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Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Government Agency Registration) Amendment Bill (Inconsistent) (Sections 5, 25(g), 26(c)) [2017] NZBORARp 9 (7 March 2017)
Last Updated: 5 January 2019
J.4
Report of the
ATTORNEY-GENERAL
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Child Protection (Child Sex
Offender Government Agency Registration) Amendment
Bill
Presented
to the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 7 of the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 and Standing Order 265
of the Standing Orders of the House of
Representatives
- I
have considered whether the Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Government
Agency Registration) Amendment Bill (‘the Bill’)
is consistent with
the rights and freedoms affirmed in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990
(‘the Bill of Rights Act’).
- I
have concluded the Bill appears to be inconsistent with s 26(2) (double
jeopardy) and s 25(g) (right to lesser penalty where penalties
change) and
cannot be justified under s 5 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- As
required by s 7 of the Bill of Rights Act and Standing Order 265, I draw this to
the attention of the House of Representatives.
The Bill
- The
Bill amends the Child Protection (Child Sex Offender Government Agency
Registration) Act 2016 (‘the principal Act’).
The purpose of the
principal Act was to establish a Child Sex Offender Register (‘the
register’) to reduce sexual reoffending
against child victims, and the
risk posed by serious child sex offenders.
- The
principal Act defines a “registrable offender” as a person who is
convicted of a qualifying offence and sentenced
to imprisonment, or sentenced to
a non-custodial sentence and ordered to be placed on the register at the
discretion of the court.
The person must be 18 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offence. All registrable offenders are required to report
a
range of personal information to the register.
- Registrable
offenders sentenced to imprisonment are required to comply with reporting
obligations for eight years, 15 years, or life
depending on the qualifying
offence committed. Registrable offenders sentenced to a non-custodial sentence
who are placed on the
register at the discretion of the court will be required
to comply with reporting obligations for eight years regardless of the
qualifying
offence committed.
- The
Bill replaces Schedule 1 of the principal Act to restate, clarify and extend the
retrospective application of the principal Act.
- Specifically,
the Bill seeks to ensure that the principal Act applies retrospectively to
persons who:
- 8.1 are serving
short-term sentences of imprisonment (two years or less) and who, at 14 October
2016, had reached their Statutory
Release Date (‘SRD’), but not
their Sentence Expiry Date (‘SED’), and were still subject to
release conditions
- 8.2 had reached
their SED before 14 October 2016 but were still subject to release conditions at
that date, and
- 8.3 had been
convicted of a qualifying offence before 14 October 2016 and who are sentenced
on or after 14 October 2016.
- New
cl 4 of Schedule 1 will also enable the Commissioner of Police to apply to the
sentencing court for a registration order under
s 9 of the principal Act in
respect of
an offender sentenced between 14 October 2016 and 13 March 2017 to a non-
custodial sentence in respect of a qualifying offence.
- The
Bill also makes minor amendments to clarify that a court’s power to make a
registration order turns on sentencing, not conviction.
Previous section 7 report
- In
2015 I presented a report to the House under the Bill of Rights Act and Standing
Order 265 on the Child Protection (Child Sex Offender
Register) Bill (‘the
original
Bill’), as the principal Act then was.1 That report concluded the original Bill
appeared to be inconsistent with s 9 of the Bill of Rights Act
(disproportionately severe treatment or punishment) and s 26(2) (double
jeopardy).
- The
inconsistency with s 9 was principally based on there being no possibility for
review of the lifetime reporting obligations, and
the report recommended that
such an opportunity be provided.
- This
issue was considered and addressed through the inclusion, on the recommendation
of the Social Services Select Committee, of s
38 of the principal Act which
provides a right of review for offenders subject to lifetime reporting
obligations.
- The
inconsistency with s 26(2) (double jeopardy) was principally based on the
proposed retrospective application of the original Bill.
