You are here:
NZLII >>
Databases >>
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act Reports >>
2007 >>
[2007] NZBORARp 51
Database Search
| Name Search
| Recent Documents
| Noteup
| LawCite
| Download
| Help
Financial Advisers Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 17, 19, 21, 25(c) and 27(1)) [2007] NZBORARp 51 (16 November 2007)
Last Updated: 5 January 2019
Financial Advisers Bill
16 November 2007 ATTORNEY-GENERAL LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990:
FINANCIAL ADVISERS BILL
- We
have considered whether the Financial Advisers Bill (PCO 8190/8) (the Bill) is
consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 (‘Bill of Rights
Act’). We understand that this Bill is likely to be considered by the
Cabinet Legislation Committee
at its meeting on Thursday 22 November 2007.
- We
considered potential issues of inconsistency with sections 14, 17, 19, 21, 25(c)
and 27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act and assessed
whether or not these issues are
justifiable under section 5 (Justified limitations) of that Act. To that end we
examined whether
the relevant clauses serve an important and significant
objective, and whether there is a rational and proportionate connection between
these clauses and that objective.[1]
- We
have reached the conclusion that the Bill appears to be consistent with the
rights and freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights
Act.
PURPOSE
- The
purposes of this Bill are to
- provide
for a comprehensive disclosure regime to ensure that members of the public can
make informed decisions about whether to use
a financial adviser and whether to
follow advice from a financial adviser;
- require
financial advisers to meet competency requirements to ensure that members of the
public hire financial advisers who have the
necessary experience, expertise, and
integrity;
- provide
for a regime under which financial advisers are held accountable for financial
advice given; and
- ensure
that there are incentives for financial advisers to manage conflicts of interest
appropriately.
BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ISSUES
Section 14 – Freedom of Expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to freedom of expression, which
includes the freedom to seek, receive, and
impart information and opinions of
any kind and in any form. The right has been interpreted as including the right
not to be compelled
to say certain things or to provide certain information.[2]
- We
note, taking into account the various domestic and overseas judicial
pronouncements on the issue, a two-step inquiry has been adopted
to determine
whether an individual’s freedom of expression has been infringed. The
first step involves a determination of whether
a particular activity falls
within the freedom of expression. The second step is to determine whether the
purpose or effect of the
proposed government action is to restrict that
freedom.[3]
Clauses 12 to 23, 65 to 68, 78 to 81
- Clauses
12 to 23 of the Bill prescribe a comprehensive disclosure regime that requires a
financial adviser to disclose certain information
to a consumer or client. For
example, financial advisers will be required to disclose details about their
experience, qualifications,
whether or not they have a criminal conviction or
have been declared bankrupt, their fees, and other interests and
relationships.
- Clauses
65 to 68 and clauses 78 to 81 of the Bill provide that the Securities Commission
(the Commission) and the Court can issue
disclosure and corrective orders in
situations where the financial adviser has contravened a financial
advisers’ obligation
or exemption (including disclosure obligations). Such
orders may require a financial adviser to disclose or publish information or
statements.
- An
important component of the first step in determining whether the freedom of
expression has been infringed is that the communication
in question must attempt
to express an idea or meaning.[4] It is
arguable whether this component is satisfied in relation to the information that
has to be provided under these provisions
because the information is of a
factual nature and does not seem to be sufficiently expressive in nature to
engage section 14. For
completeness, we have considered whether, if the
provisions place a limit on the freedom of expression, they are justifiable in
terms
of section 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- The
purpose behind the disclosure regime is to address information and knowledge
asymmetries between financial advisers and consumers,
so that a consumer has
enough information to make informed decisions about whether to use a financial
adviser and whether to follow
the financial adviser’s advice. We consider
this a significant and important objective.
- In
our view the provisions setting out the disclosure obligations are also
rationally and proportionally connected to this objective.
The information to be
provided is limited to factual information that is private to the financial
adviser, and not obvious or otherwise
available to members of the public. Making
this information available to consumers limits the risk they may make ill
informed decisions
that are harmful to them.
- We
therefore consider that, if these clauses are considered to be prima facie
inconsistent with section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act,
they appear to be
justified under section 5 of that Act.
Section 17 – Freedom of association
- Section
17 provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of association". This
provision recognises that persons should be free
to enter into consensual
arrangements with others, and to promote the common interests and objectives of
the associating group. The
right also extends to the right not to associate, and
protects the right of individuals to decide freely whether they wish to
associate
with others.
