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Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill (Consistent) (Sections 8, 11, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25(e), 27(1) and (3)) [2006] NZBORARp 29 (4 April 2006)
Last Updated: 9 January 2019
LPA-01-01-10
4 April 2006 ATTORNEY-GENERAL
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND
BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990: LAW REFORM (EPIDEMIC PREPAREDNESS) BILL
- We
have considered whether the Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill (PCO
6763/16) (the “Bill”) is consistent with the
New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (the “Bill of Rights Act”). We understand that the
Bill is likely to be considered
by the Cabinet Policy Committee at its meeting
on Wednesday, 5 April 2006.
- Our
view is that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching this
conclusion, we considered
potential issues of inconsistency with sections 8, 11, 14, 17, 18, 21, 22,
25(e), and 27(1) and (3) of
that Act.
- The
following summary provides you with:
- A brief overview
of the contents of the Bill;
- A note of the
provisions of the Bill which appear to raise issues under the Bill of Rights
Act; and
- Our conclusion
as to the Bill's consistency with the Bill of Rights Act.
- This
summary is followed by a fuller analysis which discusses each of the issues
raised under the Bill of Rights Act noting, where
relevant, the justificatory
material in each instance.
- The
Crown Law Office has examined the proposed amendments to the Parole Act 2002,
the Sentencing Act 2002, and the Summary Proceedings
Act 1957, and will provide
separate advice on whether these provisions are consistent with the Bill of
Rights Act.
SUMMARY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ISSUES
- The
Bill seeks to ensure that, should there be a human outbreak of avian influenza,
or an outbreak of a similar infectious disease
capable of becoming an epidemic,
the Crown has powers available to it that will ensure a proper response can be
made. A number of
measures
proposed by the Bill raise issues of
inconsistency with the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
Bill empowers the Prime Minister to issue a notice declaring that the effects of
an outbreak of an infectious disease are likely
to significantly disrupt
essential governmental and business activity in New Zealand. The issuance of an
epidemic notice enables
the relaxation of certain statutory requirements. We
have determined that the trigger provision is framed in a reasonable way.
- The
Director-General of Health will be authorised to set priorities for the
dispensing of medicines during an epidemic. We consider
that when these
priorities are set, the Director-General must act consistency with section 8 of
the Bill of Rights Act and, therefore,
needs to ensure that patients will not be
unjustifiably deprived of life-preserving medicines.
- Under
new section 97D(1)(b) the Medical Officer of Health may take a bodily sample
from a person liable to quarantine. This provision
appears to be inconsistent
with section 11 of the Bill of Rights Act (right to refuse medical treatment).
We consider that this measure
is justified in terms of section 5 of that Act. In
reaching this conclusion, we have noted that testing a person suspected of being
exposed to a quarantinable disease will assist the identification and treatment
of persons they have come into contact with, which
in turn will slow down the
spread of the disease.
- Three
clauses require a person to supply information to a Medical Officer. In our
view, the information required is primarily factual
and descriptive in nature,
as opposed to expressive. This requirement does not raise an issue under section
14 of the Bill of Rights
Act (freedom of expression). We note that the person
may be required to provide information about their movements and recent
activities,
which would attract the protection of section 14. We consider that
any inconsistency would be justified, having regard to the Bill’s
objectives.
- The
Bill allows a Medical Officer to forbid people congregating in outdoor places of
amusement or recreation. We consider that any
limits this provision places on
the right to freedom of association (section 17 of the Bill of Rights Act) are
justified given the
highly infectious nature of the diseases in question.
- The
Bill contains various provisions that allow a Medical Officer to redirect
aircraft, require persons to remain in quarantine, and
close of premises within
a health district. We consider that any limitation these provisions place on the
right to freedom of movement
(section 18 of the Bill of Rights Act) is justified
given the Bill’s purpose and the safeguards that have been put in place
to
ensure these measures are proportionate.
- We
considered whether the Bill raises any issues of inconsistency with section 21
of the Bill of Rights Act. Although a number of
provisions authorises the search
and seizure of property, we consider that these provisions are
reasonable.
- We
have examined whether the quarantine provisions set out in the Bill raise an
issue of inconsistency with section 22 of the Bill
of Rights. Although the
quarantine provisions authorise a form of detention that falls within the ambit
of this section, they could
not be interpreted as authorising “arbitrary
detention”.
- The
Bill includes a number of amendments that relax some statutory duties set out in
the Immigration Act when an epidemic notice is
in effect. These include relaxing
the time limit that a person may be held under a warrant of commitment, allowing
a judge to consider
a matter on the papers, and extending the maximum period of
time that a detained person must be brought before a court. We consider
that
these amendments raise issues of inconsistency with sections 22, 25(e) and 27(1)
of the Bill of Rights Act. However, such limitations
are justified in terms of
section 5 of that Act.
- We
have concluded that the Bill does not appear to be inconsistent with the Bill of
Rights Act.
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
- To
fully comprehend the purpose of the Bill, it is necessary to first explain the
threat posed by avian influenza and then discuss
the current legislative
framework for preventing the outbreak or spread of an infectious disease.
