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Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Bill (Consistent) [2006] NZBORARp 24 (18 August 2006)
Last Updated: 8 January 2019
Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Bill
18 August 2006 Attorney-General LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW
ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990: CRIMINAL PROCEEDS (RECOVERY) BILL - PCO
7242/3
Our Ref: ATT114/1298
- You
will recall that we provided you with advice on the consistency of the Criminal
Proceeds and Instruments Bill with the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("the
BORA") in June 2005 prior to that Bill’s introduction. A copy of that
advice is appended to this opinion for
your ease of reference.
- Cabinet
has now agreed to the withdrawal of the Criminal Proceeds and Instruments Bill
and its replacement with the Criminal Proceeds
(Recovery) Bill.
- Like
the Criminal Proceeds and Instruments Bill, the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery)
Bill provides for a conviction based forfeiture
regime limited to instruments of
crime and a civil regime to forfeit other property representing the proceeds of
crime or assessed
by a Court to be the value of a person’s unlawfully
derived income, although there are some
differences of detail from
the earlier Bill. The key difference is that the new Bill also includes
provisions to enable international
enforcement of foreign restraint and
forfeiture of property issues arising in New Zealand.
- We
have considered the Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Bill for consistency with the
BORA and have concluded that it raises essentially
the same issues as the
earlier Criminal Proceeds and Instruments Bill. For the same reasons as detailed
in our advice on the earlier
Bill, we have concluded that the Criminal Proceeds
(Recovery) Bill is not inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms
contained
in the BORA.
Yours sincerely
Crown Counsel
|
Allison Bennett
Assistant Crown Counsel
|
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website,
please note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the
Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to Parliament
under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the Criminal
Proceeds (Recovery) Bill. It should not be used or acted upon for any other
purpose. The advice does
no more than assess whether the Bill complies with the
minimum guarantees contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The release
of this
advice should not be taken to indicate that the
Attorney-General agrees with all aspects of it, nor does its release constitute
a
general waiver of legal professional privilege in respect of this or any other
matter. Whilst care has been taken to ensure that
this document is an accurate
reproduction of the advice provided to the Attorney-General, neither the
Ministry of Justice nor the
Crown Law Office accepts any liability for any
errors or omissions.
Criminal Proceeds and Instruments Bill
10 June 2005 Attorney-General LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990: CRIMINAL PROCEEDS
AND INSTRUMENTS BILL - PCO6396/7
Our Ref: ATT114/1298
- We
have vetted this Bill for consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 ("the BORA"). We consider that the Bill is consistent
with the rights and
freedoms contained in the BORA.
- The
Bill is intended to replace the current Proceeds of Crime Act 1991. The regime
contemplated by the Bill differs in a number of
respects from the current
scheme, but most notably in ability to seek forfeiture orders in relation to
criminal proceeds without
a conviction being obtained.
- While
we consider the Bill to be consistent with the BORA, we did consider a group of
issues in relation to ss 9, 14, 21, 23, 25,
and 27 of the BORA. These are drawn
to your attention below.
Criminal proceeds and instruments forfeiture regime
The regime
- Part
2 of the Bill sets out the criminal proceeds and instruments forfeiture regime.
The regime provides for conviction-based forfeiture
of instruments of crime and
non-conviction- based forfeiture of other property representing the proceeds of
crime or assessed to
be the value of a person’s unlawfully derived income.
Accordingly, there is provision in Part 2 for the making of the following
types
of orders:
4.1 Restraining orders (clauses 24 to 26), which have the effect of restraining
the person subject to the order from dealing with
the property other than
provided for in the order, and permitting the Official Assignee to take control
and custody of the property.
Restraining orders are temporary and are intended
to preserve the property pending determination of an application for
forfeiture.
4.2 Assets forfeiture orders (clause 47). These may be made by a Court where it
is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that
the property is "tainted
assets". "Tainted property" means any property that has in whole or in part
been;
4.2.1 acquired as a result of significant criminal activity;
or
4.2.2 directly or indirectly derived from significant criminal activity.
4.3 Profit forfeiture orders (clause 55). These may be made by a Court where it
is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that
the beneficiary has unlawfully
benefited from significant criminal activity within the relevant period of
criminal activity and has
interests in property.
