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Criminal Justice Reform Bill (Consistent) (Sections 5, 6, 25(a) (g), s 27 ) [2006] NZBORARp 52 (20 November 2006)
Last Updated: 13 January 2019
Criminal Justice Reform Bill
20 November 2006 Attorney-General
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990: CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM BILL
Our Ref: ATT395/22
- We
have considered the Criminal Justice Reform Bill (PCO 7194/13) and conclude that
it is not inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill
of Rights Act 1990 (BORA).
- We
have discussed a number of issues in detail below. To summarise, our conclusions
are:
2.1 The retrospective nature of the proposed sentencing guidelines and the
changes to the parole regime are not inconsistent with
the right against
retrospective penalties in s 25(g) of the BORA. The principal reason is that
they do not change the maximum penalty
that can be imposed for any particular
offence.
2.2 The application of the two new community based sentences to persons who
committed their offences before the provisions come into
force and where the
offence carries a maximum penalty of a community-based sentence, is not
inconsistent with the right against retrospective
penalties in s 25(g) of the
BORA because Courts applying the provisions must exercise their sentencing
discretion consistently with
the BORA, by virtue of s 6 of the BORA.
2.3 The structure, composition and role of the proposed Sentencing Council are
not inconsistent with judicial independence and impartiality,
as provided for in
s 25(a) and s 27 of the BORA. In the event that participation in the work of the
council gave rise to a conflict
of interest in a particular case, there are
practical mechanisms available to ensure that no breach of the BORA occurs.
2.4 The proposed nature of the sentencing guidelines (which are not intended to
be as prescriptive or rigid as their United States
counterparts) and the ability
of the courts to depart from the guidelines in 'the interests of justice'
provide sufficient protection
to ensure criminal process rights are not breached
in individual cases.
2.5 The power to require offenders to attend medical, psychological or
therapeutic programmes can be exercised consistently with
the right to refuse
medical treatment protected by the BORA, by the courts imposing such orders
against the wishes of the offender
only in cases when it is justifiable under s
5 of the BORA.
2.6 The various restrictions upon the rights to freedom of association and
freedom of movement are justifiable pursuant to s 5 as
is the protective
provision for young persons in respect of the imposition of the sentence of home
detention.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Overview of
Bill Retrospectivity of the Bill
Scope of the right in respect of
retrospective penalties Application of the
right to sentencing guidelines
Europe and the United Kingdom United States
Canada
Application of the right to changes in
parole eligibility
Application of majority judgment in
Morgan The 'effective maximum' analysis of
Tipping J Regime to be considered as a
whole
Application of the right to new community
based sentences
Judicial Independence and Impartiality
Nature of the Sentencing Guidelines Compulsory Medical Treatment Miscellaneous Matters
APPENDIX I: Table setting out changes to
entitlements to release and eligibility for parole
Overview of Bill
- The
Bill amends a range of legislation, largely affecting bail, sentencing and
parole of offenders. The stated purpose of the Bill
is to introduce a range of
measures to arrest the sharp increase in the prison population in recent
years.
- The
Bill's provisions include:
4.1 The establishment of a Sentencing Council responsible for issuing sentencing
and parole guidelines. The stated intention of such
guidelines is to increase
the level of consistency and transparency in decisions in these areas and to
promote 'truth in sentencing'.
At the same time, the guidelines are expected to
allow ample room for judicial discretion in sentencing individual offenders.
4.2 The introduction of an explicit hierarchy of sentences and orders.
4.3 The introduction of three new sentences that are intended to be alternatives
to imprisonment for less serious offenders, thereby
addressing the increasing
use of
incarceration for such offenders. The Bill makes home
detention a sentence in its own right, able to be imposed by the sentencing
judge. Two new community based sentences of community detention and intensive
supervision are introduced by the Bill.
4.4 Amendments to the Bail Act to better reflect the common law and ensure that
offenders are not unnecessarily remanded in custody
rather than on bail.
4.5 Amendments to the parole regime.
4.6 Miscellaneous amendments to:
4.6.1 The Extended Supervision regime for the management of child sex offenders
in the Parole Act 2002.
4.6.2 The Prisoners' and Victims' Claims Act 2005, deferring the date of the
sunset clause contained in that Act.
4.6.3 The Sentencing Act 2002 in relation to standard and special release
conditions for short-term sentences.
Retrospectivity of the Bill
- There
are a number of provisions of the Bill that have the potential to engage the
right affirmed by s 25(g) of the BORA. In particular:
5.1 The new sentences of Intensive Supervision, Community Detention and Home
Detention will be available in respect of all persons
who are sentenced after
the provisions come into force, irrespective of the date on which the offence
was committed. The transitional
provisions provide some safeguards for persons
who commit offences before the commencement of the provisions, including a
requirement
that the offender consent to the imposition of the sentence.[1] However, there are no express safeguards
to ensure that offenders are not given heavier sentences than could have been
imposed before
the commencement date.
