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Land Transport Amendment Bill (Inconsistent) (Section 25(c)) [2013] NZBORARp 48 (15 November 2013)
Last Updated: 21 April 2019
Land Transport Amendment Bill
15 November 2013 Attorney-General Legal Advice
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Land Transport
Amendment Bill
- We
have considered whether the Land Transport Amendment Bill (PCO 19920/7.0)
(‘the Bill’) is consistent with the rights
and freedoms affirmed in
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
We understand that Cabinet
will consider the Bill at its meeting on Monday, 18
November 2013.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be inconsistent with the right to be
presumed innocent affirmed in s 25(c) of the Bill
of Rights Act. We have
consulted Crown Law and it agrees with our conclusion. We recommend that you
draw the Bill to the attention
of the House of Representatives under s 7 of the
Bill of Rights Act and Standing Order 262.
THE BILL
- The
Bill amends the Land Transport Act 1998 (‘the Act’) to create a new
infringement offence at lower levels of breath
and blood-alcohol than for the
existing offences in the Act. A person whose breath alcohol is over 250 but does
not exceed 400 micrograms,
or whose blood alcohol is over 50 but does not exceed
80 milligrams, will be caught by the new limit.
INCONSISTENCY WITH THE RIGHT TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right of everyone charged with an
offence to be presumed innocent until proved
guilty according to law. This means
that an individual must not be convicted where reasonable doubt as to his or her
guilt exists.
The prosecution in criminal proceedings must therefore prove,
beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused is guilty.
- Clause
9 of the Bill repeals and replaces s 70A of the Act. New s 70A provides for a
right for a driver whose breath test exceeds
400 micrograms to elect a blood
test within 10 minutes of being advised of the result. New s 70A does not extend
that right to drivers
whose breath test exceeds 250 but does not exceed 400
micrograms. An exception is provided for a driver who is apparently younger
than
20 or who holds an alcohol interlock licence or a zero alcohol licence (to
preserve the existing position in the Act).
- Section
77(1) of the Act creates a conclusive presumption that the proportion of alcohol
in the defendant’s breath at the time
of an alleged offence is the same as
the proportion of alcohol indicated by a breath test. In other words, the
results of an evidential
breath test, once admitted as evidence, cannot be
challenged in criminal proceedings. The Bill does not
amend s 77(1)
so the conclusive presumption will apply to drivers whose breath test result is
above 250 but does not exceed 400 micrograms.
- The
Courts have identified the right to elect a blood test in s 70A as an important
safeguard against errors that may arise from breath
tests. In Aylwin v
Police,1 the Supreme Court identified the purpose of the right to elect to
have a blood test:
The right of election to have a blood test and the right to be
advised of that right, conferred by s 70A, must be regarded as providing
effective protection against the consequences of an error in a breath screening
test or an evidential breath test.
- The
Court of Appeal in R v Aylwin 2 provided a broader perspective on the
right to elect a blood test:
It may at first blush seem unfair that the defence of error in
the result of breath tests has been removed. However, at the same time
as s
64(4) was amended, Parliament introduced safeguards. The main safeguard was that
the right to elect to undergo a blood test
(and to be informed of that right)
was extended to all those who returned a positive evidential breath test,
whereas previously this
was reserved for those with readings under 600.
- The
Court of Appeal went on to note that, in Livingston v Institute of
Environmental Science and Research Ltd, 3 it had recognised that, although
defendants’ rights were limited by the removal of the error defence, the
introduction of
a universal right to elect a blood test was seen by Parliament
as a sufficient safeguard:
These amendments were fully debated and Parliament added a new
safeguard by providing the possibility of blood tests in cases where
the result
is over 600 as well as where it is under 600. That can be regarded as a quid pro
quo for the removal of the ability to
challenge the reliability of a breath
testing device on a particular occasion.
- Failing
to provide the recognised safeguard of being able to elect a blood sample,
combined with the conclusive presumption created
by s 77(1) of the Act, means
that the Bill appears to limit the right to be presumed innocent affirmed in s
25(c) of the Bill of
Rights Act.
POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS
- Where
a provision is found to pose a limit on a particular right or freedom, it may
nevertheless be consistent with the Bill of Rights
Act if it can be considered a
reasonable limit that is demonstrably justified in terms of s 5 of that Act.
- Following
the guidance of the New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Hansen v R, 4
the s 5 inquiry may be summarised as:
- does
the objective serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify some limitation
of the right or freedom?
