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Policing Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 25(c), and 27(1)) [2007] NZBORARp 46 (12 December 2007)
Last Updated: 5 January 2019
Policing Bill
12 December 2007 Attorney-General LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990:
POLICING BILL
- We
have assessed whether the Policing Bill (PCO 8297/13) (‘the Bill') is
consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 (‘the Bill of
Rights Act'). We understand that the Bill is to be considered by the Cabinet
Legislation Committee at its
meeting on Thursday 13 December 2007.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
this conclusion, we
considered potential inconsistencies with sections 14, 16, 17, 18, 21, 22,
25(c), and 27(1) of the Bill of Rights
Act.
- The
following summary provides you with:
- A brief overview
of the contents of the Bill;
- A note of the
provisions of the Bill which appear to raise issues under the Bill of Rights
Act; and
- Our conclusion
as to the Bill's consistency with the Bill of Rights Act.
- This
summary is followed by a fuller analysis which discusses each of the issues
raised under the Bill of Rights Act noting, where
relevant, the justificatory
material in each instance.
SUMMARY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ISSUES
- The
stated purpose of this Bill is to provide for policing services in New Zealand,
and to state the functions and provide for the
governance and administration of
the New Zealand Police.
- Generally,
the Bill contains provisions relating to the functioning of the Police as a
national force. Broadly, the Bill covers the:
- roles of
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioners, constables, authorised officers, Police
jailer and escort, Police guard, Police specialist
crime investigator, Police
transport safety enforcement officer, and other Police staff;
- employment
relationships and industrial relations of Police
employees;
- use of
biometric information for pre-employment vetting and crime scene
elimination;
- various offence
provisions;
- ability to take
identifying details of a person in certain circumstances;
- powers to detain
intoxicated people;
- use of the term
"Police";
- international
policing provisions;
- regulation-making
powers; and,
- use of Police
dog provisions and offences.
- A
number of measures proposed by the Bill raise issues of consistency with the
Bill of Rights Act.
- We
considered the provision enabling a constable to take the identifying details of
persons in certain circumstances for consistency
with sections 21 and 22 of the
Bill of Rights Act. We concluded that this provision was consistent with the
Bill of Rights Act in
light of the purpose of the provision, and the use that
the information will be put to.
- Clause
34 provides that a constable may in certain circumstances temporarily close any
road or any part of the road. We considered
this provision in terms of
consistency with sections 14 and 18 of the Bill of Rights Act. Taking into
account the need for the Police
to maintain public order, the circumstances in
which this power can be invoked, and section 6 of the Bill of Rights Act, we
concluded
that this clause appears consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
Bill contains a provision authorising the detention of intoxicated persons where
they are incapable of protecting themselves from
physical harm, or are likely to
cause physical harm to another person or significant damage to any property. We
concluded that this
clause does not create an arbitrary detention for the
purposes of section 22 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
Bill contains a number of provisions empowering searches of people in custody.
We consider that these provisions are consistent
with section 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- The
Bill regulates the use of the word "Police" in an operating name, and prohibits
the use of Police uniforms and related articles
in circumstances likely to lead
any person to believe that the user is a Police employee. However, we consider
that these provisions
are justified in terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
- Clauses
67 and 77 appear to place limits on section 17, the right to freedom of
association, however we consider that these limits
are justified in terms of
section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- Clause
68 provides that a strike by or lockout of, any number of constables is
unlawful. The provision is said to preserve trust and
confidence in Police, and
provide comfort to members of the public and the government of the day. The
provision applies only to constables
and thus ensures that essential policing
services will continue irrespective of the outcome of negotiations on employment
conditions.
The Bill also provides an arbitration process in the event of
disputes, and for these reasons we considered the restrictions to be
justified
in terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
Bill enables the Commissioner of Police to at any time remove any Police
employee. Although this appears to raise an issue with
the right to natural
justice, we are satisfied that any decision made by the Commissioner under this
provision will need to be made
in a manner consistent with the principles of
natural justice.
- The
Bill establishes a regime to take biometric information relating to prospective
and current Police employees. One purpose for
taking this data is pre-employment
vetting. The second purpose is to eliminate existing staff or Police associates
from being considered
in the investigation of a crime. We considered these
provisions for consistency with the right to be free from unreasonable search
and seizure.
- There
are a number of safeguards in place for the use of the biometric information.
With the use of biometric information for elimination
purposes, there are
comprehensive protections against use other than elimination. For pre-employment
vetting, it is reasonable that
given the need for public confidence and the fact
that no-one is compelled to apply to join, the Police can require DNA checks
against
outstanding offences for prospective employees; and if an outstanding
offence is found, that can then be pursued. We therefore considered
these
provisions are not inconsistent with protections against unreasonable search and
seizure under section 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
- The
Bill contains several provisions that appear to contain reverse onus offences,
thereby raising an issue of prima facie inconsistency under section 25(c)
(right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty). We have concluded that
these provisions are,
on balance, justifiable under section 5. In reaching this
conclusion we have considered the objectives of the offence provisions,
and
particularly the penalty levels. Although some of the penalties are not at the
lower end of the scale and allow for the imposition
of a sentence of
imprisonment, we consider them acceptable in view of the seriousness of the
offences concerned and the importance
of the objective at which these offences
are aimed.
- Clause
100 allows regulations to be made regulating the involvement of Police employees
in any political activity connected with elections.
For completeness we note
that any regulations made under this clause may be struck down as ultra vires
if they are found to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights
Act.
- On
balance, we have concluded that the Bill does not appear to be inconsistent with
the Bill of Rights Act.
ISSUES OF CONSISTENCY WITH THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
- Where
a provision limits the rights and freedoms protected in the Bill of Rights Act,
such limitations may be consistent with that
Act if it can be considered
"justifiable" in terms of section 5 of that Act. The section 5 inquiry is
essentially two-fold: whether
the provision serves an important and significant
objective; and whether there is a rational and proportionate connection between
the provision and that objective.[1]
Identifying details
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act provides the right to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure. There are two limbs
to the section 21 right.