5.2 Clause 35 of the Bill provides that sentencing guidelines developed by the
Sentencing Council are to apply to all persons sentenced
after the guidelines
come into force, whether or not the guideline was in force when the offence was
committed. This raises a theoretical
possibility that an offender may receive a
heavier sentence that would have been imposed before the guideline comes into
force. A
similar provision exists in respect of parole guidelines.
5.3 The proposed parole provisions mean that, for persons sentenced after the
commencement of the provisions:
5.3.1 There is no longer any entitlement to release from prison for persons
serving sentences of 12 months or less. Under the current
provisions of the
Parole Act 2002 such persons would have been automatically entitled to release
from prison (subject to any court
imposed conditions) after
serving half of their sentence. Under the new provisions such persons will not
be eligible for parole and
will have to serve their full sentence in prison.
5.3.2 Entitlement to release from prison for persons serving sentences of more
than 12 months and up to 24 months is replaced with
discretionary parole after
serving two-thirds of the sentence. Under the current provisions of the Parole
Act 2002 such persons would
have been automatically entitled to release from
prison (subject to court imposed conditions) after serving half of their
sentence.
5.3.3 Parole eligibility is increased from one-third to two-thirds for persons
serving sentences of 24 months or more.
The provisions apply according to the date of sentence, rather
than the date of commission of the offence. Accordingly, they raise
the
possibility that without a corresponding change in sentencing practises some
persons sentenced after the provisions come into
force will serve a longer
period in prison than if they had been sentenced before the provisions come into
force.
- In
our view, the provisions do not breach the right protected by s 25(g) of BORA
that 'if convicted of an offence in respect of which
the penalty has been varied
between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the
lesser penalty'. The simple
reason for this conclusion, as supported by both
domestic and international jurisprudence, is that the right protected by s 25(g)
relates only to the maximum penalty for an offence.[2] It does not extend
to the penalty imposed in individual cases by the sentencing court or the
administration of that penalty in terms
of parole. However, whilst this provides
a simple answer to the question of whether s25(g) is breached, given the recent
domestic
case law in relation to the right it is appropriate to include a more
detailed discussion of the issue.
Scope of the right in respect of retrospective penalties
- Section
25(g) provides that:
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the
determination of the charge, the following minimum rights:
...
The right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has
been varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing,
to the benefit
of the lesser penalty.
- The
right in respect of retrospective penalties has been considered by the Supreme
Court on two occasions: Morgan v Superintendent of Rimutaka Prison [2005]
NZSC 26 and R v Mist [2005] NZSC 77.
- In
Morgan the majority (Elias CJ dissenting) held that s 6 of the Sentencing
Act and s25(g) of the BORA related only to the maximum penalty[3] that could be imposed
for the
generic offence, and did not extend to the individual sentence that might have
been imposed on a particular offender.[4]
- Applying
the conclusion of the majority of the Supreme Court in Morgan, the
retrospective nature of the sentencing and parole guidelines and the changes to
the parole regime do not breach s 25(g) of the
BORA because the provisions do
not change the maximum penalty able to be imposed for any offence.
Application of the right to sentencing guidelines
- Overseas
jurisprudence makes clear that rights in respect of retrospective criminal
offences can include judicial development of the
law relating to criminal
liability . However, no jurisdiction has extended this to include
development of the law in relation to penalties such as sentencing
guidelines or practises.
- There
are three principal reasons for this:
12.1 'Penalty' applies to statutory maximums only.
12.2 It is reasonably foreseeable that within the maximum penalty, sentencing
practises and guidelines may change.
12.3 The guidelines are advisory only and do not guarantee a particular sentence
or reduce the maximum penalty that could be imposed.
Europe and the United
Kingdom
- The
European Court has not considered the application of Article 7 of the European
Convention to judicial developments in sentencing
practises or guidelines. It
has, however, been consistent in its statements of general principle that the
inquiry for the court is
whether the punishment is within the limit fixed by the
legislative provision.[5]
- The
United Kingdom Court of Appeal has consistently rejected the argument that
Article 7 is breached where there is an increase in
judicial sentencing levels:
R v A and W [2001] 2 Cr App R 275 (CA); R v JJC 24 September 2001
(CA); Twisse [2001] 2 Cr App R 37. Two rationales can be elucidated from
the judgments. Firstly, the Article applies only to changes in the maximum
penalty. Secondly,
it is reasonably foreseeable that within the maximum penalty,
sentencing practises and guidelines of the courts may change.
United States
- The
US Courts of Appeals have repeatedly held that the right in respect of
retrospective penalties is not violated by retroactive
sentence enhancements. In
a line of judgments,[6] the most recent
of which was delivered on 3 August 2006,[7] the Courts of Appeals have rejected
claims of a violation of due process where the application of the judgment of
the Supreme Court
in United States v Booker [2004] USSC 20; 541 US 1
(which
rendered federal sentencing guidelines advisory rather than mandatory) resulted
in some offenders receiving or being exposed
to higher penalties than could have
been imposed when the guidelines were treated as mandatory.
