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Social Security Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 19(1)) [2006] NZBORARp 54 (22 November 2006)
Last Updated: 13 January 2019
22 November 2006
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
1990:
Social Security Amendment Bill
- We
have considered whether the Social Security Amendment Bill (PCO 7459/9) is
consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
(‘the Bill of
Rights Act’). We understand that this Bill will be considered by the
Cabinet Legislation Committee at its
meeting on 23 November 2006.
- We
have concluded that the Bill is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act. In
reaching this conclusion, we have considered potential
issues of inconsistency
with the right to freedom of expression (section 14) and the right to freedom
from discrimination (section
19(1)). Our analysis of these issues is set out
below.
- We
understand that a subsequent version of the Bill with largely minor amendments
will go to the Cabinet Legislation Committee on
Thursday, 23 November 2006.
Further, we understand from officials that any changes to the Bill are unlikely
to give rise to Bill
of Rights Act issues. If any of the amendments do give rise
to a Bill of Rights Act issue, we will advise you immediately.
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
- The
Bill amends the Social Security Act 1964. It represents the first phase of the
Working New Zealand: Work-Focused Support package
of proposals to reform the
social support system. This package of reforms is intended to encourage
beneficiaries to participate in
the labour market, where work is an appropriate
outcome, and continue to provide social and financial support for people with
temporary
or long-term barriers to work.
- The
main objectives of the Bill are:
- to place greater
expectations on benefit recipients, which align with new developments in service
delivery and support; and
- to align and
update a number of provisions in the Social Security Act.
- The
Bill seeks to achieve these objectives by:
- introducing a
new pre-benefit activity requirement on applicants for unemployment benefit, and
enhancing the current expectations
of people who are work-tested;
- introducing
planning and activity requirements for sickness and invalid’s
beneficiaries, and other people who are not work-tested
(in particular,
the
spouses and partners of beneficiaries whose youngest
dependent child is aged under 6);
- introducing an
activity requirement (education, training or employment) instead of the work
test for young people in receipt of an
independent youth benefit;
- providing that
some people with ill health or a significant disability be exempt from any work,
planning or activity requirement;
- aligning and
updating provisions relating to:
- the
application process:
- residence
criteria:
- the
maximum stand down period (reducing the stand-down period to two weeks for all
primary benefits):
- periods
for which main benefits are paid:
- broadening a
reference to hospital care (for the domestic purposes benefit for care of sick
or infirm persons) so other forms of full-time,
disability related care are
included.
SUMMARY OF BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ISSUES
- Below
is a summary of how the issues of inconsistency with sections 19(1) and 14 of
the Bill of Rights Act arise. A more detailed
analysis of these issues follows
this summary.
- We
have considered whether issues with the right to be free from discrimination as
affirmed by section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights
Act arise in the Bill on the
grounds of age, marital status, family status and sex because of limits placed
on eligibility for certain
benefits, the lesser or greater benefit requirements
that certain people have to meet and the lighter penalties imposed on certain
people.
- A
number of clauses in the Bill compel applicants and beneficiaries to disclose
information in a range of situations in order to be
eligible or continue to be
eligible for a benefit. These clauses give rise to an issue under section 14 of
the Bill of Rights Act
(the right to freedom of expression).
- We
have reached the conclusion that, upon consideration of these issues under
section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, the Bill appears
to be consistent with the
rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act.
ISSUES OF INCONSISTENCY WITH THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
Section 19: Freedom from Discrimination
- Under
section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act everyone has the right to freedom from
discrimination on the grounds of discrimination
set out in section 21 of the
Human Rights Act 1993. The grounds of discrimination include age, marital
status, family status and
sex.
- Not
all policies or practices that draw a distinction between individuals give rise
to an issue of discrimination under section 19(1)
of the Bill of Rights Act.
This is because different treatment does not necessarily result in disadvantage.
In our view, taking into
account the various domestic and
overseas
judicial pronouncements as to the meaning of discrimination, the key questions
in assessing whether discrimination under
section 19(1) exists are:
- Does the
legislation draw a distinction based on one of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination?
- Does the
distinction involve disadvantage to one or more classes of individuals?
- If
these questions are answered in the affirmative, we consider that the
legislation gives rise to a prima facie issue under section 19(1) of the
Bill of Rights Act.
- Where
a provision is found to be prima facie inconsistent with a particular
right or freedom, it may nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act
if it can be considered
a reasonable limit that is justifiable in terms of
section 5 of that Act. The section 5 inquiry is essentially two-fold: whether
the provision serves an important and significant objective; and whether there
is a rational and proportionate connection between
the provision and the
objective.1
Discrimination on the grounds of age, marital status, family status and
sex
- Several
clauses in the Bill draw distinctions between applicants, beneficiaries and
spouses or partners of beneficiaries on the grounds
of age, marital status,
family status and sex for the purpose of determining benefit entitlements.
