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Citizenship Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 5, 6, 19(1), 25(c)) [2010] NZBORARp 70 (21 September 2010)
Last Updated: 6 May 2020
Citizenship Amendment Bill
21 September 2010
ATTORNEY-GENERAL LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990: CITIZENSHIP
AMENDMENT BILL
1. We have considered whether the Citizenship Amendment Bill (PCO
14163/3.10) (‘the Bill’) is consistent with the New
Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’). We understand that the
Bill is likely to be considered by
the Cabinet
Legislation Committee at its meeting on Thursday, 23
September 2010.
2. In our view, the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
this conclusion, we
considered potential issues of consistency with ss 19(1) (right to be free from
discrimination) and 25(c)
(presumption of innocence) of the Bill of Rights Act and
assessed whether or not any
limitations on these rights are justifiable under s 5 (Justified limitations)
of that Act. To that end, we examined – following
the guidance of the
Supreme Court of New Zealand’s decision in Hansen v R [1] -
whether the relevant clauses:
(a) serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify some limitation of the
right or freedom.
(b) If so, then:
(i) is the limit rationally connected with the objective?
(ii) does the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably
necessary for sufficient achievement of the objective?
(iii) is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
3. The stated aim of the Bill is to create a more inclusive citizenship
system. To that end, the Bill amends the Citizenship Act
1977 (the Act) by
changing various requirements migrants must usually meet before being eligible
to receive a grant of citizenship.
These changes include:
- reducing the
period applicants must be present in New Zealand before applying for the grant
of citizenship from 5 years to 2 years
for regular members of the New Zealand
Defence Force
• making better provision for
families that travel overseas together for the
Government or an international organisation, and
- providing the
Minister of Internal Affairs with an ability to grant citizenship to applicants
convicted of very minor offences.
CONSISTENCY WITH SECTION 19(1) OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
- Section 19(1) of
the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom from
discrimination on the grounds of discrimination
in the Human Rights Act 1993.
The grounds of discrimination under that Act include (among others) family
status, sex, disability,
nationality and age.
- Drawing on the
New Zealand case law on discrimination, we consider that the key questions in
assessing whether there is a limit on
the right to freedom from discrimination
are: [2]
(a) does the legislation draw a distinction based on one of the
prohibited grounds of discrimination, and if so,
(b) does the distinction involve disadvantage to one or more classes of
individuals?
- In determining
if a distinction arises, consideration is given to whether the legislation
proposes that two comparable groups of people
be treated differently on one or
more of the prohibited grounds of discrimination. [3] The distinction
analysis takes a purposive and untechnical approach to avoid artificially ruling
out discrimination. [4] Once a distinction on prohibited grounds is
identified, the question of whether disadvantage arises is a factual
determination.[5]
Clause 7
• Clause 7 inserts a new s 7A into the Act. New s 7A(1) provides
that every person born outside New Zealand before 1 January
1970 may register as
a New Zealand citizen by descent if, at the time of the person’s birth,
the person’s mother was
a New Zealand citizen otherwise than by
descent.
- We consider that
this provision draws a distinction based on family status, age and sex. We have
therefore considered whether these
distinctions give rise to disadvantage for
the purposes of s 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act and, if so, whether these
limitations
on the right to be free from discrimination are justified under s 5
of that Act.
- New s 7A creates
a distinction based on a person’s family status because only the
descendants of a New Zealand citizen will
be able to register as a New Zealand
citizen by descent. Persons born overseas who do not meet this criterion are
not entitled to
be registered as New Zealand citizens by descent. This
distinction therefore gives rise to a disadvantage.
- We note that the
purpose of this distinction is to ensure that only those persons with a
sufficiently close connection with New Zealand
may claim citizenship as of
right. Direct descendants of New Zealand citizens (other than by descent) are
deemed to have such a connection
due to their parentage. In our view, this is
an important and significant objective.
- The distinction
involved is an incident of New Zealand’s sovereign power to define its own
citizenry. Importantly though, a
descendant of a non-citizen or citizen by
descent may obtain citizenship by grant once certain criteria establishing their
connection
with New Zealand are met.
