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Conservation (Infringement System) Bill (Consistent) (Sections 14, 21, 25(c)) [2017] NZBORARp 4 (1 February 2017)
Last Updated: 5 January 2019
1 February 2017
Hon Christopher Finlayson QC, Attorney-General
LEGAL ADVICE
LPA 01 01 21
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Conservation
(Infringement System) Bill
Purpose
- We
have considered whether the Conservation (Infringement System) Bill (‘the
Bill’) is consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
- We
have not yet received a final version of the Bill. This advice has been prepared
with the latest version of the Bill (PCO 18923/7.1).
We will provide you with
further advice if the final version of the Bill includes amendments that affect
the conclusions in this
advice.
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act. In reaching
that conclusion, we
have considered the consistency of the Bill with s 14 (freedom of expression), s
21 (unreasonable search or seizure),
and s 25(c) (right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty). Our analysis is set out below.
Summary
- The
Bill introduces infringement offence regimes to eight conservation-related
Acts.
- Particular
provisions of the Bill engage rights and freedoms affirmed by the Bill of Rights
Act, specifically the right to freedom
of expression, the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, and the right to be presumed innocent
until proven
guilty.
- To
the extent that any rights and freedoms are limited by the Bill, we consider
those measures are rationally connected to a sufficiently
important objective,
impair rights no more than is reasonably necessary, and are in due proportion to
the importance of the objective.
- We
therefore conclude that the Bill is consistent with the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
The Bill
- The
Bill seeks to amend the following Acts by introducing infringement offence
regimes:
- Conservation
Act 1987
- Marine
Mammals Protection Act 1978
- Marine
Reserves Act 1971
- National
Parks Act 1980
- Reserves
Act 1977
- Trade
in Endangered Species Act 1989
- Wild
Animal Control Act 1977, and
- Wildlife
Act 1953.
- The
purpose of the amendments is to:
- improve
the effectiveness of conservation compliance and law enforcement, to better
protect conservation values
- ensure
that penalties for offences are commensurate with the seriousness of the
offence
- ensure
that people do not risk criminal convictions if they commit minor
offences
- make
the treatment of offences consistent with those in similar regimes, such as
fisheries
- remove
unnecessary costs to the court system, and
- contribute
to the Government’s objectives of improving government interaction with
New Zealanders and delivering better public
services for less
cost.
- The
Bill also makes minor amendments to the Summary Proceedings Act 1957 to bring
the new infringement offence regimes within the
scope of that
Act.
Consistency of the Bill with the Bill of Rights Act
Section 14 – Freedom of expression
- Section
14 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms the right to freedom of expression,
including the freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and opinions of
any kind in any form. The right has also been interpreted as including the right
not to be compelled
to say certain things or to provide certain
information.1
- Eight
clauses in the Bill introduce provisions to six of the principal Acts compelling
the disclosure of personal information. In
short, the Bill provides
officers2 with the power to request that a person
state, and provide evidence of, their full name, residential address, and date
of birth,
or a combination thereof (‘the information’). In all
cases, the power may only be exercised if the officer believes on
reasonable
grounds that a person has committed an offence. If a person fails to provide
such information they commit an offence.
1 RJR MacDonald v Attorney-General of
Canada (1995) 127 DLR (4th) 1.
2 Conservation compliance and law enforcement is,
primarily, undertaken by warranted Department of Conservation officers, but
other
bodies with administrative functions in relation to lands, waters, and
species protected under conservation legislation also have
compliance and law
enforcement roles under the principal Acts.
- The
penalties for failure to provide the information vary, depending on the
principal Act. They range from a fine not exceeding $2,000
on the lower end, to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding $100,000,
or both, on the upper end.
- The
penalties associated with failure to disclose the information introduce an
element of compulsion that raises a prima facie issue of inconsistency
with the right to freedom of expression affirmed in s 14 of the Bill of Rights
Act. Accordingly, these clauses
limit the right to freedom of
expression.
Is the limitation justified and proportionate under s
5 of the Bill of Rights Act?
- Legislative
provisions limiting a particular right or freedom may nevertheless be consistent
with the Bill of Rights Act if the limit
can be considered reasonable and
demonstrably justified in terms of s 5 of that Act.
- The
s 5 inquiry may be approached as follows3:
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the
objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
- The
infringement offence regimes can only operate as intended if the identity of an
individual suspected to have committed an offence
is known, particularly where
this information is required to issue an infringement notice. Failure to obtain
this information may
therefore render the regimes ineffective. Empowering
officers to obtain identifying information about a person who is suspected of
committing a conservation offence therefore appears to be sufficiently
important, and the limit on the freedom of expression appears
rationally
connected to this objective.