Clause 5: Widows’ benefits
- Clause
5 of the Bill provides that for the purposes of determining eligibility for a
widow’s benefit, the Chief Executive may
regard any dependent child as
being a child of an applicant for a widow’s benefit if the child is being
maintained by the applicant
and was at any time maintained by the
applicant’s husband.
- This
clause draws a distinction between persons on the grounds of sex and marital
status for the purposes of determining eligibility
for a widow’s benefit
because a dependent child will only be regarded as being the child of an
applicant if the applicant is
a married female. However, this distinction does
not disadvantage males with a dependent child whose spouse or partner has died,
or females with a dependent child whose partner has died, because they are
eligible for the domestic purposes benefit (DPB) to assist
them to care for
their child. The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) has advised that the DPB
rate is equivalent to the widow’s
benefit.
1 In applying section 5, we have had
regard to the guidelines set out by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of
Transport (MOT) v Noort [1993] 3 NZLR 260 Moonen v Film and Literature
Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9; and Moonen v Film and Literature Board
of Review [2002] NZCA 69; [2002] 2 NZLR 754 and Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th).
Clause 7: Domestic purposes benefits for care at home of the sick or
infirm (DPB: CSI)
Ineligibility of 16 and 17 year olds caring for spouse or partner for
DPB: CSI
- Clause
7 of the Bill provides that an applicant who has attained the age
of
16 years and meets the residential requirement is entitled to
receive a domestic purposes benefit for care at home of the sick or
infirm (DPB:
CSI), if the Chief Executive is satisfied that the applicant is required to give
full time care and attention at home
to some other person (other than the
applicant’s spouse or partner).
- This
clause draws a distinction on the grounds of marital status between 16 and 17
year olds who are required to give full time care
and attention at home to their
spouse or partner who would otherwise require hospital, rest home or residential
disability care,
or care of an equivalent kind, and those who are required to
care for any other person in the same situation. In our view, this clause
is
prima facie inconsistent with section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act as it
disadvantages 16 and 17 year olds who are caring for
their spouse or partner
because they are not eligible to receive any financial support.
- We
consider that the clause serves a significant and important objective. This is
because it helps protect vulnerable young people
and ensures that they do not
sacrifice their own well-being and future prospects, and have the opportunity to
be engaged in full-time
education, training or employment. It is particularly
important that there is no financial incentive for young persons to leave
school to care for a spouse or partner, as educational attainment is important
for improved long-term socio-economic outcomes.
- Young
persons are able to care for persons other than their spouse or partner because
there may be cultural practices involved which
oblige young people to care for
older family members. Even so, young people caring for family members will only
be able to receive
a benefit where there is no other available carer, all the
family circumstances and alternative care arrangements have been considered,
and
the young person’s parents or guardians do not have capacity to provide
adequate financial support. It is our view that
the provision is rationally and
proportionately connected to this objective and is therefore justified in terms
of section 5 of the
Bill of Rights Act.
Indirect distinction on grounds of family status
- Clause
7 draws an indirect distinction on the grounds of family status between a person
receiving a sickness or invalid’s benefit
who is married, in a civil union
or a de facto relationship with a 16 or 17 year old person, and a person
receiving the same type
of benefit who has a spouse or partner aged 18 years or
over. This is because they receive their benefit at the ‘married
rate’
and not the ‘single rate’, even though their 16 or 17
year old spouse or partner is not eligible to receive a benefit.
- We
consider that any disadvantage that arises from this situation is justified. One
of the principles underlying the social security
regime in place in New Zealand
is that young persons under 18 years will benefit long-term from being in
full-time education, training
or employment. Therefore to ensure that there is
no financial incentive for young persons to leave school or training early, such
persons are ineligible, in normal circumstances, to receive a benefit. This
principle applies equally in the present case, as the
couple will benefit
long-term if the younger of the two partners remains in full-time education,
training or employment. We note,
however, that if the couple suffers financial
hardship as a result of the younger partner or spouse not receiving a benefit,
then
that person may apply for an emergency benefit under section 61 of the
Social Security Act.
Limited eligibility of 16 and 17 year olds for DPB:
CSI
- Under
clause 7, a 16 or 17 year old applicant is ineligible to receive a DPB: CSI,
unless the Chief Executive is satisfied, having
regard to the circumstances of
the person, the person he or she is giving care and attention to, and their
families, that no other
caregiver is reasonably available to care for the other
person. This clause draws a distinction between 16 and 17 year olds and those
who are aged 18 years or older for the purpose of determining eligibility for a
DPB:CSI. Persons who are 18 years or older do not
have to meet the test outlined
above. This clause appears to raise an issue of inconsistency with section 19(1)
of the Bill of Rights
Act on the grounds of age.
