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Maritime Crimes Amendment Bill (Consistent) (Sections 18, 21, 22) [2015] NZBORARp 61 (29 October 2015)
Last Updated: 3 March 2019
29 October 2015
Attorney General
Maritime Crimes Amendment Bill (PCO 14020/3.0) - Consistency with the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
Our Ref: ATT395/233
- We
have examined the Maritime Crimes Amendment Bill for consistency with the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“the Bill
of Rights Act”). We have
concluded that whilst the Bill raises some issues under the Bill of Rights Act,
it is not inconsistent
with that Act.
Outline of the Bill
- The
purpose of this Bill is to amend the Maritime Crimes Act 1999
(“MCA”) so as to implement obligations under the 2005
Protocol to
the Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, and the 2005 Protocol
to the Rome Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf
(“the 2005 Protocols”). The 2005 Protocols are
maritime counter-terrorism treaties. Enactment of this Bill will enable
New
Zealand to ratify the 2005 Protocols.
- The
Bill introduces a number of new offences which relate to maritime terrorism and
introduces a maritime boarding regime. In summary,
the Bill proposes new
offences relating to:
- 3.1 terrorism
and ships (cl 10);
- 3.2 transportation
of weapons and nuclear material and equipment (cl 10);
- 3.3 transportation
of fugitives by ship (cl 10);
- 3.4 fixed
platforms and terrorism (cl 12);
- 3.5 intentionally
causing death or injury to any person in connection with the commission or
attempted commission of named offences
(cl 13);
- 3.6 failing to
comply with a lawful direction of an enforcement officer exercising powers under
the MCA or obstructing him/her in
exercising those powers (cl
15).
- The
Bill provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of offences if the
act or omission occurs against or on board a New
Zealand ship or fixed platform
located on New Zealand’s continental shelf, or if the defendant is a New
Zealand citizen, ordinarily
resident in New Zealand (but not the citizen of any
State) or present in New Zealand (cl 13).
- The
Bill also sets out enforcement officers’ powers when taking action to
suppress offences in the MCA (cl 15). Those powers
can be summarised as
follows:
- 5.1 Powers to
board a ship and search the ship, cargo and persons on board if the enforcement
officer has reasonable grounds to suspect
the person on board the ship has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offence against the MCA; or
the ship has been,
is, or is about to be involved in the commission of an
offence against the MCA. These powers can be exercised without warrant;
- 5.2 In relation
to a ship that fails to stop when signalled or required to do so, power to chase
the ship, fire a warning shot and,
as a last resort, fire at or onto the ship to
compel it to stop.
The powers described at 5.1 and 5.2 can be exercised in
relation to New Zealand ships wherever they may be (unless in another
state’s
territorial or internal waters). They can only be exercised in
relation to foreign ships if (a) the foreign ship is in New Zealand
internal or
territorial waters and there are reasonable grounds to suspect the offence has
been, is, or is about to be committed
in NZ internal or territorial waters; or
(b) in every other case, the flag State of the foreign ship has consented.
5.3 Powers to enter and search a fixed platform and a person on board a fixed
platform if the enforcement officer has reasonable
grounds to suspect that a
person on board the fixed platform has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offence against
the MCA, or the fixed platform itself has been, is, or
is about to be involved in the commission of an offence against the MCA. These
powers can be exercised without warrant.
5.4 Power to arrest any person without warrant if the enforcement officer has
reasonable grounds to believe the person has committed
an offence against the
MCA. The person must be delivered into the custody of a constable as soon as
practicable.
- Enforcement
officers are designated as every constable and every officer in command of a
ship or an aircraft of the Defence Force
(who may direct a person under his/her
command to exercise the powers of an enforcement officer). Reasonable force may
be used by
an enforcement officer for the purpose of exercising his/her
powers.
Extraterritorial application of Bill of Rights Act protections
- The
Bill expressly provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of
offences, and expressly anticipates the use of the boarding
regime powers in
relation to foreign ships which are outside of New Zealand internal or
territorial waters (if the flag state consents).
The Bill thus raises the
question of the extraterritorial application of Bill
of Rights Act protections. The issue is not straightforward and it is
possible that some conduct under the Bill might be found to
fall outside the
scope of the Bill of Rights Act,1 but New Zealand
authority raises the possibility that jurisdiction would be found on the basis
that extraterritorial actions could
be subject to the Bill of Rights Act where
taken or directed from New Zealand.2
- For
that reason, we have presumed for the purpose of considering the Bill that the
Bill of Rights Act would apply to the extraterritorial
exercise of the powers
that it confers. However, and in light of the qualified approach taken by other
jurisdictions and, particularly,
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada on the
effect of context upon the right against unreasonable search,3
we proceed on the basis that there is a more limited, if any, expectation
of privacy and/or protection for that privacy under the
Bill of Rights Act in
respect of searches undertaken outside New Zealand.
