Police have advised us that 1g of ‘cut’ methamphetamine has a street
value of approximately $100. However, cut methamphetamine
typically contains
between 5% and 17% pure methamphetamine. The provisions of the Bill make it
clear that the 5g ‘trigger amount’
relates to the amount of pure
methamphetamine contained within a given mixture. Therefore the accused would
have to be in possession
of 30g or more of ‘cut’ methamphetamine (at
a street value of $3000) to reach the trigger amount. In our view this is
a
crucial distinction between these provisions and the provisions impugned in R
v Sin Yau-Ming.
- 1g
of pure methamphetamine has a street value of between $700 and $1000. 5g would
have a street value of between $3500 and $5000.
- The
information provided to us also indicates that methamphetamine is typically
purchased in small quantities (1g for cut methamphetamine
and 0.1g for pure
methamphetamine).
- These
figures indicate both the high cost of a transaction involving 5g of pure
methamphetamine and the fact that it does not fit
with the pattern of purchasing
for non-supply use. Even bearing in mind the possibility that buyers might buy
in bulk to avoid detection,
and allowing some leeway for the possibility of
group purchases, we consider that it is highly unlikely that a person would
purchase
the specified amount in one transaction for personal use only and not
for supply.
- We
note that the Expert Advisory Committee on Drugs ("the EACD") has recommended
that the presumption be set at 5g.
- We
are also satisfied on the basis of the above information that, even taking into
account the possibility of changes in market trends
in the use and supply of
methamphetamine, the triggering amount is set high enough that the possibility
of an improper conviction
is negligible.
- While
acknowledging the significant penalties attached to dealing offences, on balance
we are satisfied that placing a burden on the
accused to disprove (on the lower
civil standard of balance of probabilities) the presumption of supply is
rationally and proportionately connected to the important social objective of
reducing the distribution
of these harmful and addictive drugs. There are
particular difficulties for the prosecution proving the purpose of the
possession
in drug dealing cases, this being a factor which is particularly
within the knowledge of the accused. Accordingly, we conclude that
the breach of
s 25(c) NZBORA is a justified limitation under s. 5 NZBORA.
Transfer to the Order in Council regime
- As
noted above, clause 6 of the Bill provides that future decisions as to the
quantities of controlled drugs at or above which a presumption
of supply will
operate, will be made through the Order in Council process. We consider that the
use of this process grants potentially
wide powers to the Executive in respect
of the presumption of supply; this is all the more the case when one considers
that the same
process is used to designate substances as controlled drugs. We
note that cl. 7 of the Bill stipulates certain matters to which the
Minister
must have regard before recommending Order in Council, which include advice by
the EACD (new s. 4B(4) of the 1975 Act).
- These
provisions are not in breach of the NZBORA, nor do they countenance such a
breach. They merely authorize a process of rule-making
which can and should be
undertaken in a way which is consistent with the NZBORA.
- However,
it is important to note that the consequence of this is that regulations made
through the Order in Council procedure under
the 1975 Act will themselves need
to be consistent with the NZBORA if they are not to be held to be ultra
vires the 1975 Act (see Drew v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 207; [2002] 1 NZLR 58
(CA)). As is clear from the above analysis regarding methamphetamine, it is our
view that the reverse onus inherent in a presumption of
supply is a prima
facie breach of s. 25(c) NZBORA. In addition, several search and
seizure powers (discussed below) are dependent on the particular classification
of a drug or chemical. Therefore, ensuring that future decisions regarding the
presumption of supply trigger, and the amounts and
classification of drugs, are
consistent with the NZBORA, will require clear justifications with reference to
the substances concerned,
their uses at certain quantities and the risk they
pose to society.
Offences relating to precursor substances
- The
1975 Act already contains certain provisions relating to what are termed
‘precursor substances,’ namely substances
which can be and are used
to manufacture controlled drugs. Under the current s. 12A it is an offence to
supply, produce or manufacture
a precursor substance knowing that the substance
is to be used in / for the commission of certain offences.
- At
present the 1975 Act contains no offence relating to the import or export of
precursors. The Bill creates two new offences in relation
to import or export of
precursor substances:
New section 12AB makes it an offence to import
or export into or from New Zealand any precursor substance knowing that it will
be
used to produce or manufacture any controlled drug;
New section 12AC makes it an offence to import or export into or from New
Zealand any precursor substance without reasonable excuse.
It should be noted that references to these new offences are included in s.29
of the 1975 Act which removes the defence of lack of
knowledge that the
substance, preparation, mixture or article in question was a precursor substance
(cl 16). In addition, many of
these ‘precursor substances’ are
commonly found in many everyday mixtures and preparations (e.g. nail polish
remover).
Accordingly, the prima facie capture of new section 12AC is
potentially very broad.
- It
may be argued that new section 12AC is inconsistent with the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law
under s.25(c) NZBORA.
This argument would be based on the view that essential elements of criminal
culpability, namely knowledge
of a precursor substance and intention to make
illegal substances, have been removed from the definition of the offence.
However,
consistently with our previous advice on the Films, Videos and
Publications Classification Amendment Bill (14 November 2003) we consider
that
s. 25(c) NZBORA is a "procedural" right only. It remains within
Parliament’s discretion to define the substantive mens rea
requirements of an offence, and provided that the prosecution retains the legal
burden of proving all the elements of that offence
no prima facie breach
occurs.
Application / extension of entry, seizure and detention
powers
Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
- Clause
15 of the Bill amends s. 18 of 1975 Act to extend the current Police powers
(both warranted and unwarranted) of entry, detention,
search and seizure in
respect of controlled drugs, to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine.
- Similarly,
clause 19 of the Bill replaces s. 36 of the 1975 Act to extend certain powers
under the Customs and Excise Act 1996 ("the
1996 Act"), in relation to
prohibited imports and exports to cover ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine.
