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Te Ture Whenua Maori Bill (Consistent) (Sections 5, 14, 19) [2016] NZBORARp 10 (4 April 2016)
Last Updated: 14 January 2019
1 MINISTRY OP
JUSTICE
o te Ture
LEGAL ADVICE LPA 01 01 20
This version is an uncorrected OCR version.
1 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 was passed after the
Bill of Rights Act but did not receive a vet for consistency as it had been
Introduced
prior to the Bill of Rights Act's enactment.
4 April 2016
Hon Christopher Finlayson QC, Attorney-General
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Te Ture Whenua
Maori Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Te Ture Whenua Maori Bill (`the Bill') is
consistent
with the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 ('the Bill of Rights Act').
- This
advice has been prepared in relation to the latest available version of the Bill
(PCO
17830/20.0). We will provide you with further advice should the final
version of the Bill include amendments affecting our conclusion
that the Bill
appears to be consistent with the rights and freedoms affirmed in the Bill of
Rights Act. In reaching that conclusion,
we have considered the consistency of
the Bill with section 19 (freedom from discrimination) and section 14 (freedom
of expression).
Our analysis is set out below.
Summary
- The
Bill restates and reforms the law relating to Maori land, replacing Te Ture
Whenua
Maori Act 1993.1 It maintains the dual
kaupapa of retention and utilisation, but seeks to provide clearer and more
empowering guidance with regard
to Maori land use.
- As
it provides a separate regime for Maori landholding, the Bill constitutes a
limit on the
freedom from discrimination on the basis of race affirmed by
section 19 of the Bill of Rights Act. We nonetheless consider that, given
the
particular historical context of Maori land and its intrinsic cultural
dimension, the limit is demonstrably justified under section
5 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
- Particular
provisions of the Bill further limit the freedom from discrimination, on
the
basis of family status, age, and disability. Other provisions limit the
freedom of expression affirmed by section 14 of the Bill of
Rights Act. The
limiting measures are designed to ensure the purposes of the Bill can be met in
a meaningful way and we also consider
those limits to be consistent with the
Bill of Rights Act.
The Bill
6. The Bill regulates Maori land transactions, activities and governance. Its
principles
recognise the centrality of the Treaty of Waitangi, tikanga Maori, and
whakapapa with regard to Maori land law and rights. It provides
for:
- the
status and classifications of Maori customary and freehold land;
- Maori
land tenure to be held on the basis of tikanga Maori and to endure as a taonga
tuku iho by virtue of whakapapa (in particular,
the Bill places rules and
restrictions on Maori land disposition);
- ownership
structures, beneficial interests and succession
entitlements;
- decision-making
bodies and processes in respect of Maori land, based on a policy of increasing
self-governance and including representative,
collective and threshold
decision-making frameworks;
- a
Maori land register of both legal and beneficial interests in Maori freehold
land;
- dispute
resolution processes, which in some cases will be mandatory prior to a dispute
coming before the Maori Land Court; and
- the
continuation of the Maori Land Court and Maori Appellate
Court.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights
Act
Section 19 — Freedom from discrimination
7. Section 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to be free from
discrimination on
the prohibited grounds set out in the Human Rights Act 1993 (`the Human
Rights Act').
8. The key questions determining whether legislation limits the freedom
from
discrimination are:2
- does
the legislation draw a distinction on one of the prohibited grounds of
discrimination under the Human Rights Act?
- if
so, does the distinction involve disadvantage to one or more classes of
individuals?
9. A distinction will arise if the legislation treats
two comparable groups of people
differently on one or more of the prohibited grounds of discrimination.
Whether disadvantage arises is a factual
determination.3
Discrimination on the grounds of race
10. Section 21(1)(f) of the Human Rights Act lists race as a prohibited
ground of
discrimination.
2
See, for example, Atkinson v Minister of Health and others [2010]
NZHRRT 1; McAlister v Air New Zealand [2009] NZSC 78; and Child
Poverty Action Group v Attorney-General [2008] NZHRRT 31.
3 See, for example, Child Poverty Action Group v
Attorney-General above n 2 at [179]; and McAlister v Air New Zealand
above n 2 at [40] per Elias CJ, Blanchard and Wilson JJ.