- We, therefore,
consider that the limitation on the right to be free from discrimination on the
ground of family status is proportionally
and rationally linked to the objective
and can be justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- New s 7A also
creates a distinction based on a person’s age and sex. This is because,
firstly, applicants must be born before
1 January 1970. This age-based
distinction is designed to align the Bill with previous legislation, as people
born overseas after
this date to female citizens by birth or grant are already
citizens by descent due to a law change effective from that point.
- The provision
also only allows mothers to pass on citizenship to children born overseas,
creating a distinction based on sex. The
purpose of this distinction is to
rectify a discriminatory provision of the previous citizenship legislation, the
British Nationality
and New Zealand Citizenship Act 1948, which only allowed
male citizens to pass on citizenship to children born overseas.
- We consider that
the distinctions based on age and sex do not create a disadvantage.
Clause 8
- Clause 8 repeals
s 8 of the Act and substitutes new ss 8-8F. New s 8(1) sets out the core
requirements for an application for citizenship
by grant. These requirements
include that the applicant must be of full capacity and must satisfy the
Minister that he or she has
sufficient knowledge of the English language.
‘Full capacity’
- Section 2(3)(c)
of the Citizenship Act 1977 defines full capacity as being a person who is not
of unsound mind. New s 8(1), therefore,
draws a distinction based
on
disability.
- We note that the
Minister is unable to accept an application for the grant of citizenship under
new s 8(1) from an applicant who is
not of full capacity and the application
must in such cases be referred to the Minister as a submission. Therefore,
despite meeting
all the other requirements, the applicant will not be
automatically entitled to the grant of citizenship. For that reason, the
distinction
based on disability gives rise to a disadvantage.
- When determining
whether this disadvantageous distinction is justified for the purposes of s 5 of
the Bill of Rights Act, we note
that there are important consequences attached
to taking up New Zealand citizenship, such as applicants losing (where
applicable)
the citizenship of their country of origin. Loss of citizenship of
their country of origin could have significant ramifications
which the applicant
needs to be fully aware of. Requiring an applicant to be of full capacity is
intended
to ensure that he or she is fully aware of the consequences
of obtaining New Zealand citizenship. This is an important and significant
objective.
- We have been
advised by the Department of Internal Affairs that in cases where there is
evidence that an applicant has a mental illness,
the Citizenship Office
considers carefully whether the applicant is still able to meet the full
capacity requirement despite that
illness. For instance, there have been cases
where an applicant has been detained under the Criminal Procedures (Mentally
Impaired
Persons) Act 2003 but has been considered to have sufficient
understanding of the nature and effect of the act of applying for New
Zealand
citizenship and, therefore, of full capacity for citizenship purposes.
- Moreover, we
also note that s 9(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act 1977 allows the Minister to
authorise the grant of citizenship to any
person, including a person who may be
a New Zealand citizen by descent, if he or she is satisfied that granting a
certificate of
New Zealand citizenship to the applicant would be in the public
interest because of exceptional circumstances of a humanitarian or
other nature
relating to the applicant. When exercising this discretionary power, the
Minister must – pursuant to s 6 of the
Bill of Rights Act – ensure
that his or her decisions are consistent with the Bill of Rights Act, including
s 19(1). [6]
- We have
concluded that the limitation in new s 8(1) is rationally and proportionally
connected to the objective and, therefore, justified
under s 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
‘Knowledge of the English language' - Indirect
Discrimination
- New s 8(1)(h) of
the Act provides that the Minister must be satisfied that the applicant has
sufficient knowledge of the English language.
Neither the Bill of Rights Act,
nor the Human Rights Act includes "language" as a prohibited ground of
discrimination. Nonetheless,
the language requirement appears to give rise to
an issue of indirect discrimination on the grounds of ethnic or national origin,
as it disadvantages applicants who come from ethnic or national communities
where English is not the native language. We have, therefore,
considered
whether this limitation on the right to be free from discrimination is
justified.
- We note that the
purpose of the language requirement is to enable migrants to integrate into the
New Zealand community and, more importantly,
to ensure that they can fully
access educational, health and social services in this country. We consider
that these are significant
and important objectives.