- The
Courts noted that one of the purposes of the right is "giving people 'fair
warning' of the legal consequences that their actions
will have".[8] The requirement of fair warning was
satisfied because the defendants had been given fair warning that their offences
were punishable
by the maximum penalty set out in the Criminal Code. The fair
warning relates to the "possible consequences" of the defendants' actions.[9] Related to this is the fact that the
guidelines (as held by the Supreme Court in Booker) were advisory only
and could be departed from by the sentencing judge if the circumstances
warranted it.[10]
Canada
- The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal has considered the right in the context of
increased ranges of sentences imposed by the courts and
has held that
"'punishment' must be construed to mean the punishment fixed by Parliament
rather than any range of sentences that
may emerge in court decisions within the
controlling statutory provisions": R v D (R) 48 CR (4th) 90 para 11. See
also R v WG, 6 November 1995.
Conclusion
- The
explanatory note to the Bill makes clear that it is envisaged that the
sentencing guidelines will be similar in form to sentencing
guideline judgments
presently issued by appellate courts. Further, whilst the sentencing court is
directed to follow the guidelines,
he or she may depart from the guidelines in
'the interests of justice'. Like the advisory federal sentencing guidelines in
the United
States,[11] they do not
guarantee a particular sentence or reduce the maximum sentence able to be
imposed for an offence.
- Accordingly,
we have concluded that the retrospective application of the proposed sentencing
guidelines does not breach s 25(g) of
the BORA.
Application of the right to changes in parole eligibility
- Under
the Bill:
20.1 Persons serving sentences imposed prior to the commencement of the
Sentencing Act 2002 (30 June 2002) will continue to have
their sentence
administered under the transitional provisions of the Act, which preserve:
20.1.1 A general entitlement to release[12] for persons serving sentences of 12
months or more after serving two-thirds of the sentence: s 105 Parole Act
2002.
20.1.2 A general entitlement to release for persons serving sentences of 12
months or less, after serving half of their sentence:
s 105 Parole Act 2002.
20.1.3 Parole eligibility in accordance with s89 of the Criminal Justice Act
1985 i.e. generally, one-third for persons serving sentences
of 12 months or
more for offences other than serious violent offences: s20(2) Parole Act
2002.
20.2 Persons serving sentences imposed between 30 June 2002 and the commencement
of the new parole provisions (the 'initial period'
as defined in clause 80 of
the Bill):
20.2.1 If serving a sentence of more than 2 years[13], will continue to be eligible for parole
after serving one-third of their sentence or the minimum period of imprisonment
imposed
by the sentencing court pursuant to ss 86, 89 or 103 of the Sentencing
Act (clause 120 cf s 84 Parole Act).
20.2.2 If serving a sentence of 2 years or less, will continue to be entitled to
release after serving half of the sentence (clause
121 cf s 86(1) Parole
Act). However, their release from prison is not unconditional. They will
continue to be subject to any court imposed
conditions, a breach of which
constitutes an offence punishable by up to one year's imprisonment.[14] For those serving sentences of 12 to 24
months, it is highly likely that at least the standard conditions will apply.[15]
20.3 Persons serving sentences imposed after the commencement of the new parole
provisions, irrespective of the date of the offence:
20.3.1 If the sentence is 12 months or less, will serve the full sentence. There
is no longer any entitlement to release or eligibility
for parole for such
persons.
20.3.2 If the sentence is more than 12 months will not be eligible for parole
until they have served two-thirds of their sentence:
clause 120(1).
- The
provisions are such that, without a corresponding change in sentencing
practises, some offenders may serve longer periods in prison
under the proposed
parole regime than if were sentenced before the provisions come into force. The
table annexed to this advice compares
the relative positions of different
offenders.
Application of majority
judgment in Morgan
- In
Morgan the Supreme Court considered the question of whether the changes
to the parole regime enacted by the Parole Act 2002 amounted to a
retrospective
penalty. Mr Morgan had been sentenced to a term of three years imprisonment
after the Act came into force in respect
of sentences committed prior to the Act
coming into force. Had he been sentenced prior to the Act coming into force he
would have
been entitled to release (subject to conditions and liability to
recall) after serving two thirds of his sentence. In his case, this
entitlement
was subject only to any extension of his release date for commission of
disciplinary offences.[16] As a result of
being sentenced after the Parole Act 2002 came into force, he was not entitled
to release at two-thirds but was eligible
for parole after serving
one-third.
His applications for parole had been unsuccessful. He
argued that he should be entitled to release after serving two-thirds of his
sentence and that the removal of such entitlement breached the right in respect
of retrospective penalties.
- The
majority of the Supreme Court held that 'penalty' means the maximum penalty
which a court could have imposed under the previous
sentencing regime. Applying
this approach, the provisions do not breach s 25(g) of the BORA as they do not
affect the maximum penalties
for offences.