11. The Bill provides a separate regime for Maori landholding. The very
premise of the Bill
therefore draws a distinction based on race.4 The
regime places restrictions and obligations on those with interests in Maori
land, including limitations on selling and gifting
and mechanisms for interests
in land to be dealt with against minority interest-holders' wishes. While the
regime is intended to
recognise and protect the rights of owners and
beneficiaries of Maori land, the more stringent rules about how Maori land may
be
dealt with by individuals bound by the Bill could be considered a material
disadvantage. For the purposes of this advice, we have
assumed the Bill
therefore limits the freedom from discrimination on the grounds of race.
12. However, a provision limiting a particular right or freedom may
nevertheless be
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if it can be considered reasonable and
justified in terms of section 5 of that Act. The section
5 inquiry may be
summarised as follows:5
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably
necessary
for sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?
13. We consider that the legislative provision
of a separate regime for dealing with Maori
land, to the extent that it is considered to limit the right to freedom from
discrimination, is a justified limitation.
14. The objective of the regime is to recognise and preserve the intrinsic
cultural dimension
to Maori land. Unlike other forms of private land, Maori land tenure is
derived from customary rights that have their basis in tikanga
Maori. Notions of
"ownership" of Maori land tend to be regarded by Maori in terms of stewardship
and connection, rather than proprietorship,
and in terms of permanence rather
than transience. The Bill's general policy statement notes the total amount of
Maori freehold land
is now reduced to 1.456 million hectares (approximately 5.5
percent of all land in New Zealand). The separate regime for Maori freehold
land
continues previous efforts to address the historical context of large land loss
and the importance of Whenua to Maori, and reflects
a policy shift to more
clearly support land utilisation as determined by the owners themselves. It is
also intended to be consistent
with the guarantees given in the Treaty of
Waitangi. These objectives are sufficiently important to justify some limitation
on the
right to be free from discrimination.
15. The limitations are rationally connected to the objectives of the
regime, as the
framework ensures Maori land retention remains a core focus of the regime and
continues to regulate transactions where retention may
be placed at risk. The
regime
4 Clause 5 of the Bill defines 'Maori' as an
individual of the Maori race of New Zealand, and includes a descendant of such
an individual'.
5 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7 [123],
provides a framework to protect and promote the decisions of owners of Maori
land to determine, design, establish and operate effective
governance
arrangements for their land.
- in
light of the factors outlined above we consider the regime's limits are no more
than
reasonably necessary to achieve the objectives, and are proportionate to
those objectives' importance. This conclusion also takes
into account the fact
the separate regime may not be considered a limitation on the right at all. The
regime exists in recognition
of the substantively different nature of Maori land
holding, and accordingly non-Maori may not be an appropriate comparator group.
If that is the case it would be difficult to argue that any different treatment
is based on race. Further, where, as here, there
is arguably no useful
comparator group, it is difficult to demonstrate that the regime is
discriminatory, as it is not possible to
establish any material
disadvantage.
- We
discuss these factors in more detail in relation to particular provisions of the
Bill we
consider warrant closer analysis. Of those provisions, the Bill's
treatment of persons for the purposes of descent and succession
is the most
significant.
Discrimination on the grounds of family
status
- Under
the Human Rights Act, family status (section 21(1)(I)) is a prohibited ground
of
discrimination. "Family status" means, among other things, "being the
relative of a particular person" (section 21(1)(I)(iv)). "Relative"
is defined
under section 2(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act, in relation to any person, as any
other person who "is related to the person
by blood, marriage, civil union, de
facto relationship, affinity or adoption".6
- The
Bill reflects the principle that tikanga Maori is central to matters involving
Maori
land. The Bill expressly defers to tikanga Maori for the manner in
which relationships of descent are determined. Clause 8
provides:
8 Descent relationships determined by tikanga
Maori
(1) This section applies to a provision of Parts 1 to 9 that refers to
a term that involves relationships of descent between people, such as a
reference to—
(a) a child, grandchild, brother, sister, parent, grandparent, whanau, or
descendant; or
(b) an association with land in accordance with tikanga
(2) The
tikanga of the relevant iwi or hapu determines whether—
(a) a whangai relationship at any link in the chain of descent is to be treated
as a relationship of descent for the purposes of
the provision:
(b) a relationship by birth, or a relationship by adoption order, that is deemed
by the Adoption Act 1955 to be a relationship of
a different kind is to be
treated as a relationship of descent for the purposes of the provision, despite
anything in that Act.
