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Substance Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Bill (Consistent) (Sections 11, 14, 21) [2015] NZBORARp 72 (27 November 2015)
Last Updated: 10 March 2019
Substance Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Bill
27 November 2015
Hon Christopher Finlayson QC, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Substance
Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Substance Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and
Treatment) Bill (‘the Bill’) is consistent
with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of
Rights Act’).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
with the latest version of the Bill (PCO 15293/5.0)
and on the understanding
that the Bill will be subject to minor amendments before it is submitted to
Cabinet. We will provide you
with further advice if the final version of the
Bill includes amendments that affect the conclusions in this advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with section 11 (right to refuse
medical treatment), section 14 (freedom
of expression), and section 22 (right
not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained). Our analysis is set out below.
Summary
- The
Bill provides for the compulsory assessment and treatment of individuals who are
considered to have a severe substance addiction,
and who do not have the
capacity to participate in treatment.
- The
Bill raises a number of concerns with section 11 and section 22 of the Bill of
Rights Act. These rights are fundamentally concerned
with individual autonomy
and dignity. Any limitation on these rights requires careful scrutiny and
justification.
- We
consulted with the Crown Law Office during the preparation of this advice. We
agree the impairment of an individual’s right
to refuse medical treatment
is justified under the Bill and that the provisions authorising detention in the
Bill are not arbitrary
for the purposes of section 22.
- In
our view, however, the justification for the limitations on the right not to be
arbitrarily detained is finely balanced.
The Bill
- The
Bill provides for the compulsory assessment and treatment of individuals who are
considered to have a severe substance addiction,
and who do not have the
capacity to participate in treatment. The Bill will replace the Alcoholism and
Drug Addiction Act 1966 (‘the
ADA Act’).
- The
Bill provides for:
- applications
for assessment to determine whether an individual suffers from severe substance
addiction and whether their capacity
to make informed decisions about treatment
is severely impaired;
- detention
and compulsory treatment for individuals who meet the statutory criteria with a
focus on enabling the individual to gain
the capacity to consent to and
participate in ongoing treatment;
- provisions
to protect the rights of individuals subject to the Bill and to investigate
alleged breaches of those rights;
- offences
and penalties for breaches of the Bill; and
- transitional
provisions to allow for the management of individuals who are subject to the ADA
Act.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights
Act
Section 11 - Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment
- Section
11 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to refuse to
undergo any medical treatment. The right to
refuse to undergo medical treatment
protects the concept of personal autonomy, specifically the idea that
individuals have the right
to determine for themselves what they do or not do to
their own body, free from restraint or coercion.
- Clause
19 requires that once an Area Director has received an application to assess
whether a person has a severe substance addiction,
the Area Director must make
the necessary arrangements to have a person assessed by an approved specialist.
The necessary arrangements
include providing written notice to the subject of
the application that they are required to attend for the purposes of an
assessment.
If an individual is assessed as meeting the criteria for compulsory
assessment a compulsory treatment certificate will be signed,
making them
subject to compulsory status.
- Clause
36 requires a patient - individuals subject to compulsory status - to accept
treatment properly given under the Bill and comply
with every lawful direction
given by, or on behalf of, a responsible clinician or the manager of the
treatment centre. Responsible
clinicians are authorised to give any treatment,
including medication, which they see fit.
- Compulsory
assessment and treatment are both considered medical treatment for the purposes
of section 11. The White paper commentary
to the Bill of Rights Act stated
that
the term “medical” should be interpreted broadly,
including surgical, psychiatric,
psychological and similar forms of treatment. [1]
- The
Bill therefore creates a prima facie limitation on the right to refuse to
undergo medical treatment. As summarised by Lord Donaldson
MR in Re T (Adult:
Refusal of Treatment) every adult has the right and capacity to decide whether
they will accept medical treatment,
even if refusal may risk permanent injury to
their health, or lead to premature death. [2] However, an adult patient
may be deprived of capacity to decide, or not have capacity to decide at the
time of refusal. When faced
with refusal there must be very careful and detailed
consideration of what the patient’s capacity to decide is, and to what
extent capacity has been reduced. [3]
Is the limitation justified and proportionate under section 5 of the Bill of
Rights Act?