• We
further note that the degree of language proficiency is not set at an
unreasonably high level. Applicants are only required to have a sufficient
knowledge of English, as opposed to being fluent in the
language. Moreover, in
recognition of the difficulties that certain applicants may have learning
English, the Minister of Internal
Affairs may under new s 8E waive the language
requirement when an applicant, because of his or her age or standard of
education,
or for any other reason personal to the applicant, would suffer undue
hardship if compliance with this requirement were insisted
upon. Again, the
Minister is – pursuant to s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act –
responsible for ensuring that this discretion
is exercised in a manner
that is consistent with that Act.
• In our view, the language requirement is rationally and
proportionally connected to the above-mentioned objectives. We
consider that it
is justifiable in terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Clauses 8C(2) and 8F(3)
- Clause 8 inserts
new ss 8C(2) and 8F(3). These provisions allow applicants who are accompanying
their citizen spouse, civil union
or de facto partner or parents overseas on
Crown or public service to have that time count towards the five year period a
person
must be present in New Zealand to:
(a) meet the requirement in ss 8A(1) or 8B(1), or
(b) be treated as intending to continue to reside in New Zealand for the
purpose of satisfying the Minister that he or she intends,
if granted New
Zealand citizenship, to continue to reside in New Zealand as required in s
8(1)(i).
- These provisions
create a distinction based on marital and family status, which is
disadvantageous as non-citizens who cannot meet
the criteria in these provisions
will have to continue to reside in New Zealand for the full five years to meet
the residence requirement
to apply for citizenship.
- We consider that
these limitations on the right to be free from discrimination are justified
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights.
- New ss 8C(2) and
8F(3) prevent the situation in which a person would have to continue to reside
in New Zealand to meet the residence
requirement and be separated from his or
her spouse, partner, or parent who is undertaking Crown or public services
overseas. We
consider that allowing families to stay together without
jeopardising their ability to be granted citizenship is an important objective,
and the limitation on the right to be free from discrimination will achieve that
objective.
Also, the provisions only apply to a very narrowly
described situation and are, therefore, proportional to their objective.
Clause 13 (1)
- Clause 13
repeals s 15 of the Act and substitutes ss 15(1) and 15(1A). New s 15(1) sets
out the requirements for a New Zealand citizen
to make a declaration of
renunciation of his or her citizenship. The requirements include being 18 years
old and being of full capacity.
This clause creates a distinction based on
disability and age.
- In our view,
these distinctions give rise to a disadvantage. This is because the Minister is
unable to accept an application of renunciation
of citizenship from an applicant
who is under 18 or who lacks full capacity. These applications can only be
accepted if the Minister
decides to waive either or both of the requirements
(see below paragraph 34). Despite meeting all the other requirements, applicants
who are under 18 or lack full capacity will not be automatically entitled
to renounce New Zealand citizenship.
- Renunciation of
citizenship involves the applicant giving up a number of significant rights,
including the unconditional right to
enter and remain in New Zealand
indefinitely, the right to a New Zealand passport, any other rights that may
exist by virtue of the
fact that someone is a New Zealand citizen, and
potentially the right of any children born to that person to be New Zealand
citizens.
Once a person has
renounced his or her New Zealand
citizenship, there is no ability to regain that citizenship automatically should
the person change
his or her mind. Instead, the former citizen must meet the
same grant requirements as any other applicant for the grant of citizenship.
Renunciation is a significant decision for a person to make and the person must
be fully aware of the consequences of doing so.
The
requirements in new s 15(1) have the purpose of ensuring that the applicant
has this awareness. We consider this an important and
significant
objective.
- We note that,
under new s 15(1A) of the Bill, the Minister may waive either or both of the
requirements in subsection (1) for the
person to have attained the age of 18
years and to be of full capacity, if the Minister is satisfied that it is in the
best interests
of the person to do so. When exercising this discretionary
power, the Minister is – pursuant to s 6 of the Bill of Rights
Act –
responsible for ensuring that his or her decisions are consistent with that Act,
including s 19(1).
- We consider that
the age and full capacity requirements in new s 15(1) are rationally and
proportionally linked to the objective and,
therefore, justified under s 5 of
the Bill of Rights Act.
