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Abortion Legislation Bill (Inconsistent) (Sections 5, 19) [2019] NZBORARp 30 (5 August 2019)
Last Updated: 5 August 2019
Abortion Legislation Bill – Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990 Summary
- Due
to the high degree of public scrutiny of the criteria for permitting access to
abortion services, it is appropriate for me to
set out my opinion on that aspect
of this Bill. I have therefore considered proposed new sections 10 and 11 of the
Contraception,
Sterilisation and Abortion Act for consistency with the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
- I
have concluded the gestational limit in new section 11 limits the right to
freedom from discrimination in s 19 of the Bill of Rights
Act. However, that
limitation is justified under s 5. New section 11 is therefore consistent with
the Bill of Rights Act.
The gestational limit
- Clause
7 of the Bill would insert new sections 10 and 11 into the CSA Act. New section
10 permits abortion services to be provided
without any limitation or need for
additional legal justification until the end of the 20th week of gestation.
- New
section 11 would create a gestational limit on unrestricted access to abortion
services. It provides that after the 20th week
of gestation, an abortion may
only be provided if a qualified health practitioner concludes it is appropriate
in the circumstances,
with regard to the woman’s physical health, mental
health, and well-being.
New section 11 limits the right to freedom from discrimination
- To
infringe the right to freedom from discrimination in s 19 of the Bill of Rights
Act, a distinction must be drawn on the basis of
a protected characteristic and
constitute a material disadvantage to the affected members of that group. I have
concluded new section
11 gestational limit impairs the s 19 right. That is
because it constitutes disadvantageous differential treatment on the basis of
a
protected characteristic, in this case pregnancy.
Differential treatment
- One
of the grounds of discrimination prohibited by s 21 of the Human Rights Act is
“sex, which includes pregnancy and
childbirth”.1 A distinction drawn by reference to
the length of a pregnancy therefore has the potential to infringe s 19 of the
Bill of Rights
Act, if it constitutes a material disadvantage and is not
justified under s 5.
1 Human Rights Act 1993, s 21(1)(a).
- This
is an example of so-called “intra-ground” discrimination, where the
appropriate comparator to illustrate the differential
treatment caused by a
particular act or omission is another person who exhibits the same
protected ground, but to a different degree or in a different form. For
example, a policy permitting employers to fire women who are
more than 20 weeks
pregnant would allow differential treatment of a woman who is 21 weeks pregnant
compared to a woman who is 19
weeks pregnant.
- It
would not be correct to suggest that, because both women are pregnant, they have
the same protected status and therefore cannot
be discriminated against by
reason of how they manifest that status. A simple example demonstrating this is
age. As everyone has
an “age”, any distinction wrought by a rule
about age will not be on the ground of merely having an age. Rather, it
will be based on having reached a particular age, compared to a younger
or older comparator. It will be a distinction within the ground of age.
The same can be said of different types of
disability.2
Material
disadvantage
- The
second part of the test of whether a measure limits s 19 is whether the
differential treatment of women more than 20 weeks pregnant
constitutes a
material disadvantage.3
- I
have concluded the addition of a fetter on access to abortion for women who are
more than 20 weeks pregnant will materially disadvantage
women on the basis of
the length of their pregnancy. It both requires women to seek approval to have
an abortion, and creates the
potential for approval to be withheld and abortion
services denied.
- In
2017, approximately 0.5 per cent of abortions were carried out after the 20th
week of pregnancy.4 As such, under new section 11, a
small group of women after the 20th week of pregnancy would have their ability
to make decisions
about abortion procedures removed from them, and potentially
be restricted from access to abortion services.
- The
limit on access to abortions proposed by new section 11 coincides with the
timing of the anatomy scan, which takes place by ultrasound
between 18–20
weeks of pregnancy and is central to assessing the health and development of the
foetus.5 The foetus is not large enough before this
point to have its body structure and development
assessed.6 Depending on the result of the anatomy scan,
further testing may be required to check for congenital
abnormalities.7
2 B v Waitemata District Health Board
[2017] NZSC 88, [2017] 1 NZLR 823 at [101] and n 121.
3 Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA
184, [2012] 3 NZLR 456 at [109].
- Law
Commission Alternative approaches to abortion law: Ministerial briefing paper
(NZLC MB4, 2018) at para 4.74.
- Ministry
of Health “Screening tests and scans: 14 to 30 weeks” retrieved from
https://www.health.govt.nz/your-
health/pregnancy-and-kids/pregnancy/weeks-14-30/screening-tests-and-scans-week-14-30.
- Royal
Australian and New Zealand College of Radiologists “18–20 Week
Screening Pregnancy Ultrasound” retrieved from
https://www.insideradiology.com.au/18-20-week-ultrasound/.