- Limitations
on rights and freedoms may still be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
they can be considered reasonable limits
that are demonstrably justified under
section 5 of that Act. The section 5 inquiry may be summarised as:
[4]
- does
the objective serve a purpose sufficiently important to justify some limitation
of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
Does the Bill serve an important objective?
- We
agree with the Law Commission that: [5]
“... in the
case of people who are severely dependent on alcohol or drugs there is an
important public interest that is served
by intervening to protect them where
they have as a result of severe substance dependence, a substantially impaired
capacity to care
for
themselves or make treatment decisions and are therefore at risk of serious
harm.”
- Clause
3 makes it explicit that the purpose of compulsory treatment is, amongst other
things, to protect individuals from harm. This
is a lower threshold than serious
harm. In our view, there remains a public interest in protecting individuals
from harm, even if
the harm must not be serious. The lower threshold must,
however, be taken into account when considering the proportionality of the
limitations on rights and freedoms.
Is the limit rationally connected to the objective?
- As
above, we agree with the Law Commission that “[t]here is a clear and
rational connection between interventions such as detoxification
and steps taken
to stabilise a person’s medical condition and the objective of protecting
a person from serious harm”.
- The
criteria for compulsory assessment in clause 7 do not expressly refer to
protection
from either harm or serious harm. However, the definition
of “severe substance addiction”
in clause 8 makes it clear the condition must be of “such severity that
it poses a serious danger to the health or safety of
the person”. Clause 7
also makes it clear that a person’s capacity to make informed decisions
about treatment is severely
impaired, and that compulsory treatment must be
necessary.
- We
therefore consider that there is a rational connection between limiting a
person’s
right to refuse medical treatment and the stated
purpose of the Bill.
Does the limit impair the right or freedom no more than reasonably
necessary?
- In
our view, the question of minimal impairment turns on whether there are
sufficient safeguards contained in the process which culminates
in compulsory
treatment and assessment.
- The
Bill provides some safeguards to ensure minimal impairment of section 11. Clause
37 requires that the objective of compulsory
treatment is to facilitate the
stabilisation of the patient and, if possible, to restore their capacity to make
informed decisions
about their treatment. Any medication given to a patient must
only be prescribed with due regard to the possible effects of that
medication,
and must be minimally prescribed so as not to prevent the patient from
communicating adequately.
- Once
a compulsory treatment certificate has been signed clause 56 also entitles every
patient to obtain a second opinion about their
condition. If the approved
specialist agrees to a consultation, they must be permitted access to the
patient. We note that no such
entitlement to a second opinion is explicitly
stated in the process leading to a compulsory treatment certificate being
signed. This
means that arguably there is no mechanism to seek independent
advice prior to compulsory detention and treatment.
- However,
on balance, we consider the safeguards in the Bill mean the right to refuse
medical treatment is minimally impaired.
Is the limit in due
proportion to the objective?
- The
proportionality question rests on whether the public interest that is served by
intervening to protect people who have a severe
substance addiction is
sufficiently
important to justify a significant limitation on an
individual’s right to refuse medical
treatment.
- We
consider that the limit is in due proportion to the objective. In coming to this
view, we note the importance accorded to demonstrating
that a person does not
have the capacity and the competence to make an informed and rational decision
about
treatment. [6] In our view, it is essential that the
process for demonstrating that a substance addiction is of such severity that it
poses a serious
danger to an individual’s health or safety, and that their
capacity to make informed decisions about treatment is severely
impaired, is
robust.
- Any
person who is 18 years or older may apply to an Area Director to have a person
assessed. The application must be accompanied by
a medical certificate or, if
attempts to have the person assessed by a medical professional have been
unsuccessful, a
memorandum from an authorised officer. Once an
application has been received, the subject of the application must be assessed
by an
approved specialist.