- Having
said that, we note the s 18 right to freedom of movement is specifically limited
to those in New Zealand and to the right to
move within New Zealand. Accordingly
we consider this right will only be engaged if the powers are exercised within
New Zealand internal
or territorial waters. We discuss this further below at
paragraphs 19 and 21.
New offences
- The
proposed new offences raise no issues of consistency with the Bill of Rights
Act.
- The
powers conferred on enforcement officers under the boarding regime raise issues
relating to consistency with s 18 (right to freedom
of movement), s 21 (freedom
to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure) and s 22 (right to be free
from arbitrary arrest
and detention).
Consistency with s 21 (freedom to be secure against unreasonable search and
seizure)
- Assessing
the reasonableness of search powers involves striking a balance between the
interest of the public and of the particular
individual or entity concerned to
be ‘left alone’, and the public interest in the objective of the
search. See, for example,
R v Grayson and
Taylor:4
“Any search is a
significant invasion of personal freedom. How significant it is will depend on
the circumstances. There may
be other values and interests, including law
enforcement considerations, which weigh in the particular case.”
- Whether
a search is unreasonable will depend on many factors, including the nature of
the place or object being searched, the degree
of intrusiveness into personal
privacy and the rationale for the search.5 The greater
the degree of intrusiveness, the
1 See, among others, Al-Skeini and
Others v the United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18, [137] (European Convention
rights may apply extraterritorially, but contingent on factors such as control
and authority
over individual affected); Prime Minister v Khadr [2010] 1
SCR 44, [16] (extraterritorial application exceptional); but see X (Re)
[2010] 1 FCR 640 at [46]-[48], [59] &
[64] (application where actions originating in Canadian territory).
2 See, particularly, Zaoui v Attorney-General (No
2) [2006] 1 NZLR 289, [79].
- See,
particularly, Schreiber v Canada (Attorney-General) [1998] 1 SCR 841,
[19]-[25] (expectation of privacy in overseas records) and R v Simmons
[1988] 2 SCR 495, 528 (expectation of privacy in border
searches).
4 [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA),
407.
5 Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR
305 at [172].
greater the justification required (and the greater the attendant safeguards
required to ensure that the justification is present).
- A
warranted search power allows for prior and independent verification that the
search is justified. Whilst warrantless search powers
lack prior judicial
oversight, such searches may be reasonable where the delay inherent in obtaining
a warrant would have a disproportionate
adverse effect. Warrantless search
powers have been accepted where there is a serious threat to safety or
property;6 the search is undertaken as an incident to a
lawful arrest or other detention where, for example, it was necessary to obtain
evidence
or ensure safety of the detainee;7 the search
is undertaken in the context of a regulated activity;8
or where there is a prospect of evidence being lost or destroyed,
including in the particular context of vehicle searches, the risk
that a vehicle
may move away.9
- Similarly,
factors that can diminish the seriousness of a breach of s 21 include where the
breach takes place in situations of urgency,
particularly where a person’s
safety might be in jeopardy, or in order to prevent the possible destruction of
evidence.10
- We
consider that the proposed powers to carry out warrantless searches as described
above are not per se unreasonable because:
- 16.1 The powers
are conditional on an enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to suspect
the commission of offences against
the MCA;
- 16.2 The powers
can only be exercised by enforcement officers (defined as constables and
officers-in-command) who are either trained
in investigative analysis or are
senior, experienced officers (who may also have experience in investigating
service offences);
- 16.3 The powers
may only be exercised where there is a serious threat to safety or property,
i.e. if an offence has, is, or will be
committed against the
MCA.11 There is a strong public interest in the
investigation of serious offences and, given the unique logistical circumstances
that may
pertain when enforcing the MCA, the requirement to obtain a warrant
could well impede effective law enforcement;
- 16.4 Given the
searches will be conducted on ships or fixed platforms:
- 16.4.1 there is
a real risk of evidence being lost or destroyed if the powers are not exercised
promptly upon establishment of the
reasonable grounds;
- 16.4.2 it may
be impracticable to obtain a warrant in the circumstances.
6 For example, R v
Godoy [1999] 1 SCR 311.
