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Abortion Legislation Bill (Consistent) (Sections 8, 14, 22) [2019] NZBORARp 31 (1 August 2019)
Last Updated: 5 August 2019
1 August 2019
Attorney-General
Abortion Legislation Bill – consistency with New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act 1990 Our Ref: ATT395/294
- This
briefing advises you of Crown Law’s view as to the consistency of the
draft Abortion Legislation Bill with rights affirmed
by the New Zealand Bill of
Rights Act 1990. The Bill was considered by the Cabinet Legislation Committee on
23 July 2019. This advice
addresses all matters in the Bill with the exception
of those provisions that limit access to abortion after 20 weeks’
gestation.
In respect of the matters addressed, we conclude the Bill is
consistent with the Bill of Rights Act.
Summary of advice
- This
advice concludes that:
- 2.1 Decriminalising
abortion by repealing the limitations on abortion contained in the Crimes Act
1961 does not engage the right not
to be deprived of life under s 8 of the Bill
of Rights Act.
- 2.2 Decriminalising
abortion also does not engage the right to freedom from discrimination on the
basis of sex or disability under
s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- 2.3 New
sections 15 and 17 of the CSA Act, which would create a power to declare
“safe areas” around the premises of abortion
providers, limit the
right to freedom of expression in s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act. That
limitation is justified under s 5.
- 2.4 New section
16 of the CSA Act, which would allow Police to arrest and detain people who
appear to be engaging in “prohibited
behaviour” within a “safe
zone” without warrant, does not engage the right to freedom from arbitrary
detention
in s 22 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- 2.5 New section
19 of the CSA Act, which requires a health practitioner with a conscientious
objection to refer a person seeking an
abortion to another provider of the
service sought, is inconsistent with the rights to freedom and manifestation of
religion, thought
and conscience in ss 13 and 15 of the Bill of Rights Act.
These limitations are justified under s 5.
- 2.6 New section
20 of the CSA Act, which authorises refusing to accommodate staff with a
conscientious objection, and permits differential
treatment in the process of
employing staff for an abortion service provider, is inconsistent with the right
to freedom from discrimination
on the basis of religious belief and ethical
belief, under s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act. These limitations are justified
under
s 5.
BILL OF RIGHTS ACT ISSUES
Decriminalisation – s 8 right not to be
deprived of life
- We
have considered whether decriminalisation of abortion would constitute an
infringement on the right not to be deprived of life.
We conclude that the right
is not at issue in the Abortion Legislation Bill.
- For
such an infringement to arise, a foetus must be capable of enjoying the right
not to be deprived of life as a matter of law. To
answer this question, we have
examined the CSA and Bill of Rights Acts, the “born alive” rule, and
associated jurisprudence.
- No
foetal right to life arises from the common law or s 8 of the Bill of Rights
Act. While the point has not been conclusively determined
in New Zealand,
decisions of the High Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court in Right
to Life New Zealand Inc v Abortion Supervisory Committee are
instructive.
Personhood and the born alive rule
- The
“born alive” rule is well established in New Zealand and comparable
jurisdictions.1 The rule provides that, at common law,
a foetus has no status to bring a claim and thus has no enforceable rights
before birth –
it is not a legal
person.2 At first instance of
the Right to Life proceeding, Miller J concluded that New Zealand law
generally adheres to the born alive
rule.3 This was endorsed by
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court – the latter in a decision with
respect to leave.4 A foetus
thus has no enforceable rights at common law until it is born alive.
- Although
a foetus is not itself a legal person capable of enforcing its rights, a foetus
may be capable of assuming interests and
protections based in legislation. Thus
whether deviation from the born alive rule is permitted depends on the statutory
context.5
No deviation from the born alive rule with respect to the right not to be
deprived of life
- We
consider there is no relevant New Zealand legislation that allows deviation from
the born alive rule to the extent that a foetus
enjoys a right not to be
deprived of life.
- See
for example Paton v Trustees of BPAS [1979] QB 276 at 989; Re F (in
utero) [1988] 2 All ER 193 (CA); and Winnipeg Child & Family Services
(Northwest Area) v G (DF) (1997) 152 DLR (4th)
193.
2 See for example Harrild v
Director of Proceedings [2003] NZCA 125; [2003] 3 NZLR 289 (CA).
3 Right to Life New Zealand Inc v Abortion
Supervisory Committee [2008] NZHC 865; [2008] 2 NZLR 825 (HC) [Right to Life (HC)] at
[81], citing
Harrild v Director of Proceedings, above n 2.
4 Abortion Supervisory Committee v Right to Life
New Zealand Inc [2011] NZCA 246, [2012] 1 NZLR 176 [Right to Life
(CA)]; and
Right to Life New Zealand Inc v Abortion Supervisory Committee [2011]
NZSC 97 [Right to Life (SC)] at [1].
5 See for example Re an Unborn Child [2003] 1
NZLR 115 in the context of laws relating to guardianship.
The CSA Act, for example, does not achieve this. The long title to the CSA
Act states the relevant purpose is:
...to provide for the circumstances and procedures under which abortions may
be authorised after having full regard to the rights
of the unborn child.
