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Wills Bill (Consistent) (Sections 5, 19, 21) [2006] NZBORARp 37 (7 August 2006)
Last Updated: 11 January 2019
Wills Bill
7 August 2006 Attorney-General
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990:
Wills Bill (PCO 7080/11) Our Ref: ATT395/14
- We
have considered the Wills Bill ("the Bill") for consistency with the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990 ("BORA"). We have identified
two issues of prima
facie inconsistency to which we draw your attention. After considering the
justifications for these provisions under section 5 of the BORA
we have
concluded that these provisions are not inconsistent with the BORA.
Potential Discrimination in Ability to Do a Testamentary Action
- Clause
10 of the Bill provides that:
2.1 Persons of 18 years or over may do all testamentary actions (including make
wills);
2.2 Persons under 18 years may do all testamentary
actions if they are (or have been) married, in a civil union or in a de facto
relationship;
2.3 Persons under 18 years may also make wills if they have agreed to marry or
enter a civil union with another person (though the
will is only valid on
solemnisation of the relationship) or if they are military or seagoing persons
(or about to be);
2.4 Otherwise, persons under 18 years may only do a testamentary action if they
satisfy a Family Court that they understand the effect
of a specific action or
of such actions generally and have approval given by the Court.
- This
clause would distinguish between persons who are 18 or over (or who are under 18
but married, in a civil union or a de facto relationship), and persons
who are under 18 and are not in such a relationship. The latter group have to go
through the additional
procedural hurdle of obtaining Family Court approval in
order to do a testamentary action.
- These
distinctions are prima facie inconsistent with the freedom from
discrimination on the grounds of age affirmed by section 19(1) of the BORA,
which (through section
21 paragraphs
- (i) and (b))
provides that age restrictions above the age of 16, and discrimination on the
grounds of marital status, require justification.
We consider these grounds
together, given their inter-relationship in the Bill.
Justified limitation
- A
prima facie limit on the right to be free from discrimination will be lawful if
it can be justified under s 5 of the BORA. This
assessment involves the
identification of a legitimate government objective and an analysis of the
reasonableness and proportionality
of the
Government’s actions
in seeking to attain that objective.
Comparison with other New Zealand age distinctions
- Article
1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as a person
under the age of 18 years "unless under the
law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier." Article 12(1) provides that "States Parties shall
assure to the child
who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to
express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views
of the
child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the
child."
- In
previous advice we have noted that age restrictions necessarily involve a degree
of generalisation, without regard for the particular
abilities or maturity of
individuals within the distinguished age groups. Age restrictions are set in law
at different points for
different purposes. In some contexts (e.g. the Second
Hand Dealers and Pawnbrokers Bill in May 2003) an age restriction has been
justified in terms of section 5 of the BORA as a reasonable limit prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society. In other
contexts (eg the Care of Children Bill in May 2003), we have concluded that they
cannot.
- This
Bill is concerned with the age at which the law should recognise the capacity of
a person to do a testamentary action. This is
a significant life decision that
concerns decisions about close personal relationships and the disposition of
property (on death).
We consider that this involves considerations similar to
several other sets of decisions authorised by law:
8.1 decisions to enter close personal relationships recognised by law –
marriage under the Marriage Act 1955, a civil union
relationship under the Civil
Union Act 2004 or a de facto relationship (including for the purposes of the
Property (Relationships)
Act 1976). The age limit set by law for entering these
relationships is 18, with the ability for 16 or 17 year olds also to enter
these
relationships with the consent of a parent or guardian or the Family Court;
8.2 section 26 of the Care of Children Act 2004 provides
that a parent who is under the age of 18 may appoint a person to be a
testamentary
guardian of their child after the parent’s death;
8.3 decisions about the use and disposition of property, such as the
enforceability of
contracts under the Minors’ Contracts Act
1969, ability to pledge property under the Second Hand Dealers and Pawnbrokers
Act
2004 the ability to be appointed as a director under the Companies Act 1993.
The age limit set by law for entering these relationships
is 18 (though those
under 18 can get approval from a District Court to enter a contract) and
otherwise, in general, is set at 20
by the Age of Majority Act 1970.
- The
age distinctions in these similar contexts are the same as those in the Bill
(except for parents’ appointments of testamentary
guardians and the
general age of majority). Where we have had previously to consider age
distinctions in bills providing for the
age of entry into marriage, civil union
and de facto relationship, we have concluded that the restriction
is
justified under section 5 due to the need to protect those who
may not have sufficient maturity and capacity to understand the significance
of
entering into the relationship and the full effects of it.