7 See, for example, Cloutier v Langlois
[1990] 1 SCR 158.
8 Such as a commercial activity carried out under
conditional licence: see, eg, British Columbia Securities Commission v
Branch
[1995] 2 SCR 3; Simmons v R [1988] 2 SCR 495.
9 See, for example, R v Rao (1984) 12 CCC
(3d) 97.
10 R v Williams [2007] NZCA 52, [2007] 3 NZLR
207, (2007) 23 CRNZ 1 at [123].
11 Offences punishable by 7 years, 14 years or life
imprisonment (s 7 of the MCA).
16.5 Other than searches of the person, the searches will be of ships or fixed
platforms which are less invasive of personal freedom
and where there is a
lesser expectation of privacy;12
16.6 Insofar as searches are conducted outside of New Zealand, there is a more
limited expectation of privacy and/or protection for
that privacy.
- The
capacity of courts to exclude evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable
search from a subsequent criminal trial provides
an additional
safeguard.13
- For
these reasons, we consider that no issue of inconsistency arises under s 21 in
respect of these powers.
Consistency with s 18 (freedom of movement)
- Section
18(1) of the Bill of Rights Act provides that everyone lawfully in New Zealand
has the right to freedom of movement in New
Zealand. The rights of each of the
individuals on board a ship would be affected if the power to chase a ship were
to be exercised
within New Zealand internal or territorial waters. Further, the
right would be seriously curtailed given that shots can be fired
at the ship in
order to halt its movement (if it has failed to stop when required). The power
to chase and fire upon the ship is
thus prima facie inconsistent with the s 18
right.
- However,
the need to enforce and uphold the criminal law and, in particular, prevent or
investigate the commission of very serious
maritime offences, is a legitimate
objective. The power to chase the ship, and fire upon it, will be exercised only
if the ship fails
to bring to when requested. We therefore consider that the
provision is a reasonable limit on the right that can be demonstrably
justified
in a free and democratic society (s 5 Bill of Rights Act).
- The
power to stop the ship is also prima facie inconsistent with the s 18 right (if
the power is exercised within New Zealand internal
or territorial waters). For
the same reasons as set out in paragraph 20, we consider the limitation is
demonstrably justified in
terms of s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Consistency with s 22 (right to be free from arbitrary arrest and
detention)
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act guarantees the right not to be arbitrarily arrested
or detained. Both limbs of this right are
engaged by the proposed power for an
enforcement officer to arrest a person whom s/he has reasonable grounds to
believe has committed
an offence against the MCA. However, there is a legitimate
purpose for the arrest and subsequent detention, namely to ensure the
detention
of an individual who is believed to have committed a very serious offence and,
correspondingly, ensure the safety of others.
This is an important objective and
the power is rationally and proportionately connected to it. Further, the power
may only be exercised
if the reasonable grounds exist.
12 Williams at [113].
13 Evidence Act 2006, s 30. This includes where,
notwithstanding that the conditions for exercise of the warrantless power have
been
satisfied, it would have been reasonably possible to obtain a warrant: see,
eg, R v Laugalis [1993] NZCA 551; (1993) 10 CRNZ 350 (CA); R v Dobson [2008] NZCA
359 at [30] ff.
- Although
there are no particular safeguards to limit the period of detention, the
individual must be delivered as soon as practicable
into the custody of a
constable. This appears to serve a number of purposes. It places the individual
within the standard law enforcement
processes/machinery. It enables, at a
practical level, a place for detention to continue. It also enables facilitation
of the individual’s
s 23 rights.
- In
light of these factors, we conclude that the proposed power to arrest (and
detain) does not authorise an arbitrary arrest or detention
and it is thus
consistent with s 22 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- A
large-scale limitation on the right to freedom of movement may also involve an
infringement of the right to be free from arbitrary
detention. Thus the power
to stop the ship may engage s 22 (in addition to s 18). However, even if s 22
is engaged by the enforcement
officer’s power to stop the ship, there is a
legitimate purpose for detention namely to ensure that a search of the ship
and/or
individuals may be conducted in circumstances where there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the ship or person has committed,
is committing, or
is about to commit a serious offence against the MCA. Any detention will
necessarily be limited to the period of
time that is required to stop the ship
and conduct the necessary searches. As such we consider that the proposed
power to stop
the ship does not enable arbitrary detention and is consistent
with s 22.
- This
advice has been reviewed by Austin Powell, Senior Crown Counsel.
Yours faithfully
Crown Law
Alison Todd
|
Crown Counsel
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