- As
the Law Commission notes, this may appear to suggest a foetus has
rights.6 However, Court of
Appeal authority states the substance of the CSA Act does not confer enforceable
rights on a foetus; rather it
prescribes specific precautionary requirements to
balance the “deep philosophical and moral and social attitudes” in
a
way Parliament thought necessary at the time.7 The
Court of Appeal in the Right to Life proceeding endorsed this point,
stating:8
- [54] We are
satisfied that there is no basis either from the Long Title to the CSA Act or
the abortion law to derive generally an
express right to life in the unborn
child. ...
- [55] For
similar reasons we are satisfied that there is no warrant for interpreting the
CSA Act consistently with a “State Interest”
right to life for the
unborn child. The legislation, as understood from its text and according to its
purpose, does not lead us to
the interpretation contended for by RTL.
Furthermore, we can find no basis in the CSA Act for an express right to life.
...
- Equally,
the Bill of Rights does not provide a statutory context in which to deviate from
the born alive rule. Miller J in Right to Life considered whether the
phrase “no one” in s 8 of the Bill of Rights included all humans,
legal and natural, such that
it also included a foetus. His Honour concluded s 8
did not extend to a foetus, nor could s 6 operate to extend the meaning of a
person to include a foetus. His Honour did so on the basis that: first, very few
rights in the Bill of Rights could be exercised
by or on behalf of a foetus;
secondly, it was telling that no definition of “person” extending to
a foetus was included
in the Act; and finally, it
was:9
... most unlikely that ... the
legislature would have failed to address the position of the unborn child
explicitly [in the Bill of
Rights Act], had it intended to extend to it the
right to life.
- The
Court of Appeal, while declining to decide the point, observed that Miller
J’s conclusions had “much to commend
them”.10 The Supreme Court declined leave on the
relevant issues, and thus has not heard substantive argument on them. However,
the leave decision
on those issues turned on the very question of whether the
fundamental right to life extended to a foetus. In that context, the Supreme
Court stated that “it is plain that the legislation was based on the
premise of the ‘born alive’
rule”.11
- In
our view, given the fundamental nature of the born alive rule, recognition of
rights bestowed on a foetus contra the rule ought
to be expressly stated or
necessarily inferred in legislation. That imperative is more pronounced the
greater the
6 Law Commission Alternative approaches
to abortion law: Ministerial briefing paper (NZLC MB4, 2018) at [3.30].
7 Wall v Livingston [1982] 1 NZLR 734 (CA) at
737.
8 Right to Life (CA), above n 4.
9 Right to Life (HC), above n 3, at [101]–[102].
10 Right to Life (CA), above n 4, at [64].
11 Right to Life (SC), above n 4, at [1].
significance of the right, due to the greater deviance from the born alive
rule it is likely to entail. The right not to be deprived
of life is the most
fundamental in the Bill of Rights Act. As Miller J points out, it is most
unlikely that the legislature would
have failed to address this significant
matter if it did indeed intend to extent that right to a foetus.
- Many
similar jurisdictions do not bestow rights protections on a foetus. For
example, Canadian and United States jurisprudence holds
that a foetus does not
enjoy the protection of equivalent right to life guarantees as they are not
covered by the terms “everyone”
or “person”
respectively.12 Our position is also consistent with
the United Nations Human Rights Committee’s recent General comment No
36 (2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, on the right to life. In that General comment the Committee
does not refer to any right to life for a foetus, focusing instead on protecting
women and girls from unsafe abortions.13
- The
above authorities and our analysis point to the conclusion that a foetus does
not enjoy the right not to be deprived of life under
s 8 of the Bill of Rights
Act. Accordingly, the Abortion Legislation Bill appears to be consistent with
the right to not to be deprived
of life affirmed in s 8 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Decriminalisation – s 19 disability discrimination
- One
of the grounds of discrimination prohibited by s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act
and s 21 of the Human Rights Act is disability.
We have considered whether the
decriminalisation of abortion would constitute discrimination on the basis of
disability, in that
it might either:
- 15.1 directly
lead to the birth of fewer children with disabilities; or
- 15.2 indirectly
have the effect of treating a person or group of persons
differently.14
- Because
a foetus is not a legal person in whom Bill of Rights Act rights may vest, the
right to be free from discrimination on the
basis of disability cannot arise in
the context of the abortion of a particular foetus. The Abortion Legislation
Bill is therefore
compliant with the Bill of Rights Act in respect of direct
discrimination.
- New
Zealand’s Independent Monitoring Mechanism on the Convention on the Rights
of Persons with Disabilities has observed that
an approach that has the effect
of preventing the births of a protected minority group could be
discriminatory.15 The Law Commission noted this may
increase stigma in society, result in fewer people with lived experience of
disability to advocate
for protections, and feed the
12 Tremblay v Daigle [1989] 2 SCR
530 (SCC), concerning s 7 of the Canadian Charter; and Roe v Wade [1973] USSC 43; 410 US
113 (1973) at 158 per Blackmun J, concerning the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
13 Human Rights Committee General comment No 36
(2018) on article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
on the right to life CCPR/C/GC/36 (30 October 2018) at 5.
14 Section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993: see
NRHA v Human Rights Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218 (HC) at 236.
