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Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 21, 25(c), 27(1)) [2011] NZBORARp 31 (19 August 2011)
Last Updated: 29 April 2019
19 August 2011 ATTORNEY-GENERAL
LEGAL ADVICE
CONSISTENCY WITH THE NEW ZEALAND
BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990: EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND CONTINENTAL SHELF
(ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS) BILL
- We
have considered whether the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf
(Environmental Effects) Bill (PCO 13242/12.0) (‘the
Bill’) is
consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights
Act’). We understand that the
Bill will be considered by Cabinet at its meeting on Monday, 22 August
2011.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered possible inconsistencies with ss 14 (freedom of expression), 21
(unreasonable search and seizure),
25(c) (presumption of innocence) and 27(1)
(right to natural justice). Our analysis under those sections is set out
below.
PURPOSE OF THE BILL
- The
purpose of the Bill is to establish an environmental management regime for New
Zealand’s Exclusive Economic Zone (‘EEZ’)
and continental
shelf. It regulates activities associated with the exploration, use and
conservation of the natural resources of
the exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf where those activities may have effects on the environment and
on existing interests.
- The
Bill gives effect to New Zealand’s obligations under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea to manage and protect
the natural resources of
the EEZ. The Bill aims to achieve a balance between economic development and the
protection of the environment
and existing interests. It also includes a general
duty for adverse effects to be avoided, remedied, or mitigated.
- The
Bill sets up a consent regime to regulate activities. Regulations may classify
activities as permitted, discretionary, or prohibited.
For discretionary
activities, persons will need to apply for a marine consent. The Environmental
Protection Authority (‘the
EPA’) will be the decision-maker for all
marine consents. An impact assessment will form the basis of an application and
will
allow the EPA to assess the effects on the environment and existing
interests.
CONSISTENCY WITH THE BILL OF RIGHTS ACT
Freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form. The Courts in Canada and the United
States
have held that freedom of expression necessarily entails the
right to say nothing or the right not to say certain
things.1
- Clause
55(4) of the Bill empowers the EPA to require information that is relevant and
reasonably necessary to decide an application
from:
- a
person who reviewed the impact assessment, and
- a
person who is heard or represented at the hearing.
- Clause
55(4) could limit the right to freedom of expression by compelling a person to
supply information that could be expressive
in nature.
- Where
a provision is found to pose a limit on a particular right or freedom, it may
nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act if it can be considered a
reasonable limit that is demonstrably justified in terms of s 5 of that Act.
Following the guidance
of the New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Hansen v
R,2 the s 5 inquiry may be summarised
as:
- does
the objective serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify some limitation
of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?
- The
purpose of cl 55 is to assist the EPA to obtain information necessary to perform
its functions. This appears to be a sufficiently
important objective. The
provision appears to be rationally and proportionately connected to that
objective because it is limited
to “information that is relevant and
reasonably necessary”. It is also restricted to individuals who have
chosen to participate
in the hearing process and can expect to be required to
supply relevant information.
- Clause
132 of the Bill empowers an enforcement officer to require a person, whom the
officer reasonably suspects of committing an
offence against the Bill, to supply
that person’s name, address and date of birth. It is arguable that this
information is
not truly expressive in nature, in which case it does not raise
any issues of concern with respect to the Bill of Rights Act. However,
even if
the right to freedom of expression is limited, the limitation appears to be
justifiable because the information is necessary
to ensure that enforcement
officers are able to perform their duties and the type of information is
narrowly prescribed.
Search and seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right of everyone to be secure against
unreasonable search and seizure, whether of
the person, property, correspondence
or otherwise. There are two limbs to the s 21 right. First, s 21 is applicable
only in respect
of those activities that constitute a ‘search or
seizure’. Secondly, where certain actions do constitute a search or
seizure, s 21 protects only against those searches or seizures that are
“unreasonable” in the
1 Slaight Communications v Davidson
59 DLR (4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705 (1977).
2 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7.
circumstances. A request for information or documents constitutes a search
for the purposes of s 21 of the Bill of Rights
Act.3
Power of entry to comply with enforcement order
- Clause
121(2)(a) of the Bill enables a person to comply with an enforcement order on
behalf of a person who has failed to comply,
and to enter onto any land, or
enter any structure, for that purpose.
- We
have concluded that the power of entry under cl 121(2)(a) appears to be
reasonable in the circumstances. It must be exercised for
a legitimate, and
narrowly defined, purpose under the Bill (compliance with an enforcement order).
Furthermore, the person must have
the consent of an Environment Court judge and,
if the structure is a dwellinghouse, be accompanied by a
constable.
Regulatory inspection powers
- Clause
133 of the Bill empowers an enforcement officer to enter and
inspect:
- a
place, vehicle, vessel, or structure in New Zealand territory or the exclusive
economic zone, except a dwellinghouse or marae
- a
structure located on the continental shelf in connection with the exploration of
the continental shelf or the exploitation of its
natural resources,
or
- a
vessel in the waters above the continental shelf that is beyond the exclusive
economic zone.
- Clause
2 of the Schedule to the Bill authorises the enforcement officer to: take a
sample of any substance; conduct examinations,
tests, inquiries, demonstrations,
and inspections; require the production of, inspect, and copy any documents; and
take photographs,
sound and video recordings, and drawings.
- We
have concluded that the inspection powers set out in cl 133 and the Schedule
appear to be reasonable. Their purpose is to determine
compliance with the Bill,
any regulations, a marine consent or an enforcement order. That purpose is
consistent with a regulatory
inspection regime. Individuals and organisations
that operate within a regulated industry can expect to be subject to scrutiny to
ensure compliance with the law.