Clause 9 (Prerequisites for performing financial adviser service
for member of public)
- Under
clause 9(1) of the Bill, a person may not perform financial adviser services for
a consumer unless that person is a member of
an approved professional body. This
requirement is enforced by means of an offence provision (clause 105 - Offence
of performing
financial adviser service for member of public without being
member of approved professional body and registered). This raises an
issue of
prima facie inconsistency with the right not to associate.
- The
Ministry of Economic Development (MED) has advised that compulsory membership of
an approved professional body is necessary to
facilitate monitoring and
enforcement of professional standards of financial advisers. This is needed to
improve the professional
reputation of the industry and make consumers more
confident to seek financial advice. We find this a significant and important
objective.
- In
our view these provisions are rationally and proportionally connected to this
objective. The proposed regulatory regime is based
on the principle of licensing
(only those who are approved can practice) combined with the best features of
industry self-regulation.
MED has advised that monitoring and enforcing of
professional standards may best be achieved by this approach. Examples of these
best features are the reinforcement of professional norms, effective industry
participation in the standards development process,
and high levels of self-
monitoring accompanied with State oversight. According to MED, a licensing model
such as this cannot work
without an institution of which licensees are a member.
In this it differs from, for example, a name protection (registration or
certification) regime, which provides for freedom of choice in terms of whether
one wants the benefits associated with the protected
name or not, and does not
restrict who can carry out a particular occupation.
- For
these reasons, we have concluded that the limit that clause 9 places on the
freedom of association appears to be justified under
section 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Clauses 51 (Content of rules) and 52 (Characteristics of
rules)
- Clauses
51 and 52 prescribe in detail the content and characteristics of the rules of an
approved professional body. The detailed
prescription in clauses 51 and 52
affects the freedom of members of an association to freely regulate the internal
affairs of their
organisation. This arguably engages section 17 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- MED
advises that these clauses are characteristic of a co-regulatory regime. In
order to be assured that the industry is able to regulate
itself (and therefore
ensure the competency and accountability of financial advisers in relation to
financial advice), statutory
parameters need to be put in place so that the
industry regulator knows what it must do. This in turn promotes consistency
across
the different bodies. We find this to be an important and significant
objective.
- As
clauses 51 and 52 only provide for minimum requirements for approved
professional bodies, we are of the view that these provisions
are rationally and
proportionally connected to this objective. The Bill still allows for
flexibility as different approved professional
bodies can have different
standards (within the statutory parameters) appropriate to the type of work
undertaken by members of each
approved professional body.
- We,
therefore, consider that these clauses appear to be justified under section 5 of
that Act.
Section 19 – Freedom from discrimination
- Section
19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the freedom from discrimination on
prohibited grounds set out section 21 of the Human
Rights Act 1993 including
family status. In our view, taking into account the various domestic and
overseas judicial pronouncements
as to the meaning of discrimination, the key
questions in assessing whether discrimination under section 19 exists
are:
- Does
the provision draw a distinction based on one of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination; and
- Does
the distinction involve disadvantage to one or more classes of
individuals?
- If
these questions are answered in the affirmative, the provision gives rise to a
prima facie issue of ‘discrimination’
under section 19(1) of the
Bill of Rights Act. Where a provision is found to be prima facie inconsistent
with a particular right
or freedom, it may nevertheless be consistent with the
Bill of Rights Act if it can be justified under section 5 of that Act.
Clause 5(2) (Interpretation)
- Clause
5(2) of the Financial Advisers Bill provides that "For the purpose of deciding
whether a person (A) performs a financial adviser
service for a member of the
public, unless the context otherwise requires, member of the public does not
include: (a) a
relative or a close business associate of A
(etc).”
- This
clause appears to make a distinction on the ground of family status as
it
excludes relatives from the scope of the terms ‘members of
the public’. Because the Bill aims to protect members of the
public from
harm resulting from advice provided by financial advisers who do not meet
minimum standards required for membership
of an approved professional body, we have examined whether this distinction
results in disadvantage to relatives of financial advisers.
- We
have reached the view that section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act is not
engaged.
We note that clause 5(2) provides that the terms
‘member of the public’ do not
extend to relatives of financial advisers “unless the context otherwise
requires”. In our opinion this leaves enough room
to apply the Bill to
relatives of financial advisers where this is required by the circumstances of
the case. For that reason, there
appears to be no disadvantage and therefore no
discrimination within the meaning of section 19(1).