15 New Zealand Independent Monitoring Mechanism
under the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Submission
from New Zealand’s Independent Monitoring Mechanism to Inform the
Development of the List of Issues Prior to Reporting
for New Zealand’s 2nd
Periodic Review under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
(2017) at 10.
notion of disability as a “negative experience rather than a facet of
human diversity”.16
- We
note that the Abortion Legislation Bill does not include express reference to
foetal disability. In removing the statutory tests
contained in s 187A of the
Crimes Act, the Abortion Legislation Bill removes foetal abnormality as a ground
for an abortion. For
an abortion at not more than 20 weeks gestation, new
section 10 contains no statutory criteria to be met, let alone criteria related
to disability. For an abortion at more than 20 weeks, new section 11 contains
statutory criteria that focus not on the status of
the foetus, but on the status
of the woman seeking an abortion. Further, there are no identified elements of
the Bill that create
limits or tests that would indirectly result in
discrimination on the basis of disability. This suggests the Abortion
Legislation
Bill is less likely than the present legislative regime to lead to
indirect discrimination on the basis of disability.
- There
is a remaining concern that the Abortion Legislation Bill may lead to late term
abortions for non-severe disabilities, particularly
in light of increasingly
refined screening methods and techniques. At this stage that concern is
speculative only. It has not been
shown that the provisions of the Abortion
Legislation Bill will result in the birth of fewer children with disabilities
and thereby
cause indirect discrimination against those with disability.
- Accordingly,
the Abortion Legislation Bill appears to be consistent with the right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of
disability affirmed in s 19 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Decriminalisation – s 19 sex discrimination
- As
noted above, one of the grounds of discrimination prohibited by s 19 of the Bill
of Rights Act and s 21 of the Human Rights Act
is sex. We have considered
whether the decriminalisation of abortion would constitute sex discrimination,
in that it might either:
- 21.1 directly
lead to the birth of fewer children of a particular sex; or
- 21.2 indirectly
have the effect of treating a person or group of persons
differently.17
- Echoing
our analysis above, because a foetus is not a legal person in whom Bill of
Rights Act rights may vest, the right to be free
from discrimination on the
basis of sex cannot arise in the context of the abortion of a particular foetus.
The Abortion Legislation
Bill is therefore compliant with the Bill of Rights Act
in respect of direct discrimination.
- There
is a remaining concern that sex-selective abortions will nonetheless have the
effect of treating one sex differently from the
other. The Law Commission noted
it saw no evidence of sex-selective abortions under the present legislation. It
did,
16 Law Commission, above n 6, at [12.23].
17 Section 65 of the Human Rights Act 1993: see
NRHA v Human Rights Commission [1998] 2 NZLR 218 (HC) at 236.
however, note some evidence of sex-selective abortion in specific communities
within other jurisdictions with similar legislation
to the Abortion Legislation
Bill.18
- The
Abortion Legislation Bill does not include reference to the sex of the foetus as
a ground for obtaining an abortion in either
new section 10 or 11. Nor are there
any identified elements of the Bill that create limits or tests that would
indirectly result
in discrimination on the basis of sex. It has not been shown
that provisions in the Bill will result in the birth of fewer children
of a
particular sex with the effect of treating a person or group of persons
differently.
- Accordingly,
the Abortion Legislation Bill appears to be consistent with the right to be free
from discrimination on the basis of
disability affirmed in s 19 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
“Safe area” regime – s 14 freedom of expression
- The
Bill proposes to create a power to permit regulations delineating “safe
areas” around abortion providers’ premises.
If such regulations are
made, the “prohibited conduct” defined in new section 15 will be
criminalised within that area.
That conduct includes:
- 26.1 intimidating,
interfering with or obstructing a person with the intention to stop the person
seeking or delivering abortion services;
and
- 26.2 communicating
with, or visually recording, a person:
- 26.2.1 with the
intent of causing emotional distress to a person seeking or delivering abortion
services; and
- 26.2.2 in a way
that is objectively distressing to a reasonable person in those
circumstances.
- Under
new section 17, regulations would only be made if the Minister of Health is
satisfied such regulations are appropriate and proportionate
to prevent harm to
persons accessing those premises, and are a demonstrably justifiable limitation
on rights and freedoms in a democratic
society. In effect the Minister of Health
is required to conduct the justification balancing exercise required under s 5
of the Bill
of Rights Act when considering whether a safe area is warranted.
- It
is largely the regulation-making decision which stands to be challenged under
the Bill of Rights Act, rather than empowering provisions
which do not directly
impact upon rights and freedoms. As we explain below, however, the offence of
communication intended to cause
emotional distress is a significant impairment
of s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, and so we have carefully considered
whether
such a limitation is capable of being demonstrably justified in this
context. We conclude it is.
- There
will still be a potential supplementary Bill of Rights Act issue, namely whether
the regulation declaring a “safe area”
is lawful. But once it is
accepted that the principle of criminalising certain communications within a
safe area is justifiable,
the
18 Law Commission, above n 6, at [12.18]–[12.19].
legality of the exercise of that regulatory power in a particular way will be
a context- dependent exercise which we cannot evaluate
in the abstract.
Intimidation, interference and obstruction
- Some
of the conduct that would be criminalised in a safe area – intimidation,
interference and obstruction – is familiar
to the existing criminal law.