First, section 21 is applicable only in respect of those activities that
constitute a "search or seizure".
Second, where certain actions do constitute a
search and seizure, section 21 protects only against those searches or seizures
that
are "unreasonable" in the circumstances.
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act provides that "everyone has the right not to be
arbitrarily arrested or detained."
- The
Courts have said that a detention is arbitrary if it is "capricious, unreasoned,
without reasonable cause: if it is made without
reference to an adequate
determining principle or without following proper procedures."[2]
- Clause
32(1) of the Bill provides that a constable may take the identifying details of
any person in the lawful custody of the Police.
In addition, clause 32(2)
creates a significant new power where a constable who has good cause to suspect
a person of committing
an offence may detain that person at any place for the
purpose of taking identifying details. The purpose of the taking of details
in
both cases is to enable the commencement of a prosecution.[3] A constable may use reasonable force to
secure the person's identifying details. It is an offence, after being
cautioned, to fail
to comply with any reasonable demand or direction for taking
identifying details.
- The
Bill defines identifying details at clause 32(5):
- the
person's biographical information (for example, the person's name, address, date
of birth);
- the
person's photograph or visual image;
- details
of the person's fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, height, scars, marks, and
tattoos; and
- any
other physical details relevant to the offence that the person is suspected of
committing.
- We
understand that the mischief meant to be addressed is the practice of
individuals giving incorrect identifying details when asked
by the Police.[4] This results in the wrong person appearing
on a summons or even serving another person's time in prison.
- The
Police advises that key thing is to know the person named in the information is
indeed the person appearing on the charge.
- We
consider the purpose of clause 32 is to take only the details of a person which
are necessary to identify the individual lawfully
detained by Police.[5] It is not the purpose of clause 32 to use
the recorded information against a person in criminal proceedings.[6] Based on the purpose of clause 32, we do
not consider the right not to be a witness or to confess guilt to be
engaged.
- Similarly,
we do not consider that a clause 32 demand for details triggers section 23 of
the Bill of Rights (rights of person arrested
or detained).[7] A person may voluntarily give their
details to the Police. Otherwise, once a person is detained under clause 32,
they must be cautioned.
Section 23 Bill of Rights Act requires that a person
arrested or detained[8] under any
enactment shall have the right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay
and to be informed of that right.[9] More
particularly, clause 32 does not empower Police to engage in inhumane searches
or treatment[10] of an individual to
collect details on a person's scars, marks, and tattoos and any other physical
details relevant to the offence
that the person is suspected of committing.
- We
note that much of clause 32 is not a new power. Clause 32 continues the powers
of section 57 of the current Police Act 1958. In
addition, the Land Transport
Act 1998 empowers an enforcement officer to:
"Direct a person on a road (whether or not in charge of a vehicle)
to give the person's name and address and date of birth, or such
of those
particulars as the enforcement officer may specify, and give any other
particulars required as to the person's identity."[11]
- The
fact that the power contained in clause 32 partially exists in current
legislation does not prevent it from being subject to vetting
under the Bill of
Rights Act. What is new, however, is the wide definition of identifying details
and the significant ability to
detain someone to be able to take those details
without an actual arrest (but in circumstances where there are grounds to arrest
the person).
- Sections
39(1) of the Summary Offences Act 1981 and 315(2)(b) of the Crimes Act 1961 also
create a power for a constable to arrest
an individual without a warrant where
they have good cause to suspect[12] a
person of committing certain offences. Clause 32(2) contains a similar
precondition before details may be taken.[13]
- We
consider the taking of identifying details to be prima facie inconsistent
with protection from unreasonable search and seizure because of the lack of a
warrant or judicial oversight[14]
combined with the wide definition of identifying details.
- Similarly,
the wide definition of identifying details would raise concerns about section 22
liberty rights. As an identifying detail
includes scars, marks, tattoos and any
other physical
details relevant to the offence the person is
suspected of committing, persons may be detained and reasonable force used to
secure
details about the person's body at any place for a period necessary to
take those details. We consider this provision to be prima facie
inconsistent with the liberty of the person.
Is this justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act?
- At
the outset, it is important to address the use that the information gathered
under this provision will be put to. Clause 32 provides
that the information
will only be used to identify someone to enable the commencement of a
prosecution against that person. If the
Police take details that are not
necessary for the commencement of a prosecution against the individual lawfully
detained, then the
Police will have exceeded their authority under this clause
and will be acting unlawfully.
- The
inclusion of the phrase "commencement of a prosecution against that person" and
the cases considering section 57 of the Police
Act determine the narrow use of
the compelled information. The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the
person that was lawfully
detained when this power was exercised is the same
person that is appearing in court on that summons or charge. The Crown still
bears
the burden of proving the necessary elements of the alleged crime itself.
The Crown cannot rely on the contents of an information
as evidence of those
identifying details.[15]
- We
particularly note that the purpose of this provision must be scrupulously
respected for the power under clause 32 to be consistent
the Bill of Rights
Act.
- We,
therefore, consider the above purpose to be a significant and important
objective in relation to the prima facie inconsistencies triggered by
clause 32.
- In
accepting the limited objective of this clause – only the details of a
person which are necessary to identify the individual
lawfully detained by
Police – we now consider whether the means chosen to implement this
objective are rationally connected
and proportionate to the limitations on an
individual's rights.
- The
Police states that taking identifying details is not always as simple as a name,
age, address, photo and fingerprints. The Bill,
however, allows Police to take
only those identifying details necessary to identify the person lawfully
detained. The more invasive
identifying features may only be recorded where
necessary.[16]
- Under
the Bill, biographical information is not limited to name, address and date of
birth. The Police advises that certain other
information is sometimes necessary
to identify an individual. In cases where aliases are used, misspelling of
names, or there are
multiple names and addresses for an individual, there is a
need for further biographical information.