Section 21 – Right to be Secure against Unreasonable Search and
Seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act provides:
“Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure, whether of the person, property, correspondence
or
otherwise.”
- There
are two limbs to the section 21 right. First, section 21 is applicable only in
respect of those activities that constitute a
"search or seizure". Second, where
certain actions do constitute a search or seizure, section 21 protects only
against those searches
or seizures that are "unreasonable" in the
circumstances.
Clauses 61 and 62
- Clause
61 (Approved professional body must make annual report to Commission) requires
an approved body to send the Commission a written
report each year in relation
to its activities and its financial statements. The objective of this provision
is to assist the Commission
in supervising the conduct of approved professional
bodies and to ensure that they are performing in a manner that is consistent
with the law.
- Clause
62(1) (Approved professional body must give Commission other information and
assistance on request) requires an approved professional
body to give the
Commission (or authorised person) information, assistance, and access to
the
approved professional body’s facilities.
- The
requirements in clause 61 and clause 62(1) involve compulsory access
to
information in the context of the Commission’s role of
supervising the financial adviser regime. It also enables the Commission
to
exercise its power under clause 59 (Approved professional body must notify
Commission of investigation into member misconduct)
to assist in approved
professional body’s investigations into allegations of member
misconduct.
- The
requirements in clauses 61 and 62(1) impinge to a certain degree upon reasonable
expectations of privacy which members of the
public (including financial
advisers) would have in relation to that information. For that reason, these
requirements constitute
a search for the purposes of section 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- MED
has advised that the safeguards that exist for the exercise of the power in
clause 62 are that the Commission’s request
must be
‘reasonable’ for it to carry out its duties (clause 62(1)) and it
must be required by notice in writing (clause
62(2)). Further safeguards are
provided by means of clause 137 of the Bill that requires that the Commission
complies with the requirements
of Part 3 of the Securities Act when carrying out
its inspection powers under clause 62 of the Bill.
- According
to MED this means that the Commission, inter alia:
- may
inspect only for the purposes of the Bill (refer s. 68 Securities Act
1978);
- must be
satisfied that the inspection is for the purpose of the Financial Advisers Bill
(refer s. 68 Securities Act 1978);
- must
have considered any matters relating to the necessity or expediency of carrying
out an inspection, for example, whether the information
is practicably available
from another source in the time available (refer s. 68 Securities Act
1978);
- can
employ only those powers in the course of exercising a power of entry, that are
listed in section 67 of the Securities Act 1978
(i.e. require any person to
produce a document for inspection, reproduce the document, inspect and make
records of the document,
and if reasonably required, remove the document for a
period of time that is reasonable in the circumstances)
- must
meet the requirements of those exercising powers under the Securities Act 1978,
such as: production of evidence of the person's
authority to inspect (section
68A), suitably qualified to inspect (section 68A), limits on disclosure of
information gained in an
inspection (section 68D), and can only keep documents
seized for the amount of time that is reasonable in the circumstances (section
67(1)(d)).
- In
light of these safeguards, we have concluded that the requirements in clauses 61
and 62(1) are reasonable and, therefore, are not
inconsistent with section 21 of
the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching this conclusion we note that the ability to
require documents
is less of an intrusion into the expectation of privacy than a
power of entry.[5]
Section 25(c) – Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
- Section
25(c) affirms the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty. This means
that an individual must not be convicted where
reasonable doubt as to his or her
guilt exists. The prosecution in criminal proceedings must therefore prove,
beyond reasonable doubt,
that the accused is guilty.
- Reverse
onus offences give rise to an issue of inconsistency with section 25(c) because
the accused is required to prove (on the balance
of probabilities) a defence to
escape liability. In other criminal proceedings an accused must merely raise
a
defence in an effort to create reasonable doubt. Where an accused
is unable to prove the defence, then he or she could be convicted
even though
reasonable doubt exists as to his or her guilt.
- Similarly,
a provision which requires an accused person to disprove (on the balance of
probabilities) the existence of a presumed
fact, that fact being an important
element of the offence in question, would also be prima facie inconsistent with
the presumption
of innocence.