Similar offences in the Summary Offences Act 1981 prohibit disorderly or
offensive behaviour against
public order (ss 3–4), intimidation (s 21,
which includes stopping, confronting or accosting someone in a public place),
and
obstructing a public way (s 22). To the extent that summary offences
relate to disruption of public order, they have been narrowly
interpreted by the
Supreme Court in order to reflect the right to freedom of expression in public
places.19 The proposed offence of engaging in
prohibited behaviour within a safe area has a slightly different focus; while it
would involve
a similar actus reus to those summary offences, it has a new
context-specific mens rea, less focused on disruption of public order
and more
on disruption of access to a public service.
- The
differing mens rea means it is doubtful that the rights to freedom of expression
(s 14) or association (s 16) are directly engaged
by such a prohibition, but
those rights may be incidentally engaged in the course of an offender’s
conduct. A “direct
action” protest, which aims to disrupt access to
or delivery of a health service permitted by law, generally results in an
unreasonable burden on the people it targets. We therefore consider limitations
on such conduct to be readily justifiable. We note
similar considerations apply
in respect of the power to declare a “specified non- interference
zone” under s 101B of
the Crown Minerals Act 1991, to prevent on-site
protests that would disrupt off-shore mineral exploration.20
We are satisfied that a power to declare a safe area prohibiting such
conduct, where that conduct is specifically intended to prevent
abortion
services from being lawfully sought or delivered, is a proper limitation on the
freedoms of expression and assembly in ss
14 and 16 of the Bill of Rights
Act.
Communication intended to cause emotional distress
- The
second part of the definition of “prohibited behaviour”, which bans
any “communication” or visual recording
intended to cause
“emotional distress” to people accessing an abortion
provider’s premises within a safe area,
is not a form of conduct
previously proscribed by law. This prohibition would directly engage s 14. The
proposed offence goes to
the heart of the classic justification for freedom of
expression, the “marketplace of ideas”: that is, the public airing
of controversial views, which may be distasteful to some, in a way that gives
pause or discomfort to the audience and causes them
to evaluate whether that
view is correct. In other words, causing emotional distress can be a central
purpose of free expression.
- Accordingly,
a safe area regulation may criminalise some silent protests (those not amounting
to obstructive or intimidating behaviour)
which cause the sort of harm expected
to result from free expression (emotional distress). Such a prohibition requires
robust justification.
19 Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30,
[2007] 3 NZLR 91; and Morse v Police [2011] NZSC 45, [2012] 2 NZLR 1.
20 We note no Bill of Rights Act vetting advice
was prepared in respect of that power, as it was added to the Crown Minerals
Amendment
Act 2013 by Supplementary Order Paper No 205 of 2013.
- Limits
on rights fall to be considered under s 5 in accordance with the Oakes
test.21 That is:22
- The
objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right
or freedom; it must relate to
concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society
before it can be characterized
as sufficiently important.
- Assuming
that a sufficiently important objective has been established, the means chosen
to achieve the objective must pass a proportionality
test; that is to say they
must:
- (a) be
‘rationally connected’ to the objective and not be arbitrary, unfair
or based on irrational considerations;
- (b) impair the
right or freedom in question as ‘little as possible’;
and
- (c) be such
that their effects on the limitation of rights and freedoms are proportional to
the objective.
- A
rational and proportionate limitation meeting this test will be
“demonstrably justified in free and democratic society”
under s
5.
Sufficiently important objective?
- New
section 17(2)(a) makes clear the objectives of the safe access regime are:
...to protect the safety and wellbeing, and respect the privacy and
dignity of, persons—
(i) accessing abortion services:
(ii) providing, or assisting with providing, abortion services:
- (iii) seeking
advice or information about abortion services:
(iv) providing, or assisting with providing, advice or information about
abortion services;
- This
wording closely reflects the purposes of the similar regime existing in
Victoria,23 which was recently upheld as a justified
limitation on the right to political communication by the High Court of
Australia.24 We conclude the objective of ensuring
safe, private and dignified access to abortion providers’ premises on an
equal basis with
other health services is a sufficiently important aspect of the
decriminalisation of abortion to justify a limitation on freedom
of
expression.
- The
Law Commission has observed no apparent need for a safe area regime in New
Zealand. The Bill includes such a regime, contrary
to that view. It is apparent
that the Bill addresses a real issue:
- 38.1 The Law
Commission noted there was no clear evidence the existing laws around
intimidating and anti-social behaviour were inadequate
to manage safe and
dignified access to abortion providers’ premises.25
However there
21 R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR
103; adopted in New Zealand by R v Hansen [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1
(SC).
22 R v Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303 at
1335–1336; cited in Hansen, ibid at [64].
23 Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic), s
185A(a).
24 Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery [2019]
HCA 11.