- The
Bill, in restating, clarifying and extending the retrospective application of
the principal Act, raises the same issues in respect
of s 26(2). I consider,
moreover, the Bill also limits s 25(g) (right to lesser penalty when penalties
changed) in respect of the
retrospective application of the principal Act to
persons convicted prior to 14 October 2016 but sentenced after that date.
Inconsistency with s 26(2) (double jeopardy)
- Section
26(2) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that no one who has been finally
acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence
shall be tried or
punished for it again.
- The
right recognises that there must be finality to proceedings. Once a person has
been finally acquitted, pardoned, or convicted
and sentenced, they should be
able to move on.2
- The
Supreme Court of Canada recently considered the constitutionality of
retrospective legislation analogous to the Bill.3 That inquiry engaged two subsidiary
questions:4
1 Report of the
Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the Child
Protection (Child Sex Offender Register)
Bill.
2 Police v Gilchrist
[1998] 16 CRNZ 55.
3 R v K.R.J. [2016]
SCC 31.
4 Ibid at [5].
18.1 do the legislative measures constitute a “punishment”, and if
so
18.2 is the retrospective punishment a reasonable one that can be demonstrably
justified in a fee and democratic society?
- For
the reasons given in my previous report to the House, I consider that
registration and the associated reporting obligations imposed
on registrable
offenders constitutes a “punishment” for the purposes of s 26(2) of
the Bill of Rights Act.
- For
those impacted prospectively this punishment may be seen as part of the original
sentence and therefore does not entail being
punished ‘again’ for
the same offence.
- However,
the registrable offenders to whom the retrospective application will apply did
not face the prospect of registration at the
time they were charged, tried,
convicted or, in some circumstances, sentenced. The retrospective application of
a requirement to
register and be subject to reporting obligations means that
persons already sentenced for their offending face an additional punishment
for
the same offence. This is a prima facie limitation on s 26(2) of the Bill
of Rights Act.
Is the limitation justified and proportionate under s 5 of the
Bill of Rights Act?
- Where
a provision appears to limit a particular right or freedom, it may nevertheless
be consistent with the Bill of Rights Act if
it can be considered a reasonable
limit that is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society under s 5
of the Bill of
Rights Act. The s 5 inquiry may be approached as follows:5
- does
the provision serve an objective sufficiently important to justify some
limitation of the right or freedom?
- if
so, then:
- is
the limit rationally connected with the objective?
- does
the limit impair the right or freedom no more than is reasonably necessary for
sufficient achievement of the objective?
- is
the limit in due proportion to the importance of the objective?
Is the objective sufficiently
important?
- The
purpose of the Bill is to ensure the retrospective provisions apply in
accordance with the original policy intent, which was to
enable Police to
proactively address the immediate risks presented by offenders as they moved
into the community. There is no question
that addressing the risks of
reoffending constitutes an important objective. Child victims of sexual abuse
are, moreover, amongst
the most vulnerable victims of crime, and the resultant
harm is often very serious and long lasting.
5 Hansen v R
at para. 123.
Is there a rational connection between the limit and the
objective?
- As
I observed in my previous report to the House, there is limited evidence from
other jurisdictions about the effectiveness of sex
offender registers and the
best practice for long term monitoring of high risk sex offenders in the
community after their sentences
end. The scarcity of evidence that child
protection offender registers deliver significant benefits in terms of improved
public safety
has been noted in numerous studies.6
- The
lack of evidence for improved public safety should, however, be weighed against
the severe harm caused to the victims of sexual
offences against children. There
is also some evidence from the literature to suggest that registers achieve
reductions in reoffending.7
- I
therefore consider there is a sufficient rational connection between the
limitation and the objective.
Is the impairment on the right greater than reasonably
necessary?
- My
previous report noted that the scope of retrospective application was relatively
narrow. The report also noted that the punishment
imposed did not amount to an
explicit deprivation of liberty.
- Despite
this, I did not consider the original Bill to minimally impair the rights of
those offenders to whom it retrospectively applies.