4.4 Instrument forfeiture orders (new section 142M of the Sentencing Act 2002),
which may be made where a Court is satisfied that
the property in question was
used to commit or to facilitate the commission of a qualifying forfeiture
offence, being an offence
punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 5
years or more.
- The
Bill also contains various "safeguards" and ameliorating provisions that apply
in relation to the orders provided for in Part
2. For example, clause 61 allows
a court to grant relief from a civil forfeiture order on the basis of a valid
interest in the property
or hardship. Relief may also be granted under the
Sentencing Act in relation to instrument forfeiture orders.
- The
types of orders provided for in Part 2 raise a number of potential issues under
the BORA. We note also that similar regimes for
the forfeiture of proceeds of
criminal activity in comparable jurisdictions have been subject to challenge on
a range of human rights-related
grounds. We have therefore considered the full
range of potential issues in light of relevant New Zealand jurisprudence and
that
from comparable jurisdictions.
Section 9 - cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment or
punishment
- Section
9 of the BORA provides for the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel,
degrading, or disproportionately severe treatment
or punishment.
- Section
9 appears in the subpart of the BORA entitled "Life and security of the
person".[1] The focus of ss 8 to 11 of the
BORA appears to be on interferences with bodily integrity. If that is so, then
questions arise as
to the proper scope of the terms "treatment" and "punishment"
in s 9. For example, do these apply to economic or other non-liberty
affecting
penalties such as forfeiture of property?
- This
matter has not been the subject of detailed judicial consideration in New
Zealand, although in Lyall v Solicitor-General[2] the Court of Appeal appears to have
proceeded on the assumption that s 9 was applicable to a determination of
whether tainted property
should be forfeited to the Crown under the Proceeds of
Crime Act 1991.
- In
the United States it has been held that forfeiture statutes (and individual
decisions under them) can be challenged for inconsistency
with the Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.[3]
- Similarly,
in challenges to regimes for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime (including the
instruments of crime) under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the
Courts have proceeded on the basis that forfeiture can be considered
"punishment".
- In
Turner v Manitoba[4] the Court was
asked to consider a Charter challenge to the provisions of the Wildlife Act that
provided for the mandatory forfeiture
of items used in the commission of
offences under that Act. In concluding that forfeiture was not cruel and unusual
punishment under
s 12 of the Charter, the Court cited with approval the
conclusions
reached in R v Porter.[5] In that case the Court held that while
forfeiture could be considered punishment, it was not cruel and unusual. The
Court did observe
that the thrust of cruel and unusual was directed to physical
and emotional constraints of the person and not the
individual’s financial or property loss.
- While
the application of s 9 of the BORA to "treatment" or "punishment" which does not
impact on bodily integrity has not been considered
in detail in New Zealand,
courts in the United States and Canada have been proceeded on the basis that
forfeiture does constitute
punishment and is accordingly subject to scrutiny
against constitutional protections. In any event, we consider that even if
forfeiture
orders were to be considered "treatment" or "punishment" that is
subject to s 9 of the BORA, the impact of such orders is not such
as to
constitute "disproportionately severe" treatment or punishment.
- In
Puli’uvea v Removal Review Authority[6] the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the
appellant’s removal from the country would cause "considerable distress,
sadness
and difficulties". However, it did not consider that it attained "the
high threshold" required
before the prohibition on
disproportionately severe treatment was breached. In that regard, the Court
referred approvingly to the
view that treatment had to be "so excessive as to
outrage standards of decency" to amount to disproportionately severe.[7]
- We
do not consider that the making of a forfeiture order in relation to property
that has been obtained directly or indirectly through
criminal activity or which
has been used to facilitate the commission of an offence, would be considered
"so excessive as to outrage
standards of decency".
Section 21 – unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the BORA provides for the right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure, whether of the person, property,
or correspondence or otherwise.
- We
have considered whether the provisions in the Bill that authorise the making of
restraining orders and forfeiture orders (both
non-conviction and conviction
based) give rise to an issue of consistency with s 21 of the BORA.
- On
a straightforward reading, s 21 appears to be engaged as it guarantees
protection against "unreasonable ... seizure ... of property."