7 Ibid.
- The
Law Commission records the Abortion Supervisory Committee and health
professionals as submitting that virtually all abortions
recorded from 20 weeks
onward relate to wanted pregnancies, and abortions only occur because a serious
abnormality or threat to the
woman’s life or health is
detected.8 In 2015, 82 per cent of the 107 abortions
reported from 20 weeks onward were associated with congenital
abnormalities.9
- New
section 11 will require women to make rapid decisions about abortion if the
anatomy scan suggests a congenital abnormality. A
woman’s ability to
clarify the health of the foetus with further testing, or to make a considered
decision as to whether to
carry on a pregnancy of a foetus with a congenital
abnormality, may be compromised by the feeling that she must make a decision as
to abortion before the end of the 20th week.
New section 11 is a justified limitation under s 5
- Limits
on rights fall to be considered under s 5 in accordance with the Oakes
test.10 In order to be demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society, a limit on a right must:
- 15.1 Serve a
sufficiently important purpose to limit a right; and
- 15.2 Be
proportionate to achieving that purpose, in that it must:
- 15.2.1 Be
rationally connected to that purpose;
- 15.2.2 Impair
the right in question as little as is possible to achieve that purpose; and
- 15.2.3 Have an
overall impact on the right that is proportional to the objective of the
limit.
Limitation for health care purposes not
justified
- The
text of new section 11 suggests its primary objective is to ensure that
abortions are appropriate with regard to a woman’s
physical and mental
health and wellbeing. This is a sufficiently important objective for which the
right to freedom from discrimination
may conceivably be limited.
- Limiting
a woman’s ability to choose to have an abortion after 20 weeks’
gestation is not rationally connected to the
goal of ensuring abortions are
safe, and is not a policy that minimally impairs the right to freedom from
discrimination because
that goal is already met by the general law regulating
health services. For these reasons, new section 11 is not proportionate to
the
goal of ensuring abortion services are safe.
- 17.1 The
existing general law regulating health services already addresses the issue of
safe health services, through health practitioners’
general duties
8 NZLC MB4, at para 2.16.
9 NZLC MB4, at para 2.17.
10 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103; adopted in New
Zealand by R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (SC).
of care, their duties under the Health and Disability Consumers’ Code
of Rights, and the legal obligation to only provide services
that are within the
practitioner’s scope of practice. There does not appear to be a reason to
regulate the same outcome in
a duplicative manner in relation only to abortion
services.
17.2 For the same reasons, the Law Commission suggested such a test was
potentially redundant.11
Limitation
to reflect societal interest in preservation of human life is justified
- The
Bill reflects a modified version of the Law Commission’s proposed Model C,
which would have restricted access to abortion
after the 22nd week of gestation.
The Law Commission noted the increased complexity of late-term abortions and
community concern
for preserving the life of a foetus as it
develops.12 The Commission ultimately proposed such a
limit by reference to foetal viability, stating that after 22 weeks of gestation
some foetuses
may survive if born. The Commission noted the Queensland Law
Reform Commission had proposed the same 22 week limit on the basis that
it
represented “the stage immediately before the ‘threshold of
viability’ under current clinical
practice”.13 Clinical practice indicated an
active approach to resuscitation for infants born at 23 weeks, with
resuscitation being attempted
in more than half of cases in both New Zealand and
the United Kingdom.14 In 2018 the Queensland Law Reform
Commission reported international clinical practice was that life-sustaining
treatments are unlikely
to be delivered to children born alive at less than 23
weeks of gestation.15
- The
20 week test proposed in the Bill is similar to the Law Commission’s
suggested gestational limit of 22 weeks. The Minister
of Justice explained the
difference, in the Cabinet paper seeking agreement to draft the Bill, as
maintenance of “the status
quo of a 20 week gestational
threshold”.16
- That
status quo emerged from the 1975 report of the Royal Commission on
Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion. The report noted
that foetal
viability was (at that time) recognised as possible after 24 weeks of gestation,
and referred to a proposed 20 week gestational
limit being advanced at the time
by a select committee of the United Kingdom House of
Commons.17 On that basis, the Royal Commission
found:18
... it is conceivable that with
the development of medical science foetuses born before twenty weeks may be
capable of extra-uterine
life. We find ourselves in agreement with the
recommendations of the Select Committee in England and consider there should be
an
upper time limit on abortions, restricting them to twenty
11 NZLC MB4, at para 4.56.
12 NZLC MB4, at para 4.62.
13 NZLC MB4, at para 4.69.
14 NZLC MB4, at para 4.72.
15 Queensland Law Reform Commission Review of
termination of pregnancy laws (WP No 76, 2018) at para 3.187.