Avian influenza
- The
outbreak of avian influenza, which began in mid-December 2003 in south-east Asia
and has spread to Europe and Africa, has become
a global crisis for animal and
human health. While the numbers of deaths attributable to avian influenza are
still small, the appearance
of the virus
– which has the
potential to mutate into a virulent pathogen easily transmissible from human to
human – has raised the
spectre of an influenza of equal ferocity to the
Spanish influenza that killed 40-50 million people worldwide during 1918
and 1919.
- The
global threat of avian influenza has prompted the World Health Organisation to
appeal to countries to join a global collaboration
effort to fight the outbreak.
Countries have been encouraged to develop national preparedness plans to stop,
contain and treat the
effect of an influenza, reduce opportunities for the
influenza to emerge, improve the early warning system, delay initial
international
spread, and accelerate vaccine development.
- To
that end, New Zealand officials have been involved in a major whole-
of-government exercise in planning New Zealand’s response
to an outbreak
of avian influenza. During that exercise, officials identified gaps in the
legislative framework. Those gaps mean
that New Zealand’s ability to
respond to an outbreak of avian influenza, or an outbreak of
a
similar infectious disease capable of becoming an epidemic would
be constrained.
Structure of the Health Act
- Each
health district in New Zealand has a Medical Officer of Health.
Part
3 of the Health Act 1956 – which is supplemented by the
Health (Quarantine) Regulations 1983 – sets out the powers that a Medical
Officer can
utilise to prevent the outbreak or spread of any infectious disease.
These powers can be divided into two groups based on the premise
that the
management of an outbreak of infectious disease occurs first at the border, and
then, if the infectious disease has presence
in New Zealand, in the
community.
- The
powers of a Medical Officer to manage the outbreak at the border include:
- obliging the
master or captain of a craft to notify the Medical Officer if a person on board
the craft is suffering from a sickness
suspected of being an infectious disease
(section 76 of the Health Act and clause 3 of the Health (Quarantine)
Regulations);
- preventing a
ship which may be infected with an infectious disease from entering a port
(section 70(1)(g) of the Health Act) and quarantining those on board (section
70(1)(i) of the Health Act);
- detaining for
inspection, where a person on board a craft has died from or has been suffering
from an illness suspected of being a
quarantinable disease, the craft and the
passengers and crew (clause 22 of the Health (Quarantine) Regulations);
- examining any
person who arrives in New Zealand by craft who is believed to be suffering from
any quarantinable disease, and removing
that person to hospital until the person
no longer suffers from that disease (clause 25 of the Health (Quarantine)
Regulations);
- ordering the
craft to be cleansed, fumigated, disinfected or otherwise treated (clauses 5 and
18 of the Health (Quarantine) Regulations).
- Should
efforts to prevent an infectious disease from entering New Zealand fail and the
infectious disease breaks out in the community,
a Medical Officer of Health has
more extensive and potentially more significant powers to control the spread of
the disease. These
range from prohibiting the use of any land, building or
thing declared to be insanitary (section 70(1)(a)) to requiring persons
to be
removed to a hospital or other suitable place where they can be effectively
isolated (section 79(1)).
- The
powers of a Medical Officer in relation to quarantine can only be exercised in
respect of a limited range of infectious diseases,
specifically cholera, plague
or yellow fever (clause 2 of the Health (Quarantine) Regulations). These
diseases are singled out as
they are considered to be extremely contagious and
have a high mortality rate.
The Bill
- The
Bill seeks to ensure that the Crown has sufficient powers available to it that
will ensure a proper response can be made to the
threat posed by avian
influenza. To this end, the Bill:
- addresses some
of the gaps in the Crown’s statutory powers under the Health Act
1956;
- ensures that
quarantine powers can be used for avian influenza, and that new highly
infectious diseases can be quickly added to the
schedule of quarantinable
diseases;
- repeals certain
provisions in the Health (Quarantine) Regulations 1983 and inserts those
provisions into the Health Act 1956;
- provides for the
development and implementation of a policy to prioritise scarce medical supplies
in an emergency, and protections
for those following that policy;
- gives the NZ
Police enforcement powers to assist a Medical Officer of Health in the exercise
of his or her powers; and
- amends a number
of other enactments dealing with matters that may be disrupted by, or may need
to deal specifically with the consequences
of an epidemic.
- Given
their significance, it is important to clarify that the quarantine powers set
out in the Bill are in three stages. First, following
notification from the
captain or pilot of a craft on board which a person has died or become ill from
a quarantinable disease, the
Medical Officer may detain for inspection the craft
and its passengers and crew (new section 97B). Second, the Medical Officer may
order the continued detention of any passengers and crew of the craft if he or
she believes or suspects that they have been exposed
to the quarantinable
disease in order to ascertain whether they are capable of passing it on (new
section 97(2) read in conjunction
with 97A). Third, the Medical Officer may,
after determining that any passengers or crew are or is likely to be capable of
passing
on the infectious disease, order the removal of those persons to a
hospital or other suitable place so that they may be isolated
from other persons
(new section 97E)). This last provision can also be used to remove any person in
New Zealand who is suffering
from a quarantinable disease to hospital so that
the person can be isolated and receive appropriate medical treatment.