The 'effective maximum' analysis of
Tipping J
- In
Morgan, the Court left open the possibility that the maximum penalty
prescribed by Parliament for a particular offence could effectively be
reduced
by reason of another legislative provision that provides for a non-discretionary
entitlement to release. Tipping J considered
that such an entitlement arose by
reason of the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 which provided for
release of some offenders
after serving two thirds of their sentence. Tipping J
considered that in such cases the maximum penalty for the offence was
effectively
reduced by one-third. The same argument potentially arises in
respect of some of the current provisions in the Parole Act 2002.
- The
other three judges in the majority in Morgan did not express a concluded
view on this point.[17] However, both
Gault J and Henry J expressed some concern over this approach in circumstances
where the offender's 'release' is subject
to conditions and the offender is
vulnerable to recall.[18] We agree with
those concerns and consider the better view is that because the person is not
actually released from the sentence
until the sentence expiry date,[19] it is not possible to say that the
maximum penalty for an offence is anything less than the prescribed maximum.
Regime to be considered as a
whole
- In
any event, even if release and parole entitlements formed part of the 'penalty'
for the purposes of s 25(g), as the explanatory
note makes clear it is likely
that the changes to the parole regime will be accompanied by adjustment in
sentencing practice, through
the simultaneous commencement of the sentencing
guidelines.[20]
Application of the right to new community based sentences
- In
our view the retrospective availability of home detention as a sentence in its
own right does not breach the right in respect of
retrospective penalties
affirmed by s25(g) because the sentence can only be imposed in respect of
offences punishable by imprisonment
(clause 38 and proposed s 15A(1)(b)).
Accordingly, it is within the prescribed maximum penalty for the offence. In any
event it is
available only where the purposes of sentencing cannot be achieved
by any less restrictive means and where the sentencing court would
otherwise
impose a sentence of imprisonment (clause 38).
- The
retrospective availability of the new community based sentences of intensive
supervision and community detention do give rise
to potential breaches of s
25(g) of the BORA. However, in our view the provisions can be interpreted and
applied consistently with
the BORA (and subject to s 6 of the Sentencing Act
2002) to avoid any breach.
- The
circumstances in which the provisions might breach the right are where:
29.1 An offence is committed prior to the provisions coming into force; and
29.2 The maximum penalty prescribed for such an offence is a community based
sentence.[21]
- The
hierarchy of sentences set out in clause 37 makes clear that these sentences are
harsher than the existing community based sentences.
Accordingly, a person who
commits an offence for which the maximum penalty is a community based sentence
before the provisions come
into force, is potentially subjected to a harsher
penalty than existed at the time of commission of the offence if such a sentence
was imposed. The safeguards contained in the transitional provisions, which
prevent such a sentence being imposed without the offender's
consent, go some
way to minimising the risk of a breach of the right,[22] but do not avoid a breach
altogether.
- In
our view these provisions must be read subject to s 6 of the Sentencing Act 2002
and consistently with s 25(g) of the BORA so that
if imposition of the sentence
were to result in a harsher penalty than that available at the time of
commission of the offence, then
that sentence cannot be imposed.
Judicial Independence and Impartiality
- The
Bill establishes a Sentencing Council composed of both judicial and non-judicial
members. The Council's functions are set out
in clause 10 of the Bill and
include:
- producing
sentencing and parole guidelines;
- assessing and
taking account of the cost effectiveness of the guidelines;
- providing a
statement of the guidelines' effect on the prison muster;
- giving advice on
and considering issues about sentencing and parole;
- collating and
providing to the judiciary information on sentencing practice and the adherence
to and departure from sentencing and
parole guidelines; and
- providing
information to the public about sentencing and parole.
- Sentencing
guidelines include sentencing principles, sentencing levels, particular types of
sentences, other matters relating to sentencing
practice and grounds for
departure from the guidelines. The Bill sets out a consultation process for
the
development of guidelines (clauses 14-16). Once finalised the
guidelines are presented to the Minister with a statement of the guidelines'
effect on the prison muster. The Minister then presents the guidelines to the
House of Representatives which may disallow them in
whole only (clause 19).
- Courts
are directed to impose sentences consistent with sentencing guidelines 'unless
the court is satisfied that it would be contrary
to the interests of justice to
do so' (clause 40). If a court departs from the guidelines, it must give reasons
for doing so (clause
43).
- Sentencing
Councils are becoming increasingly common internationally. Many are composed of
both judicial and non-judicial members,
but there is significant variation in
how they operate. Some Councils serve as a research and advisory body with the
development
of formal guidelines being the province of the superior courts (see,
for example, the systems in the Australian States of Victoria
and New South
Wales). At the other extreme are many of the Councils operating in the United
States, where the guidelines are very
prescriptive and there is little scope for
departure by the sentencing courts. The New Zealand model is most similar to
that recently
established in the United Kingdom.
