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Commerce Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 21, 25(c) and 27) [2008] NZBORARp 6 (3 March 2008)
Last Updated: 13 January 2019
Commerce Amendment Bill
3 March 2008 Attorney-General
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990: COMMERCE AMENDMENT
BILL
- We
have considered whether the Commerce Amendment Bill ("the Bill") (PCO 12799/3.6)
is consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 ("the Bill of Rights
Act"). We understand that the Bill will be considered by the Cabinet Legislation
Committee at its meeting
on Thursday, 6 March 2008.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
this conclusion, we
have considered potential issues of inconsistency with sections 14, 21, 25(c)
and 27 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Our analysis of these potential issues is set
out below.
OVERVIEW OF THE BILL
- The
Bill seeks to amend Parts 4, 4A, 5 and 6 of the Commerce Act 1986 ("the Act") to
promote the long-term interests of consumers
in markets where there is little or
no competition and no likelihood of a substantial increase in competition (such
as those relating
to basic infrastructure like electricity lines, gas pipelines
and airports). The Bill therefore aims to encourage outcomes that are
consistent
with competition, and, specifically, ensure that suppliers:
- have incentives
to innovate and invest;
- have incentives
to improve efficiency and provide services at a quality that reflects consumer
demands;
- share the
benefits of efficiency gains with consumers; and
- are limited in
their ability to extract excessive profits.
- Notable
initiatives include a new test and processes for determining when regulation may
be imposed; a requirement for the Commerce
Commission ("the Commission") to set
"input methodologies"[1] that will provide
greater certainty, transparency and predictability to businesses and their
customers; and "fit for purpose" forms
of regulation ranging from lighter-handed
options (such as information disclosure) to conventional price control. The Bill
also provides
for a range of associated pecuniary penalties and offences, as
well as orders for compensation and injunctions.
SUMMARY OF ADVICE
Section 14: the right to freedom of
expression
- A
number of provisions of the Bill enable the Commission to compel the disclosure
of information. These provisions aim to ensure that
firms that are not bound by
the disciplines of competition are instead subject to public scrutiny, or that
suppliers are complying
with the applicable regulatory requirements. Insofar as
these provisions engage the right to freedom of expression (which incorporates
the right to say nothing), we have concluded that they constitute justified
limitations on that right in terms of section 5 of the
Bill of Rights Act.[2]
Section 21: the right to be secure against unreasonable search and
seizure
- The
Bill enables the Commission to require the production of documents, and to
obtain a search warrant for the purposes of ascertaining
compliance with the
applicable regulatory requirements. These powers contribute to the
administration and integrity of the regulatory
regime. We have concluded that
they are each consistent with the right to be secure against unreasonable search
and seizure in section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 25(c): the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
- Clause
21 of the Bill seeks to make refusal or failure without reasonable excuse
to comply with specific requests for information an offence under section
103(1)(a) of the Act. Clause 21 gives rise to an issue of
inconsistency with
section 25(c) because the defendant is required to prove (on the balance of
probabilities) an excuse to escape
liability. In our view, clause 21 constitutes
a justified limitation on the right to be presumed innocent as affirmed by
section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act. While a person may have good reason for
failing to comply with a request for information, those
reasons are peculiarly
within the realm of the individual’s knowledge and it is rational that he
or she should be required
to provide a reasonable excuse.
Section 27(1): the right to the observance of the principles of natural
justice
- New
section 85C of the Bill prevents the Court from taking into account matters that
may be relevant to a person’s culpability
for a contravention of an
undertaking when assessing a pecuniary penalty. We have concluded that this
section is not inconsistent
with the principles of natural justice, as it does
not prevent a person from addressing his or her culpability, but rather changes
the factors upon which culpability is to be assessed.
Conclusion on consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act.
FULLER ANALYSIS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS ISSUES RAISED BY THE BILL
Section 14: the right to freedom of
expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form.
- The
right to freedom of expression has been interpreted as including the right not
to be compelled to say certain things or to provide
certain information.[3] The Bill contains several clauses that
enable the compelled disclosure of information.
Information disclosure (Part 4, subpart 4)
- New
section 53B (Effect of being subject to information disclosure regulation)
provides that every supplier that is subject to information
disclosure
regulation must publicly disclose information in accordance with a determination
of the Commission under new section 52O.