ISSUES OF CONSISTENCY WITH THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
- For
the purposes of determining whether any measure proposed in the Bill is
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act we have divided
our advice into four
categories, namely those provisions dealing with:
- (a) the
emergency powers to manage the outbreak of an infectious disease at the
border;
- (b) the
emergency powers to control the spread of an infectious disease in the
community;
- (c) the
emergency powers to prevent the outbreak or spread of a quarantinable disease;
and
- (d) the
relaxation of statutory requirements that might not be capable of being complied
with, or complied with fully during a epidemic.
- A
number of the measures falling within these categories appear to raise prima
facie issues of inconsistency with the Bill of Rights
Act. However, where an
issue arises a provision may nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act if it can be considered
a "reasonable limit" that is "justifiable" in terms
of section 5 of that Act. The section 5 inquiry is essentially two-fold: whether
the provision serves an important and significant objective; and whether there
is a rational and proportionate connection between
the provision and that
objective.1
Emergency powers to manage infectious diseases at the border
Section 22: Right not to be arbitrarily
detained
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act provides that “everyone has the right not to
be arbitrarily arrested or detained”.
- New
section 97B enables the Medical Officer of Health to detain for inspection any
craft (newly defined to include aircraft and ships)
and its passengers and crew
where, during its voyage, a person has died or become ill from a quarantinable
disease. Although this
form of detention falls within the ambit of section 22,
we do not consider that the provision could be interpreted as authorising
“arbitrary detentions”.
- The
courts have said that a detention is arbitrary when it is “capricious,
unreasoned, without reasonable cause: if it is made
without reference to an
adequate determining principle or without following proper
procedures.”2 For this reason, arbitrariness
should not be equated with “against the law”, but should be
interpreted more broadly to
include elements of inappropriateness, injustice and
lack of predictability.
- Applying
these standards to the present case, we consider that new section 97B clearly
sets out the circumstances in which the power
may be used and who may affect the
detention. The ability to detain the passengers and crew from a craft on which a
person has died
or become ill from a quarantinable disease is both necessary and
reasonable as it will help identify who among them have been exposed
to the
disease.
- We
note that new section 97B does not specify the length of time the passengers and
crew of an infected craft may be detained. The
Ministry of Health has advised
that during an epidemic a large number of craft may be detained under this
provision and this may
result in some delay in processing the passengers and
crew to determine whether they are liable to quarantine under new section 97
(see paragraph 26 above).
1 See Moonen v Film Literature Board of
Review [1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9 and R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th)
2 Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR
433 (CA) para 34
However, we note that a Medical Officer will be required by virtue of section
3 of the Bill of Rights Act to ensure that the passengers
and crew are not
detained for an unreasonable length of time.
Emergency powers to control infectious diseases in the community
Section 17: Right to freedom of
association
- We
have considered the provisions in the Bill empowering a Medical Officer of
Health to forbid people congregrating in outdoor places
of amusement or
recreation (clause 18(4), new section 70(1)(m) of the Health Act) for
consistency with the right to freedom of association.
- We
are of the view that the highly infectious nature of the diseases in question
combined with the fact that this provision does not
apply to any premises or
part thereof used solely as a private dwellinghouse means that the limits that
this provision places on
the right to freedom of association are justifiable in
terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 18: Right to freedom of movement
- Section
70(1)(h) of the Health Act currently provides that people are forbidden to leave
any place in which they have been quarantined or isolated. Clause 18(3) changes
the focus of this section to require people to remain in those places as
opposed to forbidding them from leaving.
- Clause
18(4) amends section 70(1)(m) of the Health Act to enable a Medical Officer of
Health to close all premises of any stated kind or description within the health
district for the
purpose of preventing the outbreak or spread of an infectious
disease.
- These
measures appear to be prima facie inconsistent with the right to freedom of
movement, as affirmed by section 18 of the Bill
of Rights Act. This is because
they restrict a person’s ability to move physically within New Zealand. We
are of the view that
the highly infectious nature of the diseases means that the
limits that these provisions place on the right to freedom of movement
are
justified in terms of section 5 of that Act. When considering the
justificability of the proposed amendments, particularly that
to section
70(1)(m), we took into account that these provisions do not apply to premises
used solely as a private dwellinghouse.
Nor do they apply to parliament, the
courts, judge’s chambers, or prisons.
Section 21: Freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act provides the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure. There are two limbs
to the section 21 right.
First, section 21 is applicable only in respect of those activities that
constitute a "search or seizure".
Second, where certain actions
do
constitute a search or seizure, section 21 protects only against
those searches or seizures that are "unreasonable" in the circumstances.