- There
is little jurisprudence in relation to Sentencing Councils. However, there has
been an unsuccessful challenge to the constitutionality
of the United States
federal Sentencing Commission and the guidelines produced by it. One of the
grounds for the challenge was that
it breached the principle of separation of
powers.
- The
doctrine of the separation of powers is relevant to considering whether judicial
independence and impartiality is affected by
the proposed Sentencing Council.
Section 25(a) of the BORA provides the following right, which extends to
sentencing decisions, that:
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the
determination of the charge, the following minimum rights:
...
The right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
court.
- Section
27 of the BORA affirms the right to observance of the principles of natural
justice by any tribunal or other public authority
which has the power to make a
determination in respect of that person's rights, obligations, or interests
protected or recognised
by law. The principles of natural justice include the
concept that the decision maker should not be biased (audi alteram
partem).
- In
our view, the structure and role of the proposed Sentencing Council does not
breach either of ss 25(a) or 27 of the BORA. Whilst
care should be taken in
drawing comparisons in this area, particularly in the light of the different
constitutional contexts in which
Sentencing Councils operate, our view is
reinforced by the
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
relation to the federal sentencing guidelines and Sentencing Commission.
- In
the United States, the federal Sentencing Commission is also composed of
judicial and non-judicial members. Whilst the Bill proposes
appointment of
judicial members by the head of bench in consultation with the Chief Justice
with limited powers of removal,[23] the
President of the United States appoints the judicial members to the Commission
and is able to remove them. The Commission produces
guidelines that are
considerably more rigid and prescriptive than those intended to be developed by
the Sentencing Council under
the Bill.[24] They included minimum and maximum
sentences for offences based upon certain factors. The US legislation directs
that a court 'shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range"
established by guidelines developed by a Sentencing Commission. The ability to
depart from the guidelines is considerably more limited than is proposed by the
Bill.[25]
- In
Mistretta v. United States, [1989] USSC 9; 488 U.S. 361 (1989),[26] the Supreme Court rejected a challenge
to the constitutionality of the federal Sentencing Commission and the guidelines
produced
by it. One of the principal grounds for the challenge was that the
Commission breached the principle of separation of powers.
- The
majority of the Supreme Court recognised that the Sentencing Commission was a
'peculiar institution' within the framework of government.
Although formally
placed by the Act within the judicial branch[27] 'it is not a court and does not exercise
judicial power. Rather, [it is] an "independent" body comprising seven voting
members including
at least three federal judges, entrusted by Congress with the
primary task of promulgating sentencing guidelines'.[28] The Court recognised that the powers of
the Commission were, at least to some extent, 'political or quasi-
legislative'.[29] The Court stated,
however, that:[30]
Our constitutional principles of separated powers are not violated,
however, by mere anomaly or innovation. Setting to one side, for
the moment, the
question whether the composition of the Sentencing Commission violates the
separation of powers, we observe that
Congress' decision to create an
independent rulemaking body to promulgate sentencing guidelines and to locate
that body within the
Judicial Branch is not unconstitutional unless Congress has
vested in the Commission powers that are more appropriately performed
by the
other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary.
- The
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court went on to hold that the Sentencing
Commission did not violate the separation of powers principle
by placing the
Commission in the Judicial Branch, by requiring federal judges to serve on the
Commission and to share their authority
with non-judges, or by empowering the
President to appoint Commission members and to remove them for cause. The Court
held that the
Constitution's structural protections, including the separation of
powers principle, did not prohibit Congress from delegating to
an expert body
within the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating sentencing
guidelines consistent with such significant
statutory direction, or from calling
upon the accumulated
wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in
creating policy on a matter uniquely within the knowledge of judges.
- Whilst
the Sentencing Council proposed by the Bill is not placed within the Judicial
Branch of government, like its US counterpart
its activities are not purely
judicial. Some of its functions have a significant 'executive' tinge, such as
the provision of policy
advice, informing Members of Parliament and policy
makers, and informing and educating the public. Accordingly, the question arises
as to whether involvement of the judicial members in such non-judicial
activities affects their independence and impartiality as
judges.
- In
our view, judicial independence is not affected by the structure, membership or
role of the Sentencing Council proposed by the
Bill. As is made clear by the
decision of the United States Supreme Court, there is no constitutional
impediment to the judicial
branch of government being involved in an independent
statutory body that develops sentencing policy. We also note that, in contrast
to the legislation establishing the US federal Sentencing Commission, the Bill
includes a number of provisions that expressly preserve
the independence of
judicial members of the Sentencing Council:
45.1 Appointment is by the Governor-General upon recommendation of the head of
bench and there are limited powers of removal of judicial
members: see in
particular clauses 4, 7 and 8 of Schedule 1 to the Bill.
45.2 All rights and privileges as a judge are expressly protected: clause 3(1)
of Schedule 1 to the Bill.
45.3 If a judge considers any function or activity of the Council to be
incompatible with his or her judicial office he or she may
withdraw from
participating: clause 3(2) of Schedule 1 to the Bill.