- We
are further advised that customarily taken details (name, date of birth, weight,
height, photos, eye colour) create different degrees
of certainty, fingerprints,
palm prints and footprints usually to a very high degree of certainty (depending
on the nature of people's
hands and feet). Clause 32(2)(a) would therefore
preclude the taking of any other
identifying details where it is not
necessary for the reasonable identification of the detained individual.
- The
purpose of clauses 32(5)(c) and 32(5)(d) is only for rare situations where
recording the identity of the individual lawfully detained
by Police cannot be
done with a degree of certainty using the other defined details.[17]
- The
Police advises that the reasonable force provision is a technical use of force
to cover the contact required for taking prints.
- We
therefore consider that the prima facie inconsistencies with the Bill of
Rights Act are rationally linked to the objective of clause 32.
- In
considering the proportionality, we consider broadly whether the limits place on
sections 21 and 22 of the Bill of Rights are reasonably
proportionate to the
objective of clause 32.
- The
Court of Appeal in Moulton v Police stated that[18]
"Of course it does not follow that, in the guise of asking for
particulars, the police may delve into a person's past. In a sense,
details of a
person's schooling, employment record, successive addresses, family background,
friendships, medical history, financial
position, hobbies, leisure interests and
beliefs, all serve to single him out from the rest of the population. But to
allow the collection
of information of that kind under pain of legal penalty for
non-disclosure would constitute a substantial intrusion on personal privacy;
and
to allow for inquiry into a man's past might, in some cases, require him to
incriminate himself. It could never have been contemplated
by Parliament that s
57 would be taken to empower the police to compile a dossier of that kind on any
individual in temporary custody."[19]
- The
Court of Appeal goes on to state:
"the apparent object of the section is to allow the police to
record those particulars of him which at that time, in the aggregate,
serve to
single him out from the rest of the population."[20]
- Constable
considering the exercise of their discretion to take identifying details must
also give appropriate consideration to the
values of individual liberty and
public order which are necessarily involved in the decision.[21]
- We
consider the limits placed on an individual's right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure are proportionate. We do so
in reliance of the:
- stated purpose
by the Police for clause 32;
- trigger for
being able to take identifying details is to already be in lawful custody or for
a constable to have good cause to suspect
a person of committing an
offence;
- only those
details necessary to identify the person may be taken;
- absolute
prohibition on the use of a strip search;[22]
- findings by the
Court of Appeal in Moulton that the power to take identifying details is
not designed to help the Police to gather further evidence in support of the
charge
in respect of which the person is in detained;
- general search
power under clause 37 is not available to Police in respect of people detained
under clause 32(2); and
- requirement that
the Police must consider individual liberty values when exercising the
discretion to take details.
- With
respect to liberty rights, we consider the limits on the right not to be
arbitrarily detained are proportionate. This is based
on the above
justifications and the requirement that the detention only be for the period
reasonably necessary to secure the person's
identifying details where the person
is not already in the lawful custody of the Police.
Temporary closing of roads
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act provides:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any
kind and in
any form."
- The
right to freedom of expression extends to all forms of communication, including
conduct,[23] that attempt to express an
idea or meaning.[24] Even commercial
expression is capable of protection.[25]
- Section
18(1) of the Bill of Rights provides that "Everyone lawfully in New Zealand has
the right to freedom of movement and residence
in New Zealand."
- Clause
34 provides that under certain conditions, a constable may temporarily close any
part of a road (including a motorway, private
road or private way) to all
traffic, including pedestrian traffic.
- A
constable may temporarily close a road if he or she has reasonable cause to
believe: "(a) public disorder exists or is imminent
at or near that place;
or
(b) danger to a member of the public exists or may reasonably be expected at or
near that place; or
(c) an indictable offence not triable summarily under section 6 of the Summary
Proceedings Act 1957 has been committed or discovered
at or near that
place."
- Section
18(1) of the Bill of Rights Act recognises the right of people in New Zealand to
roam at will. We consider that clause 34
is prima facie inconsistent with
this right.
- We
also consider that clause 34, in the context of protests or other activity
seeking to impart meaning on or adjacent to a road,
would be prima facie
inconsistent with section 14 (freedom of expression) of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Is this justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act?
- The
objective of clause 34 is for the protection of the public and public order and
for the investigation of serious offences. We
consider these objectives to be
significant and important for both freedom of movement and expression issues. We
now turn to whether
the means chosen to implement this objective are rationally
connected and proportionate to the limitations on an individual's rights.
- While
the prima facie inconsistency of clause 34 and the freedom of movement
and expression may overlap, we would divide the activities that may raise issues
into those activities that may seek to covey a meaning and those that do
not.
- Preventing
activities that do not seek to convey a meaning, such as stopping an
unremarkable drive from Auckland to Wellington along
State Highway One, would
engage section 18 of the Bill of Rights Act. Both sections 14 and 18 would be
engaged in stopping a protest
or a hīkoi along the same route.
- We
consider that the need for Police to maintain public order, protect the public
and investigate serious offences is rationally linked
to closing roads.
- In
addressing the proportionality of the prima facie inconsistency, the
benefits of the objectives must outweigh the deleterious effects of temporarily
circumscribing a person's right
to use a public or private road.
- There
are, however, numerous instances where the state circumscribes the use of roads.
Judge Ryan in Kerr v Attorney-General noted that:
"It must be observed that if s 18 is concerned with freedom to use
the roads then it must be one of the most qualified of the rights
and freedoms
affirmed by the Act for it is subject to the provisions of the Transport Act
1962, the Traffic Regulations 1976, and
myriad other statutory provisions
regulating, prohibiting, qualifying and directing the use of the roads and
activities in public
places."[26]
- While
the standard is lower for justifying limits to non-expressive movement, clause
34 is meets this standard in that:
- the power is
only temporary;
- it does not
explicitly allow for detention of individuals; and
- it is concerned
only with dealing with public disorder, protection of the public or
investigation of serious offences.