- The
Bill contains the following reverse onus offences:
- Clause
105 (Offence of performing financial adviser service for member of public
without being member of approved professional body
and registered)
- Clause
106 (Offence if false representation as to membership of approved professional
body or registration)
- Clause
108 (Offence of deceptive, misleading, or confusing disclosure)
- Clause
109 (Offence of deceptive, misleading, or confusing advertisement)
- Clause
115 (Offence of failing to comply with Commission’s orders)
- Under
clause 126 (Knowledge of matters presumed if employee or agent knows matters) it
is presumed, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, that a person knew of any
matter if an employee or agent of that person knew of the matter in his or her
capacity as employee
or agent.
- The
following offences in the Bill may also give rise to an issue under section
25(c) BORA by virtue of clause 126:
- Clause
107 (Offence for failure to comply with financial advisers’
disclosure
obligation)
- Clause
110 (Offence of recommending or receiving money in connection with offer of
securities when subscription illegal)
- Clause
116 (Offence of contravening financial adviser banning order)
- Clause
117 (Offence of contravening section 99 (automatic banning)
- Clause
118 (Offence of contravening Court order under section 102 or 103)
- All
of these clauses give rise to an issue under section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights
Act because a defendant may be required to prove
or disprove something to escape
liability.
Clauses 105 and 106
- Clause
105 provides that a financial adviser commits an offence if that person
contravenes clause 9, which stipulates that a person
must not perform a
financial adviser service for a consumer unless that person is a member of an
approved professional body and is
registered. It is a defence under clause
105(2) if the person proves that the person did not know, and ought not
reasonably to have
known, that the person was not registered.
- A
person commits an offence under clause 106 if she or he falsely represents that
she or he is a member of an approved professional
body and is registered. It is
a defence under clause 106(3) if the person did not know, and ought not
reasonably to have known, that
she or he was not registered. We note that clause
12(c) (Financial adviser must disclose experience, qualifications, professional
standing, etc) requires
a financial adviser to disclose the name of
the approved professional body of which the financial adviser is a member.
- The
objective of these provisions in general is to ensure that persons who provide
financial adviser services are qualified and competent
to provide these services
by ensuring they meet minimum standards required for membership of an approved
professional body. Those
falling below these standards may be held accountable
for their acts or omissions. We have noted the objectives of compulsory
membership
of an approved professional body (as described in paragraph 15 above)
and of the disclosure obligations in clause 12 (refer paragraph
10).
- In
our view, these clauses have significant and important objectives. They contain
offences that are regulatory in nature (as opposed
to ones that are truly
criminal) and the information that can exonerate the defendant is information
that is peculiarly in the realm
of the defendant.
- When
examining the proportionality of the proposed penalties, we note that as a
general principle, reverse onus offences should carry
penalties at the lower end
of the scale. The penalty for committing an offence under these provisions is a
fine on summary conviction
not exceeding $300,000 for a body corporate, and
$100,000 for an individual.
- These
penalty levels, although rather high, are comparable to the penalty levels for
similar offending under the Securities Markets
Act 1988 for investment advisers
and brokers (not yet in force) and are not disproportionate. They reflect the
potential harm that
may arise as a result of the offending. For example,
offending may lead to a member of the public acting on sub-optimal advice by
purchasing an unsuitable financial product, which in turn could generate
substantial losses for that person, as well as resulting
in income for the
adviser which the adviser might not have received if the consumer had purchased
a different product. The level
of penalty must be sufficient to act as a
deterrent for financial advisers in individual cases, as well as to deter
systemic conduct
which could have an effect on wider consumer confidence in the
industry.
Clause 108 and 109
- The
disclosure obligations for financial advisers are reinforced by offence
provisions. Clause 108 makes it an offence if a financial
adviser makes
disclosure that contravenes clauses 20 (Disclosure must not be misleading) or 21
(Disclosure of additional information).
It is a defence under clause 108(2) if
the adviser proves that, at the time when the disclosure was made, the adviser
believed on
reasonable grounds that the disclosure was not deceptive,
misleading, or confusing.
- It
is an offence under clause 109 if an advertisement contravenes clause 27
(Advertisement by financial adviser must not be deceptive,
misleading, or
confusing), and has been distributed to a person, and was authorised or
instigated by, or on behalf of, the adviser,
or prepared with the co-operation
of, or by arrangement with, the adviser. It is a defence under clause 109(2) if
the adviser proves
that, at the time when the advertisement was distributed, the
adviser believed on reasonable grounds that the advertisement was not
deceptive,
misleading, or confusing.