6 The complete
definition of relative provides, in relation to any person, means any other
person who — (a) is related to the
person by blood, marriage, civil union,
de facto relationship, affinity, or adoption; or (b) is wholly or mainly
dependent on the
person; or (c) is a member of the person's household.
(3) An order made by the court on any of the following matters is proof of
the matter for the purposes of Parts 1 to 9:
(a) whether a whangai relationship exists:
(b) whether a whangai relationship is to be treated as a relationship of
descent:
(c) whether a relationship by birth, or by adoption order, is to be treated as a
relationship of descent.
20. The Bill does not contain an
equivalent provision to clause 8(2) in respect of biological
relationships.' It therefore distinguishes lineal descendants (persons of
direct genealogical descent) from non-lineal descendants
(whangai or adopted
persons). This constitutes a distinction based on family status.
21. Descent relationships are crucial to determinations about whether a
person is a
"preferred recipient" or an "eligible beneficiary" in relation to Maori
freehold land. Unlike descent relationships by birth, descent
relationships
based on adoption, whether by custom (whangai) or by adoption order, do not
automatically confer the same benefits'
22. However, we also note the Bill's provision for adopted children to hold
or succeed to
beneficial interests even where that entitlement does not exist in general
law, as clause 8(2)(b) overrides the Adoption Act
1955.9 This means an adopted child may hold or succeed
to beneficial interests as a descendant of either or both their adoptive and
birth
parents, if the tikanga in the circumstances so determines.
23. The material disadvantage under the Bill for whangai and adopted persons
can be seen
in the following examples:
- Under
clause 105 of the Bill, a parcel of Maori freehold land may only be gifted to a
"preferred recipient" or entity. A "preferred
recipient" is defined in clause 96
as including "children, grandchildren and other descendants of the owner".
Biological children
are therefore automatically included within the definition
of a preferred recipient and eligible to receive a gift of land. A
non-biological
child (such as whangai or adopted persons) will only be able to
receive a gift if there is evidence that they are a descendant in
accordance
with tikanga as specified in clause 8(2)(a) or (b); and
- Clause
246 of the Bill sets out the way "eligible beneficiaries" are determined on
intestacy and the manner in which individual freehold
interests or parcels of
Maori freehold land devolve on intestacy. Again, lineal descendants are
automatically considered to be "eligible
beneficiaries" whilst whangai or
adopted children are subject to the provisions specified in clause 8(2)(a) or
(b).
24. Because material advantages stem from being a descendant,
and correspondingly
there is material disadvantage to those not automatically determined to be
descendants, the Bill limits section 19 of the Bill of
Rights Act. The issue is
one of infra-
7 That is, those biological relationships not
affected by adoption.
E Clauses 16, 25, 48, 59, 96, 100, 101, 141, and 292
detail these benefits.
g Under section 16(2) of the Adoption Act 1955, a
person who is adopted severs legal ties with their birth parents and is in law
considered
as a natural child of the adoptive parents.
ground discrimination, as the distinction and resultant material disadvantage
are between lineal and non-lineal descendants of the
same protected class under
the Human Rights Act.10
Is the objective sufficiently important?
- Clause
8 reflects a policy intention that the community of ownership of Maori
land
should comprise individuals who have an association with the land that
accords with tikanga Maori and whakapapa links. The intention
reflects the
Bill's objectives of retaining Maori land in Maori ownership; placing tikanga
Maori at the centre of matters involving
Maori land; and preserving Maori land
as a taonga tuku iho by virtue of whakapapa.
- The
objectives take on further significance in light of the rights and obligations
under
the Treaty of Waitangi and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Articles 3 to 5 of UNDRIP
affirm the rights of
indigenous peoples to self-determination in relation to the pursuit of economic,
social and cultural development
and internal affairs, and the right to maintain
and strengthen their distinct institutions.
Is there a rational
connection between the limit and the objective?
- Determining
whether a whangai or adopted person is a descendant by reference to
the
tikanga of a particular iwi or Wu allows that iwi or hapu to retain its
land in a way that preserves the group's connection to the
land, and therefore
the cultural importance of retaining it in the first place.
Does
the limit impair the right no more than reasonably necessary to achieve the
objective?