- If
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective
Sufficiently important objective
- The
purpose of the Bill is to reduce the number of road fatalities and injuries due
to alcohol and reduce the cost to society of these
fatalities and injuries. The
objective of denying drivers the option to elect a blood test for the
infringement offence appears to
be to make the road safety regime more effective
and efficient. In our view, in this area of law enforcement that has high
volumes,
effectiveness and efficiency gains may be sufficiently important to
justify some limitation on the right to be presumed innocent.
Rational connection
- Blood
tests take significant time to perform, add complexity to the road safety regime
at the point where the Police determine a driver’s
alcohol levels, and
impose additional costs. The additional costs have been quantified in financial
terms. The Ministry of Transport
has estimated that giving drivers the option to
elect a blood test could result in an additional 3000 to 4000 blood tests a
year.
Each blood test adds about $100.00 to the cost of processing the
infringement offence. The total extra financial cost of the right
to elect a
blood test is therefore expected to be between $300,000 and $400,000 a year.
- However,
the Ministry of Transport also expects that removing the right to elect a blood
test in the case of the infringement offence
may come with associated costs for
the justice system because it could lead to more litigation and defended
hearings. These costs
may be high enough to more than offset cost saving for
Police. In analysing a proposal to completely remove the blood test option
across the entire regime, the Regulatory Impact Statement estimated that cost
savings for Police would be more than offset by associated
cost increases to
other government agencies. There is a real risk that the justice system as a
whole may see no efficiency gains
from removing the right to elect a blood test
in relation to the new lower limit. It therefore appears doubtful that the
limitation
on the right to be
presumed innocent is rationally
connected to the Bill’s objective.
Limiting the right no more than is reasonably necessary
- The
Bill appears to impair the right more than is reasonably necessary because there
are reasonable alternatives that impair the right
to a lesser degree. The
Regulatory Impact Statement considered retaining the right to elect a blood test
but with cost recovery through
a higher infringement fee if a person elects the
blood test (this is similar to the current situation for people who are
convicted
for the existing blood alcohol offence). This option still limits the
presumption of innocence by creating a disincentive to elect
a blood test.
Nevertheless, in our view it is preferable to removing the blood test altogether
and may be a justified limitation
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights, especially
if, as is likely, the cost recovered would be a modest amount around
$100.00.
- Canadian
law may also provide a reasonable alternative. The Canadian Criminal Code treats
the breath alcohol test result as presumptively,
rather than conclusively,
valid. The presumption can be rebutted but only by evidence indicating that the
testing apparatus had not
functioned properly. Other evidence, such as bystander
accounts, is explicitly excluded. This leaves scope for an accused person
to
raise a meaningful defence while excluding spurious defences. This is a less
severe limitation on the presumption of innocence
and is likely to be a
justified limitation under s 5 of the Bill of Rights.
Proportionate to the objective
- The
denial of the right to elect a blood test could be seen as proportionate because
it is restricted to an infringement offence,
which does not carry a criminal
conviction. The right to elect a blood test remains in place for drivers facing
the possibility of
a criminal conviction and a more serious penalty.
- However,
in our view, the limitation on the presumption of innocence does not appear to
be proportionate because the road safety regime
would still be able to operate
reasonably effectively while retaining the right to elect a blood test. Any
efficiency gains would
not be sufficient to outweigh the right to be presumed
innocent. We also consider that although infringement offences do not result
in
convictions, a person may still face significant consequences such as the
imposition of demerit points through the infringement
process.
CONCLUSION
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be inconsistent with the right to be
presumed innocent affirmed in s 25(c) of the Bill
of Rights Act. We recommend
that, as soon as practicable, you bring the Bill to the attention of the House
of Representatives, pursuant
to s 7 of the Bill of Rights Act and Standing Order
262. We have attached a draft report for your consideration.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
Footnotes
[1] [2008] NZSC 113; [2009] 2 NZLR 1 at [11]
[2] [2008] NZCA 154; (2008) 24 CRNZ 87 at [49]
[3] [2003] NZCA 114
[4] [2007] NZSC 7
Disclaimer
In addition to the general disclaimer for all
documents on this website, please note the following:
This advice was prepared to assist the Attorney-General to determine whether
a report should be made to Parliament under s 7 of the
New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 in relation to the Land Transport Amendment Bill. It should not
be used or acted upon for any
other purpose. The advice does no more than assess
whether the Bill complies with the minimum guarantees contained in the New
Zealand
Bill of Rights Act. The release of this advice should not be taken to
indicate that the Attorney-General agrees with all aspects
of it, nor does its
release constitute a general waiver of legal professional privilege in respect
of this or any other matter. Whilst
care has been taken to ensure that this
document is an accurate reproduction of the advice provided to the
Attorney-General, neither
the Ministry of Justice nor the Crown Law Office
accepts any liability for any errors or omissions.
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