Requisition of property
- Clause
19 of the Bill amends section 71(1) of the Health Act to enable a Medical
Officer of Health to requisition property in order to:
- accommodate and
treat patients (new section 71(1)(a))
- store or dispose
of bodies (new section 71(1)(ab))
- transport
patients, medical personnel, medicine, food or drink, bedding and other items
(new section 71(1)(b))
- We
understand that this power is necessary since the disruption caused by an
outbreak of an infectious disease may place great strain
on the equipment and
facilities currently in the possession of the Crown. If property can be
requisitioned, then the health and civil
defence authorities will be in a better
position to respond to the outbreak, control its spread, and deal with the
social consequences
that result (such as lack of food or drink). We consider
that this power is reasonable in terms of section 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
In forming this view, we note that the Medical Officer must inform the owner,
occupier or other person in charge of the property
in writing that it is being
requisitioned, and every person who suffers loss or damage as a result of the
requisition of their property
is entitled to compensation (section 71(2) of the
Health Act).
Power of the Police to enter and inspect property
- Clause
20 of the Bill inserts new section 71A into the Health Act which will enable a
member of the Police to do any thing reasonably necessary to assist a Medical
Officer of Health exercise his
or her emergency powers. Subsection (2) confirms
that the powers conferred on members of the Police include power to enter into
and
inspect any land, building, aircraft, ship, or vehicle, and any thing in or
on it.
- This
power appears to be reasonable in terms of section 21 of the Bill of Rights Act.
In reaching this view, we note that, although
they do not have to wait until the
Medical Officer requests their assistance, the powers of the Police are tied to
those of the Medical
Officer and therefore can only be used to prevent the
outbreak or spread of an infectious disease.
Section 27(3): Rights of individual in civil proceedings with
Crown
- Proposed
new section 71A(6) provides that a member of the police is not liable for
anything done by him or her in good faith in the
exercise of a power conferred
by new section 71A (see paragraph 42 above). It could be argued that this
proposed new section raises
an issue of consistency with section 27(3) of the
Bill of Rights Act, which provides:
"(3) Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against,
and to defend civil proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to
have those
proceedings heard, according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings
between individuals."
- We
do not consider that there is any inconsistency with the rights of individuals
in civil proceedings with the Crown. We have reached
this conclusion after
considering the scope of section 27(3), which can be interpreted in two ways. It
could be argued that section
27(3) goes to substantive liability and so impacts
on Parliament's ability to determine that the Crown shall not be liable for
conduct
which, without the exclusion, could create liability. Alternatively, it
could be said that section 27(3) was only procedural in effect,
and means simply
that the procedure to be adopted in any proceedings against the Crown will be
the same as that applicable in litigation
between private parties.
- In
Matthews v Ministry of Defence3, the House of
Lords had to consider whether section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK),
which exempted the Crown from liability
in tort for injury suffered by members
of the armed forces in certain circumstances, was compatible with Article 6(1)
of the European
Convention on Human Rights.4 Their
Lordships held that the Crown's exemption from liability in tort was a matter
of substantive law, so that the claimant had
no "civil right" to which Article
6(1) might apply. Their Lordships treated the limitation on liability in section
10 as going to
the substantive claim (i.e. it did not exist), rather than
creating a procedural bar. Article 6(1) was, in principle, concerned with
procedural fairness and the integrity of a State's judicial system, and not with
the substantive content of its national law.
- The
analysis in Their Lordships' speeches is consistent with the view that the new
section 71A(6) does not infringe section 27(3).
This conclusion is supported by
the history of Crown liability in New Zealand and the many provisions which
afford protection to
officials acting in the course of their duties in good
faith and, in some instances, without negligence.
Emergency powers to prevent outbreak of quarantinable disease
Section 8: Right not to be deprived of
life
- New
section 74C enables the Director-General of Health to set priorities for the
dispensing of medicines during an epidemic, if he
or she is satisfied that there
is or is likely to be a shortage of those medicines. Priorities may be set for
any medicine, whether
or not it can be used in relation to the disease causing
the epidemic. We note that the Director- General is obliged under section
3(a)
of the Bill of Rights Act to ensure that any activity he or she carries out is
consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed
by that Act: in particular
section 8, which protects the right not to be deprived of life. This means that
the Director-General,
when setting priorities for medicine, must ensure that
patients will not be unjustifiably deprived of life-preserving medicines.
3 [2003] UKHL 4; [2003] 2 WLR 435
4 Article 6(1) provides that in the determination of
his or her civil rights everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal established by law.
Section 11: Right to refuse medical treatment
- New
sub-sections 97D(1)(a) and (b) enable a Medical Officer of Health to examine a
person liable to quarantine and take a bodily sample
from him or her. These
provisions are supplemented by new section 97G, which makes it an offence for
the person to refuse to undergo
the medical examination and provide the bodily
sample: the penalty for which is a fine not exceeding $1,000 (section 72 of the
Health Act).
- We
have considered whether new sub-sections 97D(1)(a) and (b) are inconsistent with
section 11 of the Bill of Rights Act. This provision
provides that:
“Everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical
treatment”.