- Clause
8 does not impose any restriction on whangai or adopted persons
being
descendants for the purposes of Maori land. It instead provides for a
factual determination in accordance with the tikanga of the
particular iwi or
hapu. This is consistent with the Bill's objective of ensuring retention of land
and ownership by individuals associated
with the land in accordance with tikanga
Maori and whakapapa links.
- The
Bill contains several safeguards that ensure that the right is impaired no more
than
reasonably necessary:
a. the Maori Land Court is authorised
to make special provision relating to income in respect of a person who is not
entitled to succeed
to the land or interest solely because the tikanga of a
relevant iwi or hapu determines that a whangai or adopted child is not a
descendant (clause 266(2));10
We are not aware of any New Zealand authority having considered intra-ground
discrimination at the time of writing, but it has been
recognised in
Granovsky v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [2000] 1 SCR
703; see further: A Butler and P Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act:
A Commentary (2nd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015)
at 17.16.1.
b. the disputes resolution process (instigated before court proceedings) can
be used to determine whether:
- a
person is a whangai (clause 342(2)(b));
- a
whangai relationship or relationship by adoption order is to be treated as a
relationship of descent (clause 342(2)(c)); and
- whether
a person is a preferred recipient (clause 342(2)(f)).
- The
Maori Land Court has jurisdiction to determine those same
matters.11 As noted by
the Chief Justice, Rt Hon
Dame Sian Elias, in Takamore v Clarke [20121 NZSC 116, what constitutes
tikanga Maori in any particular case is a question of fact for expert evidence
and a court asked
to identify the content of tikanga Maori by evidence is not
engaged in a process of interpretation or law-creation.
Is the
limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
- Drawing
on the factors outlined above, we consider the limitation is proportionate to
the
significance of the purposes of clause 8 in the particular context of New
Zealand's history and the continuing obligations of the
Treaty of
Waitangi.
Discrimination on the grounds of age
Judicial appointment eligibility
- Age
is another prohibited ground of discrimination under section 21 of the
Human
Rights Act. For the purposes of this advice, the Bill of Rights Act
protection from age discrimination applies to persons 16 years
and
over,12
- Clause
427(6) of the Bill provides that no person may be appointed a judge of the
Maori
Land Court after attaining the age of 70 years. This exclusion from
eligibility is prima facie discrimination on the basis of age.
- Previous
advice has found that an analogous limit on section 19 — the imposition of
a
mandatory judicial retirement age — is
justified.13 We conclude that there is nothing
particular to this Bill which lead us to depart from this reasoning in respect
of clause 427(6).
Owners' voting rights, and eligibility for
appointment as kaitiaki, whanau trust trustee and kaiwhakamarumaru
- Clause
52 provides that owners of Maori freehold land under the age of 18, and
without
a kaiwhakamarumaru 14 appointed to manage
their beneficial interest, cannot vote
on
11 Clause 300(1)(j), (n) and (o).
12
Section 21(1)(i) of the Human Rights Act 1993 defines 'age' differently
depending on the part of the Act relied upon.
13 Crown Law Office, Judicature Modernisation Bill
(PCO 17309/14.0): Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990,
pares
30 — 36; www.justice.govt.nz/policy/constitutional-law-and-human-rights/human-rights/bill-ofrights/judicature-modernisation-bill
(last accessed 14 March 2016).
A kaiwhakamarumaru is someone who provides protection or guardianship to
another to prevent harm to that person, and is defined in
clause 5 as a person
appointed by the court to manage the property of an owner needing
protection.
16 Compulsory treatment orders can he made by a court in respect of a patient
with a mental disorder requiring treatment either in
a hospital or in the
community. PPPR orders can be made by a court where it determines that an
individual lacks capacity, in whole
or in part, to manage his or her property
interests or lacks capacity to communicate his or her wishes with respect to
those interests.
15 Clauses 184(4)(g) and (h), 62(2), 75(2)(a).
decisions relating to the land. Clauses 195(3)(a), 62(2)(a) and 75(2)(a)
require the same age of individuals to be eligible for appointment
as a
kaitiaki, whanau trust trustee or kaiwhakamarumaru under the Bill.
- These
provisions constitute prima facie discrimination on the basis of age in respect
of
16 and 17 year-olds. However, we consider the limits on section 19 of the
Bill of Rights Act are justified.
