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Unsolicited Electronic Messages Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 21, 25(c)) [2005] NZBORARp 22 (22 June 2005)
Last Updated: 6 April 2021
Unsolicited Electronic Messages Bill
22 June 2005
Attorney-General
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990:
UNSOLICITED ELECTRONIC MESSAGES BILL
- We
have considered whether the Unsolicited Electronic Messages Bill (the "Bill")
(PCO 6002/5) is consistent with the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act 1990 (the
"Bill of Rights Act"). We understand that the Bill will be considered by the
Cabinet Legislation Committee
at its meeting on Thursday, 23 June 2005.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act. In reaching this conclusion, we considered potential
issues of consistency
with sections 14, 21 and 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act. Our analysis of these
potential issues is set out
below.
- We
understand that a subsequent version of the Bill with minor amendments will be
provided to the Cabinet Legislation Committee for
its consideration. Officials
from the Ministry of Economic Development have advised us that these changes are
unlikely to give rise
to issues under the Bill of Rights Act. If any of the
amendments do give rise to a Bill of Rights Act issue, we will advise you
immediately.
- The
following summary provides you with:
- A brief overview
of the contents of the Bill;
- A note of the
provisions of the Bill which appear to raise issues under one of the sections of
the Bill of Rights Act; and.
- Our conclusion
as to the Bill's consistency with the Bill of Rights Act.
- This
summary is followed by a fuller analysis which discusses each of the issues
raised under the Bill of Rights Act noting, where
relevant, the justificatory
material in each instance.
SUMMARY
Overview of the Bill
- The
Bill seeks to regulate electronic messages sent for certain marketing or
promotional purposes in order to support efforts to curb
the growth of
unsolicited electronic messages (spam). The Bill proposes to achieve this
by:
- prohibiting
commercial and promotional electronic messages from being sent to a person in
New Zealand without that person's consent;
- requiring all
commercial and promotional electronic messages to include accurate information
about the person who authorised the sending
of the message and a functional
unsubscribe facility; and
- restricting the
supply, acquisition and use of address-harvesting software and any electronic
address list produced using that software.
- The
enforcement regime under the Bill is a civil penalty regime, with the emphasis
being on Internet and telecommunications service
providers taking action in
response to customer complaints, and with the government enforcement agency
acting as the overseer and
backstop:
Issues of Inconsistency with
the Bill of Rights Act
Section 14: The right to freedom of expression
- The
Bill contains a number of provisions that limit the right to freedom of
expression. For instance, clause 9 prohibits a person
from sending unsolicited
commercial electronic messages that have a New Zealand link, or causing such
messages to be sent. Similarly,
clause 10 prohibits a person from sending
promotional electronic messages that have a New Zealand link, or causing such
messages
to be sent, to any person who has opted out of receiving messages from
that sender. We consider that these provisions are justifiable
in terms of
section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. They help curb the growth of spam in New
Zealand and contain various limitations
and safeguards to avoid capturing
legitimate messages.
Section 21: The right to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure
- The
Bill allows the government enforcement agency to apply for and exercise a search
warrant. We have concluded that this power is
consistent with section 21 of the
Bill of Rights Act. In reaching this conclusion, we have taken into account the
process of prior
authorisation for the search warrant and the limitation on the
manner in which it may be executed.
Section 25(c): The right to
be presumed innocent until proven guilty
- The
Bill contains a number of strict liability offences, which require the
respondent to prove something in order to escape liability
(clauses 9(1), 10(1),
11(1) and 12(1)). We note that there is some debate as to whether section 25(c)
of the Bill of Rights Act applies
to civil penalty regimes. Irrespective of this
debate, we are of the opinion that these provisions would constitute a
‘justified
limitation' on the right to be presumed innocent. In reaching
this view, we have taken into consideration the fact that the offences
in
question may be described as public welfare regulatory in nature. We have also
considered the importance of ensuring that individuals
who send commercial
electronic messages or promotional electronic messages are aware of and meet
their obligations under the Bill.
FULLER ANALYSIS: THE BILL OF
RIGHTS ACT ISSUES RAISED BY THE BILL
Section 14: freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act provides:
"Everyone has the right to
freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and opinions of any
kind and in any form."