Clause 14
- Clause 14 amends
s 17(2) of the Act and inserts a new subsection (2A). New s 17(2) sets out the
grounds on which the Minister may
deprive a person of his or her citizenship.
Under new s 17(2)(b), a person may be deprived of his or her citizenship if the
person
has committed an offence before acquiring New Zealand citizenship but was
convicted, and received a sentence of imprisonment, in
relation to that offence
after he or she acquired New Zealand citizenship. New s 17(2A) clarifies that
s
17(2)(b) does not apply to a New Zealand citizen
who has been granted citizenship
under the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act 1982. This exception creates a
distinction based on nationality as citizenship can only
be granted under the
Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act 1982 to West Samoan nationals.
• Applicants who do not qualify to be granted citizenship under that
Act will not benefit from the exception created in new
s 17(2A) of the Bill.
This provision, therefore, gives rise to a disadvantage.
- New Zealand
administered Western Samoa from 1914 until 1962. In 1962, Western Samoa and New
Zealand signed the Treaty of Friendship,
which provided that the two governments
would consult on matters relating to citizenship and immigration. The
Citizenship (Western
Samoa) Act 1982 enacts the Treaty of Friendship in New
Zealand domestic law.
- New s 17(2A)
recognises the fact that, under s 7 of the Citizenship (Western Samoa) Act 1982,
Samoan citizens are able to receive
the grant of New Zealand citizenship as of
right without having to meet the same grant requirements as other applicants.
Samoan citizens
do not have to meet the good character requirement or the
requirement not to have any disqualifying convictions under s 9A of the
Citizenship Act 1977. Accordingly, a Samoan applicant should not be deprived of
citizenship under new s 17(2)(b) when the fact that
he or she had committed an
offence would not have been relevant to the Minister's decision-making. In
comparison, for all other
grant applicants, the fact that they had committed an
offence would likely
have meant that they did not meet the good
character requirement, and would not have been granted citizenship if the
Minister had
been aware of the offence.
- The objective of
new s 17 (2A) is, therefore, to ensure consistency with existing legislation
that reflects New Zealand’s international
obligations and recognises the
close historical relationship between New Zealand and Western Samoa. This is an
important and significant
objective, and the limitation on the right to be free
from discrimination is rationally and proportionally linked to this
objective.
- We have,
therefore, concluded that the limitation in new s 17(2A) on the right to freedom
from discrimination can be justified under
s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
CONSISTENCY WITH SECTION 25(c) OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
- Section 25(c) of
the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right of everyone charged with an offence to
be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law. The right to be
presumed innocent requires that an individual must be proven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt,
and that the State must bear the burden of proof. [7]
- Reverse onus
offences give rise to a prima facie issue of inconsistency with s 25(c)
because the accused is required to prove (on the balance of
probabilities) a defence to avoid liability; whereas, in other criminal
proceedings an accused must merely raise a defence in an effort to create
reasonable doubt. This means where the accused is unable to prove the defence,
he or she could be
convicted even though reasonable doubt exists as to his or
her guilt.
- Clause 15
inserts a new s 20A into the Act that requires certain persons to return
certificates of New Zealand citizenship to the
Secretary. Clause 16 inserts new
s
27(3), which provides that a person commits an offence and is
liable on summary conviction to a term of imprisonment not exceeding
3 months or
a fine of $2000 who, knowingly and without reasonable excuse, fails to return a
certificate in contravention of s 20A.
- New s 27(3) can
therefore be read as providing for a statutory defence to the offence contained
in new s 20A, and for this reason
shifts the burden to the defendant to prove
the existence of a reasonable excuse. It is a reverse onus offence and
accordingly raises
a prima facie issue of inconsistency under s 25(c) of
the Bill of Rights Act.
Is the limit on the right to be presumed innocent
justified?
- The objective of
new s 27(3) is to place a greater onus on defendants to ensure that citizenship
certificates are returned to the
Department of Internal Affairs when a person is
no longer a citizen. This is particularly important to prevent fraud as a
person
could fraudulently use a citizenship certificate that has to be returned
as evidence in order to obtain entry into New Zealand (or
Australia), to stand
as a candidate in general or local elections, or use publicly funded services
(e.g health care). We consider
the prevention of fraud to be a significant and
important objective.