An interference
with a person’s possessory interest in property falls relatively easily
within that plain language. However,
we note that the Court of Appeal has
referred to the "touchstone" in s 21 BORA being "the protection of reasonable
expectations of
privacy."[8]
- However,
the New Zealand jurisprudence has been somewhat inconsistent in the application
of this concept to particular fact situations.
In the early case of Alwen
Industries v Comptroller of Customs[9] Blanchard J had to consider the
interpretation of s 284 of the Customs Act 1966. He took the view that s 21 was
relevant to the
interpretation of the provision in circumstances involving what
might be described as a simple interference with property, devoid
of any liberty
or privacy concerns.
- The
High Court in Wilson v New Zealand Customs Service[10] (involving a seizure of
an
innocent third party purchaser’s motor vehicle as part of a
customs investigation) held that on the facts it could not be said
that s 21 was
being invoked "purely for property protection purposes." In the Court’s
view there were privacy issues for the
first plaintiff inextricably
bound up in the seizure and continued deprivation of her car: "deprivation of
a person’s right to use their property or the
reduction of their property
rights to a right to apply for its return, might amount to a detrimental effect
on the owner’s
privacy interest in that property". Williams J regarded the
Canadian cases as unhelpful to the proper interpretation of s 21 BORA
because s
8 of the Charter does not contain a specific reference to "property", unlike our
s 21.
- In
McGlone v Ministry of Fisheries[11] Wild J held that there was no "seizure"
for the purposes of s 21 BORA when, by operation of provisions in the Fisheries
Act, a commercial
fisher who had failed to make returns required by that Act was
liable to have his fishing vessel forfeited upon conviction.
- In
Westco Lagan Limited v Attorney-General, McGechan J considered the
content of ss 21 to 25 of the BORA and observed that, "it would be distinctly
odd if the legislature had
plonked a provision intended to deal in a general way
with seizure of property without compensation into such a matrix", and concluded
"there is a very strong likelihood the legislature did not so intend." Moreover,
McGechan J noted that stand-alone property-protection
guarantees are well enough
known in constitutional instruments; the absence of such a direct provision, in
line with a similar absence
in the Canadian Charter, "points to a decision to
omit such rights altogether."
- Canadian
decisions under s 8 of the Charter (the equivalent provision of s 21 of the
BORA) have consistently held that forfeiture
of property is not a "seizure"
within the meaning of s 8.[12]
- In
Quebec (Attorney-General) v Laroche[13], the Supreme Court of Canada held that a
restraint order, made in conjunction with a special seizure warrant, did involve
a seizure
to which s 8 applied, notwithstanding the fact that a restraint order
under the Criminal Code of Canada does not involve the removal
of the property
in question from the custody of the person subject to the order (rather, such an
order simply "restrains" that person
from alienating the property while the
order is in force). However, the Court viewed the restraint order as "intended
to supplement
seizures that are taking place contemporaneously, and that they
place property under the control of the justice system ... whether
for the
purpose of a criminal investigation or for the punishment of crimes that fall
within Part XI of the Criminal Code". Further,
the finding that a restraint
order was a "seizure" was not determinative; the case was decided on the basis
that the evidence did
not support the making of a restraint order.
- Despite
finding that a restraint order made in such circumstances was a "seizure" the
Court in Laroche did say that:
"The prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is designed to promote
privacy interests and not property rights. Specifically,
where property is taken
by governmental
action for reasons other than administrative or
criminal investigation a "seizure" under the Charter has not occurred A
detention
of property, in itself, does not amount to a seizure
for the Charter purposes - there must be a superadded impact upon privacy
rights occurring in the context of administrative or criminal
investigation."
- Given
the unsettled state of New Zealand law in this area, we have placed considerable
reliance on the Canadian position. Certainly,
the emphasis of the Canadian
courts on privacy
as lying at the heart of the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure is consistent
with the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s view of what s 21 of the BORA
seeks to protect.
- Accordingly,
we take the view that it is arguable that restraining orders and forfeiture
under the proposed regime do not engage s
21 as there is no element of privacy
involved in the "freezing" and taking of the property.