- Therefore,
we consider that clause 34 is rationally and proportionally linked to its
objectives and is justified under section 5 of
the Bill of Rights in relation to
freedom of movement.
- The
prima facie inconsistency with section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act
arises in the context of an activity that seeks to impart meaning. We have
used
the examples of a protest or a hīkoi.
- Like
freedom of movement, we consider that the need for Police to maintain public
order, protect the public and investigate serious
offences is rationally linked
to closing roads. We also consider it proportionate to temporarily close a road
to vehicles or pedestrians
where there is a danger to the public or there is an
investigation of a serious offence.
- In
relation to public disorder, the right to express ones self, individually or as
a group, is not absolute. Article 19 of the International
Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that rights may be subject to certain restrictions, as
set out in law, and are necessary
for the protection of public order.
- The
Supreme Court in Brooker v Police addressed the issue of where protest
moves from protected expression to impinging on public order. The Court
considered expression
under the Bill of Rights Act and Brooker's conviction for
disorderly behaviour.[27]
- Elias
CJ set a standard for disorderly behaviour as
"...behaviour which amounts to intimidation, victimisation, or
bullying is disruptive of public order even if no violence is reasonably
in
prospect. Such behaviour is likely to alarm or be seen as threatening by those
present. It is likely to cause others to withdraw
from or avoid the area and it
is behaviour which inhibits normal public use of the place."[28]
- Tipping
J noted that the standard may also shift in the context of freedom of
expression:
"Where, as here, the behaviour concerned involves a genuine
exercise of the right to freedom of expression, the reasonable member
of the
public may well be expected to bear a somewhat higher level of anxiety or
disturbance than would otherwise be the case."[29]
- The
Supreme Court discussion of public disorder set a high standard to close a road
because of an existing or imminent expressive
public disorder.
- We
also expect that the Police will define public disorder pursuant to the common
law. Clause 34 will therefore be approached in light
of section 6 of the Bill of
Rights Act. This means that clause 34 is to be given a meaning that is
consistent with the guarantee
of freedom of expression under the Bill of Rights
Act.
Powers relating to the care and protection of intoxicated people
- Generally,
the Bill contains provisions authorising the detention of intoxicated persons
where they are incapable of protecting themselves
from physical harm, likely to
cause physical harm to another person or significant damage to any property.
There are two 12 hour
periods of detention authorised, each with different tests
for detention. The detention will not be for the purposes of bringing
criminal
charges or prosecutions. We consider that such detentions raise issues under
section 22 (liberty of the person).
- The
right not to be arbitrarily detained was discussed above in the context of
identifying details.
- Clause
35 does not authorise any treatment that would raise issues under section 23
(rights of persons arrested or detained).[30] In particular, section 23(5) of the Bill
of Rights would not be engaged where Police use reasonable force to protect an
intoxicated
person from self-harm.[31] It
is only where conduct by the Police veers into inhumane treatment that section
23(5) would be infringed.[32] If such
treatment did result from the detention under this provision, it would be
unlawful.
- Clause
35 takes an existing power at section 37A of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction
Act 1966 allowing Police to detain intoxicated
persons for 12 hours as a last
resort. The person may only be detained where they are intoxicated and where
they are incapable of
protecting themselves from physical harm, likely to cause
physical harm to another person or significant damage to any property.
It is a
last resort because the Police must first be satisfied that it is not reasonably
practicable to provide for the person's
care and protection by taking the person
to their residence or to a temporary shelter.[33]
- The
Bill extends this power an additional 12 hours. Clause 35(3) provides that the
decision to recommend the exercise of this power
is independent from the
Police:
"A health practitioner must not recommend the further detention of
a person detained under subsection (1) [the power to detain an
intoxicated
person for the first 12 hours] unless the health practitioner satisfies himself
or herself that—
(a) the person remains intoxicated and is incapable of protecting himself or
herself from physical harm; and
(b) the person does not have health needs that may require medical attention;
and
(c) it is not reasonably practicable to provide for the person's continuing care
and protection by—
(i) taking the person to his or her place of residence; or
(ii) taking the person to a temporary shelter."
- A
person will be as detained where there is physical deprivation of a person's
liberty.[34] It is apparent that a person
detained pursuant to this provision, for a period up to 24 hours, is detained
for the purposes of sections
22 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- We
must now consider whether the continued detention of an individual after the
initial 12 hours is arbitrary. In assessing this,
we may ask whether the
detention is made without reference to an adequate determining principle.[35]
- The
High Court in Fleming v Police stated that the purpose of the section 37A
of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 is to ensure the safety of an
intoxicated
person with the least possible encroachment on that person's civil
rights.[36] Section 37A creates a system
whereby detention at a police station is a last resort. The Police must first
attempt removal to a
residence or a temporary shelter or detoxification centre
and may only detain where this is not immediately practicable.
- Clause
35 provides for an additional 12 hour period of detention. As is set out above,
the additional period of detention will only
take place on the independent
recommendation of a health practitioner considering the criteria at clause
35(3).
- In
addition, during both the initial and second 12 hour period of detention, if the
detained person ceases to be intoxicated there
is no basis to detain the person.
The Police have advised us, that in such circumstances, the person would be
released immediately.
- We
note that the second 12 hour detention period follows from the independent
opinion of a health practitioner. The test is also narrower
than the first 12
hour period in that the focus is on harm just to oneself rather than oneself,
others or property. Through the involvement
of a health practitioner, there is
an explicit requirement that the intoxicated person not remain in detention
where they have health
needs that may require them to go to a hospital.
Detention by Police also remains the last resort in the second 12 hour period of
detention.
- We
consider that clause 35 does not create an arbitrary detention for the purposes
of section 22 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Search of people in custody
- Clause
37 empowers Police to search people and take the property on his or her
possession while in custody. The Bill provides this
power where a person:
"(a) has been taken into lawful custody; and
(b) is—
(i) at a Police station; or
(ii) in other premises, or in a vehicle, being used for Police purposes;
and
(c) is to be detained securely (whether pending a first appearance in Court or a
decision as to bail under section 21 of the Bail
Act 2000, or for the taking of
identifying details under section 32(1) of this Act)."