- The
determination of the approved specialist is a crucial one in establishing
whether a limitation on a person’s right to refuse
medical treatment is
proportionate. The Bill defines an approved specialist as a health professional,
which includes a:
- medical
practitioner
- health
practitioner who is, or is deemed to be, registered with the Psychologists Board
as a practitioner of the profession of psychology
- health
practitioner who is, or is deemed to be, registered with the Nursing Council of
New Zealand as a practitioner of the profession
of
nursing
- practitioner
who has expertise in treating persons suffering from severe substance addiction
and who is registered on account of that
expertise by a body corporate
designated under the Bill, and
- social
worker who is registered with the Social Workers Registration Board or who is a
member of a body corporate designated under
the Bill.
- We
note that this is a relatively broad definition, which encompasses individuals
who may have no medical training. It could be argued
the potentially significant
implications for individual rights would warrant a more carefully delineated
class of persons.
- However,
approved specialists must be designated by the Director of Addiction Services
(‘the Director’) under clause 95.
Before the Director designates a
health professional as an approved specialist, the Director must be satisfied
that the health professional
has significant experience in the treatment of
severe substance addictions and is suitably qualified to conduct specialist
assessments
and reviews. Authorised officers must also be specifically
designated by the Director under clause 91.
- If
the approved specialist considers that the criteria for compulsory assessment
are met, the approved specialist must sign a compulsory
treatment certificate.
As noted above, the criteria for compulsory treatment set an appropriately high
threshold.
- We
consider that the fact that assessment may only be undertaken by specifically
designated individuals, along with other safeguards
outlined above, mean that
the limitation is in due proportion to the public interest protected by the
Bill.
Section 14 – Freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to freedom of
expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and
opinions of any kind in any form.
- Clause
61 provides that a responsible clinician may direct that the mail or electronic
communications of a patient be checked. In
certain situations, the responsible
clinician may then direct that the patient not receive or send mail or
electronic communications
or electronic communications of a particular class, or
that they may only do so subject to conditions or under
supervision.
- The
power to check and potentially prevent communication is a prima facie limit on
section 14 of the Bill of Rights Act. However,
we consider the limitation to be
justified on the basis that it serves the objective of the Bill and:
- a.
there is a rational connection to the objective – the responsible
clinician must have reasonable grounds to consider that
any mail or electronic
communications could be detrimental to the interests and treatment
of:
a patient or of other persons in the treatment centre,
and
- b.
the right is minimally limited – an Area Director must approve the
checking or withholding of mail and clause 63 provides
that communications with
certain people (including judges, district inspectors, and lawyers) cannot be
withheld.
- We
therefore conclude that the limitation is in due proportion to the importance of
the objective, and is consistent with section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 22 – Liberty of the person
- Section
22 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right not to be
arbitrarily arrested or detained. Similarly to
section 11, the right not to be
arbitrarily detained protects human dignity, autonomy and liberty.
[7]
- To
trigger the concept of detention there must be a “substantial intrusion on
personal
liberty” [8], whether a physical deprivation
or a statutory constraint. The term “arbitrarily” is intended to
provide a measure of
the reasonableness of statutory powers [9], as well
as the exercise of those powers. Where an enactment is inconsistent with section
22, there can be no role for a section
5 justification.
- Clause
30 requires a responsible clinician to direct that a patient be detained and
treated in a treatment centre once a compulsory
treatment certificate has been
signed. The patient must not leave the treatment centre in which they are
detained without leave from
a responsible clinician. Detention can originally
last for a period of up to 56 days after the date on which the compulsory
treatment
certificate was signed.
- We
consider that detention for compulsory treatment constitutes a substantial
intrusion into personal liberty for the purposes of
section 22 of the Bill of
Rights Act. At issue is whether there is sufficient justification for detention
and whether the Bill carefully
circumscribes who may detain a person, for how
long, and under what conditions.
Is there sufficient justification for detention?
- The
justification for detention for compulsory treatment is that an
individual’s substance addiction is of such severity that
it poses a
serious danger to their health or safety, and their capacity to make informed
decisions about treatment is severely impaired.
To the extent a person meets
these criteria, there will be sufficient justification for detention.