There was no provision, for
example, to limit the period of registration or reporting obligations for those
retrospectively affected,
and no inclusion of a review mechanism allowing a case
for de-registration or suspension of reporting obligations to be heard.
- As
noted above, s 38 of the principal Act was included, on the recommendation of
the Social Services Select Committee, to provide
a right of review for offenders
subject to lifetime reporting obligations. A registrable offender subject to
lifetime reporting obligations
is eligible under this subsection if they:
- 29.1 have been
subject to lifetime reporting obligations for not less than 15 years
- 29.2 are not on
parole or subject to any post-sentence order (for example, a public protection
order or an extended supervision order),
and
- 29.3 a District
Court has not in the previous five years heard and declined an application under
s 38 by the offender.
- In
my view, s 38 of the principal Act addressed the concerns raised in relation to
the apparent inconsistency with s 9 of the Bill
of Rights Act. Section 38,
however, offers little or no effective relief for those persons impacted
retrospectively.
6 See, for
example: Terry Thomas, The Registration and Monitoring of Sex Offenders: A
Comparative Study (Routledge, 2011), pg. 149; Amanda Y. Agan, ‘Sex
Offender Registries: Fear Without Function? Journal of Law and Economics,
Vol. 54, No. 1, 2011.
7 Patterns of
reconviction among offenders eligible for Multi-Agency Public Protection
Arrangements (MAPPA) ISBN: 978 1 84099 471 1.
- Nothing
in the principal Act or the Bill acknowledges or compensates for the particular
prejudicial effect attendant to the additional
punishment faced by persons
retrospectively affected. It would still be possible to achieve the purpose of
the Bill to a similar
level by providing for a lesser period of reporting
obligations for those retrospectively affected.
- Likewise,
the Bill could provide for a specific mechanism to allow the courts some
supervision over the appropriateness of retrospective
application to these
persons. As drafted, it only does so for those sentenced to a non-custodial
sentence between 16 October 2016
and 13 March 2017.
- Judicial
discretion over the imposition of retrospective conditions was a significant
factor in the Supreme Court of Canada’s
majority decision in R v K.R.J
that Canada’s legislation impaired rights no more than reasonable
necessary.8 The retrospective punishment
considered in that case may only be imposed when a judge is satisfied that the
specific offender poses
a risk to children and that the
punishment
is a reasonable attempt to minimize that risk.9 For most persons affected by the Bill, no
such assessment will take place.
- Moreover,
the revised retrospective application of the Bill is extremely broad,
essentially attempting to capture all persons who
were not, at 14 October 2016,
completely free of the repercussions of a prior conviction for child sex
offences.
- I
note the prejudicial effect of the Bill’s broad retrospective application
is most acute in relation to persons who had reached
their SED, but were still
subject to release conditions, at 14 October 2016. Indeed, as release conditions
may only extend six months
beyond a person’s SED and given the proposed
timing of the Bill, some affected persons will no longer be subject to those
release
conditions.
- For
these reasons, the Bill cannot be said to impair s 26(2) no more than reasonably
necessary to achieve the objective.
Is the limit in due proportion to the importance of the
objective?
- My
previous report concluded the risk of the double punishment becoming
disproportionately severe meant it was not in due proportion
to the importance
of the objective. In my view, that finding holds for the current Bill also,
notwithstanding the addition of s 38
to the principal Act. As above, I consider
that while s 38 addressed the apparent inconsistency relating to s 9 it does not
materially
affect the proportionality of the apparent inconsistency with s
26(2).
- The
Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines state that retrospective application
may be appropriate where it is intended to address
a matter that is essential to
public safety.10 As above, I consider there
is no doubt the purpose of the Bill, and the principal Act, is a sufficiently
important objective to warrant
some intrusion into the rights and freedoms
affirmed in the Bill of Rights Act.
8 R v K.R.J
at [70 – 76].
9 Ibid at [70].
10 Legislation Advisory
Committee Guidelines (2014 Edition), Chapter 11, at para. 11.1.