- We
note that this power is largely carried over from the current Police Act at
section 57A. The above term "detained securely" appears
to replace the term
"locked up" as it occurs in section 57A.
- We
consider the search of a person in custody and seizure of any money or property
in his or her possession to be prima facie inconsistent with protection
from unreasonable search and seizure because of the lack of a warrant or
judicial oversight.[37]
Is this justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act?
- Thomas
J of the Court of Appeal in Everitt v Attorney-General extensively
considered the powers under section 57A of the Police Act:
"[S]ection [s 57A] was clearly intended to provide the police with
a general right to search every person to be locked up while in
police custody.
The section provided the "general rule" which had been perceived to be lacking
in the common law. Once the decision
to lock up the arrested person had been
made, the common law requirements of reason to suspect that the arrested person
might have
evidence on his or her person, or have something concealed which
could cause injury to them or others while in custody, was no longer
required.
Further, the search which was authorised was not expressly circumscribed in any
way. The search could be a pat-search at
one end of the range or a strip-search
at the other. No requirement of reasonableness as to the kind of search which
could be carried
out is made explicit in the section. If such a requirement is
to apply, it would need to be implied by the Courts.
The need for such an implication, however, has been put beyond doubt with the
enactment of the Bill of Rights. An interpretation which
would exclude the
requirement of reasonableness is not now open to the Courts. By virtue of s 21,
everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search. Section 57A
must be given a meaning which is consistent with that right. Consequently, the
search undertaken
under s 57A must be a reasonable search. Not only must the
arrested person be a person to be locked up as expressly provided, but
the kind
of search to be undertaken must be reasonable in all the circumstances of the
particular case."[38]
- We
consider the objective of this provision remains the same as section 57A. Clause
37 seeks to discover whether, once the decision
is made to securely detain the
person, the person has evidence on his or her person, or has something concealed
which could cause
harm to themselves or others while in custody.
- As
this provision is triggered only once a person is to be detained securely,[39] we consider there to be a rational link
between the provision and its objective.
- The
provision proportionate given the explicit requirement that the manner in which
the search is undertaken is reasonable as provided
by the case law in this area
and the circumstances where the power is triggered.[40]
- We
consider these provisions to be justified under section 5 of the Bill of
Rights.
Use of the term "Police" in an operating name and unlawful use of Police
uniforms and related articles
- Clause
49 regulates the use of the word "Police" in an operating name in a manner
reasonably likely to lead any person to believe
the activity is endorsed or
authorised by the Police or any part of the Police.
- In
addition, the Bill would prohibit the use of Police uniforms and related
articles in circumstances likely to lead any person to
believe that the user is
a Police employee. Police articles and uniforms are defined in the Bill.
- These
provisions raise an issue of freedom of expression under section 14 of the Bill
of Rights Act in relation to individual's opinions
concerning the Police. Using
the Police name, or an article or uniform, where the individual seeks to imply
that activity is endorsed
or authorised by the Police, would be expression
because that person is seeking to convey an idea or meaning.
- We,
therefore, consider that the provision regulating the use of the term "Police"
and the provision that this provision concerning
use of Police uniforms and
related articles is prima facie inconsistent with the Bill of Rights
Act.
Is this justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act?
- It
appears that the objectives of these provisions are to:
- prevent the
perception by the public that the Police have endorsed or support a particular
business or product; and
- prevent people
from having the mistaken belief that a person using a Police uniform or article
is a Police employee.
- We
consider these to be significant and important objectives.
- In
reaching this conclusion, we note that these objectives are shared by other
important marks in New Zealand. For example, the Flags,
Emblems, and Names
Protection Act 1981 regulates the use of certain terms such as "Anzac".[41] The regulation of the term Anzac is in
the context of its use in connection with any business, trade, or occupation. It
appears
that the intention is to prevent the use of Anzac for the purposes of
business and trading off of the term.
- We
consider that regulating the use of the word "Police" in operating names and the
use of Police uniforms and articles is rationally
linked to the objectives set
out above.
- In
considering whether the provisions limiting expression are proportional, we note
two competing ideas: the recognition that freedom
of expression is a central and
fundamental political right[42] and the
significant mischief that could result from individuals wrongly believing that
person is a Police employee.
- We
note that the prohibition on the use of term "Police" is strictly limited to
situations where there the term is used in an operating
name in a manner that
would lead any person to believe that the activity is endorsed or authorised by
the Police. This provision
does not restrict use of the word "Police" for any
expressive purposes other than an expression meant to mislead the public.
- The
use of Police uniforms and articles may raise concerns about their use for
creative or political comment. We note, however, that
the offence is tempered by
defence of lawful excuse and that the circumstances of the use of the uniform
and/or articles are to be
considered. We consider that a court in hearing any
case under this provision would interpret it consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act protections for expression.
- We
consider these provisions to be justified under section 5 of the Bill of
Rights.
Elimination from investigation and pre-employment vetting with biometric
information
- Clauses
78 to 83 of the Bill propose to take biometric information relating to
prospective Police employees, Police employees, and
defined Police associates.
biometric information is defined as a DNA profile of the person, fingerprints or
palm prints taken from
the person.
- There
are two purposes for taking biometric information. The first purpose is pre-
employment vetting. The biometric information would
be used to determine whether
a person would be a suitable employee or against other information held by the
Police for the purpose
of:
"(a) determining whether the person has been convicted of an
offence; or
(b) if, when matched against other information held by the Police, it indicates
that the person may have been involved in the commission
of an
offence,—
(i) investigating the offence; and
(ii) if relevant, prosecuting a person charged with committing the offence;
or
(c) if the person later becomes a Police employee, eliminating the person from
being considered in the investigation of a crime."
- The
second purpose is to eliminate existing staff or Police associates from being
considered in the investigation of a crime.