Who may detain, for how long, and under what conditions?
- Once
a compulsory treatment certificate is signed, a person becomes immediately
subject to compulsory status (clause 11). The Area
Director must then be
notified (clause
25) and a responsible clinician appointed (clause
28). Clause 25 also provides after consultation with the Area Director, for the
patient to be detained in an appropriate facility until the patient is admitted
to a treatment centre. The term “appropriate
facility” is not
defined in the Bill.
- Clause
29 requires that the responsible clinician must, as soon as practicable and in
any case not later than seven days after the
signing of the certificate:
- prepare
a treatment plan for the patient
- arrange
for admission of the patient to a treatment centre, and
- apply
to the court for a review of the patient’s compulsory status.
- Clause
75 requires that a judge must interview the patient within seven days from the
date of filing of the application for review.
If at that stage the judge is
satisfied that the criteria for compulsory status are not met, they must order
the immediate release
of the patient. Otherwise, the application for review must
be determined within 10 days after the date of filing, unless the judge
considers the application cannot be determined within 10 days of the application
for review, in which case they may extend the date
for determination to up to 20
days after the application is filed. If the judge is satisfied the criteria for
compulsory treatment
are met they may make a compulsory treatment
order.
The compulsory treatment order expires on the close of the
56th day after the date on
which the patient’s compulsory treatment certificate was signed.
- The
sum effect of the procedure outlined above is that a person may be compulsorily
detained for up to 14 days before being interviewed
by a judge, and for up to
either 17 or 27 days without a final determination of the court.
- By
contrast, the Law Commission recommended that the maximum period of detention
and treatment without a final determination of the
court should be 14 days.
[10] We raised this issue with officials from the Ministry of Health
during the drafting of the Bill.
- Turning
to the question of arbitrariness, the Court of Appeal has stated that a
detention is arbitrary when it is “capricious,
unreasoned, without
reasonable cause: if it is made without reference to an adequate determining
principle or without following proper
procedures.” [11]
The length of detention must be considered when considering its
arbitrariness and the question of reasonableness will be central to
the issue.
Relevant principles when considering whether the length of detention is
reasonable include:
- whether
a person has been detained for an unreasonable period “can only be a
matter of fact and degree in each case” [12]
- there
is some scope for delay in the process without giving rise to a breach of
section 22
- delay
is less likely to render detention arbitrary where there is no evidence the
detainee was prejudiced by the delay, and [14]
- it is
accepted that a reasonable period to allow for organisational arrangements to be
put in place does not render the detention
arbitrary. [15]
- Initially
we had concerns that the period of up to seven days within which a patient may
be detained and treated before an application
for review of compulsory status is
made was excessive. Although some delays to allow for organisational
arrangements are acceptable,
we consider that where a person is being detained
and compulsorily treated, applying for judicial authorisation of compulsory
status
should be a matter of priority. Further, as the patient is being
compulsorily treated during this period, any delay is likely to
be
prejudicial.
- The
Ministry of Health has advised the period of up to seven days to prepare the
application to the court is necessary. This is because
on an application for
review the court will consider both whether the criteria for compulsory status
are met, and whether, in all
the circumstances of the case, compulsory status
should be continued (clause 32(1) and (2)).The seven day period accounts for the
need to gather additional information about the patient to appropriately advise
the court how the patient meets the threshold for
compulsory status and whether
that status should be continued. This includes information about what their
treatment may involve and
where it will be undertaken.
- We
understand this will involve assessing the patient over a short period of time,
possibly gathering information from treatment services
and health professionals
previously involved in their care, and looking at where the best place is for
treatment. Patients may also
need to be detained under clause 25 in order to
undergo medically managed withdrawal in hospital. The physical and mental state
of
the patient may make it difficult to assess them properly within a very short
time period.
- In
the case of detention for therapeutic purposes some allowance may be made for
clinical considerations and the time required for
proper diagnosis. We therefore
consider the period of seven days’ detention prior to application is
sufficiently justifiable.