- The
right to freedom of expression extends to all forms of communication that
attempt to express an idea or
meaning.[1] The right
has been interpreted as including the freedom to send and receive
information[2] as well
as the right not to be compelled to say certain things or to provide particular
information.[3] The
right extends to political and religious expression as well as commercial speech
(such as
advertising).[4]
Overseas case law suggests, however, that not all forms of expression are
equally deserving of protection and commercial speech is
considered to reside
within the periphery of the
right.[5] The Courts
have taken the view that commercial expression is of less importance than
political or religious expression and consequently
limitations on the right in
this context are easier to
justify.[6]
Prohibiting
unsolicited commercial electronic messages
- Clause
9 of the Bill (unsolicited commercial electronic messages must not be sent)
prohibits a person from sending unsolicited commercial
electronic messages that
have a New Zealand link, or causing such messages to be sent. For the purposes
of the Bill, an unsolicited
commercial electronic message is a
message:
- sent to an
electronic address using a telecommunications service;
- that has, as its
primary purpose, marketing or promoting goods, services, land, an interest in
land, or a business or investment opportunity,
or assisting or enabling a person
to obtain dishonestly a financial advantage or gain from another person;
- that the
recipient has not consented to receiving.
This provision appears to
be prima facie inconsistent with section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- Where
an issue arises a provision may nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of
Rights Act if it can be considered a "reasonable
limit" that is "justifiable" in
terms of section 5 of that Act. The section 5 inquiry is essentially two-fold:
whether the provision
serves an important and significant objective; and whether
there is a rational and proportionate connection between the provision
and that
objective.[7]
- The
Ministry of Economic Development has advised that spam (which is usually sent in
bulk via the Internet) is a concern as it imposes
significant costs on users of
the Internet and other communications mediums as well as service providers. Spam
also reduces consumer
confidence in the use of the Internet for the purposes of
e-commerce and acts as an impediment to the effective use of e-mail. The
indiscriminate sending of offensive or pornographic material through spamming is
a particular concern because of the harmful effect
it can have on the young and
the vulnerable. The purpose of this proposal is to curb the growth of spam in
New Zealand and provide
a basis for this country to participate in international
regulatory arrangements to address the problem of spam. We consider that
this a
significant and important objective and, therefore, the first limb of the
section 5 inquiry is satisfied.
- In
our view, the proposal to prohibit the sending of unsolicited commercial
electronic messages is also rationally and proportionately
connected to this
objective. The current legislative framework for addressing issues associated
with spam and technical fixes such
as filters have not been successful in
reducing spam traffic. The prohibition on sending unsolicited commercial
electronic messages
goes to the heart of the problem by targeting the problem
messages.
- We
note that the Bill contains various limitations and safeguards to avoid
capturing legitimate messages. For example, there is no
prohibition on sending a
commercial electronic message if the recipient has given his, her or its prior
consent to receiving that
message and consent will be inferred where the message
in question is relevant to a pre-existing relationship. There are also various
safeguards to avoid capturing people who unwittingly send spam. For instance,
there are exemptions for Internet Service Providers
because spam may fall
through their filters, exemptions for persons who sent the message by mistake or
did not know that the message
had a New Zealand link, and exemptions for users
whose computers are affected by a malicious software programme or computer virus
that takes control of their e-mail programme. We also note that civil penalties
will be scaled according to the number of messages
sent.
- We
therefore consider that, while clause 9 of the Bill is prima facie inconsistent
with section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, it is
justified in terms of section 5
of that Act.
Restricting promotional electronic messages
- Clause
10 of the Bill (promotional electronic messages must not be sent to person who
opts out) prohibits a person from sending a
promotional electronic messages that
has a New Zealand link, or causing such messages to be sent, to any person who
has opted out
of receiving messages from that sender. Again, this provision
appears to be prima facie inconsistent with section 14 of the Bill
of Rights
Act.