25 Law Commission, above n 6, at [12.14].
is good reason to believe that anti-abortion demonstration activity could
become more widespread and intrusive following the passage
of the Bill. Within
the current statutory regime of criminalised abortion, providers almost all
operate from hospitals,26 which tend to be large
facilities on major roads. Repealing the “certifying consultants”
system under the CSA Act and
relying instead on health practitioners’
scope of practice to determine who may provide abortion services is likely to
lead
to a proliferation of locations at which such services are provided,
including some primary health providers, lacking the physical
and security
features of a hospital.27
38.2 Furthermore, it is apparent that some activity
occurring in New Zealand is more intrusive than silent protest. The practice
known
as “sidewalk counselling”, utilised by anti-abortion
activists, involves approaching people entering premises to seek
abortion
services in order to persuade them of the alternatives to
abortion.28 Anti-abortion activists claim to engage in
such activity in New Zealand.29
38.3 The potentiating effect of decriminalisation on anti-abortion activism can
be substantial, which in turn impacts the provision
of abortion services and the
ability safely to seek such services. The British Columbia Supreme Court found
that in Canada, following
the Supreme Court’s judgment in
Morgentaler,30 the climate around abortion
clinics became unpleasant and frightening in some areas so to discourage
clinicians from working there,
and women seeking a medical service involving
personal trauma and anxiety were becoming particularly upset or angry due to the
conduct
in front of abortion clinics.31 The Regulatory
Impact Analysis also notes research concluding that such protest action causes
anxiety and distress among people seeking
and delivering abortion services, and
that protest would deter health professionals from delivering abortion
services.32
- In
that context we are satisfied the objective of permitting the regulation of safe
areas is sufficiently important.
26 At [2.38].
27 It is relevant to consider the extent of
anti-abortion activism in other jurisdictions where abortion has been
decriminalised,
such as the United States of America, Canada and Victoria. For
example the Canadian Supreme Court judgment quashing restrictions
on abortions
expanded the provision of such services in Vancouver and resulted in significant
anti-abortion activism outside the
new facilities, as described in R v Lewis
(1996) 139 DLR (4th) 480 (BCSC) at [19].
28 See R v Spratt (2008) 235 CCC (3d) 521
(BCCA) at [58].
29 A spokesperson for Voice for Life New Zealand
says she is “a former sidewalk counsellor, part of a small team outside
Hastings
Hospital abortion clinic, that helped 32 women choose to continue their
pregnancies”: Voice for Life New Zealand “Media”
(https://voiceforlife.org.nz/who-we-are/media/,
accessed 17 July 2019).
The Life Resources Charitable Trust says that free-standing abortion clinics
in Auckland and Wellington were targeted by sidewalk
counsellors in the 1970s
and 1980s: Life Resources Charitable Trust “Coercion and Abortion”
(http://www.life.org.nz/abortion/abortionkeyissues/coercion-and-abortion/Default.htm,
accessed 17 July 2019).
30 R v Morgentaler [1993] 3 SCR 463, wherein
the Supreme Court of Canada declared that criminal penalties related to
abortion were unconstitutional.
31 R v Spratt (2008) 235 CCC (3d) 521 (BCCA),
at [70].
32 Regulatory Impact Analysis at section 3.6 (p
29).
Proportionality?
- There
is a rational connection between the objective and the limitation. Preventing
distressing communication with people seeking
or providing abortion services
will tend to preserve their privacy, dignity, safety and wellbeing. The
essential issues in assessing
proportionality are therefore whether the
impairment on the right to freedom of expression is “minimally
impairing”,
and whether in all the circumstances the impairment of the
right is outweighed by the aims of the legislation.
- Addressing
these issues requires a close examination of the Bill’s effect on common
forms of protest at abortion providers’
premises. We anticipate courts
will recognise a distinction between harmful and merely annoying activism within
a safe area:
- 41.1 Parliament
has in one other respect criminalised speech resulting in emotional distress
under the Harmful Digital Communications
Act 2015. That Act criminalises posting
a digital communication with the intention of causing “harm” to a
victim,33 where “harm” is defined as
“serious emotional distress”.34 In its
ministerial briefing paper on regulating digital communications, the Law
Commission had grappled with the difficulty of regulating
the harms arising from
communications. The Commission concluded that “the law has a role to
play” when the level of emotional
distress was “significant”,
but not when a communication “simply causes annoyance or
irritation”.35
- 41.2 Unlike the
resulting offence provision in the Harmful Digital Communications Act, which
requires “serious” emotional
distress and proof of actual harm to
the victim, the criminal offence created by new section 15 would merely require
“emotional
distress” as measured by the reasonable person accessing
an abortion provider to seek or provide abortion
services.36
- 41.3 The Bill
does not prohibit protest within a safe area per se, but rather limits protests
that rise to the level of causing “emotional
distress”. Despite the
distinction between the wording of new section 15 and the Harmful Digital
Communications Act measure
of “harm”, we conclude that a Bill of
Rights Act-consistent interpretation is still likely to maintain a distinction
between criminalised harm and mere “annoyance or irritation”.
Relatively unobtrusive silent protests, within safe areas
but a respectful
distance from the entrances to the premises in question, may escape
criminalisation on the basis that the communication
is unpleasant but not
harmful. The more assertive practice of “sidewalk counselling”,
described above at paragraph 38.2, is more
likely to fall within the scope of prohibited communication.
- Such
a distinction supports a conclusion that the proposal is minimally impairing of
the right and proportionate to the aim.
33 Harmful Digital Communications Act
2015, s 22(1).
34 Section 4.
35 Law Commission, above n 6, at [1.27].
36 We note however the vastly divergent penalties
for the respective offences: imprisonment for two years and a fine of up to
$20,000,
in respect of s 22 of Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015; as
against a maximum fine of just $1,000 for the proposed offence
under new section
15.