- The
purpose of the age restriction on voting is to ensure decisions made with regard
to
Maori land are made in full understanding of their circumstances and
consequences, both in terms of the tikanga of the relevant hapu
or iwi and
finance and landholding in general. Age restrictions also ensure kaitiaki,
trustees and kaiwhakamarumaru, who have significant
responsibilities under the
Bill, are sufficiently mature to properly understand the nature and consequences
of their actions, to
act without undue pressure or influence and to hold the
trust and confidence of the person or group concerned. Given the importance
of
considered decisions relating to Maori land in light of the Bill's purpose, we
consider this a sufficiently important objective
to justify some limitation on
the freedom of discrimination.
- The
limitation is rationally connected to the objective as the age of 18 is often
used as a
proxy for the responsibility and maturity sufficient to make
significant financial and legal decisions. That proxy is also rationally
connected to ensuring owners and kaitiaki, trustees and kaiwhakamarumaru are
able to comply with their cultural and statutory obligations.
- For
the same reasons, we consider the limits are in proportion to, and go no
further
than reasonably necessary to achieve, the objective. In respect of
voting rights this finding is supported by the Bill's provision
for
kaiwhakamarumaru themselves, who may preserve the minor's interest by exercising
voting rights on their behalf.
Discrimination on the grounds of
disability
- A
further prohibited ground of discrimination in the Human Rights Act is
disability.
Section 21(1)(h) defines disability as including physical,
intellectual or psychological disability or impairment and physical or
psychiatric illness, among other characteristics.
- The
criteria l5 for kaitiaki, whanau trust trustee and
kaiwhakamarumaru appointments
disqualify individuals subject to a compulsory
treatment order under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment)
Act 2003
or a property order under the Protection of Personal and Property
Rights Act 1988 ('PPPR orders').16
- The
ineligibility of individuals subject to compulsory treatment or PPPR orders
from
holding these roles limits the right to be free from discrimination on
the basis of disability under section 19 of the Bill of Rights
Act. However, we
consider these limits on the right to freedom from discrimination to be
justified. Excluding individuals who are
subject to an order serves, and is
rationally connected to, the sufficiently important purpose of ensuring only
those competent to
do so fill the relevant role and obligations. Those
exclusions are proportionate and go no further than reasonably necessary to
achieve
that purpose, as ineligibility applies only in respect of current orders
(which are made by a court and can be reviewed or
revoked).
Section 14 — Freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to freedom of expression,
including
the freedom to seek, receive and impart information and opinions of
any kind in any form. Freedom of expression includes the right
not to say
anything or certain things.17
- The
Bill contains several provisions which may be seen to limit the freedom
of
expression both by requiring certain personal and commercial information
to be published or accessible and by allowing certain personal
or commercial
information to be withheld."' For example, it provides for a register of Maori
Land interests ('the register'). Public
access must be maintained to the public
part of the register, which will record both legal and beneficial interests in
Maori land
as well as governance agreements, dispositions and other matters
provided throughout the Bill. Further requirements may be specified
in
regulations (but will not include contact details for legal or beneficial
owners). Personal information to be withheld from the
register during a
renewable 'withholding period' of up to five years if certain conditions are
met.
- We
consider such limits to be minimal at most and, to the extent they exist,
justified
under the Bill of Rights Act. The register, for example, is
designed to enable the public to identify owners of, interests in, and
governance and management arrangements for, Maori land. It facilitates
decision-making and dealing with respect to Maori land, and compliance with the
purpose and requirements of the Bill.
Providing grounds for withholding personal
information ensures the safety of individuals and their families where
appropriate.
- We
consider these purposes to be sufficiently important to justify some limitation
on the
freedom of expression. The limits are rationally connected and
proportionate to the objectives, and no more limiting than reasonably
necessary,
as the provisions are set out in terms that require the measure taken to achieve
the relevant objective. Exceptions, supporting
provisions and criteria, and
provision of a dispute resolution process and access to the Maori Land Court to
address any objections,
further bolster the proportionality of the
limits.
17 Slaight Communications v
Davidson 59 DLR (4th) 416; Wooley v Maynard [1977] USSC 59; 430 US 705 (1977).
18
Clauses 214, 215, and 272-276.
Conclusion
47. We have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights
and freedoms
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Edrick Child
Deputy Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal
Counsel
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