- There
may be individual cases where a judge's membership of the Sentencing Council
gives rise to a challenge to his or her exercise
of related judicial functions
on the ground of conflict of interest or a perceived lack of independence or
impartiality. The most
obvious case is where a person seeks to judicially review
the sentencing guidelines. In such a situation, any potential breach of
either s
25(a) or s 27 of the BORA can be avoided by the recusal of the judge concerned.
Practical mechanisms exist for any potential
conflict to be dealt with on a case
by case basis.
Nature of the Sentencing Guidelines
- The
mandatory and prescriptive nature of the United States federal sentencing
guidelines has given rise to other potential breaches
of criminal process rights
in the United States.[31] As a result the
Supreme Court has held that the provisions making the guidelines mandatory are
unconstitutional and invalidated
those provisions, rendering the guidelines to
be advisory only.[32]
- Such
issues do not arise under the Bill as the guidelines are neither mandatory nor
prescriptive in the same way as the United States
federal sentencing
guidelines.
- The
Bill expressly provides for a broad discretion to depart from the guidelines 'in
the interests of justice'. Furthermore, whilst
the Bill does not prescribe the
form of the guidelines to be developed by the Sentencing Council, the
explanatory note makes clear
that it is intended that they will look much more
like the current guideline judgments of the superior courts of New Zealand, than
the grid systems employed in the United States.
Compulsory Medical Treatment
- A
number of the provisions of the Bill enable the Court, as part of the special
conditions imposed in respect of community based sentences,
to order the
offender to participate in programmes. This includes attendance at medical,
psychological and therapeutic programmes.[33] Unlike orders requiring the offender to
take prescription medication, there is no express requirement that the offender
consent
to the order.
- These
provisions have the potential to breach the right to refuse to undergo medical
treatment as protected by s 11 of the BORA. However,
in our view the provisions
can be applied consistently with the BORA by the Court not imposing such
conditions upon an offender against
their wishes except where it is justifiable
to do so under s 5 of the BORA.
- In
practice such conditions are unlikely to be imposed where the offender does not
agree to participate in the programme. However,
we anticipate that there may be
some situations when it is appropriate to impose a community based order with
such a condition notwithstanding
the offender's unwillingness to participate in
the programme, such as where the offender is also the subject of a compulsory
treatment
order pursuant to the Mental Health Act. In such cases it may well be
justifiable under s 5 of the BORA to make the order.
Miscellaneous Matters
- Clause
38 of the Bill imposes a limit on use of the sentence of home detention. This
mirrors s 18 of the Sentencing Act 2002 which
prohibits courts from imposing a
sentence of imprisonment on persons who, at the time of committing the offence,
were under the age
of 17 years other than for purely indictable offences. Whilst
the provision is a prima facie limit on the right to be free from
discrimination (s 19 of the BORA), it is justifiable pursuant to s 5 as it is
protective in nature
and is consistent with New Zealand's obligations under the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.[34]
- Many
of the provisions engage the rights of freedom of association and freedom of
movement. However the limitation of these rights
in the circumstances is
justified under s 5 of the BORA.
Yours faithfully
Val Sim Crown Counsel
Crown Counsel
|
Joanna Davidson
Crown Counsel
|
APPENDIX I: Table setting out changes to entitlements to release and eligibility
for parole
|
Sentence imposed immediately prior to 30 June 2002 ('pre-cd
sentence')
|
Sentence imposed between 30 June 2002 and commencement date of new
provisions ('initial
period')
|
Sentence imposed after commencement date of new
provisions
|
12 months or less
|
Entitlement to release after serving half of sentence: s 105 Parole Act
2002 and s 90(1)(a) Criminal Justice Act 1985. Release is
not subject to
conditions but offender is liable to recall.
No earlier eligibility for parole - automatic entitlement at one half
|
Entitlement to release after serving half of sentence: s 86(1) Parole Act
and clause 120 of Bill.
Release is subject to any release conditions imposed by the court on that
sentence: s 18(1) Parole Act.
Release is not subject to recall.
No eligibility for parole - automatic entitlement at one half
|
No entitlement to release - release date is sentence expiry date: clause
120
No parole.
|
More than 12 months and up to 24 months
|
Offences other than serious violent offences:
Entitlement to release after serving two-thirds of sentence: s105 Parole
Act 2002 and s 90(1)(b) Criminal Justice Act 1985 subject
to, if a specified
offence, any order to serve full sentence made under s 107 Parole Act 2002
Eligibility for parole after serving one-third: s 20(2) Parole Act 2002 and
s 89(3) Criminal Justice Act
|
Entitlement to release after serving half of sentence: s 86(1) Parole Act
and clause 120 of Bill.
Release is subject to any release conditions imposed by the court on that
sentence: s 18(1) Parole Act. From 7 July 2004, all sentences
of 12 months or
more are subject to court imposed conditions, unless the court orders otherwise
(see s 93 Sentencing Act 2002).