- MED
has advised us that the disclosure regime for financial advisers is the key
aspect of the proposed regulation. This regime provides
potential consumers with
sufficient information about the adviser, so that they can make informed
decisions about whether to accept
the advice or not. As the decisions taken by
consumers may be potentially significant, it is important that consumers be
provided
with accurate and truthful information prior to making financial
decisions in relation to financial advice. The same rationale applies
in
relation to accurate and truthful advertising in relation to financial advisers.
We consider these significant and important objectives.
- We
also note that the provisions contain offences that are regulatory in nature.
Further, in both cases, the evidence as to why the
defendant believes that he or
she or it has not made a misleading, deceptive or confusing advertisement will
be
peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge. The defendant
will know the reasonable grounds on which the belief is based better
than the
prosecution in any instance.
- The
penalty for committing an offence under these provisions is a fine on summary
conviction not exceeding $300,000 for a body corporate,
and $100,000 for an
individual. The penalty levels are at the same quantum as those under the
Securities Markets Act 1988 for investment
advisers and brokers (not yet in
force) and reflects the seriousness of the offence (refer to the discussion in
paragraph 48).
Clause 115
- Clause
115 provides that it is an offence to contravene a (prohibition, corrective or
disclosure) order made by the Commission under
subpart 1 of Part 4 of the Bill.
It is a defence under clause 115(2)(a) if the person proves that the
contravention occurred without
the person’s knowledge or without the
person’s knowledge of the order.
- This
offence ensures that where necessary the Commission may direct financial
advisers to act in certain matters. These powers to
make orders enable the
Commission to rectify minor breaches of the law (including the disclosure regime
in the Bill) efficiently.
- We
consider that the evidence as to whether the contravention occurred without the
defendant’s knowledge, or without the defendant’s
knowledge of the
order will be in the realm of the defendant. The defendant will be in a better
position to raise evidence supporting
the lack of knowledge.
- The
penalty for committing an offence under these provisions is a fine on summary
conviction not exceeding $30,000. Given the risks
to consumers in such
instances, the penalty as such, has been aligned with the penalties for similar
offences in the Securities Markets
Act 1988 (refer to the discussion in
paragraph 48).
Clause 126 and clauses 107, 110, 114, 116, 117 and 118
- Several
clauses in Part 4 of the Bill, including clauses 107, 110, 114, 116, 117 and
118, purport to ensure that where a person knowingly
breaches the
requisite
minimum standards or where a person breaches a Court
order, that the person is accountable for that breach.
- Where
both the employer and the employee are a registered financial adviser, employers
can also be held accountable for offences committed
under the Bill by their
employees. As employers will in many instances not be connected to the act
involved in committing the offence,
it will be very difficult for the
prosecution to establish the requisite mental element. For that reason, clause
126 provides the
presumption that they did have the required knowledge of the
act.
- Employers
would, however, have information relating to the terms of employment, and other
information in the day-to-day employment
environment. As such, if the act truly
occurred without their knowledge, they would be able to
provide
information that could easily demonstrate that the
employee’s act was outside the scope of that employee’s duties, or
that the employee acted on his own volition without providing any information to
the employer.
- The
offences in clauses 107, 110, 114, 116, 117 and 118 are regulatory in nature.
The penalty for committing an offence under clauses
107, 110 or 114 is a fine on
summary conviction not exceeding $300,000 for a body corporate, and $100,000 for
an individual. The
penalty for committing an offence under clauses 116, 117 or
118 is a fine on conviction on indictment not exceeding $300,000 for
a body
corporate, and
$100,000 for an individual.
- Although
the fines cannot be considered to be at the lower end of the scale, they do not
appear to be disproportionate. These penalties
have been benchmarked against
those in the investment adviser provisions of the Securities Markets Act 1988
for similar offences
which were introduced in 2006. These reflect the potential
harm that may arise as a result of failing to comply. The level of penalty
must
be sufficient to act as a deterrent for financial advisers in individual cases,
as well as to deter systemic conduct which could
have an effect on wider
consumer confidence in the industry. This reflects the gravity of such a
breach.
- For
these reasons outlined above we consider that the limitations in the Bill on the
presumption of innocence under section 25(c)
of the Bill of Rights are justified
under section 5 of that Act.
Section 27(1) – Right to natural justice
- Section
27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act provides that every person has the right to the
observance of the principles of natural justice
by any tribunal or other public
authority which has the power to make a determination in respect of that
person’s rights, obligations,
or interests protected or recognised by law.
The Court of Appeal has stated that observance of the principles of natural
justice
is a flexible concept and is very much fact specific.