- The
proposed “safe area” regime is not of universal application, but
rather is tailored to a particular need:
- 43.1 Unlike the
Victorian regime, which applies to all premises in that state, the Bill requires
safe areas to be declared by regulation.
That will ensure that limitations on s
14 only arise where there is a specific need arising in relation to particular
premises.
- 43.2 Under new
section 17(1)(b) the regulation may be tailored to the nature of the particular
site by defining the “area”
to which it applies (so long as that
area is within 150 metres of the premises).
- Although
the prohibited behaviour within such areas is the same in every case, as noted
above a Bill of Rights Act-consistent reading
will require courts to maintain a
distinction between criminalised harm and mere annoyance.
Case law regarding safe access zones
- Australian
and Canadian case law has found safe access zone regimes to be justified
limitations on constitutional rights. However
as we explain shortly, although
the recent High Court of Australia judgment Clubb v Preston is a final
appellate judgment and relates to a similar legislative regime, it is not
sufficiently reflective of New Zealand’s
legal tradition to be confidently
relied upon. We prefer the reasoning of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in
R v Spratt, described below.
- As
noted above at paragraph 37, in Clubb
the High Court of Australia recently considered the constitutionality of a
Victorian statute providing for a similar “safe access
zone” regime.
Part 9A of the Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008 provides for 150 metre
access zones to apply around every abortion provider’s premises,
and for the criminalisation of a similar range of conduct within those zones
which is “reasonably
likely to cause distress or
anxiety”.37 Mrs Clubb breached the law by
standing five metres from the entrance to such premises and handing out anti-
abortion pamphlets to
the people
entering.38 She was found
guilty of:
... communicating about abortions with persons accessing
premises at which abortions are provided while within a safe access zone,
in a
way that is reasonably likely to cause anxiety or distress ...
- Although
the Australian constitution has no general right to freedom of expression, the
High Court of Australia has recognised an
implied right of freedom of
“political communication”, described
as:39
... a freedom that arises by
necessary implication from the system of responsible and representative
government set up by the Constitution,
not a general freedom of communication of
the kind protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
- The
extent of this implied freedom is “limited to what is necessary for the
effective operation of that system”.40
Accordingly, while Clubb provides some support to the
37 Public Health and Wellbeing Act 2008
(Vic), s 185B(1)(b).
38 Clubb v Edwards [2019] HCA 11 at [11].
39 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of New
South Wales [2005] HCA 444 at [27] per Gleeson CJ and Heydon J.
view that the proposed safe area regime would be a proportional limitation on
freedom of expression, the broader scope of the right
affirmed in New Zealand
means that Clubb is of limited application.
- Mrs
Clubb was not found to be engaged in “political” speech when she
engaged with people entering the facility. The Court
characterised an abortion
decision as “an apolitical, personal decision informed by medical
considerations, personal circumstances
and personal religious and ethical
beliefs, qualitatively different from a political decision as to whether
abortion law should be
amended”.41 But free
expression is broader in scope and includes communication about religious and
ethical issues in an effort to persuade the
listener.
- In
addition, the Clubb majority found that the communication restrictions at
issue were content-neutral, in that they applied equally to activities in
support
of both pro- and anti-abortion standpoints.42
Content neutrality is central to the right to political communication
because “a law that burdens one side of a political debate,
and thereby
necessarily prefers the other” will impair that right,43
and accordingly it will be difficult to justify shutting one side out of
a political debate. But the Court’s findings have an
air of unreality
– the Victorian law was quite plainly targeted at curtailing anti-abortion
activism,44 as is the proposed Abortion Legislation
Bill.
- R
v Spratt is more directly relevant to the New Zealand context. In that case,
the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld s 2 of the Access
to Abortion
Services Act 1996 (BC), which prohibited “sidewalk interference”
and “protest” within a designated
“access zone”. The
Court applied the Oakes test and concluded that limitations on the
Charter right to freedom of expression were demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic
society.
- The
Court determined that an absolute prohibition on protest within an access
zone was a justifiable limitation on the Charter right, because:
- 52.1 it would
be too difficult to try to distinguish between different degrees of interference
with women approaching a clinic;45
- 52.2 people
expressing a viewpoint are not entitled to a captive audience, but people
attempting to access a clinic are not free to
avoid the
message;46
- 52.3 the right
to freedom of expression was not absolutely abrogated, and any form of protest
could still occur outside of the access
zone;47
and
- 52.4 the
deleterious effects on freedom of expression was not so severe as to outweigh
the importance of achieving the legislative
objective.48
40 Lange v Australian
Broadcasting Corporation [1997] HCA 25; (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 561.
41 Clubb v Edwards, above n 38, at [252] (see also [31]).
42 At [56], [123] and [375], reflecting similar
conclusions reached by the United States Supreme Court: Schenck v Pro-Choice
Network of Western New York [1997] USSC 17; 519 US 357 (1997).
43 Clubb v Edwards, above n 38, at [55].
44 As the Court concluded in R v Lewis (1996)
139 DLR (4th) 480 (BCSC), at [91]; see also Clubb v Edwards, above n 38, at [182].
45 R v Spratt (2008) 235 CCC (3d) 521 (BCCA),
at [80].