- The
taking of bodily samples from Police employees, Police associates or prospective
Police employees amounts to a search and seizure
of the person.[43] The question then
turns to
whether the search and seizure is reasonable. Determination of reasonableness is
necessary even if there is consent.[44]
- What
is reasonable will often turn on the interests being protected. The threshold
for what is a proper standard would be considered
in light of informational
privacy interests. If there are proper standards within the Bill for authorising
the search and seizure,
and reasonable safeguards for the information collected,
the search and seizure will be reasonable.
- The
actual physical intrusion caused by taking a DNA sample is minimal. The
informational privacy interests are, however, the greater
concern as individuals
in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and control from
dissemination to the state the biographical
core of personal information.[45] The Supreme Court of Canada stated:
"Without constraints on the type of information that can be
extracted from bodily substances, the potential intrusiveness of a DNA
analysis
is virtually infinite."[46]
- The
use of biometric information for pre-employment vetting would have the following
safeguards:
- biometric
information relating to DNA is only a DNA profile and not the bodily sample
itself;
- the bodily
sample is to be destroyed once a profile is derived and stored;
- no one is
compelled to join the Police and thereby provide biometric information;
- biometric
information is to be destroyed promptly after the Commissioner decides not to
employ the person; and
- written notice
is given to the person promptly after the biometric information is
destroyed.
- The
use of biometric information for elimination from being considered in the
investigation of a crime would have the following safeguards:
- no Police
employee or Police associate can be required to provide a bodily sample or
biometric information for the purposes of this
clause;
- biometric
information relating to DNA is only a DNA profile and not the bodily sample
itself;
- biometric
information may be provided with a statement that the data is provided for the
purposes of this clause;
- the bodily
sample is to be destroyed once a profile is derived and
stored;
- the Police
associate definition would only apply non-Police employees whose duties may
involve the risk of accidentally contaminating
crime scenes or evidence;
- biometric
information must be used only for matching against other information held by the
Police for the purpose of eliminating him
or her from being considered in the
investigation of a crime;
- biometric
information is not admissible in evidence in any proceedings against the person
(even after the person ceases to be a Police
employee or Police associate);
- biometric
information is to be destroyed promptly after the person asked the Commissioner
in writing to delete it;
- biometric
information is to be destroyed, in any event, no later than 12 months after the
person ceases to be a Police employee or
Police associate; and
- written notice
is given to the person promptly after the biometric information is
destroyed.
- With
the use of biometric information for elimination purposes, there are
comprehensive protections against use other than elimination.
For pre-employment
vetting, it is reasonable that given the need for public confidence and the fact
that no-one is compelled to apply
to join, the Police can require DNA checks
against outstanding offences for prospective employees; and if an outstanding
offence
is found, that can then be pursued.
- We
consider that clauses 78 to 83 are not inconsistent with protections against
unreasonable search and seizure under section 21 of
the Bill of Rights Act.
State services superannuation schemes
- Section
17 provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of association". This
recognises that persons should be free to enter
into consensual arrangements
with others and to promote the common interests and objectives of the
associating group. The right also
extends to the right not to associate, and
protects the right of individuals to decide freely whether they wish to
associate with
others.
- Clause
67 provides that the Commissioner may make it a condition of employment of
employees that those employees contribute to a State
services superannuation
scheme.
- Compulsion
to join a workplace superannuation scheme appears to infringe section 17 of the
Bill of Rights Act, as freedom of association
includes protection of a person's
decision not to join an organisation. We must therefore consider whether this
clause can be justified
in terms of section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Is this justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act?
- The
Police advises that this provision is in line with the Government's focus on
encouraging savings, and is also a hedge against
corruption. We consider that
these are significant and important objectives.
- In
considering whether clause 67 has a rational and proportionate connection to
these objectives we note that the enabling the Commissioner
to use discretion on
compulsion does not diminish the capacity for bargaining on the issue with
employee representatives, or for
a change in approach in later years should
circumstances make it appropriate.
- For
these reasons, we consider the provision to be justified in terms of section 5
of the Act.
Restriction on resignation by constable
- Clause
77 provides that the Governor-General may, if the special circumstances require,
issue a Warrant limiting the ability of constables
to resign without
permission.
- This
provision appears to be inconsistent with section 17 of the Bill of Rights Act
as the provision would compel membership in the
police organisation.
Is this justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act?
- The
purpose of this measure is to assure a continuity of police services at times of
national crisis or emergency. This is a significant
and important objective.
- The
provision is limited as it only applies when it is in the opinion of the
Governor- General that the special circumstances require
that no constable
resign without permission. The Warrant issued by the Governor-General to this
effect will also outline conditions
whereby a police constable may resign.
- For
these reasons we consider that this provision is justified in terms of section 5
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Unlawful strikes and lockouts involving constables
- Section
16 provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly".
- Clause
68 provides that a strike by, or lockout of, any number of constables is
unlawful. This provision appears to infringe sections
14, 16, and 18 of the Bill
of Rights Act. We must therefore consider whether this clause can be justified
in terms of section 5 of
that Act.
Is this justified under section 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act?
- The
Police advises that the prohibition on strikes and lockouts provides comfort to
members of the public and the government of the
day. The provision is said to
also serve
wider interests by helping preserve public trust and
confidence in Police. We consider these to be significant and important
objectives.
- In
considering whether clause 68 is a rational and proportionate measure we note
that the provision only applies to constables, and
does not extend to all Police
employees. This ensures that essential policing services will continue
irrespective of the outcome
of negotiations on pay and conditions.
- Further,
the Bill sets out an arbitration process in the event that Police negotiations
on pay and conditions fail to result in agreement.
Therefore limiting the
ability of constables to strike does not limit their right to negotiate on pay
and conditions.
- For
these reasons we consider that the provision is justified in terms of section 5
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Removal of Police employees
- Section
27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act provides that every person whose interests are
affected by a decision by a public authority
has the right to the observance of
the principles of natural justice. One of the fundamental principles of natural
justice is the
right to be heard.