While the specific requirements are to
be set by the Commission, the information required to be disclosed may (without
limitation)
include financial statements, projections, assets values and
valuation reports, plans, forecasts and contracts (see new section 53C(2)).
The
Commission would be able to require disclosed information to be verified by
statutory declaration (new section 53C(3)), and could
require the provision of
consolidated information for all businesses (including those relating to
unregulated goods or services)
undertaken by the regulated supplier (new section
53D).[4]
- In
our view, it is questionable whether such information is truly "expressive" in
nature so as to engage section 14. In any case,
the purpose of information
disclosure regulation is to ensure that firms that are not bound by the
disciplines of competition are
instead subject to public scrutiny, making them
less likely to abuse their market power by overcharging customers and running
down
quality. In view of these ends (and the strong connection with the means
employed), we would consider such a provision to be a justified
limit on the
right to freedom of expression.
Monitoring and investigation provisions
- In
addition to the information disclosure provisions, new sections 53N (Monitoring
compliance with price-quality paths) and 53ZC (Powers
of Commission under this
Part) also enable the Commission to require the production of certain
information.
- Under
new section 53N, the Commission may (for the purposes of monitoring compliance
with a price-quality path) require a supplier
to provide:
- a written
statement confirming whether or not the supplier has complied with an applicable
price-quality path;[5]
- a report on the
written statement signed by an auditor;
- sufficient
information to enable the Commission to determine compliance with all applicable
price-quality paths; and/or
- a certificate
signed by a director of the supplier confirming the truth and accuracy of any
information so provided.
- Under
new section 53ZC, the Commission may (for the purposes of carrying out its
functions and exercising its powers under new Part
4) by notice in writing:
- require any
supplier to prepare and produce forecasts, forward plans and other information
in accordance with set methodology;
- require any
supplier or previous supplier it has reason to believe has information or
documents relevant to an investigation, audit
or inquiry, to produce or supply
documents in relation to goods or services, or the prices or operations of the
person in respect
of those goods or services;
- require any
supplier or previous supplier it has reason to believe has information or
documents relevant to an investigation, audit
or inquiry, to answer any
questions about any matter the Commission has reason to believe may be relevant
to the investigation, audit,
or inquiry; and/or
- require the
production of an expert opinion.
- To
the extent that these provisions engage the right to freedom of expression in
section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, we consider
that they constitute justified
limitations on that right. Each contributes to the important objective of
administering, and monitoring
compliance with, the regulatory regime, and each
provision may only be used with specific purposes in mind.
- While
we note that section 106(4) of the Act provides that a person is not excused
from compliance with requirements to provide information
on the basis that to do
so might tend to incriminate that person, statements made in response to
compulsory questions will be inadmissible
in proceedings for pecuniary penalties
or criminal proceedings (other than for perjury and offences under section 103
of the Act,
which insofar as relevant to statements made in response to
questions put by the Commission relate to refusing or failing to comply,
and
misleading the Commission).[6]
Section 21: the right to be secure against unreasonable search and
seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act provides:
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure,
whether of the person, property, or correspondence or
otherwise.
- There
are two limbs to the section 21 right. First, section 21 is applicable only in
respect of those activities that constitute a
"search or seizure". Secondly,
where certain actions do constitute a search or seizure, section 21 protects
only against those searches
or seizures that are "unreasonable" in the
circumstances.
- A
number of provisions of the Bill already canvassed confer powers of search and
seizure that also require scrutiny for compliance
with section
21.
New sections 53B, 53N and 53ZC
- As
mentioned above, new section 53B sets out the requirements of information
disclosure regulation. In addition to requiring the public
disclosure of certain
information, new section 53B(1)(c) provides that a supplier must supply the
Commission with any further statements,
reports, agreements, or particulars
requested for the purpose of monitoring the supplier’s compliance with the
information
disclosure requirements.
- Similarly,
new section 53N(c) of the Bill enables the Commission to require the provision
of sufficient information to enable it to
determine whether a supplier has
complied with all applicable price-quality paths.