- We
consider that the term “medical treatment” includes the non-invasive
examination of a person and the taking of a bodily
sample for the purpose of
assessment and diagnosis. This is because “it is a part of the overall
mission of treatment, and
will often involve invasion of personal interests and
bodily integrity, which is the goal of section 11 to
protect.”5
- The
purpose of new section 97D(1) is to enable the Medical Officer to determine
whether a person is suffering from a quarantinable
disease and what, if any,
follow-up management is required. Consequently, new section 97D(1) read in
conjunction with new section
97G appears to be inconsistent with section 11 of
the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
Ministry of Health has advised us that this power would be used primarily during
the early stages of an epidemic, when the medical
authorities are trying to keep
the disease out of New Zealand, and then trying to stamp out initial cases and
clusters. According
to the Ministry:
“The first period will potentially require quarantine, and we
will need to be able to target the quarantine to those posing
the highest risk,
as capacity to quarantine people will not be infinite. This could well mean that
some testing will be necessary,
in which case if people refuse testing (eg if
someone has symptoms which may or may not mean they have the relevant infection)
then
not only they but everyone on the plane would definitely need to be
quarantined.”
- The
Ministry also advised that testing a person suspected of being exposed to a
quarantinable disease for infection will assist the
identification and treatment
of persons they have come into contact with, which in turn will slow down the
spread of the disease.
Conversely, testing will reduce the strain that will be
placed on the national stockpile of prophylactic medicines, such as Tamiflu.
During the early stages of an epidemic many people will have symptoms of what
may be the disease but turn out to be something else,
and thus persons with whom
they have come into contact will not need to be prescribed prophylactic
medicine.
5 See Rishworth et al, The New
Zealand Bill of Rights (2003) at 256.
- We
consider that the information provided by the Ministry of Health provides
sufficient justification for the limit that new section
97D(1)(b) places on the
right to refuse medical treatment.
- In
reaching this view, we considered whether any measure was available that
infringed on the right to refuse medical treatment to
a lessor extent: in
particular voluntary isolation. In this regard, the Ministry advised that, based
on what is known about quarantinable
diseases generally and experiences of other
countries, the use of voluntary isolation and assurances about avoiding contact
with
other people will not prevent local transmission of the disease.
- We
note that the taking of a bodily sample would also amount to a search or seizure
of the person. However for the same reasons that
justify the limitation that new
section 97D(1)(b) places on section 11 of the Bill of Rights Act, we consider
that the requirement
to provide a bodily sample would be reasonable in terms of
section 21 of that Act.
Section 14: Freedom of Expression
- We
have considered whether new sections 97A(1)(b), and 97E(6)(b) and (6)(d) of the
Health Act raise issues in relation to section 14 (freedom of expression) of the
Bill of Rights Act. New section 97A(1)(b) requires a person
who is liable to
quarantine to supply various pieces of information to a Medical Officer of
Health that will enable the management
of risks to public health. Such
information includes the person’s name, address, travel history and
movements, and recent activities.
New section 97E(6)(b) sets out a similar
requirement in respect of a person who is kept under surveillance at large. New
section
97E(6)(d) also requires a person who is kept under surveillance at large
to provide the Medical Officer with the details of the address
where he or she
is going.
- We
consider that new section 97E(6)(d) is not inconsistent with the right to
freedom of expression. We acknowledge that the right
to freedom of expression,
as protected by section 14, includes the right to say nothing or the right not
to say certain things. We
also acknowledge the decision of the High Court in
Duff v Communicado Ltd6 that freedom of
expression should generally be defined widely and question of limits on the
right should generally be determined pursuant
to section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act. However, we do not consider that a statement of an individual's address is
sufficiently expressive
so as to attract the protection afforded by section
14.
- The
requirements of new section 97E(6)(d) do not compel any individual to disclose
any opinion they hold, or to state any matter that
they do not believe to be
true. We note, in particular, Canadian judicial decisions holding that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms does not require the elimination of
"minuscule" constitutional burdens, and
legislative action that
increases the costs of exercising a right should not be invalidated if the
burden is "trivial".
- In
addition, we note (while acknowledging the minor differences between section 14
of the Bill of Rights Act and section 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter) the decision
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-General
(Quebec)7 that ‘”expression” has
both a content and a form, and the two can be inextricably connected. Activity
is expressive
if it attempts to convey meaning. That meaning is its content."
Here, a requirement to provide your name, address and movement details
does not
appear to be sufficiently “expressive” in content to attract the
protection of section 14. Rather, name and
address information can be described
as factual and descriptive in nature as opposed to expressive or representative
of expressive
content.
- In
reaching this conclusion, we note the decision in R v
Holman8 that held that a person's right to freedom
of expression was not infringed by being required to complete a census form.
- With
respect to new sections 97A(1)(b) and 97E(6)(b), we consider that the provision
of information relating to a person’s movements
and recent activities
could be said to attract the protection of section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act,
as such information can be
described as expressive or representative of
expressive content. However, we consider the nature and extent of any
inconsistency
is such that, having regard to the Bill's objectives, it would be
"justified" in terms of section 5 of that Act.