Controlled delivery powers in relation to
precursor substances
- Clause
25 of the Bill extends the current power to undertake controlled deliveries (in
s. 12 of the 1978 Act) to all precursors (i.e.
not just ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine).
- The
controlled delivery procedure may not be used unless a Customs officer believes
on reasonable grounds that there is in or on any
craft, package, mail, vehicle
or goods any controlled drug or precursor substance that has been imported into
New Zealand in contravention
of s. 6(1)(a) or new s. 12AB of the 1975 Act. This
procedure is not extended to the less serious offence under new
s. 12AC of importing or exporting a precursor substance without reasonable
excuse.
- Clause
26 of the Bill provides for the detention and search of persons involved in
controlled delivery during course of that delivery.
It does this by inserting
new ss. 12A-D into the 1978 Act. Under existing law there is no specific power
to search and detain during
the course of a controlled delivery.
- For
a detention and search to be permissible the searching authority must believe
reasonably that the individual concerned is in possession
of: (1) controlled
drugs; (2) precursor substances (not limited to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine);
(3) substances which have been
placed by Customs to replace one of the above; or
(4) evidence of the commission of an offence under s. 6(1)(a) or s. 12AB (import
or export of a precursor substance knowing to be used for production /
manufacture of drugs). Reasonable force may be used.
NZBORA
analysis
- The
above provisions of the Bill clearly engage rights under the
NZBORA:
38.1 Unreasonable search and seizure (s. 21) which provides:
"Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure,
whether of the person, property, or correspondence or otherwise";
38.2 Liberty of the person (s. 22) which provides: "Everyone has the right
not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained";
- We
have concluded that the provisions of the Bill do not breach ss. 21 and 22
NZBORA (i.e. search and seizure would not be unreasonable,
and accompanying
detention would not be arbitrary), for the following reasons:
39.1
The provisions in issue concern activity in relation to border control and
border enforcement, where some degree of routine inspection
is common. The
analysis of s. 21 NZBORA is to a large extent informed by reasonable
expectations of privacy. In general Customs activities
are premised on a
significantly lower expectation in border transactions than in a wholly internal
situation. Further, the state’s
interests in preserving the integrity of
the border are substantial.
39.2 It is a prior condition of the exercise of the more significant search,
seizure and detention powers that there be reasonable
suspicion of an offence
under the Act.
39.3 The powers of detention are provided for by law, and are limited to
those necessary for the specified searches.
39.4 Searches, and accompanying detentions, under a controlled delivery
operation are subject to administrative and post-search reporting
requirements
which facilitate review of individual decisions by police or customs officers.
Their legality will also depend on a
reasonable suspicion of the commission of
an offence under s. 6(1) or s. 12AB, which will have been necessary to justify
the controlled
delivery itself. The new powers do not apply to the less serious
offence under new section 12AC.
39.5 In respect of cl. 15 (Police powers of entry, detention, search and
seizure) and cl. 19 (application of 1996 Act powers) the
powers have only been
extended to ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, and not to any other precursor
substances. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
are primary ingredients used to
manufacture methamphetamine and the application of more extensive law
enforcement powers to these
substances is necessary for that reason.
Police or customs – searches associated with internal concealment
situations
- Clause
27 inserts new sections 12EA – 12EE into the 1978 Act. Where an internal
concealment detention has been authorised (i.e.
detention of an individual who
it is reasonably believed has secreted a Class "A" or "B" controlled drug within
his body) it will
now be possible for him to be searched externally (either by
means of a ‘rub-down’ search or a strip search) for any
Class "A" or
"B" drugs he may have secreted on or about himself.
- These
provisions engage s. 21 NZBORA (unreasonable search and seizure). However, the
powers are subject to a number of safeguards
and on this basis we conclude that
they are reasonable and therefore not inconsistent with s. 21 NZBORA. We note in
particular the
following:
41.1 The detention itself is obviously a
prior condition for the new search powers, and the detention must have been
authorised by
a warrant from a District Court Judge (s. 13E).
41.2 It is further necessary that the person searching should have reasonable
cause to suspect that the individual has hidden on /
about his person any Class
"A" / "B" drug.
41.3 A written report of any search under these provisions must be given to
the Commissioner of Police or the chief executive of the
Customs Service (as
appropriate), and must detail the search itself and its circumstances, including
the facts which gave rise to
the reasonable suspicion.
CONCLUSION
- The
Bill contains several provisions that prima facie engage the NZBORA, and
it should be noted that future amendments to the schedules of the Act must have
an effect that is consistent
with the NZBORA. However, in our view the
provisions of the Bill (PCO 5726/13) are not inconsistent with the fundamental
rights and
freedoms set out in the
NZBORA.
Val Sim Crown Counsel
|
TMA Luey Assistant Crown Counsel
|
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website,
please note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the
Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to Parliament
under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the
Misuse of Drugs Amendment Bill 2004. It should not be used or acted upon for any
other purpose. The advice does no more than assess whether the Bill complies
with the
minimum guarantees contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The
release of this advice should not be taken to indicate that
the Attorney-General
agrees with all aspects of it, nor does its release constitute a general waiver
of legal professional privilege
in respect of this or any other matter. Whilst
care has been taken to ensure that this document is an accurate reproduction of
the
advice provided to the Attorney-General, neither the Ministry of Justice nor
the Crown Law Office accepts any liability for any errors
or omissions.
[1] See Moonen v
Literature Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA), and Moonen v Literature
Board of Review (No. 2) [2002] NZCA 69; [2002] 2 NZLR 754
(CA).
[2] [1992] NZCA 51; [1992] 3
NZLR 260, 283-4 (CA).
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