- We
consider that the clause is justified in terms of section 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act for the reasons given in paragraph 23 above.
Clause 24: Interpretation - definition of ‘part-time
work-tested beneficiary’
- Clause
24 defines the term “part-time work tested beneficiary” as a person
who is a work-tested spouse or partner and
whose youngest dependent child is
aged 6 years or older, but under 18 years. This definition draws a distinction
on the grounds of
family status between work-tested spouses or partners whose
youngest dependent child is aged under 6 years and:
- those who have
no dependent children; and
- those whose
youngest dependent child is aged 6 years or older, but under 18 years.
- The
consequences of this distinction is that spouses or partners whose youngest
dependent child is aged 6 years or more will be disadvantaged
because they are
required to be part-time work-tested (required to take up suitable employment),
whereas spouses or partners whose
youngest dependent child is under 6 years are
not required to be work-tested. It also disadvantages spouses or partners who
have
no dependent children as they are required to be full-time work-tested.
Therefore, the definition of ‘part-time work-tested
beneficiary’
appears to raise a prima facie issue of inconsistency with section 19 of the
Bill of Rights Act.
- In
our view, the definition of part-time work-tested beneficiaries is justified in
terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. The
Bill recognises that people
with dependent children under 6 years of age are best placed to provide
full-time
care for their children, but once the children are school
aged, they will be able to work part-time, while caring for their children
outside of school hours. In this context, MSD has advised that the provision is
consistent with the Government’s objective
of facilitating greater choices
for primary carers around work and parenting.
Clause 31(2): Personal development and employment plans
- Clause
31(2) provides that spouses or partners of recipients of emergency,
invalid’s, sickness or unemployment benefits who
have a dependent child
aged under 6 years must develop a personal development and employment plan
(PDEP) and comply with the PDEP
requirements. But such spouses or partners are
not subject to a work-test.
- This
clause distinguishes between spouses or partners of recipients of emergency,
invalid’s, sickness or unemployment benefits
who have a dependent child
under 6 years of age and:
- those who do not
have dependent children; and
- those whose
youngest dependent child is aged 6 years or over.
- This
distinction disadvantages spouses or partners of beneficiaries who do not have
dependent children as they are subject to a full-time
work-test as well as the
PDEP requirements. It also disadvantages spouses or partners whose youngest
dependent child is aged 6 years
or more because they are subject to a part-time
work-test as well as the PDEP requirements. Therefore, the clause raises a prima
facie issue of discrimination on the grounds of family status.
- In
our opinion, clause 31(2) is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act because it
assists certain beneficiaries and their spouses
or partners to care for young
children, who require greater parental attention, by not subjecting them to a
work-test. They are instead
required to develop a PDEP and are obliged to comply
with the requirements set out in this plan. This will enable such persons to
plan for a return to work as their family circumstances allow.
Clause 29: Independent youth benefit: obligations
- Clause
29 provides that a person granted an independent youth benefit is required
to:
- participate for
at least 30 hours a week and not more than 40 hours a week, in any approved
activities the person has previously agreed
in writing to undertake, unless the
person has a limited capacity to work because of sickness, injury, disability,
pregnancy or the
need to care for dependent children, in which case he or she
must participate in at least one approved activity (being educational,
training
or developmental activity) for at least 3 hours a week; or
- be available
for, and take reasonable steps to obtain, full-time employment.
- These
requirements do not form part of the obligations that are imposed on persons
aged 18 or over who are receiving a work-tested
benefit. Clause 29, therefore,
creates a disadvantageous distinction that gives rise to a
prima
facie issue of inconsistency with section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act on the
grounds of age.
- We
consider that Clause 29 is justified in terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act. The provision actively engages eligible young
people in education,
training, employment or developmental activities that will lead to their
long-term economic independence and
wellbeing. It is also important that a broad
range of intensive interventions be available for 16 and 17 year olds as
employment
may not be the best outcome, especially where young people lack or
have low qualifications or skills and where, due to their circumstances,
they
are not work or life-ready.
- 16
and 17 year olds are transitioning from being at school full-time to having
greater choice over activities. They are, therefore,
at greater risk of becoming
disengaged from education, training or employment and becoming inactive. Young
people who are inactive
for prolonged periods of time have a heightened risk of
poor outcomes, including lower earnings, greater reliance on social assistance,
higher rates of unemployment, criminal offending, substance abuse, teenage
pregnancy, suicide, homelessness and mental or physical
ill-health.
2 Requiring young people to engage in these activities
is intended to reduce the risk of these negative outcomes.