16 Hon Andrew Little “Taking a Health Approach
to the Regulation of Abortion” (Cabinet paper, 21 May 2019) at [44].
17 Royal Commission on Contraception, Sterilisation
and Abortion “Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion in New Zealand:
Report
of the Royal Commission of Inquiry” [1977] II AJHR E26 at
275–276.
18 Ibid, at 276.
weeks’ gestation, subject only to, the provision that abortions should
still be allowed after that time only where there is
a substantial risk [of
disability or threat to the woman’s life or health].
- It
appears then that the 20 week gestational limit currently contained in s 187A of
the Crimes Act reflected medical knowledge of
foetal viability in 1975, but with
a “buffer” built into the test to account for the possible
advancement of medical
science.
- This
history of gestational limit proposals in New Zealand demonstrates that foetal
viability has been long treated as the determinative
factor in the regulation of
abortion access. I find this approach concerning, because I do not believe that
access to abortion ought
to be progressively limited in future alongside
advancements in medical technology. Foetal viability is an important
consideration
in defining the limits of abortion access, but it is not the
determinative one.
- In
considering limits on abortion access, I conclude there are two equally
important interests at play: personal bodily autonomy,
on the one hand; and a
broad societal interest in the preservation of human life, on the other. I do
not consider that foetal viability
alone is a determinative reason to limit
pregnant women’s human rights. But states must nonetheless find some way
to balance
the two broader interests I have described. The broad societal
interest in preserving human life is therefore a sufficiently important
objective to justify a limitation on human rights, and limiting access to
abortion is a rational way of achieving that objective.
- Reflecting
both interests in law will result in relatively unimpeded access to abortion
during the early part of pregnancy, and diminishing
access to abortion in the
later part of pregnancy. But there is no one right answer as to when that
broader interest outweighs a
woman’s personal autonomy. Different states
have reached different conclusions as to when limitations on access to abortion
ought to be imposed. Australian states that have reformed abortion laws in
recent years have imposed gestational limits on access
to abortion commencing
between 16 and 24 weeks.19
- A
20 week gestational limit, beyond which abortion services require justification,
falls in the middle of that range. It also reflects
the long-standing approach
to abortion access in New Zealand, currently contained in s 187A of the Crimes
Act 1961.
- The
nature of a gestational limit is relevant to whether it is reasonable. An
absolute limit on abortion after 20 weeks of gestation
would not be a
justifiable limit on s 19. Although almost all abortions take place in the early
stages of pregnancy, there will inevitably
be circumstances where an abortion is
appropriate during late pregnancy, including threats to foetal and maternal
health detected
19 The gestational limit in Tasmania is 16
weeks, and the gestational limit in Victoria is 24 weeks (NZLC MB4, at Appendix
6). Since
the New Zealand Law Commission’s report, Queensland has
decriminalised abortion and introduced a 22 week gestational limit
on access to
abortion services (Termination of Pregnancy Act 2018), and a bill has been
introduced to the New South Wales Legislative
Assembly to do the same
(Reproductive Health Care Reform Bill 2019).
during anatomy scanning. New section 11 does not precisely define the
circumstances in which a late abortion is available. Instead
it makes the
woman’s health the primary consideration, and allows any other
consideration that may be relevant to be taken
into account. This allows
decisions about abortion after 20 weeks of gestation to be made in accordance
with good medical practice.
- Gestational
limits are arbitrary by nature. Their impact is also arbitrary: every foetus
does not become viable at the point a gestational
limit on abortion begins to
apply. As such it is difficult to undertake a “minimal impairment”
analysis of gestational
limits, and particularly difficult where such limits are
not to be justified by reference to foetal viability alone. But that does
not
mean a gestational limit is not capable of justification. I consider a
gestational limit permitting of abortions where appropriate
in the
circumstances, applying sometime around the mid-point of pregnancy, will be
capable of justifiably limiting pregnant women’s
human rights.
- The
End of Life Choice Bill currently before the House involves analogous issues.
That Bill would make a person eligible to request
assisted dying if they suffer
from a terminal illness likely to end their life within six months. If enacted,
that test would represent
Parliament’s view of the appropriate balance of
the right to bodily autonomy with society’s interest in preserving human
life. The six month period chosen will not necessarily correlate with the point
at which an illness becomes intolerable to the person
suffering, and so it is
similarly arbitrary in nature. But it is justifiable. It is open to Parliament
to make such distinctions
on the basis that society’s interest in
preserving human life remains significant up until the time that a
person’s death
is imminent.
- I
conclude the proposed 20 week gestational limit is a demonstrably justifiable
limit on the right to freedom from discrimination
in a free and democratic
society. For that reason new section 11 is a justified limitation on s 19 of the
Bill of Rights Act.
Hon David Parker Attorney-General
5 August 2019
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