- The
Bill also provides some safeguards to mitigate the risk a patient will be
detained for longer than necessary. As soon as practicable
after a compulsory
treatment certificate is signed, the approved specialist must notify that Area
Director. Clause 26 requires that
the Area Director must then notify a range of
people, including the patient’s principal caregiver, lawyer and medical
practitioner,
as well as the district inspector.
- Clause
34 provides for urgent review of a patient’s compulsory status, which may
be brought by the patient or any of the people
whom the Area Director has
notified under clause 26. An urgent review may be applied for at any time a
person is subject to compulsory
status. This provides an avenue for a judge to
review the compulsory status earlier than it might otherwise if an application
for
an urgent review precedes the
responsible clinician’s
application for a review of compulsory status.
- We
note, however, that the Bill does not explicitly require that an urgent review
be dealt with more expeditiously than the standard
review of compulsory status.
As per clause 75, the judge must interview the patient within seven days after
an application is made
to the
court. The time for confirming or
dismissing compulsory status under an urgent review is unstated.
- The
urgency of an application under clause 34 is therefore entirely reliant on the
time at which the urgent application is filed,
which may not be materially
different from the point at which the application for review is filed under
clause 29(c). Establishing
clearer and more expeditious timeframes for an
interview and decision in the case of an urgent review would assist in making
the
Bill more rights consistent.
- Clause
98 provides that the district inspector must visit the treatment centre as soon
as practicable after receiving notice of the
patient’s detention. As noted
above, the district inspector must also be notified of the right to challenge
the compulsory
status of the patient as soon as practicable after the compulsory
treatment certificate is issued.
- We
agree that it is essential for the district inspector to visit as soon as
practicable. However, we also note that given there is
no prescribed time period
in which they must do so, it is possible that it may not be until seven days
following detention and commencement
of compulsory treatment. Given the urgent
review process does not provide an expedited process for the determination of
the compulsory
status order, in our view the safeguard may not be wholly
sufficient.
- On
balance we consider that, despite some risk of a patient being detained for
longer than necessary, and potential for improvement
in the safeguards, the Bill
does not meet the threshold required for arbitrariness. We therefore consider
the Bill is consistent
with section 22 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
Disclaimer
In addition to the general disclaimer for all documents on this website,
please note the following: This advice was prepared to assist
the
Attorney-General to determine whether a report should be made to Parliament
under s 7 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
in relation to the
Substance Addiction (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Bill. It should not be
used or acted upon for any other
purpose. The advice does no more than assess
whether the Bill complies with the minimum guarantees contained in the New
Zealand Bill
of Rights Act. The release of this advice should not be taken to
indicate that the Attorney-
General agrees with all aspects of it, nor does its release constitute a
general waiver of legal professional privilege in respect
of this or any other
matter. Whilst care has been taken to ensure that this document is an accurate
reproduction of the advice provided
to the Attorney-General, neither the
Ministry of Justice nor the Crown Law Office accepts any liability for any
errors or omissions.
Footnotes
[1] A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White
Paper [1985] AJHR A.6 at [10.167].
[2] Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] EWCA Civ 18; [1992] 4 All ER 649, [1993] Fam 95
(CA) at [116].
[3] Ibid.
[4] Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7.
[5] Law Commission Report 118, Compulsory Treatment for Substance
Dependence: A Review of the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Act 1966 at
[9].
[6] Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v All Means All
[2014] NZHC 1433.
[7] R v Briggs [2009] NZCA 244 at [85] per Arnold J.
[8] Police v Smith [1993] NZCA 585; [1994] 2 NZLR 306 (CA) at [316] per Richardson J.
[9] Surrey County Council v P [2014] UKSC 19; [2014] 2 WLR 642 (UKSC)
[10] Law Commission Report 118 at [5.55].
[11] Neilsen v Attorney-General [2001] NZCA 143; [2001] 3 NZLR 433 (CA) para [34]
[12] R v Chadderton [2014] NZCA 528
[13] Ibid
[14] Ibid
[15] R v I (CA71/02) [2002] NZCA 351; (2002) 19 CRNZ 413
(CA).
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