Section 18: Freedom of movement
- We
have considered whether new section 74D of the Health Act is inconsistent with
section 18 of the Bill of Rights Act. This provision enables a Medical Officer
of Health to require the pilot
of an aircraft that has landed at a place in New
Zealand to travel to another place in New Zealand. The right to freedom of
movement
is limited when a person is prevented from travelling along a chosen
route, even though the person could take an alternate route
to get to his or her
destination.9 In our opinion, new section 74D raises a
prima facie issue of inconsistency with section 18.
- We
consider that the limits new section 74D place on the right to freedom of
movement are justified in terms of section 5 of the Bill
of Rights Act. The
purpose of the provision is to ensure that the passengers and crew of the
aircraft can be adequately processed
to ensure that they have not been exposed
to the quarantinable disease. This appears to be an important and significant
objective.
- The
redirection of aircraft is a rational and proportionate response to this
objective. In reaching this conclusion, we note that
this power is only
7 [1989] 1 SCR 927
8 (1983), 28 Alta. L.R. (2d) 35 (Alta. Prov.
Ct.)
9 See Kerr v Attorney-General [1996] DCR 951,
954 (DC)
available while an epidemic notice is in force and cannot be used unless the
Medical Officer is satisfied that:
- the disease has
or is likely to have broken out in a place the aircraft has come from; or
- the disease has
or is likely to have broken out in the place where the aircraft has landed;
or
- the aircraft is
or is likely to be carrying people infected with the disease.
The Medical Officer must also be satisfied that the aircraft or
anything in it is, or is likely to be, contaminated with the disease
and
measures necessary to deal with the situation can more practicably be carried
out at the other place.
Section 21: Freedom from unreasonable search and seizure
Infected baggage, cargo or stores
- Clause
24 of the Bill substitutes section 109 for a provision that will allow a Medical
Officer of Health to do any thing in respect
of baggage, bedding, cargo,
clothing, drink, equipment, food, linen, luggage, stores, water or other thing
that has been removed
from a craft and may have been contaminated by a
quarantinable disease. We consider that this power appears to be reasonable for
the purposes of section 21 of the Bill of Rights Act. In forming this view, we
note that the purpose of the provision is to stop
the spread of an infectious
disease, and the provision does not empower the Medical Officer to enter a
private dwellinghouse. This
restriction also applies to a member of the police
acting under new section 71A (see paragraph 42 above).
Examination by the Medical Officer
- New
section 97E(6)(a) obliges a person who is kept under surveillance at large to
present himself or herself for any medical examination
required by a Medical
Officer of Health. Given that the purpose of this provision is to enable the
Medical Officer to release persons
from quarantine even though they have been or
are suspected of having been exposed to a quarantinable disease, we consider
that this
requirement is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.
- In
reaching this decision, we have examined whether the provision entitles the
Medical Officer to require the person to submit to
intrusive or invasive testing
procedures or provide a bodily sample, and thereby raises an issue of
inconsistency with section 21
of the Bill of Rights Act.
- In
A v Council of the Auckland District Law
Society10, the High Court was asked to consider
whether a provision that required a practitioner to undergo a medical
examination required
the practitioner to submit to
10 [2005] 3 NZLR 550 (HC)
intrusive or invasive testing procedures and provide bodily samples. Having
determined that the taking of a bodily sample would amount
to a search or
seizure of the person, the Court held that the requirement for testing and the
provision of bodily samples is unreasonable
in terms of section 21 of the Bill
of Rights Act.
- In
light of this decision, we consider that new section 97E(6)(a), as currently
drafted, would not allow the Medical Officer to carry
out intrusive or invasive
testing procedures on a person or take a bodily sample from that person without
his or her informed consent.
Moreover, we consider that examinations may only be
carried out for the purposes of determining whether the person is still capable
of passing on the disease. For sake of clarity, we consider that section
97E(6)(a) should be redrafted to read “[...] any
medical examination
reasonably required by the Medical Officer of Health...”.
Obtaining of information from departments
- We
have also considered the consistency of new section 97A(5) with section 21 of
the Bill of Rights Act. This provision allows a Medical
Officer of Health to
obtain information about a person who is liable to quarantine from government
departments. We note that the
provision is qualified by the requirement that the
Medical Officer must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the information
will
help trace the person’s movements and identify the people they have
had contact with. The provision cannot be used to obtain
information about their
recent activities or other matters relating to the person.
- We
therefore consider that new section 97A(5) is consistent with the right to
freedom from unreasonable search and seizure.
Section 22: Right not to be arbitrarily detained
People liable for quarantine
- New
section 97 sets out the circumstances in which a person on board a craft is
liable for quarantine, namely:
- the person is on
board or disembarks from a craft liable to quarantine
- the person
arrives in New Zealand from overseas and a Medical Officer of Health believes or
suspects on reasonable grounds that
- - the person
suffers from a quarantinable disease; or
- - the person
has been exposed to the disease within the last 14 days.