- Clause
69 enables the Commissioner to remove at any time any Police employee, subject
to the Policing Act and any general instructions
issued under it and the
conditions of employment set out in the applicable employment agreement.
- This
clause raises an issue of natural justice as it provides the Commissioner with
the authority to make a decision about any Police
employee's employment.
- Clause
69 applies subject to the Policing Bill and the conditions of employment set out
in any applicable employment agreement. On
this basis, we are therefore
satisfied that any decision made by the Commissioner under this provision will
need to be made in a
manner consistent with the principles of natural
justice.
Reverse onus offences
- Section
25(c) affirms the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to
law. In R v Wholesale Travel Group,[47] the Supreme Court of Canada held that
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty requires at a minimum that
an individual
must be proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and that the state
must bear the burden of proof.
- In
reverse onus offences, once the Crown has proved the actus reus, the defendant
can only escape liability by proving, on the balance
of probabilities, either
the common law defence of total absence of fault, or a statutory defence that
embodies that defence.
- A
statutory defence reverses the usual burden of proof by requiring the defendant
to prove, on the balance of probabilities, the elements
of the defence. Because
the burden of proof is reversed, a defendant who is able to raise doubt as to
his or her fault but is not
able
to prove absence of fault or a
reasonable excuse to the standard of the balance of probabilities would be
convicted. We consider,
therefore, that where the defendant is required to prove
something in order to escape liability, the use of reverse onus offences
is
contrary to the presumption of innocence protection contained by section 25(c)
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Reverse Onus Offences in the Bill
- The
following provisions appear to contain reverse onus offences:
- Clause 36 (Power
to require name and address for suspected offence of killing or injuring Police
dog) – liable to a fine not
exceeding $5,000.
- Clause 48
(Personation and representing vehicle etc, as Police vehicle) – liable to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12
months, to a fine not exceeding
$15,000, or to both.
- Clause 49 (Use
of term Police or New Zealand Police in operating name) – liable in the
case of an individual , to imprisonment
for a term not exceeding 6 months or to
a fine not exceeding $5,000, and in the case of a body corporate, to a fine not
exceeding
$20,000.
- Clause 50
(Unlawful possession of Police property) - liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding 3 months, to a fine not exceeding
$2,000, or to both.
- These
provisions will enable defendants to claim a reasonable excuse defence.
- Clause
36 enables a constable to require a person to state their name, address and date
of birth if the constable has good cause to
suspect that they have committed or
is committing an offence against clause 53 of the Bill (killing or injuring
Police dogs). This
is a reasonable requirement upon a person who is suspected
with good cause of killing or injuring a Police dog.
- The
Police advises annually, an average of 40 offences of "personating police" have
been recorded over the last 10 years. In an environment
of policing by consent,
such offending is not trivial. Persons faced with a person claiming to be a
Police officer, or who is wearing
what appears to be a Police uniform, feel
obliged to comply with reasonable requests or instructions given by that person.
This can
have serious consequences.
- Clause
50 makes it an offence to be in unlawful possession of Police property. This
carries over a similar offence from the Police
Act 1958. The offence operates as
a catch-all for occasions where Police property has come into the possession of
other persons,
for example a Police baton or a Police hat. This offence also
acts as a deterrent for persons that have confidential Police documents
and is a
safeguard against misuse.
- In
our view these clauses have significant and important objectives. We note as a
general principle that a reversal of the burden
of proof is less of a concern
where the penalty is relatively low and therefore has a less significant impact
on the accused. As
a
general principle, reverse onus offences should
carry penalties at the lower end of the scale. The penalties for these clauses
include
provisions to imprison offenders for a maximum term of one year and are
therefore not at the "lower end of the scale".
- The
Police advises that the penalties for the offences under clause 48 and 49 need
to be sufficiently high to act as a deterrent,
as offences under these
provisions can have a very serious effect. The Police also advises that these
provisions are not intended
to be used in situations such as the "Undie 500"
race, or against persons attending the rugby sevens in costume.
- Further,
the Police advises that none of these offences are intended as reverse onus
offences, and that the mens rea elements of such offences have been
understood in the past to be inferred. Courts have, from the context of the
offences, either found
the mens rea element in the actions of the defendant, or
required Police to produce evidence (the Police advises to see for example
Saunders v Police[48], Keesing
v Police[49]). Thus, the Police
advises that the onus remains on Police to prove the men rea, or it is
obvious from the circumstances. In both the above cases the onus of proof was
always with the Police.
- The
Police advises the reasonable excuse test is intended as a guide for the
constable to decide if an offence has been committed,
and that the nature of
these offences invites the widest use of Police discretion.
- We
therefore consider that these provisions are consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act.
Police involvement in elections
- Section
12 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the electoral rights of New Zealand
citizens of or over the age of 18 years. In considering
overseas developments,
there appears to be a both a narrow and broad interpretation of this right. Read
literally, the section 12
only protects the right to vote and to stand for
election to the House of Representatives. Read broadly, section 12 protects the
ability of New Zealanders to participate in the electoral process.
- We
note that clause 100 allows regulations to be made regulating the involvement of
Police employees in any political activity connected
with elections.
- There
are already some limits placed on members of the New Zealand Police's
involvement in general elections in sections 52 and 53
of the Electoral Act
1993. These provisions deal with the need to maintain constitutional separation
between the Police and the executive.
Any wider restrictions on participation in
the broader electoral process would require significant justification to be
consistent
with the Bill of Rights Act. Any restrictions on participation in the
electoral process would also raise issues of inconsistency
with the right to
freedom of expression.
- For
completeness we note that the New Zealand Court of Appeal decided in Drew v
Attorney-General that secondary legislation that is inconsistent with the
Bill of Rights can be struck down as ultra vires unless the empowering
statute expressly or necessarily authorises the making of inconsistent
regulations.[50] We understand that the
Policing Bill will not
authorise regulations to be made that are
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Therefore, any regulations made under this
Bill once
enacted may be deemed ultra vires the Policing Act if they are
found to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.