Release is not subject to
|
No entitlement to release - release date is sentence expiry date: clause
120
Eligibility after serving two-thirds: clause 119
|
1985
Release is subject to conditions (107A Criminal Justice Act 1985) and to
recall.
Serious violent offences:
Entitlement to release after serving two-thirds of sentence: s 105 Parole Act
2002 and s 90(1)(d) Criminal Justice Act 1985 subject
to, if a specified
offence, any order to serve full sentence made under s 107 Parole Act 2002
No earlier eligibility for parole for sentences of less than 15 years. If
sentence is 15 years or more, eligible for parole after
serving 10 years: s
20(2) Parole Act 2002 and s 89(4) Criminal Justice Act 1985.
Release is subject to conditions (s 107A Criminal Justice Act 1985) and to
recall.
|
recall.
No earlier eligibility for parole
|
|
More than 24 months
|
Offences other than serious violent offences:
Entitlement to release after serving two-thirds of sentence: s105 Parole Act
2002 and s90(1)(b) Criminal Justice Act 1985 subject
to:
1. Any loss of remission imposed for Prison
|
No entitlement to release
Eligibility for parole after serving minimum period of imprisonment imposed
by the sentencing court. If no minimum period imposed,
after serving one-third:
s84(1) Parole Act 2002.
Where parole is granted, offender is subject to recall.
|
No entitlement to release - release date is sentence expiry date: clause
120
Eligibility for parole after serving two- thirds: clause 119
|
Disciplinary offences (power to do so only before 30 June 2002)
2. If a specified offence, any order to serve full sentence made under s105
Criminal Justice Act 1985 or s107 Parole Act 2002
Eligibility for parole after serving one-third: s20(2) Parole Act 2002 and
s89(3) Criminal Justice Act 1985
Release is subject to conditions (107A Criminal Justice Act 1985) and to
recall.
Serious violent offences:
Entitlement to release after serving any minimum term of imprisonment imposed
under s80(4) Criminal Justice Act 1985, or two- thirds
of sentence if no minimum
term is imposed: s105 Parole Act 2002 and s90(1)(d) Criminal Justice Act 1985.
Subject to:
- Any
loss of remission imposed for Prison Disciplinary offences (power to do so only
before 30 June 2002)
- If
a specified
|
|
|
offence, any order to serve full sentence made under s105 Criminal Justice
Act 1985 or s107 Parole Act 2002
No earlier eligibility for parole for sentences of less than 15 years. If
sentence is 15 years or more, eligible for parole after
serving 10 years: s20(2)
Parole Act 2002 and s89(4) Criminal Justice Act 1985.
Release is subject to conditions (107A Criminal Justice Act 1985) and to
recall.
|
|
Footnotes
- Clauses
75-77 of the Bill.
- See
Morgan v Superintendent of Rimutaka Prison [2005] NZSC 26 and authorities
discussed therein.
- For
Tipping J, the maximum penalty extended to the 'effective maximum', having
regard to the automatic release provided for in the
Criminal Justice Act 1985
i.e. in that case the effective maximum was considered to be two thirds of the
statutorily prescribed maximum.
- In
Mist the Court unanimously held that s 4 of the Criminal Justice Act (in
different terms to s 6 of the Sentencing Act) applied to preclude
the situation
where a change in circumstance of the offender (age) between commission of the
offence and sentencing resulted in the
sentence of preventive detention being
available. Whilst Elias CJ and Keith J considered that the same result would
apply under s6
of the Sentencing Act, the majority of the judges declined to
express a concluded view. However, that case turned not on the issue
of what
constituted a 'penalty', but on whether the right extended beyond variations by
amendment to the legislation to variations
resulting from the crossing of the
age limit between the date of commission of the offence and the date of
sentencing.
|
- The
general principles relating to Article 7(1) were recently reiterated by the
Grand Chamber, comprising 17 judges, of the European
Court of Human Rights:
Achour v France Application No. 76335/01, 29 March 2006 at paras 41 to
43. The majority comprised 16 judges, although one judge delivered a concurring
opinion. One judge dissented.
- Every
Court of Appeals to consider the issue has reached the same conclusion. See
United States v Barton (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2006); United States v Farris
(7th Cir. 24 May 2006); United States v Thomas (11th Cir. Apr. 26,
2006); United States v Pennavaria, No. 04-3556, 2006 WL 1061956, at 4 (3d
Cir. Apr. 24, 2006); Unites States v Williams (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2006);
United States v Alston-Graves, [2006] USCADC 19; 435 F.3d 331, 343 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
United States v Owens (7th Cir.