- This
provision must be read with new section 97A which provides that a person liable
to quarantine must comply with directions and
supply information to the Medical
Officer. If the person fails or refuses to comply, he or she will commit an
offence and will be
liable for a fine not exceeding $1,000. For the reasons set
out in paragraphs 29 to 33 above, we consider that, although this form
of
detention falls within the
ambit of section 22 of the Bill of Rights
Act, the provision could not be interpreted as authorising “arbitrary
detention”.
Surveillance
- Under
new section 97E of the Health Act, a person liable to quarantine as well as a
person who is suffering from a quarantinable disease may be removed to a
hospital or
other suitable place and kept under surveillance. This form of
detention also falls within the scope of section
22 of the Bill of
Rights Act and, again, in our opinion it is arguable whether the provision
authorises “arbitrary detentions”.
- In
reaching this view, we have taken account of a recent ruling of the European
Court of Human Rights regarding the detention of individuals
suffering from an
infectious disease. In Enhorn v Sweden11, the
Court held that such detentions will only be justified if:
- the response is
proportionate to the threat the disease poses to the general public;
- the measure is a
measure of last resort; and
- the detention
must be lifted as soon as possible as the person no longer poses a threat to the
public.
- We
consider that these factors are met in the present case. Removing a person who
has been exposed to a quarantinable disease to a
hospital or other suitable
place is reasonable and necessary as it will ensure that the person is kept
apart from other persons
during the period that they would be capable of passing
on the disease. Similarly, it is reasonable to remove a person suffering
from a
quarantinable disease to hospital where the person can be isolated from other
persons and receive appropriate medical treatment.
- We
note that a person must be released as soon as a Medical Officer of Health is
satisfied that the person is not infected with the
disease concerned or unable
to pass it on (new section 97E(3)(a)(i) and (ii)). Further, a person may only be
kept under surveillance
for a maximum period of 14 days. Although this period
may be extended by a further period of 14 days if the Medical Officer, after
considering the latest information about the disease, is satisfied that the
person is still likely to be capable of passing it on
(new section 97E(3)).
- We
do not consider that these periods are unreasonable. The Ministry of Health has
advised that a person liable to quarantine needs
to be isolated for up to two
incubation periods of the disease because of the possibility of the person
developing asymptomatic infection
and then infecting others in the cohort. While
it is impossible to predict what the incubation period will be of avian
influenza,
the incubation period of seasonal influenza is usually 3 days,
following which an adult can be infectious for a further 5 days (and
a child 7
days). Fourteen days is
11 Application no 56529/00 (25 January
2005)
considered an appropriate period: although it is necessary to provide for a
further period of 14 days in case the incubation period
of the disease is longer
than seasonal influenza.
Relaxation of statutory requirements during an epidemic
Trigger point
- Clause
5 of the Bill empowers the Prime Minister to issue a notice in the Gazette
declaring that he or she is satisfied that the effects of an outbreak of an
infectious disease are likely to significantly disrupt
essential governmental
and business activity in New Zealand (epidemic notice). The issuance of an
epidemic notice enables the relaxation
of some statutory requirements that might
not be capable of being complied with, or complied with fully during an
epidemic.
- While
the trigger provision does not directly raise an issue of inconsistency with the
Bill of Rights Act, the way the trigger provision
is framed impacts on the
proportionality of the measures available once the epidemic notice is in force.
We have therefore examined
whether the reasonableness of the trigger
provision.
- In
our opinion, for a public health emergency to justify derogating from human
rights the situation must be of an exceptional and
temporary nature. Moreover,
the threat posed by the emergency must be actual or imminent and affect all
branches of the life of the
community. These factors are extracted from the
decision of Lord Bingham in A v Secretary of State for the Home
Department12, and although that case concerned a
terrorist threat we feel that the same criteria need to be satisfied in a public
health emergency.
- We
consider that, in the present case, the trigger provision incorporates each of
these three factors. Before issuing the epidemic
notice the Prime Minister
must consult the Director-General of Health (clause 5(5)) and must be satisfied
that the outbreak of
the infectious disease is prospective or already occurring
(clause 5(2)(a)) and effects of the outbreak are likely to significantly
disrupt
essential governmental and business activity in New Zealand (clause 5(1)). The
maximum length of the epidemic notice is three
months (clause 5(3)(a)), although
the Prime Minister may issue a new notice if he or she is still satisfied that
governmental and
business activity in New Zealand is being significantly
disrupted (clause 5(4)). The Director-General must keep the situation under
review, and keep the Prime Minister informed (clause 7(1)). If the Prime
Minister is no longer satisfied that the effects of the
outbreak are likely to
disrupt essential governmental and business activity, he or she must promptly
revoke the epidemic notice (clause
7(2)).
- We
therefore consider that the trigger provision is framed in a reasonable way.
However, each of the measures that are available once
the
12 [2004] UKHL 56
epidemic notice is made must still be a proportionate response to the
disruption that is likely to be caused by the outbreak of the
infectious
disease.
Emergency power to relax statutory requirements imposing duties
- Clause
9 enables the making, while an epidemic notice is in force, of Orders in Council
relaxing any statutory requirement or restriction
imposed by any enactment. We
consider that this provision is not inconsistent with the Bill of Rights Act.