- Even
if s 21 does apply, however, in our view it is reasonable to freeze and forfeit
the assets of those seeking to benefit from criminal
activity. In reaching this
view, we note the observations of the European Court of Human Rights in Welch
v United Kingdom (1995) 20 EHRR 35 and in Phillips v United Kingdom
(41087/98) [2001] ECHR 433 (5 July 2001) in relation to the objectives
underlying legislation providing for the forfeiture of proceeds of crime in the
United
Kingdom. In Phillips the Court noted that confiscation orders were
"conferred on the courts as a weapon in the fight against the scourge of drug
trafficking,
and also to deprive a person of profits received from drug
trafficking and to remove the value of the proceeds from possible future
use in
the drugs trade." After taking into account the importance of the aim pursued,
the Court concluded that the interference suffered
by the applicant was not
disproportionate.
- Similarly,
in Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau[14] the Irish High Court held that the State
has a legitimate interest in the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime and
concluded that
the Irish Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 was a proportionate response
to the problem of the accumulation and use of assets which are
directly or
indirectly derived from crime.
- In
our view, to the extent that s 21 is engaged by the making of restraining orders
and forfeiture orders under the Bill (and we consider
that the better view is
that it is not), any seizure is "reasonable" in terms of s 21 bearing in mind
the objectives pursued by the
Bill and the various protections included in the
Bill (for example, provision for protection of third party interests, relief on
hardship grounds).
Application of s 25 ( minimum standards of criminal procedure) to civil
forfeiture
- Section
25 of the BORA provides that every person charged with an offence has, in
relation to the determination of the charge, the
certain minimum procedural
rights. These include the right to a fair trial and the right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty
according to law.
- It
has been argued in Canada that a restraining order in relation to possible
proceeds of crime impacted upon a defendant’s
right to a fair trial as it
might be seen to imply an involvement in crime. However, the Court in R v
Trang[15] held that the essence of a
restraint order was to impose a temporary restraint on property while issues
were determined. Further,
an application for a restraint order was not part of
the criminal trial against the defendant. As such it did not impact on any
finding
of innocence or guilt in a criminal trial.
- Similarly,
challenges to the consistency of proceeds of crime confiscation regimes in the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Northern Ireland
have been brought on the basis of
its consistency with similar criminal procedure guarantees to those in s 25 of
the BORA, including
those in the European Convention. In a series of decisions,
courts have consistently held that those protections do not apply to
civil
proceedings to determine an application for forfeiture.
Retrospectivity
- The
Bill will apply retrospectively (see clause 9). Accordingly, we have considered
the application of s 25(g) of the BORA. Section
25(g) provides that a person who
has been charged with an offence has in relation to the determination of the
charge "[t]he right,
if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty
has been varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing to
the
benefit of the lesser penalty."
- As
noted above, we have concluded that s 25 of the BORA does not apply to civil
proceedings. However, as the instrument forfeiture
regime is to operate as part
of the sentencing process we have considered the consistency of the regime with
s 25(g). We have concluded
that, as the regime is no harsher in its impact than
the current regime, no issue of consistency with s 25(g) arises.
Section 26(2) - double jeopardy
- Section
26(2) of the BORA provides that a person who has been finally acquitted or
convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall
not be tried or punished for it
again. As noted above, courts in Canada and the United States have held that
forfeiture constitutes
"punishment". Accordingly, there is a question whether
the forfeiture of proceeds constitutes a "second punishment" in circumstances
where a person has been convicted and sentenced of an offence.[16]
- The
United States Supreme Court in United States v Ursery[17] held that in rem civil
forfeitures are neither "punishment" nor criminal proceedings for the purposes
of double jeopardy.
- We
note also the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Daniels v Thompson[18] held that:
"In our view it would be erroneous to treat the word "punished" in section 26(2)
as embracing punishment outside the ambit of the
criminal process and its
associated enforcement of the public law."
- In
view of the Court’s narrow view of the ambit of s 26(2) in Daniels
and the United States case law on the point, we have concluded that s 26(2)
is not engaged by applications for orders under the Bill
and no issue of double
jeopardy arises.