- We
consider, for many of the same reasons set out in paragraphs 15 through 17
above, that this provision is justified in terms of
section 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act. In reaching this conclusion, we also note that additional safeguards
have been inserted to avoid
capturing promotional electronic messages,
particularly those of a political, religious or educational nature, that are
sent for
a legitimate purpose. The restriction on promotional electronic
messages only takes effect once an unwilling recipient has sent a
message to the
effect that he, she or it does not want to receive, at that electronic address,
any further promotional electronic
messages from the sender. Further, the opting
out takes effect only at the end of a period of 5 working days from the day on
which
the message was sent - thereby providing sufficient time for the sender to
adjust his or her mailing list.
Other provisions affecting
freedom of expression
- Clause
11 of the Bill provides that commercial electronic messages and promotional
electronic messages must include accurate sender
information. This measure
compels the provision of information or publication of certain statements, and
therefore appears to be
prima facie consistent with section 14 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- We
have concluded that an obligation of this nature is clearly justifiable on the
face of the Bill. The provision promotes accountability
and enables people to be
traced for law enforcement purposes. By doing so, it addresses a key problem
with spam, namely that spammers
typically hide their identities, or fake others,
so they cannot be traced or contacted. This measure, therefore, goes to the
heart
of the problem caused by unsolicited electronic messages.
- Clauses
15 through 17 of the Bill prohibit the supply, acquisition and use of address
harvesting software and harvested address lists
in connection with sending
unsolicited commercial electronic messages or promotional electronic messages.
These provisions impact
on the right to seek and impart information. However,
they impact on the right only to the extent that address harvesting software
and
harvested address lists provide an automated and comparatively cheap way of
obtaining large address lists. The prohibition would
not preclude anyone from
manually compiling lists of e-mail addresses from chat rooms and Internet
web-sites. For this reason, we
do not consider that these provisions raise a
prima facie issue with section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 21: The right to be secure from unreasonable search and
seizure
- Clauses
48 to 52 empower the government enforcement agency to apply for and exercise a
search warrant. These clauses set out the powers
conferred by the search
warrant, requirements when executing the search warrant, and disposal of things
seized under the warrant.
- We
have concluded that these provisions are consistent with section 21 of the Bill
of Rights Act, which provides that everyone has
the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure. Key factors in reaching this conclusion include
the process of prior
authorisation for the search warrant and limitation on the
manner in which it may be executed, such as the requirements of entry
at
reasonable times.
Section 25(c): The right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty
- Section
25(c) affirms the right to be presumed innocent until presumed guilty according
to law. In R v Wholesale Travel
Group[8], the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty requires at a minimum that an individual
must be proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, and that the state must bear the burden of proof.
- In
strict liability offences, once the Crown has proved the actus reus, the
defendant can escape liability by proving, on the balance
of probabilities,
either the common law defence of total absence of fault, or a statutory defence
that embodies that defence. In
general, defendants should not be convicted of
strict liability offences where an absence of fault or a "reasonable excuse"
exists.
- A
statutory defence reverses the usual burden of proof by requiring the defendant
to prove, on the balance of probabilities, the defence.
Because the burden of
proof is reversed, a defendant who is able to raise doubt as to his or her fault
but is not able to prove to
the standard of the balance of probabilities,
absence of fault or a reasonable excuse would be convicted. We consider,
therefore,
that where the defendant is required to prove something in order to
escape liability, the use of strict liability offences is contrary
to the
presumption of innocence captured by section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Strict liability offences contained in the Bill
- The
Bill contains a number of strict liability offences, which are as
follows:
- clause 9(1)
(Unsolicited commercial electronic messages must not be sent) - liable to a fine
not exceeding $200,000 if the perpetrator
is an individual, $500,000 if the
perpetrator is an organisation.
- clause 10(1)
(Promotional electronic messages must not be sent to persons who opt out) -
liable to a fine not exceeding $50,000.
- clause 11(1)
(Commercial electronic messages and promotional electronic messages must include
accurate sender information) - liable
to a fine not exceeding $200,000 if the
perpetrator is an individual, $500,000 if the perpetrator is an
organisation.