- The
right in section 27(1) affirms that decisions are made in a procedurally fair
way. Natural justice requires, inter alia, that
a decision-maker hears all
parties, whether in writing or orally. The parties need to receive adequate
notice of a decision, hearing
or complaint.
- Several
provisions in the Bill give the responsible Minister or the Commission the
ability to make decisions that affect the interests
of financial advisers or
approved professional bodies (for example, clause 45 - Withdrawal of
approval)
- MED
advises that in reality, throughout the inquiry or decision-making process, the
Commission will interact with the body. Further,
the Minister is free to discuss
any matter with any party in determining whether approval should be withdrawn.
To this end, clause
50 of the Bill provides that in exercising his or her powers
under this Act, the Minister may consult the Securities Commission and
any
affected party, including an approved professional body.
- On
balance, we consider that approved professional bodies have sufficient
opportunities to be heard. We also note that the Minister
must take his decision
in a manner that is consistent with the Bill of Rights Act. We have, therefore,
concluded that these clauses
do not raise an issue of inconsistency with section
27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act.
Clauses 71 (Commission must follow steps before making orders)
and 72 (Commission may shorten steps for specified orders)
- Under
clause 71(1)(b) the Commission has to give notice prior to making an order under
Subpart 1 of Part 4 of the Bill. The notice
provisions require the Commission to
notify those affected by its orders as follows:
- 24
hours before the Commission makes the order, in the case of an order specified
in clause 72(3) (i.e. a prohibition or corrective
order for a financial
advisers’ obligation or exemption if that order is stated to apply for a
period of 14 days or less; or
a temporary banning order)
- 48
hours before the Commission makes the order, in the case of any other disclosure
order; or
- 7 days
before the Commission makes the order, in the case of any other prohibition or
corrective order.
- Clause
72 authorises the Commission to make the orders set out in subclause (3) more
urgently than clause 71 permits – therefore
with less than 24 hours’
notice – if it thinks that this is necessary or desirable in the public
interest.
- Under
clause 71(1)(c) and (d) of the Bill, the Commission must give each person to
whom the notice of the order must be given an opportunity
to make written
submissions within that notice period or be heard (and be represented by
counsel) at a meeting of the Commission
after the expiry of that notice period.
In making its decision to make the order, the Commission must have regard to any
written
or oral submissions made (subclause (1)(e)). However, where the
Commission makes an order more urgently in accordance with clause
72, the
Commission may give persons an opportunity to make only oral submissions, not
written, to a member, officer, or employee
of the Commission.
- We
have examined whether these clause 72, by permitting such short notice periods
in which submissions, if made, must be brought,
and by permitting only oral
submissions, amounts to an effective denial of the right to be heard and
therefore to the right to natural
justice.
- MED
advises that a disclosure order may need to be done within a very short
timeframe so that an offending advertisement or incorrect
disclosure can be
quickly remedied, and its exposure to the public (which might be harmful) can be
minimised. The notice period is
intended to make time available for the
financial adviser to voluntarily correct the statement (advertisement or
disclosure).
- In
view of the fact that the objective is to prevent harm to the public, and the
rationale of the disclosure regime in the Bill, we
have concluded that the
clause 72 is not inconsistent with section 27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act.
CONCLUSION
- We
have concluded that the Bill does not appear to be inconsistent with the rights
and freedoms affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990.
Jeff Orr Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
|
Stuart Beresford
Acting Manager
Human Rights/Bill of Rights Team
|
- In
applying section 5, we have had regard to the guidelines set out by the Court of
Appeal in Ministry of Transport (MOT) v Noort [1993] 3 NZLR 260;
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9; and
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2002] NZCA 69; [2002] 2 NZLR 754.
- RJR
MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada (1995) 127 DLR (4th)1
- Ross
v New Brunswick School District No 15 [1996] 1 SCR 825 4.
R v Keegstra [1990] INSC 224; [1990] 3 SCR 697, 729,
826
5. Trans Rail v Wellington District
Court [2002] NZCA 259; [2002] 3 NZLR 780, 791-792
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website,
please note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the
Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to Parliament
under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the
Financial Advisers Bill. It should not be used or acted upon for any other
purpose. The advice does no more than
assess whether the Bill complies with the
minimum guarantees contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The release
of this
advice should not be taken to indicate that the Attorney-General agrees
with all aspects of it, nor does its release constitute a
general waiver of
legal professional privilege in respect of this or any other matter.
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/NZBORARp/2007/51.html