Investigative powers I
- Subpart
7 of Part 2 of the Bill contains a range of investigative powers that are
intended to enable enforcement officers to carry
out their functions and duties
under the Bill. These include:
40.1 Warrants to search for and seize property issued by a Judge on the
application of the Police (clause 100);
40.2 Warrants to search for and seize property issued
by a Judge on the application of the Director of Criminal Proceeds Confiscation
("the Director") (clause 102);
40.3 The Director’s power to require production of documents (warrantless)
(clause 104);
40.4 Court order requiring production of documents made on the application of
the Director (clause 106);
40.5 The Director’s power to require attendance before the Director and/or
the answering of questions and/or the supply of
information and/or the
production of documents (warrantless) (clause 107);
40.6 Search warrants issued by a Judge on the application of the Director in the
event of non-compliance with clauses 104, 106, or
107 (clause 108); and
40.7 Warrants to search for and seize property issued by a Judge on the
application of the Official Assignee (clause 109).
- We
have considered the consistency of these various powers with ss 14 (right to
freedom of expression which includes the right not
to be compelled to impart
information) and 21 (unreasonable search and seizure) of the BORA.
"Reasonable" search and seizures?
- "Reasonable"
in the context of section 21 essentially means that the power to search or seize
is substantively justified in the context
of balancing legitimate state
interests against the expectations of privacy. In considering the search regime
established by the
Bill, we have borne in mind the objectives of the Bill,
namely, preventing individuals involved in criminal activity from benefiting
directly or indirectly from that criminal activity, and ensuring and the
proceeds of crime are not available to such persons.
- We
note that the searches authorised by clauses 100, 102, 106, 108, and 109 all
require prior authorisation by a judicial officer
who must be satisfied that a
sufficiently objective standard has been proven before issuing a warrant. The
powers are confined to
search for and seizure of evidence relevant to
proceedings under the Bill and property that is or may be subject to an order
under
the Bill. Further, clause 115 sets out the form and content of warrants
and requires that certain matters must be stated in the warrant
in reasonable
detail. Clause 117 specifies the powers that are conferred by a search warrant
and includes a requirement for searches
to be carried out at a time that is
"reasonable in the circumstances".
- With
respect to the searches authorised by clauses 104 and 107, we note that these
are warrantless powers. However, while case law
in New Zealand and Canada has
held such powers to demand the production of documents to be "searches" that are
subject to the BORA
and the Charter respectively,[19] courts have recognised that the impact
on privacy interests involved in a demand for documents is far less than in a
physical search
of property or persons.[20] Further, clause 122 prescribes the
content and form of notices issued by the Director and requires that a notice
which requires
attendance before the Director must state that the person has the
right to be accompanied by a lawyer. These powers are also quite
limited in
their application - clause 104 may only be exercised against a person whose
property is subject to a restraining order
or a officer of a financial
institution that the Director believes has information about property subject to
a restraining order
and clause 107 may only be used against a person whose
property is subject to a restraining order made on the application of the
Director.
- The
Bill also provides for the Official Assignee to hold seized property and for its
return where it is not subject to a restraining
or forfeiture order (clause
111). It also requires those executing warrants to produce evidence of their
authority to search and
seize (clause 1219. There are also restrictions on the
extent that self-incriminating information obtained from a person can be used
against that person in a criminal prosecution (see paragraphs 47 to 49
below).
- Finally,
we have also taken into account the objectives served by the investigative
powers in subpart 7, namely, the securing of property
and the gathering of
evidence required to support applications for forfeiture of property derived
from criminal activity. Bearing
in mind these objectives and the various
safeguards around the powers, we have concluded that the investigative powers
contained
in subpart 7 are "reasonable" search and seizures within the meaning
of s 21 of the BORA.
Forced expression
- We
have considered whether the requirements in the investigative regime requiring
the provision of information and answering of questions
raise an issue in
relation to s 14 of the BORA.
- We
consider that these requirements are not inconsistent with the right to freedom
of expression. We acknowledge that the right to
freedom of expression, as
protected by section 14, includes the right to say nothing or the right not to
say certain things. However,
for the same reasons that we have concluded that
the investigative regime is "reasonable" in terms of s 21 of the BORA, we
consider
that to the extent that this regime limits the right to freedom of
expression it constitutes a justified limitation on that right
in terms of s 5
of the BORA.