- clause 12(1)
(Commercial electronic messages and promotional electronic messages must contain
functional unsubscribe facility) - liable
to a fine not exceeding $200,000 if
the perpetrator is an individual, $500,000 if the perpetrator is an
organisation.
- We
note that the Bill establishes a civil penalty regime for dealing with
unsolicited electronic messages. Section 25(c) is generally
considered to apply
only to criminal proceedings. Overseas case law, however, suggests that in
proceedings that result in the imposition
of civil penalties, the respondent has
the protection of the various fair trial rights if that penalty has a
‘punitive
element'.[9] It is
possible to argue that the fines imposed for the offences listed in the
paragraph above have a punitive character and, thus,
the right set out in
section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights could apply. We note, however, that this
issue has yet to be determined
in New Zealand and it is unclear whether the
courts would agree that individuals facing sanctions under a civil penalty
regime have
the protections provided for in section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights
Act.
- Irrespective
of the debate as to whether section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act applies to
civil penalty regimes, we consider that
these offences would amount to a
reasonable limit on the right to be presumed innocent in terms of section 5 of
that Act. The aim
of the Bill is to regulate the sending of electronic messages
certain marketing or promotional purposes, and to provide a disincentive
to
spammers who gain commercial advantage out of responses to unsolicited
commercial electronic messages. To this end, the Ministry
of Economic
Development has indicated that the offences have been framed as strict liability
offences to ensure that there is an
onus on individuals who send commercial
electronic messages or promotional electronic messages are aware of and meet
their obligations
under the Bill.
- The
penalties for these liability clauses include provisions to fine offenders up
$200,000 if the perpetrator is an individual and
$500,000 if the perpetrator is
an organisation, and are therefore not at the 'lower end of the scale'. We have
taken into account
the Ministry of Economic Development's explanation that the
penalties have been set at this level in order:
"to be
commensurate with the potential commercial advantage to be gained from responses
to unsolicited commercial electronic messages.
The maximum amounts of $200,000
for individuals and $500,000 for organisations are based on the principle of
setting maximum amounts
which are sufficient to operate as a financial
disincentive to prospective professional spammers who might look to base
themselves
in New Zealand."
- We
therefore consider that, on balance, the limit the strict liability offences
place on the right to be presumed innocent is justifiable
in terms of section 5
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Conclusion
- For
the reasons given above, we have concluded that the Bill appears to be
consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act.
Jeff Orr Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
|
Stuart Beresford Senior Legal Advisor Bill of Rights / Human Rights
Team
|
CC Minister of Justice Minister of Information Technology
|
|
1 R v Keegstra [1990] INSC 224; [1990] 3 SCR 697, 729, 826
2 Federated Farmers of New Zealand v New Zealand Post [1992] NZHC 3003; [1992]
3 NZBORR 339.
3 RJR MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada (1995) 127 DLR
(4th)
4 Irwin Toy Ltd v A-G (Quebec) (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 577
(SCC)
5 RJR MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada (1995) 127 DLR
(4th) 1; see on this point the dissenting judgment of La Forest J.
6 See Richard Claydon & Hugh Tomlinson,
[1] R v Keegstra
[1990] INSC 224; [1990] 3 SCR 697, 729,
826
[2] Federated
Farmers of New Zealand v New Zealand Post [1992] NZHC 3003; [1992] 3 NZBORR
339.
[3] RJR
MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada (1995) 127 DLR
(4th)
[4] Irwin Toy
Ltd v A-G (Quebec) (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 577
(SCC)
[5] RJR
MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada (1995) 127 DLR (4th) 1; see on this point
the dissenting judgment of La Forest
J.
[6] See Richard
Claydon & Hugh Tomlinson, The Law of Human Rights (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, 2000), Vol. 1, 15.171 -
15.176.
[7] See
Moonen v Film Literature Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9 and R v Oakes (1986) 26
DLR (4th)
[8] R v
Wholesale Travel Group 84 DLR (4th) 161, 188 citing R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR
103.
[9] See
Benham v the United Kingdom [1996] ECHR 22; (1996) 22 EHRR 293, para 56, and Lauko v
Slovakia [1998] ECHR 82; (1998) 33 EHRR 994, para 58
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