- In
relation to the property-related Acts, we have not recommended that the
Attorney- General issue a report under section 7 of the
BORA for inconsistency
with the BORA, though in one instance we reported our view that the issue was
finely balanced. In that instance,
it was relevant that the Bill covered a wide
range of potential actions. Similarly, our conclusion that the age restrictions
in the
Care of Children Bill was not justified was influenced, as highlighted in
our advice, by the existence of a broad range of matters
that were affected by
the age restriction in that Bill. We concluded that such a wide range of matters
were not all inappropriate
for 16 and 17 year olds to decide for themselves. The
Bill considered here is not subject to that problem.
International Comparisons
- The
approach to age restrictions in the Bill is generally consistent with other
comparable jurisdictions with bills of rights. In
particular, with the exception
of Quebec, each of the provinces and territories of Canada provide that wills
made by minors (being
persons under 17-19 years, depending on the state) are
invalid except:
11.1 in all provinces and territories except Newfoundland and the Yukon, where a
minor is or (with the exception of Prince Edward
Island) has been married;
11.2 in Alberta, if a minor "has or has had a spouse or
adult interdependent partner’ and in Saskatchewan, is or was
‘cohabiting
in a spousal relationship";
11.3 in Ontario, if a minor is "contemplating marriage and the will states that
it is made in contemplation of marriage to a named
person except that such will
is not valid unless and until the marriage to the named person takes place";
11.4 in all provinces or territories, if a minor is a member of the Armed Forces
of Canada or is a mariner or seaman.
- In
Quebec, minors (under 18), may not dispose of any part of their property by
will, except articles of little value. Only Newfoundland
sets the age at which a
will is invalid at under 17; all other provinces and territories set the age of
invalidity at under 18-19
years of age.
- In
relation to the United Kingdom, the Wills Act 1837 (as amended by Family Law
Reform Act 1969) provides that wills made by persons
under 18 are not valid. The
Family Law Reform Act 1969 reduced the age at which a person can validly make a
will from 21 to 18. There
is no exception for married persons, but soldiers and
mariners under 18 are able to make a will. However, Scotland is one rare
jurisdiction
that grants testamentary capacity to persons under the age of 18
without any limitations.
- In
relation to Australia, the age at which a will can validly be made has also been
reduced from 21 to 18 in all states and territories.
Most of the states and
territories have exceptions for persons under 18 wishing to make specific
testamentary dispositions if approved
by a court and, in some cases by the
Public Trustee. Almost all of the states have exceptions
for
married persons and for wills made in contemplation
of marriage but only upon solemnisation of the marriage contemplated.
Consideration of the Justification for the Bill
- The
key question is whether there is sufficient justification for setting the age
limit for doing testamentary actions at the age
of 18 rather than at 16. The
primary rationale appears to be the importance of testamentary actions, and the
central objective that
such actions should be done by persons with sufficient
maturity and capacity to understand the nature and consequences of their
actions.
Closely associated with this objective is the concern that persons, who
otherwise have sufficient maturity and capacity to perform
testamentary actions,
undertake those actions freely and without undue pressure or influence.
- The
presumption of the Bill is that persons of 18 years and over are of sufficient
maturity to do testamentary actions, whereas persons
who are under 18 are not,
unless specifically judged to be.
- It
can be argued that persons of 16 or 17 years, who are more likely still to be at
secondary school, may be more susceptible to influence
by factors such as peer
pressure in the school environment, or pressure from family members. Given their
legal rights in relation
to property and contracts they may also be less likely
to have significant property in respect of which to do a testamentary act.
So
the likely need of 16 and 17 year olds to do a testamentary act may be less, and
the risk of error in them doing an act may be
greater, than that of persons of
18 years and over.
- However,
we note that there is a paucity of robust evidence that supports the precise
correlation of age and susceptibility to external
pressures. We also note that
other mechanisms in the general law are available to address undue influence and
lack of testamentary
capacity, though the thresholds are relatively high.
- The
Bill enables those 16 and 17 year olds to do testamentary actions by gaining
consent through a specified procedure – through
approval by a Family
Court. In this respect, the Bill is consistent with the current law on the
capacity of persons of 16 or 17 years
of age to enter important relationships
recognised by law (marriage, civil union or de facto relationships)
through a specified consent process.
- The
exception in the Bill that allows persons of 16 or 17 years who have entered
such a relationship to do testamentary actions reflects
that those persons have
already obtained the requisite consents and approvals to form these
relationships. It also reflects the increased
likely need for this group to make
dispositions of property by will, as does the provision in the Care of Children
Act that enables
a parent to appoint a testamentary guardian.
- In
the context of a will, an advantage of the Family Court approval mechanism is
that it offers a degree of protection to 16 and 17
year olds seeking to do valid
testamentary actions. If there is a Family Court approval on the record
certifying the capacity of
the 16 or 17 year old to make a will, it would be
more difficult to challenge the validity of such a will posthumously for lack of
capacity, than it would be if 16 and 17 year olds could freely make
wills.