Self-incrimination
- Section
23(4) of the BORA provides that every person who is detained under any enactment
has the right to refrain from making any
statement. However, clause 136 provides
that no person is excused from answering any question, providing any
information, producing
any document, or providing any explanation on the ground
that to do so would or might incriminate or tend to incriminate that person.
Accordingly, in circumstances where there is a detention (such as arguably exist
when a person is required to attend before the Director
under clause 107) an
issue of consistency with s 23(4) of the BORA arises.
- However,
it is noted that there is a limitation on the use that may be made of self-
incriminating statements obtained in such circumstances
under the Bill. Clause
138 provides that a self-incriminating statement may only be used in a
prosecution for an offence where the
person gives evidence inconsistent with
that statement. A refusal to answer questions or provide information, or the
provision of
misleading information, may only be used in a prosecution under
clause 125 (failure to comply with notices, orders and search warrants).
- The
limitation on the availability of self-incrimination as a basis for refusing to
answer questions or provide information is intended
to ensure that the
objectives underlying the Bill are not defeated by a lack of necessary
information. In view of this, we consider
that the limitations on the use that
may be made of self-incriminating statements in prosecutions contained in clause
138 is a sufficient
safeguard to ensure that the limitation on s 23(4) is
justified under s 5 of the BORA.
Right to be presumed innocent
- Section
25(c) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act provides for the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
- In
R v Wholesale Travel Group, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
right to be presumed innocent requires that an individual must be proven guilty
beyond reasonable
doubt and that the state must bear the burden of proof.[21]
- Clause
125 provides that it is an offence for a person against whom an examination
notice, a production notice, or production order
has been made to fail, without
reasonable excuse, to comply with that notice or order. Clause 128 provides that
every person who,
without reasonable excuse intentionally obstructs any person
exercising a power or carrying out a function under the Act commits
an
offence.
- These
clauses appear to bring into play s 67(8) of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957
which provides that:
"Any exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or qualification, whether it does or
does not accompany the description of an offence
in the enactment creating the
offence, may be proved by the defendant, but, ...need not be so negatived in the
information, and,
whether or not it is so negatived, no proof in relation to the
matter shall be required on the part of the informant."
- The
effect of this that a defendant who is able to raise doubt as to his or her
fault but is not able to prove absence of fault on
the balance of probabilities
would be convicted. This is contrary to the presumption of innocence because the
defendant is convicted
even though reasonable doubt exists as to his or her
fault.
- Whilst
the penalties are at the high end for a reverse onus provision (up to 6 months
imprisonment or a fine of up to $5000 or both
in the case of clause 125 and up
to 3 months imprisonment or a fine of up to $5000 or both in the case of clause
128, we consider
that these provisions constitute justified limitations on s
25(c) of the BORA. We have reached this conclusion after taking the following
factors into account:
57.1 The matters which the defendant is required to prove are matters that can
be said to be peculiarly within the knowledge of the
defendant;
57.2 The importance of ensuring necessary information
is available to enforcement officers so that the objectives underlying the Bill
are not undermined;
57.3 The availability of a defence operates to the benefit of a defendant.
Natural justice
- Section
27(1) of the BORA provides that every person has the right to the observance of
the principles of natural justice by any tribunal
or other public authority
which has the power to make a determination in respect of that person's rights,
obligations, or interests
protected or recognised by law.
- Clause
22 of the Bill permits applications for restraining orders to be made without
notice to persons having an interest in the property.
Such an ex parte
order may only be made where the Court is "satisfied that there is a risk of
the proposed restrained property being destroyed, disposed
of, altered, or
concealed." Clause 22 overrides clause 23 (which provides for the rights of
persons having an interest in the proposed
restrained property to be heard at
and adduce evidence in relation to an application for a restraining order).
- Ex
parte processes involve an abrogation of the right to natural justice and
will only be justified in circumstances of particular urgency.[22]
- However,
we consider that the limitation on s 27(1) of the BORA imposed by clause 22 of
the Bill is justified in view of the fact
that an ex parte order may only
be made in circumstances where there is a risk to the property concerned.
- Further,
we note also the judgment in Martin v Ryan where the Court held that the
discretion to make an ex parte order was a discretion that should be used
only in circumstances justifying overriding natural justice. Accordingly, the
Courts will,
in interpreting clause 22, be required to exercise their discretion
as consistently with s 27 of the BORA as possible.