The creation of an emergency
power is necessary given that the circumstances of
a pandemic would be truly exceptional and this option may be the best and
perhaps
only way to provide adequately for all the unforeseeable contingencies.
We note that an order can only be made when the consequences
of the epidemic are
such that it is impossible or impracticable for the person on whom the
requirement is imposed to comply with
it, and the relaxation is no greater than
is reasonably necessary in the circumstances (clause 9(2)). We also note that
the emergency
power will only be available while an epidemic notice is in force,
and may not be used to authorise the relaxation of provisions
that impact on
fundamental rights and freedoms (clause 9(3)). Limitations on such provisions
would need to be done by way of primary
legislation, following approval by the
House of Representatives.
- We
note that such an order may authorise a Judge, Registrar, or Deputy Registrar to
waive or vary a requirement imposed by a rule
of court (clause 9(5)). As with
other provisions in the Bill, the language used in this clause is discretionary.
This means that
the Judge or Registrar must
– in order to
comply with their obligations under section 3(a) of the Bill of Rights Act
– consider whether the waiver
or variance of the requirement would
unjustifiably limit the rights and freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights Act
(in particularly,
the fair trial rights and the right to natural justice) and,
if so, decline to waive or vary the requirement.
Relaxation of the duties set out in the Immigration Act 1987
Section 22: Right not to be arbitrarily detained
- Section
60(7) of the Immigration Act provides that no person (other than certain refugee
status claimants who either claimed refugee
status only after a removal order
was served, or whose inability to leave New Zealand arises from some action or
inaction on their
part) may be detained under warrants of commitment for
consecutive periods of more than three months. New section 129ZG provides
that,
in calculating the consecutive period no account shall be taken of any periods
of detention occurring while an epidemic notice
is in force.
- We
do not consider that this provision is inconsistent with section 22 of the Bill
of Rights Act. Section 60(7) places the onus on
immigration authorities to do
everything in their power to arrange for the removal of a person from New
Zealand within a defined
period of time. Such matters
include
ensuring that the person has the appropriate documents to travel, arranging
flights and entry visas, and organising a police
escort, if required. If there
is significant disruption to essential governmental and business activities, it
is unlikely that these
arrangements will be able to be made within the three
month time limit. Further it is unlikely that other countries will accept
travellers
from a place that an epidemic notice is in force. Failing to provide
for an extension to the three month time limit will mean that
these persons,
many of whom are subject to detention because they present a flight risk or
other risk to the community, would have
to be released. We also note that during
the period of an epidemic notice, such persons will continue to have the ability
to apply
to the courts to have the warrant of commitment vacated.
Section 25(e): Right to be present at the trial
- Clause
30 of the Bill will insert new section 129ZC into the Immigration Act. This
provision will enable a District Court Judge or
Registrar to deal with a matter
for which the Immigration Act requires a person to be brought before them on the
basis of documents
only.
- We
note that the language used in this provision is discretionary. This means that
the Judge or Registrar must – in order to
comply with their obligations
under section 3(a) of the Bill of Rights Act – consider whether the
granting of an order to deal
with a matter on the papers would deprive the
person of his or her right to be present in the courtroom (as protected by
section
25(e) of the Bill of Rights Act) and, if so, decline to make such an
order.
Section 27(1): Right to natural justice
- The
Immigration Act contains a number of provisions that require a person who is
detained under the Act to be brought before a court
within a stated interval.
For instance, a person detained under a warrant of commitments must be brought
before a court every 7 days
(section 128B(10)(b)). New section 129ZD provides
that, while an epidemic notice is in force, these periods may be extended to an
interval of not more than 28 days.
- We
have considered section 129ZD for consistency with section 27(1) of the Bill of
Rights Act. Section 27(1) provides that every person
whose interests are
affected by a decision by a public authority has the right to the observance of
the principles of natural justice.
One of the fundamental principles of natural
justice is the right to be heard. In our view, by reducing the frequency that a
detained
person must be brought before a court, new section 129ZD appears to be
inconsistent with section 27(1).
- We
consider, however, that new section 129ZD is justified in terms of section 5 of
the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching this view,
we have taken into account the
fact that this provision will only operate in circumstances where there is
significant disruption
to essential governmental and
business
activities. It is likely that the resulting high rate of absenteeism will place
great strain on the ability of the courts
as well as detention facilities to
function properly. In any case, the decision to extend the period that a person
must be brought
before a court is discretionary: that is the judge may decide
that in the circumstances of a particular case a detained person should
be
brought before him or her within a shorter time period. Further, if the notice
applies to only stated parts of New Zealand, the
provision will only operate
within those parts (see new section 129ZD(3)).
Conclusion
- Overall,
we have formed the view that the Law Reform (Epidemic Preparedness) Bill appears
to be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act. In reaching this conclusion, we
have given particular emphasis to the purpose of this legislation, and the need
to ensure that
the Crown has appropriate powers available to it to respond to
and manage the threat posed by avian influenza.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
|
Stuart Beresford Principal Advisor
Bill of Rights/Human Rights Team
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