- Furthermore,
the power to enter and inspect may only be exercised if the enforcement officer
is expressly authorised to do so by the
EPA in writing. The inspection officer
must carry evidence of their identity. The power must be exercised at a
reasonable time and
cannot be exercised in respect of a dwellinghouse or
marae.
Presumption of Innocence
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The right to be
presumed
3 New Zealand Stock Exchange v
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1992] 3 NZLR 1 (PC).
innocent requires that an individual must be proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, and that the state must bear the burden of
proof.4
Strict Liability Offences
- Clause
127 of the Bill specifies that offences against s 15 of the Bill are strict
liability offences. Section 15 places restrictions
on certain activities in the
EEZ or the continental shelf, unless the activity is a permitted activity or is
authorised by a marine
consent.
- Strict
liability offences raise a prima facie issue of inconsistency with s
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act because, once the prosecution has proven the
defendant committed the
act in question, the defendant must prove the
defence (or disprove a presumption) on the balance of probabilities to escape
liability. In other criminal proceedings a defendant
must merely raise a
defence in an effort to create reasonable doubt. In the case of strict liability
offences, a defendant who is unable to prove the
defence, or disprove a
presumption, could be convicted even if reasonable doubt exists as to her or his
guilt.
- We
have considered the following factors in assessing whether a departure from s
25(c) can be justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights
Act:
- the nature and
context of the conduct to be regulated
- the ability of
the defendant to exonerate themselves, and
- the penalty
level.
- A
reversal of the onus of proof is generally considered to be more easily
justifiable for "regulatory" offences such as those set
out in the Bill. Those
who choose to participate in regulated industries should be expected to meet
certain expectations of care
and accept the enhanced standards of
behaviour.5
- Strict
liability offences can also be justified where the offence turns on a particular
matter that is peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant. In such
cases, it is easier for the defendant to explain why he or she took (or failed
to
take) a particular course of action than it is for the Crown to prove the
opposite. For the specified offences in this Bill, we consider
the defendants to
be in a better position to explain why they failed to comply with the necessary
regulatory requirements, than for
the Crown to prove the opposite.
- A
reversal of the burden of proof is less of a concern where the penalty is
relatively low and therefore has a less significant impact
on the accused. As a
general principle, strict liability offences should carry penalties at the lower
end of the scale. The penalty
for a contravention of s 15 is a fine not
exceeding
$300,000 for a natural person and $600,000 for a
non-natural person. We are satisfied that a maximum fine of this magnitude is
appropriate
for a strict liability offence given the nature of commercial
activities undertaken in the EEZ and the continental shelf.
4 R v Wholesale Travel Group 84 DLR (4th)
161, 188 citing R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103.
5 R v Wholesale Travel Group (1992) 84 DLR
(4th) at 213.
Principal/Agent Relationship
- Clause
128 of the Bill makes a principal liable for offences committed by an agent.
Subclause (4) makes it a defence to prove that
the principal:
- did
not know nor could reasonably be expected to have known that the offence was to
be or was being committed
- took
all reasonable steps to prevent the commission of the offence, and
- took
all reasonable steps to remedy any effects of the act or omission giving rise to
the offence.
- Arguably,
cl 128 could limit the presumption of innocence because, once the prosecution
has proved that the agent has committed the
offence, the principal must make out
the defence in subcl (4), on the balance of probabilities, to escape
liability.
- In
our view, the provision can be justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act. It
is important that those ultimately responsible
for regulated activities
undertaken in the EEZ or the continental shelf cannot escape liability for
offending simply by claiming
that they had no knowledge that it was taking
place. It is reasonable to expect that principals will know what their agents
are doing
when the agent is acting on their behalf. Furthermore, the defendant
will be best placed to make out the defence, especially by
showing the
reasonable steps taken to prevent the offending from
occurring.
Right to Natural Justice
- For
completeness, we note that cl 58 of the Bill imposes some restriction on
information provided at a hearing of the EPA. Clause
58(4) of the Bill empowers
the EPA to direct a person at a hearing not to present any part of a submission
if it is irrelevant or
not in dispute. Clause 58(5) of the Bill empowers the EPA
to direct that parts of submissions be struck out if they are frivolous
or
vexatious, disclose no reasonable or relevant case, or would constitute an abuse
of process to hear them.
- We
have considered whether cl 58 could limit s 27(1) of the Bill of Rights Act,
which affirms the right of everyone to the observance
of the principles of
natural justice. The right to be heard is one aspect of the right to natural
justice. In our view, s 27(1) is
not limited because the matters which the EPA
can refuse to hear are not substantive.
CONCLUSION
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. This advice
has been prepared by
the Public Law Group and the Office of Legal Counsel.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
In addition to the general disclaimer for all
documents on this website, please note the following: This advice was prepared
to assist
the Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to
Parliament under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to
the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Bill.
It should not be used or acted upon
for any other purpose. The advice does no
more than assess whether the Bill complies with the minimum guarantees contained
in the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The release of this advice should not be
taken to indicate that the Attorney-General agrees with
all aspects of it, nor
does its release constitute a general waiver of legal professional privilege in
respect of this or any other
matter. Whilst care has been taken to ensure that
this document is an accurate reproduction of the advice provided to the
Attorney-General,
neither the Ministry of Justice nor the Crown Law Office
accepts any liability for any errors or omissions.
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