Judicial Review
- Section
27(2) of the BORA provides that every person whose rights, obligations, or
interests have been affected by a determination
of any tribunal or other public
authority has the right to apply for judicial review of that determination.
- Clause
87 provides that decisions to take proceedings under the Act by the Director are
not reviewable.
- However,
in our view this limitation on s 27(2) is a justified limitation on that right
under s 5 of the BORA. We note that this limitation
reflects a common law
reluctance to interfere with prosecutorial decisions. This is generally
justified on the basis that matters,
which might, in other contexts, give rise
to grounds for judicial review, are open to challenge at trial. In this context,
it is
open to a person affected by an application under the Bill to raise any
issues of law, fact or opinion that he or she disputes in
front of the Court
hearing the application. The limitation on judicial review in relation to this
category of decisions simply reflects
the policy objective of avoiding
collateral proceedings that operates in relation to criminal proceedings.
Conclusion
- While
the Bill raises a number of potential issues of consistency with the BORA, we
have concluded that overall it is not inconsistent
with any of the rights and
freedoms contained in the BORA.
Yours sincerely
Crown Counsel
|
Allison Bennett
Associate Crown Counsel
|
Footnotes
1 The other provisions of this subpart of the BORA
deal with the right not to be deprived of life; the right not to be subjected to
medical or scientific experimentation; and the right to refuse to undergo
medical treatment.
2 [1997] NZCA 73; (1997) 15 CRNZ 1, 6-7 and 9 (CA).
- See
for example United States v Busher 817 F 2d 1409 (1987) (9th
Circ).
4 (2000) MBQB 94; see also Spence v R [2004] NLSCTD 113 involving a similar
challenge to the Wildlife Act of Newfoundland and Labrador where the Supreme
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador
held that the forfeiture of a seaplane used
in the commission of poaching offences was not cruel and unusual punishment.
5
(1989) 26 FTR 69
6 (1996) 2 NRNZ 510 9 (CA).
- Ibid
at 512.
- R
v Fraser [1997] 2 NZLR 442, 449; (1997) 3 HRNZ 731, 739 (CA). See
also R v Grayson &
Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399, 407; (1996) 3 HRNZ 250, 260 (CA).
9 [1993] NZHC 1889; (1993) 1 HRNZ 574
(HC).
10 (1999) 5 HRNZ 134 (HC).
- HC,
Wellington CP 62/98 16 December 1998, Wild J.
- See
for example, Ford Credit Canada Ltd v Canada (Deputy Minister of National
Revenue) (1995) 100 BCLR (2d) 162 where the Supreme Court of British
Columbia held "Section 8 is designed primarily to protect the privacy rights of
individuals and
affords protection to property only where that is required to
uphold the protection of privacy."
13 [2002] 3 SCR 708
14
[1997] 1 EHC 106; [1997] IEHC 106; [1998] 3 IR 185
15 (2002) 161 CCC (3d) 210
16 We note that Bill would amend the Sentencing Act
2002 to make instrument forfeiture orders part of the sentencing regime provided
for by that Act. Accordingly, as such orders will form part of a person’s
sentence we have not considered the issue of double
punishment in relation to
such orders. Similarly, an issue about "double punishment" will
obviously not arise in relation to an application for an asset forfeiture
order or a profit forfeiture order where no criminal proceedings
have been
taken.
17 [1996] USSC 69; 518 U.S 267 (1996)
18 [1998] NZCA 3; [1998] 3 NZLR 22
- See
for example, New Zealand Stock Exchange v Commissioner for Inland Revenue
[1992] 3 NZLR 1; R v Mills [1999] 3 SCR 668.
- See
for example, British Columbia Securities Commission v Branch [1995] 2 SCR
3 and R v McKinlay Transport [1990] 1 SCR 627.
- R
v Wholesale Travel Group 84 DLR (4th) 161, 188 citing R v Oakes
[1986] 1 SCR 103.
- See
Y v X (2003) 22 FRNZ 965; [2003] 3 NZLR 261; [2003] NZFLR 1126 and
Martin v Ryan
[1990] NZHC 151; [1990] 2 NZLR 209 which involved ex parte applications for protection orders
under domestic violence legislation.
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