- On
balance, however, I consider the degree to which the Bill and the principal Act
intrude on the right not to be subjected to retrospective
punishment outweighs
the importance of the Bill’s objective.
- In
addition to the reasons given in my previous report, I would emphasise the
general principle that legislation should not be retrospective.
The presumption
plays an important role in safeguarding the rule of law,11 which ‘requires that a citizen,
before committing himself to any course action, should be able to know in
advance what are the
legal consequences that will flow from it.’12
- The
principle against retrospective legislation is strongest in relation to
legislation that imposes obligations or penalties, or
takes away acquired
rights, in this case, to prevent “a person from suffering the patent
injustice of being punished twice
for the
same offence.”13 The retrospective requirement to register
and fulfil reporting
obligations is undoubtedly contrary to this important principle.
- I
therefore consider the limit on s 26(2) of the Bill of Rights Act is not in due
proportion to the importance of the objective.
Inconsistency with s 25(g) (right to lesser penalty where penalties changed)
- Section
25(g) of the Bill of Rights Act affirms that everyone who is charged with an
offence has, in relation to the determination
of the charge, the right, if
convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has been varied between
the commission of the
offence and sentencing, to the benefit of the lesser
penalty.
- The
right to a lesser penalty when the penalty has changed between the commission of
the offence and sentencing affirms the principle
that statutes should not have
retrospective effect to the disadvantage of the offender.
- As
noted above, the Bill seeks to clarify that the principal Act applies to persons
who had been convicted of a qualifying offence
before 14 October 2016 but who
were sentenced on or after 14 October 2016. Accordingly, I have considered
whether the requirement
to register and the attendant reporting obligations also
constitutes a variation in the penalty for the purposes of s 25(g).
- Section
25(g) applies only to penalties that are punitive in nature. British courts have
observed that measures are more likely to
constitute a penalty the more closely
tied they are to the commission of an offence and the more they are intended to
punish the
offender rather than protect the public.14
- The
purpose of the principal Act is, as noted above, primarily aimed at protection
of the public. While the intention of the principal
Act may not be purely
punitive, however, in New Zealand the imposition of significant restrictions on
the liberty of an individual
over a prolonged period of time has been held to be
punitive and,
11 R v K.R.J
at [23].
12 Black-Clawson
International Ltd. v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G. [1975] UKHL 2; [1975] A.C. 591
(H.L.) at [638].
13 Daniels v Thompson
[1998] NZCA 3; [1998] 3 NZLR 22 (CA), per Thomas J (dissenting) at [57].
14 Gough v Chief
Constable of the Derbyshire Constabulary [2002] QB 1213 (EWCA).
therefore, a penalty.15 An order to
register is also closely tied to the conviction and sentencing for relevant
sexual offending against children.
- I
therefore consider that registration and associated reporting obligations are a
“penalty” and that the Bill will limit
s 25(g) of the Bill of Rights
Act by retrospectively applying the principal Act to persons who were convicted,
but not yet sentenced,
prior to 14 October 2016. Further, for the reasons given
above in relation to s 26(2), I consider the limit cannot be demonstrably
justified under s 5 of that Act.
- In
addition to the reasons given above, I also note that s 25(g) is mirrored in s
6(1) of the Sentencing Act 2002. Section 6(2) of
that Act provides that the
right applies despite any other enactment or rule of law. That the right
affirmed in s 25(g) is specifically
and powerfully recognised elsewhere in
legislation emphasises its importance and further suggests the intrusion on that
right is
not in due proportion to the importance of the objective.
Conclusion
- For
the above reasons, I conclude the Bill appears to be inconsistent with s 26(2)
and s 25(g) of the Bill of Rights Act and that
the inconsistencies cannot be
justified under s 5 of that Act.
Hon Christopher Finlayson
Attorney-General
7 March 2017
15 See, for example,
Belcher v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections (2006)
CA184/05 (CA).
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