46 At [84].
47 At [85].
- With
the exception of the first point (which does not arise under the proposed scheme
due to the mens rea requirement of any unlawful
communication, meaning that the
proposed prohibition is not absolute) the same factors are applicable to the
proposed scheme contained
in the Bill, and support a conclusion that a
particular exercise of the regulatory power will be capable of
justification.
Limitation is demonstrably justified
- We
conclude the empowering provision to make regulations, declaring safe areas in
which communication causing emotional distress is
criminalised, is inconsistent
with s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, but that inconsistency is a demonstrably
justified limitation
under s 5 because:
- 54.1 the power
to declare a safe area and thereby criminalise certain communication within that
area pursues a sufficiently important
purpose;
- 54.2 the
criminalisation of certain communication is rationally connected to that
purpose; and
- 54.3 the
limitation is minimally impairing of s 14 and any regulation is capable of
amounting to an appropriate balance of the rights
and interests at issue,
because:
- 54.3.1 there is
a requirement to be satisfied of the need for a safe area in respect of a
particular facility;
- 54.3.2 there is
an ability to tailor the extent of that area within a 150 metre boundary;
- 54.3.3 most
likely the court will make an interpretive distinction between harmful and
merely annoying communication; and
- 54.3.4 the same
considerations listed in paragraphs 52.2-52.4 above are applicable in this case.
Warrantless arrest
- One
aspect of the proposed “safe area” regime is new section 16 of the
CSA Act. That section would permit a constable
to arrest and take into custody
without warrant persons who are reasonably believed to be engaging in prohibited
behaviour within
a safe area and fail to stop engaging in the prohibited
behaviour.
- Arrest
without warrant must be specifically provided for by law. There is a general
power to arrest people for offences punishable
by
imprisonment.49 For any lesser offences, it is
necessary to empower constables to arrest without warrant.
- Because
the power to arrest without warrant is express and authorised by law, new
section 16 does not limit the freedom from arbitrary
detention provided by s 22
of the Bill of Rights Act. Any arrest may be “arbitrary” on the
facts, or become arbitrary
due to a failure to comply with the obligation under
s 23(2) of the Bill of
48 At [91].
49 Crimes Act 1961, s 315.
Rights Act to promptly charge or release a person arrested for an offence.
But a simple power to arrest without warrant does not offend
against any section
of the Bill of Rights Act.
Conscientious objection
- Clause
7 would insert new sections 19–20 into the CSA Act, which:
- 58.1 continue
the ability to exercise a conscientious objection to providing contraception,
sterilisation and abortion services, but
creates a new referral duty on people
exercising such an objection;
- 58.2 require an
employer to accommodate a conscientious objection, unless it would cause
unreasonable disruption to the employer’s
activities; and
- 58.3 creates a
process for applicants or employees to complain about differential treatment on
the basis of a conscientious objection.
New referral duty – ss 13 and 15 freedom and manifestation of religion,
conscience, and belief
- New
section 19 differs from the current conscientious objection provision in the CSA
Act. It requires a health practitioner to notify
their conscientious objection
to a pregnant woman at the earliest possible opportunity, and creates a duty to
refer the woman to
another practitioner who can provide the service
required.
- New
section 19 would not require a person to provide or perform any contraception,
sterilisation or abortion service despite their
conscience. However, it would
require a person to refer a woman seeking that service to a provider of that
service. For someone with
a belief that certain such services are inconsistent
with the sanctity of life, this may engage their freedom of thought, conscience
and religion under s 13 of the Bill of Rights Act, or their manifestation of
those beliefs under s 15. Requiring a person with a
conscientious objection to
providing a particular service to refer a woman to a provider of the service,
may result in the health
practitioner feeling complicit with the provision of
that service despite their objection.
- The
Minister of Justice has indicated the purpose of this amendment
is:50
... to mitigate the risks to the
pregnant woman of the potential delays, costs, and stress of having to find
another health practitioner.
The right of the practitioner to object to
providing the service, and the right of the woman to access the services in a
timely way,
must be appropriately balanced.
- The
Attorney-General has previously considered a similar clause for consistency with
s 13 of the Bill of Rights Act. Clause 7 of the
End of Life Choices Bill would
permit a medical practitioner to conscientiously object to providing assisted
dying services and refer
someone to another medical practitioner. The
Attorney-General concluded this was a prima facie breach of s 13 because it
required
the medical practitioner to do something the practitioner
conscientiously objected to (making a referral).51
The
50 Hon Andrew Little “Taking a
Health Approach to the Regulation of Abortion” (Cabinet paper, 21 May
2019) at [62.
51 Hon Christopher Finlayson “Report of the
Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the End of
Life Choice
Bill” (4 August 2017) at [63].
Attorney-General concluded the limit on s 13 was justified under s 5 as it
was necessary to meet the objective of the Bill and was
the most minimal
impairment of the right possible.52
- We
conclude the limitation of ss 13 and 15 of the Bill of Rights Act created by new
section 19 is similarly justified. The Abortion
Legislation Bill is intended to
facilitate access to abortions for women seeking them. For the same reasoning as
the Attorney-General
adopted in relation to the End of Life Choices Bill, the
referral of pregnant women to willing health practitioners is necessary
to meet
that objective:
- 63.1 Facilitating
access to abortion services is a legitimate goal to achieve by legislating.