Mar. 17, 2006); United
States v Cross (7th Cir. Nov. 23, 2005); United States v Vaughn, [2005] USCA2 410; 430
F.3d 518, 525 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v Egenberger, [2005] USCA8 742; 424 F.3d 803,
806 (8th Cir. 2005);
United States v Rines[2005] USCA10 236; , 419 F.3d 1104, 1106-07 (10th Cir. 2005);
United States v Dupas, 419
F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v Lata, [2005] USCA11 91; 415 F.3d 107, 112
(1st Cir. 2005); United
States v Scroggins[2005] USCA5 176; , 411 F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 2005); United
States v Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297,
1308 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v Jamison [2005] USCA7 490; 416 F. 3d 538 (7th Cir.
2005). 7 United States v Barton (6th Cir. Aug.
3, 2006).
8 See Farris at p4 citing United States v
Paulus [2005] USCA7 482; 419 F 3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2005). 9 See
for example United States v Jamison [2005] USCA7 490; 416 F.3d 538 at 539.
- See
United States v Barton (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 2006), particularly the comments
in footnote 4.
- As
held by the Supreme Court in Booker.
- Subject
to certain exceptions, particularly the ability of the Department of Corrections
to apply under s105 of the Criminal Justice
Act 1985 or s 107 of the Parole Act
2002 for an order that the offender serve the full sentence: see s 104 Parole
Act 2002.
- The
Bill amends the definitions of long-term and short-term sentences. A short-term
sentence is presently two years or less, but is
reduced under the Bill to twelve
months or less: clause 80(2). However, this is offset for persons who have
already been sentenced
by halving their sentence for the purpose of determining
whether they are serving a short-term or long-term sentence: clause 80(6).
- See
ss 93-96 Sentencing Act 2002
- Since
July 2004, the standard conditions are deemed to have been imposed unless the
court specifies otherwise: s 93 Sentencing Act
2002.
- Prior
to 30 June 2002 when the Parole Act came into force, there was the power under
the Penal Institutions Act 1954 to extend the
release date as a penalty for
prison disciplinary offences. This power was removed at the same time as the
Parole Act was enacted.
- Elias
CJ delivered a dissenting judgment in which she took a broader view of what
constituted a penalty and, accordingly, also disagreed
with Tipping J's
'modified approach': see para 5 of the judgment.
- Gault
J at para 32; Henry J at para 115.
- The
release regime under the Criminal Justice Act 1985 provided no guarantee than an
offender would not serve their full sentence.
Whilst released from prison, an
offender was not released from the sentence until the sentence expiry date.
Their release from prison
was subject to conditions and they were vulnerable to
recall to prison where they could serve the full term. A further point, not
considered in the Morgan judgments, is that the administration of
sentences was also governed by the Penal Institutions Act 1954. Pursuant to that
Act, the
date on which an offender was entitled to release could be postponed as
a penalty for disciplinary offences committed whilst in prison.
It was entirely
possible that an offender would not be entitled to release after serving
two-thirds of the sentence. Indeed, whilst
practically speaking it was highly
unlikely, it was theoretically possible that an offender could behave so badly
in prison that
he/she would not be entitled to release until the sentence expiry
date.
- Even
applying the broader view to the right taken by Elias CJ or the 'effective
maximum' approach expressed by Tipping J, the expected
corresponding change to
sentencing practises resulting from the Sentencing Council has the potential to
offset the changes in the
parole regime. Elias CJ appears to accept that if
changes in parole amount to a variation of a penalty, the changes should not be
considered in isolation. In considering whether the penalty has been increased,
it is appropriate to have regard to any accompanying
changes in sentencing
policy and the ability to take account of the parole regime when sentencing
(Morgan judgment para 21).
- No
breach can occur where the offence carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment as
the new community based sentences are not harsher
than imprisonment.
- See
clauses 75-77.
- Clause
11.
- The
explanatory note to the Bill expressly states that 'the guidelines issued in New
Zealand are likely to look and operate quite
differently from the "grid systems"
employed for this purpose in the United States'.
- Whilst
the Supreme Court has subsequently invalidated some of the statutory provisions
thereby rendering the guidelines as advisory
only, at the time the Court
considered the challenge to the constitutionality of the Commission, the
guidelines were regarded as
mandatory.
- The
majority judgment has since been re-affirmed by the Court in the judgment of
Justice Stevens in United States v Booker [2005] USSC 593; 543 US 220
(2005).
- The
Commission was said to be established "as an independent commission in the
judicial branch of the United States".
28 At p385.
29 At p394.
30 At p385.
- Particularly,
the right to trial by an impartial jury. This was as a result of the guidelines
being so prescriptive as to the factors
that determined the sentencing range
that the factors effectively became akin to elements of the offence. This meant
that if they
were taken into account on sentencing without having been
determined by the jury or admitted by the accused, the right was breached.
- Booker
v United States [2005] USSC 593; 543 US 220.
- See
clause 50 (proposed ss 54F and 54G); clause 65 (proposed ss 80D and 80O).
- Whilst
a provision in such terms is not required, the Convention includes a number of
general protections for children in criminal
proceedings, including the
principle that imprisonment of children should be a last resort (see in
particular Articles 37, 40)
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