- The
powers to require information are not excessively broad. They may only be
exercised by an officer, and that officer must believe
on reasonable grounds
that the person has committed an offence. The information, while personal, is in
our view factual in nature.
In the context of the detection and regulation of
conservation offences, we do not consider the power to require this type of
information
raises privacy concerns. For these reasons, the provisions limit the
right to freedom of expression no more than is reasonably necessary.
- The
Department of Conservation considers that a failure or refusal to provide the
information constitutes an offence against the administration
of justice, the
gravity of which precludes responding by way of an infringement notice. For this
reason, the offences and penalties
associated with failure or refusal to provide
information requested by officers are of a criminal nature. While the maximum
penalties
may appear high, upon conviction a sentencing judge would exercise
discretion in imposing
3 Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7
[123].
an appropriate penalty in proportion to the particular offending at hand. It
appears that the limit on the right to freedom of expression
is in due
proportion to the importance of the objective.
- The
Bill therefore appears to be consistent with the right to freedom of expression
affirmed in s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Section 21 – Right to be secure against unreasonable search and
seizure
- Section
21 of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone has the right to be secure
against unreasonable search or seizure, whether
of the person, their property or
correspondence, or otherwise.
- The
right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure protects a number of
values including personal privacy, dignity, and
property.4 In order for a statutory power to be
consistent with s 21 the intrusion into these values must be justified by a
sufficiently compelling
public interest. The intrusion must be proportional to
that interest and accompanied by adequate safeguards to ensure it will not
be
exercised unreasonably.
- If
a provision is inconsistent with s 21 of the Bill of Rights Act, it cannot be
demonstrably justified with reference to s 5 of that
Act. The creation of an
unreasonable power of search and seizure cannot be justified in a free and
democratic society.
- The
Bill adds a new provision to each of the eight principal Acts authorising the
seizure and forfeiture of property associated with
the commission of an
infringement offence. These provisions are analogous to the powers that exist in
the principal Acts in relation
to criminal offences.
- These
provisions require a person to be found guilty, or admit the commission of an
infringement offence, before the associated property
seizure is authorised. As a
result, we consider that these provisions are not unreasonable for the purposes
of s 21.
- We
therefore consider that the Bill appears to be consistent with the right to be
secure against unreasonable search or seizure affirmed
in s 21 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Section 25(c) – Right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
- Section
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. The prosecution in
criminal proceedings must
therefore prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
accused is guilty.
- The
Bill introduces strict liability infringement offence regimes to the eight
principal Acts being amended. When issued with an infringement
notice, a person
can choose to either pay the associated fee or request a hearing. If a hearing
is requested, a defendant must prove
their defence on the balance of
probabilities to escape liability.
- Strict
liability offences raise a prima facie issue of inconsistency with s
25(c) of the Bill of Rights Act by shifting the onus of proof onto a
defendant.5 We have therefore
4 See, for example, Hamed v R
[2011] NZSC 101; [2012] 2 NZLR 305 at [161] per Blanchard J.
5 R v Hansen at [38]-[39] per Elias CJ, [202]
per McGrath J, [269] per Anderson J.
considered whether this prima facie inconsistency can be justified
under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- We
consider the purposes of the strict liability offence regimes to be sufficiently
important. The Bill seeks to improve the effectiveness
of conservation
compliance and law enforcement, for the purposes of protecting New
Zealand’s environment. The Department of
Conservation has advised that the
introduction of infringement offence regimes will:
- enable
simpler, more efficient, and cost-effective law enforcement for the bulk of
offending against conservation provisions, which
is at the less serious end of
the spectrum
- ensure
proportionate responses to the wide range of conduct encompassed by many
conservation offences, and
- create
greater awareness of, and respect for, conservation values, decreasing
incidences of harm to natural and historic heritage.
- The
Department of Conservation has advised that the introduction of these strict
liability offences will deter offending in the first
place, and fill the current
gap between warnings being issued for less serious offending and the
commencement of criminal prosecutions
for more serious offending. We therefore
consider that the limit on the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty
is rationally
connected to the objective of ensuring compliance with
conservation-related legislation.
- The
Department of Conservation has also advised that the introduction of strict
liability infringement offence regimes enables the
consequences of misconduct to
better fit the circumstances and relative seriousness of offending. In
particular, the Bill does this
by ensuring that individuals involved in minor
offending receive an infringement notice rather than a criminal conviction. We
consider
that the provisions limit the right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty no more than is reasonably necessary, and are in
due proportion to
the importance of the objective being sought through introduction of these
infringement offence regimes.
- The
Bill therefore appears to be consistent with the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty affirmed in s 25(c) of the
Bill of Rights
Act.
Conclusion
- We
have concluded that the Bill appears to be consistent with the rights and
freedoms affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
Jeff Orr
Chief Legal Counsel Office of Legal Counsel
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