- New
section 53ZC(1)(e)(i) also enables the Commission (for the purposes of
exercising its functions and powers under new Part 4) to
require any supplier or
previous supplier it has reason to believe has information or documents relevant
to an investigation, audit
or inquiry, to produce or supply documents in
relation to goods or services, or the prices or operations of the person in
respect
of those goods or services.
- Clause
21 of the Bill would make refusal or failure (without reasonable excuse) to
comply with sections 53B(1)(c), 53N or 53ZC an
offence under section 103(1)(a)
of the Act punishable upon summary conviction by way of fine not exceeding
$10,000 in the case of
an individual, or $30,000 in the case of a body
corporate.
- A
requirement to produce documents under statutory authority is likely to
constitute a search for the purposes of section 21 of the
Bill of Rights Act,
especially where failure to provide the documents results in possible
sanction.[7] Accordingly, the
Commission’s powers to require disclosure under these sections must be
exercised reasonably. However, the
powers must also be reasonable in
themselves.
- In
this regard, we consider that new sections 53B(1)(c), 53N(c) and 53ZC(1)(e)(i)
are reasonable, and therefore consistent with section
21. This is because:
- each contributes
to the important objective of administering, and/or monitoring compliance with,
the regulatory regime, and each provision
may only be used with specifically
defined purposes in mind;
- the production
of documents is less of an intrusion into a person’s expectation of
privacy
than a power of entry;[8] and
- a regulated
supplier in an uncompetitive marketplace has less of an expectation of privacy
than an ordinary citizen.
Clause 20 – Power to search
- Clause
20 of the Bill seeks to amend section 98A of the Act, which provides for a
warranted search power. The purpose of the amendment
is to confirm that section
98A applies not only in respect of suspected contraventions of the Act, but also
in respect of suspected
contraventions of any regulatory requirements imposed by
the Commission under the Act.
- Accordingly,
a suspected breach of an information disclosure requirement set by the
Commission under new section 52O, for example,
would be sufficient to engage
section 98A.
- We
consider that clause 20 is reasonable, and therefore consistent with section 21
of the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching this conclusion,
we have noted that:
- the integrity of
the regulatory regime is dependent upon the Commission being able to effectively
gather evidence of non-compliance;
- a person
appointed by the Commission to conduct a search may only do so with the prior
authorisation of a District Court Judge, Justice,
Community Magistrate, or Court
Registrar (not being a constable) – section 98A(2);
- in issuing a
search warrant, the District Court Judge, Justice, Community Magistrate, or
Court Registrar must be satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds to believe
that it is necessary for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not a person has
engaged in or
is engaging in conduct that constitutes or may constitute a
contravention of the Act (including the regulatory requirements); and
- the Act contains
a number of safeguards such as clear parameters on the powers conferred by a
search warrant and the powers granted
to persons called to assist (section 98B);
the requirement for the person executing the warrant to produce evidence of
authority
and evidence of identity (section 98C); and the requirement to produce
an inventory of items seized (section 98D).
Section 25(c): the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act provides:
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the determination of
the charge, the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to
law.
- Section
25(c) protects the right of an individual not to be convicted where reasonable
doubt as to his or her guilt exists, meaning
the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Strict liability offences give
rise to an issue
of inconsistency with section 25(c) because the defendant is
required to prove (on the balance of probabilities) an excuse to escape
liability; whereas in other criminal proceedings a defendant must merely raise a
defence in an effort to create reasonable doubt.
Where a defendant is unable to
prove an excuse, then he or he could be convicted even though reasonable doubt
exists as to his or
her guilt.
- As
mentioned above, clause 21 of the Bill seeks to make refusal or failure
without reasonable excuse to comply with new sections 53B(1)(c), 53N and
53ZC an offence under section 103(1)(a) of the Act. In our view, clause 21
constitutes
a justified limitation on the right to be presumed innocent as
affirmed by section 25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act.
- In
reaching this view, we note that the objective behind the provision is to ensure
that the Commission has unobstructed access to
information about suppliers.
Access to this
information will allow the Commission to effectively
monitor and enforce suppliers’
compliance with the regulatory requirements of new Part 4.