Furthermore, delay in the administration
of an abortion can be dangerous for
pregnant women, as it can lead to more severe side effects and higher rates of
complications,
as well as significantly more pain for women seeking medical
abortions.53 The objective of the referral duty is
therefore sufficiently important.
- 63.2 The
referral duty is also proportionate to the goal of facilitating access to
abortions, in that it achieves its objective while
minimally impairing the
conscientious objector’s rights. It does not require active participation
in the provision of services,
but will mitigate the delays to accessing
services that will be caused by the conscientious objector’s refusal.
- Accordingly,
new section 19 appears to be consistent with the right to freedom and
manifestation of religion and conscience affirmed
in ss 13 and 15 of the Bill of
Rights Act.
Employment discrimination – s 19 freedom from unlawful discrimination on
the basis of religious or ethical belief or political
opinion
- New
section 20 permits health providers to differentiate between prospective and
current employees on the basis of their inability
to reasonably accommodate a
conscientious objection. It replicates current provisions applying to employment
in the Human Rights
Act:
- 65.1 Section 22
of the Human Rights Act makes it unlawful for employers to refuse to employ,
dismiss, or to treat employees differently
on the basis of a prohibited ground
of discrimination. This prohibition would be replicated in respect of
conscientious objection
by new section 20(1).
- 65.2 Section
28(3) creates a duty to accommodate religious or ethical beliefs unless they
would unreasonably disrupt the employer’s
activities. This accommodation
duty would be replicated in respect of conscientious objection by new section
20(2).
- 65.3 The
dispute resolution mechanism provided by the Human Rights Act would also be
replicated by new section 20(3), which would
permit an aggrieved person with a
conscientious objection to bring an employment discrimination claim as if it
were a breach of s
22.
52 Hon Christopher Finlayson
“Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990 on the End of Life Choice
Bill” (4 August 2017) at [64].
53 Law Commission, above n 6, at [2.89].
- However,
new section 20 goes further than the Human Rights Act protections on employees,
appearing to provide less protection to prospective
employees with a
conscientious objection than the more general protections on religious and
ethical beliefs:
- 66.1 Under the
Human Rights Act there is explicit protection from being asked questions in the
employment application process that
would tend to indicate an intention to
discriminate:
23 Particulars of applicants for employment
It shall be unlawful for any person to use or circulate any form of
application for employment or to make any inquiry of or about
any applicant for
employment which indicates, or could reasonably be understood as indicating, an
intention to commit a breach of
section 22.
66.2 To the contrary, new section 20 contains no such protection, and new
sections 20(1)(a) and 20(2) imply such questions will form
a legitimate part of
the employment process, as employers may refuse to employ someone if their
conscientious objection cannot be
accommodated.
New section 20 infringes s 19 of the Bill of Rights
Act
- Religious
and ethical beliefs are already required to be reasonably accommodated by
employers under s 28(3) of the Human Rights Act.
But to the extent that new
section 20 permits pre-employment discrimination on the basis of a religious or
ethical belief meeting
the definition of “conscientious objection”,
it authorises differential treatment on the basis of religious or ethical
belief
in breach of s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act.
- Political
opinion is also a protected ground under s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act, but the
“reasonable accommodation”
duty in s 28(3) does not apply in respect
of such beliefs expressed or manifested in the course of employment. If a person
is subject
to differential treatment on the basis of a political opinion
meeting the definition of “conscientious objection”, then
new
section 20 also authorises differential treatment on the basis of political
opinion in breach of s 19 of the Bill of Rights Act.
Limitations on s 19 are justified under s 5
- For
similar reasons to those given above in relation to the proposed referral duty
created by new section 19, the limitations on the
right against discrimination
on the basis of religious, ethical or political belief are justified ones.
- The
Abortion Legislation Bill is intended to facilitate access to abortions for
women seeking them. For the same reasoning as the
Attorney-General adopted in
relation to the End of Life Choices Bill, the ability to treat applicants and
employees differently on
the basis of a conscientious objection is necessary to
meet that objective:
- 70.1 As noted
above at paragraph 63.1, facilitating
access to abortion services is a legitimate goal to achieve through legislation.
The apparent aim of new section 20 is
to ensure conscientious objection does not
render an abortion provider ineffective through lack of available staff to
perform certain
procedures.
- 70.2 New
section 20 is also proportionate to the goal of facilitating access to
abortions, in that it achieves its objective while
minimally impairing the
conscientious objector’s rights. New section 20(2) protects people with a
conscientious objection by
requiring an employer to consider whether and how
they could reasonably accommodate the objection. It is only if a conscientious
objection cannot be reasonably accommodated that employment status can be
affected. The reasonable accommodation test will ensure
that the extent of any
differential treatment on the basis of religious, ethical or political belief is
proportionate to the goal
of effective service delivery.
- In
accordance with Crown Law’s policies, this advice has been peer reviewed
by Paul Rishworth QC. This advice was substantially
contributed to by Monique
van Alphen Fyfe, Assistant Crown Counsel.
Matt McKillop Crown Counsel
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