CONCLUSION
- Overall,
we have formed the view that the Policing Bill appears to be consistent with the
Bill of Rights Act.
Michael Petherick Manager, Ministerial Advice Office of Legal
Counsel
|
Stuart Beresford
Acting Manager
Bill of Rights/Human Rights Team
|
Footnotes
- See
Moonen v Film Literature Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9 and R v Oakes
(1986) 26 DLR (4th).
- Neilsen
v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR 433 (CA) para 34.
- This
purpose is not present in the existing power under s 57 of the Police Act.
- See:
R v Tahana 15/11/06, Simon France J, HC Auckland CRI-2006-004-6234
[Unreported]. Interestingly, the constable formed the belief that the accused
has given false details pursuant to a lawful demand after receiving information
about the nature of Mr Tahana's tattoos versus those
of the person he had
named.
- Moulton
v Police [1980] NZCA 19; [1980] 1 NZLR 443, 446.
- See:
Matthews v Department of Labour [1984] 2 NZLR 400, 408: concerning the
sensitive subject of the use of recorded information against a person in
criminal proceedings.
- Temese
v Police [1992] NZCA 190; (1992) 9 CRNZ 425 (CA): section 23 of Bill of Rights has to be
applied in a realistic and commonsense way in the context of furnishing
particulars at a road
stop.
- In
the absence of any specific statutory provision, there is no general power to
detain a person against his or her will for questioning:
R v Admore
[1989] 2 NZLR 210.
- R
v Butcher and Burgess [1991] NZCA 135; [1992] 2 NZLR 257; (1991) 7 CRNZ 407 (CA); see also:
clause 32(3) that explicitly provides for a caution to be given by a constable
before anyone may be alleged to have committed
an offence by failing to comply
with a reasonable demand under this clause.
- Taunoa
v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70 para 79 (Elias CJ). 11 Land Transport Act
1998 s 113(2)(a).
- The
word "suspect" requires a degree of satisfaction, not necessarily amounting to
belief, but at least extending beyond mere speculation
as to whether an event
has occurred or not: Corporate Affairs v Guardian Investments Pty Ltd
[1984] VicRp 81; [1984] VR 1019, cited with approval by Neazor J in R v Thompson
(1995) 13 CRNZ 546.
- The
Supreme Court of Canada noted that taking fingerprints for the purposes of
identification invades the rights of the accused less
than being arrested and
charged for an offence although both are available on taking a person into
lawful custody: R v Beare; R v Higgins [1988] 2 SCR 387 paras 33-5.
- Butler,
Andrew and Petra The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary
(Wellington: 2005) 18.25.1.
- R
v Patterson [2007] DCR 165 para 80.
- R
v Patterson [2007] DCR 165 para 33.
- We
consider that this definition would not, however, include bodily samples given
the express requirements for the taking of bodily
samples contained in the
Criminal Investigations (Bodily Samples) Act 1995.
- Recently
referred to in context of the compelled providing identifying details and bodily
samples, respectively, in R v Patterson [2007] DCR 165 and A v Council
of the Auckland District Law Society [2005] 3 NZLR 550.
19 [1980] NZCA 19; [1980] 1 NZLR 443, 446.
20 [1980] NZCA 19; [1980] 1 NZLR 443, 447.
21 Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR
433 para 37 (CA). 22 Clause 31(2)(d) of the Bill.
23 Police v Geiringer [1991] NZHC 1960; [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 331
(DC, HC).
24 R v Keegstra [1990] INSC 224; [1990] 3 SCR 697, 729,
826
25 Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald
Corp 2007 SCC 30. 26 [1996]DCR 951, 955 (DC).
- Brooker
v Police [2007] NZSC 30.
- Brooker
v Police [2007] NZSC 30 para 45 (Elias CJ).
- Brooker
v Police [2007] NZSC 30 para 92 (Tipping J).
- In
contrast, subs 23(2) and 23(3) is only capable of being invoked by a person "who
is arrested for an offence." Subsection 23(4)
only applies to those "arrested or
detained under any enactment for any offence or suspected offence." Clause 26
does not create
an offence.
- Scott
v Police (1994) 12 CRNZ 207 (HC).
- Taunoa
v Attorney-General [2007] NZSC 70 para 79 (Elias CJ).
- Section
37A of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 also required that the Police
also attempt to take an intoxicated person
to a recognised detoxification
centre. This requirement is not carries over into the Bill.
- Butlers
19.6.2; R v Kirifi [1992] 2 NZLR 242.
- Neilsen
v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR 433, 441 (CA).
- [1988] NZHC 1253; (1988)
3 CRNZ 184; see also: Conroy v Police [1990] NZHC 81; (1990) 5 CRNZ 600 (HC).
- Butlers
18.25.1
- Everitt
v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 449; [2002] 1 NZLR 82 paras 73-4.
- Everitt
v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 449; [2002] 1 NZLR 82 para 37 (Elias CJ, Richardson P and
Keith J) 40 R v Jefferies [1993] NZCA 401; (1993) 10 CRNZ 202
(CA); Everitt v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 449; [2002] 1 NZLR 82.
- At
section 17.
- Butlers
at 13.2.1; Living Word Distributors Ltd v Human Rights Action Group Inc
(Wellington) [2003] 3 NZLR 570 (CA).
- R
v Jefferies [1994] 1NZLR 290, 300 (CA) (Richardson J); Butlers at 18.4.4,
18.11.2.
- Butlers
at 18.12.1.
45 R v Plant [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281,
293.
- R
v R.C. 2005 SCC 61 at para. 28.
- R
v Wholesale Travel Group 84 DLR (4th) 161, 188 citing R v Oakes
[1986] 1 SCR 103.
- HC,
Auckland AP 152-91, Aug 13 1991.
49 HC, Auckland M 1205-83, Oct 31
1983.
50 [2001] NZCA 207; [2002] 1 NZLR 58.
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under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
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