Clause 43: Effect of sanctions on rate of benefit for people
married or in civil union or de facto relationship
- Clause
43 provides that if the suspension or cancellation of a benefit payable at a
work-test married rate results from the failure
of both work-tested spouses or
partners in respect of whom the benefit is paid to comply with work-test
obligations and they have
one or more dependent children, the suspension or
cancellation of the benefit applies to only half the applicable rate of the
benefit
before any abatement on account of income. The spouses or partners are
entitled to receive half that rate (and the appropriate income
test applies to
that rate).
- This
clause draws distinctions on the grounds of marital status and family status
between beneficiaries who are married, in a civil
union or a de facto
relationship with dependent children and those who are married, in a civil union
or a de facto relationship without
dependent children. The distinction arises
where a childless couple can be liable to have their total benefit suspended or
cancelled
where both members of the couple fail to meet their obligations,
whereas if the couple have dependent children, the suspension or
cancellation
affects only half of the benefit.
- We
consider that this distinction is justifiable because it costs more to support a
family than it does to support a couple. Suspending
the total benefit for a
family on welfare would cause considerable hardship, and the limited financial
assistance the beneficiaries
would receive during a suspension or cancellation
period will enable such persons to continue to support their children.
2 McLaren (2003) Reconnecting Young
People, Ministry of Social Development, & Maloney, (2003) The
Determinants, Patterns and Outcomes of School-to-Work Transitions Among
Youth in
the Christchurch Health and Development Study, Department of Labour.
Section 14 Freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act provides:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including
the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinion
of any kind and
in any form."
- The
right to freedom of expression extends to all forms of communication that
attempt to express an idea or meaning,3 and has been
given a very broad meaning to encompass conduct that has an expressive
component.4 The right has been interpreted as including
the right not to be compelled to say certain things or to provide certain
information.5 Part of the reasoning behind this
position is that individuals should not be portrayed as being aligned with
particular opinions that
they do not believe in or forced to express deeply held
personal beliefs. The right not to say certain things appears to extend to
written6 as well as verbal7
forms of communication.
- A
number of clauses in the Bill compel applicants and beneficiaries to disclose
information in a range of situations in order to be
eligible or continue to be
eligible for benefit. For instance, clause 31(1) of the Bill enables the Chief
Executive to require beneficiaries
to attend and participate in interviews to
identify, inter alia, any features of the person's individual
circumstances or parenting responsibilities that may affect the ability of the
person to
obtain employment, and the person’s skills and experience that
are relevant to obtaining employment.
- We
consider the provisions that raise issues of inconsistency with section 14 of
the Bill of Rights Act appear to be justified in
terms of section 5 of that Act.
The aim of these provisions is to require beneficiaries and applicants for the
unemployment benefit,
who are able to work, to be available for suitable
employment and plan for returning to work in the future. The purpose of these
provisions is to ensure eligibility for benefits and to identify the appropriate
training for clients to take up to assist them to
move into work.
- Additionally,
MSD has advised that keeping active and connected is a key way of achieving the
objective of assisting people into employment.
Provisions that require persons
to disclose information to Work and Income, for instance, about their skills and
experience provide
that agency with more opportunities to identify the
appropriate level of support required and allow the agency to get to know a
client
as a person not just a beneficiary. The PDEP planning requirements and
enhanced case management system enable Work and Income to
work more proactively
with people and allow people to take advantage of services or programmes on
offer.
3 R v Keegstra [1990] INSC 224; [1990] 3 SCR 697,
729-826.
4 Irwin Toy Ltd v Attorney-General (Quebec)
[1989] 1 SCR 927, 968.
5 Slaight Communications v Davidson 59 DLR
(4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705
(1977).
6 Slaight Communications v Davidson 59 DLR
(4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705
(1977).
7 West Virginia State Board of Education v
Barnette [1943] USSC 130; 319 US 624 (1943).
Conclusion
7. We have concluded that the Bill appears to be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.
Melanie Webb Margaret Dugdale
Manager, Ministerial Advice Policy Manager, Bill of Rights/Human Rights
Office of Legal Counsel Public Law Group
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website,
please note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the
Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to Parliament
under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the Social
Security Amendment Bill. It should not be used or acted upon for any other
purpose. The advice does no
more than assess whether the Bill complies with the
minimum guarantees contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The release
of this advice should not be taken to indicate that the Attorney- General agrees
with all aspects of it, nor does its release constitute
a general waiver of
legal professional privilege in respect of this or any other matter. Whilst care
has been taken to ensure that
this document is an accurate reproduction of the
advice provided to the Attorney-General, neither the Ministry of Justice nor the
Crown Law Office accepts any liability for any errors or omissions.
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