- The limitation
on the right to be presumed innocent is rationally linked to this objective as
it provides a legal deterrent to fraudulently
using or retaining a citizenship
certificate.
- Important for
the justification of reverse onus offences is also whether the offence turns on
a particular matter that is peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendant.
[8]
In such cases, it is easier for the defendant to explain why he or she took
(or
failed to take) a particular course of action than it is for the
Crown to prove the opposite. In the present case, there could be
genuine
reasons why the citizenship certificate was not returned such as the person
being sick or being overseas. The defendant
is best placed to show why he or
she did not return the certificate.
- We note that as
a general principle, reverse onus offences should carry penalties at the lower
end of the scale. A reversal of the
burden of proof is a concern when the
penalty involves imprisonment. In this case, the penalty level reflects the
fact that the
citizenship certificate could be used to conduct fraud if it were
not returned. Providing a strong deterrent and punishment reflects
the
seriousness of what can be obtained through having evidence of New Zealand
citizenship. In our view, the penalty is clearly
associated with the importance
of the objective of the offence.
- We consider that
new s 27(3) appears to impair the right to be presumed innocent no more than is
reasonably necessary for sufficient
achievement of the objective of the reverse
onus offence. The limitation is in due proportion to the importance of that
objective.
- Accordingly, we
have concluded that new s 27(3) appears to be justifiable under s 5 of the Bill
of Rights Act.
CONCLUSION
- We have
concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. This advice
has been prepared by the Public
Law Group and the Office of Legal Counsel.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel
Office of Legal Counsel
Footnotes:
1. The proportionality test under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act, as applied
in Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, draws on the test articulated by the
Canadian Supreme Court in R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103, R v Edwards
Books and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713 and R v Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303.
See for example, Hansen, at [42] per Elias CJ; [64] and [79] per
Blanchard J; [103], [104] and [120]-[138] per Tipping J; [185] and [217] per
McGrath J; and
[272] per Anderson J.
2. See, for example, Atkinson v Minister of Health and others [2010]
NZHRRT 1; McAlister v Air New Zealand [2009] NZSC 78; and Child
Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General [2008] NZHRRT 31.
3. Quilter v Attorney-General
[1997] NZCA 207; [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) at [573] per Tipping J (dissenting)
relied on in Atkinson v Minister of Health and others
[2010] NZHRRT 1 at [199];
McAlister v Air New Zealand [2009]
NZSC 78 at [34] per Elias CJ, Blanchard and
Wilson JJ and at [51] per Tipping J; and Child Poverty Action Group v
Attorney- General [2008] NZHRRT 31 at [137].
4. Atkinson v Minister of Health and others [2010]
NZHRRT 1 at [211]- [212]; McAlister v
Air New Zealand [2009] NZSC 78 at [51] per Tipping J; and Child
Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General [2008] NZHRRT 31 at [137].
5. See for example Child Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General
[2008] NZHRRT 31 at [179]; and McAlister v Air New Zealand [2009]
NZSC 78 at [40] per Elias CJ, Blanchard and Wilson JJ.
6. Section 6 states that wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that
is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained
in the Bill of Rights Act,
that meaning shall be preferred to any other meaning.
7. R v Wholesale Travel Group (1992) 84 DLR (4th) 161, 188 citing
R v Oakes [1986] 1
SCR 103.
8. See, for example, Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions
[2004] UKHL 43; [2005] 1, AC 264.
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website,
please note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the
Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to Parliament
under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the
Citizenship Amendment Bill. It should not be used or acted upon for any other
purpose. The advice does no more
than assess whether the Bill complies with the
minimum guarantees contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The release
of
this advice should not be taken to indicate that the Attorney-General agrees
with all aspects of it, nor does its release constitute
a general waiver of
legal professional privilege in respect
of this or any other matter. Whilst care has been taken to
ensure that this document is an
accurate reproduction of the advice provided to the Attorney-General, neither
the Ministry of Justice nor the Crown Law Office accepts
any liability for any
errors or omissions.
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