- In
our view, when such finely balanced value judgments call to be made the
question, whether or not other alternatives to the Family
Court approval
mechanism exist, falls within the margin of appreciation that is commonly
afforded to governments in the realm of
social policy.
- In
terms of justification under section 5 of the BORA, overseas authority in Canada
and the United Kingdom is relevant (though occurring
in different constitutional
contexts in terms of the relationship between judiciary and legislatures).
There, courts now recognise
the ability of Parliament to pass valid legislation
which limits rights within "a range of reasonable alternatives", and have
afforded
a degree of deference to the legislature in this field: R v Director
of Public Prosecutions Ex p Kebilene [1999] UKHL 43; [2000] 2 AC 326 at 381; RJR
MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney-General) [1995] 3 SCR 199 at para 160;
Libman v Quebec (Attorney- General) [1997] 3 SCR 569 at 605-6. The
question is not necessarily whether the proposed limitation on a right or
freedom is the least intrusive limitation
possible, but whether it lies within
the range of alternatives of limitations that are reasonably unintrusive. New
Zealand courts
have not fully considered arguments about such an approach
here.
- On
the basis of these considerations we have concluded that the prima facie
discrimination on the grounds of age and marital status can be considered to
be justified under section 5 of the BORA as a reasonably
proportionate response
to an important and significant objective.
Potential Discrimination of Effect on a Will of Marital Status
- Clauses
18 and 19 of the Bill:
25.1 provide that a will made by a person of 18 years or older is revoked if the
testator marries or enters into a civil union (unless
the will is made in
contemplation of the new relationship); and
25.2 provide that an end to a marriage or civil union
(brought about by a separation order or order dissolving a marriage or civil
union under the Family Proceedings Act 1980) makes
void certain
provisions in a will (in relation to appointment of or disposition to the
testator’s spouse or partner) unless
the will makes it clear that the
testator intended the provision to be effective; but
25.3 Do not provide that either of the above two effects are caused by entry
into, or ending of, a de facto relationship.
- These
clauses therefore distinguish between persons who are married or in a civil
union on the one hand and persons who are in a de facto relationship.
They thereby constitute a prima facie inconsistency with the freedom from
discrimination on the grounds of marital status affirmed by section 19 of the
BORA.
- We
note that the Bill reforms the current law – which provides that marriage
revokes a will and divorce disentitles a former
spouse but beginning or ending a
civil union or de facto relationship does not. The Bill therefore removes
discrimination that exists in the current law.
- We
also note that, in relation to the entering into or ending of a marriage or a
civil union, these provisions have a significant
impact in over-riding a
testator’s stated intended disposition and having a potentially
disinheriting effect.
- The
policy justification provided for not requiring the entry into or end of a de
facto relationship from having the same significant impact is the
uncertainty of establishing, with precision, the time at which a de facto
relationship is entered into or ends. Unlike a marriage or civil union,
there is no precise act of will required by law that precisely
signifies the
entry into or ending of a de facto relationship. This would be necessary
in order to apply these provisions of the Bill to a de facto
relationship. Yet the time of a de facto relationship beginning or
ending can be uncertain and imprecise. This is recognised by the approach of the
Property (Relationships)
Act 1976 in listing, in section 2D, nine different
matters that are relevant to a court determining the existence or non-existence
of a de facto relationship.
- Given
the ability of a person entering or exiting from a de facto relationship
to make or change a will if they wish to, and the potentially significant
interference in, and disinheriting effect of
applying these provisions of the
Bill to de facto relationships, we conclude that the prima facie
inconsistency of these provisions with the BORA is justified in terms of
section 5 as a proportionate response to an important and
significant
objective.
Conclusion
- Accordingly,
we advise that we have not identified any inconsistency in the Bill with the
BORA. This opinion has been peer reviewed
by Val Sim.
- We
attach a copy of this opinion for forwarding to the Minister and Associate
Minister of Justice for his information if you wish.
Dr Matthew S. R. Palmer Special Counsel
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website, please
note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the Attorney-General to
determine whether a report should be made to Parliament under s 7 of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the Wills Bill. It should not be
used or acted upon for any other purpose. The advice does no more than assess
whether
the Bill complies with the minimum guarantees contained in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The release of this advice should
not be taken to
indicate that the Attorney-General agrees with all aspects of it, nor does its
release constitute a general waiver
of legal professional privilege in respect
of this or any other matter. Whilst care has been taken to ensure that this
document is
an accurate reproduction of the advice provided to the
Attorney-General, neither the Ministry of Justice nor the Crown Law Office
accepts any liability for any errors or omissions.
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