- The
offence has been cast as a strict liability offence because, while a person may
have good reason for failing to comply with a
request for information, those
reasons are peculiarly
within the realm of the individual’s
knowledge. Given that this is a regulatory offence, it is
rational that the defendant be required to prove a reasonable excuse, as the
defendant is best placed to adduce evidence as to the
reasons for failure to
comply.
Section 27(1): the right to the observance of the principles of natural
justice
- We
have also given particular consideration to whether new section 85C (Matters
Court must not take into account under sections 85A
and 85B) is consistent with
the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice affirmed by
section 27(1) of the Bill
of Rights Act. New section 85C seeks to prohibit the
Court from taking certain matters into account in determining a person’s
liability and penalty for the contravention of an undertaking. In particular,
the Court would be prohibited from considering whether
the undertaking is still
necessary or desirable, and the extent to which the contravention may have
lessened competition in a market.
- New
section 85C impacts upon the ability of a defendant to make a plea in
mitigation, or at least, to have it considered. However,
we accept that new
section 85C (in combination with the mandatory considerations in new section
85A(4)) is designed to place the
focus on the behaviour of the defendant, rather
than engaging the Court in competition analysis. It does not prevent a person
from
addressing his or her culpability, but rather changes the factors upon
which culpability is to be assessed. For example, while the
court may not assess
the appropriateness of the Commission accepting the undertaking in the first
place, it must consider the circumstances
in which the contravention took place
- which will no doubt
include reference to any changes beyond the
defendant’s control, whether the defendant sought a variation of the
undertaking,
and so forth. Accordingly, we do not consider that new section 85C
is inconsistent with the right to the observance of the principles
of natural
justice.
CONCLUSION
- Overall,
we have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act. In reaching this conclusion, we have
given particular emphasis to the
purpose of the legislation, and the need to create a workable scheme for the
regulation of non-competitive
markets.
Michael Petherick Manager – Ministerial Advice Office of Legal
Counsel
|
Stuart Beresford
Manager
Bill of Rights/Human Rights
|
1 The term "input methodologies" refers to the rules, processes and requirements
relating to regulation, such as how to calculate
the cost of capital, value
assets, allocate common costs, prepare regulatory accounts and so forth.
- In
applying section 5, the Ministry of Justice has regard to the guidelines set out
by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Transport (MOT) v Noort [1992] NZCA 51; [1992] 3
NZLR 260; Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [1999] NZCA 329; [2000] 2 NZLR 9;
and Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2002] NZCA 69; [2002] 2 NZLR 754; as
well as the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Oakes [1986]
1 S.C.R. 103.
- RJR
MacDonald v Attorney-General of Canada (1995) 127 DLR (4th) 1.
4 Importantly though, such consolidated information may only be required for the
purpose of monitoring compliance with information
disclosure regulation applying
to regulated goods or services (new section 53D(2)). For example, it may be
necessary to ensure that
common costs are properly allocated.
- Under
new section 53M(1), a "price-quality path" must specify either the maximum price
or prices that may be charged by a regulated
supplier within a regulated period,
or the maximum revenues that may be recovered by a regulated supplier within
that period; the
quality standards that must be met by the regulated supplier;
and the regulatory period.
- Sections
106(5) and (6) of the Act, to be amended by clause 23 of the Bill.
- New
Zealand Stock Exchange v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1992] 3 NZLR 1
(PC); see also McKinlay Transport Ltd v R (1990) 68 DLR (4th) 568 (SCC);
and Thomson Newspapers v Canada 1990 CanLII 135 (SCC); [1990] 1 SCR 425.
- Trans
Rail v Wellington District Court [2002] NZCA 259; [2002] 3 NZLR 780, 791-792.
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website, please
note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the Attorney-General to
determine whether a report should be made to Parliament under s 7 of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the Commerce Amendment Bill. It
should not be used or acted upon for any other purpose. The advice does no more
than
assess whether the Bill complies with the minimum guarantees contained in
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The release of this
advice should not be
taken to indicate that the Attorney-General agrees with all aspects of it, nor
does its release constitute a
general waiver of legal professional privilege in
respect of this or any other matter. Whilst care has been taken to ensure that
this document is an accurate reproduction of the advice provided to the
Attorney-General, neither the Ministry of Justice nor the
Crown Law Office
accepts any liability for any errors or omissions.
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